20VC：千亿美元AI助手之争：Town、Instinct与GrokBot的对决 | 我们为每位工程师在AI工具上投入7.5万美元 | AI助手市场并非泡沫，且AI助手将取代你手机上的每一个应用——专访Town创始人JD

所以一旦你知道了这一点，而且你知道价格每九到十二个月就会减半，你就知道它会降到什么水平，这样你今天就可以把产品定价在一个能在十八个月内产生百分之二十、百分之三十利润率的位置。

And so as soon as you know that, and you know the price every nine to twelve months halves, so you know where it's going to be, so that you could price your product today at a point where you'll generate 20 percent, 30% margins in eighteen months.

我们基本上就是这么想的。

That's the way that we mostly think about it.

但关键问题是，到最后，你的任务里有多少比例是前沿的？是百分之十、百分之二十还是百分之三十？

But the open question is, at the end of the day, are you left with 10% of your tasks being frontier or 20% or 30%?

这个答案我们不知道，而这会改变这些公司的经济状况。

And we don't know the answer to that, and that will change the economics of these companies.

现在有多少比例的任务是用开源模型处理的，又有多少是用前沿模型？

What percent of tasks go through open versus frontier today?

对我们来说，大部分都是前沿模型。

For us, it's mostly frontier.

为什么？

Why is that?

恕我直言，这些任务本身，我觉得其实并没有那么复杂。

With the greatest of respect, the tasks being asked, I don't imagine are actually that sophisticated.

这里就是，抱歉。

And this is where, like sorry.

恕我直言，就像我们之前聊到Instinct一样，我给Instinct的都是难题。

With the greatest of respect, as we talked about Instinct earlier, I give Instinct hard problems.

我想要IMAX的《奥德赛》票，连续几天每分钟盯着看有没有票。

I want Odyssey tickets at the IMAX, continuously monitor it for days by the minute that they're there.

对你来说，恕我直言，我们的网站就是用来做邮件标签和预简报的。

For you, in the greatest of respect, it's our site for email tagging and pre briefs.

简单多了。

Much easier.

其实，很多人也会让我们做难的事情。

Well, actually, a lot of people ask us to do hard things.

所以很多用户定制的流程其实挺复杂的。

So a lot of the custom workflows that people build will be quite complicated.

所以那些地方我们大多会用前沿模型。

And so that's where we will use most frontier.

我觉得我们在标注这类任务上还是不会用开源模型，但我们会用前沿提供商里更便宜的模型。

I think we still don't use open weight for things like labeling, but we will use much cheaper models from one of the frontier providers.

主要原因是因为作为公司，我们的重点是，想象一下，我可以通过转向开源模型来改善我们的成本，但这并不会给我带来太多产品优势。

The main reason is because as a company, our focus Imagine, I can improve our COGS by moving to open weight, but it doesn't give me much product advantage.

它不会让我的产品变得更好用。

It doesn't make my product work better.

所以如果我有一个工程师的工时，这个工时最好花在哪里？

So if I have an engineer hour, what is the engineer hour best spent on?

是让我现有的收入变得更高效？

Is it taking my current ARR and making it more efficient?

还是想办法通过开发更好的网络效应功能来更快地增长产品？

Or is it figuring out a way to grow the product faster by working on a better network effect feature?

或者让模型变得更好，并集成一个新的数据源，让模型对一部分用户的轨迹预测变得更好？

Or making the model better and integrating with a new data source that makes its trajectories much better for a set of our users?

我们非常专注于更快地把蛋糕做大，而不是追求理想的经济效益。

And we're very focused on growing the pie faster, much more so than getting the ideal economics.

而且我们的经济状况还不错，对吧？

And our economics are fine, right?

虽然可以更好，我也能更快地降低成本，但那不是业务成功的关键限制，所以我们不这么做。

They could be better, and I could move down the cost curve faster, but that's not the constraint to success for the business, so that's why we don't do it.

在网络效应方面，有没有什么有趣的教训或观察？

On the network effects side, have there been any interesting lessons or observations?

从全面铺开到全面覆盖，你学到了什么？

What have you learned on expansion from wall to wall?

首先，对我们来说，网络效应的一个有趣之处是，如果公司里有一个人喜欢捣鼓，开始构建团队技能、团队集成、团队例行程序这些镇上所有人都能免费使用的积木，那么我们往往会看到更快的采用速度。

So first of all, interesting aspect for us of network effects is if the company has one person who is a tinkerer and who starts to build things like team skills, team integrations, team routines, those are all building blocks on town that everyone on the team gets for free, then we tend to see a lot more adoption faster.

这很有趣，对吧，因为我们试图打造一个不需要这种捣鼓的产品。

It's interesting, right, because we're trying to build a product that doesn't require the tinker.

因为对于单人体验，我们希望你能快速上手并获得大量价值。

Because for the single player experience, we want you to be onboarded and get a ton of value.

如果你是房地产经纪人，你会有专门针对房地产经纪人的自动化工具。

And if you're a real estate agent, you have automations that are real estate agent specific.

如果你是销售人员，你会得到专门为销售人员设计的自动化功能。

And if you're a salesperson, you get automations that are salesperson specific.

我们想让你开箱即用就获得这种体验，但实际情况是，如果旁边有高级用户，他们会找到方法让其他用户更成功。

We're trying to give that experience to you out of the box, but what happens is if there's a power user that's next to other users, they find ways to make those other users much more successful.

我觉得很多AI产品都会有这种情况。

And I think you'll find that with a lot of AI products.

实际上，一个预测指标就是团队里有没有喜欢捣鼓技术的人。

One of the predictors actually is, is there a tinkerer on the team?

我们经常问自己一个问题：我们能不能识别出这些人，并且让他们更容易为其他团队成员创造传播效应？

One of the questions we ask ourselves a lot is, can we identify those folks, and can we make it easier for them to create virality for their other team members?

第二个观察是，在公司里，甚至在企业里，有很多职能领域还没有被AI充分覆盖。

And then the second observation is, there are a lot of functions that are underserved by AI within companies, even enterprises.

我给你举一个很简单的例子。

I'll give you a very simple one.

如果你是企业里的销售团队，这三年来你已经被各种AI产品推销过无数次了。

If you're a sales team at an enterprise, you've been sold AI in every direction now for three years.

如果你是销售运营人员，一天没收到十封AI公司的邮件，那你肯定没上LinkedIn。

If you're a sales ops person and you do not have 10 emails a day from an AI company, you're not on LinkedIn.

那肯定有问题。

Something's wrong.

完全同意。

Totally.

但还有其他职能，比如行政助理、幕僚长、HR团队成员、财务，以及一些初级财务人员，他们日常工作中接触的AI并不多。

But then there are other functions like executive assistants, chief of staff, HR team members, finance, some more junior finance team members that don't have that much AI in their day to day.

确实不多。

They really don't.

他们的很多工作流程还是靠邮件或者招聘人员来完成的。

And a lot of their workflows still operate out of email or recruiters.

所以像Town这样的产品，我们经常发现早期采用和增长，而且我觉得有些职能从外面看没那么吸引人，但实际上他们非常渴望用技术来让生活更轻松。

And so a product like Town, I think often we find early adoption and growth, and I would say some functions that seem from the outside less juicy, but actually that are really hungry for technology to help make their life easier.

