20VC：如今做种子轮需要10亿美元——风险投资的未解真相 | 下一个十年，谁胜谁负？| 在AI时代，利润率与定价为何不再重要（嘉宾：Sameer Dholakia，Bessemer）

在你看来，竞争格局变了吗？

Has the competitiveness changed in your mind?

这是否影响了你对投资和市场结果的看法？

And does that shape how you think about investing and market outcomes?

说实话，我并不认为竞争的广度变了。

Look, I actually don't believe that the competitive breadth has changed.

变的是竞争背后的资本密集度，因此导致了这种竞争强度，对吧？

What's changed is the capital intensity behind the competition, and therefore, it leads to this competitive intensity, right?

如果你看看那些资金储备，比如Legora和Harvey筹集的巨额资金，那带来的竞争强度绝对和我那个时代不一样。

If you looked at the war chest, the amounts of money that, take a Legora and Harvey have both raised, that leads to a competitive intensity that absolutely is different than what I dealt with in my era.

现在资本是护城河吗？

Is capital a moat today?

这是关键的区别吗？

Is that the differentiator?

我完全相信资本就是护城河。

I absolutely believe capital is a moat.

我一直说，市场会选出赢家，然后这就变成了一个自我实现的预言，对吧？

I've always said that markets pick winners, and then it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, right?

在我们那个时代，SendGrid和Twilio就是API的积木，你把它插到你的应用里，就能发送通信。

In our day, SendGrid and Twilio were the API building blocks to plug into your application to go send communications.

一旦开发者决定了用哪家，那就结束了。

And then once developers had decided that, it was game over.

我们就赢了。

We had won.

你成了默认选择，就成了市场的赢家。

You were the default, that you became the market winner.

这种情况确实会发生。

And that does happen.

我们以那个为例，在这些市场里就能看到。

And we see it in these markets if we take that one as an example.

现在有很多法律科技公司，也有很多AI法律服务提供商。

There are lots of legal tech companies, lots of AI legal providers.

但如果你问任何大律所的人，主要的法律AI公司有哪些，他们肯定会说出这两家。

But if you asked anybody at a big law firm who are the major legal AI companies, they would name those two.

所以我确实相信，资本不仅让这些公司能以惊人的速度扩张，也为它们打造了品牌。

And so I do believe that the capital creates both the ability to scale at an extraordinary pace, and therefore, a brand for those businesses.

然后人才就会纷纷涌来，这样就形成了一个不断强化的良性循环。

Talent then ends up flocking, and then you just get this reinforced flywheel.

接着它们赢得更多客户，这个良性循环就继续下去。

Then they win more customers, and then the virtuous cycle continues.

你相信“造王者”这种说法吗？

Do you believe in king making?

我相信。

I do.

就像你说的，如果资本是护城河，那么在短时间内投入大量资金，就会带来天然的优势。

To your point that if capital is a moat, excessive amounts in short amounts of time give inherent advantages.

你同意我这种关于“造王者”的看法吗？

Do you agree with king making like I do or not?

是的，因为我相信你说的每一点，资本就是护城河，而且它也是向市场发出的信号。

Yes, because I believe everything you said, which is the capital is a moat, and it is a signal to the market.

而且我做了很长时间的软件公司，你的产品必须非常出色。

And having built software companies for a very long time, your product has to be exceptional.

你的公司领导层也必须非常出色。

Your company leadership has to be exceptional.

用数学的话说，这是必要条件，但不是充分条件。

I would say in math speak, it's necessary but not sufficient.

要想赢得市场，你必须拥有最大的资金储备，拥有最多的资本，这是必要条件。

It is a necessary condition for you to win the market, that you have the biggest war chest, that you have the most capital.

我真的相信你就是在玩这种游戏。

I really do believe that you are in that kind of a game.

而且因为算力如此稀缺，所以算力如此昂贵，如果你没有这些，你就根本无法参与。

And it's because the compute is so scarce, and therefore, the compute is so expensive, that if you don't have that, you just can't play.

所以是的，我同意你前半部分的说法，但这还不够。

So yes, I agree with you at the first part of your statement, but it is not sufficient.

那你必须得拿出一个让客户赞不绝口、爱不释手、还会推荐给朋友的产品，才能当老大。

You have to then deliver an amazing product that your customers rave about, love about, tell their friends about if you want to be the king.

不然的话，你根本没戏。

Otherwise, you have no chance.

所以这点我完全同意你。

So I agree with you completely there.

而且我也同意你之前说的，就是现在10到12倍的增长率跟以前完全不一样了。

And I also agree with what you said earlier, which is the 10 to 12X and the growth rates now are very different to what they were.

你看看现在看到的增长率，就是Sasta、我和Jason一直说的三倍、三倍、两倍、两倍，这个说法是不是不对了？

When you look at what you're seeing today growth rate-wise, is the triple, triple, double, double that Sasta and me and Jason always talked about, is that wrong?

现在这样还不够吗？

Is that not enough anymore?

光靠这个，已经吸引不到风投的钱了，因为他们可以把钱投到那些增长快得多的超高速增长公司里去。

It is not enough to attract capital from venture capitalists who have opportunities to put them into these hypergrowth companies that are growing much, much, much faster.

我们这些风投基金，不管基金多大，像我们刚募了57.5亿美元，钱依然是稀缺的。

All of us as venture capital funds, your capital, as big as these funds are, we just raised $5.75 billion, it's still scarce capital.

现在还是有很多能以超高速增长达成交易的机会。

There are deals to be done at crazy hypergrowth rates.

不过话说回来，我仍然相信能找到那些符合T2、D3模式的公司，因为在当前环境下，这些公司的入场价格可能会大不相同，估值倍数也会很不一样，但你仍然可以在这些投资上获得可观的风险投资回报。

Now, all that said, I do still believe in finding companies that are doing the T2, D3 because the entry prices on those in this environment can be dramatically different, a very different multiple, and you can still make a great venture return on those.

你认同这个观点吗？

Do you buy that?

你还记得那些，我称之为“Excel交易”的吗？

Do you remember the, I call it the Excel deals?

你还记得那些Excel增长交易吗，比如1Password、Qualtrics，它们在一些不太显眼的地方发现了这类出色的资产，这些资产可能更注重资本效率。

Do you remember the Excel growth deals, like the 1Passwords, the Qualtrics, where they found these kind of amazing assets in less obvious locations that were maybe more capital efficient?

然后他们用一些增长资本来推动这些资产，结果变成了更好的业务。

They then juice them up with some growth capital, and then it turns into an even better business.

你觉得下一代还会有这样的机会吗？

Do you believe those will exist in the next gen?

还是说，实际上，你必须得有足够的资本才能达到那样的规模？

Or actually not, you have to have that capital to get to the scale?

我觉得随着时间的推移，我们会看到很多应用公司，它们可能会像你刚才描述的那样。

I think that over time, we'll see a bunch of application companies that can look like what you just described.

