20VC：詹森·黄关于“创始人模式”的经验教训 | 如何判断OpenAI或Anthropic是否会摧毁你的公司 | USV因热爱音乐而获得10亿美元投资回报 | Shiv Rao @ Abridge：五年荒漠期达成产品市场契合，估值达53亿美元

正确的答案是：我不需要上市。

The right answer was, No, I don't need to.

我有一个使命。

I have a mission.

为了实现这个使命，我会不遗余力。

And to serve that mission, I will do what it takes.

如果在私募市场就能做到，我就在那里融资。

And if I can do it in the private markets, I'll raise money there.

如果非得上市才能做到，那我就上市。

If I need to go public to do that, then I will go public.

我认为在未来几年，大型企业推进人工智能的最大障碍之一，就是数据的整洁度和数据结构。

I think one of the biggest barriers to AI progression within large enterprise in the next few years will be data cleanliness, data structure within large enterprises.

大型医疗组织在数据准备、数据结构和数据整洁度方面是不是一团糟？

Is it a mess in large healthcare organisations in terms of data preparation, data structure, data cleanliness?

是的，确实如此。

Yeah, it is.

当你看到OpenAI和Anthropic宣布派出前线工程师，还跟大型私募股权公司合作去支持他们的投资组合时，如果这还不能说明垂直AI在未来很长一段时间内都有巨大的机会，那我真不知道什么才算了。

When you saw the announcements from OpenAI and Anthropic about forward deployed engineers and these partnerships with big private equity groups to go help their portfolios, if that wasn't a sign that there is absolutely an incredible opportunity for the foreseeable future for vertical AI, I don't know what is.

你能帮我解释一下吗？

Help me understand that.

为什么这么说？

Why is that?

这并不容易。

It's not easy.

要进入这些大企业，搞清楚它们的状况，拿到数据、清理数据、整理数据，融入具体的工作流程，还得合规操作，把所有要求都满足，哪有那么简单。

It's not easy to go into one of these enterprises and figure stuff out, to get access to the data, to clean the data, to organize the data, to be able to integrate into specific workflows, to do it in a compliant way, to check off all the boxes.

这可不是普通的SOC 2认证，这是高信任度的要求。

It's not SOC two, it's high trust.

这跟所有网络安全问题都息息相关。

It's like all the cyber stuff.

比如，心理诊疗产生的行为健康数据，跟内科全科医生诊疗产生的数据，处理方式必须完全不同，你得明白这一点。

It's being able to know that behavioral health information from a psychological encounter, for example, that data should be treated very differently than data that's coming from an internal medicine primary care physician's encounter.

这里面要做的事情太多了，要打造一个可扩展的系统，得花不少功夫。

There's just so much to it, and it takes a lot of effort to build a machine that's scalable.

要成功向企业销售AI工具，非得有FDE流程不可吗？

Do you have to have an FDE process to be successful selling to enterprise with AI tools?

不用，没必要。

No, you don't.

在我们这儿就不用。

Not in our case.

你得先从零到一突破。

You're gonna get to that zero to one.

你得深入医院、诊所，听医生和护士怎么说，一点点摸清楚需求。

You're gonna get to that first product in all the ways, like people in the health systems, in the clinics, and listening to the doctors and the nurses and figuring it out.

但这跟现场部署是两回事。

But that's not for deployed motion.

这纯粹是搞清楚怎么做出一个真正贴合需求的产品。

That's just like figuring out how to build a product that fits.

但如果你的第一个产品是那种无处不在的，你切入的是一个能大规模推广的流程，那你就基本稳了。

But if your first product is something that is everywhere, if you've attacked a workflow that can scale, then you're sort of set.

这其实是个经典做法——我们选的第一个产品，就是知道在医疗领域到处都用得上的。

It's a classic motion of we picked a first product that we knew was everywhere in healthcare.

几乎每个医生，都必须和病人交流。

Every single doctor, practically speaking, has to speak to a patient.

太好了。

Great.

这就是我们的切入点。

That's our signal.

我们要围绕这个交流环节，创造实际价值。

We're gonna attach ourselves to that spoken signal and create value.

太好了。

Great.

我们的第一个价值点是什么？

What's our first bit of value?

就是一个笔记。

It's a note.

明白了。

Got it.

他们讨厌笔记吗？

Do they hate notes?

是的。

Yep.

他们确实讨厌笔记。

They hate notes.

我们可以把它们自动化。

We can automate them.

很好。

Great.

我们做了个笔记工具。

We created notes.

现在咱们来处理批量开单吧。

Now let's go scale notes.

然后就想着，接下来该干嘛？

Then it was like, what's next?

他们特别讨厌下这些订单。

They hate placing those orders.

得一个个点下拉菜单，还得琢磨该选哪个单子。

They have to hit all kinds of dropdown menus and figure out what the right order is.

不错。

Cool.

那咱们来搞定账单吧。

Let's do orders.

他们特别讨厌处理账单。

They hate billing.

没几个医生是学财务、会计或者收入周期管理出身的。

No doctor went to billing school, accounting school, revenue cycle school.

我以前在大型医疗系统当企业风投的时候，经常以医生身份组织午餐学习会，用披萨和PPT给医生们讲收入周期的事。

And when I was a corporate VC at a large health system, we used to have these lunch and learns as a doctor where we try to teach doctors about revenue cycle with pizza and PowerPoints.

每个医生都是那种眼神放空、心不在焉的样子。

Every single doctor, thousand yard stare.

根本没人想来参加。

Nobody want to be there.

那我们能不能帮他们把这些事自动化了？

So can we automate that for them?

当然可以。

Absolutely.

这几年下来，我们终于做到了：每位临床医生背后都有一支助手团队，默默帮他们处理所有这些杂务。

So now we've gotten to this point over the course of a few years where it's like every single clinician has this team of assistants that we are deploying in the background to go do all the jobs.

而这些工作，本来就没人愿意干。

And many of these jobs nobody wanted to do in the first place.

我跟你们的一位投资人聊过，虽然不能点名，但他夸你们的产品太棒了，你说的每一点都让人印象深刻。

I spoke to one of your investors who won't remain nameless for this one, and they said amazing products and amazing everything that you said.

但如果你想要实现当前以及未来的企业价值，就必须更贴近资金流动的环节。

But if you are to fulfill the enterprise value that you have today and that you will have moving forwards, you have to move closer to the flow of money.

这么说合理吗？

Is that fair?

我觉得这不仅合理，而且本来就是我们想做的事。

I think it's not only fair, it's also what we want to do.