所以一旦他们采用了，就会产生一个有趣的效果，因为他们经常和领导、高管或者运营团队的人合作，然后我们就能通过运营团队渗透进去。

And so as soon as they adopt it, there's an interesting effect because they often work with, like, leaders or execs or people in ops teams, and then we get penetration through the ops teams.

从使用到让人眼前一亮，或者说到让用户感到惊喜，这个时间有多重要？

How important is time to wow or time to user delight?

对。

Yeah.

说实话，我觉得我们的产品今天能行，唯一的原因就是单个用户能很快看到价值。

I think the only reason our product works today, honestly, is we have very low time to value for a single user.

也就是说，用我们的产品，不需要任何配置，开箱即用，马上就能带来那种神奇的时刻。

So the fact that with us, no configuration, you get out of the box, it gives a magic moment.

然后用户就会开始问问题。

Then the user is asking questions.

我还能用这个技术做些什么？

What else could I do with this technology?

对我们来说，所有的重点就是把这个做好。

That's for us all the like, our focus is on getting that right.

我们能不能很快让你看到价值？

Can we give you time to value there really quickly?

然后我们在其他集成方面打持久战。

And then we play the longer game on all the other integrations.

对我们来说，这效果真的非常好。

For us, that's working really, really well.

自从我们有了Town，再说一次，抱歉，但Instinct在过去两到三周里似乎突然爆发了。

Since we've had Town, and again, sorry, but Instinct in the last two to three weeks break out, seemingly so.

我已经被推销了四到五个欧洲的Town或欧洲的Instinct。

I've been pitched four to five European towns or European Instincts.

我是说，真的是四到五个不同的。

I mean, literally, four to five separate ones.

有些是弱企业级，有些是消费级，有些两者兼有。

Some are weak enterprise, some are consumer, some are both.

如果你能给我们建议，投资者应该如何看待这个领域？

How should investors be thinking about this space if you could advise us?

我们刚才在讨论护城河。

We were talking about moats.

在Town，我们下了一些赌注，认为我们的产品会持久。

At Town, we make some bets on why we think the product will last.

我会回答你关于欧洲公司的问题，但我们确实下了一些赌注。

I'll answer your question about Europeans, but we've made some bets.

我们下的一个赌注是，你只会有一个有名字的AI助手，你给它一个形象，我们叫它Townie，我们围绕建立人与AI之间的这种关系打造了一整个品牌。

One of the bets that we made is you only get one AI assistant that has a name, you give it an image, we call it a Townie, and we have a whole brand around really building this relationship between the human and the AI.

对我们的很多用户来说，这很能引起共鸣。

And for a lot of our users that resonates.

他们想要这个。

They want that.

他们想要一个他们信任的、他们塑造的、他们上色的、以他们为形象并命名的东西。

They want something that they trust, that they shape and that they color that's in their image that they name.

他们非常喜欢这个。

They like that a lot.

这听起来有点傻，但实际上我认为这是一种防御性优势。

It's silly, but actually I think that is a form of defensibility.

就像Snapchat在市场上的结构性防御一样，即使它的业务远不如TikTok、Facebook或Instagram那么出色，因为它从根本上就与众不同。

Much like Snapchat structurally in the market is defensible, even though it's not nearly as good a business as TikTok or as Facebook or Instagram, because it's fundamentally different.

它对运营方式有强烈的观点，有些人会被这种观点吸引。

It has a strong opinion about how it operates, there are some people that are drawn to that opinion.

所以我们对用户和他们的Townie之间的关系有非常强烈的看法，对很多用户来说，这确实能引起共鸣。

So we have a very strong opinion about the relationship between the user and their townie, and for a lot of our users that really resonates.

所以我们有这个优势。

So we have that.

我们还押注于网络效应，这个我们已经谈了很多。

We have a bet on network effects, which we've talked a whole bunch about.

然后我们做的第三个赌注是，我们坚信通过大量的预处理，可以为用户带来更好的结果。

And then the third bet that we make is we are big believers that through a lot of pre processing, you can get better outcomes for users.

所以我们在你提问之前就投入大量计算来构建用户的心理模型，比如预先创建上下文，这样我们就能在职场社交、理解你正在做的项目、了解你的公司以及这些基础方面非常高效。

So we spend a lot of compute before you even ask a question to build a mental model of the user, like pre creating context in a way that allows us to be really effective at things like work networking, understanding the projects that you're working on, understanding your company, and those kinds of building blocks.

所以这三件事是我们认为随着时间推移会对产品产生影响的。

So those are three things that we think over time make a difference for a product.

所以，如果我是投资者，问题就是，为什么有人能在欧洲赢？

So the question, if I were an investor, is why does someone deserve to win in Europe?

是因为分销渠道吗？

And is it a distribution thing?

是因为GDPR和隐私问题吗？

Is it a GDPR and privacy thing?

还是说，Town其实在法国根本不做营销，所以如果你在法国做Town，你就能赢？

Is it a town is not in fact doing any marketing in France, and so you could win in France if you're the town of France?

所以你必须有一个具体的理由，说明为什么某家本地公司能笑到最后，因为这类产品开发成本很高。

So you have to have some specific reason why some local company will win endgame, because these products are expensive to build.

就像你之前提到的Grokbot，我的很多研发投入其实只是为了跟上竞争对手。

Like you said, Grokbot earlier, a lot of my R and D is just keeping up with the Joneses.

你的智能体至少得跟别人一样能干。

Your agent has to be as capable at least.

先别管你的分销策略，别管你擅长工作场景，也别管那些网络效应功能。

Forget your distribution strategy, forget the fact that you're good at work, forget the network effect features.

如果Codecs能做到你做不到的事，而且那件事对用户很重要，那你就完了。

If codecs can do something that you cannot do, and that thing is something that matters to users, it's over.

所以你必须至少在能力和水平上和所有人一样好。

So you always have to be at least as good as a harness and capabilities as everyone.

这非常昂贵。

It's very expensive to do that.

不像我团队里只有两个工程师在努力追赶Codecs。

It's not like I have two engineers of the team trying to keep up with Codecs.

Codecs有大约100人在改进它，所以我们必须在很多任务上和他们一样有效，否则用户会想，我为什么要每月花50美元用Town？

Codecs is like 100 people making that thing better, and so we have to somehow be as effective on a lot of tasks as Codecs, or otherwise a user is going to be like, Why would I pay $50 a month for Town?

这说不通。

It doesn't make sense.

我会花24.99美元用OpenAI。

I'm going to pay $24.99 for OpenAI.

如果我是投资者，我会想，这个本地竞争对手有足够的市场潜力吗？

If I were an investor, I would be like, Does this local competitor have enough TAM?

他们能不能攒够足够的资金来跟上技术能力的步伐？

Are they gonna be able to have a war chest that's big enough to just keep up with capabilities?

然后，我是否相信他们在这个非常横向的市场中有理由获胜？

And then do I believe they have a a reason to win in this very horizontal market like where they are?

这会很难。

It'll be hard.

在硅谷招人是不是像大家说的那么疯狂？

Is hiring in the valley as insane as everyone says it is?

说实话，我没觉得那么疯狂。

I don't find it crazy, honestly.

比如，我在Plaid的时候，和Stripe竞争，感觉并不比现在难。

Like, I think when I was at Plaid and we were competing with Town for, like, Stripe, that felt no harder than what I'm doing now.

我能问一下，在产品构建过程中，最让你意想不到的困难是什么？

Can I ask, what's been the hardest thing about the product build that you maybe didn't expect?

