Curt Jaimungal (Me): The Complete Consciousness Iceberg | 2 Hours of Obscure Consciousness Theories Explained

该理论使用了一个意识剧场的隐喻。

The theory uses a metaphor of a theater of consciousness.

现在想象一个灯光昏暗的剧场，只有聚光灯照耀的内容才能被有意识地感知。

So now imagine a dimly lit theater where only the spotlight content is consciously perceived.

这个舞台代表工作记忆，而聚光灯由注意力控制。

This stage represents working memory with the spotlight controlled by attention.

观众由无意识的专用处理器组成，例如负责语言、情绪或感官体验的处理器。

The audience consists of unconscious specialized processors, like those for language, emotions, or sensory experience.

全局工作空间理论提出，当信息获得进入这个全局工作空间并被广泛广播时，意识便由此产生。

Global Workspace Theory proposes that consciousness emerges when information gains access to this global workspace and is broadcasted widely.

这种广播使得不同脑区之间的信息得以整合，从而产生连贯的行为和主观体验。

This broadcasting allows for the integrated information across different brain regions, leading to coherent behavior and subjective experience.

这种观点与一些神经科学发现相一致。

This view aligns with some neuroscientific findings.

例如，研究表明，知觉与大脑活动的长程同步有关，这可能是全局工作空间理论中广播现象的神经基础。

For instance, studies have shown perception is associated with long range synchronization of brain activity, which could be the neural basis of the broadcast in Global Workspace Theory.

因此，我们在这里关注意识在认知中的功能作用，而非难题本身。

In this way, we focus here on the functional role of consciousness in cognition rather than the hard problem.

它说，嘿。

It says, hey.

这就是意识所做的事情，即使我们完全无法解释成为某种事物的感觉是什么样的。

Here's what consciousness does even if we fully can't explain what it's like to be something.

通常，批评者认为全局工作空间理论并未解决解释鸿沟。

As usual, critics argue that global workspace theory doesn't address the explanatory gap.

这种信息的广播如何产生主观体验？

How does this broadcasting of information create subjective experience?

然而，像斯坦尼斯拉斯·德阿纳这样的支持者基于全局工作空间理论发展出更详细的神经生物学模型，提出了关于意识过程的可检验预测，例如，有意识的知觉会与大脑分布式网络中后期的激活爆发相关。

However, proponents like Stanislaus Dehan have developed a more detailed neurobiological model based on global workspace theory, providing testable predictions about conscious processes, such as the idea that conscious perception would be associated with a late burst of activation in a distributed network of brain regions.

如果意识确实是一个全局工作空间，那么是什么决定了哪些信息能够进入这个工作空间？为什么某些意识内容感觉更生动，甚至更真实？

If consciousness is indeed a global workspace, then what determines what information gets access to this workspace, and why do some contents of consciousness feel more vivid or even more real than others?

卡尔·荣格对意识的解释。

Carl Jung's explanation for consciousness.

荣格提出了一种心理模型，包含意识和无意识两个部分。

Carl Jung proposed a model of the psyche that includes both conscious and unconscious elements.

根据荣格的观点，意识只是冰山一角，此话双关。

According to Jung, the conscious mind is just the tip of the iceberg, pun intended.

在冰山之下是个人无意识，包含被遗忘或压抑的记忆与经历；更深层面则是集体无意识，它储存着普遍继承下来的思想、经验乃至人格模式，荣格称之为原型。

Beneath lies the personal unconscious, containing forgotten or repressed memories and experiences, and even deeper, the collective unconscious, a repository of universal inherited patterns of thoughts, experiences, even personalities that he called archetypes.

荣格理论的核心是个性化概念，即把无意识内容整合进意识的过程。

Central to Jung's theory is the concept of individuation, the process of integrating unconscious contents into consciousness.

荣格的观点与我们曾提及的一些东方哲学有共鸣。

Jung's idea resonates with some Eastern philosophies that we've touched on.

例如，他的集体无意识概念与吠檀多哲学中的普遍意识观念有相似之处。

His concept of the collective unconscious, for instance, has parallels with the Vedantic idea of a universal consciousness.

然而，荣格的理论具有鲜明的西方特色，根植于他的临床工作和个人经历。

However, Jung's approach is distinctly western and grounded in his clinical work and personal experiences.

此外，荣格的集体无意识并非一个我们所有人从中产生的统一意识源头，而更像一个我们共同拥有的储藏库。

Also, the collective unconscious of Jung is less of a unified source of consciousness from which we all spring and is more akin to a reservoir that we have in common.

所以区别在于，在东方的观念中，你被视为海洋上的涟漪，涟漪与海洋之间几乎没有区别，因为它们都属于同一种介质，即水。

So the difference is that in the eastern case, you're seen as the ripple on the ocean with little distinction between the ripple and the ocean since they're both of the same medium, namely water in this case.

而对荣格而言，集体无意识更像是一种共享的祖先记忆或遗传的进化智慧，它影响着我们的心理，但荣格并不否定个体意识。

Whereas for Jung, the collective unconscious is more akin to a shared ancestral memory or inherited evolutionary wisdom that influences our psyche, but Jung doesn't negate individual consciousness.

因此，集体无意识是我们所有人共同汲取的原型和本能模式的宝库，但我们仍然是界限分明的个体。

So the collective unconscious is a common stockpile of archetypes and instinctual patterns that we all draw from, but we still remain delineated individuals.

对荣格来说，主观体验并不像硬问题所暗示的那样，是需要解决的问题。

For Jung, subjective experiences aren't seen as issues to be resolved like the hard problem suggests.

相反，荣格认为体验是关于心理中需要探索和整合的元素的启示，这一过程被称为个体化。

Instead, Jung sees experience as being informative of elements of the psyche that require exploration and integration in the process of something called individuation.

现在，个体化是指通过整合意识与无意识的心理层面，成为一个完整且有差异的个体的过程。

Now individuation means the process of becoming a whole differentiated person by integrating conscious and unconscious aspects of one psyche.

这与其它意识理论所主张的‘合一’形成对比。

This is in contrast to the oneness of the other theories of consciousness.

在卡尔·荣格的观点中，个体化实际上有助于使人更加独特，而不是更加相似。

In Carl Jung's view, individuation literally aids in becoming more distinctive rather than becoming more the same.

为了实现这一点，你需要直面并整合你的阴影，这是你走向心理完整性的旅程的一部分。

In order to accomplish this, you would need to confront and integrate your shadow as part of your journey towards psychological wholeness.

阴影指的是你压抑或否认的自我方面。

The shadow being the aspects of yourself you've repressed or denied.

例如，你可能需要面对当他人成功或获得赞誉时你内心深处的嫉妒，或者你需要面对自己倾向于虚假的冲动，也就是你倾向于通过说哪怕是最微小的善意谎言来扭曲现实。

For instance, you may need to confront the part of you that's deeply envious when others succeed or gain accolade, or you may need to confront your urge to falsity, that is your tendency to bend reality by telling even the tiniest white lie.

这些方面需要被承认、理解，然后整合进你的意识自我，而不是被压抑、否认，甚至更糟的是完全无视。

Those are aspects that need to be acknowledged, understood, and then integrated into your conscious self rather than suppressed, denied, or even worse, unacknowledged.

这将使你成为一个更完整的人。

And this will allow you to become a more complete individual.

荣格派分析师詹姆斯·霍利斯认为，在荣格看来，意识不仅仅是觉知，更是意义的承载者。

Jungian analyst James Hollis suggests that consciousness, in Jung's view, is not just awareness, but the carrier of meaning.

这将焦点从‘意识是什么’转向了‘意识做什么’。

This shifts the focus from what consciousness is to what consciousness does.

也就是说，意识如何在你的生活中创造和诠释意义。

That is to say, how consciousness creates and interprets meaning in your life.

大家好。

Hi, everyone.

希望你们喜欢今天的节目。

Hope you're enjoying today's episode.

如果你渴望深入了解物理、人工智能、意识、哲学，以及我的个人反思，所有内容都可以在我的Substack上找到。

If you're hungry for deeper dives into physics, AI, consciousness, philosophy, along with my personal reflections, you'll find it all on my Substack.

订阅者可以优先获取新节目、新文章、幕后洞察，还有机会加入一个充满活力的志同道合的探索者社群。

Subscribers get first access to new episodes, new posts as well, behind the scenes insights, and the chance to be a part of a thriving community of like minded pilgrimers.

通过加入，你将直接支持我的工作，帮助维持这些对话处于前沿水平。

By joining, you'll directly be supporting my work and helping keep these conversations at the cutting edge.

所以，请点击屏幕上的链接。

So click the link on screen here.

点击订阅，让我们一起继续拓展知识的边界。

Hit subscribe, and let's keep pushing the boundaries of knowledge together.

谢谢大家，祝您观看愉快。

Thank you, and enjoy the show.

顺便说一下，如果你在收听，网址是 c u r t j a I m u n g a l dot org。

Just so you know, if you're listening, it's c u r t j a I m u n g a l dot org.

Curt Jaimungal dot org。

Curt Jaimungal dot org.

欢迎来到意识冰山的第三层，这一次我们将深入探索一个更加绚丽多彩的世界，以通俗易懂的方式讲解每一种意识理论，并将哲学思想与现代认知科学理论联系起来。

Welcome to the consciousness iceberg layer three, where this time we'll delve into the even deeper kaleidoscopic world of explaining every theory of consciousness in a straightforward manner, connecting philosophical ideas to modern theories of cognitive science.

探讨海德格尔的‘此在’概念，注意力图式理论是什么？

Exploring Heidegger's notion of Dasein, what is the attention schema theory?

