Ledger 钱包被转走1亿美元，自我托管还安全吗？

通常来说，像这种往钱包里植入恶意芯片的攻击方式，以前是非常昂贵的。

Typically, kind of attacks, inserting implants into wallets, used to be very expensive.

所以一般只针对特定的目标下手。

So it would be done on very specific targets.

比如说，他们会制造10到20个间谍设备，然后根据泄露的地址寄给目标，并附上信息说，很抱歉，你的信息被泄露了，或者你的设备有问题，请用这个替换。

For example, you would create 10 or 20 spy units and then you would ship those to addresses you've got from a leak to people telling them, we're sorry, your information was leaked or the device you've got has an issue, please use this one instead.

这种事情确实发生过。

And that's something that actually happened.

但变化在于，这种新型植入芯片现在可以大规模生产，而且安装起来非常方便。

The one thing that has changed is that this new implant is made for mass production and ease of installation.

可以说，未来我们很可能会看到更多这样的情况。

Let me say that we're likely going to see a lot more of it in the future.

大家好。

Hey, everyone.

关于今天的节目，简单说几句。

Just a quick note about today's episode.

就在我们直播之前，Ledger发布了两条公告，但我们直到节目结束后才看到，所以没能讨论到。

Shortly before we streamed, Ledger released two announcements that we didn't see until after the show and so didn't get discuss.

其中一条是Ledger关于这次事件调查的公告。

One was an announcement by Ledger about the investigation into this incident.

他们的博客说，一个高度有组织的犯罪团伙花了几个月时间，购买了所谓的正品Ledger设备，打开它们，装上定制的隐藏组件，这些组件旨在设置过程中捕获恢复短语，然后通过东南亚的转售商重新投入市场。

Their blog post said that a highly organized criminal group over months bought quote genuine Ledger devices, opened them, fitted custom built hidden components designed to capture the recovery phrase during setup, and put them back into distribution through resellers in Southeast Asia.

我和Mark、Jonty在这期节目里讨论的所有内容仍然相关，但要注意Ledger只承认转售商问题存在于东南亚，这与关于在欧洲购买的设备也存在问题的报道相矛盾。

Everything Mark and Jonty and I discussed in this episode is still relevant, but notice Ledger only admits that the reseller issue existed in Southeast Asia, contradicting reports that devices bought in Europe also had issues.

Ledger的博客说：'我们追踪了每一条线索，包括派人去当地市场，包括德国，从商店里随机购买并打开一些设备进行检查。'

The Ledger blog post says, quote, We followed every lead, including sending teams to local markets, including Germany, to spot buy and open a number of devices from stores.

我们还检查了仓库中的样品。

And we also examined samples from warehouses.

所有检查过的设备都是干净的。

Every unit examined was clean.

所以Ledger自己并没有找到确凿证据表明欧洲转售商出售的设备也受到损害，这你会在节目里听到我们讨论。

So Ledger itself has not found corroborating evidence that devices being sold by resellers in Europe were also compromised, which you'll hear us discuss in the show.

在那篇帖子之后，公司随即发布了他们的新设备 Ledger Atom，宣传说它支持量子安全，有安全元件芯片、隐私开关、AI 代理功能，还能操作 DeFi 协议。

After that post, the company then announced their new device, the Ledger Atom, which is being marketed as quantum ready, has a secure element chip, a privacy switch, AI agent features, and the ability to DeFi protocols.

不过，由于公告时机的问题，这条推文被骂得很惨，评论区有人说：“谁觉得在最近发生这么多事之后马上发布新产品是个好主意，就该马上被开除。”

However, with the timing of the announcement, the tweet was getting ratioed hard with comments like, Whoever thought it's a good idea announcing a new product right after everything that took place recently needs to be fired ASAP.

虽然我们没来得及讨论这个进展，但鉴于发布时机这么尴尬，看看这个设备未来会得到什么反响，会很有意思。

Although we didn't get to discuss this development, it'll be interesting to see what the reception is to this device going forward given the awkward timing of the launch.

除此之外，就请大家好好享受这期节目吧。

Other than that, enjoy the show.

大家好。

Hi, everyone.

欢迎收听 Unchained，这是你获取加密货币资讯的靠谱渠道，不炒作、不吹嘘。

Welcome to Unchained, your no hype resource for all things crypto.

我是主持人 Shin。

I'm your host, Shin.

感谢大家来观看这场直播。

Thanks for joining this live stream.

首先，我们先快速听一下赞助商的广告，是他们让这个节目得以播出。

First, we'll take a quick word from the sponsors who make this show possible.

本期节目由Nexo赞助，Nexo是领先的数字资产财富平台。

This episode is brought to you by Nexo, the premier digital assets wealth platform.

你可以通过这个平台赚取加密货币的每日利息，或者借款，这个平台已经赢得了超过1000万客户的信任。

Earn daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds all through one platform trusted by more than 10,000,000 clients.

更多信息请访问nexo.com。

Find out more at nexo.com.

请注意地区限制、资格要求和相关条款。

Geo restrictions, eligibility, and terms apply.

在开始之前，我想请你帮个忙。

Before we get started, I wanna ask you for something.

我们现在正在为Unchained做一系列决定，比如接下来做什么、什么时候直播、我们应该多做些什么，我更希望在做出这些决定之前听听你的意见，而不是之后。

We're making a bunch of decisions right now about Unchained, what we make next, when we go live, what we should be doing more of, and I'd rather hear from you before we make them than after.

所以我们准备了一份调查问卷。

So we put together a survey.

只需要几分钟，而且是匿名的，还有一个框可以告诉我们可以改进的地方。

It takes just a few minutes, it's anonymous, and there's a box where you can tell me what we could be doing better.

我会阅读所有的回复。

I read all the responses.

链接在节目说明里，或者你也可以扫屏幕上的二维码，或者访问 unchainedcrypto.com/survey。

The link is in the show notes, or you can snap the QR code on screen, or go to unchainedcrypto.com/survey.

谢谢。

Thanks.

今天的话题是闲鱼转卖技巧。

Today's topic is the leisure reseller hacks.

参与讨论的有 Karpelis Labs 的首席执行官 Mark Karpelis，以及 SEAL 911 的贡献者兼 Pangolin Intelligence 创始人 Jonty。

Here to discuss are Mark Karpelis, chief executive officer at Karpelis Labs, and Jonty, SEAL 911 contributor and founder of Pangolin Intelligence.

欢迎 Mark 和 Jonty。

Welcome, Mark and Jonty.

我不觉得我们抱歉。

I don't think we're sorry.