市场的速度太快了，Harry。

The speed of the market is insane, Harry.

我从来没见过这样的。

I've never seen anything like it.

以前，你跟客户聊，做一个功能，他们会用，然后你从那个功能里学到东西。

Before, in the past, you talked to customers, you build a feature, they would use it, and you would be learning from that feature.

这些学到的东西会用到下一个功能，再下一个功能。

The learnings would go into the next feature, and the next feature.

最后才会有人模仿你的第一个功能。

Then eventually someone would copy your first feature.

但那时候你已经领先三步了。

But then you had your three learnings ahead.

你明白我的意思吗？

Do you know what I mean?

你就能利用你的产品市场契合度来创造更多的产品市场契合度。

You'd been able to use your product market fit to generate more product market fit.

对初创公司来说，通常你要靠这些用户洞察吃很久的红利。

For startups, usually you're milking these user insights for a really long time.

最终你会用完用户洞察，但那要花十年时间才会发生。

Eventually you run out of user insights, but that would take ten years to happen.

所以你有这么长一段时间，仅仅因为你在市场上排名第一或第二，就能学到更多并不断迭代。

So you have this entire period where you can, just because you're number one or number two in a market, learn more and iterate.

这真的很好。

It's really good.

现在的问题是，构建速度太快了，一旦某个东西对某个人有效，所有人都会注意到，并且能在两周或四周内跟上，复制得非常非常快。

The problem today is it is so much faster to build that as soon as something is working for somebody, everyone notices and is able to get there within two weeks or four weeks, copy really, really fast.

你只能以人类的速度学习。

You can only learn at the speed of humans.

你现在可以以机器的速度构建，但只能以人类的速度学习。

You can build now at the speed of machines, but you can only learn at the speed of humans.

所以我无法提取足够多的学习成果，让我能够进入下一个功能。

And so I'm not able to extract quite as many learnings that allows me to get to the next feature.

所以现在的感觉是，速度非常必要，但每个人都在快速前进。

So the way it feels right now is speed is so necessary, but everyone's moving fast.

我们刚创业的时候，我原本以为今年第一季度和第二季度，我的想法是创业圈里有15个竞争对手在跟我们竞争。

When we started the company, I would think first quarter and second quarter of this year, my mentality is there's 15 competitors in the startup universe that are competing with us.

大概有15家真正有威胁的公司。

Maybe 15 companies that matter.

现在可能就剩下两三家竞争对手了。

And now I'm probably down to two or three competitors.

我觉得这个领域最后能赢的也就那么几家公司，而我们离起跑线很近。

I feel like only a couple of companies are going to win this space, and we're close from the startup starting gate.

还有苹果、谷歌、Grokbot、Cursor、OpenAI和Anthropic这些大玩家的起跑线。

There's the Apple, Google, Grokbot, Cursor, OpenAI and Anthropic starting gates.

创业公司得先冲破这些云层。

You have to clear the clouds for the startups.

通常创业公司会跑得很快，但老牌玩家不会那么快。

Usually also the startups would be really fast, but the established players wouldn't be that fast.

但说实话，像Claude、Anthropic这样的公司，速度真的很快。

But you've to be honest, like Claude, Anthropic is very fast.

Cursor、Grokbot，他们的速度简直快得离谱。

Cursor, Grokbot, they're operating at a speed that is it's uncanny.

你知道吗？

Know?

而且我最好的朋友之一在那里管工程，所以我每次跟他聊天，都会觉得挺难过的，因为我们在竞争。

And one of my best friends runs engineering over there, so I'm always like, you know, whenever I talk to him, I'm I'm sad that we're competing.

但你知道，我们确实在竞争，我就觉得，那家伙真厉害。

But, you know, we're competing, and I'm like, that guy's good.

那家伙做事特别靠谱。

That dude can get shit done.

我必须在硅谷最顶尖的人之一面前赢下来，而且对方公司既有创业公司的基因，又有巨大的成本和规模优势。

I've got to beat one of the best people in the Valley at a company that has the DNA of a startup but is operating with huge cost and scale advantages.

这才是最让人压力山大的地方，因为我觉得你一刻都不能松懈。

That's what's super stressful, because I think you can't rest for one minute.

你不会有那种竞争对手要花六到十二个月才能追上来的感觉。

You don't have the feeling that the competitors, it'll take them six to twelve months to catch up.

我从来没有这么强烈地感觉到这一点。

I feel that like never before.

你提到了创业公司那边有两三家很关键。

You mentioned the two to three that matter on the startup side.

你觉得是哪几家，为什么选它们？

Who would you say those are, and why did you choose them?

不，这个我不会说。

No, I'm not going to say that.

不会给竞争对手免费打广告，不会给竞争对手免费打广告。

Not gonna give free marketing not gonna give free marketing to competitors.

你也不能怪我试试嘛。

You've got you can't blame me for trying.

我试着用路易斯·塞鲁克斯那招。

I tried to do the Louis Theroux.

你懂吧？

You know?

就像，嘿。

It's like, hey.

你怎么看待这个问题？

How do you think about that?

跟我说说。

Like, tell me.

对。

Yeah.

听着，这是个蓝海市场，你得明白。

Look, it's a Blue Ocean market, you've to understand.

当我们去见大多数客户时，他们什么都没听说过。

When we go to most customers, they've not heard of anything.

这是蓝海，因为人们把ChatGPT当作谷歌的增强工具来用。

It's blue Ocean, because people are using ChatGPT as a Google enhancer.

这就是市场。

That's the market.

有竞争对手是好事。

Competitors are great.

他们会给你压力。

They put pressure on you.

让你觉得自己必须拿出高水平的表现。

They make you feel like you have to execute at a really high level.

但关键是你和潜在竞争对手要有不同的策略。

But what's important is you have a different strategy than a potential competitor.

你之前提到过Instinct。

You mentioned Instinct earlier.

我觉得Instinct和Town做的不是同一件事。

I don't think Instinct and Town are trying to do the same thing.

你不觉得吗？

You don't?

我觉得我们赚钱的方式不一样。

I don't think we're trying to monetize in the same way.

我的意思是，我们最终会看到结果，但我们的收入来自那些使用我们进行工作的公司，并且有多个团队成员参与，形成网络效应。

I mean, we will see endgame, but we generate revenue from companies that are using us for work with network effects around multiple team members working on it.

他们的产品完全没有这些功能。

Their product doesn't do any of that.

也许这就是他们策略的一部分。

Maybe that is part of their strategy.

我看到他们的策略更侧重于获取客户，目前提供完全补贴的免费产品。

I see a strategy that's more customer acquisition, with a free product that's fully subsidized right now.

这可能会改变，但如果你从外部看，产品功能相似，所有工具都有类似的功能。

That might change, but if you look from the outside, the products have similar capabilities, but all harnesses have similar capabilities.

但如果你看目标客户群和营销方向，我觉得差别挺大的。

But if you look at the ICPs, where the marketing is going, it just feels pretty different to me.

我更关注Grokbot而不是Instinct，因为我觉得Grokbot瞄准的市场和我们更接近。

I pay attention to a Grokbot more than I would to Instinct, because I think Grokbot is going after a similar market to what we are.

对我来说，那才是真正让我思考的地方，比如我们的策略和Grokbot有什么不同。

For me, that is more of the place where I'm like, how is our strategy differentiated from Grokbot?

我们要怎么去获取不同类型的客户呢？

How are we going to acquire a different customer?