我只是觉得短期内风险投资的钱不会流向那里。

I just don't think that that's where the venture dollars are going to flow in the near term.

当你有机会投资那些正在大规模十倍增长的项目，而你的机会只是翻倍增长时，你当然会选择十倍增长的那个。

When you have opportunities to invest in things that are 10Xing at scale, and your opportunity is something that's doubling, of course, you're going to go to the 10Xing.

这就像是一个智力测试。

That's just like an intelligence test.

我们管这叫蛋糕还是死亡。

We call it cake or death.

你看过艾迪·伊扎德吗？

You ever seen Addie Izzard?

他说：“蛋糕还是死亡？”

He goes, "Cake or death?"

然后你说：“请给我蛋糕。”

And you go, "Cake, please."

蛋糕。

Cake.

哇。

Wow.

真是没想到。

What a surprise.

我完全没料到。

I wasn't expecting that.

这问题真难回答。

What a tough question.

不过话说回来，你觉得我们投资那些第二梯队、第三梯队的公司能赚钱吗？

I- But all that said, do I think we can make money investing in companies that are T2, T3?

当然能。

Absolutely.

可以的。

You can.

所以这就变成了一个有点复杂的问题，比如你想在两者之间怎么分配？

And so then it becomes a little bit of a mixed question, like how much do you want to have in one versus the other?

你提到了那57.5亿美元。

So you mentioned the $5.75 billion.

说实话，这确实不少。

It's quite a lot, to be honest.

我们先从17.5亿美元的种子轮和早期投资说起。

Let's start with the $1.75 billion seed and early.

种子轮和早期。

Seed and early.

现在做种子轮需要十亿美元吗？

Do you need a billion dollars to do seed today?

我们今天早些时候刚看到，USV宣布了他们的9亿美元基金。

We just saw literally earlier today, USV announced their $900 million funds.

做种子轮需要十亿美元吗？

Do you need a billion to do seed?

从我看到的这些价格，还有早期团队那边报上来的估值来看，如果你想想需要多少次出手才能找到赢家，我真不知道一个小规模的种子基金怎么能成功。

Seeing the prices that I'm seeing, valuations we are seeing for the early-stage deals coming in from my teammates on the early-stage side, if you just think about the number of shots on goal you need to have to find the winner, I don't know how you would have a small seed fund and be successful.

我也不知道。

I don't.

你在定价和持股比例上看到了什么？

What are you seeing in that pricing and ownership level?

这取决于业务类型，如果是资本密集型、算力密集型的业务，而很多AI业务都是这样的，对吧？

Depending on the business, if it is a capital compute-intensive business, and a lot of these AI businesses are that, right?

所以这也取决于你想在哪个环节玩，想投资多资本密集型的业务。

So it also depends a little bit on where you want to play, where in the stack do you want to play, how capital-intensive of a business do you want to invest in.

如果你说，'嘿，我不需要投资那些需要硬件、机器人的东西'，或者'我不想投资那些为了算力而训练模型的公司'。

If you're like, "Hey, I don't need to invest in, I don't know, something that requires hardware, robotics," or, "I don't want to invest in something that's training a model for compute."

也许有些地方确实不需要那么高的资本密集度，但我只是觉得在这个智能和AI的时代，很多业务确实需要。

Maybe there are places where you don't need that capital intensity, but I just think in this era of intelligence and AI, I think a lot of them do.

所以如果你假设情况是这样，那这账就算不过来了，无论是对创业者还是对你，如果你不投入的话。

And so if you assume that that's the case, man, the math just won't math for the entrepreneur or you if you're not paying.

想当年，你看，我做这行已经31年了，一直在软件行业。

In my day, look, I've been doing this for, I've been in software 31 years.

那时候的种子轮投资大概是300到500万美元，估值在2000到4000万。

A seed check in the day was like $3 to $5 million on a 20 to $40 million valuation.

那真是完全不同的时代。

It was a dramatically different time.

那现在呢？

And what is it today?

我没有具体数字，但我知道肯定高了好几倍。

I don't have the specific numbers, but I know that it's factors higher.

这点我很确定。

That I know.

高得多。

It's way more.

而且如果在此基础上再翻几倍，你真的得指望自己眼光特别准。

And when your factor's higher off of that, you really got to hope that you're a great picker.

这就说到我另一个世界观了，如果你愿意听的话。

And this is where I get into one of my other kind of worldviews, if you will.

我只是个谦逊的生意人，哈里。

I'm just a humble business guy, Harry.

我把风投行业看作和其他行业一样。

And I think about the venture industry like any other industry.

所以对我来说，当我考虑进入这个行业作为第二职业时，我看了风险投资这个资产类别，然后我说："这跟我九十年代中后期经历的一点都不一样，那时候全是硅谷的硬件、软件，而且主要是早期投资。"

And so to me, when I was evaluating coming in and starting it as a second career, I looked at the venture capital asset class, and I said, "This looks nothing like what I grew up with in the mid-late '90s, where everything was hardware, software in Silicon Valley and principally early stage."

现在它已经全球化，覆盖你能想到的每个行业，从种子前投资一直到IPO，投资额动辄数亿美元。

And now it is global, every sector you could imagine, and everything from a pre-seed check through up into IPO, where you're investing hundreds of millions of dollars.

我刚才提到的每个维度——地域、阶段、行业——都变得截然不同，范围也广得多。

Every one of the vectors that I just mentioned of location, stage, and sector are dramatically different and broader.

这就是这个资产类别的专业化。

It's just the professionalization of this asset class.

所以如果你从这个角度看，你会想，好吧，在大多数行业，当它们专业化并达到规模时，你要么得站在这一端，也就是一个整合了大量资源的全球巨头平台。

And so if you think of it in that context, you're like, okay, well, in most industries, when they professionalize and they get to scale, you either have to be on this end of the spectrum, which is a giant global platform that consolidates a whole bunch over here.

要么你就得在另一端，做一个极致的专家，专注于某个特定领域。

Or you need to be an extreme specialist over here that is doing fill-in-the-blank.

比如我，就是在旧金山做早期AI投资，对吧？

I'm doing AI deals in San Francisco, early stage, right?

你得在三个维度上都做到极致专业化。

You got to optimize specialty on all three dimensions.

你只能选这两条路之一。

You could be one of those two.

如果你卡在中间，那就自求多福吧。

And if you're in between, good luck.

我觉得那是个很难受的位置。

I think that's a rough place to be.

我真的这么觉得。

I really do.

这也是为什么Bessemer会——我觉得Bessemer是一个大型全球平台。

And it's the reason that Bessemer is go-- I think Bessemer is a big global platform.

但说真的，我告诉你，如果不是一个巨大的全球平台，或者一个能提供差异化价值、因为专业而更擅长挑选项目的顶级专家，我觉得赚钱会很难。

But man, I tell you, not being a giant global platform or an incredible specialist who can add differentiated value and be better at picking because you are a specialist, I think it's a hard world to make money.