过去这一周，加密社区被一系列黑客攻击震惊了，这些攻击似乎已经策划了几个月，甚至可能一年以上。

This past week, the crypto community has been stunned by a series of hacks that appears to have been months, if not a year or more, in the making.

据估计，超过一亿美元从Ledger硬件钱包中被盗，这些钱包是从东南亚一个叫CryptoBilis的经销商那里购买的。

An estimated $100,000,000 or more has been stolen from Ledger hardware wallets purchased from a reseller in Southeast Asia known as CryptoBilis.

Jonty，据我所知，你是第一个在攻击刚开始时发推文的人。

Jonty, as far as I can tell, you were the first person to tweet about the hack just as it started.

跟我们说说你是怎么发现的。

Tell us how you became aware of it.

你好，Laura。

Hi, Laura.

谢谢邀请我们。

Thanks for having us.

是的，正如你所说，除了我的日常工作，我还是一个叫C0911的项目的贡献者。

So, yeah, as you said, aside from my day job, I'm a contributor to project called C0911.

如果你不了解我们，我们是一群大约25名经过审查的安全研究员，基本上运营着一条24小时7天的免费紧急热线，为任何遇到加密紧急情况的人提供专家建议，无论是损失数亿美元的大公司，还是遭遇钓鱼攻击的普通老人。

If you don't know us, we're a group of about 25 vetted security researchers who essentially operate a 20 fourseven free emergency hotline for anybody experiencing a crypto emergency to get some expert advice, so that's anything from big companies who've lost hundreds of millions of dollars all the way to your grandad who's suffered a phishing attack or something.

所以，自然而然地，当这些盗窃案开始发生时，人们就开始向CO911报告，说，嘿，我的Ledger钱包被清空了。当我们收到大约五份完全相同的报告时，我们就开始担心了。

So, naturally, as soon as these thefts started coming through, people started reporting to CO911 saying, hey, my ledge has been drained and when we get an influx of about five reports that say exactly the same thing, we start getting concerned.

而我在CO911的主要角色，以及更广泛地说，我的经验，我是一名链上分析师，所以我查看区块链数据，试图弄清楚发生了什么。

And my main role at CEO nine eleven and more generally my experience, I'm an on chain analyst, so I look at the blockchain data to try and work out what's happened.

所以我立刻开始查看这些盗窃案，注意到流入盗窃地址的资金量远远大于那些联系CO911的受害者报告的损失金额。

So I immediately started looking at these thefts and noticed that the inflows to the theft addresses were significantly larger than the amounts that were being reported as lost from the victims who reached out to see on nine eleven.

这告诉我，实际上这件事的规模比我们正在接触的受害者要大得多。

What this tells me is that actually the scale of this thing is much larger than just the victims that we're talking to.

根据我最后的统计，在这一波事件中，损失已经超过1亿美元。

I've got, by my last count, over 100,000,000 lost in this particular wave of incidents.

但在那时，我们还不知道损失的确切原因。

But at that point, we didn't know the exact cause of the losses.

而真正弄清楚这一点的唯一方法，就是让更多的受害者向我们报告，这样我们才能开始寻找规律。

And the only way that we were gonna really work that out was if we had more victims reporting to us so that we could start to look for patterns.

所以这就是为什么我上Twitter发布了盗窃地址，并请求人们联系我。

So that's why I went on Twitter and posted the theft addresses and asked for people to reach out.

马克，你们公司其实发过一篇关于这种攻击的博客，这种攻击大概是一年前首次出现的，而且后来版本不断改进。

And, Mark, your company actually had a blog post about this type of attack, which was first seen a year ago, I guess, and has seen successive improved versions.

解释一下这个攻击是怎么运作的。

Explain how the attack works.

这个攻击的方式是在钱包账本里安装一个额外的模块，在你初次设置设备时，它会盯着屏幕看。

So the attack works by installing into the wallet ledger, in this case, an extra module that will be looking at the screen as you set up your device initially.

当你设置设备时，屏幕上会显示你的助记词，这基本上就是保护你钱包里所有东西的密码。

And when you set up your device on the screen will be shown your seed phrase, which is basically the password that is going to protect everything you're going to store on this wallet.

这个助记词由24个单词组成。

The C3 is made of 24 words.

当你看到这些单词并写在纸上时，这个植入模块也在旁边看着，记下每一个单词。

So as you see the words and write these on paper, the implant will also be watching, taking note of every single word.

当你看到第24个单词时，这个植入模块就会通过内置的移动模块把你的密码发给攻击者。

And as you reach the end, which is 24 words, the implant will be sending your password basically to the attacker using the mobile model that is included in the implant.

这太聪明了，因为Ledger本来应该有这个坚不可摧的硬件组件，但他们就在上面加了个东西，完全绕过了这个硬件，只是看着屏幕，然后通过内置的eSIM把信息发出去，就像我们手机上的信息发送一样。

It's so clever because, you know, Ledger, it's supposed to have this hardware component that is impenetrable, but then they just attached something on there that bypasses that completely and is just looking at the screen and then has a little eSIM that just sends it out the way that any of, you know, of our information on our mobile phone gets sent.

CryptoBilis很快就被确认为被黑客攻击的设备的经销商。

CryptoBilis was rather quickly identified as the reseller whose devices were being hacked.

我们对CryptoBilis了解多少？

What do we know about CryptoBilis?

你们两位谁回答都可以。

And either one of you can respond.

目前我们掌握的信息不多。

At this point, we don't have a lot of information.

首先了解到的是，CryptoBilis的创始人大约在六个月前卖掉了公司，但目前我们还不清楚这是否与这次事件有直接关联。

The first thing that came up to be known is that the founder of CryptoBilis had sold the company about six months prior, but we don't know at this point if this has a direct connection with this event or not.

不过，很明显的是，很多受害者都是从CryptoBilis购买的他们的钱包。

What was clear, however, is that a lot of the victims had bought their wallet from CryptoBilis.

一些从CryptoBilis购买钱包的人打开后也发现了里面的植入物。

Some people who had bought their wallet from CryptoBilis also opened this and found an implant inside.

我觉得，从更根本的角度来看，这次攻击之所以非常可怕，是因为CryptoBilis是Ledger设备的授权经销商。

I guess I guess more fundamentally than this, the reason that this attack is very scary is that CryptoBilis was an authorized reseller of Ledger devices.

我……

I...

它是Ledger批准销售其硬件钱包的供应商之一。

It's one of the vendors that Ledger has approved to resell their hardware wallets.

