20VC: Why Seed is for Suckers | a16z's $20BN Fund & Founders Fund's $4.6BN: What Makes Them So Good | Why Josh Kushner Is the Master of Venture Capital Strategy | Why Extended Private Markets Screw US Citizens with Jason Lemkin and Rory O'Driscoll

但如果你连那些基础条件都没有，那你说得对。

But if you don't have the gruels as well, then you're right.

那确实非常困难。

Then it's compellingly hard.

你说‘非常困难’？

You say you say compellingly hard.

是的。

Yeah.

我们都有有限合伙人。

We all have LPs.

经常有LP给我打电话，说：‘哈利，这家公司到底怎么了？’

I have a lot of LPs call me up and go, Harry, what the happens to this company?

我到哪儿去套现？

Where am I getting my liquidity?

我从杰森那儿投了不少。

I've got exposure from Jason.

我是直接掌握的。

I've got it direct.

当你看看你们这一代的Dataiku、Calibra、Algolia这些公司，它们的增长率已经不像以前那么高了。

And when you look at a generation of your Dataiku's, your Calibra's, your Algolia's, the growth rates aren't quite what they used to be.

盈利能力也没达到预期。

The profitability isn't quite there.

关键问题是，这一代公司接下来会怎样？流动性又从哪里来？

And it's a question of what happens to this generation of companies and where does liquidity come from?

说到底，这3万亿美元的问题之所以重要，是因为这大致就是私人风险投资资产的公允市值。

Look, it is The reason the $3,000,000,000,000 question is because that's the rough fair market value of privately held venture assets.

这其中大概有一到两万亿美元是高增长的新兴企业，另外两万亿美元则是成熟、增长放缓的SaaS和云公司，它们已经不再具备上市的势头，但依然有相当的价值。

And, you know, maybe half 1,000,000,000,000 to 1,000,000,000,000 of that is high growth new stuff, and the other 2,000,000,000,000 is mature, slower growth SaaS and cloud companies that don't have the trajectory anymore for an IPO, but as yet have meaningful value.

我觉得有意思的是，我当年在1999年、2000年的时候，所有好的项目都上市了，差的那些则烂到极点，到2002年我们就直接清算了。

And I think that's the interesting thing is that if it was like, I was around in '99, 2000, All the good deals went public, and all the bad deals were so shit that by 2002, we closed them down.

我们说，哎呀，算了吧，然后大家就各自转身了。

We said, whoopsie, and we all moved on.

你可以放下两亿美元，但你放不下两千亿美元。

You can move on from a $200,000,000 you can't move on from $2,000,000,000,000.

对吧？

Right?

所以，为了帮这些公司找到像样的退出路径，得花大力气重新梳理每个人的投资组合。

So there's a huge amount of really grim industrial work that's going to have to be done on everyone's portfolio to manage these companies through to a meaningful exit.

正如我所说，两千亿美元不是小数目，这不仅关系到有限合伙人的收益，也牵动着众多大型企业的命运。

Because, you know, as I say, you can't walk away from $2,000,000,000,000 that are not only your LPs economics, the euro economics, significant big companies.

这些公司体量太大，你根本走不开，但要处理好它们，绝对是一场硬仗。

And they're so big that you're not gonna walk away, but it's gonna be a lot of hard work.

其中一个办法，就是咬牙坚持，一步步做到盈利。

One option, you just grind your way to profitability.

也可以考虑私募股权退出。

You look at PE exit.

或者推动行业整合。

You look at consolidations.

你会看到一些私募之间的整合，把同一领域的两三家公司合并起来，试图改变它们的盈利轨迹。

You know, you you're gonna see some private to private where you put the two or three companies in the same space together and try and change the economics of the trajectory.

也许会有一些规模较小的IPO，人们会说：我知道市场不怎么样，但求求你，给我一点流动性吧。

Maybe you'll see some smaller IPOs where people go, I know it's not a great market, but god, give me some liquidity.

价格决定一切市场。

Price does all markets.

你明白吧？

You know?

以上所有情况都会发生。

All of the above.

这会是极其个案化、漫长又疲惫的工作。

It's gonna be real case specific, long and tiring work.

但另一方面，两千亿美元在美國也是真金白银。

But on the other hand, $2,000,000,000,000 is real money even in America.

罗里，我有个疑问一直担心着，本来想写下来，但没数据支撑，因为你手里的投资组合覆盖面更广。

Rory, what I wonder one thing that worries me, I wanted to write this up, but I don't have the data to to support it because you have a much broader portfolio.

我担心私募股权公司根本不想收购这些公司。

I'm worried that the PE firms aren't trying to buy these companies.

这才是我真正担心的事。

That's what I'm worried about.

问题不在估值上。

It's not the valuation.

至少你还有个选择。

At least you have an option.

我担心的是，那种私对私的模式，我觉得这主意不错，对吧？

I am worried that and the private private I think is a great idea right?

拿两家年增长20%、估值2亿的公司，以5亿市值上市，这游戏就玩起来了。

Take two companies at 200 growing 20, take it public at 20% at 500,000,000, you've got you've got a game.

每个人都该看看这个交易，但我真的震惊了。

Everyone should look at that deal but I'm just stunned.

以前我总能看到私募基金把整个投资组合都翻个遍。

I used to see pea hunting everything in the portfolio.

我每年都会来南三角区，跟一些创始人聊，跟他们说：我们在这儿呢。

I would come to South Triangle and every year I'd talk to some founder and be like, well, we're here.

我会问：有私募股权公司找过你吗？

I'm like, has a pee firm talked to you?

有。

Yes.

二十倍。

20.

对吧？

Right?

那些增长平平的公司，根本没人去深入了解。

Folks that in this sort of mediocre growth level, they're getting no tire kicking.

你有没有发现，其实根本没人去尽职调查？

Are you seeing lots of tire kicking that's not happening?

因为我根本没看到这种情况。

Because I ain't seeing it.

我们没看到太多这样的情况，你说得一点没错。

We're not seeing a huge amount, and you're exactly right.

这个看法很敏锐啊，杰森。

And it's quite a shrewd comment, Jason.

我觉得原因在于这一点。

And I think the reason is this.

私募股权的人，讽刺的是，偏偏喜欢我们不喜欢的东西。

PE guys ironically love the things that we don't love.

让我解释一下我的意思。

And let me tell you what I mean by that.

他们喜欢那种无聊的软件公司，只在一个极小的细分市场里，占了40%的份额，然后未来五年不断涨价压榨客户，因为客户根本没别的选择。

They love a boring ass software company in a teeny tiny vertical with 40% market share where they can screw the customers for the next five years by raising prices because there's nowhere else to go.

风险投资和SaaS项目则偏爱那些覆盖面广的横向市场，有机会竞争，说不定能做成十亿美元的生意。

Venture deals, SaaS deals love broad horizontal markets where you can compete and maybe get a billion dollar outcome.

所以，那些才是能得到行业资金支持的公司。

So those are the companies that are industry funded.