那那些十亿美元的基金会怎么样呢？

So what happens to the billion-dollar funds?

我不知道，但我很庆幸自己不在其中。

I don't know, but I'm glad I'm not at one of them.

我可以告诉你。

I'll tell you that.

我觉得你必须站在两端之一。

I think you have to be on either end.

我真的这么认为。

I really do.

我真的这么认为。

I really do.

而且你看，我相信每个人都有成功的路径。

And look, I'm sure there's a path to success for everybody.

祝你好运。

Good luck.

我只是从外部给你一个不加修饰的看法，纯粹作为一个商业人士来看这个行业。

I'm just giving you my outside in, unvarnished view, just as a business guy looking at an industry.

我只是在冷静地分析，告诉你，我在商业历史上看到的就是这样：当市场变大时，它们会整合，然后会有特殊的——你看汽车行业。

I'm just analyzing it clinically, and I'm telling you, that's what I've seen in the history of business, is when markets get big, they consolidate, and they have special-- You take automotive.

不管你选哪个行业都一样。

It doesn't matter what industry you pick.

美国会有三大巨头，日本会有丰田、本田。

There will be your big three in the US or the Toyota, Hondas in Japan.

一端是少数几个巨头，另一端你可以像保时捷、法拉利那样，成为细分领域的专业玩家。

You get a handful of giant players on one end, and then you can be like, "I am a Porsche or a Ferrari or a specialty player on the other side of the spectrum."

但我觉得，处在中间位置确实很难。

But being in the middle is a tough place to be, I think.

确实如此。

It is.

我觉得这确实是个很难的位置。

I think it's a very tough place to be.

我能问你一个问题吗？你看今天这两个不同的工具，我请了Menlo的Venky上节目，他是我们共同的朋友。

Can I ask you, when you look at the two different vehicles today, I had Venky from Menlo on the show, mutual friend of ours.

是的，我很喜欢Venky。

Yeah, love Venky.

对，他因为说早期和种子投资是期权赌注，你要建立一个投资组合，而受到了一些批评。

Yeah, he got some stick for saying that early stage and seed investments were option bets, and you build a portfolio-

哦，我看到了那个。

Oh, I saw that.

期权赌注。

... option bet.

很难没看到那个。

It's hard not to have seen that.

我觉得我们大概有五百万的浏览量了。

I think we're at about five million views.

但他说的没错，对吧。

But he's by definition, right.

如果你大部分资金都投在后期，而你又做早期投资，除非你说‘我故意不投任何早期项目’，那简直是愚蠢至极、毫无理性，否则早期投资本质上就是期权。

If you have the majority of your dollars at late stage, by nature of doing early stage, unless you said, "I'm deliberately not going to invest in anything that I do early," which would be utterly moronic and irrational, it by nature has to be an option.

我觉得我既做过运营也做过投资，我认为大家不满的是那种说法，也许他们就是——我不知道，是不是那种‘我是小公司的创业者，我不想只是被当成一个期权’的感觉。

I think having been on both sides of the operator and venture thing, I think what people were taking umbrage with was the notion that, maybe this is what they're-- I don't know, was that the, "I'm an entrepreneur of a small thing.

“我不想只是被当成一个期权。”

I don't want to just be an option."

我跟Venky很熟。

I know Venky well.

我私下认识他。

I know him personally.

他是个很棒的人。

He's a great dude.

他们公司也很棒。

They're a great firm.

他不是那个意思。

That is not what he meant.

但他从理性上讲，百分之百是对的。

But what he meant intellectually is 100% correct.

这确实是一个选项。

It is an option.

如果它成功了，那我就会投入更多资金。

And if it works, then I'm going to put more capital behind it.

我相信，任何做风险投资的人，如果听了或者认真想过这个观点，都会觉得这是不言而喻的。我觉得可能有些创业者，那些辛辛苦苦想把事情做起来的人，会有点不满，他们不想只是被当作一个选项。

Anybody in venture capital, I believe, that listened to that or thought through that understands that to be a truism, and I think there may have been a little bit of flak maybe on the human entrepreneurs that are doing the hard work of trying to build these things, and I don't want to just be an option.

但实际上，我自己也当过创业者，我会对这些人说："不，兄弟。"

But actually, I would challenge those entrepreneurs, having been one myself, and I would say, "No, man.

你要明白，你的公司，你必须赢得继续扩张的权利，赢得下一轮融资的权利，才能获得更多资金，继续朝着你的梦想前进。"

Understand that your business, you have to earn the right to keep scaling, to earn the right to the next round, to get more capital, to keep building towards your dream."

这就是游戏规则。

That is the game.

如果你不觉得这是真的，那你还没搞懂这个游戏。

And if you don't think that is true, you're not understanding the game.

你能帮我理解一下吗？

Can you help me understand?

我完全同意。

I totally agree.

当你拿到1.75的时候，这里面有没有预留储备金，还是说这里没有储备，然后你从40亿里加倍投入，那是增长的部分？

When you have the 1.75, does that have reserves baked in, or is the idea that you have no reserves there and then you double down from the 4 billion, which is growth?

两者都有。

Both.

我们当然在1.75里预留了储备金，但我们不想只是按比例跟投。

We absolutely have reserves baked in to the 1.75, but we don't want to just be doing pro rata checks.

对于那些我们认为正在起飞的公司，我们会像之前那样加大投入，比如我们刚刚宣布了对Elisei的一轮投资，差不多要投近2亿美元。

In the companies that we believe are taking off, we want to back up the truck as we've done, like we just announced a round with Elisei where we're going to be investing nearly $200 million that we just announced.

所以当我们看到那些我们认为在大市场里能赢、能建立伟大公司的赢家时，我们就会说：'好，走起。'

And so when we see the winners that we think are in big markets, are going to build great companies, we're like, "Yep, let's go."

那这种互动具体是什么样子的？

What does that look like then, that interplay?

你会担心Sameer只关注一家公司而忽略另一家所带来的信号风险吗？

And do you worry about the signalling risk of Sameer jumping all over one company and not another company?

不，我不担心。

No, I don't.

归根结底，我相信真相会让你自由。

At the end of the day, I believe the truth will set you free.

就像如果信号风险是他们还没有在我公司上加大投入，那信号其实就是，这个业务还没有证明它会像这样发展。

Just like if the signalling risk is they haven't backed up the truck on my company yet, the signalling there is simply, yeah, the business hasn't yet demonstrated that it is going to be going like this.

这没关系。

That's okay.

我就经历过这样的情况。

I led one of those.

这需要时间。

It takes a while.

创业真的很难，兄弟。

It's hard to build businesses, man.

我不担心这类事情的外界看法，因为我自己经历过，我觉得创业者和CEO们最了解自己的公司。

I don't worry about the optics on stuff like that because I've been in the seat, and I think the entrepreneurs and the CEOs, they know the business they have.

他们清楚自己在做什么。

They know what they're working on.