它在印度尼西亚、马来西亚和菲律宾都有销售授权，所以也涉及多个司法管辖区。

It was authorized across Indonesia, Malaysia, and The Philippines, so also multiple jurisdictions.

而且，是的，这正是这次供应链事件不同于过去我们看到的许多其他硬件钱包……

And, yeah, that's what makes this supply chain incident different from many other hardware wallet...

假冒硬件钱包销售的假版本的地方。

Fake versions of hardware wallets that we've seen in the past being sold.

我确实想问一下。

I did wanna ask.

虽然我们知道无法确切知道发生了什么，但我确实看到一些人注意到了公司去年春天被出售的事实。

So I know we can't know exactly for sure what happened, but I did see some people taking that fact that the company had been sold last spring.

然后老板还说，引述，“我们受合同保密条款的法律约束，直到10月19日才能公开发布公告。”

And then the owner also said, quote, we were legally bound by contract confidentiality to hold off on public announcements until October 19.

所以黑客攻击的时机和那个日期的关系非常有意思。

So the timing of the hack and the relationship to that date is very interesting.

但我确实看到有些人做出一个可能合乎逻辑的推断，认为CryptoBilis的新主人可能以某种方式牵涉其中。

But I did see some people making what could be a logical leap that potentially the new owners of CryptoBilis are implicated somehow.

所以我觉得这很有趣。

So I thought it was interesting.

我看到Ledger宣布要求CryptoBilis暂停销售和发货所有Ledger设备，因为有可能CryptoBilis的所有者实际上以某种方式……

I saw Ledger announce that they had asked CryptoBilis to pause all sales and shipments of Ledger devices because there is a possibility that the CryptoBilis owners are actually, you know, like, somehow...

可能就是黑客攻击的来源。

Potentially, the the source of the hack.

我……

I...

我很想知道你对这件事的看法。

I'm curious for your thoughts on that.

所以我想在这一点上，还没有任何确凿的证据。

So I guess at this point, nothing is confirmed.

所以我不想无端指责任何人。

So I I I don't wanna accuse people of anything.

当然，那个时间点确实很耐人寻味。

Certainly, that timing is interesting.

但我觉得还有一件有意思的事情，就是最近曝出来的消息，可能反而能反驳CryptoBilis是泄密源头的说法，那就是东南亚还有其他授权经销商卖过被篡改过的Ledger设备，而且这也导致了加密货币被盗。

But I guess something else that is interesting that's that's come out, which might go against the argument that that CryptoBilis is is maybe the source of the compromise, is that there are other authorized resellers of Ledger devices in Southeast Asia who are known to have sold tampered devices, and, also, this has resulted in in in cryptocurrency being stolen.

所以这个问题不仅仅是CryptoBilis一家的事。不过要说明一下，目前我还没听说东南亚以外有Ledger设备被清空的事情。

So this is an issue that's not just limited to crypto billers, but so far, to be clear, I'm not aware of any reports of Ledgers being drained from outside of Southeast Asia.

好的。

Okay.

而且……

And...

等一下。

Wait.

抱歉。

So I'm sorry.

那就是在其他地方卖出的设备吧。

That was the other devices sold elsewhere.

那一波黑客攻击也包括那些吗？

That was also in this wave of hacks?

从链上分析来看，显然这一波攻击引起了媒体的关注，足以让大家知道这件事，不过在10月9日还有一大波攻击。

So from the on chain analysis, whilst there was obviously this wave that sort of caused all the stuff in the media or enough to be aware of this incident, there was a large wave of attacks on October 9.

通过链上分析，实际上看起来实施这些黑客攻击的人之前就曾盗取过加密货币，所以在10月9日之前就有被盗的记录。

Through on chain analysis, it actually looks as though whoever is responsible for these hacks has drained cryptocurrency previously, so there is evidence of drains prior to October 9.

我最早知道的是9月8日，大概早了一个月。

The earliest that I'm aware of is September 8, so about a month prior.

但这些损失金额小得多，这也就是为什么没有引起我们现在对CryptoBilis这么大的关注。

But these are much smaller in value, and this will be why it won't, of course, the massive spotlight that we now have on CryptoBilis.

那9月8日的那些设备是通过CryptoBilis卖出的，还是你提到的东南亚的那些其他经销商卖出的？

And for September 8, were those devices sold via CryptoBilis or from those other resellers that you mentioned in Southeast Asia?

是东南亚的其他经销商。

Other resellers based in Southeast Asia.

现在已经确认了。

This is now confirmed.

但是，是的，我想非常明确地说，除了Ledger公开声明的内容之外，我……

But, yeah, I want to be super clear that outside of what Ledger has stated publicly, I.

也就是说，东南亚的经销商，我没有听说有任何加密货币被盗的报道。

E, resellers in Southeast Asia, I'm not aware of any reports of cryptocurrency being drained outside of that.

我确实看到一些推文，有人提到了东南亚的其他经销商，但我们稍后再谈这个。

I mean, I did see some tweets where people named other resellers in Southeast Asia, but we'll talk about that later.

我觉得Mark实际上自己检查过东南亚其他经销商卖出的设备。

I think Mark actually has himself looked at devices from other resellers in Southeast Asia.

对。

Yes.

我确实收到了一台在新加坡机场从Metapod购买的设备，Metapod也是Ledger的授权经销商。

I actually received one device that was purchased at the airport in Singapore from Metapod, which is also authorized reseller of Ledger.

在这台设备里面，也有一个间谍植入物，被配置来窃取信息。

And inside this device, there was also a spy implant that was configured to take the information.

所以，Ledger Flex 的其他部分，跟 Nano X 不是一回事。

So the rest of the Ledger Flex, which is not the same as the Nano X.

这个设备要更复杂一些。

It's a bit more of a complex device.

而且我很惊讶地发现，用来监视屏幕的技术居然这么先进。

And I was very surprised to see how advanced was the technology used to spy on the screen, basically.

那这和最近这一波攻击用的是完全一样的技术吗？

And was it the exact same as what's been used in this recent wave?

不一样，这是一个完全为 Ledger Flex 定制的版本，跟我们在 Ledger Nano X 上看到的那种很不一样。

It's not the exact same in the sense that it's a version that's fully customized for the Ledger Flex, which is very different from the one we've seen on the Ledger Nano X.

但基本上还是同样的板子，同样是三颗芯片的流程。

But it's still the same kind of boards on the same process of having three chips.

一颗负责监视屏幕，记录密码。

One which is monitoring the screen and taking note of the passphrase.

