20VC：为何现在是应用层的时机？| 为何OpenAI与Anthropic不会赢得应用层？| 为何初创公司应追求代币最大化？| 为何风投在AI时代应降低对价格与股权的权重？——对话Mike Mignano，USV

对吧？

Right?

像Salesforce或者微软这样的公司，员工人数太多了，每个人都能无限制地使用令牌资源。

There are too many employees at a Salesforce or, I don't know, a Microsoft such that every employee can just have an unlimited token spend budget.

所以我觉得这些公司很快就会开始限制他们的使用预算。

So I think we're gonna see a lot of those companies start to constrain their spends.

我们已经看到一些类似的情况出现在Etsy上

And we've seen mentions of things like these on Etsy

Meta、Uber、微软、Wall Street Journal都有过相关报道。

We've Meta, Uber, Microsoft, Wall Totally.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得对初创公司来说，算账的方式可能不太一样。

I think if you're a startup, the calculation probably looks a little bit different.

你的公司规模小得多，对吧？

Your organization is smaller, right?

所以你不会遇到那种五万、十万甚至五万名员工毫无节制地花钱的情况。

So you're not going to have a situation where you have 5,000, 10,000, 50,000 employees just spending out of control.

你可以更严格地控制开支。

You can more tightly control the spend.

但作为初创公司，你现在每一点优势都至关重要。

But also, I think as a startup, you need every advantage you can get right now.

如果我现在是哪家初创公司的CEO，我肯定会拼命争取把预算用在最关键的地方。

And so if I, you know, if I were the CEO of a startup right now, I would actually still be pounding the table to maximize token spend on the on the right things, right?

尤其是写代码的时候，其他比如简单总结或日常运营这类任务，我可能会用Sonnet这类模型。

Definitely with coding, maybe not with other things, just for simple tasks like summarization or, operations type work, I'd probably be leveraging Sonnet or something.

但如果是初创公司，而且我在写代码，我肯定要用最前沿的模型。

But if I'm at a startup and I'm coding, I wanna be using the frontier.

我要拿所有能拿到的优势去对抗Salesforce这样的大公司。

I want every advantage I can get against Salesforce.

如果你是最顶尖的开发者，你是会选择去大公司，让他们给你预算但严格限制你用什么模型，还是去初创公司，那里根本就是放开手脚随便用？

So if you are the best dev, are you gonna go to a big incumbent who are gonna give you a budget and really constrain your abilities in terms of model usage, or are you gonna go to a startup where fundamentally they say, Hey, it's a free for all.

做最好的自己。

Be your best self.

我觉得你会选择加入初创公司，尤其是那些有使命驱动的初创公司——说实话，过去几年我们好像都没怎么见过这种模式。

I think you're gonna go to a startup, especially the startups right now that are mission driven, especially the startups that are mission driven, which, by the way, I don't know that we've really been in that mode for the past couple of years.

是的，Anthropic 确实有使命驱动，但现在硅谷资金泛滥，很多公司根本不需要靠使命来驱动。

Yes, Anthropic's been mission driven, but there's so much money and capital sloshing around the valley in this ecosystem, I think a lot of companies haven't needed to be mission driven.

但现在不一样了，他们会发现，使命反而成了优势。

I think now they will, and it's work gonna to their favor.

你觉得我们现在是不是正进入一个新阶段：Fable 会以某种形式重新崛起，带来更强大、更新的模型，让你一个顶级工程师顶替十个普通工程师，而你用巨额的 token 开支来支付这个代价？

Do you not think we enter a world in now where Fable will come back in some rejuvenated form one way or another, where Fable comes back and newer and better models come back and you just have the 100x engineer, and you pay for that token spend, which is enormous, with the replacement of the 10 other mid engineers.

我觉得工程团队的结构一定会发生变化。

I do think engineering organizations are going to evolve.

未来团队规模会越来越小，但成员的水平和质量会更高，因为很多基础性工作现在都可以交给智能代理去处理了。

You will increasingly have probably somewhat smaller teams of higher caliber and higher quality engineers, because I think a lot of the lower level tasks increasingly can be delegated away to agents.

就开源生态而言，以现在的状况来看，你觉得有多少企业流程可以用开源方案来完成？

In terms of the Open ecosystem, when we look at it today, what percent of enterprise workflows do you think can be done with Open?

企业里80%的非编码任务，用不上最前沿的模型也能完成。

80% of non coding tasks in the enterprise can be done with models that are not at the frontier.

如果你在写代码，那最好还是用最前沿的模型。

I think if you're coding, you probably wanna be leveraging frontier models.

但像总结内容、写文档、做简报这类工作，根本没必要用最顶尖的模型，开源模型完全够用。

But I think things like summarization or the generation of docs and briefs and things like this, I don't think you need to be at the frontier, and so you probably can leverage Open Source models.

我们现在看到的开源模型，进步速度比以前快多了。

I think a lot of the Open Source models we're seeing are catching up faster than they were previously.

只要不是写代码，其实根本没必要追最前沿的模型。

I don't know that you need to be at the frontier if you're not coding.

中国拥有最好的开源模型。

China have the best open source models.

看到这个开源生态的发展速度和演进程度，真是让人惊叹。

It's unbelievable to see the rate and the evolution of that open source ecosystem.

你觉得这让人担心吗？

Is that concerning, do you think?

我觉得，说实话，初创公司和团队都会往激励方向走。

I think, look, I think startups and teams go where the incentives are.

随着我们进入一个‘反抗联盟’真正有机会崛起的时代，我会看到越来越多聪明的团队转向开源。

I think as we shift to a world in which this Rebel Alliance might actually have a fighting chance, we're gonna see a lot of smart teams going more and more towards open.

我真的很感兴趣。

I'm really intrigued.

你刚才提到了路由层。

You said about the routing layer.

你真觉得会在路由层诞生十亿到五十亿美元的公司吗？还是觉得像Fireworks或Base Ten这样的推理服务商会蚕食这块市场？

Do you fundamentally think there will be ten to fifty billion dollar companies built in the routing layer, or do you think your inference providers like Fireworks or Base Ten eat into that?

或者坦白说，如果你再往上走一层，还有Nebius这样的公司站在顶端。

Or, candidly, if you wanna go a step above that, you've got Nebius who sits on top.

我采访Nebius的创始人时，他说我们需要……我可不敢模仿他的口音，不然听起来就像007里的反派，他非得找我算账不可。

When I had the founder of Nebius on, he's like, we need I'm not gonna put it on his accent because I'll sound like a Bond villain, then he'll fucking kill me.

你得把整个技术栈都吃下来才行。

But you need to eat all of the stack.

我觉得现在路由确实挺有意思，也很重要。

I do think routing is interesting and important right now.

随着企业努力优化他们的令牌支出，他们希望确保选用的模型不仅能力匹配任务需求，成本也要合理。

Again, as enterprises are trying to optimize their token spend, they wanna make sure that the model they're using is the right model for the job, not only in terms of its capability and what it can get done, but its cost.