你想想，在美国，其实全球很多地方都一样，临床医生的报酬并不是基于他们提供的医疗服务，而是基于他们记录下来的医疗服务。

When you think about it, in The United States, but really this is true in many parts of the world, clinicians, doctors, they're not compensated for the care that they deliver.

他们拿到的是自己写下来的诊疗记录的报酬，而不是实际提供的照护。

They're compensated for the care that they documented that they deliver.

当我们最初意识到这一点，决定聚焦于语音信号，并且决定在捕捉前后都用它来自动生成病历的时候，我们就知道，这同时也等于在自动生成账单。

When we first realized that, okay, we're going after this spoken signal, and the first thing that we're going to build with it before, during, after we capture it is a note, we knew we were creating bills too.

所以你必须认真对待这份责任。

And so you've got to take that responsibility very seriously.

因为医疗领域的商业运作实在太复杂了。

Because the enterprise motion in healthcare is complicated.

你面对的利害关系方很多。

You have a lot of different stakeholders.

你有最终用户，但还有决策者。

You have your end users, but then you have the decision makers.

还有首席医疗信息官，也就是CMIO。

And there's a CMIO, a chief medical information officer.

还有首席信息官，也就是CIO。

There is a CIO, a chief information officer.

然后还有首席财务官。

And then there is a CFO.

他们每个人看问题的角度都不一样。

And they all have a different lens.

能平衡各方诉求，让这三者都认同，才是真正的关键。

And being able to thread the needle, being able to resonate with all three is really how you win the day.

所以从一开始就要明白，这些病历最终会变成账单。

And so being able to recognize from the from the get that, okay, these notes are actually gonna end up being bills.

所以我们来聊聊这个笔记生成的架构和流程，现在它已经演变成一个更依赖智能代理的流程了。

So let's approach this note generation architecture, that workflow, and now what's become a much more agent driven process.

我们要有意识地设计它，确保能顺利衔接进财务总监的业务场景。

Let's approach that very deliberately so that we have the immediate extension afterwards into the CFO's world.

Epic 也做同样的产品，你们怎么跟他们竞争？

How do you compete when Epic do the same product?

他们那个产品，谁都不喜欢，可偏偏用的人太多，根基太深了。

They're such a they're like the the product that no one likes, but it's so entrenched.

在这样的环境下，你们怎么突围？

How do you compete in that world?

我们根本不是在和 Epic 竞争。

We are not competing with Epic.

Epic 那个系统，说白了就是个基础平台。

You know, Epic is a is a Do

他们没有能跟你们抗衡的产品吗？

they not have a competitive product to you?

他们确实有个产品或者某个功能。

They have a they have a product or a feature.

他们现在已经有东西了，甚至已经推出一段时间了，能帮着处理病历记录。

They have something out there now even that's been out for a beat that helps with notes.

但我之前跟你说的那些，其实特别关键。

But, you know, what I was explaining to you earlier is really, really critical.

对我们来说，从来就不是为了病历本身。

For us, it was never about the note.

我们真正看重的是那个信号，是那种对话，它才是我们切入的突破口。

It was always about the signal, the conversation that we were using as the wedge.

正是这种对话、这种语音信号，让我们能融入各种工作流程，甚至不止于病历。

That conversation, that spoken signal, allows us to now build into any number of workflows, even beyond notes.

当你在做病历的时候，比如结合后面整个收入周期，做法就会完全不同。

And when you're building notes with, for example, all of the revenue cycle that comes next, you build them differently.

就像那些基础模型公司一样，我们从来不想变成一个电子病历系统。

It's a moment where, kind of like the Foundation Model company, we don't ever want to be an electronic medical record.

顺便说一下，我是在Epic系统环境下长大的，以前待过的医疗系统里用过好几种电子病历。

And by the way, like, I grew up with Epic, and I was at a health system that had multiple medical records.

但相比之下，我用Epic的时候最开心，比其他任何系统都顺手。

And I was always the happiest when I was using Epic compared to any others out there.

所以我们是在这些系统之上做东西。

So we build on top of them.

但我们搭建的这一层，是智能层。

But the layer of the stack that we are building is the intelligence layer.

我们选择的切入点是对话，因为在医疗场景里，真正产生价值的时刻，就是医生、护士和患者讨论治疗方案的那一刻，那是最核心的时刻。

And the wedge that we've chosen is the conversation because it's that sacrosanct moment in healthcare where the actual value is getting exchanged, where the doctor and the patient or the nurse and the patient where they're talking about the care plans.

所以，如果我们能以一种既符合临床需求、又满足合规要求的方式记录这些对话，就能逐步构建起这一层，而且未来扩展起来也会非常容易。

And so being able to capture them in a way that's not just clinically useful, but compliant is a way to build out that layer over time and you can extend very easily.

我觉得很多经验往往是从反思自己做错的事情中得来的。

I think lessons are often learned from reflecting on what you did that you shouldn't have done.

回头想想，你有没有做过一些决定，现在看来其实换条路会更好？

What did you do that on with the benefit of hindsight, you're like, it would have been better to choose an alternative path?

疫情期间，大家其实都在摸索着前进。

During the pandemic, I think everybody's just sort of figuring it out.

也许我们本该更专注地投入研究，躲进实验室里专心搞科研，或者优化一下BERT模型。

I think perhaps we could have doubled down on research and just sort of hibernated for a beat into research caves and or we were fine tuning BERT models.

BERT、BioBERT、LongFormer、Pegasus、T5，这些模型我们都有在用。

BERT and BioBERT and LongFormer and Pegasus and T5.

我们在2021年就发过一篇论文，讲的是怎么用比大模型更早的模型，来实现今天这些功能，而且还能规模化。

And we had published a paper in 2021 around how you could actually do some of the jobs we do today at scale, but do it with models that predated LLMs.

其实我们本来可以多做点研发，但早在疫情之前，我们就已经决定：医生那边的门槛太高了，不如先从患者入手。

There's a world where we could have done more R and D, but the decision that we made pretty early on, even before the pandemic, was that the barrier to entry on the doctor side was so high, let's go build for patients.

所以我们做了一款面向消费者的App，让每个人都能直接问医生：‘我能录个音吗？’

So we built a direct to consumer app that would allow any one of us to ask our doctor, Hey, can I record?

然后把对话录下来，自动生成一份总结给自己留着。

And capture the conversation and create a summary for themselves.

我还记得当初向USV做种子轮路演时，有一张幻灯片上画着一位医生和一位患者面对面坐着。

I remember when we first pitched USV for that seed round, one of our slides had a doctor on one side, a patient on the other.

