20VC：主导Anthropic的首轮融资 | 开源是否会威胁Anthropic的业务 | 在AI时代，利润率是否重要 | 为何“三倍、三倍、双倍、双倍”如今已不够好 | 与Menlo的Matt Murphy探讨为何如今A轮融资如此艰难

如果这个复利效应持续下去，而且这确实是我们看好的一家公司，那它将成为有史以来最有价值的公司之一。

If this thing keeps compounding and this is really the company that we believe, this will be one of the most valuable companies of all time.

利润率现在还有那么重要吗？

Do margins matter anymore?

当然重要，影响挺大的。

They do a lot.

而且，你知道的，我们现在作为投资者正处在一个比较微妙的阶段。眼下很多优秀公司的利润率都不高，大概在20%到30%左右，但我觉得它们未来大概率都能提升到60%甚至70%。

And and, you know, we're we're in this kind of, like, tricky period as investors where right now a lot of great companies have low margins, 20 to 30% margins, and, you know, they all probably have a path to get to 60 or 70.

你知道的，很多公司因为推理的计算成本太高，已经很难再宣称自己是毛利率90%的企业了。

You know, a lot of companies, just because of the cost of computing inference, it's harder to say you're gonna be an 90% gross margin company anymore.

不过，优秀的公司毛利率能做到70%左右。

But, you know, great companies are, you know, 70% gross margin.

但通往这个目标的路径是这样的：嘿，

But, you know, the path to get there is like, hey.

我要做一些优化。

I'm gonna do some optimizations.

我对推理成本并没有完全绑定，我可能会用自己的数据，做一些跟顶级实验室互补的事情，打造一个能提升我毛利率的模型。

I'm not completely tied to inference around, you know, my cost structure, and I'm probably going to do something complementary to the leading labs with my own data and build a model that kinda gets my gross margin up.

你正在接触很多高速增长但毛利率异常的公司，得判断哪些真有办法达到理想的盈利结构。

So you're intercepting a lot of these hyper growth companies with margins that are atypical for what we usually invest in, and you're trying to figure out which ones actually have a credible plan to get to a great margin structure.

顺便说一句，我觉得Lovable就是其中之一。

And for what it's worth, think Lovable is one of those.

Lovable的毛利率会因为采用开源技术而大幅提升，毕竟开源成本低得多。

The margin structure of Lovable will be changed greatly with the utilization of Open Source, which is obviously much cheaper.

这跟你们投Anthropic的思路有点冲突。

That goes against one of the other investments being in Anthropic.

你觉得这两者是相互对冲的关系吗？

Do you see them as like hedges against each other?

你担心开源进展太快吗？现在开源能做的事情实在太多了。

Do you worry about the progression of Open Source given how much can be done now with Open Source?

这让我很感兴趣。

I'm intrigued.

你是怎么看待这个问题的？

How do you think about that?

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，首先，Anthropic 是 Lovable 非常棒的合作伙伴，反过来也一样。

I mean, first of all, Anthropic is a fantastic partner to Lovable and vice versa.

但是，这个市场真的太大了。

But, like, this market is so big.

其实这件事有两个方面。

So there's really two dimensions to that.

一方面，有人担心 Lovable 和 Anthropic 会互相掣肘。

One, some people worry about Lovable and Anthropic tripping over each other.

我觉得 Anthropic 更偏向技术型用户，而 Lovable 则更面向普通大众用户。

I think love Anthropic always comes with things a little more like the technical user, and Lovable comes at it more from the the lay user.

中间肯定会有些重叠，但我认为两者都有很大的发展空间，都能做得非常出色。

I'm sure there's probably some overlap in the middle, but I think there's plenty of big space for each one to do extremely well.

而且你看，Cursor 当时几乎成了 Anthropic 的焦点目标，但他们我觉得结果还是挺不错的。

And, you know, look, Cursor was about as in the crosshairs of Anthropic as possible, and they I think they still had a pretty darn good outcome.

不过整个开源这个话题，你看。

But the whole Open Source topic look.

这就跟任何市场一样。

It's like any market.

当你以某种方式起步时，就像，你看。

When you start off in a certain way, it's just like, look.

我想先把东西跑起来。

I wanna get something running.

我想把它发布出去，证明我确实做出了一个很酷的产品，所以一开始肯定选最简单的方案。

I I wanna get it out there and just prove I've got, you know, a a cool product, and so you just default to the simplest thing.

之后再做各种优化。

Over time, you do more optimizations.

对吧？

Right?

所以我也在 OpenRouter 的董事会任职，这家公司你们经常提到，我很高兴听到大家谈论它。

And so I'm also on the board of OpenRouter, a company that you all talk about quite a bit, and I love hearing you guys mention them.

而且，你知道，他们的核心目标就像北极星一样，就是……嘿。

And and, you know, that's kind of like the north star there is like, hey.

他们会有一层智能机制，拦截来自任何应用的 API 请求，然后基本就是问：哪个模型最适合我？

You would have some intelligent layer that intercepts an API call from any application and basically says, what's the best model for me?

比如，根据我正在优化的效率边界，选择最优的那个。

Like, across whatever efficiency frontier I'm trying to optimize for.

是价格问题吗？

Is it price?

是推理能力的问题吗？

Is it reasoning?

还是性能的问题？

Or is it performance?

你知道的，比如延迟之类的。

You know, latency, things like that.

到了规模化阶段，企业就需要处理这些事务，来管理和优化自己的业务。

And at scale, like, that's the kind of stuff you need as a company to manage and optimize your business.

所以 AI 的第一波浪潮就是先跑起来再说。

And so wave one of AI is like, let's just get it going.

第二波则是让我们在使用什么、何时用、怎么用这些方面变得更加精细和复杂。

Wave two is like, let's get a lot more sophisticated about what we use and when and how.

如果你在使用策略上变得精细，成本优化自然就会成为其中的一部分。

If you're getting sophisticated about what you use, when, and how cost optimization comes into it.

所以我一直有个疑问，如果开源模型能搞定企业里96%的工作流程，那前沿模型公司的潜在市场规模是不是就大幅缩水了？

So I do just wonder, like, if Open Source can do 96% of enterprise workflows, does that not dramatically reduce the TAM of frontier model companies?

也许我们现在还太早，市场规模看着还有十万亿美元，但说不定以后Anthropic和OpenAI去解决癌症和气候变化，而你邮件里的标签分类这种小事，全交给开源模型去做了。

And maybe we're so early that it's still $10,000,000,000,000 for a TAM, but, like, maybe Anthropic and OpenAI solve cancer and climate change, and your email tagging is done by open source.

你是这么想的吗？

Is that how you think?

不是的。

No.

我觉得基础模型，比如安赛乐米塔尔，拥有非常独特且高性能的智能模型。

I think the foundation models, let's say specifically Anthropic, have such special models, performant intelligent models.

很难有人会说，我用开源模型加上我的数据就能搞定一切。

It's gonna be hard for somebody to just gonna say, I've used open source with my data.

它对你正在做的某些事情确实有用且积极，但我认为它还不够强大，无法真正取代那些顶尖模型。

It's going to be functional and positive for some amount of what you're doing, but I just don't think it can be powerful enough to really, you know, displace it.

所以我的整体思路是，你会同时使用多个模型。

So I'm my mindset generally would be like, you're gonna use multiple models.

假设你是一家公司，可能你的模型里一半用 Anthropic，一半用开源方案。

Let's say if you're someone pick a company that maybe you use 50% Anthropic and 50% open source in your own model.

我觉得情况不会像你说的那样好。你刚才更多谈的是成本，但我认为达不到 96% 这个比例，因为实际情况是，企业看到了这一点。

I don't think it goes to that well, you were talking more cost, but I don't think it goes to that 96% because what's happening is companies see this.

没错，成本确实能降下来，但如果用 Anthropic，实际上能提高客户留存率。

Like, yes, I can get lower cost, but if I use Anthropic, it actually increases my customer retention.

还能带来更多收入。

I generate more revenue.

我让用户的平台参与度更高了，现在很多应用公司的数据也证实了这一点。

I get users to engage with the platform more, and that is what the data is suggesting now with a lot of application companies.