他们知道要怎么做才能更上一层楼。

They know what they have to do to take it to the next level.

如果他们还没达到那个水平，我觉得大多数CEO或创业者不会假装自己已经达到了。

And if they're not yet at the next level, I don't think most CEO entrepreneurs aren't going to want to try to pretend that they're not.

那么你有40亿美元的增长资金投入到你负责的市场领域。

So you have $4 billion then in growth going to your segment of the market.

这看起来怎么样？

How does that look?

你看那个投资组合，集中度有多高？

When you look at the portfolio there, how concentrated is that?

单笔投资的规模大概是多少？

What does the check size look like?

储备金的情况怎么样？

What does the reserves look like?

我很好奇你是怎么构建一个40亿美元的投资组合的。

I'm just fascinated how you construct a $4 billion portfolio.

这确实很了不起，因为数字显然非常惊人。

It's incredible because the numbers are obviously staggering.

它们很大。

They're large.

但我认为基本面可能并没有那么大的不同，因为我们仍然希望进行集中投资。

But I don't think that the fundamentals are perhaps not all that crazily different in that we still want to have concentrated bets.

所以这意味着，集中投资就是说，如果我们有足够的信心，我们可能会向某个机会、某家公司投入2亿到4亿美元。

And so what that means is a concentrated bet means, shoot, we may write $200 to $400 million into a given opportunity, into a given company if we have that much conviction.

而且这可能会分散在几轮融资中，几轮下来。

And it'll probably be over a couple different rounds, couple few rounds.

但你还是在追求相对的集中度，不管你怎么称呼它。

But you're still looking for a relative concentration, whatever it is you want to call it.

对于单一公司，你愿意把基金的比例提高到多少？

What percent of the fund would you be happy to go up to for a single company?

5%到10%大概是我们晚期成长基金的平均单笔投资规模，明确一下，是晚期成长基金。

5% to 10% is sort of what I think our average check size will be for late stage growth, to be clear, for our late growth funds.

早期成长有点不同。

Early growth is a little bit different.

但晚期成长，5%到10%感觉没问题。

But late growth, 5% to 10% feels fine.

而且我告诉你，我们上一只成长基金，Century II，我记得有20%投在了一家公司上。

And I'll just tell you, our last growth fund, our Century II, I think we had 20% into one name.

那家公司是Anthropic。

The name was Anthropic.

我对这个投资感觉挺好的。

I feel pretty good about it.

所以如果我们认为这是一家具有划时代意义的公司，我们会灵活上调比例。

So we will flex it up if we believe it is a generational company.

你们有早期成长和晚期成长两个阶段吗？

You have an early growth and a late growth?

是的，我们有。

We do.

我的天哪。

Fucking hell.

这太离谱了。

What the fuck?

别开玩笑了。

Fuck off.

早期成长和晚期成长非常不同。

Early growth is very different than late growth.

得了吧。

Come on.

别这样。

Come on.

差别太大了。

It's so different.

不，不是的。

No, it's not.

好吧。

Okay.

你说说看。

Tell me.

请讲。

Go ahead.

它们都是增长。

They're both growth.

不不不不不。

No, no, no, no, no.

我们为什么不做一个中期增长呢？

Why don't we do a mid growth?

公司——

Companies-

我们为什么不做一个早期增长、一个中期增长、一个不太晚的增长、一个晚期增长、还有一个上市前的增长呢？

Why don't we do an early growth, a mid growth, a not so late growth, a late growth, a pre-IPO growth?

你得画出来……

You've got to draw...

我承认，哈里，确实在某处有一个任意的划分界限，但我要从性质上讲，投资一家收入在2000万到4000万美元之间、估值大概在5亿到10亿美元的公司，和投资一家估值150亿美元的Fireworks，这两者之间有很大区别。

I will concede, Harry, that there is an arbitrary distinction cutoff line somewhere, but I will tell you qualitatively, there is a big difference between investing in a company that is in there in the 20 to 40 million of revenue range, or is between call it, I don't know, half a billion to a billion-dollar valuation, versus I'm coming into a Fireworks at 15 billion.

你谈的是非常不同阶段的公司。

You're talking about a very different stage of company.

你对业务的了解程度是不同的。

What you know about the business is different.

风险状况也是不同的。

The risk profile is different.

投资金额也会不一样。

The check size is going to be different.

所有方面都会不一样。

All the things are going to be different.

这些我都明白，但我觉得关键还是看投入资金的回报倍数。

I get all of that, but I think what matters is your multiple on invested cash.

而且说实话，我觉得如果看像Fireworks这样的公司，一旦成功，回报简直大得惊人。

And actually, I think if you look at, say, a Fireworks, I think the upside is just fricking enormous if this works.

确实大得惊人。

Enormous.

没错。

Sure.

我也很喜欢Legora，但本质上，因为它是垂直市场，所以回报空间相对小一些。

And I adore Legora, but by nature, I think the upside is just less because it's a vertical market.

它不是面向全世界的智能产品。

It's not intelligence for the world.

我觉得Max也会同意这一点。

I think Max would agree with that.

这是法律。

It is law.

即使加上税务和合规，它仍然是相对垂直的。

And even if it's tax and compliance as well, it is still relatively verticalized.

所以我认为你应该关注的是投入现金的倍数，我其实觉得那是一样的。

And so I think your multiple on invested cash is what you should be looking at, which I would argue would be the same, actually.

我同意你的看法，我们投资的很多机会，因为我们只试图在早期成长和晚期成长这两个阶段中投资最好的。

I agree with you that many of the opportunities that we are investing in, because we are only trying to invest in the very best in both of those stages of early growth and late growth.

我确实相信在这两个方面，你都能找到10倍和20倍的公司。

I do believe that on both sides of those, you can find 10 and 20 X companies.

我们至少要求五倍，这在成长阶段是非常高的标准。

We want nothing less than a five, and that's a really high bar in growth.

你从早期成长中做了什么，但没有放到晚期成长中，现在后悔没放进去的？

What did you do from your early growth that's not in your late growth that you rue not putting in your late growth?

哎呀，这个问题问得好。

Ooh, that's a good question.

我特别看好另一家垂直AI公司，叫FieldGuide，它是做审计AI的。

I'm really excited about another vertical AI company called FieldGuide that is in, it's AI for auditors.

我们之前已经投资了Abridge，做医生AI，还有EvenUp和Legora，做律师AI，现在FieldGuide是审计AI。

So we've done AI for doctors with Abridge and AI for lawyers with EvenUp and Legora, and FieldGuide is AI for auditors.

这家我投得比较早。

And I did that one early.

我记得我们投资的时候，他们的年经常性收入还不到一千万美元。

I think they were sub-10 million of ARR at the time we invested.

当时估值大概不到两亿美元，现在他们发展得特别猛。

It was probably a little under a $200 million entry price, and they are just ripping.

他们增长非常快。

They are growing really fast.