唐纳德·霍夫曼和约沙卡·巴赫等思想家的最新理论有哪些？

What are the latest theories from thinkers such as Donald Hoffman and Joscha Bach?

我们还将探讨安德烈亚斯·戈梅斯·埃米森提出的意识边界问题，以及尼尔·拉哈夫的意识相对性观点。

We also tackle the boundary problem in consciousness as articulated by Andreas Gomes Emilsson, as well as addressing the relativistic view of consciousness by Nir Lahav.

这是一种在2020年代提出的新理论。

This is a radically new theory proposed in the twenty twenties.

我们将考察这些所有框架如何相互作用、互补并彼此矛盾。

We'll see how all of these frameworks interact, complement, and contradict one another.

我们开始吧。

Let's begin.

海德格尔的此在概念。

Heidegger's concept of Dasein.

此在这一概念在海德格尔的哲学中十分普遍，尤其体现在他开创性的存在主义著作《存在与时间》中。

The concept of Dasein is prevalent in Heidegger's philosophy, particularly in his seminal existential work, being and time.

此在一词常被译为‘在那儿’或‘在场’。

The term Dasein is often translated as being there or presence.

本质上，它指的是人类意识作为一种能够觉察并追问自身存在的存在形式。

Essentially, it's human consciousness as a form of being that's aware of and questions its own existence.

在意识研究的语境中，此在的意义在于强调意识对世界的主动参与。

In the context of consciousness studies, Dasein is significant because it places an emphasis on consciousness having an active engagement with the world.

海德格尔认为，我们的意识或此在总是被抛入世界之中。

Heidegger posits that our consciousness or Dasein is always thrown in the world.

这意味着我们发现自己身处一个并非自己选择的境遇中。

This means that we find ourselves in a context that we didn't choose.

然而，我们仍然必须在这个世界中前行。

However, we still must navigate it.

而这种前行涉及感知物体，并将它们理解为一个有意义的整体——用海德格尔的话说，就是‘世界’。

And this navigation involves both perceiving objects and understanding them as part of a meaningful whole or a quote unquote world in Heideggerian terms.

你可以将这看作是还原论与整体论的融合。

You can think of this as a fusion of reductionism and holism.

此在总是已经卷入一个意义世界，在其中，事物根据我们的意图和关切显现为相关或不相关、有用或无用。

Dasein is always already involved in a world of significance where things show up as relevant or irrelevant, useful or useless based on our intentions and concerns.

这与我们在上一层讨论过的约翰·韦尔瓦克的‘相关性实现’理论相关。

This relates to John Vervaeke's relevance realization that we talked about in the previous layer.

许多关于意识的观点强调被动观察者的层面，例如某些形式的正念冥想，你只是观察自己的思绪，而不是成为自己思想的创造者。

Many views on consciousness emphasize the passive observer aspect, such as some forms of mindfulness meditation, where you watch your thoughts rather than become the author of your thoughts.

海德格尔说，这是一种错误。

Heidegger says this is a mistake.

意识并不反映一个独立存在的现实。

Consciousness doesn't mirror a reality that exists.

它是意义的共同创造者和协商者。

It's a co creator and negotiator of meaning.

此在的一个方面是其时间性。

One aspect of Dasein is its temporal nature.

海德格尔认为，此在总是先行于自身，面向未来投射，同时扎根于过去，他称之为向死而生。

Heidegger argues that Dasein is always ahead of itself, projecting into the future while being grounded in its past, what he calls being toward death.

因此，这与卡尔·弗里斯顿的预测性方法有共通之处，这些方法将在第四层中提及。

In this way, it's common to the predictive approaches of Karl Friston, which will come up in layer four.

所以订阅以获取通知。

So subscribe to get notified.

这种时间结构意味着意识本质上是面向未来的。

This temporal structure means that consciousness is inherently future oriented.

正是你对未来的导向塑造了你的当下。

It's your orientation to the future that shapes your present.

这与一些冥想实践所持的更注重当下的观点形成对比。

This stands in contrast to the more present oriented views, such as those of some meditative practices.

海德格尔认为，试图通过将意识分解为各个组成部分或将其与神经过程相关联来完全理解意识，这种观点是愚蠢的。

Heidegger suggests that the notion that consciousness can be fully understood by breaking it down into its components or correlating it with neural processes is a foolish one.

相反，此在表明意识是一种不可还原的现象，与我们在世之存在紧密交织。

Instead, Dasein suggests that consciousness is an irreducible phenomenon intertwined with our being in the world.

这与现代强调意识的具身性和嵌入性的理论相呼应，例如非作用主义和延展心智假说，同时拒绝仅用大脑活动来解释意识的路径。

This resonates with modern theories that emphasize the embodied and embedded nature of consciousness, such as inactivism and the extended mind hypothesis, while it rejects approaches that attempt to explain consciousness solely in terms of brain activity.

注意图式理论。

Attention Schema Theory.

注意图式理论是神经科学家迈克尔·格拉齐亚诺提出的一种关于意识的较新理论。

Attention Schema Theory is a relatively recent theory in the study of consciousness, proposed by neuroscientist Michael Graziano.

它为意识如何从大脑的注意机制中产生提供了令人信服的解释。

It offers a compelling explanation for how consciousness arises from the brain's mechanisms for attention.

AST的核心观点是，大脑会构建各种过程的模型或图式，以确定和控制这些过程。

The core idea of AST is that the brain constructs models or schemas of various processes to determine and control them.

例如，为了控制身体的运动，大脑会创建一个关于身体在空间中位置的模型，称为身体图式。

For instance, to control the movement of the body, the brain creates a model of the body's position in space known as a body schema.

同样，格拉齐亚诺提出，大脑会构建一个注意力图式，即一个关于注意力指向何处以及关注什么的模型。

Similarly, Graziano proposes that the brain constructs an attention schema, a model of where attention is directed and what it's focusing on.

根据注意力图式理论，当大脑构建自身注意力的模型时，意识便由此产生。

According to AST, consciousness arises when the brain creates a model of its own attention.

这种对注意力的自我建模，正是我们产生觉知体验的原因。

This self modeling of attention is what gives us the experience of being aware.

换句话说，意识是大脑向自身表征其正在关注某物的一种方式。

In other words, consciousness is the brain's method of representing to itself that it's attending to something.

注意力图式理论并不认为注意力本身即是意识，而是认为大脑对注意力的内部模型才是我们所体验到的意识。

AST doesn't claim that attention itself is consciousness, but rather that the brain's internal model of attention is what we experience as consciousness.

这一理论表明，意识并非大脑的基本属性，而是一种有用的建构，一种模型或表征，如果你愿意这么说的话。

This theory suggests that consciousness isn't a fundamental property of the brain, rather it's a useful construct, a model, or a representation, if you will.

这种建构有助于大脑管理复杂的任务和社会互动。

One that helps the brain manage complex tasks and social interactions.

注意力图式理论一个引人入胜的方面或含义，在于它有可能解释所谓的‘解释鸿沟’。

One of the intriguing aspects or implications of AST is its potential to explain the quote unquote explanatory gap.

这就是为什么和如何物理过程会产生主观体验的问题。

That is the question of why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience.

格拉齐亚诺认为，这种差距可能是由于大脑的注意图式本身不完整所致。

Graziano suggests that this gap may be a result of the brain's attention schema being inherently incomplete.

大脑将注意建模为一种无形的、难以言喻的过程，这使我们将其体验为某种根本性的神秘事物，尽管它只是大脑构建的一个模型。

The brain models attention as an intangible, ineffable process, leading us to experience it as something fundamentally mysterious, even though it's just a model constructed by the brain.

但是，库尔特，这到底意味着什么？

But, Curt, what does that even mean?

嗯，注意图式理论与某些预测处理理论的要素一致，这些理论认为大脑是一个预测机器，不断生成关于世界的模型以指导行为。

Well, AST aligns with some elements of predictive processing theories where the brain is seen as a prediction machine constantly generating models of the world to guide behavior.

就意识而言，注意图式理论提出，大脑会生成一个关于自身注意的模型，而这个自我模型正是我们体验为意识的东西。

In the case of consciousness, AST posits that the brain generates a model of itself paying attention, and this self model is what we experience as being conscious.

为了更好地理解这个概念，可以想象如下情景。

To better understand this concept, imagine it like the following.

当你看电影时，你会意识到角色和剧情。

When you're watching a movie, you're aware of the characters and the plot.

然而，你并不一定意识到是投影仪将图像投射到屏幕上。

However, you're not necessarily aware of the projector that's casting the images on the screen.

你大脑的注意图式就像那台投影仪。

Your brain's attention schema is like the projector.

它负责创造这种体验，但却始终被隐藏起来。

It's responsible for creating the experience, but it remains obscured.

它被排除在你的意识觉知之外。

It remains hidden from your conscious awareness.

另一种理解方式是，它就像一束聚光灯，照亮你体验中的某些方面，而让其他部分处于黑暗中。

Another way to think of it is like a spotlight that illuminates certain aspects of your experience while leaving others in the dark.

因此，AST的批评者认为，它并未充分解释意识的定性方面，哲学家称之为质性感受（qualia）。

So critics of AST argue that it doesn't fully account for the qualitative aspects of consciousness, what philosophers call qualia.

然而，AST的支持者认为，它确实提供了一个强大的框架，将注意与觉知整合起来，而这两者正是意识体验的关键组成部分。

However, proponents of AST suggest that it does offer a robust framework for integrating attention and awareness, which are the key components of conscious experience.

电磁场拓扑与边界问题。

EM field topology and the boundary problem.

意识研究中的边界问题是一个尚未充分探索的领域，与更为人熟知的绑定问题密切相关。

The boundary problem in consciousness research is an underexplored area closely related to the better known binding problem.