因此会有一些公司专门专注这一块，比如纽约的Open Router，他们正在做不少有意思的工作。

And so you're gonna have companies that are singularly focused on this, companies like Open Router out of New York, which is doing some really interesting work.

同时，也会有一些公司利用栈中其他部分来打造产品，顺便把路由层作为盈利点来建设。

And then you're also gonna have companies that are leveraging other parts of the stack for their products that build their own routing layer as an opportunity to monetize.

实际上，我们接触过不少在栈的不同层级上开发的公司，一聊到他们的商业模式，都会提到构建路由层并从中盈利。

Actually, we've talked to a number of companies building at various different levels of the stack that when you talk to them about their business model, they talk about building a routing layer and monetizing the routing layer.

所以我觉得这是个很有潜力的方向，很多公司都会去尝试，因为他们看到了机会。

So I think it's a really interesting area that has a lot of opportunity, and a lot of different companies are gonna go after it because they see the potential.

如果不只是变成一个普通的传输通道，你该怎么给路由层赚钱呢？

How do you monetize a routing layer without becoming just a commodity pipe?

这是个好问题。

It's a good question.

我觉得现在很多公司都在考虑在上面加一点差价收费。

I think a lot of companies right now are thinking about charging a small margin on top of it.

我觉得你说得对，这种商业模式可能并不太理想。

And I think to your point, that might not be a great business model.

几周前我在X上发了一篇关于这个的文章，不少人留言分享了他们的想法，其中有个挺有意思的观点，说是可以在路由层搞一种‘悬赏’模式——路由层因为选对了模型而获得奖励，对吧？

I put out a piece on X about this a few weeks ago, and a number of people chimed in with some of their interesting idea I heard was this notion of almost a bounty model at the routing layer, where the routing layer gets rewarded for choosing the right model, right?

也就是说，当你选中最高效或者最适合某个任务的模型时，路由层才能收到费用。

So if you choose the most efficient model or the best model for a certain task, that's when they collect a fee.

我觉得这个想法挺有创意的。

And I thought that was kind of an interesting idea.

目前还没看到有人真正实现，但我个人觉得这主意相当不错。

Haven't necessarily seen it built out yet, but I thought it was a pretty interesting idea.

我得说，光靠路由层就做出一家五百亿美元的公司，我看挺难的。

I think it's hard to see that $50,000,000,000 company built in routing alone, I have to say.

也许吧。

Maybe.

但另一方面，我们在企业领域，尤其是基础设施领域，一再看到，这些基础设施公司会深度融入开发者的流程和生态系统，根本没法轻易替换，因为它们已经成了行业标准。

But on the other hand, we've seen time and time again in the enterprise, in infrastructure specifically, that these infrastructure companies, they become deeply embedded in the developer workflows and in the developer ecosystems, and you just can't rip them out because it just becomes the gold standard.

所以也许会有人打造出一个路由层，每个开发者都会采用，而且根本不想换掉。

So maybe somebody will build that routing layer that every developer adopts and never wants to remove.

你觉得我说美国风投USV错失了模型赛道，这公平吗？

Would you say it's unfair of me to say that USV missed the model game?

我觉得USV玩的是另一套游戏，这其实一直就是他们的传统。

I think USV was playing a different game, and that's actually been the history of

难道游戏不就是靠打造划时代的公司，获得惊人的回报吗？

Is the game not unbelievable returns in generational defining companies?

所以USV，我再说一遍，

So USV, again, I

我觉得他们从来不怕表达立场，而且USV确实没有投资任何一家大型模型层公司。

think has never been afraid to take a position, and I think USV did not invest in any of the big model layer companies.

但过去几年，USV一直在押注能源领域，我坚信，这个故事的完整脉络还没完全展现出来。

But what USV now has been doing for a number of years, and I'm a big believer that we haven't seen the full circle of this narrative play out, is they've been betting on energy.

他们从2001年就开始押注能源了。

They've been betting on energy since 2001.

长期以来，他们的想法是，不管哪种模型胜出，只要你相信人工智能和智能的发展，就一定需要底层的能源来支撑这些技术。

And the idea has been for a long time now that no matter what model wins, if you believe in AI and if you believe in intelligence, there's going to be an energy layer underneath that is going to be needed to power these things.

自2001年以来，我们逐渐明白，实际需要的能源比当初预想的还要多，而且对能源的便携性要求也更高了。

And over the time since 2001, we've learned that we only need even more energy than we thought, and we need more portability of energy than we thought.

所以能源是USV的一个核心投资主题。

And so energy is a big theme at USV.

这个方向从2001年就开始了，直到今天——不管是2020年还是2026年，依然如此。

It was starting in 2001, and it still is to this day in 2000 or 2026.

我刚才是不是说2001年？

Did I say 2001?

我是说2021年。

I meant 2021.

你怎么看待能源领域的投资？毕竟这行资本投入太大了。

How do you think about investing in energy given the CapEx intense nature of it?

我们投资了一家叫Fuse Energy的公司，我觉得特别棒。

You know, we're investing in a company called Fuse Energy, which I think is incredible.

我对这个投资特别满意。

I'm so happy with.

但在能源领域，这确实是个资本投入很大的生意。

But it's a CapEx intensive business in terms of, like, the energy space.

确实如此。

It is.

但我认为现在也有很多创新正在发生。

But I think there's also a lot of innovation happening.

只要有创新，就能找到一些团队，他们在做别人还没想到的科学实验。

And where there's innovation, you can find early teams that are doing science experiments before anyone else is thinking about them.

几年前，USV投资了一家叫Radiant的优秀公司，他们正在生产小型核反应堆，这些反应堆是直接从流水线上下来的，而且将成为全球首批在美国核试验穹顶内进行测试的公司之一。

USV a few years ago invested in a great company called Radiant, which is building small nuclear reactors that literally come off of a factory line, you know, and it's gonna be one of the first companies in the world to test in the dome in The United States for nuclear energy.

所以我觉得，在创新的前沿地带，有很多有意思的方向和模式，作为风投，这些才是最值得下注的地方，因为在最早期，其实并不需要那么多资本。

And so I think there are a lot of interesting models and ideas happening on the edge of innovation, those are the best places to bet as a venture capitalist because in the earliest days, they're actually not that capital intensive.

你知道我最喜欢哪个故事吗？

You know what story I fucking love?

Boom Supersonic。

Boom Supersonic.

太疯狂了。

Crazy.

没错。

Yeah.

我不是那个意思。

Don't get me wrong.

我们都喜欢协和飞机。

We all love Concord.

对啊。

Yeah.

布莱克，我也超爱坐飞机，兄弟。

And Blake, I love flying too, dude.

那就开始吧。

Game on.

但AI领域在涡轮机方面有个巨大的商机。

But there's this massive business in turbines for AI.

这世界真有意思。

What a wonderful world.

我们公司Roon有个赌注。

We we have a bet in a company called Roon.

是一家了不起的公司。

Amazing company.

你听说过Roon吗？

Have heard of Roon?

没听过。

No.