我为他们感到特别兴奋和骄傲，而且我们还没能加大投资呢。

I'm really excited for them and proud of them, and we haven't yet been able to back up the truck.

他们的增长势头非常惊人。

Their inflection has been extraordinary.

我觉得和很多公司一样，在一二月份模型取得飞跃之后，他们的解决方案突然变得极具吸引力，采用率也证明了这一点。

I think like a lot of companies, post this January-February magical time when the models took a leap forward, all of a sudden, their solution became wildly more compelling and the uptake is showing it.

我要追问一下，那它真的算是一家划时代的公司吗？

I'm going to push you, but is that really a generational company?

没有冒犯的意思。

No offense.

对，这确实很吸引人。

Yeah, it's fascinating.

但话说回来，Fireworks才是。

But no, but Fireworks is.

Cognition或者Factory有可能。

Cognition or Factory could be.

当然。

Sure.

再说一次，我完全没有不尊重FieldGuide的意思。

And again, I mean it with zero disrespect to FieldGuide.

它可以是一个非常出色的企业，一个100亿到200亿美元规模的企业。

It can be a phenomenal business, a 10, 20 billion business.

但要进入后期增长阶段，就像Accel所说的，作为Accel的领投基金，这真的是那种划时代的企业吗？

But to be in the late growth, as Accel calls it, the leaders' fund for Accel, is this really the generational?

嗯，这取决于你怎么定义划时代。

Well, it depends on your view of where you would define generational.

如果现在划时代意味着市值要达到1000亿美元，那我同意你的看法。

If generational now is you got to get to $100 billion market cap, then yeah, I agree with you.

它可能不是那种。

It's probably not that.

而其他一些公司确实有可能，但我认为这是一个非凡的企业，我希望我当时能投入更多。

And some of those others certainly can be, but I think it's an extraordinary business, and that's one I wish I had backed up the truck on more.

而且如果价格合适，就像我们之前说的，投入现金的倍数实际上可以是一样的。

And if the price is right, then to the point that we said earlier, the multiple on invested cash can actually be the same.

所以——

So-

完全正确。

Exactly right

……那没问题。

... that's fine.

你们早期和晚期成长阶段是分开的团队吗？

Do you have separate teams for early to late growth?

不，同一个团队。

No. Same group.

我们有四位非常优秀的普通合伙人，还有一支很棒的副总裁和助理团队，都在全力推进这件事。

We've got four great GPs, an amazing team of VPs and associates that are going after this thing.

我们一直在努力。

We've been working on it.

跟你说，哈里，我对我们的成长团队和过去几年建立起来的业务感到非常兴奋。

Man, I'll tell you, Harry, I am so fired up about our growth team and the practice we have built over the last few years.

我敢说我们的成长投资组合可以跟世界上任何一支成长团队比一比。

I'd put our growth portfolio up against any growth team in the world.

我真的这么觉得。

I really do.

我觉得我们会有整个成长投资领域，乃至整个风投界最好的投资组合之一。

I think we're going to have one of the best portfolios in all of growth, in all of venture capital.

我之前跟你团队里的很多人聊过，他们都说你特别重视文化，我当时想，“哎呀，这多没劲啊。”

I spoke to many people on your team beforehand, and they said the real focus you have on culture, and I thought, "Oh, gosh, how boring."

别这样，老兄。

Come on, man.

这可是最重要的话题。

It's the most important topic.

哦，每个CEO都会说，“我想谈谈文化。”

Oh, every CEO is like, "I want to talk about culture."

但等你跟他们团队的人聊完，发现根本不是那么回事。

And then you speak to their team, and it's different.

就像每个营销团队都会说，'谈谈文化。'

It's just like every marketing team is like, "Talk about culture.

谈谈文化。

Talk about culture."

不过，我确实听到了一些事情，想问问你。

I did hear something, though, that I would like to ask.

塔利亚-

Talia-

……让我问你关于队友和朋友胜过同事和同事，每天如此，周日更是如此。

... told me to ask you about teammates and friends beat colleagues and coworkers every day and twice on Sunday.

周日更是如此。

And twice on Sunday.

没错，兄弟。

That's right, man.

这句话我已经用了十年了。

I have used that line repeatedly for a decade now.

那这对你今天建立风投公司有什么影响呢？

How does that impact how you build a venture firm today, then?

嗯，你看，我先说说这句话的由来，然后再讲讲为什么我觉得它这么重要，即使在建设公司的时候也一样重要。

Well, look, first I'll explain the genesis of the line, and then I'll talk about why I think it's so important, even in firm-building, as much as it was.

这句话源于我在SendGrid担任领导职务的时候。我一直认为，做生意最难的事情就是让一大群人齐心协力，朝着一个共同的目标协调一致地工作。

It came from when I was leading and serving at SendGrid, and I have just always believed building businesses, the hardest thing to do is to align masses of humans, so many people, to work in a coordinated and orchestrated way towards a singular goal.

这真的太难了，兄弟，每个在听的CEO都会说，没错，他们懂。

That is really effing hard to do, man, and every CEO listening is like, yep, they hear that.

他们知道这一点。

They know that.

这就是最难的部分。

That is the hard bit.

而且我发现，如果你的团队，你的人真的互相喜欢，真的互相关心，把彼此当作队友而不是同事，那这就是一种战略竞争优势。

And I have found it was a strategic competitive advantage if your team, if your humans actually liked each other, if they actually cared about each other, and they thought of each other as teammates and not colleagues.

原因，哈里，就是队友会为彼此更努力地工作。

And the reason, Harry, is that teammates work harder for each other.

他们不是在为自己工作。

They're not working for themselves.

他们是在为队友工作，为团队工作，而且你绝对不想让队友失望。

They're working for their teammates, and they're working for their team, and you never want to effing let down your teammates.

我明白你的意思。

I get you.

我显然同意。

I obviously agree.

没法不同意。

Can't disagree.

但那我该怎么付诸实践，把同事变成队友呢？

But then how do I then put that into practice to turn coworkers and colleagues into teammates?

有什么办法吗？

What can be done?

我先从最重要的基础说起。

I'm going to start with the most important basics.

你们必须在文化和价值观上保持一致。

You have to be aligned on culture and values.

我们做事的方式必须非常明确，每个人都得遵循。

How we do our work has to be super clear, and everybody aligns up to it.

标准是不能改变的。

There's no changing of the standard.

你不能容忍那种表现很好但不守规矩的混蛋，如果你说了——或者不管是什么情况。

You can't have the asshole that's a great performer that doesn't abide by the rules if you say-- Or whatever it is.

无论你的文化和价值观是什么，你都得让每个人都以同样的方式工作。

Whatever your culture and values are, you have to get everybody working in the same way.

你必须保护这一点，而且团队里的每个人都应该有权力说：'不，如果你偏离了我们的文化和价值观，我会指出来。'

You've got to protect that, and everybody has to be empowered on the team to be like, "Nope, I'm going to call that out if you are deviating from our culture and values."