但有些API调用根本不需要这么高的功能水平。

But there's certain API calls that just don't need that level of functionality.

说实话，这对大家都有好处。

And frankly, it's good for everybody.

这能促使Anthropic保持创新，继续做最前沿的公司，不敢松懈，同时初创公司也能用开源技术走自己的创新路子。

It keeps Anthropic on their toes to keep innovating most innovative company around, so they'll keep innovating, not stay still, and and then startups innovate in their own way with open source.

你觉得AI的成本非得降下来不可吗？

Do you think the costs have to come down for AI?

萨姆·阿尔特曼明确说过，他们正在推出越来越便宜的token，大幅降低使用成本。

Sam Altman said very clearly that they are doing cheaper and cheaper kind of tokens and reducing the cost significantly.

AI真的必须大幅降价吗？我们会看到成本曲线急剧下降吗？

Does AI have to get significantly cheaper, and will we see this cost curve come down massively?

我觉得这跟任何产品都一样，成本越低，市场就越容易打开，花更少的钱能做更多的事，经济上的这种正向循环总会带动更多活跃度。

Well, I mean, I think it's like any product, you know, that you can argue that the cheaper it is, the more it kinda opens up the market because you can do more for less and that all you know, those economic curves always spark activity.

不过，你看，就算在 Anthropic 自家产品线里，也有 Sonnet、Opus 和 Fable 这些不同的模型。

But, you know, mean, look, even within the Anthropic family, right, like, you you've got Sonnet, you've got Opus, you've got Fable.

所以 Anthropic 自己也在不断推陈出新，毕竟没有哪种方案是万能的。

So even the even Anthropic itself is innovating around, you know, hey.

确实，不存在一种模型能通吃所有场景。

It's not one size fits all.

我觉得未来会是这样的组合：Anthropic 的模型家族，加上开源模型，还有用你自己的数据训练出来的模型。你会综合对比这些不同的选择，然后做出决定。

So I think you're going to have the combination of something like that, a family of models from Anthropic and then a set of open source models and things that you train with your own data, and you're gonna look across that whole tapestry and say, hey.

我这边是50%用这个，30%用那个，还有20%用别的。

I'm I'm using 50% this, 30% that, 20% this.

这些都是在大规模应用时才会出现的优化手段。我觉得我们现在刚进入这个阶段，坦白说这让事情变得更有意思了，因为会出现很多二三线的公司突然冒头并迅速崛起，而不是整个市场都集中在少数几家手里。

And that's those are the kind of optimizations that happen at scale, and that's the stage of market that I think we're just entering into, which makes it a lot more fascinating, frankly, because there's going to be so many kind of second and third order companies that spike and take off versus, you know, the whole market being concentrated.

我确实挺外行的。

I'm incredibly naive.

所以我有个地方不太明白，我们看到OpenAI搞了Jalapeno，据说Anthropic正和三星合作自研芯片，DeepSeek也在做自己的芯片，Meta同样在自研芯片。

And so I don't understand something, which is that we see obviously, OpenAI have jalapeno, reportedly Anthropic working with Samsung to create their own chips, DeepSea creating their own chips, Meta creating their own chips.

你觉得现在是不是必须得做全栈？

Do you have to be full stack today, do you think?

这也是为什么我们看到大家都在往芯片层进军吗？

And is that why we're seeing everyone move into the chip layer?

我觉得这又回到了我之前说的优化问题。

I think it goes back to what I said about optimizations.

我是说，就像谷歌很久以前做的TPU，还有亚马逊的Trainium一样。

I mean, you know, Google with their TPUs a long time ago, Amazon with their Trainiums.

我的意思是，到了某个规模，你一看账单就会觉得，我给别人的钱实在太多了。

I mean, just at some scale, you look at your bill and you're like, I'm paying somebody way too much.

你懂的。

You know?

然后你就会想，好吧，为了某些部分，我愿意付这笔钱，毕竟这是我们的成本，因为他们的技术确实好得多、也与众不同，我根本没法跟他们竞争。

And you say, well, I'm willing to pay that for some part of, you know, my COGS because that's just so much better and different and I can't compete with that.

但也许他们做的其他一些业务，我完全可以利用自己的技术来把成本降下来。

But maybe there's some other types of activities they're doing that I can really leverage my own technology and bring my cost structure down.

而且，你知道的，做芯片这行不容易。

And, you know, I mean, the chip business is hard.

想涉足这一行，祝你好运。

Good luck wading into that.

对吧？

Right?

这需要一支特别的团队，尤其是现在你要跟黄仁勋以及市场上其他众多对手竞争。

You know, it takes a special team, especially if you're going to compete with Jensen and a lot of other options out there right now.

不过，你知道的，这些公司都很聪明，他们会想，嘿。

But, you know, these companies are smart and they're looking at like, hey.

你看。

Look.

我们的模型里有些非常特定的操作，要是能有个芯片，在内存缓存这些方面表现成这样，那我们的性能就能大幅提升。

There's some very specific thing that we do in our model that if we had a chip that just behaved like this from a memory cache, whatever, like, it would make us so much better.

我敢肯定，对于训练或推理中的一部分工作负载来说，这可能会带来很大的影响。

And I'm sure for some percentage of the workload, whether it's in training or inference, that could be a big deal.

所以，如果你是一家年收入一千亿美元的公司，这事儿大概值得一试。

So that's probably worth the swing if you're a $100,000,000,000 revenue company.

当我们讨论全栈和非全栈的时候，我之前请过Nebius的创始人来节目里聊过。

When we think about kind of full stack versus not being full stack, you know, I I've had the founders of Nebius on the show.

今天我还刚请了Fireworks的Lynn来做客。

I just had Lynn from Fireworks on the show today.

Nebius那边说他们打算进入OpenRouter业务，而且会主动去推进。

And Nebius said they were moving into the OpenRouter business and would actively take it.

今天早上我问Lynn，这中间有啥价值吗？

And then I asked Lynn this morning, is there value in it?

她说，没有。

And she was like, no.

在路由这个业务上？

In the routing business?

对。

Yeah.

你觉得这里面有什么价值？

Why do you think there is?

是我漏掉了什么吗？

What what am I missing?

首先，OpenRouter的优势在于，他们拥有大量自发的开发者用户，因为这些开发者信任他们。

Well, first of all, what OpenRouter has is, like, they've just got this groundswell of organic activity with developers who come to them because they trust them.

大家都认可它是一个优质的推理模型市场。

They know it's a great inference marketplace.

他们对自己的智能模型很有信心。

They love their intelligence.

我觉得不会有太多开发者涌向Nebius。

Like, I don't think a ton of developers flock to Nebius.

如果我是个开发者，我肯定不会一大早就想着说，嘿。

Like, if I'm a developer, I don't wake up and be like, hey.

你懂的？

You know?

所以他们有点没找对对话的对象。

So they're kind of in the wrong part of the conversation.

但如果你用的是 Nebius，而他们又是你的底层服务商，还负责路由，那没问题。

But if you're on Nebius and they're your underlying provider and they provide routing, okay.

行。

Fine.

你懂的。

You know?

但如果你是一家正在构建并考虑使用多个云平台的公司，并且想要在一定程度上隐藏这种依赖，那么 OpenRouter 是个很棒的解决方案。

But if you're a company that's building and thinking about multiple cloud platforms and you wanna kind of even obfuscate that, then OpenRouter is a great solution.

你觉得这个路由业务的市场规模会有多大？

How big is the routing business gonna be, do you think?

我是说，OpenRouter 能做到多大？

Like, how big could OpenRouter be?

它会不会成为一个五百亿美元级别的大生意？

Is that is that a $50,000,000,000 business?

我的意思是，他们的发展势头简直太猛了。

I mean, their trajectory is insane.

我是说，我都忘了他们公开宣布过什么，所以最好别乱说。

I mean, I forget what they've publicly announced, so I better not say anything.

这家公司在开源模型、替代模型和模型优化市场真正爆发之前，就已经实现了令人震惊规模的巨额盈利。

This company, wildly profitable at a scale that would probably shock most people before this whole open source model, alternative model, model optimization market really takes off.