我们的能力和工具要怎么才能真正脱颖而出，让用户觉得与众不同？

How are our capabilities and our harness going to really stand out and feel really different to users?

我更多是这么想的，而不是……

That's more my mindset than

Grokbot 和 X 的整合，对于企业客户和专业用户来说，到底是优势还是问题？

To what what is extent is Grokbot's integration into X a feature or a bug to some corporates into professional usage?

实际上，和搜索的整合可能会让人担心。

It could be concerning, actually, the integration with the search.

我觉得品牌对他们来说是个问题，有些人可能就因为品牌而不愿意碰它。

I think brand for them, I think some people just won't wanna touch it because of brand.

这是不可避免的，而且他们得一直面对这个问题。

That's just inevitable, and it's they're gonna have to deal with forever.

但从分发角度来看，我觉得在某些细分市场，早期增长阶段可能挺有用的。不过，在 X 上使用这些产品的人并不代表产品市场契合，也就是说他们不是主流用户，这一点你得记住。

But from a distribution perspective, and I think for some segments, I think in early growth it is probably quite useful, I think a person on X that uses these products is not actually product market fit, meaning those are not the mainstream users, and you have to keep that in mind.

顺便说一句，我觉得Grokbot那边一直在考虑这个问题。

By the way, I think they think about that over at at Grokbot all the time.

但我觉得他们并不认为赢得X上的重度用户或网红就是市场所在。

But I don't think they think winning the power user slash influencer on X is where the market is.

那不是赢得市场的地方。

That is not where you win the market.

那是早期采用者的市场。

That's the early adopter market.

你能帮我理解一下苹果的智能体路线图吗？

Can you help me understand Apple's agent roadmap?

我觉得苹果的问题有两方面。

I think the problem for Apple is twofold.

第一，他们不是一家云公司。

One, they're not a cloud company.

他们确实不是。

They're just not.

这真的不是他们的基因，他们根本不懂怎么做云服务。

It's just not their DNA, they don't know how to do cloud.

而这之所以重要，是因为我们之前聊过的那些。

And the reason why that matters is because of what we talked about earlier.

智能体拥有的数据越多，表现就越好。

Agents are better the more data they have.

而且数据并不全在手机上。

And the data is not all on the phone.

所以，他们不擅长云服务，这是一个大问题。

So the fact that they're not cloud is one big issue.

第二个问题是，他们为了竞争，把自己绑在了隐私和本地设备处理上，这让他们远远落后于前沿。

The second issue is they've contorted themselves for competitive reasons around a privacy and on device story that is absolutely puts them far away from the frontier.

手机上的本地模型确实很厉害，但就是比前沿的慢，也笨一些。

Local models on the phone, it's amazing, but it's just slower and dumber than what's at the frontier.

所以，只要他们坚持这种本地设备上保护隐私的做法，从人类角度看，隐私立场是好的，但他们太依赖本地设备了。

And so as long as they're committed to this on device privacy preserving stuff, the privacy stance is good from a human perspective, but they've tied it too much to the on device.

所以，不擅长云服务，又局限于设备端，再加上从隐私角度出发，连在手机上整合他们拥有的所有数据都变得困难，这些都是很大的劣势。

So not being good at cloud, then being on device, and then from the privacy standpoint, making it difficult even on the phone to interoperate with all of the data that they have, Those are a lot of disadvantages to play with.

不过，与此同时，他们确实拥有这些设备。

Now, at the same time, they do have the devices.

新的Siri会成为一个更好的个人助理，比那个……我是说，虽然只是传闻，但你知道那些试过的人怎么说。

The new Siri is going to be a much better personal assistant than the I mean, it's rumored, but you know people who've tried it.

在硅谷，你懂的。

When you're in the valley, you know?

所以我们都清楚它会很好。

And so we all know it's going to be good.

但我觉得它会不错，但感觉上不会像Town或Grokbot那么强大。

But I think it's going to be good, but it's going to feel not nearly as powerful as Town or Grokbot.

在能力上甚至都还差得远。

It's not even going to be there in terms of its capabilities.

但它会在你的手机上，很方便，你能用它处理更多数据，它会有云组件，会很好用。

But it'll be on your phone, it'll be convenient, you'll be able to enable more data with it, it'll have a cloud component, it's going to be good.

但在能力上，它大概比我们今天聊的所有东西落后九个月。

But it's going to be like nine months away capability wise compared to everything that we've been talking about today.

我不知道，我是说他们有了新CEO，我们看看他们会怎么处理，但我觉得他们就是需要雇一个完全不同背景的人，然后说，你们这些人，你们不明白。

I don't know, I mean they have a new CEO and we'll see how they take it, but I think they just need to hire somebody that has totally different DNA and be like, you guys, you don't understand.

人们和数字数据交互的方式正在改变，我们要么搞清楚这一点，可能得抛弃很多原则，要么我们就赢不了这一代的战争。

The way people interface with digital data is changing, and we either are figuring this out and we may have to throw a lot of our principles away, or we're just not going to win this generation of the war.

我觉得这对他们来说是个实实在在的风险。

I think that is, like, a a real risk for them.

你担不担心我们即将进入的网络威胁黄金时代里会出现的那些数据泄露？

Are you concerned by the data leakages that we're gonna have in the the kind of golden age of cyber threats that we're entering into?

好像我们都对网络攻击习以为常了，比如Meta就出过事。

It seems like we've all kind of normalized cyber attacks, and it's like, Meta had one.

啊，Throbbing也出过事。

Ah, I'm Throbbing had one.

如果你想构建用于商业场景的AI，你就不能出错。

If you want to build AI that is used for business use cases, you cannot get it wrong.

我们已经到了人类不会逐行阅读代码的阶段。

We've passed the point where humans will read every line of code.

这种情况再也不会发生了。

That is never happening again.

像访问控制这类系统关键代码，仍然由人类来审查。

The most important lines of code around access controls and things like that for systems are still being read by humans.

但总的来说，在人类历史上，我们已经过了那个会回到人类逐行看代码的世界的节点。

But overall, in the history of humanity, we have passed the point where we will go back to a world where humans are looking at lines of code.

现在是计算机在生成代码，并带着各种防护措施投入生产，从测试到其他模型，比如友好的模型来攻击你，这样不友好的模型以后就找不到漏洞。

It's computers that are building code that is being shipped into production with various guardrails, from testing to other models, like friendly models attacking you so that unfriendly models can't later find exploitations.

这就是我们现在的世界。

That's the world we live in.

显然，在人类历史上，在这个新世界里，总会有发生坏事的时候。

Obviously, in the history of humanity, in this new world, there's going to be points where there's bad events that happen.

你知道，这有点像化学品。

You know, it's a little bit like chemicals.

在二十世纪，我们开始用化学品做一些很酷的事情，然后我们把化学品倒进河里，下游城市的人们就生病了。

In the twentieth century, we started to do cool things with chemicals, and then we put the chemicals in rivers, and then cities downstream, people got sick.

然后我们就想，哦，对，好吧，我们得通过像环保署这样的法规，这样你就不能随便把化学品倒进河里了。

And then we were like, Oh, yeah, okay, let's pass regulation like the EPA so that you can't just dump the chemicals in the river.

你得先稍微清理一下再倒，后来还要给危险化学品贴上标签，标明它们危险、能去哪里、怎么处理。

You've to clean them a little bit before you do, and then later you label dangerous chemicals, not as dangerous, where they can go, how you get rid of them.