问题是，当你没能实现十亿美元的回报，发现市场其实没那么大，或者发现隔壁公司也在竞争，你就剩下一个规模太小、没有定价权的公司。

And the problem is when you fail to get the billion dollar outcome, when you discover your market is tinier, or when you discover that an adjacent company is competitive, you're left with this subscale company that doesn't have the same pricing power.

你身处一个挺大的市场，但有个更大的对手在那儿，能慢慢把你压垮。

You're in a perfectly good big market, but there's a bigger company out there that can grind

对。

Yeah.

根本没什么定价能力。

There's no pricing power.

没有定价权，私募股权的人最受不了这个。

With no pricing power, and PE guys just hate that.

因为他们一看就明白：这事儿我懂。

Because they can look at it and go, I get it.

你现在一年赚一亿美元。

You're doing a 100,000,000 now.

你可以慢慢熬，但没法砍掉三成成本、提价，然后还指望赚同样的钱。

You can grind it, but you can't take 30% of the cost out, raise the prices, and get the same thing.

我同意。

So I agree.

我觉得，不是每个一亿美元的交易都值得出手。

I think that not every deal at a $100,000,000 would be interesting to pay.

如果他们在这个领域有相关业务，可能会收购，因为能整合进去。

If they have an adjacency in the same space, then they might buy it because they can load it on.

但当你看看他们喜欢的项目，再对比我们风投做的那些，根本不是同一类交易。

But when you look at the things they love and you look at the things they make we make in venture, they're not the same deal.

当你列出来他们投资的公司类型，就一清二楚了。

And it's very clear when you when you list the kind of companies they do.

比如，某个冷门行业的会计软件，市场占有率极高，根本没人敢投资竞争对手。

It's like, oh, obscure vertical accounting software for an obscure vertical, you know, massive market dominance, and no one's ever gonna fund a competitor.

他们就是这么算的。

Like, they just run that math.

他们砍掉冗余的销售团队，把价格翻倍，缩减工程团队，直接把40%的现金流拿走。

They cut they firewall the salespeople, double the prices, cut the engineering down, kick off 40% cash flow.

比如一些通用型的CRM公司，或者干脆说2016年那批第一代客户支持公司，如果你砍掉研发和销售市场，光看毛收入留存率，也能做到80%。

In some of the broad horizontals in a CRM company or let's just say a first generation customer support company from 2016, if you cut off the r and d and the sales and marketing, your gross dollar retention will be 80%.

但你再也卖不出任何新产品了。

You won't be selling any new shit.

业绩会持续下滑，产品两年内就没人用了。

You'll be declining, and your product will become irrelevant in two years.

不过除此之外，祝你今天愉快。

But other than that, have a great day.

像这样的公司，你该怎么看呢，杰森？你把它们归到哪一类？

Those companies you are and, Jason, where do you put those companies?

你之前提到过，你得想办法在维持现有业务的同时，找到推动新增长的路径——这比直接卖给私募股权公司难多了，我说过这一点。

You have to one of the things you said earlier about you probably have to find a way to fund new growth while at the same time, you know, building a new It's a much harder play than just sell it to PE, as I said.

就是我们之前聊过的那些其他事。

It's all the other things we talk about.

你提到过，风投和私募股权看重的东西其实不一样，而且如果你这么做、那么做，风投这边还是能看到十亿美元的回报机会。

You said that kind of the difference between what venture likes and what PE likes and, hey, if we do this and this, we can see the billion dollar outcome in venture.

这跟新闻有点关系，安德里森刚宣布了200亿美元的基金，还有相关的计划。

Kind of relating it to news, but Andreessen announced a $20,000,000,000 fund and the plans around it.

通用资本有80亿美元，Lightspeed我不知道他们到底有多少十亿。

General Catalyst have $8,000,000,000 LightSpeed, I don't know how many billion dollars they have.

他们各种基金搞得实在太乱了，但都是几十亿几十亿的规模。

It's so confusing with all their different vehicles, but billions and billions.

十亿美元的退出？

Billion dollar exit?

谢谢你赞助了圣诞派对。

Thanks for paying for the Christmas party.

我是认真的。

I'm being serious.

如果你有8%，那就是8000万美元回本。

If you have 8%, it's 80,000,000 back.

说句老实话，他们显然不是冲着十亿美元退出去的。

I mean, to state the banal, they're obviously not focused on billion dollar exits.

他们瞄准的是数量更少、但规模大得多的退出项目。

They're focused on a much smaller number of much larger exits.

对吧？

Right?

这其实就是整个策略的核心。

And that's the bet in a nutshell.

如果你想让这些数字成立，要么就得拿下海量的十亿到五百亿美元级别的退出项目。

If you're gonna make those kind of numbers work, you either have to do lots of I mean, you have to get, like, vast numbers of billion to $5,000,000,000 exits.

你到底是冲着一百亿，还是千亿级别的退出去的？

Are you in as I say, you're playing for the 10,000,000,000 or the 100,000,000,000 exit.

关键问题是，这种项目到底有多少个？

The question is how many of those there are?

通常来说，任何能筹到这种基金的人，都已经证明自己至少能找到一个。

Typically, anyone who raises one of these funds has proven they can already find at least one.

很明显，他们之前找到了Databricks，而且做得非常成功。

By def and reason to know is they found Databricks, and they've done amazingly well.

他们持有其中很大一部分股份。

They own a huge slug of that.

确实有可能。

It could yeah.

这不仅仅是一个基金的回报项目。

It's not just a fund returner.

这是多个基金的回报项目。

It's a multi fund returner.

对吧？

Right?

没人会因为蠢笨就拿到一百亿或两百亿的估值。

No one gets given 10,000,000,000 or $20,000,000,000 because they're idiots.

他们拿到两百亿，是因为有十年十五年的出色业绩，而且从来没踩过雷。

They got given $20,000,000,000 because they earned it by, you know, ten or fifteen years of track record with no bad funds, by the way.

这又回到了你之前提到的另一位合伙人的话题。

That back to that kinda the comment you made on another partner earlier.

你展示了能力，而金融领域大多数出问题的时候，都是因为人们对趋势跟得太紧了。

You demonstrate your and then, typically, most things in finance, when things goes wrong, is when people lean into a trend just a bit too far.

关键问题是，现在是不是到了那个临界点？

And the judgment here is, is this that point?

这其实正是你在问的核心。

And that's really what you're asking.

说实话，我不确定。

And I I don't know.

我觉得他们最大的优势在于，现在有太多公司选择长期保持私有，这自然意味着对资金的需求更大，而只要有这些资金，就理应能获得可观的回报。

I mean, I think the biggest thing they have in their favor is the fact that so many companies are staying private for longer, which by definition means more need for capital, which by definition means if you have that capital, you should be able to make an acceptable return.

二十年前的风投市场，根本消化不了两千亿美元。

So the venture market that I knew twenty years ago couldn't digest $20,000,000,000.

连边都沾不上。

It wouldn't even be close.

那时候根本谈不上回报，因为通常的IPO规模在十亿到五百亿美元之间，每年最多也就一两家能超过这个数。

There would be no possibility of return because, you know, typically, IPOs were 1,000,000,000 to maybe 5,000,000,000, and there was one bigger than that every year at most.