他们在建造微型数据中心，直接放在发电机、风电场旁边，解决便携性问题。

They're building micro data centers that sit directly next to generators, wind farms and things like that, to solve the portability issue.

怎么才能让能源尽可能快地靠近计算设备和数据中心？

How do you get the energy as close as possible, as quickly as possible to the compute, to the data centers?

所以我们一直在关注这类创新，它们正在重新定义能源的供应方式和便携性。

And so we're on the lookout for things like this that are sort of innovating the model of energy and portability of energy.

这不正是资本主义的美妙之处吗？

Isn't this just like the joy of capitalism?

你听说过Met Panther Lassa吗？就是那家在海上建数据中心的公司。

Met Panther Lassa, know, this company that does data centers at sea?

哇，真的吗？

Oh, wow.

这完全就是亚当·斯密说的那只看不见的手啊——能源出了问题，市场自然就会催生出Roon、Panther Lassa，甚至马斯克都在往太空建数据中心。

And it's just like fundamentally to Adam Smith's invisible hand, kind of the market solves itself in terms of we got an energy crisis, and then you get Rune and Panther Lassa and Elon building data centers in space.

太疯狂了。

It's crazy.

太棒了。

It's awesome.

现在真是个好时候。

It's a cool time.

现在投资特别有意思。

It's a fun time to be investing.

确实如此。

It is.

所以我就特别生气，看到很多欧洲创业者还在做中小企业的会计软件。

And this is why I get really pissed off with a lot of European entrepreneurs who are still building SMB accounting solutions.

我觉得企业级市场里头，自动化还有很大机会。

I think that there's an opportunity for automation in the enterprise.

我个人更想打造那些能彻底颠覆市场的产品和公司。

Personally, I would much rather build products and companies that obliterate.

这其实是我们USV一直在讨论的话题。

That's actually something we talk about at USV all the time.

别只是自动化，要直接碾压。

Don't automate, obliterate.

不过呢，确实有些人就想做自动化。

But hey, some people want to automate.

那‘不要自动化’是什么意思？

What does that mean, don't automate?

你刚才提到自动化，还谈到了SaaS，我觉得已经有不少了不起的公司，通过自动化现有的工作流程和业务模式取得了成功。

Well, you just talked about automation, and you talked to I think you were talking about SaaS in a I think there have been amazing companies built that automate existing workflows, existing processes.

但在USV，我们更倾向于投资那些彻底颠覆市场和原有商业模式的企业。

But at USV, we like to bet on businesses that obliterate, that literally obliterate markets and existing business models.

正因如此，我们其实很少投资企业级市场。

We actually don't do a lot of enterprise investing for this exact reason.

企业级投资往往需要通过中间人去销售，或者开发一些只是让现有业务变得更高效的产品。

Enterprise investing often requires selling to middleman, you know, selling to selling to customers, or building things that just make existing businesses faster.

我们想投的是那些真正重新定义做事方式的公司。

We want to invest in businesses that literally reinvent the way something is done.

比如Doctronic就是一个例子。

Take Doctronic as an example.

你听说过Doctronic吗？

You familiar with Doctronic?

没听过。

No.

几年前，USV领投了Doctronic的种子轮。

USV led the seed in Doctronic a couple of years ago.

那时候，这想法听起来简直疯狂。

At the time, it seemed like a crazy idea.

让AI把医生装进每个人的口袋里。

AI putting a doctor in literally everyone's pocket.

我们本可以投资那些让医疗流程更快、更高效，或者帮人处理保险理赔的AI，但我们选择把医生放进每个人的口袋，用AI彻底重塑整个模式。

Now, we could have invested in AI that make medical practices faster or more efficient or help you with, you know, insurance claims, or we can put doctors in everyone's pocket and totally reinvent the model with AI.

所以我觉得

So I

这正是我们说的‘颠覆’，而不是‘自动化’。

think that's what we're talking about when we talk about obliterate, don't automate.

Doctronic，医生装进口袋，诸如此类。

Dotronic, doctor in your pocket, da da da.

这让我想到教育。

It reminds me of education.

不好意思。

Sorry.

我不是那个意思，没有贬低的意思。

I didn't mean that disparaging.

这太棒了。

It's awesome.

我喜欢读书。

I like reading.

这让我想到——不好意思。

But it reminds me sorry.

其实，教育也挺像这么回事的。

Education kinda reminds me of the same, actually.

你知道在教育和医疗领域，最受益的通常是哪些人吗？

And do you know who the biggest winners are in both education and in medicine in most cases?

是谁呢？

Who's that?

是那些平台型玩家。

It's the horizontal players.

就是YouTube。

It's YouTube.

我担心的是，尤其是在健康领域，ChatGPT已经是第二大常用工具了。

And my worry is, especially with, like, health, chat GPT is second most used thing.

健康方面。

Health.

所以我的问题跟Dotronic没关系。

And so my question to that tied is not tied to Doctronic.

我想知道的是，模型提供商将来会怎么发展，它们渗透到应用层的时候，怎么不会抢走我们的饭碗？

It's how do you think about where model providers will go and eat into the application layers and not kill our lunch?

有可能吧。

Maybe.

我们刚才还在聊那个桥。

We just talked about a bridge.

你最近不是请过希夫来过吗？

I think you had Shiv on here recently.

这个桥公司在这个问题上已经埋头干了快十年，早就占了先机。

A bridge has been working on this problem for close to ten years now, and it's given them a massive advantage.

像医疗这种高度监管的行业，你不可能一进门就说：‘好了，我们现在要做医疗了。’

It turns out in highly regulated industries like healthcare, you can't just walk in the door and say, Hey, we're gonna do healthcare now.

你得真刀真枪地建立关系、找合作伙伴，一个个过监管关卡。

You have to actually build relationships, build partnerships, clear through regulatory hurdles.

这反而成了他们的护城河。

And that ends up being a form of a moat.

USV 是在2018年，也就是八年前投资了桥公司。

USV invested in a bridge, I think, in 2018, eight years ago now.

这家公司花了五六年甚至七年才走到今天这个转折点，现在他们的产品已经被众多医生和不同的医疗系统广泛使用，因为他们成功跨越了那些障碍。

It took that company five, six, seven years to hit this inflection point now where this product is being used by so many doctors in so many different health care systems because they were able to clear those hurdles.

所以我们可能会说，如今实验室和超大规模科技公司可以轻易接管任何市场上的任何产品。

And so we can say that we live in a world where the labs and the hyperscalers can take over any product in any market.

但事实上，从古至今，技术与创新一直都是这样发展的。

But the reality is that's been the story of technology and innovation since the beginning of time.

总会有初创公司、创始人和创业者，专门去做那些别人还没想到的、最难啃的硬骨头，最后反而胜出。

There are always going to be startups and founders and entrepreneurs that specialize and do the really hard things before anyone else has thought of them that end up prevailing.

就说Spotify吧，我们开头提到过的那个，对吧？

I mean, just take Spotify, which we talked about at the beginning, right?

Spotify挑战的可是个庞然大物。

Spotify went up against a behemoth.