我们是一路学过来的。

We learned along the way.

现在有一套最佳实践，既包括监管方面的，也包括行业内的最佳实践。

There's a set of best practices, both from a regulatory perspective and just best practices in industry.

现在的情况是，攻击的成本效益完全失衡了，我们正在努力弄清楚最佳实践应该是什么样的。

Right now what's happened is the cost benefit of attacks is just thrown out of whack, and we're trying to figure out what the best practices look like.

你不可能指望我们每一步都做对，但我觉得我们必须做对，因为我们不可能回到人类逐行检查代码的时代。

And you can't imagine we're going to get that right every step of the way, but I think we will have to because there's no way we're going back to a world where humans are looking at every line of code.

说到使用情况，你怎么定义成功用户？

When we think about usage, how do you define a successful user?

就是每个月都付我钱的人。

Define them as someone who pays me every month.

只要他们一直付钱——不，我是认真的。

If they keep paying me No, I'm serious.

我是认真的。

I'm serious.

只要他们一直付钱，我就算完成任务了。

If they keep paying me, I've done my job.

我不能把他们看作是用得越多越好。

I can't think of them as the more tokens they use.

那样想很危险。

It's a dangerous way to think about it.

因为如果你觉得他们每个月用更多token就是成功，那万一他们用token的方式让他们自己觉得回报不那么明确呢？

Because if you think about it as they use more tokens every month that's successful, what if they're using the tokens in a way where the ROI is less clear to them?

也就是说，他们没意识到自己在用token做一些自己不太看重的事情。

Meaning they don't realize that they're using tokens to do things that they don't value as much.

如果你们做得太过分，有一天他们醒来，发现付给你们的钱太多了，就会生气，然后就不再使用你们的产品了。

If you do too much of that, then they wake up one day and they're just paying you too much and they get mad and they churn off of the product.

所以我觉得你们得从长远的角度来看。

So I think you have to take a long term perspective.

关于最大化token使用量，我觉得有两个问题。

The problem with token maxing there's two problems, in my opinion.

一个是公司告诉人们，嘿，你们可以在AI上随便花多少钱，这其实不好。

One is companies told people, Hey, you can use as much money as you want on AI, which is bad.

你们应该让人们思考，在这里用AI的回报率是否值得。

You want people to think, is the ROI of using AI here worthwhile?

所以现在人们不再反对员工使用AI了。

So now people are not going against employees using AI.

他们反而说，不，不，我们需要激励机制。

They're like, no, no, we need incentives.

这样他们用AI就是出于正当理由了。

So they use AI for good reason.

一方面，你得提前考虑投资回报率。

One aspect, you need to think about ROI upfront.

但第二个问题是，有时候很难知道某些事情的回报率，比如，让我为会议做更充分的准备。

But the second problem is sometimes it's hard to know the ROI of something like, let me be more prepared for a meeting.

为会议做更充分的准备，这到底有多值得？

How worth it is it to be more prepared for a meeting?

对于那些整天会议连轴转的人来说，能在开会前一分钟做好准备，不至于在会上出丑，这可能价值很大。

For people who have back to back meetings all day, being able to, in one minute before the meeting, feel prepared enough to not look like an idiot, it might be worth quite a lot.

而对于那些开会时有人帮忙准备、自己不用发言、只是坐在那里的人来说，这就不值什么了。

For people who have meetings where they have someone else preparing and are presenting in the meeting, and they don't have to present anything and they're just sitting there, it's not worth anything.

所以我只是拿这个例子来说。

So I'm just using this example.

这个工作流程对不同的人来说价值完全不同，但消耗的token数量却完全一样。

This workflow has totally different value for different folks, but it costs the exact same number of tokens.

对吧？

Right?

我觉得大多数人不会这么想。

And I don't think that people think about it that way.

所以我把成功看作是在给我付钱，因为如果你每个月都付钱给我，那说明我基本上是在提供足够的价值。

So I think of success as paying me, because if you're paying me every month, that means I'm mostly doing a job of delivering enough value.

不管你在Town上用的是49美元、15美元还是99美元的套餐，你付给我的钱，你都能得到足够的价值。

When you look at the $49 or the $15 or the $99 whichever plan you're on, on Town that you pay me, you're getting enough value.

但我很在意在这个过程中让你知道你的钱花在哪里，因为我觉得你需要感觉到我在帮你避免浪费太多token。

But I'm very concerned along the way with informing you about where you're spending money, because I think you need to feel like I am doing a good job of avoiding you spending too many tokens.

所以过去一个月我们最受欢迎的功能之一就是，当我们发现你有异常运行的routine，比如那些消耗大量token的routine时，我们会开始发邮件提醒你。

So one of the most popular features for us over the last month is we started sending emails when it looked like you had rogue routines, like routines that were just costing a lot of tokens.

然后人们就会说，哦，谢谢。

And then people were like, Oh, thank you.

我相信你。

I trust you.

现在我觉得你在为我着想，担心我使用产品的方式不对。

Now I feel that you're looking out for me using the product badly.

对我来说，这就是关键。

That's the part for me.

我不知道怎么衡量，但我希望用户成功，对我来说，成功就是你付钱给我，并且信任我们是合适的平台，能帮你高效地使用AI。

I don't know how to measure it, but I want people to success for me is you pay me and you trust that we are the right platform that helps you both use AI but do so efficiently.

我觉得如果我们能做到这一点，我们就能把生意做得相当不错。

And I think if we can do that, we can we can have a pretty decent business.

你的定价是每月14美元、49美元和99美元吗？

Yours is $14 a month, $49 a month, and $99 a month?

对。

Yeah.

还有1.99美元。

And $1.99.

没错。

Correct.

哪个细分市场最赚钱，哪个最不赚钱？

Which is the most profitable segment and which is the least profitable segment?

我之所以这么想，是因为我的朋友杰森·兰普金，他显然付了Anthropic Pro之类的费用，2.99美元，然后他大概花了15000美元的token。

And the reason I think about that is, like, my friend Jason Lampkin, he obviously pays for, like, Anthropic Pro or whatever it is, $2.99, and he spends about $15,000 of tokens.

对Anthropic来说，他是最差的客户，但他用的是那种个人专业版最高级的套餐。

He is the worst customer for Anthropic, but he's on that, like, pro max individual plan.

对。

Yeah.

我们没有最高级套餐，但有用户想要这个。

We don't have a max plan, and we have users who ask for it.

我一直在想，我们该不该让这些大客户用最高级套餐？

And I've been asking myself, do we let the whales have a max plan?

因为从营销角度看，这挺有用的。

Because from a marketing perspective, it's useful.

你知道，他们一直在为产品做宣传。

Know, they're just advocating for the product all the time.

所以我也考虑过这个。

So I've thought about that.

我觉得15美元这个套餐对用户来说真的很划算。

The $15 plan is a really good deal, I would say, for users.

我们把它当作一个让用户充分体验产品的途径，这样他们就会意识到应该花49美元，因为那个套餐功能真的很强大。

We use it as a way for people to use the product enough that they realize they should pay $49 where the product is really powerful.

所以15美元套餐的单位经济效应最差，补贴最多。

So the $15 plan has the worst unit economics, is the most subsidized.

然后我觉得99美元套餐整体上利润最高，因为那类用户是重度用户，但又不是那种想无限花钱的重度用户。

And then I would say probably the $99 plan is the most profitable overall because it's like a power user, but it's not a power user that's trying to spend unlimited numbers of spend.