你知道吗，在这个企业保持私有状态长达十五年以上的世界里，还要应对大规模的二级市场交易来解决员工问题，很可能这些资金确实有地方可投。

You know, in a world where things are staying private for fifteen plus years, where there's massive secondaries to deal with employee issues, it may well be that there's a place to put all that money.

回报可能达不到风投那种三倍的水平，但你要知道，竞争对手不过是小盘股11%的回报率。

The returns mightn't be three x venture returns, but, you know, the competition is the small cap return of 11%.

如果你能提供百分之十几到接近百分之二十的回报，有限合伙人可能会觉得这已经很不错了，这正是他们愿意下的注。

You know, if you're delivering high mid high teens, it may be that the LPs think that's great, and that's the bet they're taking.

杰森，你是怎么分析的？

Jason, how did you analyze it?

上周刚有个有限合伙人发了条推文，我有点反应慢了。

There's some LP on Twitter that made this tweet literally this last week that, I'm a little slow.

当年罗里提出‘一到十，再减五个季度’的时候，我也豁然开朗了。

Like, when Rory made the old, one to ten and five quarters less, this one opened my eyes too.

这些基金看起来疯狂，确实也够疯狂，但基金规模应该跟你能投进多少赢家项目挂钩，看你能用多少资本撬动多少回报。

It's like, the side these funds seem crazy and they are crazy, but the size of the fund should be tied to the amount of winners you can deploy x amount of cap capital into.

所以像安德里森这样的机构，从我们一开始就是这样，红杉也一直如此——他们能接触到每一个项目。

So if you're Andreessen, a beauty to an Andreessen at this point, certainly been true of Sequoia since we started, is they see every deal.

安德里森能接触到每一个项目。

Andreessen sees every deal.

明白吧？

Okay?

所以他们能把这些数据列成表格，比如Databricks在2021年估值达到了270亿美元。

And so they can put this on a spreadsheet, and they're like, you know, Databricks was 27,000,000,000 in 2021.

如果我们全程参与了这一轮投资呢？

What if we've done the whole round?

别管他们是不是投了A轮。

Forget about that they were in the a.

对吧？

Right?

假设他们2021年只投了30亿美元呢？

What if they just put in 3,000,000,000 in 2021?

那他们早就多赚了两倍半的回报了，不是吗？

They would have already 2 and a half extra money, right?

他们把数据填进表格，加总一下，就说：没错，我们能在二十四个月内投出两千亿美元，对吧？

They put it on a spreadsheet and they add it up and they're like, yeah, we can deploy 20,000,000,000 in twenty four months, right?

我觉得这就是实际运作的方式。

I think that's the way it works.

而且事情其实就这么简单。

And I think it's that simple.

正如罗里所说，现在资金太多了，尤其是在后期交易和项目上。

And there's so much capital to Rory's point, especially in the in these later stage deals and the ideas.

只要你看过每一个项目，要在这张表上投出两百亿根本不是难事。

They can easily deploy the 20 on that spreadsheet if you see every deal.

我觉得确实存在敏感性分析，模型也支持这种推算。

I do think there's a sensitivity analysis and the model supports it.

这才是你真正该去探索的方向。

That's what you want to adventure.

如果你融得太多，光是管理费就吃掉一大块，项目反而不够用了。

And when you raise too much for the fees or whatever, you run out of deals.

大多数人不是缺钱，是找不到够好的项目。

Most folks run out of great deals to see.

如果你把所有S级项目都看一遍，那这就是我用安德森的方法算出来的结果。

If you see every S tier deal, like here would be my Andreessen math.

假如我们把风险投资领域里所有的S级项目都看一遍呢？

If what if we see every S tier deal there is in venture?

我们看了100%的顶级项目，一个都没落下。

A 100 we see a 100% of all the best deals.

100%都看过了，但还是错过了其中90%。

A 100% of the we've seen them all, and we passed on 90%.

那你可以回过头去，做个复盘分析。

Then you could go back in time and just do an analysis.

对吧？

Right?

我们当初错过那些十亿美元级公司的时候，就该这么做——既然每个项目都看了，也许就能解释那两千亿美元的缺口了。

This is what we should have done when we passed on all the Decacorns because you're in every one, and it maybe solves the 20,000,000,000.

我觉得确实如此。

I think it probably does.

但那才是他们本该做的。

But that's what they should have done.

我坚决不同意他们能看遍所有项目。

I I would hard push back that they see every deal.

坚决不同意。

Hard push back.

会被炒鱿鱼。

Get fired.

根据我有限的经验，就是埃文·德里森。

My limited experience is Evan Dreeson.

如果你不是马克或者本，没拿下每一个项目就会被开除，对吧，罗里？

If you're not Mark or Ben, you get fired if you didn't bring in every deal, don't you, Rory?

这不残忍，这不就是风投的规则吗？你没看遍每一个项目，就会被开除。

Isn't mean, isn't that the way venture You get fired if you don't see every deal.

你可以承认他们看过大多数交易。

You can stipulate they see most.

没错。

Right.

我不觉得在200亿美元基金策略中，没看过每笔交易会是前三大的问题，真正该担心的是其他方面。

I don't think I how a genuine comment of all the things that could go wrong with a $20,000,000,000 fund strategy, not seeing every deal is not a top three issue.

管理200亿美元资金的两个关键问题是：首先，没错，你得看到所有好项目。

The two issues with deploying $20,000,000,000 are, first of all, yes, you see every good deal.

但别忘了下一句——你得看每笔交易，这意味着你也会看到所有烂项目。

But remember the next sentence, you see every deal, which means you see every bad deal.

每有一个好项目，就有99个烂项目。

And there are 99 shit deals for every one good deal.

你看的项目越多，筛选的能力就越重要。

The more deal for you see, the more important picking is.

相对筛选比绝对筛选要容易一些。

Now relative picking is easier than absolute picking.

换句话说，我们骨子里其实都是比较型买家，有时候在抽象层面看一个项目，我会有点拿不准，说它好也不一定，说它不好也不见得。

In other words, if we are comparison shoppers at heart, most sometimes in the abstract, when I look at the deal, I get kinda caught up, but it maybe it's good, maybe it's not.

但大多数时候，如果我看到一个好项目，再配上五个差的，我脑子里就能直接判断：这个比那五个强。

But most of the time, if I see a good deal and five bad deals, my little IQ can go, I think that one's better than the other five.

那就选这个吧。

I should do that one.

所以，看遍所有项目确实优势很大，但你还是得一个一个仔细筛选。

So seeing all the deals is a huge advantage, but you still have to piece piece through them.

这算是第一个问题。

So that's kind of issue one.

如果你参与每一个好项目的投资，那你确实能看见所有好项目，但同时也会看到所有烂项目——所以筛选依然关键。

You're gonna see every good deal if you're do at round every good deal, but you're also gonna see every bad deal, so picking still matters.

我觉得他们能想明白，毕竟那帮人聪明得不得了。

I think they can figure that out because they're wildly smart dudes.

归根结底，真正的问题是：私募市场到底能不能消化得了这么多钱？

I think the real question in the end comes, is there just room in as privates for all that money?