这简直就是大卫对抗歌利亚的经典故事，一路上他们本可以被轻易击垮五十次，但他们专注深耕，早早地、持续地做了最难的事，现在自然成了赢家。

It's a classic David and Goliath story, and they could have been killed 50 different ways along the way, but they specialized, and they did the hard thing early and often, and now they're obviously the winner.

我明白你的意思，觉得实验室能随便切入任何应用层，但我不但觉得这不成立，而且就算能，也挺没意思的。

So I hear you that the labs can kind of go into any application layer, but not only do I think that that's not true, I also just think it's not really fun.

如果我们不相信初创公司能打败巨无霸，那作为风险投资人，我们还有什么乐趣可言？

And what fun can we have as venture capitalists if we don't believe that startups can take down the Goliath?

而且，即使它们真的赢了，我也不觉得事情会这么非黑即白。

I'm also not sure if it's as binary even if they do.

你看到Claude和Anthropic专门组了一个团队，专门去跟Figma竞争。

You know, you saw Claude and Anthropic dedicate an entire team to design and to go up against Figma.

但Figma依然是年收入数十亿美元的公司，这个领域里还有不少其他竞争者。

Figma is still a business that does multiple billions in revenue, and there's still multiple players in the space.

产品确实出色。

Great product.

没错。

Yeah.

产品确实出色。

Great product.

品牌值得信赖。

Trusted brand.

说到开发者生态，我最大的失误就是以为会有一家彻底跑出来，一家独大。

Trusted you know that my biggest mistake also, especially on the developer landscape, was I thought that there would be, like, a runaway.

当然，云服务确实跑出来了，表现非常出色。

And, of course, Cloud has run away and done amazingly well.

但Lovable的年经常性收入已经到五亿美元了，Cognition、Ratplit、Anthropic、Clock、Codex也都表现得非常强劲。

But Lovable's at 500,000,000 ARR, Cognition is, Ratplit is, Anthropic, Clock, Codex is crushing.

它们全都大获成功。

They've all crushed.

通常来说，市场领导者并不会拿下100%或者80%的份额。

There usually isn't a market winner that takes 100% of the market or 80% of the market.

更常见的情况是，市场领先者大概能拿到30%左右，剩下的70%依然充满机会。

Usually, you see is that the market winner takes something like 30% of the market, right, which means the 70% remaining is totally up for grabs.

只要市场足够大，这70%里完全能孕育出几个规模巨大的赢家。

And if the market's big enough, that can produce some really large winners.

你在USV看到的投资机会，和你在Lightspeed时看到的有什么不同吗？

Do you see different deals at USV to the types you saw Lightspeed?

我不是说不好或者更差。

I'm not saying bad or worse.

你只是觉得不一样吗？

Do you just see different?

说到我们之前聊过的种子轮，我觉得只要你主动走出去，就会遇到符合这些主题和想法的项目。

You know, going back to what we talked about earlier with seed, I think if you put yourself out there in the world, you're gonna see deals that match those themes and ideas.

我不是说我在Lightspeed的时候没这么做。

And not to say I didn't do that at Lightspeed.

我们在Lightspeed的时候也这么做过。

We did that at Lightspeed as well.

但就像之前说的，我们特别关注能源领域，或者现在的这个‘反抗联盟’，很多相关公司自然就会找上门来。

But to the point earlier about being very focused on energy, right, or now being very focused on this Rebel Alliance, we're going to see a lot of those companies come to us.

我觉得当你规模还小的时候，就得学会挑重点。

And I think when you're small, you kind of have to pick your spots.

你得给自己设限，专注在少数几件事上。

You have to have constraints and focus on a small number of things.

所以我觉得，我们之所以看到的东西不一样，是因为我们真的、真的深入钻研，有时候会集中一段时间，只关注那么几个特定领域，有自己的判断框架。

And so I think to the extent that we see things different, it's because we focus really, really deeply, and for a period of time, we may only look at a couple of different areas that we have theses

你现在最不确定、最让你担心的是什么？

What are you unsure of right now that is worrying you?

我之前说过，很多人担心模型提供商往应用层渗透，比如Ligure和Anthropic的投资人公开表示想进军法律领域。

To my point earlier, I think a lot of people are concerned by the intrusion from model providers into the application layer, where investors in Ligure, Anthropic are very openly suggesting they wanna come into legal.

我觉得这简直蠢透了，原因有很多。

I think that's fucking moronic for multiple reasons.

你明明在追逐通用人工智能，却跑去跟Clifford Chance或者Slaughter and May抢饭碗，这根本说不通。

When you're chasing AGI to be like, ah, we're gonna go after your lunch, Clifford Chance, or Slaughter and May.

这没什么道理。

Doesn't make much sense.

虽然我一直说，初创公司永远有空间，再强大的模型或公司也不可能包打天下，但竞争压力确实还是让人担忧。

As much as I say that there's always gonna be opportunity for startups and that one model or one company can't do everything, of course, you still worry about competitive threats.

你知道的，我在Lightspeed的时候，跟Granola合作得很紧密，Suno也是。

As you know, I partnered closely with Granola when I was at Lightspeed, Suno as well.

我的意思是，这两家初创公司正在对抗体量巨大的老牌企业。

I mean, those are two startups going up against massive, massive incumbents.

尤其是Granola，OpenAI直接推出了一个竞争性产品，对吧？

Granola in particular, OpenAI launched a directly competitive product, right?

Notion也推出了直接竞争的产品。

Notion, up, launched a directly competitive product.

所以我确实担心这个，但我觉得，归根结底，做初创公司时这种担忧一直都在。

And so I do worry about that, but I think, again, that's always been the worry when you're building in start ups.

Granola的真正担忧，难道不是进不了企业市场吗？

Is the worry not for Granola just breaking into enterprise?

像Notion这样的公司，想打入传统企业市场，一直特别困难。

Like that traditional enterprise, like Notion have found it incredibly hard to break into traditional enterprise.

这些产品都是初创公司和风投支持的，确实了不起，能做到五十亿美元收入已经很棒了，但你得做到五百亿才行。

These are startup and venture funded products, which is amazing, and you can get to 500,000,000 in revenue, but you need to be 5,000,000,000 in revenue.

我觉得Granola的优势在于它非常专注，这一点我认为正是帮助它打入企业市场的关键。

I think the nice thing about Granola, what it really has going for it, and one of the things that I believe has helped that company in enterprise penetration, is being really focused.

对吧？

Right?

他们就只做笔记。

They're just doing notes.

就只是做笔记。

They're just doing notes.

我觉得还有其他一些创业公司，在向企业销售时，试图做太多不同的事情。

I think there are other companies, startups selling into the enterprise, that try to do many different things.

老兄，我觉得你得做得更多才行。

Dude, I think you gotta do more.

也许吧。

Maybe.

但我觉得关键是先敲开大门。

But I think you wanna get your foot in the door.

而当你想敲开大门的时候，最好先专注卖一样东西。

And I think when you wanna get your foot in the door, you wanna sell one thing.

一旦你进去了，就可以横向扩展到其他领域。

And once you're in, then you can you can expand horizontally to different categories.