不过我们也有按用量计费的方案，所以对我们来说，一旦用户用到了套餐上限，大部分人会转向按用量计费，我们尽量根据用户的实际使用情况来调整费用。

But we also have usage based pricing, so what happens for us is once you run into the plan limits, mostly you go to usage based, and so we we try to adapt the spend to the user.

你能帮我选一个结果吗？

Can you choose one outcome for me?

是选一亿个消费者每月付20美元，还是一百万个客户每月付100美元？

A 100,000,000 consumers paying $20 per month or a million customers paying a $100 a month?

选多的那个。

The more.

更多的用户。

More users.

更多的用户，但付费更少。

More users paying less.

为什么？

Why is that?

嗯，因为我要从反事实的角度来看。

Well, because I'm going to go counterfactual.

因为我觉得随着时间的推移，在工作场景中，AI会被用来为人们做越来越多的事情。

Because I think over time, in the work setting, AI will be used to do more and more and more for people.

所以我认为，从长期来看，通过提升NRR、增加每个用户的收入，增长潜力是非常巨大的。

So I think the long term potential for growing for like NRR, driving more revenue per user, is extremely large over the long term.

所以你要通过付费的方式获取用户，因为你希望他们用于工作场景，因为你会不断找到更多方式让他们用AI来创造商业价值。

So you want to acquire the users in a paying motion because you want them to be for work use cases, because you will keep finding more ways for them to use AI to generate business value for themselves.

而在个人领域，我觉得情况不是这样。

Whereas in the personal sphere, it doesn't feel like that to me.

我和妻子需要预订的餐厅约会，或者和朋友组织的旅行，也就那么多。

I only have so many restaurant dates I need to book with my wife, or trips I need to organize with my friends.

我需要发给新医生的个人病历文件，也就那么多。

I only have so many personal doctor's files that I need to send to a new doctor.

这类事情的数量是有限的。

There's only so many of those things.

当我做这些事情时，我节省了时间，而时间就是金钱。

And when I do those things, I save time, and time is worth money.

但在商业方面，当我创造出能为企业带来价值的东西时，他们赚了更多钱，然后他们就会想要更多这样的东西。

But on the business side, when I create something that generates value for the business, they make more money and then they want more of that thing.

给你举个明确的例子，如果你在平台上有一家招聘公司，他们因为Town能接更多客户。

So a clear example for you, if you want a recruiting firm on the platform, they can take more clients because of Town.

他们用Town自动化了招聘流程的很大一部分，以至于他们真的能接更多客户。

They've used Town to automate enough of the recruiting process that they literally take more clients.

对他们来说，在不增加任何员工的情况下，多接一个客户，这家招聘公司每月就能多赚3000美元，而他们为所有用户每月付给我们506100美元。

And for them, taking an incremental and without hiring anyone at this recruiting company one more client is an extra $3,000 a month, and they pay us across all their users $506,100 dollars a month.

所以对企业用户来说，投资回报率特别简单。

And so the ROI is super simple for them for a business use case.

他们会想，哦，我每月付600美元，就能带来3000美元的收入。

They're like, Oh, I pay $600 a month and I get $3,000 of revenue.

这很划算。

That makes sense.

我喜欢这样。

I like that.

他们赚得更多了。

They're making more money.

大家都开心。

Everyone's happy.

而且我觉得，如果我能让他们看到还能再接一个客户，哪怕在Town上多花500美元，他们也愿意。

And I think for them, if I could show them the way that they could take another client, and even if it costs them another $500 on Town, they would be willing to do that.

所以我觉得企业这边的增长潜力要大得多。

And so I think the growth potential on the business side is much larger.

所以我宁愿有很多用户付我们更少的钱，因为我觉得随着时间的推移，我可以向他们展示我能提供越来越多的价值，他们值得在Town上花越来越多的钱。

So I'd rather have lots of users paying us less because I think over time I can show them that I can deliver more and more value, and it's worth it for them to spend more and more on Town.

Town因为模型能力现在做不到什么，但你觉得两三年后会变得非常厉害？

What is Town not able to do because of model capability that you think will be incredible in two to three years?

语音是最明显的。

Voice is so obvious.

我的意思是，这正在发生。

It's I mean, it's happening right now.

不是那种你对着它说话的语音。

It's not voice like you just speak to it.

我指的是对话式的。

I just mean conversational.

你会以220亿美元的价格投资Eleven Labs吗？

Would you be an investor in Eleven Labs at a $22,000,000,000 price?

关于Eleven Labs，我们是他们的用户，他们的声音听起来最好。

I think on Eleven Labs, like, we're users of Eleven Labs, they sound the best.

我又没拿钱。

I'm not paid.

我又不是投资人。

I'm not an investor.

那玩意儿贵得很。

It is very expensive.

我不知道的是，它会不会到顶。

What I don't know is if it tops out.

我觉得，像11Labs这样的公司，风险就在于，一旦语音质量够好了，你就能搞到它。

That's, I think, the risk for something like 11Labs, meaning we just get voices good enough and then you can get it.

我可以在BaseTen上放开源权重模型，就能搞到。

I can put open weight models on BaseTen and get it.

但现在感觉还不是那样。

But it just doesn't feel like that right now.

我只是不知道，在达到那个程度之前，他们还有多少时间。

I just don't know how much runway they have before it reaches that.

所以这就是为什么我没有说我看跌。

And so that's why I'm not saying I'm bearish.

我真的很喜欢那家公司，但是，220亿美元是一大笔钱。

I really like that company, but, like, 22,000,000,000 is a lot of money.

那么一两年后，你对价格有多敏感？

And how price sensitive are you in a year or two?

现在，恕我直言，你可以烧钱。

With the greatest of respects right now, you can you can burn cash.

关键是产品市场契合度和增长，以及打败竞争对手。

It's about PMF and growth and beating others.

在两到三年内，等等，你是在直截了当地尝试以更高效的方式让经济运作起来。

In a two to three year, wait, you're bluntly trying to make economics work in a much more efficient manner.

如果我们有两三百万用户使用语音，那会对我们的利润率造成冲击。

If we have two to 3,000,000 users using voice, that's a hit to our margin profile.

当然。

For sure.

我的意思是，在那段时间里我更在意的是这个。

I mean, I care a lot more over that time.

所以我才说，如果语音功能要达到那个水平，可能得比现在好两倍，尤其是语气、表达和情感理解这些方面。

That's why I'm saying, like, if the voice capability it'd have to be, like, maybe twice as good as today, especially tone and expression and, like, the emotional read.

一旦这些问题解决了，我就想尽可能降低成本，因为一旦感觉够用了，差不多到位了，我就不需要更好的了。

Like, once you solve that, I would wanna go as cheap as possible because especially for, like, once it feels good enough, it's almost there, I don't need much better.

但在利润率方面，我从不觉得是在烧钱。

But on the margin profile stuff, I don't ever think of it as burning money.

妈，我父母要是听到我说这种话，他们肯定不乐意。

Mom, my parents would not be okay with me saying words like that.

我觉得我们在支出上很谨慎，目的是短期优化增长，长期优化毛利率。

I think we were being thoughtful in our spend in order to optimize for growth in the short term and gross margin in the long term.

说实话，语音方面并不是我最担心的。

Voice is not where I'm really stressed out about it, honestly.