如果有空间，这种情况就会继续下去。

And if there is, this will continue.

如果没有，迟早会停，但不是因为风投人士变成熟了。

And if there's not, then at some point, it won't stop because the venture guys will be mature.

不会停，是因为创始人会更谨慎地控制估值上限。

It won't stop because the founders will kinda be more careful to cap.

也不会停，是因为有限合伙人会停止投资。

It won't even stop because the LPs will stop.

真正会让它停下来的，是有限合伙人的上级——整体首席投资官们，不再向风投分配资金。

It will stop because the LPs bosses, the overall CIOs will stop allocating capital to venture.

只要这事没发生，这个游戏就会一直玩下去。

Until that happens, this game goes on.

顺便说一句，如果他们刚融完二百亿美元的那天，这事就结束了，那他们就是赢家，因为他们手握二百亿美元，别人一毛钱都没有。

And by the way, if it happens the day after they close $20,000,000,000, they win the best because they have 20,000,000,000 and no one else has any.

所以，风投这个小生态会一直持续，只要还有足够的新有限合伙人不断注资，让它保持运转。

So this whole little ecosystem in venture is gonna keep going as long as there are enough new LPs to fund it and keep it fueled up.

几乎完全独立于整体市场。

Almost clearly independent of the wider market.

二月份的波动居然只带来短暂的喘息，真是令人惊讶。

It's been stunning that the February didn't cause much more than the pause for breath.

那只是短暂的喘息而已。

It was just a pause for breath.

这简直太疯狂了。

It was just it's crazy.

你看OpenAI融了三百亿美元，再看其他数十亿美元的融资，根本不用怀疑这个生态能不能消化得了。

When you look at OpenAI raising $30,000,000,000 and when you look at multi billion dollar fundraiser, I don't think there's any question on whether this ecosystem can actually absorb it.

接下来真正该问的是，这本质上还是风险投资的游戏吗？

I think the subsequent question is, is it fundamentally a venture game?

我知道，你也知道，很多投资方当初以四十亿美元投进了这些模型公司。

I know and we both know many investors in some of the model providers who came in at 4,000,000,000.

现在估值涨到了六千亿，他们回报翻了三倍半，因为员工股权被严重稀释，后续融资又太猛了。

It's now 60,000,000,000, and they're three and a half x up because employee stock dilution was so heavy and the funding rounds coming in were so heavy.

即使回报不错，倍数还是太低了。

The multiples are shit even with great returns.

我的观察和想法是，我有时候太保守了，所以得提醒自己别太谨慎。

My observation and my own thinking is I'm sometimes too conservative, so I push against myself.

我觉得这些新入局者的一大优势，就是他们入行没多久。

I think one of the big advantages some of these newer entrants had was that they weren't in the business a long time.

因为当你干得久了，我就记得99年到02年那会儿。

Because when you've in a long time, I remembered '99 to 2002.

我记得 crashafter.com 那会儿，所有资金都撤走了。

I remember the crashafter.com and all the capital getting withdrawn.

这让我自然而然变得谨慎。

So it made me naturally cautious.

你说得对。

And you're right.

当初在估值四百亿的时候投钱，我是凭直觉做的。

The idea of writing a check at 4,000,000,000, you know, I did this instinctive.

这其实算不上风险投资。

Well, that's not really venture.

但说实话，风险投资就是为了赚钱。

But the truth is this, venture will pay to make money.

有些轮次确实赚了不少钱，只是因为股权被稀释，没他们预期的那么多。

And some of those rounds have made decent money, perhaps not as money as they thought because of the dilution.

你看那些进入这个领域并取得成功的人，共同特点就是他们都是新面孔，比如安德森、创始人基金，没被所谓的‘冒险’束缚，他们只想着怎么赚最多的钱，怎么钻系统的空子。

But a I mean, if you look at one of the common characteristics of the folks who enter this market and and have been successful has been newer entrants like Andreessen, like Founders, unencumbered by, quote, is adventure, and who have just said to themselves, how do I make the most amount of money and hack the system?

他们赚得比Thrive还多。

And they've made more Thrive.

Thrive和Think确实是很好的例子。

Thrive, think, are a great example.

Beth？不是。

Beth, no.

Poof？我来告诉你为什么。

Poof, by the way, and I'll tell you why.

Thrive成功了。

Thrive worked.

因为真正的房地产投资者只懂一件事：在每条街上买最好的房子。

Because a real estate investor knows only one thing, buy the best damn house on every block.

所以他就在金融科技领域买了最好的那栋房子。

So he bought the best damn house on the fintech block.

Stripe。

Stripe.

成了。

Tick.

他又在OpenAI领域买了最好的那栋房子。

He bought the best damn house on the OpenAI block.

成了。

Tick.

接着，他在基础设施和数据库领域买了最好的那栋房子。

And then he bought the best damn house on the infrastructure bot database.

滴。

Tick.

等你做完，就回家等着支票源源不断进账就行了。

Then you just go home when you're done and you wait for the checks to ball in.

这招太绝了。

It's genius.

你说得对。

And you're right.

我骨子里每一个细胞都会告诉我，别这么干。

Every little fiber of my being would have said, don't do that.

这不叫风险投资。

That's not venture.

但我可没在迈阿密住着三套房子。

But I'm not living in three houses in Miami.

他赢了。

He wins.

所以我现在会提醒自己，别光说这不算风险投资。

So I've learned to say to myself, don't just say it's not venture.

光这么说，真的适合这个游戏吗？

Just saying that, is that the right strategy for this game?

在当前这个市场环境下，这显然是正确的策略。

And it clearly is the right strategy for this market at this point in time.

但整个周期里，尤其是股市下跌的时候，这策略还管用吗？

You know, will it be the right strategy across the cycle when there's an equity downturn?

可能不管用了，因为你承担的只是价格风险，而这种风险通常是高度相关的。

Maybe not because the only risk you're taking is price risk, but that's typically a correlated risk.

所以一旦出问题，大概只有三分之一的概率是所有资产同时崩盘，因为你的股权价值会一起下滑。

So if it does go wrong, maybe it's only a one in three chance it will go wrong on everything because your equity values will tumble.

但只要不是这种情况，Thrive策略简直太棒了。

But absent that, the Thrive strategy was brilliant.

在每一个博客上都买最好的房产。

Buy the best property on every blog.

这就像玩大富翁。

It's like monopoly.

你把所有蓝色的小地块都拿下了。

You got all the little blue ones.

别人一掷骰子准得落在你那儿。

The long people are gonna land in it.

你就能赚大钱了。

You're gonna make a lot of money.

我对这个洞察力真是羡慕得不行。

I'm profoundly jealous of that insight.

如果有人给我五十亿美元，我希望能有本事自己想到这招。

If someone had given me $5,000,000,000, I probably hope I would've been smart enough to do that myself.

靠自己。

Myself.

关键问题不是这算不算风险投资。

The criteria is not is it venture or not venture?

只有一个标准。

There's only one criteria.