一颗通过移动网络把截获的数据发出去，还有一个 eSIM，基本上就是数据合约，用来把数据传到网上。

One that is communicating with mobile network to send what has been captured, and an eSIM, which is basically a data contract to actually send the data online.

你说它相当精密，那它具体不同在哪里呢？

And when you say it's quite sophisticated, like, what was different about it?

实际上我们见过很多版本的植入设备。

We've seen actually a number of versions of the implant.

最早的那个版本是去年年底发现的，今年大概五月或者四月底才公之于众。

The very first version that was found was found late last year and was presented, I think in May or late April this year.

它基本上就是一块板子，带着几根线，连接到Ledger的不同位置。

It's basically a board with some wires that connect to different point of the ledger.

所以很容易看出来。

So it's very easy to see.

非常不自然。

It's very unnatural.

从那个版本开始，我们见过一些带橙色软板的版本，看起来更专业，但安装起来依然很费劲。

And from that version, we've seen versions that have an orange flex board, which looks more professional, but it's still a lot of work to install.

我们看到的新版本用的是黑色板子。

The new version we're seeing have blackboards.

而且对于Nano X来说，这块板基本上直接就能放进去。

And actually for the Nano X, the board will basically just fall into place.

你只要把它放到板上，稍微动一下，它就卡住了。

You just put it on the board, move it bit, it just clips.

然后你只需要加一点焊锡，把它固定住。

And then you just have to put some point of solder to his sole.

很明显，这个植入设备已经改进过了。

And very clearly, the spine implant has been improved.

而且不管是谁在做这件事，他都在不断学习和改进，不只是小小的进步，而是巨大的飞跃，显然是在做真正的研究，投入了大量的资金来制造这些板子。

And whoever is doing this is learning and making improvements are not just very small improvement but very giant leaps doing real research with a lot of funding to create those boards.

我在Ledger Flex里找到的那块板，有一些组件是专门为Ledger Flex定制的，我自己也做过一些电子方面的事情。

And the board I found into the Ledger Flex actually had some of the components built specifically for Ledger Flex, I've built myself some electronics and did some things.

其中值得一提的是，Flex用了很多非常小的连接器，叫做HeroSA连接器。

Among other things, the Flex use a lot of very small connectors, which are known as HeroSA connectors.

他们掌握了制作Flex延长线的技术，这些延长线连接原来的Ledger连接器和本该去往的地方，用来截取传到屏幕的信号。

And they've mastered the building flex extenders that connect between the original ledger connector and the board where it's supposed to go to take a copy of the signal going to the screen.

所以从过程来看，我觉得他们已经投入了很多预算，因为你不可能不经过大量试错就做出这种东西。

So sensing for the process, they've already have a lot of budget, I would say, because you don't build this without doing a lot of trial and error.

而且你也需要很多测试设备。

You a lot of test devices too.

而且背后的技术显然不是最近几天才冒出来的。

And the technology that's behind this clearly is not something that just came from a few days ago.

他们花了数月时间进行研发才造出这个。

It's They spent months of research and development building this.

好的。

Okay.

这就是我从你博客文章里得到的印象，因为你一年前就见过类似的版本。

That was the impression I got from your blog post because you had seen similar versions a year ago.

关于这个，我还想问最后一个问题。

I did want to ask just one last question about this.

我们之前提出了一个猜测，说CryptoBilis的新主人可能是罪魁祸首，但既然其他经销商也有这些被篡改的设备，那也可能存在另一种可能性。

So we floated this theory that potentially the new owners of CryptoBilis could be the culprits, but also since other resellers have these compromised devices that potentially there could be another theory.

我只是想知道，你们两位能不能说说，可能有哪些情况，谁可能是幕后黑手，或者这些设备是怎么被植入这种恶意组件的？

I was just wondering if you, either one of you, could walk through what the universe of potential scenarios are in terms of who the culprits might be, or how this compromise was inserted into these devices.

目前很难说。

It's very difficult to say at this point.

当然，收购CryptoBilis的时间点看起来非常可疑。

The timing of the purchase of CryptoBilis, of course, looks very suspicious.

但一般来说，我们倾向于在证明有罪或无罪之前保持中立，所以我不想在这个方向上走得太远。

But, generally, we like to consider that unless proven guilty or innocent, so I don't want to go too far in this direction.

剩下的问题是，因为我们在马来西亚以外的其他经销商那里也看到了同样的植入物，比如在新加坡，这说明这个故事还有我们目前不知道的部分。

The question that remains is because we are seeing the same kind of implants in other resellers outside of Malaysia, like in Singapore, there is more to this story than we know today.

我猜执法部门正在调查。

I would guess that law enforcement is investigating.

我不知道目前我们还能说多少，除非……

And I don't know if there's much we can say at this point without...

我宁愿看看执法部门能查出什么，而不是试图猜测可能是什么，因为可能性太多了，而且没有证据的猜测可能对调查没什么帮助。

I mean, I would rather see what law enforcement come up with rather than trying to guess what could it be because there could be so many things, and yet just guessing without evidence, we might not be any good for the investigation.

因为从宏观层面来看，很明显，这些设备要从 Ledger 工厂流转到新加坡或马来西亚等地的商店进行销售，中间必然要经过好几手。

Because on a broad level, obviously, to get from the Ledger factory to the shops in Singapore or Malaysia or wherever they're being sold, these devices have to pass through a number of hands.

也就是说，存在一条供应链和物流链，Ledger 设备在物理上就是从 A 点运到 B 点。我们需要重点审查的，就是这些设备在流转过程中究竟经过了哪些环节、被哪些人经手过。

Like, there's a supply chain there, a logistics chain, where these Ledger devices essentially physically go from A to B, and that's what's going to need to be scrutinised, is the hands that these devices have passed through evidently at some point.

在这个流程中，有人或者某个团伙对设备进行了篡改。

In that process, somebody has or a group of people have tampered with the devices.

归根结底，我认为 Ledger 的供应链细节并不公开，所以作为局外的普通个人，我们很难通过外部观察来摸清这次攻击背后的具体情况。

Ultimately, I don't think Ledger supply chain is public, so it's not something that we're going be able to know as private individuals looking at this attack from the outside.

所以，是的，我想 Ledger 肯定在密切关注这件事，我也知道来自不同司法管辖区的执法部门肯定也在积极调查。

So, yeah, it's something that I imagine Ledger is actively scrutinizing, and I know law enforcement from various jurisdictions is definitely actively scrutinizing.

好的。

Alright.

稍后我们会聊聊这起黑客攻击可能蔓延到的其他国家和地区。

So in a moment, we'll talk about other jurisdictions where this hack may have spread.