我觉得我们正站在爆发的边缘，而这家公司已经是个庞然大物了。

I feel like we're just on the cusp of it, and this company is already a beast.

所以我对此抱有很高的期望。

So I have massive and very high hopes.

我们之前提到了 Lovable。

We mentioned Lovable earlier.

除了 Lovable，在应用类公司里，你觉得还有哪些是有重要意义的？比如我们共同投资的 Legora。

In terms of, like, other application companies that you are in and are very meaningful, another that we have together is Legora.

对。

Yeah.

Love Max。

Love Max.

我非常欣赏他。

Think the world of him.

他简直是个超级猛人。

What an absolute beast.

提醒一下，你给 Legora 投的是哪一轮？

Remind me, what what round did you do for Legora?

你们刚完成的那轮

You did the

就是大概六个月前发生的那轮融资，你知道的。

The round that just happened, you know, about six months ago.

好的。

Okay.

那你们融了多大的额度？

And what size chat did you do?

大概在50以下，但就在那个区间。

It was kinda sub 50, but in that range.

明白了。

Okay.

所以你就觉得，太好了。

And so you're like, great.

咱们先站稳脚跟，以后再慢慢加码，跟这个业务更紧密地合作。

Let's get a foothold in here, and we can put more in with time and partner more closely with this business.

没错。

Exactly.

大家都跟我说，你瞧，都周五早上了，Harry，你至于这么较真吗？

Everyone tells me and again, you're you can be like, Harry, for goodness sake, it's like Friday morning.

我就想来场轻松点的访谈。

I wanted a chilled interview.

你别把我逼得太紧了。

You can put me back down.

但大家都跟我说，哦，Anthropic才是真正的威胁。

But everyone tells me, oh, Anthropic is the real threat.

我就想，你在开玩笑吧？

And I'm like, are you kidding me?

这完全是一个重度的GTM业务，重点是跟律师建立关系，做法律方面的部署。我是说，这跟Anthropic完全是两码事。

This is like a heavy GTM business focused on building relationships with lawyers, doing legal deployments with g I mean, it's it's completely different.

当大家都说Anthropic的法律业务会打败他们时，你该怎么回应这种说法呢？

How do you answer that statement when everyone's like, well, Anthropic Legal's gonna beat them?

对。

Yeah.

首先，Max Max 很特别，这个你清楚。

Well, first of all, Max Max is special, as you know.

我做尽职调查的时候，看了你和他的采访。

Part of my diligence was watching, you know, your your interview with him.

他执行力超强，而且人特别随和，跟他相处很愉快。

But he's just an execution machine and, just a lovely person to be with.

我觉得吧，你知道的，有一阵子这里的情况是，很长一段时间里，感觉界限还挺清晰的。

I think, you know, there's always for a while here, we're in this period of for a long time, it felt cleaner.

就像，嘿。

Like, hey.

有个模型，有个API，然后还有做应用的公司。

There's a model and there's an API, and then there's application companies.

而且，很明显，这些界限变得越来越模糊了，就在几个月前那会儿。

And and, obviously, that's kind of gotten blurrier and blurrier, and there's a period a couple months ago.

这简直就像 SaaS 行业的末日景象。

It's like SaaS pocalypse.

你懂的。

You know?

一切都在消失。

Everything's going away.

我觉得这种情况已经缓和了不少，现在我们正在慢慢理清头绪，搞清楚到底是怎么回事。

And I think some of a lot of that has kind of faded, and now we're kinda sorting out, like, okay.

那么，究竟哪些应用真正值得保留，原因又是什么呢？

Well, which which applications really deserve to live and why?

我觉得，虽然我不代表Anthropic发言，但我的看法是，大家得看清楚。

And I think, you know, not speaking for Anthropic, but my my view is they're kinda like, look.

如果模型随便做点什么，而你的应用不够独特，无论是工作流还是你在此基础上构建的价值，模型都能把这块市场抢走，那说明它本来也没什么护城河。

If the model just kinda does something and your application isn't distinctive enough, the workflow, the value you've built on top of it, the model takes that market away, well, then it probably wasn't that, you know, defensible anyway.

以Max和Legora为例，他们聘请了律师和全职员工深入其中，去理解这些工作流。

I think in the case of Max and Legora, you know, they have lawyers and FTEs getting in there and understanding these workflows.

它基本上会跨越不同的组织边界。

It's kinda like crosses organizational boundaries.

我觉得，一个模型很难直接介入，因为这里涉及多方利益相关者，比如公司法务部门和律师事务所。

Like, I think it's very hard for a model just to come in and be like, oh, there's multiple constituents here because you've got corporate lawyers, law firms.

在处理具体案件时，你会有客户，还有多家律所参与。

And when you're on a case, you've got a client, you know, multiple law firms.

所以这虽然不是个简单的平方级问题，但确实很复杂。

So it's it's just an it's not quite an n squared problem, but it's complicated.

而且你需要那些能理解这一点的流程。

And you need workflows that understand that.

即便在律所内部，你也需要上下文信息。

You need context even within the own law firm.

所以我觉得，基于这些去创造和挖掘价值，空间非常大，而且我很欣赏他们目前的执行方式。

So I think there's just a lot of I know there's a lot of value to build and create on top of all that, and love the way they're executing.

Gore 要想证明其融资估值的合理性，是否必须在法律业务之外取得成功？

Does the gore have to succeed outside of legal for it to justify the valuations that it will want to raise at.

你看哈维提到要拓展到合规和税务领域，等等。

You see Harvey talk about moving into compliance and tax and do do do do.

然后我觉得Legora也会这么做。

And then I I think Legora will too.

但这是因为，如果你想融资一百亿美元，那没问题。

But it's because they if you wanna raise it 10,000,000,000, cool.

但是，到了某个阶段，光靠法律业务是不够的。

But, like, there's a price at which you need more than just legal.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我的意思是，马克斯，也许他没怎么公开说过，但毫无疑问，这确实是战略的一部分。

I mean, look, Max, I I guess maybe he hasn't been as public about it, but, absolutely, that's part of the strategy.

当我们彼此了解，讨论这轮融资时，我们想的不只是当前这一轮，还有未来可能继续参与，和公司长期合作——愿景要大得多。

You know, when we got to know each other and we were thinking about the round and justifying not only the current round and hopefully, you know, participation in the future round and working with the company, The vision is much bigger than that.

这不是必须的。

It's not have to.

关键是，你们已经打造了一个基础平台，恰好特别擅长理解复杂、专业的服务团队，比如法律、税务、会计这些领域。

It's just it's just, you know, you've built this base platform that happens to be really, really good at understanding complicated, sophisticated service teams, you know, legal, tax, you know, accounting, all this.

那为什么不往这些方向扩展呢？

Why wouldn't you expand into that?

而且，可能还有一条腿的支撑点我们还没看到，下次我再来聊的时候，说不定就能谈到了。

And then there's probably another leg of the stool out there yet that we haven't even seen that we'll be talking about maybe next time I'm on.

我觉得A轮融资现在是最难熬的阶段。

I think Series A is the worst place to be today.

我的合伙人总因为这个跟我唱反调，因为A轮创始人会觉得，好吧。

And and my partners always hate me for this because Series A founders are like, great.

我们就不去见他们了。

We won't go and see them.

但A轮确实是最尴尬的位置。

But it's the worst place to be.

你们现在的营收大概在100万到300万美元之间，但估值却高达2亿到4亿美元，ARR倍数达到了200倍，可产品市场契合度（PMF）却还很弱。

You have, like, 1 to 3,000,000 in revenue, and you're a 200 x ARR at 2 to 400,000,000 with little PMF.

你觉得现在从切入点的角度来看，A轮融资是最难的吗？这也是为什么大家都涌向成长期和种子前轮的原因吗？

Do you agree that right now, insertion point wise, Series A is the hardest, and that's why we're seeing everyone flock to growth and pre seed?

经历过这么多轮周期，你是怎么看待这种现象的？

And and how do you think about that, having seen so many cycles?

确实挺难的。

It's tough.

我的意思是，你说得太对了。

I mean, you nailed it.