虽然绑定问题探讨的是如何将分散的神经活动整合为统一的意识体验（见第二层），但边界问题则追问：这些体验为何以及如何具有明确的界限？

Now while the binding problem deals with how disparate neuronal activities coalesce into a unified conscious experience, see layer two, the boundary problem asks why and how these experiences have distinct limits.

为什么我们的自我感和体验会有清晰的边界？

Why does our sense of self and experience have clear edges?

请注意，像鲁珀特·斯皮拉这样的人认为，意识不仅没有所谓的界限，而且反直觉地，我们的意识体验本身也没有界限。

Now note that some like Rupert Spira argue that not only does consciousness not have so called limits, but counterintuitively, does our experience of consciousness have limits.

你可以在这里观看与鲁珀特·斯皮拉的这段播客。

You can see this podcast with Rupert Spira here.

但今天，我想谈谈安德烈亚斯·戈麦斯·埃米森提出的一种理论。

But for today, I wanna talk about a theory created by Andreas Gomez Emilsson.

电磁场拓扑学是一种应对这种界限划分问题的方法。

Electromagnetic field topology is an approach to tackling this delineation issue.

该理论认为，大脑中电磁场的拓扑结构可能为意识体验创造出明确的边界。

This theory suggests that the topology of EM fields in the brain could create hard boundaries for conscious experiences.

这些边界由电磁场的物理和拓扑特性所定义。

These boundaries are defined by the physical and topological properties of EM fields.

该理论基于拓扑分割原则，即大脑电磁场的不同部分被限定在不同的拓扑边界之内。

This theory rests on the principle of topological segmentation, where different segments of the brain's electromagnetic field are enclosed within distinct topological boundaries.

这种分割理论上可以解释为什么我们的意识会感觉被划分为特定的、有界限的体验。

This segmentation could theoretically account for why our consciousness feels segmented into specific bounded experiences.

现在我们来谈谈电磁场拓扑的一些关键特征。

Now let's talk about some key features of EM field topology.

首先，你有一个整体性的封闭结构。

So number one, you have a holistic enclosure.

电磁场会在高神经活动区域周围形成封闭结构，将这些区域与其他脑活动分隔开来。

EM fields create these enclosures around areas of high neuronal activity, segmenting these from the rest of the brain activity.

其次，框架不变性。

Number two, frame invariance.

这些边界在不同的意识状态下并非静态不变。

These boundaries are not static across different states of consciousness.

相反，各种意识状态的本质源于这些边界如何动态地移动、变形和改变。

Instead, the very nature of various states of consciousness stems from how these boundaries dynamically shift, morph, and change.

既有分割出较大意识体验的全局边界，也有影响即时体验内容的局部边界。

There are both global boundaries that segment out larger conscious experiences and local boundaries that affect immediate experiential content.

这种动态交互在我们的意识景观中创造了多种路径，就像改变气球的形状会在其中形成不同的路径一样。

This dynamic interaction allows for a multitude of pathways within our conscious landscape, similar to how altering the shape of a balloon creates different paths within it.

现在第三点，存在下行因果性。

Now number three, there's downward causality.

这些被分割的场可以影响其边界内的神经活动，表明意识与脑活动之间存在双向互动。

The segmented fields can influence neuronal activity within their boundaries, suggesting a two way interaction between consciousness and brain activity.

最后，第四点，无需强涌现。

And lastly, number four, there's no need for strong emergence.

电磁场拓扑及其整体向下的效应均由物理定律所蕴含，更符合弱涌现的形式。

EM field topology and its holistic top down effects are all implied by the laws of physics, aligning more with the form of weak emergence.

这一观点从经典的原子论视角转向了将连续场动力学和拓扑变化视为自然现象的视角。

This perspective shifts from a classical atomistic view to one that appreciates continuous field dynamics and topological changes as natural phenomena.

这种方法不仅探讨了意识的边界问题，还同时深化了我们对不同意识状态（如清醒状态和各种改变状态）如何通过电磁场拓扑结构的变化得以维持或转换的理解。

This approach addresses not only how consciousness is bounded, but simultaneously enhances our understanding of how different conscious states, such as waking and various altered states, could be maintained or shifted through changes in the EM field topology.

顺便说一下，这里的拓扑学是一个术语，指的是映射连接关系，或者你可以简单理解为哪些部分与哪些部分相连。

Now topology, by the way, in this sense, is a fancy term for, quote, unquote, mapping the connectivity, Or you can just think of it as what parts are connected to what.

验证这一理论需要通过模拟和实证研究，聚焦于电磁场在拓扑变形下如何保持一致的洛伦兹不变性。

Testing this theory involves simulations and empirical research focusing on how EM fields maintain consistent Lorentz invariance despite topological deformations.

这表明电磁场独立于观测参考系。

This showcases that the EM fields are independent of observational frame of reference.

解决边界问题或许能告诉我们，为何我们的体验会以这种方式呈现，从而可能催生通过技术手段操控或增强意识的新方法。

Now solving the boundary problem could tell us why our experiences are framed the way they are, potentially leading to new ways to manipulate or enhance consciousness through technological means.

约沙·巴赫的理论。

Joscha Bach's theory.

约沙·巴赫的理论认为，皮质结构源于由动机系统信号和所学习数据结构驱动的奖励学习过程。

Joscha Bach's theory suggests that cortical structures result from reward driven learning based on signals from the motivational system and the structure of the data being learned.

顺便说一下，皮质结构只是对大脑外层——大脑皮层的任何部分的一种更正式的表述。

A cortical structure, by the way, is just a dressed up manner of referring to any part of the cerebral cortex, the outer layer of the brain.

这一理论的核心是指挥者，即所谓的指挥者，它是一种经过训练的计算结构，用于调节其他皮层功能的活动。

Now at the heart of this theory is the conductor, the so called conductor, which is a computational structure trained to regulate the activity of other cortical functionality.

这个指挥者通过改变其他皮层结构的活动和参数化来引导注意力并提供执行功能。

This conductor directs attention and provides executive function by altering the activity and parameterization of other cortical structures.

它将所关注过程的各个方面整合为一种协议，然后用于反思和学习。

It integrates aspects of the processes it attends to into a protocol, which is then used for reflection and learning.

但这一理论中的基本代理是什么？

But what are the elementary agents in this theory?

巴赫将它们描述为大脑皮层中的柱状结构。

Bach describes them as columns in the cerebral cortex.

这些柱状结构通过发育过程中的强化学习自组织成更大的脑区单元。

These columns self organize into larger organizational units of brain areas through developmental reinforcement learning.

这种皮层交响乐的活动高度分散且处于瘫痪状态。

The activity of this cortical orchestra is highly distributed and paralyzed.

它无法被作为一个整体来体验。

It can't be experienced as a whole.

位于前额叶皮层的指挥家协调着整个表演。

The conductor located in the prefrontal cortex coordinates the performance.

它不是一个小人。

It's not a homunculus.

相反，它是一组动态的函数逼近器。

Instead, it's a set of dynamic function approximators.

虽然大多数皮层乐器调节着该生物体与环境之间的动态和互动，但指挥家调节的是整个管弦乐队自身的动态。

While most cortical instruments regulate the dynamics and interactions of this organism with the environment, the conductor regulates the dynamics of the orchestra itself.

你现在可能会想知道，经验是在哪里被整合的？

Now you might be wondering, where does experience get integrated?

巴赫指出，指挥家是唯一发生这种整合的地方。

Bach states that the conductor is the only place where this happens.

未被整合到协议中的信息，无法在系统的反思、言语产生或连贯自我模型的构建中具有功能相关性。

Information not integrated into the protocol can't become functionally relevant to the system's reflection, the production of its utterances, or the generation of its cohesive self model.

那么，如果没有指挥家，会发生什么？

So what happens without the conductor?

巴赫认为，我们的大脑仍然能够执行大部分功能。

Bach asserts that our brain can still perform most of its functions.

我们会成为能够进行协调的感知和运动行为的梦游者，但却缺乏中心性的连贯性与反思能力。

We'd be sleepwalkers capable of coordinated perceptual and motor action, yet lacking central coherence and reflection.

顺便说一下，在盒子理论中，记忆起着重要作用。

Memories play a significant role, by the way, in box theory.

记忆可以通过重新激活皮层配置来生成，这种激活是通过协议中相应位置存储的连接和参数实现的。

Memories can be generated by reactivating a cortical configuration via the links and parameters stored at the corresponding point in the protocol.

对协议的反思性访问本身就是一个可以存储在协议中的过程。

Reflective access to the protocol is itself a process that can be stored in the protocol.

通过访问这一机制，系统可能会记得自己曾经有过经验性的接触。

By accessing this, a system may remember having had experiential access.

所以让我们把这个说得极其简单。

So let's make this extremely simple.

对于现象意识，巴赫认为，一个系统能够访问曾经拥有经验的记忆，这既是必要条件，也是充分条件。

For phenomenal consciousness, Bach claims it's necessary and sufficient that a system can access the memory of having had an experience.

那么体验本身的现实性呢？

What about the actuality of the experience itself?

这无关紧要。

This is irrelevant.

一个说明指挥者、协议与意识体验之间关系的例子，可以通过图表来可视化。

An example illustrating this relationship between the conductor, the protocol, and the conscious experience can be visualized through a graph.

让我们想象一个由节点和边构成的场所，这些节点和边代表你大脑中的皮层区域。

So let's imagine a place with nodes and edges representing your brain's cortical regions.

每个节点都包含特定的信息，比如视觉数据、听觉信号或情绪反应等。

Each node possesses specific information, such as visual data or auditory signals or emotional responses, etcetera.