它能不能让你赚钱？在整个周期里能不能让你赚钱？

Is it gonna make you money, and is it gonna make you money across the cycle?

这个问题的前半部分，答案显然是肯定的。

And the answer to the first part of that question looks like it's yes.

至于后半部分，关于整个周期的回报，你一年后再来找我，或者十年后再来找我吧。

And the answer to the second part of the question across the cycle is call me in a year or ten years.

既然可以直接投一笔大钱给一个赢家，早早套现，用四分之一的时间就实现回报，干嘛还要费劲去搞种子轮投资，指望二十年后八倍回报呢？

Why struggle to pretend you can do eight x over twenty years on a seed fund when you can just write one big check into a winner and call it a day and achieve liquidity in a quarter of the time?

虽然倍数会低一点，但绝对收益会更高。

The multiple will be lower, but the absolute return will be higher.

分成也会更高。

The carry will be higher.

干嘛要傻乎乎地投种子轮，等上二十年，就为了让推特上的人夸你有个八倍或十倍的基金？

Why would you do the stupid seed investing and wait twenty years so that everyone on Twitter can say you had an eight x or 10 x fund.

太棒了。

Hooray.

二十年一无所获，还得跟四个合伙人分那点小钱。

Split with four partners on your tiny little fund after twenty years making nothing.

直接投一大笔，然后完事了。

Just write the big fucking check and call it a day.

这简直太蠢了。

Like, it's so stupid.

要是最终能赚到十亿，早期投资确实不错。

Like, when outcomes are a billion, seed is is is great.

要是最终回报超过两万亿美元，还投早期？那纯粹是傻子才干的事，罗里。

When outcomes are north of $20,100,000,000,000, it's for seed is for suckers, Rory.

投早期就是傻子才做的事，我觉得。

Seed is for suckers, I think.

我喜欢这句话。

I love that.

我就是，顺便说一句，我打算直接拿走这句话了。

It's I I just I'm that's that, by the way, is about to be I'm gonna steal that.

我连提你名字都懒得提。

I'm not even gonna give you credit.

我太喜欢了。

I love it.

根本不需要。

Don't need.

说正经的，杰森，你说得一点都没错。

All joking aside, you're exactly right, Jason.

咱们说的其实是一回事：只要有人愿意为这种高风险投钱，这确实是赚大钱的好路子。

We're saying the same thing, which is and this was a compellingly great way to make a lot of money provided someone's willing to give you that kind of capital for that for that risk.

但我也不确定，有时候我觉得这风险真挺值得冒。

And what I don't know is is there's a part of me sometimes think it's a really good risk.

从逻辑上讲这么做很合理，但另一部分我又觉得，从相关性来看，这策略实在太冒险了。

You should make sense to do it, and part of me thinks it's a very risky strategy in terms of correlations.

如果搞砸了，那后果会很严重。

And if it goes wrong, it'll be horrible.

这可不是我们平时干的事，所以我一般不怎么琢磨这个。

It's not what we do, so I don't spend a lot of time thinking about it.

不过现在看来，情况还不错。

But right now, it looks pretty good.

我能问一下吗

Can I

罗里，你说的这种相关性风险，到底可能出什么问题？

just ask, Rory, what could go wrong when you say about that correlated risk?

它们跟……相对来说关联性没那么强。

They feel relatively uncorrelated to a

在一定程度上是这样。

certain extent.

从个体财务表现来看，它们的不相关性体现在选择上。

The uncorrelated in terms of individual financial performance are picking.

只要是选股，你就已经在三个不同市场选出了最好的资产。

Anything to do with picking, you've picked the best asset in three diverse markets.

你说得对。

You're right.

它们在这一点上并没有相关性。

They're not correlated that way.

真正相关的是基本面的股权估值。

What is correlated is fundamentally equity values.

我们现在所处的世界里，高增长科技公司的市盈率能达到三十、三十五倍。

We live in a world where high growth tech companies get thirty, thirty five PEs.

假设某位总统像七十年代那样搞垮经济，市盈率跌到九倍、十倍、十一倍，连成长股也跌到十二、十三倍。

If hypothetically, a president were to destroy the economy like in the seventies, just staying, and PEs went to nine or 10 or 11, and even growth stocks went to 12 or 13.

你看看1968年到1982年间‘漂亮五十’股票发生了什么。

Like, look what happened to nifty 50 between '68 and '82.

如果成长股的估值溢价消失了，所有这些资产都只按六七倍收入来估值——这其实已经不低了——那你所处的环境就完全不一样了。

In a world where the growth stock premium goes away, if you start valuing all those assets of six or seven times revenues, which is still pretty healthy, you're just in a very different place.

所以，这唯一的风险就是。

So that's the only risk.

你买的是最优质的资产。

You've bought the best assets.

唯一的风险是，世界突然觉得股票不值那么多了。

The only risk is that the world decides that equity isn't worth as much.

在这种情况下，明确地说，原本能带来三倍回报的策略，可能只拿到一点五倍，因为你并没有承担太高的估值风险。但如果你像我们这样操作，完全依赖高价收购明星资产的策略，回报可能跌到零点五倍甚至零点七倍。

And in that case, to be clear, a strategy that would get a three x will get a one and a half x because you haven't taken a ton of valuation risk If you're doing the kind of things we do, a strategy that's entirely predicated on buying marquee assets of high prices could get a point five or point seven x.

所以你得把握好时机，不能在估值被压缩的时候被迫抛售。

And so what you are there is like time sensitive because you don't want to have to liquidate in a time where you have a compressional multiple.

这就是为什么如果你有两千亿美元，咔嚓一下，我愿意出这个价，买下街区里最好的资产。万一市场崩盘，我还能再砸钱，以更低的价格买入，等估值重新回升。

Which is why if you have 20,000,000,000, ka ching, I can pay that price, buy the best house on the block, and if I want to sell that house and there's a market crash, kaboom, I can put in even more money at a reduced price and wait for the multiples to expand again.

再说一次，

Again, with

这个隐含的前提是，公司本身能持续增长。

this one implicit broadly, yes, but there's one implicit assumption in that, which is that the comp the company will continue to compound.

我们这里面临的问题是事后诸葛亮式的视角。

And the problem here we're dealing with is ex post fact or vision.

你看，现在有五六家科技公司估值都达到一万亿美元了，显然这事儿是能办到的。

Like, there are there's there are five or six technology companies worth a trillion dollars, so it's clearly doable.

OpenAI 现在值三千亿美元，既然其他五家公司能做到从零到一万亿美元，它也完全有可能。

You can truly compound from 300,000,000,000, which is where OpenAI is today, to a trillion because five other companies did it.

但你忘了，大多数科技公司根本做不到这一点。

What you forget is most tech companies don't.

每当你持有一家公司更久，就相当于在做一次筛选。

And every time you hold for longer, think of it as a process of distillation.

你手里最好的公司会变得更强，最差的则会一路下滑。

Your best ones get better, and your worst ones go down.

只要你选对了公司，就能一直扛下去。

So provided you've got the right ones, you can tough it out forever.

但要是你投了黑莓，结果它还一直是家私有公司，那可就太糟心了。

But be a bit of a bummer to discover you'd invested in BlackBerry, and it was still private.