不过，我们现在的策略是两头重中间轻。

But I mean, what we're doing is a barbell strategy right now.

对吧？

Right?

也就是说，嘿。

So it's like, hey.

一家公司到底什么时候才能在某个领域确立自己的领先地位？

When is a certain company in a category establish themselves as a leader?

因为你知道的，在那个阶段，你可能甚至连竞争对手是谁都还不清楚。

Because, you know, in that kind of one to three, you may not even know who the competitors are yet.

对吧？

Right?

但你还是会按他们能赢的预期去估值，毕竟在那个阶段，市场就是这么定价的。

And you're going to pay as if they're going to be the winner because that's just the way the valuations are in that kinda, let's say, one to 10 range.

所以我们已经调整了方向。

So we've moved our yeah.

我们有一个基金叫转折基金，一直管它叫早期增长阶段。

We have a fund called inflection fund, and we always called it early growth.

对我们来说，早期增长指的是年经常性收入三百万到一千万美元之间。

Early growth to us meant, like, 3 to 10,000,000 of ARR.

但实际上，对于优秀公司来说，这个窗口期以前大概能持续一年到一年半。

Reality is, like, for the good companies, that window used to last, like, a year, year and a half.

现在呢，可能就撑一周。

Now it lasts, like, a week.

像马克斯和莱戈拉这样的公司，一天就能完成。

Or in the case of Max and Legora, that's what they do in a day.

所以，这种策略真的很难再继续下去了。

So, you know, like, it's just that was a hard strategy to keep pursuing.

这就是门罗转折型投资的典型做法。

So that's kinda like the Menlo inflection classic kind of investment.

但事实上，真正值得关注的是那些彻底脱颖而出的例外情况，它们的收入直接冲到了一千万以上，这时候你就会觉得，市场已经认准了它们，或者你相信它们一定会成为赢家。

But really, it's been more to these outliers where they've completely, you know, broken out somewhere above 10 or and that's kinda like market specific where you feel like, they've been anointed the winner or you believe they will be.

至于你提到的A轮投资，那其实是这个双峰策略的另一端。

But to your specific question around Series A, that's the other side of the barbell.

所以我们现在把投资阶段提前了很多。

And so what we've done is gone much earlier.

我们专门制定了种子轮策略，三位合伙人可以当场开出高达八百万美元的支票。

So spending more time we've got the specific seed strategy where three partners can write up to an 8,000,000 check, like, on the spot.

以前这个上限是三百万，现在我们放宽了限制，让团队能更灵活、更迅速地行动。

That number used to be three, so we kind of expanded the aperture and the flexibility for the team to move quickly.

但眼下最难的是，种子轮和A轮之间的时间间隔被大大压缩了。

But the hard part in a right now is that seed a, the time between those two things has really compressed.

如果你仔细看看这两轮之间的关键数据，就会发现……

And if you really look at, like, the the data points between those two rounds, like, okay.

他们在这段时间里把产品又推进了不少。

So they kinda built more of the product.

他们大概有五六个试点项目，或者之前有过五个，现在收入达到了一百万。

They kinda have, like, five POCs or maybe they had five POCs, and now they have a million of error.

你会觉得，这谁都能做到。

And you're like, I know anybody can do that.

并不是谁都能做到。

Not anybody.

我不想把这事儿说得太简单。

I don't wanna oversimplify it.

但这其实并不是什么特别强的信号，估值却从五千万直接跳到了两亿左右。

But it's not really that much of a signal, and yet the valuation goes from 50 to, you know, to 200 or something like that.

所以这就是难点所在。

So that's so that's the hard part.

所以我们把投资阶段进一步提前了，虽然不算严格意义上的种子前轮，但种子轮阶段对我们来说变得更为重要，尤其是针对很多这类技术型项目。

So we we've really moved earlier to, you know, kind of the I wouldn't say pre seed, but more like that seed motion has become much more prominent for us getting early, especially, you know, to a lot of these technical projects.

我们在 Neolabs 方面也有非常具体的策略。

We have very specific strategy around Neolabs too.

我们大概投了七个项目，但不会像以前那样砸两亿美元进去。

We're in about seven of them, but we're not going in with, like, 200,000,000.

我们更看重能在早期拿到股权，或者参与那些我们认为最终能跑出来的项目，然后加大投入。

We're going in where we can get ownership early or be part of something that we think ultimately could be a winner and pile in.

所以我们根据市场环境调整了策略，既能在后期阶段采取两头下注的方式，也能在种子轮阶段介入得更早。

So we've adapted to the environment with a bunch of strategies that allows us to pursue this barbell on a later stage and getting even earlier on the seed stage.

我觉得在这一轮投资中，表现最差的可能是那些小型精品种子基金，而这恰恰是现在你遇到的每一位有限合伙人（LP）都想要的。

I think one of the worst performing groups in terms of venture in this vintage will actually be the small boutique seed funds, which is what every single LP that you speak to today, Matt, wants.

每个LP都是这样，这真是最搞笑的事。

Every LP this is the funniest thing.

每个LP都想要那种只投旧金山、规模在1亿美元以下的种子基金。我觉得在这个周期里，这类基金的表现会是最差的。因为像你们、Founders Fund、Benchmark、Sequoia、Excel这样的机构，凭借非常出色的种子轮产品，效率太高了。

Every LP wants San Francisco specific seed fund only under a 100,000,000, and I think this will be the worst performing category of venture in this vintage because firms like you and Founders Fund and Benchmark and Sequoia and Excel and you list goes on and on are so effective with a very good seed product.

确实。

Yeah.

所以如果你是一家5000万美元的种子基金，每次投资200万美元，那你就会发现自己太庞大了，没法做跟投，又太小了，没法做领投。

That it if you're a $50,000,000 seed fund and you're writing $2,000,000 checks, Dude, I'm too big to be friendly, and I'm too small to lead.

对。

Yeah.

你同意吗？还是说你觉得我错了？

Do you agree, or would you say I'm wrong?

是的。

Yeah.

不是。

No.

我是说，你看。

I mean, look.

我觉得变化最大的一点是，从我刚入行那会儿到现在，很长一段时间里，大家都有自己固定的分工领域。

I I think the biggest thing that's changed from the time, you know, my my early days in the business, but for a long time, is people used to have their swim lanes.

而现在越来越多人变成了全栈玩家，包括我们Benchmark的那些好朋友，他们也增加了成长期基金。

And now more and more, everyone's full stack, including our good friends now at Benchmark adding a growth vehicle.

对吧？

Right?

以前在种子轮阶段，大家总爱这么讲，说要是让机构投进来，会有负面信号。

And then everyone used to make this argument in the seed world, like, oh, there's negative signaling if you let an institution in in there.

我觉得现在这说法也不太管用了。

I think that's kind of out the window as well.

因为对于优质的公司来说，大家都怕错过，所以轮次金额也越来越大。

Because for the right companies, like, everybody's getting preempted and the rounds are bigger.

可能现在又回到了更合作式的融资模式，毕竟金额变大了嘛。

Maybe we're back to, you know, more collaborative rounds because they're bigger.

以前大家都觉得，必须得拿下整轮投资，但现在你看到联合投资的情况越来越多了。

Everyone used to be like, well, I have to have the whole round, and now you see a lot more syndication.

不过这种各司其职的模式已经不见了，这就是我们当下的时代特征。

But this whole notion of swim lanes is gone, and that's just the the times we're in.

我觉得联合投资其实更好。

The syndication element's actually nicer, I find.

能够更多地协作，感觉挺不错的。

It's nicer to be able to be more collaborative.

我更喜欢这样。

I like that a lot more.

说真的，在我职业生涯的前十五年里，每次我主导A轮融资时，都会拉一家顶尖机构一起参与。当时的说法是，你看。

I mean, believe me, for the first ten, fifteen years of my career, every Series A you led, you would bring in another kind of top tier firm alongside you, and the view is like, look.

我们合作起来会更高效。

We're gonna work more effectively together.

我们能更好地帮助这位创业者成长并扩大规模。

We're gonna be better helping this entrepreneur grow and scale.

然后接下来的十年里，答案变成了不行。

And then for ten years, it became no.