那你最担心的是什么？

Why are you really stressed out about it?

我觉得关键是那些处于前沿的任务占比。

I think it's the percentage of tasks that are frontier.

因为其他所有事情，我都能想象把价格降下来。

Because on everything else, I can imagine getting the prices down.

但我之前说的那个观点是，随着时间推移，会有更多方式用AI为很多公司创造更多收入。

But the thesis that I just said before is over time there are more ways to use AI to generate more revenue for a lot of companies.

这意味着，前沿领域有些东西能带来更多收入。

The implication there is there's things at the frontier that generate more revenue.

而前沿的问题在于，我在前沿完全没有定价权。

And the problem with the frontier is I have zero pricing power at the frontier.

我觉得Cursor最后就是这种情况。

I think this is what happened to Cursor at the end.

你可以拥有巨大的市场份额，客户也喜欢你，一切都好。

You can have huge market share and the customers love you and everything.

但如果你以70%的利润率支付供应商，同时又和供应商竞争，最终会变得有点困难。

If you're paying your suppliers and competing with your suppliers at 70% margin, eventually it gets a little bit difficult.

这正是我担心的部分，就是最后的结局。

That is the part that I'm worried about, the endgame.

但再说一次，我有很多假设条件。

But again, I have lots of ifs.

我得达到数千万用户。

I have to get to tens of millions of users.

他们必须付费。

They have to be paying.

我得有足够的规模。

I have to have a lot of scale.

然后我仍然处于和供应商竞争的境地。

And then I'm at a place where I'm still competing with my suppliers.

我仍然在和OpenAI、Anthropic竞争，而且我还在为那些对我来说处于前沿的20%或30%的工作负载给他们送钱。

I'm still competing with OpenAI and Anthropic, and I'm just giving them money for the 20% or 30% of workloads that are at the frontier for me.

这就是为什么经济账算不过来的原因。

That's what makes the economics not work.

这就是我担心的部分，到了最后阶段我需要找到解决办法。

That's the part where at the end of the game I need some solve for that by then.

我现在还不需要。

I don't need it right now.

之所以说这是唯一的问题，是因为这是我经济模式中唯一和别人不同的地方。

The reason that's the only problem is that's the only part of my economics that's different from somebody else's.

所以接下来有个宏观问题：AI产品是不是因为都有补贴，所以并没有真正的产品市场契合度？

So then there's the macro question, is, is there not real product market fit for AI products because it's all subsidized?

这是有些人可能会有的另一种看法。

That would be the other take that some people could have.

否则，只要你不和供应商竞争，你的经济模式和竞争对手就是一样的。

Otherwise, as long as you're not competing with your suppliers, you have the same economics as your competitors.

那么你提升利润率的能力通常更多取决于竞争格局，而不是其他因素。

Then your ability to drive margin usually is driven by the competitive landscape more so than anything else.

竞争对手越少，你能获得的利润率就越高。

The fewer competitors you have, the more margin you can have.

你在和你的供应商竞争。

You are competing with your suppliers.

我的意思是，比如像Astra，我就是。

Mean, like, Astra I am.

你把他们看作直接竞争对手。

You see as you see as a direct competitor.

对吧？

Correct?

完全正确。

Totally.

我现在就是。

I am today.

百分之百，我现在就是。

A 100% I am today.

是的。

Yeah.

但那个百分比，哦，那是个表情。

But the percentage the percentage oh, that was a face.

我确实在和Astra竞争，但问题还是那个开放盒子的问题。

I am competing with Astra, but there's still the the it's the open box problem.

你会惊讶于有多少人根本不知道AI能做什么。

You would be shocked at how many people just don't know what AI can do.

问题在于，要让普通人通过产品体验真正从AI中获得价值，真的很难。

Problem is having a product experience that gets a normal person to get value out of AI is really hard.

这就是为什么人们用了Town之后会喜欢，然后开始付费。

That's why when people use Town, they like it, and then they start paying for it.

我们的获客付费率超过15%，也就是说，试用产品的用户中有超过15%最终会付费，这对PLG来说是非常高的。

The payment rate for us on acquisition is more than 15% of users who try the product end up paying for it, which is extremely high for PLG.

因为相对于他们从ChatGPT中得到的，我们提供的价值实在太大了。

Because the value delivered relative to what they were getting out ChatGPT is just huge.

你破解了什么别人没破解的，才达到那15%的？

What did you crack that other people didn't to get that 15%?

这个产品真正的洞察在于，如果你一开始就让用户连接他们的邮箱和日历，你就能足够了解他们，从而推荐AI能帮他们完成的任务。

The real insight behind the product was if you ask people upfront to connect their email and their calendar, you can know enough about them that you can suggest tasks that AI can do for them.

这就是唯一的洞察。

That's like the only insight.

如果你在OpenAI工作

If you're working at OpenAI

我在，你正在检查，抱歉，

I'm and you're checking sorry,

这就是

this is where

我们之前开玩笑说我更爱说话、更爱插嘴。

we joked before about me being more mouthy and goby.

说吧。

Do it.

那很有洞察力吗？

That that insightful?

就像，总是说，这是我们对你的所有要求，我就觉得，不可能。

Like, is always like, here's all the things that we want from you, and I'm like, no way.

不可能。

No way.

读写邮件的能力。

Readwrite email abilities.

不。

No.

说实话，我觉得他们的建议就是很糟糕，但几个月前他们甚至还没有建议功能。

I think their suggestions are just, like, plain bad, to be honest, but they didn't even have suggestions until a few months ago.

区别就在这里。

The delta is this.

如果你想用ChatGPT，你不需要连接你的邮箱。

If you want to use ChatGPT, you don't have to connect your email.

他们不会强迫你这么做。

They just don't force you to do it.

他们现在会多次要求你这么做，因为他们意识到这个功能很有用。

They ask you a bunch of times to do it now because they realize the value is helpful.

但基础体验上，他们是想向普通人展示，嘿，你只要有个聊天框就能从这个产品中获得价值。

But the base experience, they're trying to show someone normal, Hey, you can have value in this product just because you have a chat box.

大多数人的体验就是这样。

That's how most people experience it.

我们的做法更像是，听着，你必须连接邮箱和日历。

Our approach is more like, Listen, you have to connect email and calendar.

如果你不这么做，你就没法用我们的产品。

You cannot use our product if you don't do those things.

但如果你这么做了，我们就能为你实现所有这些神奇的功能。

But if you do those things, we can do all this magic for you.

这是我们对你的了解。

Here's what we know about you.

这是你平时做的工作。

Here's work that you normally do.

我们会推荐一些自动化流程，帮你把工作中那部分自动搞定。

We'll recommend automations that automate that part of your work.

这时候大家就会觉得，哇，这真的很酷。

That's the part where people are like, oh, that's really cool.

我觉得这有点像一道硬性的付费门槛。

I think of it a bit like a a hard paywall.

你知道，你一进来，它就跟你说，嘿。

You know, when you land and it's like, hey.

交一下你的月费。

Pay your monthly subscription.

然后你就想，嘿。

You're like, hey.

连接你的日历和你的邮箱。

Connect your calendar and your your email.

那一刻的流失率是多少？

What percent churn at that moment?

30%，一开始就流失这么多。

30%, right off the bat.

对，这个数字挺大的，你得愿意承受这个损失。

Yeah, it's big, You've to be willing to take that hit.