他们刚发布了iPhone，你一想，算了，不玩了。

And they just launched the iPhone, and you decide, screw it.

咱们能干掉他们。

We can take these guys.

我再投十亿进去。

I'll put in another billion.

然后你就一路推着它往前走。

And, you know, and then you just march the thing down.

说实话，大多数科技公司最终都被收购、合并，或者失败了。

The hard truth is most tech companies in the end get acquired, rolled up, unsuccessful.

所以你撑得越久，对选股的精准度要求就越高，必须押中赢家。

So the longer you push, the more premium there is on the absolutely right on your stock picking and having a winner.

不是什么疯狂的赌注。

Not a crazy bet.

我只是说，任何投资背后，都藏着某种风险。

I'm just saying it typically, any financial bet has an embedded risk somewhere in it.

世上没有白给的钱。

There's no such thing as free money.

当某些东西看着像白送钱的时候，通常只是风险还没被看清而已。

And when stuff looks like there's free money, it just typically means that the risk isn't fully recognized.

这确实是个不错的生意。

This has been a great business.

但现在已经进入后期了。

It's also late stage.

你发个推文吧，杰森。

I mean, you send a tweet, Jason.

我看到过关于这事的帖子。

I saw it there about that.

这看起来像是最容易赚钱的方式，让人忍不住想，咦？

It looks like the easiest way to make money imaginable, which makes you go, hey.

真希望我也能这么做。

I wish I'd do that.

但接下来，B，潜在的风险到底在哪？

But then b, what's the buried risk?

哈利，我不想谈这家公司。

And and Harry, I don't wanna discuss the company.

明白吗？

Okay?

你可以在任何事上问我，唯独这件事别逼我。

Don't push you can push me on anything except this one thing.

我只是...

But I just

我有一家公司，它...

have a have a company that's

刚刚成为独角兽了。

just become a unicorn.

一家后期基金刚刚投了近九位数。

A late stage fund just put in almost 9 figures.

明白吗？

Okay?

他们持有的股份和我一样多。

And they own as much as me.

你听好了。

Now listen.

我很幸运能成为这家公司的一员。

I'm lucky to be a part of the company.

但你说，要是公司只以成本价卖了，他们可是一分钱都拿不到，对吧？

But like, okay, listen, if the company's only sold for the basis, they make nothing, right?

可他们承担的是百亿美金的回报风险，对吧？

But they're underwriting a $10,000,000,000 outcome, right?

从实际效果来看，他们赚的钱会和我差不多，对吧？

They, for all intents and purposes, will make just as much money as me, right?

事实上，他们还能更大力地支持公司。

In fact, they can support the company more.

他们跳过了好几年的辛苦和压力。

They skipped years of work and stress.

结果必须得很大，但要是真成了，你干嘛还做这种早期投资呢？

And it has to be a big outcome, but if it does, why would you do this seed stuff?

股权是一样的，却能跳过那好几年，对吧？

Like, it's the same ownership, skip all the years, right?

而且，你知道的，你至少已经稳拿1倍回报了，这已经是不错的结局了。

And, yeah, if you know, and you've got your 1x worst case, your wonderful 1x.

但我得说点不一样的，我理解你的顾虑，因为我也有同样的焦虑和纠结。

But there is an I'm gonna argue against I understand it because I go to the same, you know, angst and machinations.

对吧？

Right?

我投资组合里有不少好项目，我们赚得不少，而后期投资者却没赚到这些钱。

Good deals in my portfolio, but we've made good money and what later stage investors haven't.

这本来就是常态。

And that's just the nature.

别忘了。

And remember.

但如果赚的是大钱，结果其实都一样。

But if it's really good money, you make the same.

对。

Yes.

没错。

Agreed.

如果这是一场例外的游戏，谁还在乎那几亿美元的回报呢？

If this is an outlier game, right, who cares about those little $800,000,000 outcomes?

谁会在乎？

Who cares?

罗里，你能谈谈一种你赚到钱、别人没赚到的方法吗？你从中学到了什么？

Rory, can you talk about one way you've made money, others haven't, and just what you learned?

不用说出具体名字，只要说说就行

You don't have to name it, but just

你进去时付得越多，退出时就得卖得越高才能赚钱。

to It just it keeps me the higher the price you pay going in, the higher the price you have to be on exit to make money.

就这么简单。

It's just as simple as that.

因为我们两边都经历过。

Because we've on both sides of that.

我们最近有一笔交易，公司估值涨到了1倍，早期投资者拿到了3倍回报。

We had a sale recently where we got a one and the early investors got a three x.

对吧？

Right?

这其实又回到了资本获取的问题上。

And it it all comes back to this idea of can go back to even the access to capital.

如果你能拿到大笔且宽容的资金，就像那些顶级基金那样，那你确实该玩大的，你说得对。

If you have access to capital that's large and forgiving, which is what these mega funds have, then you should play the big balls game because you're exactly right.

你不能这么做。

You don't do it.

你得少干点活。

You have to do less work.

如果成功了，你赚的和那些投了早期项目的杰森、投了A轮的罗里一样多。

If it works great, you make out the same as Jason who did the seed for suckers and Rory who did the a.

如果没成功，你最多亏个本金，但还能被原谅，重新再来。

And if it doesn't work out, you're get a one x, but you get forgiven and you start again.

如果你有这种资金，那就该玩这种游戏。

If you have access to that kind of money, that's the game you should play.

提醒我一下，杰森，你和我为什么不玩别的玩法？因为2009年我在到处转悠，没人给我十亿美元说：来试试。

Remind me, Jason, the reason you and I don't play a different game is I was wondering around in 09/2009, and no one offered me a billion dollars and said, hey.

搞砸了也没事。

Have a go.

到2030年，我们再给你十亿。

And if it doesn't work, we'll give you another billion in 2030.

如果你管理的是小基金，就得追求更高的成功概率。

When you have a smaller fund, you want to have a higher probability of the upside.

而且，从逻辑上讲，尽管你不想听这个，但价格越高，你在这笔交易中超越价格、实现的不是十亿美元，而是千亿美金回报的可能性就越低。

And, logically, even though you don't wanna hear this, the higher you're going in price is just the less likely it is you in that one deal that can transcend price and be the not the billion dollar outcome, but the $10,000,000,000 outcome.

你只是把成功的门槛抬得更高了。

You're just upping the bar on getting it just right.

所以支持这个观点的理由是，如果我能拿到五十亿，还有可能拿到两百亿，那我当然会玩，马克和杰森也一样。

So that's the argument for it, is that 5,000,000,000 and I could get 20,000,000,000, I'd play but Mark and Jason does too.

我我

I I

我明白，罗里，但你的投资记录已经非常出色了。

get that, Rory, but you have a pretty great track.

你在不同市场周期中都证明了自己是个非凡的投资者。

You've proven yourself to be a phenomenal investor across cycles.

坦白说，你现在完全能拿到更多资金。

With respect, you could probably get a lot more now.

那你为什么不去拿呢？

Why do you not?