不行。

No.

不行。

No.

每一轮融资都必须由单一投资者来投。

Everything has to be one investor.

其中一部分确实跟持股比例有关，但我挺喜欢这种联合投资的模式。

And some of that's obviously a function of of ownership, but I like the syndication part.

我们之前聊到种子基金规模太大会有挑战，A轮现在也不是个容易切入的阶段，还有那种哑铃型的策略，以及三十亿美金的基金规模。这些在我和Rory、Jason的节目里都提过，但当时讨论得可能不够透彻。

When we talk about seed funds of that size being challenging, Series A being a difficult insertion point today and and the barbell approach, The $3,000,000,000 fund size, we talked about it in the show with Rory and Jason, and we didn't really get it in the nicest way.

你看，现在有Anthropic、Lovable、Legora、OpenRouter、Fireworks等等，好公司数都数不过来。

You've got Anthropic, you've got Lovable, you've got Legora, you've got OpenRouter, you've got Fireworks, you've got the list goes on and on and on of great companies.

你完全可以融到更多的钱。

You could raise way more.

为什么你们要融资三轮？

Why did you raise three?

风投的未来是不是会集中在像 GC、Lightspeed 这样更大的平台，以及我们熟知的这些大牌机构身上？

And is the future of venture not much bigger platforms like GC and Lightspeed and all the big names we know so well?

其实，当你募集更多资金时，会对公司的运营、文化以及团队规模产生一系列影响。

Well, when you take on more capital, there's implications of that in terms of how you run the firm, culture, how many people you have.

我们更喜欢保持一个精悍高效的团队，大概有12位合伙人，再加上一些优秀的总监、助理等成员，这样能让公司更强大。

And we love to be a relatively small and mighty machine with, you know, roughly, let's say, 12 partners and a great set of, you know, principals, associates, things like that that make us better and stronger.

但一旦你搞成全栈模式，搞五个不同的团队，每个人就开始各自为政，只顾着自己的那一亩三分地。

But, like, when you go full full stack and you have, like, five different teams, you start doing sector like, everybody's kind of out for a pass.

我以前在别的地方也见过这种情况，你明明能做点大事，却没法真正聚焦在一小群人身上。

And sometimes I've seen this in other places where you feel like, well, I could do great things, but I can't really index on this small group of people.

如果一个团队表现不好，就会拖累其他团队，导致整体缺乏默契、自主性和协作感——这正是我们在Menlo特别想避免的。

There's too many of the if one group doesn't do as well, then they kinda drag down, you know, how this this other group so it kinda leads to a bit of less feeling of, like, alignment, agency, collaboration together, and that's what we've really wanted to keep at Menlo.

尽管我们有两只基金、两套投资委员会，但工作流程非常灵活，风投基金的合伙人也能主导成长基金的投资项目等等。

And despite having two funds and kinda two ICs, we have a very fluid amount of work across those two groups where partners from the venture fund can lead investments in our growth fund, etcetera.

所以核心问题是：我们希望Menlo怎么应对市场？

So it's really more like, how do we want Menlo to meet the market?

我们内部该怎么运作？

How do we wanna run internally?

我们怎么保持团队小而精，不让自己变成一家公司，却依然是一家真正的合伙制企业？

How do we wanna keep our team relatively small with great people and not feel like we're more a company, but we still really are a firm.

老兄，我就是一个普通的英国播客主持人。

Dude, I'm just a humble British podcaster.

我们这儿不谈规模扩张。

We don't talk about scale here.

明白吗？

Okay?

我们就是跟大家都处成朋友。

We're we're just we're we're everyone's friend.

朋友，我们可不算小团队。

Everyone's not so tiny, my friend.

不过我真正想问的是，我很了解Josh和Thrive，他们是我的好朋友。

But my question there actually is, you know, I know Josh and Thrive very well, dear friend.

他以前总跟我说，其实人们在投资阶段上的适应能力和灵活性，比大家想象的要大得多。

And he's always said to me that, you know, people have a lot more plasticity investing across the stage than than one thinks.

你是不是觉得大家会觉得，哦，他是个成长期投资者？

Do you think people are like, oh, they're a growth investor?

还是说大家其实具备这种在不同阶段间灵活转换的能力，一个优秀的种子轮投资人也能成为出色的成长期投资人？

Or do you think people do have that plasticity to move across stage and a great seed investor can be a great growth investor?

我觉得大家最好还是各守各的领域，我还是用“赛道”这个词吧，意思就是，嘿。

I think you're best off if people pick a I'll use the word swim lane again, meaning like, hey.

毕竟很难面面俱到，对吧？尤其是在种子轮阶段。

You it's just hard to cover everything, right, especially in seed.

比如，我怎么可能既要到处跑，像斯坦福实验室那样跟研究人员见面，又要去追逐全球最有增长潜力的前20个投资项目呢？

Like, how am I supposed to be wandering around, you know, Stanford Labs, meeting with researchers, and also chasing the 20 best growth potential investments in the world?

这根本忙不过来。

It's just it's just too much.

我觉得，你在某个领域投入的工作密度，以及由此积累的模式识别能力，会让你变得更出色。

And I think the pattern recognition, the density of the work that you apply to a certain area makes you better.

所以我们的团队大致就是这样划分的：早期团队、关注异常值（outlier）的团队，还有专注成长型公司的团队，大家各司其职。

And so that's roughly how we've split our team is, you know, early stage team, outlier, growth kind of companies, and everybody really focused.

但如果遇到某个项目特别适合基金里其他同事来投，那也没问题。

But if something comes up that's a great fit for somebody across the fund vehicles, then fine.

团队之间是有流动性的。

There's fluidity.

但我真心觉得，你最好还是把精力高度集中在一个点上，比如把80%的时间都花在这上面。

But I really do feel like you're best off by being super, super focused with, let's say, 80% of your time.

同时也要考虑行业方向。

Think about sector wise too.

突然间，处理器、GTPU、GPU这些都火起来了。

All of a sudden, processors, g TPUs, GPUs are hot.

对吧？

Right?

然后还有国防科技领域。

And then you've got defense tech.

现在特别火。

It's hot.

大家都急着往里冲。

And everybody's kinda rushing in.

你不能进去之后，随便碰到一个项目就一头扎进去，觉得自己挺懂行似的。

You can't go in there and just kinda spearfish one investment that you run into and feel like you've got the expertise.

你得把这块的市场格局摸透。

You need to understand that landscape.

你得了解那些创业者。

You need to understand the entrepreneurs.

你还得搞懂买方那边。

You need to understand the buy side.

要是你以前没在半导体公司干过，那可就太难了。我当年就是先从一个创业公司起步，后来才去的普衡律师事务所。

And if you haven't really worked in a semiconductor company before, which I did, that's where I started my career at a startup before I joined Planet Perkins, it's so hard.

拿出合适的芯片，往往得花上两三年时间。

It can take two, three years to get the right chip out.

你以为拿下了设计订单，结果转眼就没了。

You think you got a design win, it evaporates.

真的非常非常难。

Very, very hard.

那 Ariovic 和 Steve Vassalo 在 Cerebras 那边怎么样？

What about Ariovic and Steve Vassalo with Cerebras?

我的意思是，他们直接对那家公司进行了鱼叉式攻击。

I mean, they directly did a spearfish on this one company.

好的。

Alright.

好吧，我跟埃里克聊过这件事。

Well, I've I've I've talked to Eric about this.

顺便提一下，你们有布鲁斯·邓利维，你知道的，他是半导体行业的知名投资人。他甚至可能在你们的节目里说过，他所有的合伙人，甚至可能连他自己，都劝他别这么做。

And by the way, you had Bruce Dunleavy, like, one of you know, epic semiconductor investor, and he's like, all my partners and maybe even said this on your show, but, like, you know, all his partners told him not to do it.

不过，作为投资机构，我们偶尔也会遇到那种让人觉得特别不一样的项目。

But, like, I would every once in a while as a firm, you can do something that's a little bit like, there's something really special here.

可能最后没成，但如果真成了，那可就太棒了。

We might get a zero, But if this works, wow.