但如果你一进来就铺得太广，就得让企业放弃一大堆现有的工具。

But I think if you come in, expand it really, really wide, now you have to convince the enterprise to give up all these different things.

对吧？

Right?

你得放弃你的Gmail、Google文档、Google表格和日历。

You gotta give up your Gmail and your Google Docs and your Google Sheets and your calendar.

对吧？

Right?

还有别的各种东西。

And this and that.

但如果你只做会议记录，那就像是说：我们只是做你们公司的第二大脑，对吧？

Whereas if you're just doing meeting notes, it's like, hey, we're just gonna be your second brain for your company, right?

别的我们什么都不做。

We're not gonna do anything else.

我们只是做你们的第二大脑。

We're just gonna be your second brain.

对了，顺便说一句，我们在这方面是最棒的。

Oh, and by the way, we're the best at it.

你就不担心微软不断拆分产品吗？比如Teams压倒一切，或者Copilot崛起。

Do you not worry about the enduring wave of Microsoft unbundling, whether it's Teams that crushes or whether it's Copilot.

这些产品都是微软靠做65%到70%平平无奇的东西，再靠捆绑销售来打败对手的。

These products are Microsoft has built a business on doing 65% to 70% meh products, but with the power of bundling, beat the competitors.

我确实担心这一点。

I do worry about that.

当然了。

Of course.

毫无疑问。

Absolutely.

我们已经看到Slack经历过这一幕了。

We saw this play out with Slack.

对了，Slack现在还在呢。

By the way, Slack is still around.

它依然是个价值巨大的产品。

It's still a massively valuable product.

但没错。

But, yes.

我确实担心。

I do.

两千七百亿。

27,000,000,000.

我喜欢我们这么说的方式。

I love the way we say this.

就是两千七百亿。

It's like 27,000,000,000.

我接了。

I'll I'll take it.

是的。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

我确实有点担心。

I do worry about it.

我还发现，不管是AI产品还是格兰诺拉麦片，上下文都特别重要，对吧？

What I have also learned about AI products and granola is that context is extremely valuable, right?

如果格兰诺拉麦片渗透进你的公司，全公司都在用，不断产生和积累这些丰富又宝贵的信息，那这种东西，作为企业你是真不想放手的。

If granola gets inside of your organization and everyone in the organization starts using it and producing and accumulating all of this amazingly rich and valuable context, that's not something you as an enterprise want to give up.

你已经建立起一套极其丰富的信息历史，它真的能帮你工作得更高效。

You've built out this incredibly rich history of information that actually helps you work better.

我觉得，现在做AI产品，很大程度上讲究的是抢先一步，而且要飞快地推进。

I think this era of building AI products is in many ways about being first and about moving really, really fast.

让我担心的是，这么大的成果，结果却让人提不起劲。

You know what worries me is just like the meh of such large outcomes.

而且再说一遍，这些话听起来可能挺消极的，但真不是这个意思，毕竟我是个播客主持人，得做个特别说明。

And and again, this all sounds incredibly disparaging, and it's not meant at all because I'm a podcaster, so incredible disclaimer.

而且我还是个风险投资人。

And a VC.

但我想说的是，像SpaceX这样的公司估值达到三万亿美元，你知道吗？埃隆·马斯克一夜之间赚的钱，比沃伦·巴菲特一辈子赚的还多。

But my point being, like, you have a SpaceX at 3,000,000,000,000, do you know Elon Musk made more money overnight than Warren Buffett has done in his entire career?

他确实了不起。

Credit to him.

他确实了不起。

Credit to him.

干得漂亮。

Well done.

资本主义真了不起。

God bless capitalism.

真是个了不起的企业家。

An amazing entrepreneur.

了不起的创业者。

Amazing entrepreneur.

愿资本主义长存。

God bless capitalism.

但我想说的是，像Anthropic和OpenAI这样的公司，还有那些估值上万亿的企业，相比之下，年收入只有五亿美元的AI公司确实很难。

But my point is, like, when you have the outcome sizes of Anthropic and OpenAI and the trillion dollar companies, the company that does 500,000,000 in AI are tough.

我觉得这一切最终都回到一个问题：你到底在追求什么？

I think it all goes back to what are you optimizing for?

你的使命是什么？

What's your mission?

你面临哪些限制？

What are your constraints?

我们刚进演播室之前，就聊过风险投资的事。

We talked about VC early on before we stepped into the studio here.

USV一直以来都管理着规模较小的基金。

USV has always had small funds.

这正是我们喜欢玩的游戏。

It's the game we like to play.

作为一家规模较小的风投公司，你依然可以非常成功地实现自己的目标。

You can be very successful in terms of what you're trying to accomplish as a venture firm with a small fund.

也许同样的模式在管理一百亿美元的基金时行不通，但我们玩的是另一套游戏。

Now, maybe that same model can't work if you have a $10,000,000,000 fund, but we're playing a different game.

我觉得你玩的也是另一套游戏。

And I think you're playing a different game too.

如果没有媒体，我是不会做风投的。

I I would not do venture without media.

前几天我对我的有限合伙人说，有两件事让他们特别惊讶。

I said to my LPs the other day, two things that really shocked them.

我说，如今没有四十亿美元的基金，根本不可能做A轮投资。

I said, you can't do series a unless you have a $400,000,000 fund today.

一点机会都没有。

Absolutely no chance.

现在A轮投资成本太高了。

Series As are expensive now.

动不动就是一亿美元的估值。

They're 100,000,000 posts.

有时候八千万美元的估值也常见。

They're 80,000,000 posts.

偶尔甚至能达到一亿五千万美元。

They're occasionally 150,000,000 posts.

所以，如果你想投这个阶段的项目，还能拿到不错的股权，那你的基金规模得比三年前大一些。

And so, if you wanna write a check into around that size and get decent ownership for your fund, you have to have a slightly bigger fund than you had three years ago.

你对股权比例的要求变得更灵活了吗？

Are you being more elastic around how you think about ownership?

我觉得这跟阶段有关。

I think it depends on stage.

在USV，我们认为种子轮和A轮的股权很重要，因为现在的回报潜力更大了。

The way we think about it at USV is that the the seed and series a stage ownership is important, And the reason is the outcomes are bigger right now.

你之前提到过。

You talked about it.

那些最终表现特别出色的公司，往往在很短的时间内就融了大量资金，估值也一路飙升。

And the companies that end up doing really, really well raise a lot of capital very, very quickly, and the valuations get very high.

到了后面的轮次，想拿到股权变得特别难，尤其是对规模小的基金来说。

And in those later rounds, it's actually very, very hard to buy ownership, especially if you're a small fund.

所以你必须在早期就拿到这些股权。

And so you have to get that ownership early on.

种子轮和A轮，正是你能做到这一点的关键阶段。

And seed and series A are kind of the rounds where you can do that.

一旦公司跨过那个门槛，进入B轮或C轮，你就能看出谁是市场领导者、有潜力成为一代巨头，那时候股权比例就没那么重要了。

Now once a company sort of crosses that chasm, maybe into the series B or to the Series C, you can identify them as being market leaders and potential generational companies, then I think it matters less.