中间就像有个手机，我们其实能帮到双方。

There's like this mobile phone in the middle and was like, We can help both.

双方都需要帮助。

Both sides need help.

双方都希望有自主权。

Both sides want agency.

双方都希望掌握自己的故事，而我们正好能做到这一点。

Both sides want to own control the story or have that story, and we can do that.

我们可以用人工智能来服务他们。

We can serve them with AI.

所以我们先从一方入手。

And so we started on one side.

我觉得我自己有时候也在想，当初在患者这边，或许我们可以换种方式来做。

I think there's like a part of me that thinks that we could have perhaps built differently there on the patient side.

这对我们来说至关重要，稍后我会再谈到这一点。

It's super core to who we are, and we'll get back to that, actually.

我们现在再回到这张幻灯片的患者端。

We're getting back to the patient side of that slide now again.

但从战略上讲，当初做患者端是个错误。

But it was a strategic mistake then to build that patient side.

相对而言，也许我们本该在研发上多花几轮时间，而不是拼命琢磨能行得通的商业模式。

Relatively speaking, maybe we could have spent a couple more cycles on R and D as opposed to I mean, we were really banging our heads against the wall trying to figure out business models that could work.

说到底，也许这才是问题所在。

You know, maybe that's the mistake.

真正的问题不在于我们在这个领域做了什么，而是我没能尽早确认：我们到底有没有一家公司能立足于此。

It's not actually that we built in that space that I really worked hard to figure out if we had a company there, and we didn't.

因为单靠消费者端的医疗健康业务，往往只能做出那种永远没法赢得企业信任的公司。

Because the companies that you can build on top of just the consumer in healthcare, oftentimes there's the kind of companies that that paint themselves into a corner that can never be trustworthy enough to go enterprise.

这类公司商业模式的核心，是把用户极其私密的信息卖给不知谁谁谁，每天都得洗好几遍澡才能安心。

They're the kind of companies where the business models would require you to take multiple showers every single day because you're selling really private sensitive information to who knows what entity.

我们不想变成那样的公司，但意识到这点的时候，已经太晚了。

And that's we we didn't wanna be that, but, like, we realized that too late.

我觉得我当初该做的调整是，虽然我们做出来的东西确实很有价值，但也不能忽视了实际收入会是多少。

I think the pivot that I should have made is probably, Okay, we built something really valuable here, but let's not lose sight of what were the actual revenues are going to be.

所以回到你最初的问题，我对这家公司的核心理念非常坚定，但我们确实做了很多次调整，不只是营销方式，连商业模式也改了。

And so back to maybe your original question, I think very strong about what the thesis of the company was, but we pivoted a lot, not just on go to market, but also business model.

你提到的商业模式转型，很多人现在都在谈，比如按使用量收费这种特别创新的方式，其实Twilio早就这么做了。

You said about kind of business model pivot that I think a lot of people are talking about, oh, the rise of consumption based pricing like this, this incredibly innovative thing, which is Twilio has been around for a while.

对。

Yeah.

还有你提到的财务总监，你说了不同的利益相关方。

And CFOs that you mentioned, you mentioned different stakeholders.

财务总监喜欢按席位收费。

CFOs want seat pricing.

他们希望明确知道，比如我这里有10个医生。

They wanna know that, like, I've got 10 doctors.

我这里有10张账单。

I got 10 bills.

对于这些前沿企业来说，未来的定价机制应该是什么样的？

What is your lessons on the pricing mechanism of the future for many of these frontier businesses?

这挺有意思的。

Well, it's interesting.

我觉得我们还在摸索中。

I think we're still learning.

我们一开始的想法很简单，按席位收费，也就是企业一次性买断整个系统。

We started with a keep it simple idea, sensibility, per seat, you know, an enterprise licensing the entire system.

我们最早的竞争对手是微软。

The first big competitor for us was Microsoft.

他们几年前花了两百多亿美元收购了一家叫Nuance的公司，而且也有类似的产品。

They had bought a company called Nuance for 20 some billion some years ago, and they had a product in our category.

直到现在，我们还在市场上和他们竞争。

And we still compete with them in the marketplace.

但我觉得，我们已经确立了自己完全不同的定位，提供的是完全不一样的产品。

But I think we've established ourselves as a completely different type of company with a completely different kind of offering.

但现在，我们对待他们的做法已经和以前不一样了。

And at this point in time, we don't approach them the same way we used to.

所以你不觉得捆绑销售是个真正的威胁？

So you don't buy bundling as a real threat.

我记得我之前完全忽略了 Nabla。

I remember I'm completely fainting Nabla.

Nabla 应该是你们的竞争对手吧？

Nabla is a competitor of yours, I think.

是的。

Yeah.

一个潜在的对手。

A candidate.

我提到过他们，当时特别担心捆绑策略会严重威胁到他们主导市场的能力。

I alluded to them and I was like really concerned that bundling would be a very prominent threat to their ability to dominate the market.

我当时的担心是错的吗？

Was that a wrong concern of mine?

这两家公司我们现在几乎看不到了。

We don't see either of those companies much anymore.

我不确定这跟捆绑销售有没有关系。

I'm not sure if it has anything to do with bundling.

我觉得关键是我们成功开辟了一个新领域，创造了一个让市场真正认可的品类。

I think it has to just do with us being able to carve off, like, a category, you know, create a category that I think has resonated with the marketplace.

两天前我在亚特兰大埃默里大学参加了一些圆桌讨论，会上有位医生把‘bridge’当动词用，后来另一位医生也这么用了。

I was two days ago, I was in Atlanta and at Emory and was on some panels over there, but one of the doctors on the panel used a bridge as a verb, and then another doctor later used it as a verb.

晚餐时我问了其中一位，你当时说‘bridge’到底是什么意思？

And then I asked one over dinner, like, what did you mean when you said that?

他们解释的时候，意思远不止是‘帮我生成了一条笔记’那么简单。

And when they describe what they mean by that, they mean something that it's a lot more than like, oh, it created a note for me.

而是说它帮我做了很多事，减轻了我的负担，让我能专心面对眼前的病人。

It's like, oh, it did all these different jobs for me, and it unburdened me, and it allowed me to help, you know, just focus on the patient in front of me.

我觉得这才是我们能够胜出的原因。

I And think that's what what's allowed us to win.

我们回到你刚才问的价格问题。

Back to your pricing question.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得现在市面上很多定价模型都太复杂了，尤其是像微软这样的公司，把事情搞得特别晦涩难懂。

I I think there's a part of me that thinks that there's a lot of complex models out there, and especially like the Microsofts of the world just obfuscate things so much and make things so complicated.