这就让我想起我们投资 Anthropic 的那次经历。

And I'll that's I know I'll take you back to our investment in Anthropic.

情况差不多。

Like, same thing.

感觉这事儿不太对劲。

It's like, this doesn't really fit.

这跟我们平时的做法不太一样。

This isn't what we normally do.

不过，要是真成了，那可就太棒了。我是说，Dario这位创始人非常特别，市场也极好。

But, wow, if this works I mean, you got such a special founder in Dario and an amazing market.

如果这俩人真能成行业双雄，那目标也就达到了，到时候肯定会取得巨大的成功。

And if these guys become the two and that was the goal at the time, this is gonna be wildly successful.

那我们当时有没有意识到，他们最终会成为行业第一？

Now did we ever realize they were gonna be the normal number one?

那就像是一闪而过的灵感，但这就是你投资这类公司所能获得的巨大回报。

That was like a little, twinkle in the eye, but that's the upside you get by getting yourself in these companies.

我能问个关于地域的问题吗？

Can I ask you just on geography?

我们之前聊过 Lovable 这家公司。

We've spoken about Lovable.

我们聊过 Legora，这两家公司显然都设在瑞典。

We've spoken about Legora, two companies based in, obviously, Sweden.

然后还有 Anthropic，你们在西海岸。

And then you have Anthropic and you sitting on the West Coast.

你觉得随着 AI 的重心重新回到旧金山，权力的中心性会怎样变化？

How do you think about the centrality of power with AI moving back to San Francisco?

大家都说那里汇聚了最聪明的人才和最优秀的研究人员，而且你们在赢家方面的投资组合也非常全球化。

All the brightest minds, all the best researchers are there being the common theory, with also a portfolio that's very global in terms of winners.

对。

Yeah.

旧金山那几年挺奇怪的。

San Francisco was a weird place for a few years.

你懂的。

You know?

就像，所有酷孩子都想去纽约，旧金山感觉有点像座鬼城，非常集中在SaaS领域，没什么特别有意思的事情发生。

Like, all the cool kids wanted to be in New York, and San Francisco felt a little bit like a ghost town, very concentrated in Sass, not like that much interesting stuff going on.

我很高兴看到它重新焕发生机。

And I love seeing it have its mojo back.

对吧？

Right?

每当这种浪潮来袭，湾区总是走在前面，现在这里充满了更多的活力。

It's like when these waves come, the Bay Area usually leads, and so it's just giving so much more energy.

就连那些一辈子住在纽约、从来没想到要离开的人，现在也搬到湾区来了。

And people who are, like, lifetime New Yorkers who would never think about leaving you know, living in The Bay are now coming out here.

我觉得越来越多的大学毕业生都在说，对。

I think more college grads are saying, yeah.

纽约确实很酷，但我得去那边，参与到这场AI浪潮中去。

New York's cool, but I gotta get out there and be part of this AI thing.

所以我觉得这对湾区来说是个好消息。

So I think it's great for the Bay Area.

我觉得正是这种人才的聚集，才让湾区一直如此特别。

I think the the concentration of that talent is what has always made The Bay special.

你知道的，你基本上就是不停地跟人聊天、见创业者，了解大家都在怎么逼自己一把。这不仅仅是指工作态度，更多是技术层面，他们具体在搞什么项目。

You know, you just kinda you're just constantly talking and meeting entrepreneurs and understanding how everyone's pushing themselves, not just, like, their work ethic, but more, like, technically, what they're working on.

你住在湾区所积累的这些资源和视野，要是换作你在别处一家很不错的公司，可能得翻上十倍甚至百倍才能达到。

Your context that you have by living in the Bay Area is probably like 10 or a 100 x if you're just some really great company somewhere else.

不过，得给你点个赞，也不光是你个人，而是说现在欧洲那边发生的情况。

Now kudos to you and not, you know, just you personally, but like, you know, what's going on in Europe right now.

就像那种深度思考的人才外流的现象。你之前提到过几家公司，比如 Lovable 和 Legora，还有 Ryan 提到的另外几家。

Like, that whole deep mind diaspora, you know, you mentioned a couple of companies like Lovable and Legora that we're in and Ryan a couple more.

这对我们来说可是新鲜事。

Like, that's new for us.

以前我们总说，哎呀，去不了欧洲什么的。

We would always be like, oh, we can't, you know, go to Europe.

那边更像是一种手工作坊式的产业。

It's kind of a more of a cottage industry there.

人才主要集中在哪些地方呢？

And where does the talent really spike?

但我一直觉得，在欧洲当创业者，难度要大得多。

But the one thing I'll have always thought about Europe is if you're an entrepreneur there, it was harder.

所以在欧洲，想成为优秀的创业者，需要更多的韧劲，不像在湾区，进YC当创始人其实没那么难。

So there's kinda more grit to be a great entrepreneur in Europe than, let's say, in the Bay Area where it's not incredibly hard to get into YC and just be a founder.

我觉得在欧洲，一直以来都难得多。

I think in Europe, it's always been a lot harder.

如果你能在欧洲从零开始，打造出一家全球公司，那本身就说明你非同一般。

So if you have the grit to get off the ground in Europe to be a global company, that says a lot about you.

我们目前还没在当地设点，但花的时间越来越多，也确实想进一步拓展那里。

So I wouldn't say we're putting boots on the ground there, but we're spending a lot more time and definitely interested in doing more there.

Lovable的Anton总说，在欧洲创业就像是开了困难模式。

Anton at Lovable always says building in Europe's, like, you know, hard mode.

我想问一下，当你失去一个单子时，有没有发现共同的原因？

Can I ask you, when you lose a deal, is there a commonality as to why you lose?

最常见的原因就是你进场太晚了。

The thing that's most often is that you were late to the party.

对吧？

Right?

就是说，你不够重视，没有把这家公司当成你真正想跟进、想建立关系的目标。

Like, you know, you were not intentional enough that this was a company that you wanted to be tracking and building a relationship.

结果你等到融资前几周甚至一个月才介入，而别人已经跟人家建立了一年的关系。

So you're coming in a couple weeks or a month before the round and somebody else has a year long relationship.

这基本上就是死局了。

That's usually a death knell.

对我来说，最致命的因素通常是这种：‘哦，我在上一家公司跟Matt共事过七年’，听到这儿我就觉得，行吧，到此为止。

The biggest death knell always for me is like when it's like, oh, I worked with them at my previous I worked with Matt on my previous company for seven years, and I'm like, okay.

这事儿没戏了。

I'm done.

毕竟，在这行里人际关系太重要了，因为这是一个高度依赖信任的领域，无论是风投机构内部，还是跟我们要合作的公司之间，信任都至关重要。

And so, I mean and relationships mean so much in this business because it's it is high trust matters so much in both within a venture firm and with the companies we work with.

所以，想靠那种‘闪婚’式的、或者短期的冲刺来建立这种信任，真的很难。

And so it's hard to establish that in some, you know, shotgun wedding, some sprint.

所以我们非常刻意地争取走在前面。

So we try to be very intentional about getting out ahead of things.

我觉得对于最好的那些公司，情况总是像争球一样充满变数，这时候特别需要认识一个跟公司有关系的人，能帮你稍微引导一下，让事情顺利落地。

You know, I'd say for the best companies, they're always going to be this, like, kinda jump ball, and and it's incredibly important to know someone who's associated with the company who can kinda help guide you in, land the plane a little bit.

如果你没有这层关系，而别的投资人有，情况就不一样了。

And if you don't have that and another investor does, like, hey.

比如他们会说：这个人跟这位董事会成员合作了十年，而且有过非常成功的合作经历。

This person has worked with this board member for ten years, and they had a great experience in some big outcome.

你知道的，更多是这类情况。

You know, it's it's more things like that.

很少就是那种，直截了当地，你知道的，比如估值之类的。

It's rarely just, like, straight up, you know, valuation, stuff like that.

对。

Yes.

估值确实让人头疼，但对于合适的公司，你知道的，你会不惜一切代价争取加入。

Valuation can be painful, but for the right companies, you know, you do what it takes to be in.

对我来说，最大的错误其实都跟股权比例有关。

The single biggest mistake for me is always actually focused around ownership.