所以是文化和价值观。

So culture and values.

我觉得一个好的价值观应该是可以被争论的，无论是支持还是反对。

I think a good value is something that could be argued for or against.

不同意。

Disagree.

单独看某个价值观，当然可以有人同意或不同意，但你必须有一套价值观，然后说，这就是我们的方式。

The value isolated from the organization, sure, anybody could agree or disagree, but you have to have a set of them that you're like, this is our way.

这就是SendGrid的做事方式。

This was the SendGrid way of doing things.

我们有四个H：快乐、渴望、谦逊、诚实。

We had our four Hs, happy, hungry, humble, and honest.

四个H：快乐、渴望、谦逊、诚实，这就是我们的四个价值观，我们做的每件事都必须强化这四个价值观，如果你偏离了，就会被指出来。

Four Hs, happy, hungry, humble, honest, and those were our four, and everything we did had to reinforce those four if you deviated.

这对SendGrid来说非常好。

And so it was great for SendGrid.

你总不能说你不应该快乐，不应该有渴望吧。

You can't argue that you shouldn't be happy, you shouldn't be hungry.

我们想要的是不快乐、没有抱负的骗子。

We want unhappy, unambitious liars.

不。

No.

嗯，不是。不是。

Well, no. No.

好的。

Okay.

我要反驳一下。

I'll push back.

举个例子。

Here's the example.

我总说，SendGrid——我很喜欢SendGrid，我们的文化。

I always said that S-- And I loved SendGrid, our culture.

我觉得那很棒。

I thought it was amazing.

我觉得我们的同事，如果你能找到任何一个Gridder，问他们：“嘿，你在SendGrid工作开心吗？

I think our teammates, if you could go track down any Gridder out there and say, "Hey, did you enjoy working at SendGrid?

那是个特别的团队吗？

Was it a special team?"

我打心底里知道，一百个人里一百个都会说：“是的，那是个特别的团队。”

I know to my bone that 100 out of 100 of them will say, "Yes, it was."

但之所以会这样，是因为那个谦逊的H。对于某些人来说，那里本来可能是个地狱般的工作场所，对吧？

And the reason for that, though, is take the humble H. It would've been seventh hell as a place to work for a certain group of humans, right?

我们的谦逊H是“我们”，不是“我”。我们会在面试中问候选人：“哈里，告诉我一个你最引以为傲的职业成就。”

Our humble H was we, not I. It was about we would ask people in interviews, "Harry, tell me about a professional accomplishment of which you are most proud."

然后我们会坐下来，数一数他们用了多少次“我们”和“我”。

And then we would sit back and do a pronoun count.

哈里说“我们”的次数有多少？

How often does Harry say we?

哈里说“我”的次数有多少？

How often does Harry say I?

我想要那些说“我们”的人。

I want the people that say we.

这就是我们的价值观。

Now, that was our value.

这就是SendGrid的价值观。

That was SendGrid's value.

但这并不意味着它就是正确的价值观。

That doesn't mean it's the right value.

你说得对，这个问题可以两面看。

To your point, you could argue either side of that.

我不在乎。

I don't care.

但对于我们公司、我们团队来说，我们就是这样协作的。如果你不是这样的人，那也没关系。

But for our company, our team, the way we work together is this way, and if you're not that way, that's fine.

劳动力市场很大。

It's a big labor market.

去别的地方找工作吧。

Go find another place to work.

那很好。

That's great.

没什么大不了的。

No harm, no foul.

但是，重要的是你带进来的人愿意以某种方式一起工作，这样才能建立团队，而不只是同事和合作伙伴。

But man, it matters that the people you bring in want to work together in a certain way, and that's how you build a team and not colleagues and coworkers.

顺便说一下，这是第一点。

And by the way, so that's number one.

然后第二点，我接着讲第二点。

But number two, I get against to number two.

第二点，同样重要的是，要得到队友而不只是同事，你需要花时间在一起，但不做工作。

Number two, which is also equally important to get teammates and not just colleagues, is you go spend time together not doing work.

我知道这听起来很疯狂。

I know this sounds so crazy.

当我领导SendGrid的时候，我们每年一月都会带整个公司飞到墨西哥，进行年度启动大会。

When I was leading SendGrid, we flew the entire company every January down to Mexico for an annual kickoff.

整个公司，一个不落。

The whole effing company.

不是销售团队，也不是什么总裁俱乐部。

Not a sales team, president's club.

我是说整个公司，我们会把他们关在房间里一整天，然后跟他们讲清楚愿景和使命。

I mean the whole company, and we'd lock them in a room for a day, and we would get lined up on here's the vision, here's the mission.

这就是我们做这些事的原因。

This is why we're doing what we're doing.

这是今年的目标，等等等等。

Here are the goals for the year, blah, blah, blah.

第二天一整天，他们就是去找其他办公室的人，一起去划皮划艇。

They would have the whole second day was go find somebody from another office and go kayaking together.

一起去骑山地车。

Go mountain biking together.

一起坐在泳池边喝一杯。

Go sit by the pool and have a drink together.

我不在乎你们做什么，只要一起做就行。

I don't care what you do, just do it together.

哈利，这件事之所以重要，是因为所有在听的首席执行官们都会明白我在说什么。

And the reason this matters, Harry, is that for all the CEOs listening out there, they will understand when I say this.

创业过程中总会出问题。

Shit goes wrong when you're building businesses.

这很难。

It's hard.

当一群同事和伙伴在一起时，你知道出问题时他们首先会做什么吗？

And when you have a group of colleagues and coworkers, you know what they do first when shit goes wrong?

他们要么这样——听的人注意了，我正用手指指着对方，就像你们在互相指责一样，对吧？

They either go like this, and for those listening, I'm pointing my fingers as if you're pointing at each other, right?

就是互相推卸责任。

It's blame-placing.

销售部门没有及时跟进线索。

Sales isn't responding to the leads fast enough.

营销部门没有给我带来足够的潜在客户。

Marketing isn't generating enough pipe for me.

当事情进展不顺利时，他们就会互相指责，或者更糟，他们干脆走人，因为他们觉得：“算了，我去下一家公司吧，反正我只是个同事。”

When things aren't going well, they point fingers, or worse, they just head for the doors because they're just like, "Well, I'll go to the next company because I'm just a colleague.

“这只是一份工作。”

This is just a job."

但队友、朋友，在创业的艰难时刻——相信我，这样的时刻有很多——团队里的那些人会团结在一起。

But a teammate, teammates and friends in hard moments when you're building a business, and believe me, there are many, that group of people in a team are going to come together.

他们不会开始互相指责。

They don't start pointing fingers.

他们会聚在一起，然后走过去说：“哈利，兄弟，我跟你一起骑过山地车、划过皮划艇，或者坐在泳池边喝过饮料。”

They come together, and they go across and be like, "Harry, dude, I spent time with you mountain biking or kayaking or sitting by the pool having a beverage.

你是个好人。

You're a good dude.