指挥者——即前额叶皮层——会选择性地采样它们的输出，并将它们压缩成某种紧凑的序列化协议。

The conductor, which is the prefrontal cortex, selectively samples their outputs, compressing them into some compact serialized protocol.

首先，注意你有多少东西是 unaware 的。

Firstly, note how much you're not aware of.

即使此刻，你周围也存在着空气。

Even right now, there's the air around you.

也许你脚上穿着鞋子或袜子，或者如果你坐在地上，脚底可能还沾着一些泥土。

There's perhaps your shoes or your socks or if you're on the ground, maybe some dirt underneath your soles.

还有一些你忽略的背景信息。

There's some background that you're ignoring.

也许有木头的气味，或者咖啡、橙汁的气味，又或者背景中有人在咳嗽。

There's maybe the scent of wood or there's maybe the scent of coffee or of orange juice or someone else coughing in the background.

你并没有有意识地察觉到所有这些处理过程。

You're not consciously aware of all of this processing.

指挥者采样这些输出，生成一个压缩的表示，这就是你坐在这里听播客的状态。

The conductor samples these outputs creating a compressed representation, which is just you sitting down listening to a podcast.

当你回忆这段经历时，你并不是在访问原始的感官数据，而是访问这个压缩后的协议。

When you recall this experience, you're not accessing the raw sensory data, but you're accessing instead this compressed protocol.

你回忆播客的主观体验，是指挥者重新激活并稍作重新解读这个协议的过程。

Your subjective experience of remembering the podcast is the conductor reactivating and slightly reinterpreting this protocol.

屏幕上像素的质性体验，或者你所感受到的好奇心，并不是存储下来的具体属性。

The qualia of the pixels on the screen or the curiosity that you have isn't a stored property.

相反，这是你的大脑在重建记忆时产生的涌现性解释。

Instead, it's an emergent interpretation as your brain reconstructs the memory.

根据巴赫的说法，这解释了为什么我们的记忆通常感觉不如原始体验那么生动。

This, according to Bach, explains why our memory often feels less vivid than the original experience.

我们所依据的是一个压缩后的协议，而不是原始的感觉数据。

We are working from a compressed protocol, not raw sensory data.

好的。

Okay.

但这和困难问题有什么关系呢？

But how does this have anything to do with the hard problem?

想想经典的哲学僵尸思想实验，你可能听说过，我们想象一个在生理上与人类完全相同的存在。

Consider the classical philosophical zombie, that thought experiment that you've heard of, where we imagine a being physically identical to a human.

然而，这个存在缺乏意识体验。

However, this being will lack conscious experience.

在巴赫的框架中，这个概念变得毫无意义。

In Bach's framework, this concept becomes incoherent.

想象两个完全相同的神经网络，一个有意识，另一个是僵尸。

Imagine two identical neural networks, one conscious and one a zombie.

两者都拥有相同的导体机制，将信息采样并压缩成一种协议。

Both have the same conductor mechanism, sampling and compressing information into a protocol.

两者都能通过访问和解释这一协议来报告自己的体验。

Both can report on their experiences by accessing and interpreting this protocol.

在巴赫的框架中，有意识的系统并没有某种额外的不可言说的属性。

For Bach, the conscious system doesn't have some extra ineffable property.

它的意识体验恰恰就是它访问并报告自身协议的能力。

Its experience of consciousness is precisely its ability to access and report on its protocol.

这与之等同。

It's equivalent to that.

因此，僵尸系统由于与之完全相同，必然也具备相同的能力。

So the zombie system, being identical to this, would necessarily have the same ability.

当我们认识到这种‘有意识的感觉’本身是一种建构，是大脑通过解释其自身协议而讲述的一个所谓故事时，意识的‘困难问题’便迎刃而解了。

The seemingly hard problem of what it feels like to be conscious dissolves when we recognize that this feeling itself is a construct, a so called story the brain tells itself by interpreting its own protocol.

没有与信息处理并行的独立体验发生。

There's no separate experience happening alongside the information processing.

体验就是处理过程。

The experience is the processing.

那么，根据巴赫的说法，现象意识是什么？

So what is phenomenal consciousness according to Bach?

根据巴赫的说法，感受质是什么？

What is qualia according to Bach?

感受是什么？

What is what are feelings?

蓝色感是什么？

What is blueness?

对巴赫而言，现象意识被理解为我们前额叶皮层最近一次关注内容的最新记忆。

To Bach, the phenomenal consciousness is understood as the most recent memory of what our prefrontal cortex attended to.

意识体验并不是对世界或内在空间的体验。

Conscious experience isn't an experience of being in the world or an inner space.

这是一种记忆。

It's a memory.

它是超过50个脑区生成的梦境，反映在单一区域的协议中。

It's the recognition of a dream generated by more than 50 brain areas reflected in the protocol of a single region.

通过将注意力指向自身的协议，指挥家能够存储并重现自己拥有意识体验的记忆。

By directing attention to its own protocol, the conductor can store and recreate memories of its own experience being conscious.

这种观点解决了在实现人工智能意识时面临的许多困难。

This perspective resolves much of the difficulty in specifying an AI implementation of consciousness.

只需要实现一个能够记住曾经历过某事并能报告该记忆的系统即可。

It's necessary and sufficient to realize a system that remembers having had experienced something and can report on that memory.

巴赫认为，我们的意识体验并不是对某种物理现实的直接感知。

Bach suggests that our conscious experience isn't a direct perception of some physical reality.

不是。

No.

相反，它是一种梦境，是我们大脑构建的模型，用以表征和与周围世界互动。

Instead, it's a dream, a model constructed by our brain to represent and interact with the world around us.

唐纳德·霍夫曼的理论：认知科学家唐纳德·霍夫曼认为，我们的视觉感知通常并不是对终极现实的真实反映。

Donald Hoffman's Theory Donald Hoffman, a cognitive scientist, argues that our visual perceptions, in general, aren't veridical representations of ultimate reality.

为什么？

Why?

因为进化选择的是繁殖适应性，而不是对本体真理的接触。

Because evolution selects for fitness to reproduce, and not for access to ontological truth.

这一点在他的论文《适应性胜过真实》中有详细阐述，链接在描述中。

This is outlined in his fitness beats truth paper linked in the description.

想想这个。

Consider this.

一个把兔子看作美味食物的原始人，比一个将其视为复杂分子结构的人更有可能生存下来。

A caveman who sees a rabbit as tasty food is more likely to survive than one who perceives it as a complex molecular structure.

当然，这前提是分子结构才是更真实的存在。

This, of course, presumes that the molecular structure is what's more real.

霍夫曼将我们的感知比作计算机界面，比如桌面上的一个文件夹。

Hoffman likens our perceptions to computer interfaces, such as a folder that's on your desktop.

你现在看到这个文件夹，会想：电脑里真的有一个小小的文件夹吗？

Now you see that folder and you think, is there actually a tiny folder inside your computer?

没有。

No.

它只是对复杂二进制代码的一种有用简化。

It's just a useful simplification for complex binary code.

同样，霍夫曼认为，进化塑造了我们的感知，使其成为简单的幻觉，以帮助我们应对世界。

Similarly, Hoffman argues that evolution shaped our perceptions as simplistic illusions to help us navigate the world.

在他职业生涯的后期，霍夫曼提出，时空本身并不是客观现实。

Later in his career, Hoffman suggests that space time itself isn't objective reality.

它只是我们界面的一部分。

It's just a part of our interface.

对一些物理学家来说，这非常显而易见，因为我们尚未找到将广义相对论与量子力学统一的方法，而许多尝试都假设时空是涌现出来的结构。

To some physicists, this is quite obvious and straightforward because we don't have a method of reconciling general relativity with quantum mechanics and several of the attempts to do so posit structures where space time emerges.

然而，一些其他物理学家会说，时空不是基本的，并不意味着时空比你的车更虚幻，因为你的车也不是基本的。

Some other physicists, however, would say that space time not being fundamental doesn't mean space time is any more of an illusion than your car is an illusion because your car isn't fundamental.

那么，根据唐纳德·霍夫曼和他的合作者沙坦·普拉克什，什么是真实的呢？

So what is real according to Donald Hoffman and his collaborator, Shaitaan Prakesh?

意识。

Consciousness.

他们提出了意识现实主义，认为客观世界由意识主体及其体验构成。

They propose conscious realism, which states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences.

不是粒子在形成大脑时产生意识，而是意识创造了时空和物体，包括我们所感知的大脑。

Instead of particles creating consciousness when they form brains, consciousness creates space time and objects, including what we perceive as a brain.

现在让我们思考一下，这与其他理论相比如何？

Now let's think, how does this compare to other theories?

让我们逐一分析。

Let's break it down.

我们有乔斯查·巴赫的皮层指挥家理论，认为意识是我们前额叶皮层所关注内容的记忆。

We have Joscha Bach's cortical conductor theory, which sees consciousness as a memory of what our prefrontal cortex attended to.

霍夫曼持不同意见，认为意识是根本的，因此他们在现实的本质上产生了分歧。

Hoffman disagrees, saying consciousness is fundamental, and so they diverge on the nature of reality itself.

巴赫仍然在物理主义框架内运作，而霍夫曼则礼貌地把物理主义扔进了垃圾桶。

Bach still operates within a physicalist framework, while Hoffman, politely, throws physicalism down the garbage chute.

迈克尔·格拉齐亚诺的注意图式理论认为，意识是大脑对其自身注意力的模型。

Michael Graziano's attention schema theory views consciousness as the brain's model of its own attention.

现在，霍夫曼会说，这恰恰弄反了。

Now Hoffman would say that this gets it backward.

对他而言，意识并不是由大脑产生的。

For him, consciousness isn't created by the brain.