不过首先，我们要请赞助商说几句，感谢他们让这档节目得以呈现。

But first, we'll take a quick word from the sponsors who make this show possible.

如果你的加密货币不只是放在钱包里，还能做更多事情呢？

What if your crypto could do more than just sit in your wallet?

Nexo是一个数字资产财富平台，你可以在这里获得加密货币的每日利息，或者用你的资产作为抵押来借款。

Nexo is a digital assets wealth platform where you can generate daily interest on your crypto or borrow funds against your assets.

今天，Nexo已经服务超过1000万客户。

Today, Nexo serves more than 10,000,000 clients.

更多信息，请访问nexo.com。

Find out more at nexo.com.

还有一件事，我们开展了一个听众调查。

One more thing, we've got a listener survey open.

只需要几分钟，而且是匿名的，这会影响我们接下来制作的内容。

It takes just a few minutes, it's anonymous, and it changes what we make next.

使用屏幕上的二维码，或者前往unchainedcrypto.com/survey。

Use the QR code on screen or go to unchainedcrypto.com/survey.

链接在节目说明中。

The link is in the show notes.

回到我和马克、琼蒂的对话。

Back to my conversation with Mark and Jonty.

10月11日，一位名叫Zero X Johannes的加密货币用户在推特上发文说，提醒大家，Ledger事件不仅限于亚洲。

On October 11, a crypto user named Zero X Johannes tweeted, PSA, the Ledger incident isn't limited to Asia.

这是一台在欧洲官方经销商实体店购买的设备。

This is a device purchased in store from an official reseller in Europe.

正品设备不会有这些线缆，如图二所示。

A legitimate device doesn't have any of these cables as can be seen in picture two.

这看起来甚至像是间谍植入物的旧版本，尽管这台设备是几周前才买的。

This even seems to be an old version of the spy implant even though the device was purchased a couple weeks ago.

新版本通常会把植入物藏在屏幕后面，所以更容易被忽略。

The newer versions usually hide the implant by the screen so it's easier to miss.

第二天，他又发推说，更新一下。

The next day, he tweeted, Update.

我可以确认，Ledger的供应链在欧洲也受到了影响。

I can confirm that the Ledger supply chain is compromised in Europe as well.

我今天刚从另一家MediaMarkt门店买了第二台设备，录下了开箱过程，结果又发现了间谍软件。

I just purchased a second device from a different MediaMarkt location today, recorded the unboxing process, and discovered spyware once again.

那我们对这个问题在欧洲有多普遍有什么了解吗？你有没有记录到欧洲的受害者？

So do we have any sense of how widespread this issue is in Europe, and have you logged any victims in Europe?

从受害者报告来看，我可以肯定地说，据我所知，没有设备是在欧洲购买后导致资金被转走的。

I can certainly say on the victim side from victim reports that I'm aware of, I'm not aware of any devices that have been bought in Europe leading to a drain.

所以，从我所了解的受害者报告来看，我无法证实这一点。

So I can't corroborate that from the victim reports that I'm aware of.

好的。

Okay.

至于设备本身，Xerox Jornet实际上把每台设备都寄给了我一份，也寄给了Ledger一份。

For the device itself, Xerox Jornet actually sent it to me and to Ledger one of each devices.

寄给我的那台今天到了。

The one sent to me arrived today.

所以我已经拆开看了一下，确认里面有脊椎植入物。

So I already had a look inside and confirmed that it had a spine implant.

我还确认了安装方式跟我之前在这里看到的那些有点不同。

I also confirmed that the way it was installed was slightly different to the things I've seen here.

所以我不确定是不是同一种安装方法。

So I'm not sure if it's the same method of installation.

但可以肯定的是，植入的芯片是一样的。

It's sure it's the same implant.

同时，Ledger 已经从 MediaMarkt 下架了所有销售，而且据我所知，他们今天宣布已经验证了所有库存，说没有任何东西被动手脚。

Meanwhile, Ledger has pulled all the sales of Ledger in MediaMarkt and said, I believe today, that they verified all the inventory and say that nothing was compromised.

所以目前我知道的也不多。

So I don't know much at this point.

我们...

We've...

所以我们手里有两台设备，是同一个人在两个不同门店买的，都被动了手脚。

So we have those two devices that one person had bought from two different locations that have been compromised.

所以我也搞不清楚。

So I don't know.

我们现在这里信息太少了。

I mean, we're lacking a lot of information here.

好的。

Okay.

嗯，所以约翰内斯买的第二个设备不是退货，他在推特上说，店铺记录显示库存来自Aqipa GmbH，虽然Ledger的首席技术官不确定Aqipa是否是Ledger和MediaMarkt之间的直接经销商，但看起来就是这样。

Well, so the second device that Johannes bought was not a return, and he tweeted, quote, store records show the inventory originated from Aqipa GmbH, While Ledger's CTO was unsure if Aqipa serves as the direct distributor between Ledger and MediaMarkt, it appears to be the case.

鉴于Aqipa在欧洲各地分销，任何通过他们进货的实体零售店都可能面临风险。

Given that Aqipa distributes across Europe, any physical retail store receiving stock through them may be at risk.

然后他说，引用一下，Ledger应该立即启动产品召回以保护用户。

And then he said, quote, Ledger should initiate an immediate product recall to protect users.

你觉得这对公司来说是不是个好举措？

Would you agree that that would be a good move for the company?

这个问题现在可能很复杂。

That's probably very complex of a question right now.

虽然至少暂停那些从Aqipa进货的店铺的销售是个好主意，但一旦……

While it would be a good idea to suspend sales at least for any store that gets their latest from Aqipa, Once...

现在的主要问题是，很难知道货架上的设备是否被篡改过。

I mean, the main issue we have right now is that it's not easy to know if a device being sold on the shelf is compromised or not.

拆开检查很容易，但我觉得Ledger不可能把MediaMarkt库存里的每一台都拆开检查，那得花好几天的功夫。

You can verify very easily when you open it, but I don't think Ledger has opened every single thing that had in stock in MediaMarkt that would be days of work to do this.

而且那样的话，基本上所有库存都卖不出去了。

And that would put all the inventory basically unsellable.

所以目前具体什么情况，我也不太清楚。

So I don't know exactly the situation at this point.

实际上，对于最终用户来说，买到手里检查是否被篡改是很简单的，特别是Nano X。

The fact is, the end user, it's very easy to verify when you buy your ledger if it's compromised or not, especially if it's a Nano X.

它很容易打开。

It can be opened easily.