我们得为我们的团队解决这个问题。”

We got to figure this out for our team."

这就是解决问题的方式。

That's how you solve problems.

而且当困难来临时，我跟你说，队友和朋友绝对比同事和伙伴强，每天都是，周日更是如此。

And when times are hard, and I'm just telling you, man, teammates and friends will beat colleagues and coworkers every day and twice on Sunday.

不，我完全理解。

No, I totally get that.

我完全同意这个观点。

I completely agree with that headline.

我觉得我受过训练，也坚信价值观要与众不同、要有争议性。

I think I'm very trained and strongly believed in the values being differentiated and arguable.

所以我们相信，努力工作，最努力的工作，会带来更好的结果。

So, we believe that hard work, hardest of work, leads to better results.

我不相信休息日。

I don't buy the rest days.

我不相信健身房里的休息日。

I don't buy rest days in the gym.

你练的是不同的部位。

You train a different body part.

你做有氧，不做力量训练。

You do cardio, not weights.

菲尔普斯赢了——

Phelps won-

阿门。

Amen

……因为他确实——不，但很多人不同意这一点。

... because he did-- No, but a lot of people don't agree with that.

我在欧洲因为这个被批评。

I'm chastised for it in Europe.

我被当成恶魔之子。

I'm the spawn of Satan.

哇，哇。

Whoa, whoa.

因为他们会说，'不，我们应该……' 说真的，老兄，这观点不受欢迎。

Because they go, "No, we should..." Like, seriously, dude, it's not popular.

我在劳工大会上会被嘘下台的。

I will get booed on stage by labor conferences.

真的假的。

No kidding.

好吧，听我说，我告诉你，兄弟，我完全同意你的看法。

Well, listen, I'll tell you this, man, I couldn't agree with you more.

我觉得，我是两个移民的儿子。

I think, I'm the son of two immigrants.

职业道德就是一切，那种饥饿感。我常说的话是，我想和那些愿意拼了命去成功、绝不放弃的人一起工作。

Work ethic is everything, that hungry H. My line was always, I want to work with people who are going to run through effing walls to be successful, who will not relent.

我们引用埃米纳姆的歌，比如，'成功是我唯一的选择。

We quote the Eminem song, like, "Success is my only mother effing option.

失败不存在。'

Failure is not."

我就想要这样的人。

I want people like that.

对我们来说，第二点就是，在投资委员会里，感情用事代价太高了。

Number two for us, feelings are expensive in investment committees.

Sameer，如果咱俩在投资委员会里，我想直接说，你觉得我们该为X公司付那个价，你就是个白痴，为什么这么说？

Sameer, if me and you are in an investment committee, I want to say you're an idiot for thinking that we should pay that price for X company, and why is that?

我不想绕来绕去。

I don't want to have to tread around it.

比如，“Sameer，谢谢你提出这个。

Like, "Sameer, thank you for bringing this.

我感谢你花时间和那位创业者交流，但我觉得我们应该考虑……”

I appreciate the time you spent with the entrepreneur, but I think we should consider..."

抱歉。

I'm sorry.

我们俩都够成熟。

We're both big enough.

所以，是的，当然。

So yeah, sure.

而且再说一次，这对你的团队和文化来说可能很棒，那些选择这样做的人会在一起很合拍，他们会欣赏这种直接。

And again, that can be great for your team and culture, and people that are going to opt into that are going to be awesome together, and they're going to appreciate the directness.

我想说的是，在投资委员会里，真正的智力诚实才是最重要的。

I would say, the intellectual honesty in the IC is actually what matters most.

但我的观点其实是，你们能辩论是好事，因为我不是永远正确的，这只是我们的方式。

But then my point is actually, it's great that you can debate, because I'm not right, it's just our way.

但我不理解的是像Zoom那样的价值观，我觉得是快乐。

But what I don't understand is the values like Zoom, which is, I think happiness.

没有人提倡不快乐。

No one's advocating for unhappiness.

不，我明白。

No, I hear that.

顺便说一句，关于快乐这一点，我在SendGrid的时候，确实发现我必须写下这四个H每个是什么意思，对我来说，快乐当然是我们希望员工快乐，但我在SendGrid所说的快乐H并不是那个意思，我想要的是那些能把世界和我们的业务看作半满的人。

And by the way, I'll just say on the happiness one, by the way, at SendGrid, our happiness, I did find at SendGrid, I had to write down what do we mean by each of these four Hs, and the happy for me was, of course, we want employees to be happy, but that's not what I meant by the happy H at SendGrid was, I want people who are going to see the world and our business as half full.

杯子是半满的，不是半空的。

The glass is half full, not half empty.

而且总有些人会很消极，就像《小熊维尼》里的屹耳一样，或者就是那种扫兴的人。

And there are just people who are going to be negative, man, who are going to be like, Eeyore in "Winnie the Pooh," or just going to be downers.

我就觉得，不，不是这样的。

I'm like, no, man.

我想要的是乐观的人，是那种充满干劲、愿意去解决问题的人。

I want people who are optimists, who are fired up to go tackle problems.

这才是我说的“快乐”的意思。

And that's what I meant by happy.

不是说我自己很开心。

Not like I'm joyful.

当然开心也很好。

That's great, too.

我希望你开心。

I hope you're joyful.

但我希望你是一个积极向上的人，当事情变糟或困难时，你不会变得消极，把整个团队也拖下水。

But I want you to be a positively disposed person who, when things go bad or are hard, you're not going to go negative and bring the team down with you.

回到风险投资的话题，我们看到这些企业正在积累一些最令人难以置信的价值。

If we go back to venture, we're seeing some of the most incredible value accumulation from these businesses.

我们提到了Legoro，也提到了Fireworks。

We've mentioned Legoro, we've mentioned Fireworks.

我想你也投了Foul。

I think you're in Foul as well.

你怎么看待什么时候是卖出的最佳时机？

How do you think about when's the right time to sell?

而且IPO不断推迟，可能还会有更多像Stripes这样的公司。

And with IPOs being continuously pushed, maybe as many more Stripes.

你怎么看待流动性事件？

How do you think about liquidity events?

不，你看，我开玩笑说进入这个行业四年半还算新手，但我知道DPI很重要。

No, look, I joke about being new to the business four and a half years into venture, but I do know that DPI matters.

我也没那么新。

I'm not that new.

我知道流动性很重要。

I know that liquidity matters.

DPI很重要。

DPI matters.

我们的LP不是把钱给我们无限期使用的。

Our LPs are not in the business of handing us the money for perpetuity.

所以我们得把回报翻倍还给他们。

So we got to get it back to them in multiples.

这个我明白。

And I get that.

现在，我觉得因为我们在AI浪潮中还很早，这不是主要关注点，但我想说，因为这些企业会持续增长，持续大规模增长。

Right now, I think because we're still so early in this AI wave, it's not a principal concern, but I would say because I think these businesses are going to keep compounding and keep compounding at scale.