这时候重点就变成怎么把钱投进去，看这笔投资能带来多少现金回报。

Then it's just about getting capital into those companies and underwriting it as a cash on cash type outcome.

别再纠结百分比了，就想象一下：如果我们投了两千五百万进去，这笔钱最终能翻多少倍？

Forgetting about percentages, just imagining, okay, if we put $25,000,000 into this, what can the multiple be on that?

能涨十倍吗？

Is it a 10x?

能涨一百倍吗？

Is it 100x?

能涨一千倍吗？

Is it 1000x?

如果真是那种特别大的机会，那你其实根本不需要

If it is, you know, if it's something really big like that, then you don't really need

太在意持股比例。

to think about ownership.

我们刚做了一笔投资，等这个消息公布的时候，你就能看到了。

We just did a deal together, and by the time this comes out, it'll be announced.

昨晚创始人给我发了条消息，所以我现在能聊这个。

I actually got a message from the founder overnight, which is why I'm able to talk about it.

是FOMO的Paul。

Paul at FOMO.

哦，不错。

Oh, nice.

对。

Yeah.

你们那一轮是后来做的。

And you guys did that round later.

对我们来说是后来。

Later for us.

对。

Yeah.

所以我才问了那个问题。

And that was why I asked that question.

对。

Yeah.

但你看到了市场规模，对不了解的人来说，这本质上是下一代交易应用。

But you saw the size of market, and for people that don't know, it's the next generation trading app in many respects.

我想你注意到入场时的估值倍数扩张了。

I guess you saw that multiple expansion at the entry price you came in at.

这真是个完美的例子。

That's a perfect example.

我们当时也看到了这种情况，就问自己：这东西最终能长到多大？

You know, we we saw that where it was, and we said to ourselves, how big can we see this getting?

我们认为它未来远不止现在的规模。

We think it can be a lot bigger than it is now.

所以对于这一轮，我们不会太在意持股比例。

And so for this one, we're not gonna be ownership focused.

我们只是打算投一笔钱进去。

We're just gonna we're gonna put a check-in.

从这轮开始，我们可能每一轮都会参与，毕竟我们的基金规模有限，但我觉得机会和上升空间足够大，值得跟进。

We may be able to bet every round from here out because, again, we have constraints to the size of our funds, but we think there's enough opportunity and enough upside from here that it's worth it.

如果你觉得没有可能成为巨头，还值得投吗？

Should you do it if you don't think there's, like, a mega outcome?

我知道这听起来有点奇怪。

I know that sounds strange.

我不太确定。

I'm not sure.

对我们USV来说，在后期阶段，如果我们觉得没有巨大的回报潜力，那大概就不值得下注。

For for us, for USV at the later stages, if we don't think that there's a gigantic outcome, it probably doesn't make sense for us to bet.

但我的问题是，即使没有巨大回报，早期阶段是不是也该投？

But even should you do it early if it's not a gigantic outcome is my kind of question.

听我说。

Look.

一般来说，我们总是希望投资的项目所处的市场足够大，机会面足够广，我们会用这个标准来看待每一家公司。

I think in general, you always want to believe that the things you're betting on are playing in large markets with very, very large surface areas, and we're going look at every company that way.

但我觉得，因为我们的基金规模比较小，跟你类似，这种模式下我们的下行保护其实更强，不像那些大基金，动不动就得靠几十亿的回报来撬动。

But I do think that because our funds are smaller, similar to yours, there's probably more downside protection for us in that model than, say, at a larger fund where you have to multiply billions of dollars.

我们现在投资的这支核心基金，规模是2.75亿美元。

For us, the fund that we're investing out of now, the core fund, it's a $275,000,000 core fund.

所以，相比投几个十亿美元的项目，你更容易在同样的股权比例下实现更高的回报。

And so you can multiply that a lot easier than multiplying, say, several billion dollars, especially if you get the same type of ownership that a that a larger fund is getting.

不过我觉得，对于那些大型平台型基金来说，现在可能是有史以来最好的时机，因为他们能靠业务扩张和退出规模实现类似风投的回报。

I think it will be the best time ever, though, for the very large platform funds, and I think they'll be able to deliver venture like returns because of the expansion and outcome sizes.

你觉得这种说法对不对？

Do you think that's true or not?

你看看Thrive就是个例子。

I mean, you look like a Thrive.

是的。

Yeah.

他们的增长型基金表现，比90%的种子轮基金都要好。

I mean, their numbers are better than 90% of seed fund numbers on their growth growth vehicle.

没错。

Yeah.

你想想，他们其实早就打下了基础。

When you look at I mean, you know, they have made a precursor.

太惊人了。

Phenomenal.

OpenAI 基金，显然非常出色。

The OpenAI Fund, obviously incredible.

他们用数十亿美元的资金获得了风投级别的回报。

They are getting venture outcomes on multibillion dollars.

我们认为，现在正走出一个大规模基础设施建设、资本投入极高的时期。

We think that we are coming out of a period where there has been a massive infrastructure build out and very, very capital intense companies.

那些能够投资于这些高资本密集型公司的大型机构，表现得非常出色。

Firms, large firms that were able to invest in those very capital intensive companies have done phenomenally well.

但同样，我们现在所处的世界，应用层将涌现大量初创公司和应用程序，它们对资本的需求没那么高。

But again, I think we're also now playing in a world where there will be a proliferation of startups and apps at the application layer that are less capital intensive.

对于这类公司，你得清楚自己在找什么，而且你可以用相对较小的金额就进入这些企业。

And for those, again, I think you're gonna need to know what you're looking for, and I think you can you can get in those companies at more modest check sizes.

但我认为，你不能设立一个中等规模的基金来做这件事。

Now I don't think you can have a fund that's in the middle to do that.

你得要么做大，跟着主流走，要么就做得很小，观点鲜明，用小基金撬动更大回报。

Think you need to either be on the the large end and play the consensus game or be really small and really opinionated and multiply a much smaller fund.

你的出价有弹性吗？

Are you elastic on price?

说实话，过去一年我们错过了两笔投资。

You know, candidly, we we've lost two deals in the last year.

听好了，是被别人出价比下去了。

And listen, we got outbid.

我不确定，如果我们出同样的价格，能不能赢下来。

I don't know if we would have won if we'd paid the same price.

我不喜欢那些人，动不动就说‘差两倍三倍’——我们出了一亿五，别人出三亿抢走了；另一个项目，别人出四亿把我们挤掉了。

I hate people that say that as the but by like two or three x, we bid one fifty and another we got outbid by 300, another we outbid 400.

我是不是该直接加价？

Should I have just paid?

我跟我的合伙人弗雷德·威尔逊聊过。

I talked to my partner, Fred Wilson.

必须给弗雷德点个赞，他是真正的传奇之一。

Gotta shout out Fred, one of the one of the GOATs.

我问他一个问题。

And I asked him a question.