大脑是由意识创造的。

The brain is created by consciousness.

这就是唐纳德·霍夫曼说‘神经元在被感知之前并不存在’时的意思。

So this is what Donald Hoffman means when he says that neurons don't exist until perceived.

贝尔纳多·卡斯特鲁普的分析性唯心主义与霍夫曼的观点更为接近。

Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism aligns more closely with Hoffman.

他们都将意识视为根本的。

They both see consciousness as fundamental.

关键区别在于，卡斯特鲁普假设了一种普遍意识，它将自身分割为各个个体心智，而霍夫曼则描述了一个相互作用的意识代理网络。

The key difference is that Kastrup posits a universal consciousness that segments itself into individual minds, while Hoffman describes a network of interacting conscious agents.

海德格尔的‘此在’概念强调意识是对世界的主动参与，霍夫曼会同意这一点。

Heidegger's concept of Dasein emphasizes consciousness as active engagement with the world, and Hoffman would agree.

然而，霍夫曼会补充说，我们所参与的这个世界本身也是意识的建构。

However, Hoffman would add that this world that we're engaging with is itself a construct of consciousness.

海德格尔断言，此在（或人类存在，你可以这样理解）与世界是不可分割且相互构成的，二者在本体论上没有优先性。

Heidegger asserts that Dasein, or human existence, you can think of it like that, and the world are inseparable and co constitutive, with neither having ontological priority.

这与霍夫曼的意识现实主义相矛盾，后者赋予意识以本体论上的优先性。

This contradicts Hoffman's conscious realism, which gives ontological priority to consciousness.

安德烈·加尔梅斯·埃米尔森的电磁场拓扑理论试图解决意识的边界问题。

Andrey Galmes Emilsson's EM field topology theory tackles the boundary problem of consciousness.

霍夫曼的理论完全绕过了这个问题，因为他在根本上将意识视为基本的。

Hoffman's theory sidesteps this issue entirely by making consciousness fundamental.

如果这些物理过程本身也是意识的建构，那就无需解释物理过程如何产生有界限的意识体验。

There's no need to explain how physical processes create bounded conscious experiences if those physical processes are themselves constructs of consciousness.

好的。

Okay.

现在你可能会想，库尔特，所有那些将心理状态与大脑活动相关联的证据该怎么解释呢？

Now you might be thinking, Curt, what the heck about all the evidence that correlates mental states with brain activity?

霍夫曼确实有一个答案。

And Hoffman does have an answer.

这些相关性之所以存在，是因为意识创造了大脑活动。

These correlations are fomented because consciousness creates brain activity.

所以，确实存在非常直接的相关性，只是因果关系的方向相反。

So yes, there's quite straightforwardly a correlation, it's just that the causation goes in the other direction.

尼尔·拉哈夫的相对性意识：如果意识不是一种绝对属性，而是一种依赖于观察者参考系的相对属性呢？

Nir Lahav's Relativistic Consciousness What if consciousness isn't an absolute property, but a relative one that depends on the observer's frame of reference?

这一观点是拉哈夫理论的核心，旨在弥合功能意识与现象意识之间的解释鸿沟。

This idea is at the heart of Lahav's theory, which aims to bridge the explanatory gap between functional and phenomenal consciousness.

拉哈夫从两个关键假设出发：第一，意识具有某种物理性解释或广义物理主义；第二，相对性原理即使在意识领域也成立。

Lahav starts with two key assumptions: consciousness, number one, has some kind of physical explanation or broad physicalism, and then number two, that the principle of relativity holds true even for consciousness.

好的。

Okay.

但这在实践中意味着什么？

But what does this mean in practice?

就像爱因斯坦那样思考。

Nearest thinking like Einstein.

你从公设出发，然后观察它们的推论。

You start with postulates and then you see their consequences.

这些推论暗示了认知参考系的概念，即由认知系统的动态所决定的视角。

The consequences suggest the concept of cognitive frames of reference, that is perspectives determined by a cognitive systems dynamics.

拉哈夫随后建立了意识人类爱丽丝（假设）与一个声称缺乏现象意识的假想僵尸AI系统鲍勃之间的等价原理，两者具有相同认知结构。

Lahav then establishes an equivalence principle between a conscious human, Alice, let's say, and a purported zombie AI system, say Bob, with the same cognitive structure but supposedly lacking phenomenal consciousness in the latter case.

如果爱丽丝和鲍勃获得相同的测量结果和行为输出，相对性原理要求它们必须遵循相同的物理定律。

If Alice and Bob obtain the same measurements and behavioral outputs, the relativity principle dictates that they must have the same physical laws in force.

这引导我们得出一个反直觉的结论：尽管鲍勃被假定为僵尸，他也必须具有现象意识。

This leads us to the unintuitive conclusion that Bob, despite being assumed to be a zombie, must also have phenomenal consciousness.

好的。

Okay.

假设你正在看一场日落。

So let's say you're looking at a sunset.

从你的第一人称视角，你会体验到色彩和情感。

From your first person perspective, you experience colors and emotions.

一位神经科学家观察你的大脑时，会看到特定的神经放电模式。

A neuroscientist observing your brain would see certain patterns of neural firing.

这两种视角是在描述同一种现象吗？

Are these two perspectives describing the same phenomenon?

根据拉哈夫的说法，是的。

According to Lahav, yes.

它们只是来自不同认知参考框架的不同测量方式。

They're just different measurements from different cognitive frames of reference.

这些是同一底层现象的不同视角，就像辐射在某种视角下可见而在另一种视角下不可见一样。

These are different perspectives of the same underlying phenomena akin to how unra radiation appears from one perspective but not another.

但等等，你可能会问。

But wait, you ask.

库尔特，意识难道不是私密的，对外部观察者不可触及的吗？

Curt, doesn't consciousness feel private and inaccessible to outside observers?

拉哈夫解释说，这是由于第一人称和第三人称视角下可测量的差异造成的。

Lahav explains this is due to the difference in measurements possible from first person and third person perspectives.

在认知系统内部，表征具有因果力量，并被体验为质性感受。

From within a cognitive system, representations have causal power and are experienced as qualia.

然而，当你从外部观察时，我们只能测量物理基础。

However, when you're from the outside, we can only measure physical substrates.

好的。

Okay.

那么自由意志呢？

So what about free will?

尼尔·拉哈夫可能会说，自由意志是相对的，这统一了决定论与自由意志论。

Nir Lahav may say that it's relative and that this unifies determinism and libertarian free will.

但让我们想想我刚才说的话。

But let's think about what I just said.

现象意识并不是真正私密的。

Phenomenal consciousness isn't truly private.

它只是需要正确的参照框架才能直接测量。

It just requires the right frame of reference to measure directly.

因此，拉哈夫的方法旨在通过表明物理模式和现象属性是同一枚硬币的两面来消解困难问题。

Thus, Lahav's approach aims to dissolve the hard problem by showing that the physical patterns and the phenomenal properties are two sides of the same coin.

它们是同一现象根据观察者认知视角所呈现的不同方式。

They're different ways the same phenomenon appears based on the observer's cognitive perspective.

但这难道不是把解释的负担又推后了一步吗？

But doesn't this just push the explanatory burden back a step?

我们不是现在必须解释意识如何在不同参照框架中组合并演化成复杂的生物形式，而不是解释意识如何从非意识物质中产生吗？

Instead of explaining how consciousness emerges from nonconscious matter, don't we now have to explain how it combines and evolves into complex life forms across different frames of reference?

拉哈夫认为，他的理论为实证研究开辟了新的途径。

Lahav argues that his theory opens up new avenues for empirical research.

是的。

Yes.

因此，他提出了可检验的实验，以探究意识的最小条件，以及这些条件如何与睡眠、麻醉或其他改变状态相关。

So he proposes experiences to test predictions about the minimal conditions for consciousness and how these relate to sleep or to anesthesia or other altered states.

顺便说一下，改变状态在‘意识冰山’的描述中，第一层就已经探讨过了。

Altered states, by the way, were explored in layer one, link in the description of this consciousness iceberg.

例如，尼尔·拉哈夫可能会寻找在认知状态下特定认知空间的激活，以及在无意识状态下的缺失。

For instance, Nir Lahav may look for activation of specific cognitive spaces during cognitive states and their absence during unconscious states.

好的。

Okay.

但这个理论与其他理论相比如何？

But how does this theory compare to others?

嗯，与唐纳德·霍夫曼相比，由于拉哈夫的理论将意识视为依赖于观察者参考框架的相对属性，这与霍夫曼的意识实在论形成鲜明对立。

Well, with Donald Hoffman, since Lahav's theory posits consciousness as a relative property dependent on observers' frames of reference, it contradicts sharply with Hoffman's conscious realism.

霍夫曼认为意识是根本性的，并创造了我们所感知的现实，而拉哈夫则认为意识是一种物理现象，其表现形式因视角而异。

While Hoffman argues consciousness is fundamental and creates our perceived reality, Lahav suggests consciousness is a physical phenomenon that appears different based on perspective.

考虑霍夫曼的桌面比喻。

Consider Hoffman's desktop analogy.

霍夫曼可能会说，电脑、它所在的桌子以及你周围的房间都只是意识的构造，但洛哈夫会反驳说：不是这样的。

Hoffman may say that the computer, the desk it's on, and the room all around you are just constructs of consciousness, whereas, the love would argue, no.

这些是真实的物理对象，但我们对它们的意识体验取决于我们的认知参照框架。

These are real physical objects, but our conscious experience of them depends on our cognitive frame of reference.

那伯纳多·卡斯特鲁普呢？

But what about Bernardo Kastrup?