到目前为止，我们能胜出，我觉得正是因为我们在定价上刻意跟他们反着来。

We've won so far by, I think, even competitively positioning against that.

但我也在想，我们得继续留意一下，因为看到其他行业有些公司用特别复杂的结构，结果还真行得通，我不禁怀疑是不是有什么我们没注意到的门道。

But there's a part of me that thinks that, like, you know, we need to continue to take notes here because I see some companies in other verticals with incredibly complex structures and find out it's working and wonder if there's something to it.

我总说，我宁愿把主菜留给别人当甜点，因为我会比他们更在意这件事。

I always say I always want my main course to be someone else's dessert because, like, I'm gonna care much more than they do.

而你对这个市场的重视程度，天然就远超微软，毕竟这可是你全部的事业。

And, like, you care much more than Microsoft do about this market by very nature of the fact that it's all you do.

对。

Yeah.

对那些正在听的创业者，有很多公司其实勉强能做，产品也还说得过去。

Any advice to founders listening where we have a lot of companies where it's like, well, they kinda could do and they kinda do have a competitive product.

我们该不该自己另起炉灶？

Should we just roll our own race?

我们该不该也死死盯住他们？

Should we be unwaveringly focused on them also?

如果你坐下来跟他们谈，有什么建议可以给到他们？

Any advice to them if you're sitting down with them?

我的意思是，你当然得跟他们竞争。

I mean, you gotta you wanna compete against them.

你肯定要干掉竞争对手。

You obviously wanna kill the competition.

但真正能干掉对手的办法，是专心做好自己的产品，同时留意他们的一举一动，这样才能找准自己的定位，甚至反向压制。

But the way you can kill the competition is mostly focusing on your product and keeping in mind what they're doing so that you can competitively position, but also counter position.

大公司往往有很多软肋，你完全可以针对这些弱点来反制，让他们不得不盯着你。

Big companies oftentimes have a lot of soft spots that you can be counter position against where they just have to watch you.

你说到这种反向定位的时候，

When you say counter position in that way,

我懂，因为我特别喜欢汉密尔顿·海尔姆的《七种力量》。

I know because I love Hamilton Helm with Seven Powers.

对。

Yeah.

你能解释一下这具体是什么意思吗？你怎么用它来赢得竞争？

Can you explain what that means and how you think about using it to win?

当你以一种对手不敢做的方式去做，因为那样会伤害他们现有的业务，这就会迫使他们认真思考，甚至根本不敢直接跟你正面竞争。

When you're building in a way where the competitor couldn't build because it would impact their current business, it would hurt them, it really pushes them to think hard and probably prohibits them from directly competing against you.

今天有什么事情，你明明能赚大钱，却偏偏不去做？

What could you make a large amount of money on today, but for some reason you do not?

这又是为什么？

And why is that?

我们卖数据是不赚钱的。

We don't make any money selling data.

我们不这么做，是因为在医疗行业，信任是一切。

We don't because trust is everything in healthcare.

整个行业的发展速度，完全取决于信任的建立。

Like, the industry moves at the speed of trust.

建立信任要花很长时间，但我觉得，相对这个行业来说，我们已经以惊人的速度做到了。

It takes so long to build up, and we've been able to build it up, I think, in record time, relatively speaking, in this industry.

我们四年里完成的事，很多公司得花十五到二十年，这全靠公司内部的团队、他们建立的关系，以及最重要的是，我们交付的产品和创造的价值。

I think we've done in four years what a lot of companies take fifteen to twenty years to be able to do, and that's all thanks to the people inside the company and the relationships that they build, and at the core, the product that we've been able to deliver and the value that we've been able to create.

我能问你个问题吗？

Can I ask you a question?

这难道不是关乎更大利益的道德问题吗？

Is that not a moral question for the greater good?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，如果你为医疗数据打造一个像鹦鹉那样的系统，是不是就能让前沿模型更好地发展，从而推动全球医疗水平的提升？

And what I mean by that is if you were to create a macaw for health care data, would you actually be empowering frontier models to create better models for the world to benefit global health care services.

这难道不是一个道德问题吗？

Is is that not a moral question?

但具体该怎么做呢？

But how do you do it, though?

你到底该怎么操作？

How do you do it?

那你跟谁合作来实现呢？

And who do you partner with to do it?

都有哪些人参与？

And who's involved?

当然，谁来负责？对我们来说，每开发一个利用数据的新功能，公司里都有一个原则：先赢得信任。

Obviously, Who's a And so for us, when we build new features that leverage data, we have a refrain in the company, which is earn the right.

所以我们总是先跟医疗系统合作伙伴沟通，他们往往提前就知道我们的路线图，也已经认可了，我们甚至在合同里就写明了可以基于获得的洞察来开发X、Y、Z功能，从而优化产品或推出相关的新产品，创造价值。

So we always go back to our health system partners and oftentimes they know about our roadmap in advance and they've already blessed it and we've already papered this into the contract that we can build X, Y, Z with the insights that we get so that we can improve the product or build other adjacent products that create whatever value.

但建立这个基础模型，就像我们之前说过的那样。

But building that foundation model is like we talked about it before.

我们确实会深入到更底层的部分。

We we do reach lower into the stack.

我们会自己训练模型。

We do train our own models.

某种程度上，这些模型才是我们真正的核心工具。

And to some extent, we are you know, these models are the the real workhorse for us.

那么，我们能不能打造一个模型，为更大的公共利益服务呢？

And so could we build a model that ends up serving that kind of function for the greater good?

当然可以。

Absolutely.

但我们希望在所有人都清楚明白的情况下这么做。

We would just want to do that with everybody's eyes wide open.

我们的所有合作伙伴都表示：我们一起来做。

All of our partners saying, let's go.

我们也正有此意。

We want that too.

在这个行业里，这套做法是行得通的。

In this industry, it works.

在这个行业里，大家都能明白这个道理。

In this industry, people kinda get it.

你可以选择A：提前六个月获得前沿模型的访问权，或者选择B：获得一支由顶尖研究员和工程师组成的团队，为期六个月。

You can have access to option a, frontier models before anyone else for six months, or option b, a talent pool of the best researchers and engineers for six months.

你会选哪个？

Which would you rather?

选B。

B.

这还用说吗。

No question about it.

归根结底，最重要的始终是人。

Because ultimately, it's always about the people.

只要你有出色的人才，迟早能自己打造出模型和底层技术。

And if you've got incredible people, you're gonna build your own models, your own primitives.