打开后，植入的芯片很明显，至少目前是这样。

When it's open, the implant is very obvious, at least for now.

但就目前的情况来看，我觉得Ledger不想引起恐慌，而且他们可能也不想在确认之前就发表任何声明。

But the way it is right now, I don't think Ledger wants to cause a panic and a procedure probably don't want to say anything they even confirmed first.

但我仍然认为，哪怕只有一个人在一个原本没有植入芯片的地方发现了一个植入物，尤其是来自未经授权的经销商，这也是一个非常非常严重的问题。

But I do still think that one person, even just one person finding one implant into a location when there was none, especially from unauthorized reseller, is a very, very big issue.

哦，等等。

Oh, wait.

抱歉。

And I'm sorry.

MediaMarkt是授权经销商还是非授权经销商？

MediaMarkt is an authorized or unauthorized reseller?

他们是授权的。

They are authorized.

他们在Ledger的官网上有列出。

They are on Ledger's website.

好的。

Okay.

我觉得可以这么说，如果Johannes的说法能得到Ledger的证实，那么，显然，停止销售，甚至可能从欧洲召回设备，会是一个谨慎的安全措施。

I think it's fair to say that if Johannes' account can be corroborated by Ledger, then, obviously, stopping the sales but potentially recalling devices from Europe could be a prudent security measure.

但我觉得他们掌握的信息比我们多得多，他们不想基于无法证实的信息采取行动。

But I imagine they have access to far more information than we do, and they don't want to act on information that they can't corroborate.

所以我想这就是他们还没这么做的原因。

So I imagine that's why they haven't done it yet.

但说实话，没有他们掌握的那些信息，这个问题很难回答。

But, really, without the information that they have access to, it's hard to answer the question.

好的。

Okay.

我知道我们掌握的信息不全，但现在我们知道了，不只是CryptoBilis，还有东南亚的Metapod。

So I know we don't have all the information, but now that we do know, it's not just CryptoBilis, it's also Metapod in Southeast Asia.

现在欧洲也有这些案例。

Now we have these ones in Europe.

而且我知道Tether也在采取一些预防措施。

And obviously, I know Tether is also taking some precautions.

其中一个关键措施就是停止通过CryptoBilis进行转售。

One key is stopping reselling through CryptoBilis.

我很好奇，如果让你推测一下大概是怎么……

I'm curious if you were to put a theory of kind of how...

而且即使从马克一年前的博客文章来看……

And even with Mark's blog post from...

结合你知道的那些信息，你觉得到底发生了什么？

Starting from a year ago, with the pieces that you know, what does it seem happen?

比如有人想出了这种实施黑客攻击的方法，然后进行了测试。

Like somebody maybe came up with this way of perpetrating this hack and then tested it.

这是我的推测，基于那篇博客文章，然后大规模地执行了。

That's my theory based on the blog post and then kind of executed it in a large sweep.

不过，是的，我很想听听你认为有哪些可能性。

But, yeah, I would love to hear you talk a little bit about what you think is in the realm of possibility.

通常，这种攻击，比如在钱包里植入恶意软件，过去非常昂贵。

Typically, this kind of attacks, inserting implants into wallets, used to be very expensive.

所以通常只针对非常特定的目标。

So it would be done on very specific targets.

比如，你会制造10到20个SPI设备，然后通过泄露的地址寄给那些人，告诉他们：很抱歉，你的信息泄露了，或者你手上的设备有问题，请用这个替代品。

For example, you would create 10 or 20 SPI units, and then you would ship those to addresses you've got from a leak to people telling them, we're sorry, your information was leaked or the device you've got has an issue, please use this one instead.

而且这种事确实发生过。

And that's something that actually happened.

变化之处在于，这种新的植入物是为了大规模生产和安装方便而设计的。

The one thing that has changed is that this new implant is made for mass production and ease of installation.

可以说，未来我们很可能会看到更多这样的情况。

Let me say that we're likely going to see a lot more of it in the future.

至于现在发生的事，我不能确定这两台设备是不是运气特别好，正好找到了MediaMarkt库存中仅有的两台被植入的设备，还是说设备其实更多。

For what's happening right now, I wouldn't be able to say for sure if those two devices were just having a lot of luck in a way, finding the only two injected device in all of MediaMarkt or if there are more devices.

也有可能并不是所有设备都被感染了。

It's quite possible too that not all the devices are being infected.

也许他们只对一半的库存动手，或者只对某些箱子下手，又或者他们找到了其他方式，专门在MediaMarkt的库存中植入设备。

Maybe they only did half of the stock or they only did some boxes Or maybe they found a different way to inject implanted devices inside the stocks of MediaMarkt specifically.

所以目前很难知道具体是怎么发生的。

So it's very difficult to know at this point how it's happening.

但就目前而言，我能说的最简单的一点就是，当你自己要使用某个设备时，检查一下它是否被植入过东西。

But the one thing that I can say for now that is easy to do is to verify if a device has been implanted or not when you're going to use it for yourself.

所以现在没必要恐慌。

So there's no reason to panic at this point.

只要检查一下，小心一点就好。

Just have a look and be safe about it.

哦，我正想说一下我的看法，不过先声明一下。

Oh, I was just gonna give my point of view, and I'll caveat.

这只是猜测。

This is speculation.

考虑到我们知道，这次事件的幕后黑手也曾在多家经销商那里销售被植入的设备，导致资金被盗。

Given that we know whoever is responsible for this incident has also been responsible for devices being sold from multiple resellers leading to drains.

我猜测，这可能发生在经销商之上的某个环节，也许是分销商之类的。

I would speculate that potentially this is occurring potentially a layer above the actual resellers themselves, maybe a distributor or something like that.

但同样，没有Ledger的回应，我们很难确定。

But, again, this is hard to know without Ledger's input.

我觉得这件事其实没那么大规模的一个原因是损失金额。

Something that I do think swings in the favor of this not being incredibly widespread is actually the loss amount.

虽然一亿美元显然是一笔巨款，但如果问题真的广泛得多的话，我早就该看到东南亚以外的地方出现大量损失了。

Whilst a $100,000,000 is obviously a very substantial amount of money, I would have expected by now to see losses, like considerable losses from places outside Southeast Asia if this was massively more widespread.

现在没有这种情况，这是个好兆头，希望这个问题是可控的。

The fact that we haven't is good and I think is a good sign that hopefully this is a contained issue.

不过，是的，接下来几天我们就能看到了。

But, yeah, we'll see in the coming days.

就像马克说的，现在你能做的最好的事情就是，如果你真的很担心，可以自己验证一下。

And as Mark said, the best thing you can do right now is if you're really concerned, you can verify yourself.