我觉得，其实我们每个人都是自己经历的产物。

I think, actually, I'm we're all products of our experience.

我觉得自己是个相当保守的投资者。

I think I'm a very conservative invest somewhat conservative investor.

我身上带着点烙印，因为我亲身经历过1999年到2010年的那段日子。

I think I am branded a little bit by remembering surviving '99 to 2010.

我不希望在职业生涯快结束时，手里攥着大笔钱，却管不好，最后搞砸了。

I don't wanna take a lot of money at the end of my career, manage it badly, and then fail.

我不愿意赌这一把，因为我亲眼见过事情搞砸后是什么样子。

I don't wanna make that bet that because because I've seen what it looks like when it goes wrong.

我记得1999年到2005年那会儿有多惨。

I remember what '99 to 2005 was like, and it was miserable.

你这么说我的业绩，真是客气了。

And it's kind of you to say about my track record.

我觉得我的表现算得上稳健出色，但算不上惊天动地。

I'd say it's it's solidly good rather than spectacularly amazing.

对吧？

Right?

我是个稳健靠谱的投资者。

I'm a solid good investor.

我想说的是这一点。

And I would say this.

比起2010年之后赚的大笔收益，我更自豪的是2000到2010年间赚的那点小钱。

I am most proud of the fact that I made small amounts of money from 2000 to 2010 than I am about much larger returns from 2010 on.

我亲身经历过市场低迷，挺了过来——而当年99年、2000年认识的那批人，七成在四年后就退出了这个行业。

I've lived through a downturn and survived when, you know, 70% of the people I knew in '99, 2000 were out of the business four years later.

所以，我们经营业务的方式，或者说投资策略的核心，就是一定要熬过那样的低谷。

So probably the way we run our business, way, you know, one of our investing strategies, I always wanted to survive that downturn.

这可能会限制你的收益上限，但大大提高了不惨败的概率。毕竟，我清楚地记得事情有多容易彻底崩盘。

And that probably constrains your upside a little bit, but it increases the probability of not going horribly I mean, I remember how horribly wrong things can go.

想想看，过去十年里最耀眼的两个趋势型玩家，老虎基金和软银，现在都已经退出了战场。

I mean, the big moment the two biggest momentum players of the last decade, Tiger and SoftBank, already out of the game.

Insight 这样的机构确实了不起，投了那么多钱，却靠眼光挺了过来。

Huge credit to someone like Insight who were putting out a lot of money but managed to survive because of savvy.

你手里的钱越多，潮水退去的时候，被冲垮的风险就越大，你知道的。

But the bigger the dollars you're playing with, the more risk there is of just getting crunched up, you know, when the top when the tide goes out.

Insight 是怎么做到比 Tiger 挺得更久的？

What did Insight do to survive more than Tiger?

我觉得他们更厉害，说白了，他们投的项目更早，价格也更低。

I think they're much I mean, I think they had a much broader they were doing deals at much earlier, lower prices.

我提到他们，只是因为按募资总额排，他们本来就是第三名。

They just I named them only because, logically, if you just rank the dollars raised, they were third on the list.

SoftBank 已经没了，Tiger 也基本出局了。

And, you know, South Bank gone, Tiger effectively gone.

我觉得他们就是更会投资。

I think they were just better investors.

我觉得他们有

I think they had

搞几笔投资肯定有帮助，对吧，哈里？

a doing a few whizzes is gonna help, isn't it, Harry?

没错。

Absolutely.

这正是我想说的。

That's my point.

而且听起来他——

And it sounds And he

连上一轮都没参与。

didn't even do the last round.

我的意思是，确实如此。

I mean, yeah.

也不完全是，杰森。

Yes and no, Jason.

老兄，如果你真看了回报数据，没错，百分之百出色。

Dude, if you actually looked at the returns, I mean, yes, a 100% amazing.

但他们所在的85亿美元基金里，报告的回报高达26亿美元，这

But it was a $2,600,000,000 reported return to them in an 8 and a half billion dollar fund, which is

这算起来还是太难了。

like That math still still is hard.

是的。

Yeah.

泰迪做的这笔投资堪称史上最佳之一，回报却只占基金总额的三分之一。

I mean, Teddy did one of the best investments of all time, and it returns a third of the fund.

基金总额的三分之一。

A third of the fund.

要是我，非被逼疯不可。

That would drive me nuts.

如果我投了Wiz，回报只有三分之一，我大概早就退出风投行业了。

I would probably quit Venture if I did Wiz, and it was only a third of the fund.

我肯定会让他去找哈里和罗里谈谈。

I would probably tell him to go talk to Harry and Rory.

如果你在管理一个80亿美元的基金，

If you are pulling down

我觉得你不会退出。

the fees on an $8,000,000,000 fund, I don't think it'd quit.

这话说得有点 cynical。

Cynical.

我可能会退出，因为这游戏不够有趣了。

I might quit because because I the game wouldn't be fun enough.

这游戏不够有趣了。

The game wouldn't be fun enough.

对吧？

Right?

但我确实觉得，基金规模越大，你就越得认真对待这26亿美元回报太低的问题。

But I do think the bigger you are but genuine comment on The whole 2,600,000,000 only returns.

你规模越大，就越得有能力找到不止一个这样的项目，而是多个。

The bigger you are, the more you undertaking to be competent and find not just one of those, but multiple goals.

这个观点一遍又一遍地被重复。

It's the same point over and over again.

你采取的这种策略，只有在执行非常到位、并且能拿到大量顶尖交易的情况下才管用。

You've embarked on a strategy that only works if you have a really strong level of execution and you get in large significant numbers of the very best deals.

说真的，Insight 确实做到了这一点。

And, you know, all credit to Insight look like they've done that.

而且还没付过高价。

Let and without paying over the odds.

Vision Fund 和 Tiger 就没那么好了，他们冲得太猛，一直硬撑，有点儿像机器人一样停不下来。

Less credit to Vision Fund and Tiger, they kinda kinda went over the top of the curve and just kept going a little too long like, you know, robot.

你的选择空间就变小了。

Your degrees of freedom.

Andreessen 也会面临同样的问题。

And, you know, Andreessen will wrestle with the same thing.

我觉得他们是非常精明的投资者。

I think they're wildly savvy investors.

但当你手握两百亿时，保持纪律的压力就会变得极大，可操作的空间也变得非常有限。

But when you've got 20,000,000,000, the impetus on being disciplined just the degrees of freedom you have are tight.

对于老牌基金来说，比如Emergence，他们刚筹了十亿美元。

For the old school, like, emergence just raised a billion.

明白吗？

Okay?

他们是我其中一个投资人。

They were one of my investors.

我没问过他们，但我猜大概有两个原因让他们决定筹十亿。

I didn't ask them, but I think I know I think there's probably two reasons they raised a billion.

对吧？

Right?

一个是新一代投资人，他们可能没那么怕风险，也没经历过那些伤痛。

One is because there's a new generation, right, who's maybe less risk doesn't have those scars.

但我认为第二个原因是，单笔投资的金额变大了。

But I think the second reason is because the checks are bigger.