卡斯特鲁普主张一种普遍意识，它被分割成各个个体心智。

Kastrup posits a universal consciousness that segments into individual minds.

相比之下，洛哈夫将意识扎根于物理的认知系统中。

Lahav in contrast grounds consciousness in physical cognitive systems.

卡斯特鲁普认为意识是根本的，而洛哈夫则认为意识是一种涌现属性，尽管它从不同视角看会有所不同。

Where Kastrup sees consciousness as primary, Lahav sees it as an emergent property, albeit one that looks different from various perspectives.

约什卡·巴赫的皮层指挥家理论将意识视为前额叶皮层所关注内容的记忆，这一观点更接近洛哈夫，而非霍夫曼或卡斯特鲁普。

Joscha Bach's cortical conductor theory views consciousness as a memory of what our prefrontal cortex attended to, and this aligns more closely with Lahav than with Hoffman or Kastrup.

巴赫和拉哈夫都大致在物理主义框架内运作，尽管拉哈夫会扩展物理主义的定义，加入相对性的维度，暗示巴赫所描述的所谓‘记忆’可能在不同的认知参照框架下呈现出不同的样子。

Both Bach and Lahav operate broadly within a physicalist framework, Though Lahav would expand what physicalism is, adding the dimension of relativity, suggesting that the, quote, unquote, memory Bach describes might appear differently from various cognitive frames of reference.

让我们明确一点。

So let's be clear.

我们就来想想一个苹果。

Let's just think about an apple.

霍夫曼会说，那个苹果并不存在于物理实体中。

Hoffman would say that that apple doesn't exist as a physical object.

它只是意识的一种建构，可以说是我们的物种特有的现实界面中的一个图标。

It's a construct of consciousness and icon, if you will, in our species specific interface with reality.

而卡斯特鲁普则会看着那个苹果说，这个苹果是普遍意识的一种显现，由一个所谓的‘他者’——也就是你——所体验到的这种普遍意识。

Whereas Kastrup would look at that apple and say, that apple is a manifestation within universal consciousness experienced by an individual, quote unquote, alter, which is you, of this universal consciousness.

巴赫则会将你的体验描述为你的前额叶皮层对某些感官输入和概念关联的注意所形成的记忆，从而产生了苹果存在的错觉。

Bach would instead describe your experience as a memory of your prefrontal cortex attending to certain sensory inputs and conceptual associations giving the impression of the apple.

而拉哈夫会说，苹果是一个物理实体，但你对其红色的意识体验是一种依赖于你认知参照框架的测量。

Now Lahav would say that the apple is a physical object, but your conscious experience of its redness is a measurement that depends on your cognitive frame of reference.

从另一个视角来看，比如一位神经科学家观察你的大脑时，同样的现象可能仅仅表现为神经活动的模式。

From another frame, say, a neuroscientist observing your brain, the same phenomenon might just appear as patterns of neural activity.

现在有一些值得思考的问题：海德格尔的‘向死而生’观念如何影响你对意识及其与时间关系的理解？

Now some questions to ponder are: How does Heidegger's idea of being toward death influence your understanding of consciousness and its relation to time?

注意图式理论对人工意识的发展可能带来哪些启示？

What implications might attention schema theory have for developing artificial consciousness?

理解边界问题如何改变我们研究意识状态改变的方式？

How does understanding the boundary problem change our approach to studying altered states of consciousness?

巴赫的理论在哪些方面挑战了传统意义上对质性的理解？

In what ways does Bach's theory challenge the notion of qualia as traditionally understood?

霍夫曼的理论如何解释不同个体之间的共享经验与共识现实？

How does Hoffman's theory account for shared experiences and consensus reality among different individuals?

拉哈夫的相对论意识理论是否最终弥合了物理主义与非物理主义心灵理论之间的鸿沟？

Does Lahav's theory of relativistic consciousness finally bridge the gap between physicalist and nonphysicalist theories of mind?

你好。

Hi.

如果你是第一次访问这个频道，我的名字是库尔特·杰蒙格尔，是《万物理论》节目的主持人。

If you're new to this channel, my name is Curt Jaimungal, the host of theories of everything.

我的目标是引领物理学、哲学、人工智能与意识交汇处的对话。

My mission here is to lead the conversation at the intersection of physics, philosophy, AI, and consciousness.

如果你和我一样热衷于探索生命中最重大的未解之谜，我诚邀你成为频道会员。

If you share my excitement for exploring life's largest unanswered questions, I invite you to become a channel member.

你将提前数天甚至数周获得新剧集的观看权限，还能享受仅限会员的深度独家内容。

You'll gain early access to new episodes, sometimes days or even weeks prior to anyone else, plus members only exclusive content that goes even deeper.

作为会员，你还会获得一个专属徽章，让你在评论区脱颖而出，并在回复时享有最高优先权。

As a member, you'll also receive a unique badge to stand out in the comments and top priority when I respond.

最重要的是，你的支持帮助我邀请世界顶尖研究者进行深入对话，让我们始终站在前沿。

Most importantly, your support helps me bring world leading researchers for in-depth conversations that keep us at the bleeding edge.

加入链接在描述栏和屏幕上。

The link to join is in the description and on screen.

感谢观看，我期待与你继续这段旅程。

Thank you for watching, and I look forward to our continued journey together.

我们在会员区见。

See you on the member side.

现在，当我们进入第四层时，我们正站在一些最具雄心的理论的边缘。

And now as we enter layer four, we find ourselves at the precipice of some of the most ambitious theories yet.

在这一层中，我们将探索道格拉斯·霍夫施塔特的奇异循环以及自我指涉的悖论。

In this layer, we'll explore Douglas Hofstadter's strange loops as well as the paradox of self reference.

我们还将探索彭罗斯的量子意识理论。

We'll also explore Penrose's quantum theory of consciousness.

我们还将探讨克里斯托弗·兰根具有挑战性的CTMU理论，并简要涉及约翰乔·麦克法登的电磁场意识理论以及大卫·查尔莫斯的延展心智假说。

We'll also explore Christopher Langan's challenging CTMU, and we'll touch on Johnjoe McFadden's electromagnetic field theory of consciousness, as well as David Chalmers extended mind hypothesis.

还有伊恩·麦吉尔克里斯特的关系性双面一元论。

Oh, and Ian McGilchrist's relational dual aspect monism.

让我们开始探索意识冰山的第四层。

Let's begin our journey into layer four of the consciousness iceberg.

道格拉斯·霍夫施塔特的奇异循环。

Douglas Hofstadter's strange loops.

道格拉斯·霍夫施塔特的奇怪循环是他在其普利策奖获奖著作《哥德尔、埃舍尔、巴赫》中深入探讨的概念。

Douglas Hofstadter's strange loops is a concept he meticulously explores in his Pulitzer prize winning book, Godel, Escher, Bach.

奇怪循环是一种框架，用于理解自我意识和意识如何通过大脑对世界和自身的建模而产生。

Strange loops is a framework for understanding the emergence of self awareness and consciousness from how the brain models the world and itself.

核心观点是，意识源于大脑内部的自指反馈循环，系统通过在其对世界的模型中表征自身而意识到自身。

The core idea is that consciousness comes from self referential feedback loops within the brain, where a system becomes aware of itself by representing itself within its own model of the world.

好的。

Okay.

在整个意识冰山中，你会听到‘自我’这个词出现无数次，所以请准备好迎接一些杰米·武的表达。

You'll hear the term self far too many times to count throughout this entire iceberg, so expect some Jaimie Vu.

想象一台摄像机对准一台播放其自身输出画面的电视屏幕。

Imagine a video camera pointed at a TV screen displaying its own output.

会发生什么？

What happens?

你会看到无限递归的图像，层层嵌套，形成一种自指的视觉表现。

Well, you get an infinite regress of images within images, each of them nested within the other one, creating a visual representation of self reference.

霍夫施塔特认为，大脑中也发生着类似的过程：最初指代外部对象和外部事件的符号与表征，开始反过来指向系统自身，从而形成一个循环。

Hofstadter argues that a similar process occurs in the brain where symbols and representations initially referring to objects that are external and also events that are external begin to refer back to the system itself, creating a loop.

这就是他所说的奇怪循环。

So this is what he calls a strange loop.

他提出，这种奇怪循环是自我意识以及‘我’——引号中的‘我’——出现的关键。

He proposes that this strange loop is the key to self awareness and the emergence of an I, a quote unquote I.

因此，至少对我来说，这更像是对自我意识的解释，而非意识本身。

Because of this, this is more of an explanation to me at least of self consciousness rather than consciousness itself.

现在，‘哥德尔、埃舍尔、巴赫’中的‘哥德尔’指的是库尔特·贾伊曼格尔，不是另一个不太酷的库尔特·贾伊曼格尔——真正厉害的那个库尔特，他证明了：一个足够复杂的形式系统（这里需要加个星号，因为其中有一些技术性前提），可以包含既为真又在系统内部无法证明的自指语句。

Now that girdle in the girdle escher Bach refers to Curt Jaimungal, not Curt Jaimungal, the other actually cool Curt, who demonstrated that a formal system of sufficient complexity, you have to put an asterisk there because there's some formalities to that, can contain self referential statements that are both true and unprovable within the system itself.

这些所谓的‘哥德尔语句’揭示了形式系统的内在局限性，而霍夫施塔特认为，这为意识的本质提供了一些线索。

These quote unquote girdle sentences demonstrate the inherent limitations of formal systems and according to Hofstadter gives some clue to the nature of consciousness.

为什么这么说？

How so?

因为神经元相互连接的网络及其以层级和递归方式处理信息的能力，在霍夫施塔特看来，是一种能够生成类似哥德尔语句的形式系统。

Because the network of interconnected neurons and its ability to process information in a hierarchical and recursive manner is seen by Hofstadter as a formal system capable of generating girdle like sentences.