我想说的是，泰勒这周一直在强调，但真的不要慌。

The one thing I would say, and I think Taylor has been saying this all week, but definitely don't panic.

我们在SEAL 911处理过很多这种情况，当人们恐慌时，他们往往会犯一些愚蠢的错误，这实际上比什么都不做给他们带来更大的风险。

Something that we are dealing with at SEAL 911, and we deal with this a lot, is when people panic, they tend to make silly mistakes, and actually, like, this leads to them bringing themselves more risk than if they just did nothing.

他们可能在打开设备的过程中弄坏了Ledger，然后无法访问助记词，从而损失资金；或者试图把资产转移到新钱包，但在过程中出错，导致无法访问资金。

They might break their ledger in the process of opening it and not have access to the seed phrase, so lose their money, or try and transfer their assets to a fresh wallet and make a mistake in that process and lose access to the money.

我们确实收到过这类事情的报告，所以无论你做什么，都要小心谨慎，三思而后行。

We do get reports of this kind of stuff happening, so whatever you do, do it carefully and with some due thought and attention.

好的，我也想问一下，我一直听说最好直接从制造商那里购买，所以我之前还真没意识到他们的授权经销商名单有多庞大。

All right, so I do also want to ask, I've always heard that it's best to buy directly from the manufacturer, and so I actually hadn't realized just how extensive their authorized reseller lists were.

我之前也没意识到人们从经销商那里购买有多普遍。

I don't think I realized just how common it was for people to buy from resellers.

所以我很好奇，即使在这件事发生之前，关于在哪里购买，是不是也有某种安全等级排序？

So I'm curious, even before this incident, was there some sort of hierarchy of security in terms of where you would purchase?

是不是从制造商那里购买是最好的，授权经销商是其次？

Was it that buying from the manufacturer was the best, authorized reseller was second?

大家是怎么看待这个问题的？

How did people think of that?

因为让我惊讶的是，人们竟然信任经销商。

Because it just was a surprise to me that people were trusting resellers.

我觉得如果你纯粹关心物理安全，尽量减少设备到你手上之前经过的手数，是一个明智的做法。

I think if you care purely about physical security, minimizing the number of hands that devices are passed through before they reach you is a sensible approach.

所以显然，在这种情况下直接向 Ledger 购买是降低风险最好的方式，但那样可能会带来其他的风险。

So, obviously, buying directly from Ledger in this case would be the best way to minimize that risk, but that may bring about other risks.

所以，人们有正当理由想从授权经销商那里购买。

So there are legitimate reasons why somebody might want to buy from an authorized reseller.

过去我们见过很多次硬件钱包公司或其物流供应商遭到攻击和泄漏数据的事情。

We've seen a lot in the past of various hardware wallet companies or logistics providers for those companies getting breached and leaking data.

有些人可能想以现金在实体店购买硬件钱包，这样他们的个人数据就不会在网上被泄漏。

Some people might want the option of purchasing a hardware wallet in person in a store with cash so they don't have their personal data leaked on the Internet.

还有一个更基本的原因，某些国家对硬件钱包或加密设备的进出口有严格的法律，所以他们会使用授权经销商。

Another reason that's even more basic than this why authorized resellers are used in certain countries have tough laws on the import and export of hardware wallet or crypto graphic devices.

实际上，越南就是这样的一个地方。

So one such jurisdiction is actually Vietnam.

在越南，你必须持有许可证才能进口加密设备。

Vietnam, you have to have a license to be able to import cryptographic devices.

所以如果设备从法国发货，作为个人，那会很麻烦，你可能会在海关被拦下。

So if devices are being shipped from France, as an individual, that device is pretty tricky and you could get turned away at customs.

这就是为什么在这些地区会有官方授权的经销商。

So that's why there are authorized resellers in those jurisdictions.

我觉得这是一个权衡，但纯粹从物理安全角度来看，显然直接从生产商购买会减少中间环节，降低供应链被篡改的风险。

I think it's a it's a trade off, but purely on the physical security side, obviously, buying directly from the producer is going to minimize that number of hands and decrease the risk of a supply chain compromise.

我不确定你有没有看到Leonidas NFT发推文说Ledger应该立即终止他们的授权经销商计划。

Well, I don't know if you saw Leonidas NFT tweeted that Ledger should end their authorized reseller program immediately.

我挺好奇的。

I'm curious.

我理解你提到的那些权衡，那你觉得那个建议怎么样？

So I understand the trade offs that you mentioned, but what do you think of that suggestion?

我觉得那样可能太激进了，但Ledger可能可以采取一些措施来确保这类问题不会发生，或者未来更难被利用。

Well, I would say that's probably too drastic, but there are steps that Ledger can probably take to make sure that these kind of issues cannot happen or would be much more difficult to cause in the future.

有一件事我不太清楚，比如CryptoBilis的交接具体是怎么发生的，Ledger有没有收到通知，有没有对新运营方进行审查。Ledger这边可以做一些事情来让产品更安全地销售，比如临时封装，这样你就能知道你的Ledger有没有被打开过。不过很多方法还是可以在某种程度上被破解，这基本上就是一场猫鼠游戏，就看谁动作更快。

One thing I don't know exactly how, for example, the handoff of CryptoBilis happened, if Ledger was notified and if Ledger vetted the new operators of the company, There are a few things that Ledger could be doing on their side that would make their product more safe to sell, such as temporary packaging, so that if you know if your Ledger has been opened before or not, while a lot of those methods can be defeated in some ways, it's always a game of the cat and mouse basically of trying to just move faster than the other.

但就这件事而言，我觉得Ledger本来可以做得更好的，因为听起来这已经不是新问题了。

But for this thing, one thing I do think that Ledger could have been doing because it sounds like this is not a new issue.

这个问题至少已经讨论了六个月了。

It's been discussed for at least six months.

Ledger本可以……

Ledger could have maybe...

我觉得一个好的做法是，告诉人们从第三方甚至授权经销商那里购买Ledger时，最好打开看看，确认硬件是否和Ledger提供的说明书里展示的一致。

What I would have seen a good idea is to tell people that when buying a Ledger from a third party, even an authorized reseller, to maybe have a look inside and verify that the hardware is as shown into the manual that Ledger provides.

因为Ledger实际上在每个设备的说明书里都提供了设备内部的图片，以及应该是什么样的。

Because Ledger actually provides in the manual of each device, picture of the inside of the device, how things should be.