没错，前沿模型你确实能搭上这趟车。

And, yes, the frontier models, you're gonna be able to ride.

但那种套利机会，那种短暂的优势，对我们来说根本不是终极目标。

But that that arbitrage, that period of arbitrage, you know, that's not the be all end all for us.

人才市场真有大家说的那么难吗？

Is the talent marketplace as hard as everyone suggests it is?

是的。

Yeah.

当然了。

Yeah, absolutely.

我觉得我们有个优势，能给候选人带来不少正向情绪。

You know, I think we have the benefit of being able to release a good amount of oxytocin for candidates.

我们是一家有使命的公司。

We're like a purpose company.

我们是一家追求意义的公司。

We are a meaning company.

即使公司已经估值后，你依然愿意把最宝贵的几年献给这里，因为我们已经具备规模，而且正在做三件事。

You can be post money but still wanna put your best years into this company because we're at scale, and we're trying to do three things.

我们想为医疗体系中最重要的那些人节省时间。

We're trying to save time for the people who matter most in health care.

我们想为整个系统节省开支。

We're trying to save money for the system.

医疗领域需要降低成本，但同时我们也要挽救生命。

We need deflationary economics in health care, but we also wanna save lives.

你刚才提到了更大的福祉。

You talked about the greater good.

我们希望让医护人员感觉自己像超级英雄。

We wanna help clinicians feel like superheroes.

我们有个新功能，刚刚上线了，比如医生登录系统后。

We have a feature, for example, we just released where a doctor goes in.

我们会提示他们该问哪些问题，或者该考虑哪些诊断方向。

We give them cues on what questions they should ask or diagnoses they should consider.

我们的方式跟市面上大多数临床决策支持产品完全不同。

And we're doing it in a totally differentiated way unlike a lot of clinical decision support products out there.

我们靠的是上下文。

We're using context.

我们专门针对每个病人的具体情况来设计这些信息。

We're engineering the context about who this patient is.

这些信息来自各种医疗系统，也来自医患对话本身。

That context comes from all those different systems of record and from the conversation.

恕我直言，如果你只是给医生提示该问什么、该考虑什么诊断，干脆直接让他们下岗算了。

With the greatest of respect, dude, if you're giving them prompts for questions and diagnoses, for goodness' sake, just replace them.

这得看情况。

It depends.

每位医生如果发现自己的工作能被机器人替代，大概都会问一句：你开什么玩笑？

So every clinician, if a bot can do their job, I think most every clinician will say, like, what are you talking about?

几年前《美国医学会杂志·内科学》上有一篇文章提到，医生每天得有三十个小时才能把所有工作做完。

There was an American Journal and General Internal Medicine article that was published a few years ago that suggested that doctors need thirty hours a day to get all of their work done.

所以我们仔细研究了那篇论文，把导致三十小时工作量的每一项任务都拆解了一遍，现在正逐一解决。

So understandably, we've looked at the paper, we've parsed all the different tasks that lead to thirty hours, and we're picking them off.

我们正在组建一批助手或智能代理，提前帮医生完成所有病历录入，告诉他们该问哪些问题，协助撰写病历，处理账单。

We're creating these teams of assistants, of agents that can go and get all the pre charting done for the doctor before they walk in, tell them what questions to ask, help them create their note, do their billing.

只要是我们能做的其他事情，我们都会尽力去实现。

All the other things that we can do, we absolutely will try to do.

但与此同时，就像你问的那样，那些高频、低风险的诊疗环节，确实必须自动化。

At the same time though, I think, like to your question, there's high frequency, low stakes care that absolutely needs to be automated.

比如现在在犹他州，就有很多争议，关于公司能不能开始自动处理药品续方。

Right now in Utah, for example, there's a bunch of controversy around companies being able to or starting to automate medication refills.

AI能不能自动为患者续开处方？

Can AI automate prescription refills for a patient?

这种事，再低风险、再高频不过了。

That's as, low stakes, high frequency as it gets.

但正是这类工作流程，会一步步被自动化，最终让我们接近一种最枯燥、没人愿意做的初级医疗模式。

But it's those types of workflows that will progressively get automated till we get to some approximation of maybe the most boring variant of primary care that nobody wants to practice.

但一旦涉及到那些复杂的情况，就像你之前提到的品味和判断力，我觉得那时候情况就会变得非常现实，也会引发杰文斯悖论之类的现象。

But as soon as you get into the hard stuff, you talked about taste and judgment earlier, that's where I think things get very real and that's where invoke Jevon's paradox or whatever.

但我们正面临着一波医疗需求的浪潮，而目前的体系并没有准备好去应对。

But we're in for a tsunami of health care needs and the system is not prepared to deliver it.

哦，我完全不用担心我们会因为不需要医生而裁掉他们。

Oh, I unwaveringly don't worry about, oh, we're gonna fire doctors because we don't need them.

对。

Yeah.

最离谱的就是这个。

Is the most ridiculous.

你去过

Have you

那种

ever been to, like,

急诊室吗？

an emergency room?

外面有很多人。

There are people out there.

外面有很多人。

There are people out there.

是的。

Yeah.

对，我知道。

Yeah, I know.

他们周五晚上得去急诊室，亲眼看看那种痛苦。

They need to go to an emergency room on a Friday night and see the pain.

这种事情正在发生。

It is happening.

高盛最近其实有篇报道，我偶然读到，说奇怪的是，我睡前总爱看些

Goldman actually recently, I was reading Weirdly, I have bedtime reading that

我每天晚上都会找来读。

I queue up every night.

得多出去走走。

Need to get out more.

我以前经常参加聚会。

I used to party.

现在我晚上睡觉前会读点东西，白天把文章存起来。

Now I have bed time reading where I save articles in the day.

昨晚我就读了一篇。

And I was reading one last night.

文章里提到高盛的一项分析，估计在五年内，智能代理的令牌消耗量会增长24倍。

They said that there was an article by Goldman, and essentially, they estimate that agents within a five year period will increase token consumption by 24 x.

特别具体，就是24倍。

Very specific, 24 x.

25倍就有点夸张了。

25 would be exaggerated.

你觉得这个数字是高估了、低估了，还是差不多？

Do you think that is overplayed, underplayed, or about right?

具体的数字我不确定，但我觉得大方向上是对的。

I don't know about the specific number, but I think, directionally, I think so.

一旦你开始用上这项技术，根本停不下来。

You just can't get enough of this technology once you start to use it.