你们现在内部最大的产品分歧是什么？

What's the biggest internal product disagreement you guys have today?

哦，这个问题问得好。

Oh, good one.

我们在一些纯个人使用场景上找到了产品市场契合，这是我们没想到的，比如家庭，比如父母。

We have product market fit for some purely personal use cases that we didn't expect, like families, like parents.

Town在那里的产品市场契合度非常高。

There's tremendous product market fit for Town there.

至少在美国，学校会发很多邮件，而且有很多门户网站需要处理体育联盟的事情，还有孩子的成绩单，还有很多需要为孩子安排的事情，比如理发、夏令营等等。

Schools, in America at least, send a lot of emails, and they have a lot of portals where things have to happen for sports leagues, and there's kids reports, and there's a lot of scheduling for kids that has to happen for haircuts and summer camps and all of these things.

而我们的产品，因为它在邮件和日程安排方面确实很出色，所以在家庭用户中真的非常受欢迎。

And our products, because it's really good at email and it's really good at the scheduling stuff, really has tremendous product market fit for families.

问题是，我们要不要针对这个群体做营销？

The question is, do we market to this group?

我们要不要花时间在这上面？

And do we spend time on it?

因为这个群体很好，也有付费意愿，但他们的付费意愿比不上中型企业。

Because it's a great group and it has a willingness to pay, but it does not have the willingness to pay of a mid market firm.

我们不可能什么都做。

We can't do all the things.

所以你说得对，我们是一个已经变现的平台，所以我们的指标每个月都在增长。

So to your point, it's like, well, we're a monetized platform, and so our metrics are growing month over month.

收入才是对业务最重要的。

Revenue is what matters to the business.

所以这就是为什么会有争论，因为当你在意想不到的地方找到了产品市场契合点，你人生中有几个选择。

And so it's why it's an argument because when you find product market fit somewhere you don't expect, you have a few choices in life.

一个选择是，你会说，我喜欢这些用户，我喜欢家长。

One choice is you're like, I love these users and I love parents.

我很喜欢这些用户。

I love the users.

我很喜欢这些使用场景。

I love the use cases.

这些使用场景和价值非常清晰，但和我们原本对业务增长的设想不完全一致。

The use cases and the value is super clear, but it's not fully aligned with how we've thought about the business growth.

但我觉得这也是为什么我们内部在认真思考，因为我们在想，如果我们多看看各个方向，这到底值不值得？

But I think that's why we're having interesting thinking internally, because we're like, if we look around enough corners, is this worth it?

还是说我们应该更专注于现有的策略？

Or should we be more focused on our existing strategy?

这其实挺有意思的，当你创业的时候。

Which is fun when you build a company.

你会从用户那里学到东西，然后必须做出正确的决定。

You learn things from users, and you've got to make the right decisions.

你们现在的收入大概是多少？

What are you guys at revenue wise today?

没有。

No.

抱歉。

Sorry.

你得明白，你得明白。

You gotta you gotta understand.

这就像打乒乓球一样。

It's like it's like ping pong.

你发球过去，有时候会被打回来。

You give it a go, you sometimes get hit back.

明白吗？

Okay?

就是这样，我们在融资的时候，我会利用这些机会来为业务制造公关和增长。

And it's like that, and we're, like, fundraising or, like, I will use those moments to create PR and growth for the business.

那个我还没准备好去做。

I'm not quite ready with that one to do it yet.

兄弟，兄弟，百分之百。

Dude, dude, a 100%.

你知道我会给你什么建议吗？

And you know what I would advise you?

就是一定要把不同的时刻分开。

To always separate moments.

我见过太多次了，人们把融资和收入里程碑混在一起。

Too many times I see people, like, combine a fundraise with a revenue milestone.

千万别这么做。

Do not do that.

这是两个独立的公关时刻，可以变成两个大新闻，而不是一个。

Those are two separate PR moments that can be made into two big moments, not one.

你为什么要合并它们，白白丢掉两次曝光的机会呢？

Why would you why would you amalgamate them and lose the ability for two hits?

我觉得，媒体现在比以前更怀疑了。

The press, I think, is more skeptical of it used to be.

以前，能以某个估值融资是非常罕见的，那时候媒体会报道，但现在媒体要求更多。

Once upon a time, raising at a certain valuation was so rare, you could get publications to now the publications want more.

你对这个领域本身看到了很多质疑。

You're seeing a lot of skepticism on the space itself.

你知道吗？

You know?

Instinct 在没有盈利模式的情况下融了25亿美元。

Instinct raised it $2,500,000,000 with no monetization.

你觉得对这个领域的质疑合理吗？

Do you think the skepticism around the space is warranted?

对我们来说，我们有收入和增长。

For us, we have the revenue and the growth.

我不知道竞争对手的增长情况。

I don't know what competitors' growth is.

如果你能相信其中一些公司能吸引数千万用户，在这个产品将成为人们做数字事情的入口的领域，而这些事情他们现在是在手机应用上做的。

If you can believe that some of these companies can get to tens of millions of people in the products, in an area where the product will be the entryway for people to do digital things that they're doing in apps on their phone right now.

如果创业圈里能出一个赢家，那就能建起一家巨头公司。

If there is a winner there that comes out of the startup universe, there is a giant company to be built.

这轮融资的十亿美元估值，是一开始就定的，还是被一步步抬上去的？

The billion dollar price for the new round, did it start there, or did it get ratcheted up and up and up?

对。

Yeah.

我……我不能否认，也不能确认或否认。

I I can't I can't deny or I can't confirm or deny.

我很喜欢，我是说，Arie，我不会让你从我这里套走任何消息。

I love I mean, Arie, I will not let you take any moments for me away from me.

你什么都不说，我也没在打探。

You're not commenting anything, and I'm not even prying.

但是，比如，哦，Indy在这么做。

But, like, the, oh, Indy is doing it.

哦，Indy不是，对你来说好的是，这全都是公关吗？

Oh, Indy is not what's great for you is this all just PR?

感觉你的名字到处都是。

Like, your name's just everywhere.

挺不错的，兄弟。

Pretty good, mate.

你真的很会套话。

You're you're amazing at trying.

我老了，你知道吗？

I'm old, you know?

我都47岁了。

I'm like 47 years old.

我都不记得自己多大了。

I don't even know how old I am.

这就是我老的程度。

That's how old I am.

当你连自己是不是要到某个岁数都记不清的时候，你就知道自己老了。

When you know you're old when you don't remember if you're turning a certain age.

我47岁，再过几个月就48了。

I'm 47, turning 48 in a few months.

我活了这么久，有些时候我在公开场合做过一些让我自豪的事，也做过一些让我不自豪的事。

I've been around for a while, and there are times in my life where publicly I've done things that I'm proud of, and publicly I've done things aren't, that I'm not proud of.

我提这个的原因是，我觉得为了生意而刻意制造公关宣传，这不符合我的价值观。

The reason I mention this is I don't think it aligns with my value system on anything to create PR just for the business.

我希望公关是由我的用户来创造的，因为他们喜欢这个产品。

I think I want the PR to be created by my users because they love the product.

如果你看到任何关于Town的新闻，不管是好是坏，那都不是我刻意去制造的。

If you ever see any news about Town, good or bad, that is, I'm not out there creating the PR.

那根本不是

That's just not

我觉得这是个错误，恕我直言，我会建议你改变这一点。

I think that's a mistake that, respectfully, I would push you to change.

可能吧。

Probably.