我问他：在风投领域，你学到的最重要的经验是什么？

I said, what is what is the biggest lesson you've learned in VC?

其实我是问他，有哪几条最重要的经验。

Actually, I asked him what are a couple of the biggest lessons.

其中一条是：永远不要因为价格而放弃机会。

And one of them was never pass on price.

弗雷德说，永远不要因为价格而放弃机会。

So Fred says never pass on price.

我觉得现实中，可能没这么绝对，还是有些讲究的。

I think in reality, there's probably some nuance.

回到USV的策略，我觉得如果我们投的是稍晚一些的阶段，就必须确信这家公司是市场赢家。

Just to bring it back to the USV strategy, I think for us, again, if we're investing a little bit later stage, we need to really believe that it's a market winner.

回报倍数可能会非常高。

The multiple can be very, very, very high.

这种情况下，我们在价格上可以稍微灵活一点。

And in that case, we can be a little bit more elastic on price.

但在最早期的阶段，尤其是我们用小基金投资时，我觉得价格上始终得有个上限，不然基金的回报模型就撑不起来。

But I think at the earliest stages, especially when we're investing out of our small funds, I do think there will always be a limit for us on price, just because otherwise we can't make the fund math work.

我知道我的工作为什么这么棒，因为我真的一直在学习这个行业。

You know why my job is just incredible is because I really am a student of this business.

对了，你刚才提到要感谢Fred。

And by the way, you said shout out to Fred.

我17岁的时候给Fred发过邮件，他和Brad Feld都在半小时内回了我。

I emailed Fred when I was 17 years old, and him and Brad Feld both responded to me within thirty minutes.

真的吗。

Wow.

这恰恰说明，当你明明一无所有的时候，他们依然愿意花时间回应你。

Like, that is the testament to giving time to people when, you know, candidly, I had nothing.

我曾在那个播客里讲过一件事，Anchor刚上线的时候，我根本没见过Fred，结果Anchor应用不小心自动替他发了推文。

I told a story on that podcast where when Anchor first launched, I had never met Fred, and the Anchor app accidentally auto tweeted for Fred.

那时候他在Twitter上的粉丝量已经很大了。

And he has a big follower count on Twitter at the time.

现在当然叫X了。

Now it's X, obviously.

他对此特别不高兴。

And he was not happy about that.

他在Twitter上直接找我理论。

He started lighting me up on Twitter.

那正是Anchor上线后的第二天。

This is one of the day like, the day after we launched Anchor.

作为第一次创业的人，我当时确实挺难堪的。

Obviously, that was uncomfortable for me as a first time founder.

但正如你所说，我事后立刻给他发了封邮件。

But to your point, I cold emailed him right after the fact.

我向他道歉了，还主动提出帮他排查问题。

And I apologized, and I offered to troubleshoot it with him.

他立刻回复了，态度特别友善，宽容又理解。

And he responded immediately, and he was super gracious and forgiving and understanding.

我也经历过类似的事。

And so I had a similar experience.

我觉得任何形式的曝光都是好事。

And I think all publicity is good publicity.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

True.

实际上，大概率是这样。

Actually, probably.

那件事反而带来了大量关注。

Get a lot of publicity from that.

是的，你确实可能如此。

Yeah, you probably do.

永远别只看价格。

Never pass on price.

说到风投资金这个话题，我想起彼得·芬顿跟我说过的一句话：用价格来检验你对项目的信心有多强。

Where I was going with the student of venture dollars, I think it actually goes something that Peter Fenton told me, which is use price as a litmus test for your conviction.

你看，

There you

就是这个道理。

go.

比如像Fuse的Alan Chang，或者Airwise的Jack这样的创始人。

And it's like, actually, there are founders like Alan Chang at Fuse or Jack at Airwise.

就算价格涨三倍，我今天也愿意掏钱。

You could treble the price, I'd still pay it today.

有些创始人就是这样，就算价格翻倍，你还是会想：这钱我照样出。

You have founders like this where if you doubled the price, you're like, I'd still pay it.

是的，当然了。

Yeah, yeah, absolutely.

我能想到一些我做过的最成功的投资。

I can think of some of the best deals I've done.

即使现在回头看，价格已经挺满意了，但如果能重来一次，我可能还是愿意出双倍的价格。

And even though I'm happy with where the price landed, in hindsight, I'd probably pay double the price if I could go back and do it again.

如果我问你，现在你从事风投这么多年，最大的教训是什么——就像你之前问弗雷德那样，你觉得会是什么？

If I were to ask you what are your biggest lessons now, having been in venture, in the same way that you asked Fred, what would you say they

是啊。

are?

你不能把自己的想法强加给创始人。

You can't project

你的

your

想法不能强加在创始人身上。

own ideas on the founder.

当然，如果创始人愿意，你可以提供建议。

Sure, you can offer ideas, of course, if the founder wants.

但尤其是你以前做过运营，总会不自觉地想，我知道这生意该怎么搞，我知道这产品应该怎么设计。

But especially as a former operator, you often think, oh, I know how this business should be built, or I know how this product should work.

但这种想法真的很容易让你踩坑。

And I think that can really, really get you into trouble.

我以前的合伙人，光速的刘宇，我就犯过好几次这种错，有一天他打电话跟我说：我觉得你这是拿自己当创始人的视角在看问题。

One of my former partners, Jeremy Liu at Lightspeed, I made this mistake a few times, and he called me up one day and he said, Hey, I think you're projecting as a former founder.

他还说，根据我的经验，这种做法非常危险，风险极高。

And he's like, In my experience, that's very, very dangerous and very risky.

我觉得这真是个很好的教训。

I think it was a great lesson.

现实是，就算你想法很好，觉得自己知道答案——哪怕你确实是对的——但公司毕竟是创始人的，他们可能完全有别的想法。

The reality is even if you have great ideas and you think you know the answer, even if you're right, by the way, reality is it's the founder's company, and they may completely different way.

更别说，如果你把自己的想法强加给正在评估的团队，很可能完全看走眼。

And not only that, if you project your ideas on a team that you're evaluating, you might get it completely wrong.

对吧？

Right?

你可能会看一个生意，觉得我知道这家公司该怎么做。

You might look at a business and say, I know what this company needs to do.

它得做A、B、C、D，然后就能赢。

It needs to do A, B, C, D, and then it's going to win.

但如果你基于这种判断下注，而团队根本没做这四件事，那你这注就押错了。

But if you make your bet based on that evaluation and that judgment, and that team doesn't do those four things, you made a bad bet.

别把自己的想法强加给他们。

So don't project.

别把自己的想法强加给他们。

Don't project.

你得真正相信团队，相信他们的判断，相信他们能执行自己的计划。

You have to really believe in the team and the team's judgment and the team's ability to execute on their own plan.

这对我来说是个很大的教训，作为

That was a big lesson for me as a

前首席执行官。

former CEO.

创始人、市场、产品。

Founder, market, product.

给它们打个一分到三分的分。

Rate them one through three.

我刚干这行的时候，会觉得是产品、市场、创始人。

When I first started this job, I would have said product, market, founder.