但在同一页上，Ledger也写着打开设备会使保修失效。

But on the same page, Ledger also writes that opening your device will rule the warranty.

所以，如果你同时说打开看看就会失去保修，那展示内部图片就有点矛盾了。

So that's kind of why showing pictures inside if you say at the same time that warranty is going to be void if you look inside.

我觉得，既然Ledger早就知道这个问题，他们至少应该发布一些通用的指导，这样也许一些客户会去检查自己的设备。

I think the fact that this has been known by Ledger for a while should have at least triggered Ledger to issue some generic guidance so that maybe some customers would look at their device.

对于像CryptoBilis这样的经销商，似乎有很多受害者，一些CryptoBilis的客户，哪怕100个人里只有一个人打开了他们的Ledger并发现了问题，也会促使其他人也去检查，很可能就会减少这次的总损失，或者让这次攻击更早被发现。

In the case of a reseller like CryptoBilis, which seems to have a lot of victims, some of the CryptoBilis customers, even if just one person out of 100 would have opened their ledger and found something, would have prompted other people to do the same, very likely reduced the total amount lost this time or this attack to be detected a lot sooner.

有个挺有意思的事儿，是 Sebastian V Sta。

Something that was interesting is Sebastian V Sta.

说实话，我不太确定这人是谁。

I'm actually not sure who this person is.

他个人资料上写着是量子物理学家，但他发推说记得看过 Ledger 的广告提到盒子上没有防拆贴纸。

It says quantum physicist on their profile, but he tweeted that he remembered reading something about Ledger advertising that there's no anti tampering sticker on the box.

所以我们翻出了那个旧盒子，他拍了照，对，上面附了个小告示，说这个盒子上没有防拆贴纸。

So we dug up this old box and he photographed, yeah, it came with a little notice saying, there is no anti tampering sticker on this box.

每次开机时，密码学机制都会检查 Ledger 设备内部软件的完整性。

A cryptographic mechanism checks the integrity of your Ledger device's internal software each time it is powered on.

安全元件的触发机制能防止任何拦截或物理替换的尝试。

The secure element trip prevents any interception or physical replacement attempt.

Ledger 设备在设计上就是防篡改的。

Ledger devices are engineered to be tamper proof.

所以，确实挺让人担心的，他们居然还为此沾沾自喜，结果显然根本没用。

So, yeah, it's kind of concerning that they were bragging about that, and obviously, it didn't matter.

那么现在考虑到我们八月份看到的那个冷钱包被黑的事件，现在又看到这个Ledger的。

So now considering that we saw this cold card hack that happened in August, Now we're seeing this Ledger one.

我很好奇你现在对自我托管有什么看法。

I'm curious to hear your opinion on self custody at the moment.

你觉得它已经不行了吗？

Do you think it's dead?

你觉得它只是暂时不安全吗？

Do you think it's just temporarily unsafe?

你觉得是不是有一些新的最佳实践，人们需要遵循才能做到自我托管？

Do you feel like there's just new best practices that people need to follow in order to be able to self custody?

你对整个自我托管的理念和运动，有什么哲学上的看法？

What's your kind of philosophical take on the whole self custody ethos and movement?

自我托管之所以存在，有个很重要的原因，就是人们的电脑会中病毒，会被黑客攻击。

Self custody is here for a big reason, is that people's computers get virus and get hacked.

有一件事……

One thing...

我们在IT安全里经常用一个词叫攻击面，基本上就是指一个IT系统有哪些入口，能让别人钻进去。

One term we use a lot in IT security is attack surface, which is basically what entry points there is into an IT system that would allow someone to get inside.

而电脑呢，你是连着互联网的。

And for computer, you are connected to the Internet.

你会浏览网页。

You browse.

一天要打开好多网站。

They open a number of websites all day.

通常，你还会往电脑里插各种设备、U盘什么的。

Typically, you will be plugging devices, USB keys inside your computer.

所以这些都是风险因素，而冷钱包或者硬件钱包就是为了减少这些风险而存在的。

So all of these things are risk factors that cold wallet or hardware wallets are here to alleviate.

所以，把你的私钥和签名操作放在一个单独的、连接方式有限的设备上，比如只能用USB和蓝牙连接，这样就大大缩小了攻击面，从而保护你的加密货币不受那些病毒或者能感染电脑的东西的侵害。

So by having your private key and performing the signature on a separate device, which has a limited connectivity option, like for the call on your USB and Bluetooth, which basically limits the attack surface, you protect your cryptocurrencies from all those viruses or things that can infect your computer.

而且我觉得，用冷钱包或硬件钱包来自我托管是很成功的，它大大减少了因为病毒导致的加密货币被盗，以至于那些犯罪团伙不得不转而寻找攻击这些设备的方法。

And I believe that self custody on cold wallets or hard wallets has been successful and has reduced the crypto theft from virus enough for those criminal groups to move to find ways to attack those devices.

而Ledger，我认为在市场上占有率最高，所以很可能成为首要目标，因为那里最有利可图。

And Ledger having, I believe, the largest market share in terms of outlets out there was probably the first targets, basically, where there was the most to gain.

所以Ledger成为第一个被攻击的对象，这很合理。

And that would make sense that Ledger was the first being attacked here.

当然，从九一一事件的角度来看，我可以这么说，使用热钱包的人所遭受的损失，我。

Certainly, on the nine eleven side, I can say that the losses from people using hot wallets, I.

也就是。

E.

那些密钥存放在联网的电脑、手机或类似设备上的钱包，造成的损失远比硬件钱包要大得多。

Wallets where the keys to those wallets are held on a computer that's connected to the Internet or a phone or something like this, that causes significantly more loss than we see from hardware wallets.

所以，是的，恶意软件侵入设备并窃取密钥仍然是一个大问题，我认为硬件钱包在解决这个问题上确实有一席之地。

So, yeah, it's still the case that getting malware onto devices and that malware exfiltrating keys is a major issue, and I do think that hardware wallets have a place to solve that issue.

不过我也同意，我们目前正处在一个非常艰难的时期，而且安全方面的缺陷，不仅仅是这次Ledger的事件，还有各种公司的数据泄露、熵问题，这些都让硬件钱包很难推销。

Although I would agree that we're going through a really tough spot at the moment, and I think the security failings, not just in this instance with Ledger, but the data breaches, the entropy issues across various different companies make this a really tough sell.

我知道还有其他人在提倡，比如我的朋友Zac XPT就主张人们应该使用隔离的iPhone，专门用来进行交易签名。

I know that there are other people, and my friend Zac XPT has been arguing that people should use isolated iPhones essentially just to do transaction signing.