但我确实认为我们应该寻找机会，只是从实际出发，作为谨慎、有风险意识的商人。

But I do think that we should look for opportunities, just practically, just being prudent, risk-aware businesspeople.

你应该在过程中适时套现一些，确保能拿到一些DPI，为你的LP和基金锁定收益。

You should take some chips off the table along the journey to make sure that you're getting some DPI and locking in gains for your LPs and your funds.

你应该这么做。

You should.

你觉得你是不是——这是个委婉的批评。

Do you find that you're a, this is a backhanded compliment.

你觉得，凭借Bessemer的品牌，你往往能在融资轮中占据一个非常优质的位置，你能够做到这一点吗？

Do you find that you're able to, given the brand of Bessemer, is often a very premium brand in a round?

不，我感谢你的夸奖，我也确实认为我们有一个很好的品牌。

No, I appreciate that, and I do think we have a great brand.

我觉得当我们寻求一些流动性，想要套现部分股份并带回DPI时，这通常发生在旅程的非常后期，大多数人都能理解这一点。

I think that when we're looking for a little bit of liquidity to take some chips off the table and bring DPI back, it tends to be at very late stages of the journey, and most people see it for what it is.

也就是说，是的，他们在这里持有巨大的仓位。

Which is, yeah, they've got an enormous position here.

他们会赚很多很多钱，而且整个事情会继续复利增长。

They're going to make lots and lots of money, and the whole thing is going to continue to compound.

但为了把一部分收益返还给LP，我发现现在大家对此都更就事论事了。

But to take a little bit off the table to get back to LPs, I just find people are more matter of fact about that now.

这又回到了资产类别专业化的话题。

And this is back to the whole professionalization of the asset class.

以前这感觉像是个人的决定，像是“你是不是不再相信我了？”

What used to feel like a personal decision and like, "Do you not believe in me anymore?

“你是不是不再相信我的业务了？”

Do you not believe in my business anymore?"

我只是觉得，以我们现在建设的业务规模、开出的支票大小以及估值水平，大家都能理解。

I just think that at the scale of the businesses that we're building, the size of the checks that we are now writing at the valuations that we're writing them, I think people get it.

CEO们非常——我也曾站在另一边。

CEOs are very-- I've been on the other side.

他们是成熟的商业人士。

They're sophisticated businesspeople.

他们明白。

They understand.

我完全同意你的看法，我觉得大家在这件事上摇摆得太厉害了，总觉得“你要是卖了，他们得多难过啊”。

I totally agree with you there, and I think people oscillate too much on the, "Oh, they'd be so upset if you sold."

我觉得创始人其实在这件事上非常理性，也很聪明。

I think founders are actually very rational and smart about it.

超级理性。

Super rational.

你看，你告诉我。

Look, you tell me.

在你合作的那些创始人里，到了特别后期融资的时候，有多少人自己一点都不套现的？

What percentage of the founders that you're working with that get to crazy late stage don't take any in secondary themselves as the rounds of financing go through?

我这边大部分都会套现。

Most of mine are.

他们也是在为家人做正确的事，对吧？

And they're doing the right thing for their families, right?

而且我也会建议他们这么做。

And I tell them to.

我就说，'哥们，你最好在这儿卖一点，确保你家庭的经济安全。'

I'm like, "Shoot, you should probably sell a little bit here, bud, to make sure that you're financially secure for your family."

我觉得这很好。

And I think that's great.

没问题。

No problem.

我觉得这会让创始人变得更好。

I think it makes better founders.

我完全同意你的看法。

I completely agree with you.

你会用更长远的眼光去思考——

You think with a much longer-term vision-

对，然后他们才愿意放手一搏，对吧？

Yeah, and then they're willing to swing for the fences, right?

完全同意。

Completely agree with you.

我能问一下吗，你觉得随着Stripe证明了如果做得好，公开市场可能比私人市场更难，IPO的数量会不会大幅减少？

Can I ask, do you think we see the number of IPOs drastically reduce as Stripe shows that public markets can be harder than private markets if done well?

你怎么看这个问题？

How do you think about that?

我简单说几点。

Only a few comments here.

第一，我认为这是一个永久性的结构性转变，公司会保持私有状态更长时间。

One, I believe that it is a permanent structural shift that companies will stay private longer.

私人风险投资这个资产类别就是大得多。

The asset class of private venture capital is just that much bigger.

市场上有更多的资金，也有更多的公司。

There are that many more dollars in the market, and that many more firms.

所以它们会保持私有更久，我觉得这是必然的。

So they will stay private longer, and I think that is a given.

而且你会看到越来越多的跨界投资者在这里花更多时间。

And I think you're going to see crossovers that are spending more time here.

我觉得有限合伙人之所以增加对这类资产的配置，是因为他们明白这一点。

I think LPs are allocating more to the asset class because they get that.

如果他们等着在公开市场收获，就无法享受这代际繁荣带来的回报。

They can't reap the rewards of this generational boom if they're waiting for them in the public markets.

大部分涨幅其实在私募市场就已经发生了。

Most of that run-up will have already happened in the private markets.

所以我完全相信这是真的。

So I absolutely believe that is true.

我也相信，明年晚些时候以及2028年，IPO市场会迎来解冻。

I also believe that we will see an unlock in the IPO markets next year, later next year, and in 2028.

我觉得会有很多公司上市，而且我们确实经历了这么长时间的市场关闭。

I think a lot of companies will go public, and I just think we've had this, the window's been shut for so long.

我能问一下，为什么会出现这种解冻？

Can I ask you, why will that unlock happen?

是什么原因导致的？

What will cause it?

我本来就是学经济学的，所以供需关系是实实在在的。

I'm an economist by training, man, and so supply and demand is a thing.

就是那么回事。

It's just a thing.

所以，依我看，接下来会有很多优秀的企业上市，在市场上取得不错的成绩，但公开市场的投资者显然渴望获得纯AI领域的投资机会，而且他们不希望只从少数几家公司那里获得。

And so what's going to happen, in my humble opinion, is you'll see a bunch of great businesses go public that will have a lot of success in the market, but there will be an obvious appetite from investors in the public markets to get pure play AI exposure, and they don't want it from just a few companies.

他们希望从几十家甚至上百家纯AI公司那里获得。

They're going to want it in dozens or hundreds of companies that are pure play AI exposed.

我觉得供需关系，需求会非常强劲，以至于他们愿意出高价。

And I just think the supply and demand, the demand will be so incredible that they will be willing to pay prices.

然后供需关系发挥作用，价格变动，我认为我们会看到很多公司，窗口会打开，很多人会出来。

And then supply and demand works, prices move, and I think we'll see a lot of companies that the window will be open, a lot of people will come out.

关于IPO，我想最后说一点，我自己经历过，我相信上市会让公司变得更好。

I'll say one last point on the IPO thing, which is, having done it myself, I believe it makes for a better company.

我深信不疑。

Deeply believe.