Emergence 最近投了 Bolt 五六十亿美元吧，类似这样的项目。

Emergence just did, like, 50,000,000,000 or 60,000,000 into, like, Bolt or something like that.

对吧？

Right?

以前的话，一千万美元的单子就已经算很大了。

Back in the day, that'd be a $15,000,000 check.

那现在像你们这样的基金，是不是非得把规模做大才能玩得下去？

So what about funds like you having to have a fund size to play the game today?

我同意，确实，我很了解并非常尊重那些人。

I I agree because, yeah, I know and respect those guys enormously.

而且说实话，我们做的也差不多。

And, you know, we've done roughly the same thing.

我们已经投了五六个基金了。

We've put probably over five or six fund.

你们从三亿涨到六亿，再到九亿。

You've gone from 300 to six hundred and nine hundred.

但基金里的投资交易数量其实没怎么变，因为平均每笔投资的金额涨上去了。

And the number deals in the fund hasn't changed all that much because the average check size has gone up.

咱们不妨仔细聊聊这一点。

And let's talk about that for a second.

我刚查了一下数据。

I just checked it.

名义GDP的增长。

Nominal GDP growth.

也就是货币的名义价值。

In other words, the value paper value of money.

从1999年到现在，涨了三倍。

It's three x from '99.

换句话说，1999年的GDP是十万亿美元，现在是三十万亿美元。

In other words, GDP in '99 was 10,000,000,000,000, and it's 30,000,000,000,000 today.

所以如果1999年你的基金规模是1亿美元，那今天你得做到三到四亿，才能保持同样的分量。

So in other words, if your fund size was a 100 in '99, you gotta be three four hundred today just to be the same thing.

尤其是过去四五年，疫情期间的名义GDP增长非常惊人。

And, you know, in particular, in the last four or five years, nominal GDP growth in the COVID period was huge.

如果你只增长了50%，其实已经落后了。

If you're up 50%, you're falling behind.

由于单笔投资金额上涨，基金规模扩张几乎是不可避免的。

Some element of fund expansion is almost inevitable because the check size has gone up.

如果投资金额的上涨是合理的，那可能还有一部分额外增长，并不完全由通胀驱动，更多是因为大家在拼命争胜。

And if the check size has gone up appropriately, then on top of that, there's probably some extra increase in the check size that maybe isn't appropriate, might not be the right word, but it's more it's less driven by pure economics of just inflation and more driven by people are playing to win.

如果你不正视这个问题，不主动应对，结果会怎样？

And what you see in that is if you don't go and we wrestle with this.

如果我们不扩大基金规模，就会发现，那些原本我们认为最合适的项目，我们根本够不着。

If we don't grow the fund size, we were finding a deals that we would have thought were the scale sweet spot.

我们变得无关紧要了。

We just weren't relevant.

你带着两千万的支票去谈投资，人家根本懒得理你。

You'd come into a deal with your little $20,000,000 check, and they'd laugh at you.

当你规模提到两千万时，你去联系有限合伙人，他们投五百万，然后你的基金规模就涨到三千万了。

And you go up to 25, and you'd call an LP, and they get five, and then you'd be up to 30,000,000.

你得根据策略来设定基金规模，因为基金规模本身就是策略。

And you've got to size the fund for the strategy because fund size is the strategy.

我觉得在B轮这种阶段，大家通常都会投两千万的初始金额。

And I think for the kind of a b stage where those guys play, we pay a big you probably are writing $20,000,000 initial checks.

算上预留资金，你投的总额可能达到三千万，还不包括后来追加的后期轮次。

You're probably writing $30,000,000 total checks including reserves without even hogging for those late stage rounds.

你可能希望每期基金投超过二十个项目，因为就像我们半小时前聊的，要抵消产品市场契合度的波动，实现整体回报，我在这里要和那个播客的观点持不同意见。

And you probably want more than 20 deals per fund because as we discussed half an hour ago, with product market fit variance to replicate the same overall fund return, and I this is where I do the disagree with the podcast of a benchmark.

我想确保每期基金都有足够多的项目，这样基金才有较高的成功概率。

I wanna make sure I have enough deals in every fund that the fund has a good probability of success.

如果你每期投二十五个项目左右，还没反应过来，资金就已经投到七八亿了。

Say you're closer to 25 deals per fund, you're at seven, eight hundred before you blink.

但这一点是

But this is

为什么五千万美元的种子基金让我抓狂。

why $50,000,000 seed funds drive me nuts.

因为实际上，扣掉费用后，你只有四成能用来投资。

Because actually, when you take away fees, you've got 40 of investable.

而且你想一想，现在平均一轮种子融资是三百万到五百万美元。如果你想领投并像他们声称的那样拥有真正的控制权，根本不可能投到至少二十家公司。

And when you think about the average seed round today being 3 to $5,000,000, if you wanna lead it and take real ownership like they say they do, there's no way that you're getting at least even 20 companies.

确实投不到。

You're not.

你这是在承担集中风险。

You're taking concentration.

我一直以来的做法就是高度集中。

That's what I've always done is high concentration.

承担高风险的集中投资。

High concentration risk.

对。

Yeah.

但是在天使轮还是种子轮阶段？

But at pre seed or seed?

我的天，杰森，这太离谱了。

I mean, Jason, this is nuts.

如果你不想玩这个游戏，也不想募集巨额资金，那就只能承担高度集中的风险。

Well, you don't wanna if you wanna play that game and you don't wanna raise a massive fund, you gotta take concentration risk.

对吧？

Right?

或者假装一下。

Or pretend.

所以创始人基金募集了46亿美元。

So so Founders Fund raised $4,600,000,000.

其中16亿美元是超额募资。

$1,600,000,000 oversupply.

有很多有限合伙人给我打电话，问我喜欢哪些基金，哪些在节目里被推荐过。

I have so many LPs call me asking which funds I like, which reference well from the show.

我从未见过哪个基金像创始人基金这样，机构需求如此旺盛。每个有限合伙人都想投创始人基金，而且是直接追着要，这简直更少见。

I've never had such institutional demand for any single fund asset than I have for Founders Every single LP wanted Founders Fund and wanted Founders Fund gross, which is even more rare.

未来会有越来越多的资金涌入这个资产类别吗？

Will we have more and more money going to the asset class?

资金会不会越来越集中到顶尖的那几家，而其他人就越来越难混？

Will we have more and more money concentrate into just the top players and it'll be shit for everyone else?

我们该怎么看待这个问题？

How do we think about that?

我正试着把事实和你的问题联系起来，因为你从这些事实推到那个问题，中间的逻辑并不明显。

I'm trying to relate the facts to the question because it wasn't obvious how you got to the question from the facts.

因为你列出的关于创始人基金的事实，正确的解读其实是：他们可能就是最顶尖的基金，几乎无可争议，所以需求最大也就不足为奇了。

Because the correct response to the facts you outlined about Founders is they may be to a rounding error of the best fund, so no surprise they get the most demand.

我的意思是，看到内部消息泄露确实挺让人兴奋的。

I mean, yeah, it was great to see the leak.

现在他们的表现真是惊人地出色。

Now they're astonishingly good.