就算推理成本降了，你还是会越用越多。

Even as inference costs come down, you just end up using more and more and more of it.

有些工作，尤其是那些你永远做不好的，简直就是无底洞。

I think for certain jobs, especially the jobs that you'll never be good enough on, those are bottomless pits.

现在比以往任何时候都更明显，连公司怎么组织都体现了这一点——你能覆盖的范围大得多。

Now more than ever before, even reflected in the way people are organizing their companies these days, you can cover a lot more surface area.

那就多做点就是了。

So just do that much more.

现在最难招的是什么岗位？

What's the hardest role to hire for today?

我觉得，能把真正出色的高管——判断力超强的那种——吸引到我们这样的公司，特别关键。

I just think getting really amazing executives, like really high judgment executives, into a company like ours is critical.

这部分是因为我们现在所处的时刻确实前所未有。

A part of it is because this is pretty unprecedented, this moment.

能有这样一些人当向导特别重要，他们熟悉大量过往经验，但又能跳出这些经验，反过来反思它们。

Being able to have folks who can serve as guides, who have a lot of patterns that they can match against priors, but the right person who can kind of go against those priors but can kind of reflect upon them.

从做决定到采取行动之间的时间正在不断缩短。

The time between a decision and an action is getting compressed.

很明显，产品开发这块，我们现在的做法跟一年前已经大不一样了。

Obviously, product development, we do things differently now than we did a year ago even.

公司各个层级的时间都在被压缩。

Every layer of the company is getting compressed.

我觉得，找到那些判断力超强的高管，依然是我一直在努力的事。

And I think high judgment people, incredible executives is is still a thing that I'm working on.

你怎么看布赖恩·切斯基说的‘创始人模式’？他强调要尽可能贴近最底层的运作。

How do you think about you know, Brian Chesky obviously speaks about Founder Mode and the importance of getting as close to the bare metal as possible.

一方面你提到高管需要靠经验模式来应对问题，另一方面你怎么平衡这两者？

How do you think about that on the one hand with the need for execs pattern matching playbooks that you mentioned there?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得这两者并不配套。

I I I don't think they're they they go together.

在我看来，创始人模式其实就是服役期的概念。

I think, like, Founder Mode is just about to me, it's about tours of duty.

看公司里哪里着火了，或者什么事最重要，再结合你最擅长的，你就冲上去解决它。

Depending on what's on fire inside the company or, like, what's the most important thing and what you're best at, you just go crush.

遇到挑战，你就得全力以赴把它拿下。

You just have to go kill whatever that challenge is.

这不意味着你要事无巨细地去管每个人。

And it doesn't mean getting into the details and micromanaging everybody in the company.

而是该上场的时候就上场，该退下的时候就退下。

It means doing the tour of duty when it makes sense.

Jensen，也就是Nvidia，是我们投资人之一，他跟我讲过这件事。

Jensen, Nvidia is one of our investors, and Jensen told me this.

他曾经半夜给我打电话，当时正开车回家，突然来这么一通，但我一听就知道是他。

He once called me at midnight, and it was, like, on his way home, cold call, and I knew it was him.

我接起来，感觉特别棒。

And I picked it up, and it was it was awesome.

你当时在睡觉吗？

Were you in bed?

我在睡。

I was.

我就爬起来了。

And I got up.

明白了。

Alright.

那是我亲爱的。

It's my darling.

是Jensen。

It's Jensen.

是的

Yeah.

没错

Exactly.

你一定会飞起来的

You are gonna fly.

是给你妻子的

It's to your wife.

没错

It is.

我确实就是这么说的

That's actually what I said.

我的朋友詹森

My buddy Jensen.

我就是这么说的

What I said.

她就回了句，随便吧。

And she was like, whatever.

我跟他说：嘿，Jensen。

I was like, hello, Jensen.

我那时候正小声跟他说话。

I'm like, whispering to him.

他怎么说的？

What did he say?

他给我回电话，是因为我之前发了封邮件给他。

He was he was calling me back because of an email I had sent him.

我那天早些时候就给他发了条简短的消息。

I'd sent him, like, a two liner earlier in the day.

他的服务响应时间简直快得离谱。

So his SLAs are insane.

他回得特别快。

He responds that fast.

这真的太不可思议了。

It's really wild.

他想帮我梳理一下我当时遇到的难题。

He wanted to unpack, like, a challenge that I was experiencing.

但那天我学到的一课是，你的工作就是爱上你正在做的这份工作。

But one of the lessons for me that day was just, like, your job is to fall in love with whatever the job is.

这是你可以做到的。

That is something you can do.

你可以说服自己。

You can convince yourself.

你得想办法调整自己，让自己真正喜欢上整天在飞机上生活的样子。

You have to find a way to bend your DNA to, like, crisper new DNA in that, like, loves living on airplanes.

我现在就是整天在飞机上过日子。

I live on airplanes now.

如果你五年前抓到我，我肯定说：绝不可能。

And I I I think if you caught me, like, five years ago, I'd be like, never.

我们不会那么做。

We're not gonna do that.

我们会找别的办法来成长和扩展。

Like, we're gonna find other ways to grow and scale.

但这份工作就是需要这样，而我也享受这个过程。

But this is what the job requires, and I enjoy it.

你还没把你的

What have you not CRISPRED your

优势转化成真正擅长的事呢？

way into yet that you need to?

是啊，这问题问得好。

Yeah, it's a good question.

我觉得，人们的优势往往也是他们的短板。

I'd say, like, you know, people's strengths are their weaknesses too.

你特别特别擅长的东西，背后总有个阴影。

There's a shadow to what you're very, very good at.

我下面管着人力资源团队。

I have HR reporting to me.

这类工作并不属于我最该做的核心事务。

That kind of stuff is not the kind of stuff where I think I'm operating top of license.

我前几天发过一条推文，说从来没有哪位出色的CEO是真正喜欢人力资源的。

I tweeted the other day that no great CEO ever liked HR.

是的。

Yeah.

我发了那条推文后，收到的反对意见多到惊人，真的吗？

I have never got so much hate Oh, really?

回头一看，全是批评。

Back.

我的意思是，真的吗？

I mean Really?

没想到会引发这么大的反应。

It was just surprising.

我明白这个道理。

I see that.

我一直觉得，这大概就是为什么大家总拿HR里的‘凯伦’开玩笑吧。

I thought that was why, like, know, we all joke about, like, Karen in HR.

但我心里清楚。

But I know.

可人人都说，你这个人太狠了。

But everyone's like, you know, you're a dick.

我对这一点感到很意外。

I'm surprised by that.