这些是那些指向系统自身的自指语句，形成了一个产生自我意识的循环。

These are those self referential statements that point back to the system itself, creating a loop that gives rise to self awareness.

好的。

Okay.

相当复杂。

Quite complicated.

那么，霍夫施塔特的观点与我们在这一冰山中遇到的其他观点相比如何呢？

So let's say, how does Hofstadter's idea compare to some of the others that we've encountered in this iceberg?

佛教对意识的看法会认为，自我是一种幻觉——至少某些流派如此认为，这似乎与霍夫施塔特的奇怪循环相矛盾，因为奇怪循环暗示着一种真实但涌现的自我。

Well, the Buddhist view of consciousness would say that the self is an illusion, at least according to some schools, and that may seem to contradict Hofstadter's strange loop, which suggests that there's a real, albeit emergent self.

尽管奇怪循环可以被理解为一种创造所谓稳定自我幻觉的过程，而非一个真实且不变的实体，但霍夫施塔特的这种解释仍主张一个涌现的自我，这与佛教的‘无我’（Anatta）观点相冲突。

While a strange loop could be seen as a process that creates the, quote unquote, illusion of the stable self rather than a real and unchanging entity, this interpretation, the Hofstadter one, still posits an emergent self, which is at odds with the Buddhist view of Anata or no self.

那它与全局工作空间理论相比如何呢？

How about how it compares to Global Workspace Theory?

这一理论认为，当信息在大脑中广泛广播到一个全局工作空间时，意识便产生了。

Well, that theory suggests consciousness comes about when information is broadcast widely to a global workspace in the brain.

这个全局工作空间通过提供对来自大脑各个区域信息的访问，可以被视为形成奇怪循环的必要条件。

This global workspace, by providing access to information from various brain regions, could be seen as a necessary condition for a strange loop to form.

这意味着，虽然全局工作空间理论并不必然包含奇怪循环，但它可能为该循环的发生提供了神经学基础。

This means that while global workspace theory doesn't entail the strange loop, it may give the neurological grounding for the loop to occur.

另一方面，泛心论认为意识是物理世界中一种基本且无处不在的特征，这种观点既可能与霍夫施塔特的奇怪循环相容，也可能与之矛盾。

Panpsychism on the other hand, which is that view that consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world, could be seen as both compatible and contradictory to Hofstadter's strange loops.

另一方面，如果意识源于物质的基本属性，那么大脑中的自我指涉循环就可以被视为这种基本意识的一种特定表现形式。

On the other hand, if consciousness comes from fundamental properties of matter, then the self referential loops in the brain could be seen as a particular manifestation of this fundamental consciousness.

那么，它如何与约翰·韦尔瓦克的‘相关性实现’理论相关呢？该理论强调心智不断判断在任何特定情境中什么是重要的过程。

How about how it relates to John Vervaeke's theory of relevance realization, the one that emphasizes the mind's constant process of determining what's important in any given situation?

奇怪循环可以被看作是一种高级别的相关性实现，即系统自身对其世界模型变得重要。

A strange loop could be seen as a high level relevance realization where the system itself becomes relevant to its own model of the world.

系统通过在其自身模型中表征自己，从而认识到自身的存在和能动性。

The system by representing itself within its own model recognizes its own existence and agency.

这仅仅是我的一些推测。

Now this is merely speculation on my part.

还有消除性唯物主义。

Then there's eliminative materialism.

试着快速说五遍。

Try saying that five times fast.

这种观点认为，我们对心智的常识性理解从根本上是错误的，意识是一种幻觉，丹尼尔·丹内特等人曾提出或至少主张过这一点。

That's the view that our common sense understanding of the mind is fundamentally flawed and that consciousness is an illusion that people like Daniel Dennett state or at least stated.

丹尼尔会认为，大脑中并不存在笛卡尔式的剧场。

Daniel would have argued that there's no Cartesian theater in the brain.

没有一个中心场所容纳意识，相反，丹尼尔·丹内特可能认为意识是分布式脑过程的产物，无需任何自指循环。

There's no central place where consciousness resides, and instead, Daniel Dennett may see consciousness as a product of distributed brain processes without any need for self referential loops.

现在，对侯世达理论的主要批评之一是：你究竟该如何检验它？

Now one of the main criticisms of Hofstadter's theory is how the heck do you test this?

自指循环更像是一种概念框架，而非可检验的假设。

Strange loops are more of a conceptual framework than a testable hypothesis.

另一个批评是，道格拉斯·侯世达的理论并未充分解决意识的定性方面，哲学家称之为质性感受。

Another criticism is that Douglas Hofstadter's theory doesn't fully address the qualitative aspects of consciousness, what philosophers call qualia.

虽然奇怪的循环可能解释了系统如何变得自我意识，但它们无法解释这种自我意识为何伴随着主观体验。

While strange loops might explain how a system becomes self aware, they don't explain why this self awareness is accompanied by subjective experience.

罗杰·彭罗斯的协调客观还原理论：罗杰·彭罗斯，这位数学物理学家和诺贝尔奖得主，在他的著作《皇帝新脑》中提出，意识源于量子过程。

Roger Penrose's Orchestrated Objective Reduction Roger Penrose, the mathematical physicist and Nobel laureate, argues in his book The Emperor's New Mind that consciousness comes from quantum processes.

但具体在哪儿呢？

But where specifically?

又是如何具体发生的呢？

And how specifically?

后来当斯图尔特·哈梅罗夫登场时，这些问题才部分得到解答。

Well, some of that came about later when Stuart Hameroff entered the picture.

斯图尔特认为，这发生在微管中，当然。

Stuart says it's within microtubules, of course.

这些是细胞内，尤其是神经元内的微小结构。

Now these are tiny structures inside cells and neurons in particular.

彭罗斯提出，这些量子计算负责意识体验中那些不可计算的方面。

Penrose posits that these quantum computations are responsible for the non computable aspects of conscious experience.

还记得我刚才提到的哥德尔吗？

Remember Godel that I just talked about?

对彭罗斯来说，哥德尔表明，我们心智的理解能力中存在着某种非计算性、非形式化的东西。

To Penrose, Godel showed that there's something non computational, non formal going on with our mind's ability to understand.

尤其是这种理解能力。

It's this ability to understand in particular.

这大致是因为我们能够理解或看出哥德尔句子是真实的，尽管形式系统本身无法证明它。

This is roughly because we can understand or we can see that the girdle sentence is true even though the formal system itself can't prove it.

好的。

Okay.

那么回到微管。

So back to microtubules.

微管是由微管蛋白组成的圆柱形聚合物。

Microtubules are the cylindrical polymers of the protein tubulin.

尽管它们几乎存在于所有细胞中，但在神经元中尤其丰富。

Even though they're pretty much found in all cells, they are particularly abundant in neurons.

但它们有什么作用呢？

But what do they do?

它们在维持细胞结构、运输分子和调控细胞分裂中发挥作用。

They play a role in maintaining the cell structure, transporting molecules, and regulating cell division.

好的。

Okay.

那有什么了不起的呢？

So what's the big deal?

彭罗斯和哈梅罗夫提出，这些微管内的微管蛋白分子可以处于叠加态。

Well, Penrose and Hammarov suggest that the tubulin molecules within these microtubules can exist in a superposition of states.

很多人谈论微管，但实际上他们应该谈论的是微管蛋白。

So many people talk about microtubules, but actually they should be talking about tubulin.

这种叠加态是量子力学的典型特征。

Now this superposition is a hallmark of quantum mechanics.

这些叠加态可以被维持。

These superpositions can be sustained.

但能持续多久呢？

But for how long?

嗯，必须足够长，才能进行有意义的量子计算。

Well, it has to be sufficiently long enough for there to be some meaningful quantum computation.

彭罗斯提出，当这些微管蛋白中的量子叠加态达到由引力效应决定的某个阈值时，就会发生一种称为‘协调客观还原’的不可计算过程。

Penrose proposes that when these quantum superpositions in the tubulin reach a certain threshold determined by gravitational effects, a non computable process called Orchestrated Objective Reduction occurs.

他推测，这些事件就是意识体验的瞬间，为量子过程与意识之间架起了一座桥梁。

He suggested that these events are moments of conscious experience providing a bridge between the quantum process and consciousness.

‘协调’这一部分指的是，量子计算是由大脑的电活动或整体活动所协调的。

The orchestrated part of Orchestrated Objective Reduction just means that the quantum computations are orchestrated by the brain's electrical activity, or activity in general.

但这种协调究竟起到了什么作用？

But what does this orchestration do?

它起到同步不同神经元中微管活动的作用。

It acts to synchronize the activity of microtubules across different neurons.

彭罗斯和哈默罗夫认为，这种同步活动产生了统一的意识体验。

Penrose and Hammarov argue that this synchronized activity gives rise to a unified conscious experience.

罗杰·彭罗斯并没有明确支持泛心论，但他的理论可以被视为与之相容。

Now Roger Penrose doesn't explicitly endorse panpsychism, but his theory can be seen as compatible with it.

为什么这么说？

How so?

如果意识源于量子过程，而这些量子过程在某种程度上是宇宙的基本组成部分，那么意识可能就是现实的一种基本特征，以某种形式存在于所有物质中。

If consciousness arises or comes about from quantum processes, and these quantum processes are somehow fundamental to the universe, then it could be that consciousness is a fundamental feature of reality that is present in some form in all matter.

这与泛心论的观点一致，即意识不仅限于大脑，而是宇宙本身的一种属性。

This aligns with the panpsychist view that consciousness is not limited to brains, but instead is a property of the universe itself.