有好几家公司，比如 Deal、Eleven Labs、Star Cloud，它们只给我们 1% 的份额，我觉得这太少了，不能接受。

There've been several companies where we've had like 1% offered to us, Deal, Eleven Labs, Star Cloud, where we were like 1%, we can't be doing that.

现在回头看，这些公司本来都能带来巨大的回报。

And now I look back and all of them would have returned.

金额非常可观。

Huge amounts of money.

我是这么受训的，职业生涯大部分时间也都是这么做的，所以后来我花了不少功夫才慢慢放下那种思维。

That's the way I was trained, and I learned that for most of my career, so it took me a lot to kinda shed that.

你觉得有限合伙人能理解这一点吗？

Do you think LPs understand that?

毕竟有限合伙人总是偏爱高持股比例、组合规模精简、集中投资，还要对标基准。

Because LPs always like high ownership portfolio, constrained portfolio sizes, concentration, benchmark.

你觉得他们意识到游戏规则已经变了吗？

Do you think they get that the game has changed?

我觉得他们能看到结果。

I think they see the results.

对吧？

Right?

可能一开始他们没意识到，但我们跟他们讲得很清楚，我们会有核心投资，然后还有一些小的跟投或者早期投资。

So, like, maybe not upfront, but we're pretty explicit with them that we kinda have, like, hey.

一个基金里，核心项目是这样的，其他的就是所谓的跟投或者起步型投资。

Here's a core position in a fund, and then here are what call, like, tracker checks or starter checks.

再说说我们的Anthology基金吧。

Or frankly, even look like look at our Anthology Fund.

对吧？

Right?

那个基金里有五十多家公司，每家投资在十万到一百万美元之间，都是在种子轮进的。

Like, that's over 50 companies somewhere between a 100 k and 1,000,000 where you kinda get in a seed round.

从这个基金里脱颖而出的公司有OpenRouter、Whisper和Axiom Math。

And the companies that have graduated out of that have been OpenRouter, Whisper, Axiom Math.

所以有几件事。

So there's a couple of things.

第一，这让我们获得了一些独家、所谓的交易机会，同时也让你有机会进入公司的股东名册，了解创业者，然后在发现某些事情行得通时果断出手。

One, that gives us a bit of proprietary, quote, deal flow, but it gives you the opportunity to be in the cap table, get to know the entrepreneur, and then pounce when you see something's working.

我想说，如果你能挤进一家公司，你在下一轮融资中大幅参与甚至领投的可能性就会高出十倍。

And I would say if you get even a wedge into a company, you're 10 x more likely to be able to participate significantly in the next round or lead.

我认为有限合伙人明白这一点，或者正在逐渐明白。

And I think LPs get that or they are getting it.

我完全同意你的看法。

I totally agree with you.

你通过这种方式发放支票，是为了随着公司的发展阶段，把资金更集中地投进去。

And you do those checks so you can concentrate capital more with the progression of the company.

我在 VC Braggs 上火了。

I went viral on VC Braggs.

马特，上次你来做节目时，我表现得特别配合，态度温和，就像一场哈利波特式的冒险一样。

Matt, when you did our last show, I was very amenable and sweet and nice little kind of Harry Potter adventure.

我这个人想法很明确，很多人其实不太喜欢我这么说。

Now I'm quite binary, and apparently, a lot of people don't always like what I say.

尤其是《VC Braggs》那期，他们特别不认同我，因为我刚拒绝了一家公司，他们打算从150万直接跳到500万，再冲到1500万。

And VC Braggs in particular took real problem with me because I said, basically, I turned down a company the other day because they were going from, like, one and a half to five to 15.

这种资本投入的机会成本是实实在在的，增长预期根本不在一个频道上。

And there's an opportunity cost of capital to say that's very real, the and growth expectations are just very different.

换句话说，就是三倍、三倍、两倍、两倍地往上冲。

In other words, triple, triple, double, double.

是的。

Yeah.

现在这种节奏已经提不起兴趣了。

It's just not exciting enough anymore.

所以我因此被批评了一顿。

And so I got chastised for this.

你认同吧，从100万到500万，再从500万到1500万，这其实挺好的。

Are you with me that fundamentally, if I bring you a one to five and then a five to 15, again, it's great.

我不是在贬低它，只是现在的风险投资市场已经不是这样了。

I'm not belittling it, but that's just not the venture game today.

确实不是。

It's not.

确实不是。

It's not.

而且很难去改变，也很难去扭转过去二十多年里大家对什么是好、什么是优秀的固有认知，但这确实是现实。

And it's and it's hard to say, and it's hard to change, you know, the context, the twenty plus years of context around what good and great was, but that's the reality.

现在的环境已经变了。

The environment has changed.

所以如果你环顾四周，可能会觉得，以前这算是前百分之五的水平，现在看起来更像是前百分之五十。

And so if you look around and you're like, well, that used to be top five percent, and now it looks more like top 50%.

但我们的目标可不是要挤进前百分之五十。

Well, we're not trying to be in top 50%.

对吧？

Right?

所以这就是现实情况。

So that's just the reality.

我是说，当我们看到这些公司一年之内从零做到一百倍的增长时，作为投资者，我们对此是控制不了的。

I mean, it's not controllable by us as investors when we look around and see these companies doing zero to a 100 in in a year.

我从来没见识过这样的案例，而且这样的例子多得我现在都数不过来。

Never seen anything like it, and there's more examples of that than I can probably count right now.

有没有哪家公司是你没投，但特别想投的？

What company are you not in that you would most like to be in?

有好几个。

There are several.

有一家公司我一直特别佩服，它是那种历史罕见的 outliers。回想起来，看看那些真正伟大的公司，比如我在 Kleiner 早期时，Jeff Bezos，后来还有 Daniel Ek 和 Collison 兄弟。

One company that I've really admired as the outlier entrepreneurs in my history going back, you look at the companies that became great, you know, when I was early days at Kleiner, it like, you know, Jeff Bezos and later on Daniel Ak and the Collison brothers.

不知怎么的，这些了不起的创始人最终把公司给做起来了。

And, like, somehow or another, these amazing founders end up manifesting the company.

我不觉得仅仅是因为他们选对了市场，或者说，某种程度上确实选对了，但更重要的是他们那种势不可挡的力量、创造力、远见、执行力，以及他们融资和招募顶尖人才的能力，方方面面都做到了极致。

I don't necessarily think it was that they chose the right market or I mean, somewhat they did, but it was really just the force of nature, the creativity, the vision, the execution, their ability to raise capital, hire the best talent, all that.

所以，总之，我觉得在欧洲有个例子，因为离你比较近，就是像 Eleven Labs 的 Matti 这样的人。

So, anyway, I think an example of that in Europe, just because it's close to home for you, would be someone like Matti at eleven Labs.

我对他非常敬佩。

Very big respect for him.

所以，你知道的，我不想把我在播客里的整个项目清单都公开，但既然你熟悉这个，我就提一下。

So, you know, I don't wanna give everyone on the podcast my whole pipeline, but just because that's one you know well, I'll I'll throw that out there.

你记得 Menlo 内部最 controversial 的一笔交易是什么？

What was the most controversial deal inside Menlo that you remember?

答案很明显是 Anthropic，不过我在琢磨这件事，顺便说一下，当时有两个比较有争议的点。

The obvious answer is anthropic in some ways, but I'm I'm trying to think about and and by the way, there was two controversial points around that.

第一点就是，这真的是风投基金该做的事吗？

One was, you know, the first just like, is this really what a venture fund does?

第二点是，我们以前从来没做过 SPV（特殊目的载体）。

And the second was like, we've never done an SPV before.

我们真的要走这条路吗？

Are we really gonna go down this path?

我一时想不起来还有什么别的事让我觉得特别震撼，那种‘哇’的感觉。

I can't really remember offhand anything like that was that profound and felt like, wow.

我们为了做成这件事，尤其是这个规模较大的SPV，几乎是在押上公司的声誉，开辟新路。

We're kinda putting the reputation of the firm, especially the bigger SPV, on the line to kinda pull this off and, you know, breaking new ground.