天哪。

Oh my god.

真够狠的。

Savage.

当时我就说，听好了。

At that, and then I said, listen.

如果你周五想在家上班，那也没问题。

If you wanna work from home on Friday, that's okay.

但你得坦率接受一点：你不会像在办公室那么拼命干。

But just accept that bluntly, you're not gonna work as hard.

你十点去上普拉提，周五在家上班？这等于一周四天都在摸鱼。

You're gonna go to Pilates at ten, and work from home Fridays is bullshit four days a week.

你们是每周五天都在办公室吗？

Are you five days a week in office?

我们每周在办公室三天。

We are three days in office.

为什么这么说？

Why?

有些同事通勤距离太远，来公司很不方便。

We just have certain folks who have to travel long distances in order to get in the office.

所以我们还在摸索，到底什么样的安排最合适。

And so we're still adjusting what exactly, like, the sweet spot is.

这样没问题吧？

Is that okay?

你难道不希望一周五天都在办公室吗？

Would you not rather have five days a week?

我喜欢和大家在一起。

I love being around the people.

我喜欢在白板前工作，但我也经常在飞机上度过。

I love being at the whiteboards, but I'm also living on airplanes.

但我很清楚，尤其是EPD，对公司里每个人都有很大帮助。

But I I just know how much, especially EPD benefits, about everybody in the company honestly, like, benefits.

不过现在事情变化太快了，面对面的时间越多，效果就越好。

But this moment, things are moving so quickly that the more time that you have in person, the better.

这点毫无疑问。

There's no question about it.

我不是那种自上而下管人的类型。

I'm not like a top down.

我们当然不是那种自上而下的风格，但我们的文化确实不是那样的。

We're not like top down September, obviously, but we don't have that kind of culture.

我觉得很多人只是在刷指标，这其实就是古德哈特定律。

I think that there are a lot of people who are token maxing and, like, it's Goodhart's law.

以你们现在的规模，会不会因为流程和政策变得僵化而拖慢节奏？

Do you worry at your size, you malaise into slowness process policy?

你们一共有多少人？

How many people do you have?

四百五十人。

450.

四百五十。

Four fifty.

四百五十人的时候，真能只靠核心团队撑起来吗？说实话。

Is it possible to only have a players at four fifty, honestly?

这是个很好的问题。

It's a great question.

我觉得是的。

I think so.

而且我觉得这需要每个人都能参与进来。

And I think I think it takes everybody in

公司里的每个人都需要不断审视自己的标准，重新评估，确保所有人都达标。

the company continually looking at what their bar is and reassessing and making sure that everybody is.

你是什么时候开始不再见每一个新加入的人的？

When did you stop meeting everyone who joined?

已经很久了。

It's been a long time.

已经很久了。

It's been a long time.

一百人的时候？

A 100?

甚至可能再早一点，说实话。

Even probably even a little bit before that, honestly.

大概就是那时候。

It was around then.

是吗？

Is that right?

那你建议其他创始人该怎么

And how would you advise other founders on how to

说实话，根本没什么固定套路。

that there's any playbook, honestly.

我觉得这还跟你身边的人有关。

I think it depends on who's around you too.

比如你身边有哪些高管，他们能不能分担很多这类工作。

Like, what what executives around you who can do a lot of that work as well.

我觉得文化特别关键。

I think culture is critical.

不管创始人兼CEO怎么想，他们在塑造文化上都起着决定性作用。

And no matter what the founder CEO thinks, they play a huge part in setting it.

你可以用很多种方式传达你认为能帮助你取胜、实现使命的文化。

And there are a lot of different ways you can you can kinda convey what you believe is the culture that's gonna help you win, achieve your mission.

在我看来，亲自面见每一个候选人并不在其中。

And meeting every single candidate isn't necessarily, in my estimation, one of them.

如果你真正信任你的招聘经理和高管们，让他们传递这种文化，事情自然能搞定。

I think if you really trust your hiring managers and you really trust your executives as carriers of that culture, you can work it out.

你觉得哪些文化要素最不为人所知，却至关重要？

What is the most non obvious but core cultural element that isn't standard?

大家都会说要更有野心、更投入、更注重使命，这些都对。

You know, everyone's slightly more ambitious people, people that care, mission oriented, all that.

当然。

Wonderful.

对我来说，有个挺特别的，叫‘泰坦尼克法则’。

So one weird one for me is that it's called the Titanic rule.

我之前提到过席琳·迪翁。

And I mentioned Celine Dion earlier.

我们这儿特别喜欢《泰坦尼克号》。

We love Titanic here.

没错。

Yeah.

这电影真棒。

Great movie.

整整三个小时。

It's three hours long.

每个人都该能和家人一起进影院看场电影。

Everyone should be able to go to a cinema with their families.

但如果你在WhatsApp或Slack上收到消息，就得在三小时内回复，必须的。

But if you're asked a question on WhatsApp's Slack, you need to respond within three fucking hours.

这能推动效率和紧迫感，这就是泰坦尼克法则。

It drives efficiency and urgency, titanic rule.

对。

Yeah.

还有什么不太明显、特别、反主流的信念在引导你的原则吗？

Anything that guides your principles that's less obvious, special, counterculture?

比如Luxe的Josh Wolf，我记得好多年前见过他，他经常说一句话：肩上的负担，能变成口袋里的筹码。

You know, like, the Josh Wolf from Luxe, I remember years ago meeting him, And I think he says this a lot, but chips chips on shoulders makes chips in pockets.

这种特质其实很难去评估一个人，但有些人就是有一种惊人的冲劲，而这股劲头源自他们内心最深处的东西。

I think that's it's a hard thing to kind of be able to assess in a person, but there are just certain people who have insane slope, and that slope is coming from something very, very deep in core to, you know, to who they are.

他们有明确的目标，你一看到他们，就忍不住想支持他们。

They're on a mission, and you see them and you just wanna you wanna invest in them.

你甚至想买他们的股票，那种感觉就是说不清，但就是能感受到。

You want stock in them, and you you just sort of feel it.

所以我觉得，不是说有人在到处找心理上有问题的人，我们之前聊到过心理评估的事。

So I think, like, it's not that you're looking for like, there's a bunch of VCs out there looking for broken people, and we're talking about psychological assessments, I think, before we started.

确实有些风投会这么做，我之前在融资前，就遇到过一位这样的投资人。

Now some VCs will do that, and I had one before we we took money from one of our investors.