我现在完全倒过来了。

I've completely flipped that.

现在是创始人、市场、产品。

Now founder, market, product.

我觉得创始人才是最重要的。

I think that the founder is the most important thing.

说到底，大多数初创公司，尤其是早期的，迟早都会调整方向。

At the end of the day, most startups, especially early stage startups, they're gonna pivot in some form or another.

最重要的是，他们有没有韧性？

What's most important is, are they resilient?

他们能不能把事情做成？

Can they execute?

他们能不能应对变化？

Can they adapt to change?

当你

When you

如果看错了一个创始人，你会错过哪些你本来希望看到的东西？

get founder reads wrong, what do you not see that you wish you'd seen?

我经常发现，沟通是创始人的一大难题。

I often see communication as a big hurdle for founders.

我觉得作为领导者，最难的事之一就是有效沟通，因为沟通贯穿公司建设的每一个环节。

I think one of the hardest things you can do as a leader is communicate effectively, because I think communication touches every part of company building.

它关系到招聘，而我们知道，招聘是你能做的最重要的事情之一。

It's part of recruiting, which, as we know, is one of the most important things you could do.

你得能说清楚你的使命、你的价值观，为什么你存在，你想达成什么目标。

You have to be able to communicate your mission, your values, why you exist, what you're trying to accomplish.

你得跟投资人说清楚，对吧？

You have to communicate to investors, right?

如果你不擅长表达，就别想融到资。

If you're not a great communicator, you're not going to be able to raise capital.

别想让风投把钱投进你的公司。

You're not going to be able to put venture dollars into the business.

你得能把产品的愿景讲给团队听，对吧？

You need to be able to communicate your product vision to your team, right?

如果你说不清楚，怎么让团队齐心协力做出完美的产品？

How can you align the team around building the perfect product if you can't communicate it?

你得能把你的故事讲给市场听。

You have to be able to tell your story to the market.

回过头看我过去一些判断上的失误，可能问题就出在沟通上。

When I think about some of the mistakes I've made in evaluation, it's maybe been on communication.

那可能是最大的一个了。

That's probably been one of the biggest.

你觉得你在投资中犯过的最严重的错误是什么？

What do you think the single biggest mistake in Venturers you've made in terms of miss?

我觉得我最大的错误可能就是你告诉我的那两个。

I would say mine probably is one that you gave me, which is well, two of yours.

当初大卫·富兰克林创办Collective时，介绍我认识了Suno，那时我拒绝了他们。

I turned down Suno when David Franklin founded Collective introduced me at the seed.

你知道当时学到的教训是什么吗？

You know what the lesson was there?

这事儿挺有意思的。

Really interesting.

我希望迈克不介意我提起这件事。

I hope Mike is okay with me saying this.

我相信他不会介意的。

I'm sure he is.

那是一张二十五万美元或者二十万美元的支票，股权也就1%左右。

It was a 250 check or a 200 k check, and so the ownership was, you know, 1%.

是的。

Yeah.

我当时就说了，不行。

And I was like, no.

我得拿高比例的股权。

I need to be high ownership.

我的有限合伙人也一直跟我说，要拿高股权。

My LPs tell me high ownership.

至于Granola，说实话，只是我想象力不够。

And Granola, honestly, was a lack of imagination.

Chris那边我看过了，挺不错的，但那是个还很粗糙的想法。

Chris, I saw, was great, but it was a very unformed idea.

我当时就想，我不能就这么当个创始人了。

And I was like, I can't just Founder.

创始人优先。

Founder first.

只能是创始人主导。

Well, founder only thing.

如果只有创始人，另外两个人根本不存在，那双方都会犯严重错误。

When founders, other two don't exist, terrible mistakes there for both.

讽刺的是，你们俩都做得非常出色，

Ironically, both were you you did very well,

所以恭喜你们。

and so congrats.

顺便说一句，这是两种完全不同的做法。

Two different motions, by the way.

对我来说，Granola 就是纯粹押注创始人。

Granola for me was a pure founder bet.

纯粹押注创始人。

Pure founder bet.

我认识Chris。

I knew Chris.

我认识Chris已经十五年了。

I've known Chris now for fifteen plus years.

而且他也不是那种特别会推销自己的人。

He's also not an amazing seller.

我打算直接给他。

Just gonna give it if I

之前我没把话说得太直白。

hadn't been blunt.

但我跟克里斯私下里挺熟的。

But I knew Chris up close.

所以我当时在搞 Anchor 这个项目的时候，Socratic 是他之前的创业公司，就紧挨着我们。

So when I was building Anchor, the Socratic office, Socratic was his previous startup, was right behind ours.

我们还一起参加过几次聚会。

And we did a few meetups together.

我们俩的团队一起搞过几次聚餐喝酒。

Our we got our teams together for a few happy hours.

我和他作为创始人经常聊天，互相倾诉创业中的困难，也给彼此提建议。

And I and I you know, I would talk to him as another founder, and we would share our struggles and, you know, get advice from each other.

我觉得这人肯定行，我了解他。

I was like, this guy, I know he can do it.

我亲眼见过他做事。

I've seen him.

我亲眼看过他把事情做成。

I've seen him do it.

这纯粹是押注创始人。

Pure founder bet.

Suno 这个项目完全不一样。

Suno was something very different.

Suno 是基于明确判断做出的投资。

Suno was a pure thesis driven bet.

对我来说，这个投资逻辑源于Anchor时期，那时我亲眼看到一个产品如何让创意表达变得大众化。

For me, the thesis came from actually the days of Anchor and seeing what it meant for a product to democratize a creative medium.

在AI出现之前，音乐领域从来没能真正实现大众化。

And music had never really been fully democratized before AI.

于是我走出去，见了每一个在做音乐AI的团队。

So I went out and I met with every team building AI for music.

我到处寻找，把所有相关团队都找了一遍。

I went out and I hunted down every team.

然后我就遇到了Mikey和他们的团队，我当时就心想，这真是个了不起的团队。

And then and then, of course, I met Mikey and the team, and I was like, wow, is an incredible team.

接着，从创始人的角度再看，我更加确定，这真是个了不起的团队。

And and then the founder then the founder lens came on, and I was like, this is an incredible team.

你第一次见到创始人时，怎么判断这个人值不值得投资？

How obvious is it when you meet a founder that you wanna invest?

见到Mikey和Suno的创始团队时，我是一眼就决定了。

With Mikey and the Suno founders, it was immediate.

我第一次见Mikey就立刻有感觉了吗？

I I met Mikey normally immediate?

不一定。

Not always.

不是每次都这样。

Not always.

但Suno这边，确实是。

With Suno, was.

我和Mikey在新泽西州霍博肯我家附近的一家餐厅见了面。

Mikey and I sat down at a restaurant near my home in Hoboken, New Jersey.

他家人住在新泽西，所以我们约在霍博肯碰头。

His family's in Jersey, so we met up in Hoboken.

我们一见面就特别投缘。

We just immediately hit it off.

瞬间就有一种默契。

Just instant connection.