我之所以说它‘可能’相容，但并非‘确实’相容，是因为对彭罗斯而言，意识并不是存在于每个亚原子粒子中的宇宙属性，而是粒子坍缩才产生意识，这显然是不同的。

Now the reason I say that it could be seen as compatible, but not that it is compatible, is because for Penrose, consciousness isn't a feature of the universe that's present within any given subatomic particle, but rather it's the collapse of particles that produce consciousness, and that's decidedly different.

因此，在某种意义上，这是一种物理主义或唯物主义的意识理论。

Thus, in some sense, it's a physicalist or materialist theory of consciousness.

事实上，我曾就这个问题专门与罗杰·彭罗斯交谈过，你可以在描述中点击收听完整的播客。

In fact, I spoke to Roger Penrose about this in particular, and you can click in the description for that full podcast.

彭罗斯理论的主要批评之一是，量子效应极易被任何环境噪声所干扰。

One of the primary criticisms of Penrose's theory is that quantum effects are easily disrupted by any environmental noise.

关于微管是否真的扮演了彭罗斯所建议的角色，目前尚无共识，即使就在几个月前，人们在微管中发现了超辐射这一量子效应。

There's no consensus on whether microtubules actually play the role that Penrose suggests, even if just a couple months ago superradiance was found in microtubules, which is a quantum effect.

然而，这并非他们所寻找的量子效应，但它确实表明，即使微管相对宏观，仍能展现出某种量子特性。

However, it wasn't the quantum effect that they were looking for, but it does demonstrate that microtubules are capable of demonstrating something quantum like, even though they are relatively macroscopic.

CTMU，即宇宙的认知理论模型。

CTMU, the cognitive theoretic model of the universe.

克里斯托弗·兰根的认知理论宇宙模型，简称CTMU，目标极为宏大。

Christopher Langan's Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe, also known as the CTMU, is highly ambitious.

它旨在通过一个统一的框架解释一切，包括意识。

It aims to explain everything, including consciousness, within a single unified framework.

现在，让我稍微介绍一下背景。

Now here's a bit of a background.

物理学中的万有理论，所谓‘和谐地统一广义相对论与标准模型’。

A theory of everything in physics is something that, quote, unquote, harmonizes general relativity with the standard model.

兰根将‘万有理论’中的‘一切’一词，延伸得比仅限于标准模型和广义相对论更远。

And Langan takes this word from theory of everything, the everything word, farther than just those two, standard model and general relativity.

他将‘一切’理解为宇宙中的所有事物，包括宇宙本身、意识、规律、你，甚至是我们无法建模的东西。

He takes it to mean everything in the universe, including the universe itself, including consciousness, including the laws, including you, including even what we can't model.

更多背景是，克里斯托弗·兰根是一位自学成才、智商极高的人。

Some more background is that Christopher Langan is an autodidact with an extremely high IQ.

他的智商曾多次被测量过，而且他度过了一个艰难的贫困童年。

This was measured several times, and he's had a rough underprivileged childhood.

我曾与克里斯托弗就他的理论进行了四个小时的对话，详情请见描述中的链接。

I've spoken to Christopher here for four hours on his theory, so click in the description to see.

兰根认为，宇宙是一个自指系统。

Langan argues that the universe is a self referential system.

某种程度上，他认为意识源于宇宙自我反思的能力，但即便我刚才说的也不完全准确。

In some sense, he thinks that consciousness comes from the universe's ability to reflect upon itself, though even what I just said isn't quite right.

很难用简短的话概括CTMU。

It's difficult to summarize the CTMU shortly.

CTMU的基础理念是，信息和认知都是现实的根本要素。

The CTMU is grounded in the idea that information and cognition are both fundamental to reality.

信息是自指的。

Information is self referential.

好吧，这什么意思？

Okay, what does that mean?

意思是它指向自身。

Well, it means that it refers back to itself.

他提出，宇宙是一种所谓的自配置、自处理的语言，能够理解和操控其自身的信息。

He suggests that the universe is a quote unquote self configuring and self processing language, capable of understanding and manipulating its own information.

实际上，更准确地说，根据克里斯托弗·兰根的观点，现实既是语言，也是对这种语言的处理过程。

Actually, to be more accurate, according to Christopher Langan, reality is both the language and the processing of that language.

而兰根所称的自配置、自处理语言，正是这个实体。

And that's the entity that Langan calls self configuring, self processing language.

因此，意识是这种宇宙语言的基本组成部分，人类和其他有意识的生物则作为所谓的叙述者或代理者，参与宇宙的自我实现。

Consciousness then is a fundamental aspect of this universal language with humans and other conscious beings acting as tellers, quote unquote tellers, or agents that contribute to the universe's self actualization.

你会注意到，许多关于意识的理论都贬低语言作为一种低分辨率的交流手段。

You'll notice that many theories of consciousness deride language as being a low resolution means of communication.

我个人认为，这种对语言的看法极其贫瘠。你可以在这里看到我的Substack文章，阐述语言不仅是信息的传递，更是创造与发现的过程。

I personally think that's an extremely impoverished view of language, and you can see my Substack article here about how language is also the process of creation and discovery, not just transmission.

兰根的观点与此类似，他并不轻视语言，反而将其提升到最高层次。

Langan is similar in that he doesn't hold a language with such a low regard, and in fact, he elevates it to the highest category.

语言就是宇宙本身。

It is what the universe is.

宇宙不仅用语言表达，它本身就是语言。

The universe is not only expressed in language, but is that language.

那么，CTMU与其他我们探讨过的理论是相符还是相悖呢？

So how does the CTMU align or disalign with other theories we've explored?

那理想主义呢？

How about idealism?

嗯，CTMU在某种程度上与理想主义相符。

Well, CTMU somewhat aligns with idealism.

怎么说？

How so?

它认为意识是现实的根本。

It sees consciousness as fundamental to reality.

是的。

Yes.

CTMU认为宇宙本质上是精神的，物理世界是意识的显现。

The CTMU suggests that the universe is essentially mental and that the physical world is a manifestation of consciousness.

这一点与乔治·贝克莱和贝尔纳多·卡斯特鲁普等唯心主义哲学家的观点相呼应。

Now this resonates with idealist philosophers like George Berkeley and Bernardo Kastrup.

然而，虽然兰根认同唯心主义，但他会说它并不完整，就像只谈论骰子上的三点一样。

However, while Langan aligns with idealism, he would say that it's incomplete and akin to talking only about, say, the number three on a dice.

对。

Sure.

有三个点存在，但还有其他的点。

There are three dots that exist, but there are other dots.

我们在这期与卡斯特鲁普和兰根的播客中讨论了这一点。

We talk about this in this podcast with Kastrup and Langan here.

那么，CTMU如何与唯物主义相一致呢？

Now how does CTMU align with materialism?

在某种意义上，CTMU与唯物主义的关系，就像它与唯心主义的关系一样，即包容了它。

In some sense, the CTMU aligns with materialism in the same way that it does with idealism, in the sense of encompassing it.

唯物主义认为，意识是大脑物理过程的副产品，而在CTMU中，意识被视为宇宙本身的根本属性。

Materialism, by the way, would say that consciousness is a byproduct of the physical processes in the brain, whereas in the CTMU, sees consciousness as fundamental to the universe itself.

除了CTMU使用晦涩的语言（这本身有点讽刺，因为这是一套关于语言的理论）之外，它主要受到的批评是依赖于自指概念。

One of the primary criticisms of the CTMU other than its use of abstruse language, which is somewhat punny given it's a theory about language, is its reliance on the concept of self reference.

虽然自指在数学和逻辑中是一个已确立的概念，但将其应用于整个宇宙却并不明确。

While self reference is an established concept in mathematics and logic, its application to the universe as a whole isn't clear.

宇宙具有自指性究竟意味着什么，并不清晰，但至少对我来说，并非完全不可理解。

It's not clear what it means for the universe to be self referential, but at least to me, it's not entirely unclear.

对他而言也是如此。

Nor is it for him.

例如，惠勒曾画过一幅图，用以阐述宇宙与观察者之间的关系。

Wheeler, for instance, drew this image to talk about the universe and an observer.

事实上，我在与阿曼达·盖弗特的这期播客中更深入地讨论了这一点。

In fact, I talk more about that in this podcast here with Amanda Gefter.

约翰乔·麦克法登的意识电磁场理论，也称为半场理论。

Johnjoe McFadden's conscious electromagnetic field theory, also known as semi field theory.

你有没有想过，我们称之为头部的这块所谓的肉块——一个贬低性的唯物主义者可能会这么说——是如何产生我们所说的意识体验的？

Have you ever wondered how this supposed lump of meat that we call our heads, which is what a denigrating materialist may say, gives rise to what we call conscious experience?

好吧，分子遗传学家约翰乔·麦克法登提出了另一种意识理论，其核心是大脑的电磁场。

Well, Johnjoe McFadden, a molecular geneticist, proposes a different sort of theory of consciousness that centers on the brain's electromagnetic field.

他称之为意识电磁信息场理论，或半场理论。

He calls this the conscious electromagnetic information field theory or semi field theory.

麦克法登认为，大脑的电磁场整合了来自不同脑区的信息。

McFadden argues that the brain's EM field integrates information from different brain regions.

我们大脑的电磁场不仅仅是神经活动的副产品，而是意识本身的载体。

The EM field of our brain isn't just a byproduct of neural activity, instead it's the substrate of consciousness itself.

麦克法登提出，这种电磁场整合了来自不同脑区的信息，从而形成了我们所有人都熟知的统一体验。

McFadden suggests that this EM field integrates information from different brain regions, creating that unified experience we all know so well.