我觉得我们合伙人最大的优势就是技术背景都很强。

I think we know the great thing about our partners, we've got a very technical group.

我们规模小，所以大家目标特别一致。

We're small enough to have high alignment.

彼此之间非常尊重。

We respect each other a lot.

做决定其实挺容易的。

It's easy to make.

我们互相倾听，做出的决策都很靠谱。

You know, we listen to each other, make good decisions.

所以真没什么让我觉得特别有争议的事。

So I don't find things that controversial.

我不太认同那种观点，觉得非得有一堆反对票，只要有一张赞成票就能造成异常值。

I don't really ascribe to this point of view where you need, like, a bunch of noes, and there's one person who's a yes, and that leads to an outlier.

我知道确实有这种例子，但这在我待过的公司或者我们团队里，还真没怎么遇到过。

I know there are examples of that, but that's not really been my experience in the firms I've been part of or with our team.

最后一个问题，然后我们就进入快速问答环节。

Final one before we move into a quick fire.

我数学不太好，不过要是粗略算一下，Anthropic 和相关的分布情况，大概会在 Kerry 那边分出一百亿美元左右。

I'm I'm not great at maths, but if I do like a little bit of a back of a napkin on Anthropic and distributions, it'll distribute around $10,000,000,000 in Kerry.

这数目可不小啊，马特。

It's quite a lot of Monopoly money, Matt.

但在凯瑞那边不算什么。

Not in Kerry.

对吧？

Right?

我们的位置在那边以北。

Our position is north of that.

你可以算算Kerry通常是什么水平，所以在Kerry这边没那么高，但我们……

You can do the math on what Kerry usually is, so it's not quite that on Kerry, but our

这我能理解。

understandable.

二十到三十亿美元。

2 to 3,000,000,000.

这是个非常庞大的数字。

It's a very big number.

当一次大获全胜之后，你怎么看一家公司的持续发展？

What do you think about firm sustenance when there is such a big win?

我们确实见过一些公司，明明赚得盆满钵满，却反而难以维持领先地位。

We have seen firms candidly struggle to maintain dominance when everyone makes so much money bluntly.

你如何看待这种巨大成功之后的持续力？

How do you think about sustenance post such success?

我觉得Menlo从我和Venke十年前加入起，就一直保持着挑战者的心态，后来Sean Caroline回归，还有Mark Siegel这位合伙人，是他把团队真正凝聚起来的。

I think Menlo has always had a challenger mentality since myself, and Venke came over a little over ten years ago, and kinda Sean Caroline came back and, you know, Mark Siegel was the partner who's there who kinda put the band together.

从十一年前那个时刻起，就一直在拼命打拼，不断奋斗，一路建设，直到今天，这种过程令人无比振奋。

And ever since that moment about eleven years ago, it's just been a grind, a fight, a build exhilarating to kinda get to this point.

我觉得，我们一路带过来的每个人，都能感受到Menlo在不断提升，越来越成功。

And I feel like everyone we brought along has kinda felt Menlo move up that stack and be more and more successful.

所以我觉得推动我们的，是你能想到的那些东西——不是单纯为了赚钱，也不是‘天啊，我们终于成了AI领域最顶尖的公司之一’，而是怎么把这份优势持续放大、加倍投入？

So I think what's driving us is what you would expect, less about that monetary outcome and holy shit, we've put ourselves in a place to be one of the, hopefully, leading firms in AI, and how do we really compound and double down on that advantage?

这种动力，我每天都能感受到，不仅来自我自己，也来自所有合伙人。

And that's the energy I feel every day, certainly from myself and all my partners.

我根本想象不到这种状态会消失。

I I just can't see that going away.

感觉就像，我们终于到了这儿。

It's kinda like it's kinda like we arrived.

我们已经站在这里了。

We're here.

接下来，我们该怎么做？

What do we do with that?

钱确实不少，但这并不是我们这么做的初衷。

And the money is great, but that's not why we did all this.

我觉得投资人越有钱，投资水平就越高，因为他们不用操心怎么规避风险，而是专注于如何最大化收益。

I think richer investors make better investors because you do not worry about downside mitigation, but you focus on upside optimization.

这个市场到底能有多大？

How big can this be?

如果这事儿真成了，会怎么样？

What happens if this works?

你并不担心有限合伙人不再追加投资。

You're not worried about LPs not re upping.

你也没有把精力放在风险规避上。

You're not focused on risk mitigation.

你觉得我这么想对吗？

Do you agree with me in thinking that?

当然。

Of course I do.

我觉得这在公司层面和个人层面都存在。

And I think it's at a firm level and it's at an individual level.

在我的职业生涯中，确实有过那么些时候，你会感到有些怀疑，无论是来自你自己还是周围的人，这会让你的表现大打折扣。

And there's been times in my career where you feel some doubt, either from yourself or those around you, and it makes you dramatically worse.

对吧？

Right?

所以我们努力营造一种高信任的环境，互相支持，毕竟在这个行业里，每个人都会经历失败。

And so what we try to do is have a high trust environment, build people up, and everyone is going to fail in this business.

对吧？

Right?

就是早点认清现实，然后平稳着陆，或者做出正确的决定。

It's just kinda recognizing that sooner and kinda landing the plane or doing the right thing.

世上最糟糕的事就是死抱着不放，假装现实不存在。

The worst thing in the world is to kinda hold on and just go to try to act like the reality is not the reality.

很多时候，你帮创始人平稳着陆，其实是在帮他们一把。

And oftentimes, you're doing a founder a favor by even helping them, you know, kinda kinda land the plane.

所以，是的，我觉得这是个很重要的点，也是在这个行业里需要好好管理的事情。

So, yeah, I I I think it's an an important point and an important thing to manage in this business.

我想快速进入一个快问快答环节。

I would love to move into a quick fire round.

我刚才在很多不同领域都追问了不少，很感谢你的耐心。

I have pushed and prodded around many different areas, so I appreciate the patience.

真正让人有点受不了的部分来了，我准备好了。

This is where the really off putting stuff comes, I'm ready.

哥们，你天生就是干这行的料。

Dude, you were born ready for this.

过去这一年里，你改变了哪些看法？

What have you changed your mind on in the last twelve months?

哦，我是说，当然包括对大公司规模的认知，以及Menlo在追求这些目标时应该有多大胆。我们需要那些敢于独立思考、愿意承担这类风险的人。这一点比以往任何时候都重要，尤其是关于公司能发展到多大的问题。

Oh, I mean, certainly just how big companies can be and how bold Menlo should be in pursuing those, that we need people who are free thinkers and willing to take those kind of risks, and that's more true than ever, like just how big a company can be.

最大的失误是什么？你从中吸取了什么教训？

Biggest miss, and what was your lesson from it?

以前我觉得那些是巨大的失误，但现在回头看，感觉没那么严重了。

The things that I would look back on at the time as a biggest biggest miss no longer feel that way.

那我给你举一个例子吧。

So that's like like I'll I'll give you one.

你知道的，我们当时在“一英寸线”那轮，拿下了 Plaid 的投资，我对 Zach 和他的公司以及他们取得的成就一直非常敬佩。

You know, we were at the one inch line, winning Plaid back in the day, and I have the utmost respect for Zach and the company and what they've done.

但在那个当下，我觉得失去那个项目对我的职业生涯和获胜能力来说简直是生死攸关的。他们确实是一家很棒的公司。

But at the point in time, I felt like when I lost that, that that was, like, existential to my career and ability to win, and and, you know, they're a great company.

不过我想，这反而让我更明白了一件事，就是一次失败并不能定义任何人。

But I guess what that did is just more conditioned me around, like, one loss doesn't define anyone.

要是没投中 Anthropic，那肯定更让人难受。

Now, okay, if you didn't win Anthropic, that would have been extra painful.

但关键是，你得继续往前走，去找到下一个大机会。

But the point is, like, you just gotta keep going and finding that next big one.

只要像我们在 AI 领域那样，抓住正确的重大趋势，并且跑在前面，这些周期性的机会自然会来。

And if you focus on the right big trends like we did around AI and get out ahead of it, that these cycles come along.