但我认为，关键是要找到那种发自内心的热忱，这种热忱不仅能带来你提到的那些执行力，更能体现韧性和拼劲。

But I think it's just looking for a level of fire that's gonna translate into not only those SLAs you talked about, but, you know, resilience and grind.

这一直都是战时状态，而且现在的战争跟以往任何时期都不一样。

And it's always wartime, and it's a different kind of war now than ever before.

不是每个人都能当战士。

And not everybody's a warrior.

你是战时型CEO，还是和平时期型CEO？

Are you a wartime or a peacetime CEO?

哦，

Oh,

别开玩笑了。

come on.

真的，别逗了。

Like, come on.

你是战时型CEO？

You're a wartime CEO?

你不可能是。

You can't be.

是的

Yeah.

别无他法，只能如此。

There's no other there's no other way to be.

你永远都在竞争。

You're always competing.

你所处的市场变化太快了。

You're in a market that is moving so fast.

哪有什么和平时期的CEO？

Like, who's a peacetime CEO?

就连Costco的CEO，我觉得他特别棒但被低估了，他是和平时期的CEO吗？

Like, even the Costco CEO, who I think is awesome and under celebrated, is he a peacetime CEO?

也许他是。

Maybe he is.

也许他确实是个出色的和平时期CEO。

Maybe he maybe he's a good peacetime CEO.

但只要创始人一退出CEO位置，我就走了。

But The minute the founder transitions out of CEO role, I'm out.

你同意这个说法吗？

Do you agree with that?

是的。

Yeah.

我确实很认同这类公司，你知道的，我就喜欢这种公司。

I definitely, like, you know, I believe in those types of companies.

我就想投资这种公司。

Those are the types of companies I want.

在Abridge的发展过程中，你觉得哪个阶段最难熬？

What stage of Abridge development have you struggled most with?

我一直觉得产品与市场的契合度就像一连串章节。

You know, I always think product market fit is a series of chapters.

我们总是搞错。

And we always get it wrong.

我当时以为已经找到产品市场契合点了，结果突然一下就没了。

It's like, I had product market fit and then boom.

所以你得不断去发现新的产品市场契合点。

So you're constantly finding new product market fits.

在公司发展的哪个阶段，你觉得最难应对？

What chapter of company development did you find the most challenging to grapple with?

那现在你明白了什么？

And what do you know now?

说实话，我觉得公司最难受的阶段，就是那种没什么压力的时候。

You know, honestly, like the the chapter of company that that sucks the most is like the one where you don't feel pressure.

我们公司有句话叫：压力出钻石。

Like, we we have a saying in the company, pressure makes diamonds.

当你感觉像在 cruise control，完全靠自动驾驶的时候，那种感觉真的很糟。

When it feels somehow like you're on cruise control, you're on autopilot, that kinda sucks.

如果你没在琢磨怎么把目标翻十倍，没在想怎么突破常规，没在找新的突破口、创造新价值，一旦你感觉不到压力，开始躺平了，那真的特别难受。

If you're not figuring out how to 10x your ambitions, if you're not figuring out how to think outside the box or find new pockets to pull from, new value to create, you if don't feel that pressure for some reason, if you're coasting, that doesn't feel feel good at all.

你们最高的一轮融资是多少？

What's the largest round you've raised?

上一轮是三亿，大概一年前完成的。

Our last one was 300 about a year ago.

明白了。

Okay.

融了三亿美元之后，你们怎么防止开支和预算变得松散？

So when you raise 300,000,000, how do you prevent expenses and budget becoming too loose?

这么多钱，我见过不少公司一拿到钱就乱花。

It's a lot of money, and I see it with a lot of companies where suddenly spending just becomes loose.

各种活动、差旅、酒店，乱七八糟的开销就来了。

Events, travel, hotels, da da da, it's loose.

你们是怎么避免这种情况的？

How do you prevent that?

我们请了非常有原则的财务负责人，他们能和我们一起梳理公司的目标，然后明确哪些目标绝对不能妥协。

You hire really principled finance leaders who can work together with you to unpack what the goals of the company are and then recognize that against certain goals, you don't wanna blink.

你融这笔钱，是因为现在它就是个硬工具，能帮你赢下来。

You raise this capital because it's a brute instrument now that is gonna allow you to win.

所以有些事，根本没必要讨论。

And so against certain things, you just don't wanna even debate.

如果你还在纠结，那你就做错了。

And if you are, you're doing it wrong.

但如果你有懂业务的财务负责人，你就该有分寸，知道像给纽约办公室买一套高档音响这种事，其实根本没必要。

But having the right business minded folks and finance leader means that you should probably also have discipline to know that you didn't need what I just ordered for our New York City office, like some fancy speakers.

不过有时候，这些细节确实能塑造文化。

But sometimes that stuff creates culture too.

对，没错。

So yeah.

哪一轮融资最难？

What was the hardest round to raise?

最难的是A轮。

The hardest round was a series a one.

你知道，风险投资，你当然也清楚，那一轮其实挺弱的。

You know, venture capital, you know, you obviously know it was a weak round.

我们当时处境不妙，因为融资额后面就带了个‘1’。

We were in a weak spot because there's, like, a digit at the end of it.

就是个‘1’。

A one.

简直糟透了。

Like, terrible.

他当时说

And he's

这到底是什么鬼东西？

like, what the fuck is this?

是啊。

Yeah.

那边的情况确实挺艰难的。

Obviously, things are tough over there.

但那头几年，我们就觉得消费类产品那种商业模式不太对劲。

But those first years, we talked about, like, the consumer product business models not feeling right.

你们是不是一直被拒绝？

Did you just get lots of no's?

那一轮确实收到了不少拒绝。

We got a handful of no's on that round for sure.

USV 不是应该保证你们下一轮融资吗？

Does USV not just guarantee your next round?

他们投了种子轮和 A 轮。

They did the seed and the a.

一开始，USV 就是我们商业模式的核心。

USV was our business model initially.

我们还有贝塞默、Pillar 这些很棒的投资人，还有很多其他机构，但那时候我们还没到转折点。

We had other great investors like Bessemer and Pillar and plenty of others, but we were pre inflect.

所以我们能感觉到，情况不对。

And so we knew we could feel it.

那时候So在发生什么？

Was So was happening in

是那个A1吗？

that A1?

是的。

Yeah.

我们找到了一些相信Winnington Ventures的人。

We found folks who believed in Winnington Ventures, for example.

比如，我们做过一轮估值两倍的融资。

Like, we did a round at a two x.

大家都觉得突破很快就要来了。

Folks believed that it was coming soon.

我们拿到了像

We got it like

40投8这样的投资。

a eight on 40.