第六季第45集：重新思考贸易与发展

多边贸易体系的弱化，对全球经济整体而言显然是个坏消息，尤其对发展中经济体更是如此。

The weakening of the multilateral trade system, obviously bad news for the global economy as a whole, but particularly bad news for developing economies.

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Welcome to Vox Dev Talks.

我是蒂姆·菲利普斯。

My name is Tim Phillips.

我们认为自上世纪九十年代以来，超级全球化推动的全球贸易创造了许多增长奇迹。

We think of global trade, hyper globalization as having created many growth miracles since the nineteen nineties.

但事实果真如此吗？

But is that the full story?

如果我们更仔细地审视这些奇迹的根源，是否能帮助我们理解过去十年的地缘政治与技术变革如何影响——并将持续影响——国际贸易与发展之间的关系？

If we look at the source of these miracles more closely, will that help us to understand how the geopolitical and technology shifts of the last decade have affected and will continue to affect the relationship between international trade and development?

耶鲁大学的彭妮·戈德堡和国际货币基金组织的米歇尔·鲁塔，就这一主题为即将出版的《发展经济学手册》撰写了相关章节，现在两位都来到了我们的节目。

Penny Goldberg of Yale and Michele Ruta of the International Monetary Fund are the authors of a chapter in the forthcoming handbook of development economics on this topic, And they both join me now.

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So welcome to VoxDevTalks.

彭妮？

Penny?

你好，蒂姆。

Hi, Tim.

非常感谢你的邀请。

Thank you very much for having us.

米歇尔也是。

And Michele as well.

你好。

Hello.

嗨。

Hi.

很高兴再次见到你。

Good to see you again.

能再次和你们两位交谈真是太好了。

It's great to talk to both of you again.

在这项研究中，你们很早就区分了贸易的静态收益和动态收益。

In this work, you you're distinguishing very early on between the static and the dynamic gains from trade.

你们是这么称呼它的。

That's what you call it.

现在你们怀疑静态收益是否能完整说明贸易如何推动发展，我想很多人可能会这么认为。

Now you're skeptical that the static gains tell the full story of how trade drives development, which I think many people might assume.

这些静态收益是什么？为什么你们持怀疑态度？

What are these static gains and why are you sceptical?

让我先退一步强调，正如蒂姆所说，这项研究是在《发展经济学手册》的背景下完成的。

Let me back off for a second to emphasize that this work was done in the context of, Tim, as you said, the handbook of development economics.

因此我们想评估当前发展现状，同时也探讨未来面临的挑战，以及我们过去经历的情况有多大可能在未来重演。

And so we wanted to take stock of where development is today, but also what the challenges for the future are, and how likely is it that what we've experienced in the past is going to repeat itself in the future.

所以霍妮卡，这尤其涉及到贸易，更广泛地说是全球化问题。

So Honika, it comes to trade in particular, and globalization more generally.

它被认为是过去几十年我们经历的一些增长奇迹的原因，特别是在东亚地区。

It has been credited with some of the growth miracles we experienced in the previous decades, especially in East Asia.

这一点或许体现在'出口导向型增长'这一术语中。

And this is perhaps reflected in the term export led growth.

正如你所说，我们怀疑能否通过静态比较优势的渠道来解释这些增长奇迹。

As you said, we are skeptical that you can explain these growth miracles through the channels of static comparative advantage.

贸易领域有大量研究强调贸易能够带来收入增长和发展。

There is a voluminous work in trade that has emphasized that trade can generate income gains and growth.

但我们的观点是，通过这些渠道很难产生增长奇迹。

But our point is it's very hard to generate growth miracles through these channels.

这里所说的'静态'，本质上是指将国家的禀赋——如物质资本和人力资本、技术和制度等——视为既定条件的机制。

And by static here, we mean essentially mechanisms that take a country's endowments, so physical and human capital, for example, technology and institutions as given.

而贸易实现收入或福利改善的主要渠道，通常是通过发挥比较优势、专业化分工和资源重新配置。

And then the main channel through which trade achieves an improvement of income or welfare more generally is through starting comparative advantage, through specialization, through reallocation of resources.

如果你把这些机制放入近十年来蓬勃发展的定量贸易模型（包括新旧模型）中考察。

If you put these mechanisms through quantitative trade models that have flourished in the last decade, both old and new models.

很难模拟出我们在现实中看到的增长数字。

It's very hard to generate the numbers that we see in practice.

举例来说，韩国人均GDP在1960年代至2000年代的几十年间增长了30倍。

So to give you one example, Korea's GDP per capita grew 30 fold in the last few decades, between the 1960s and the 2000s.

贸易模型很难模拟出这种增长幅度。

And it's very hard for a trade model to generate these.

虽然存在实现方法，但难度非常大。

There are ways to do it, but it's very hard.

从实践角度看，以墨西哥这样的贸易高度开放国家为例，虽然曾快速增长，但最终遇到了停滞点。

Also from a practical point of view, if you look at a country like Mexico, that has been very open to trade, it did grow very fast, but eventually it hit a stopping point.

经济停滞不前，陷入了中等收入陷阱。

It stagnated, it hit this middle income trap.

因此，贸易可以通过静态渠道解释增长，但无法解释我们过去见证的那些奇迹。

And so trade can explain growth through static channels, but it cannot explain these miracles that we've seen in the past.

我们更强调所谓的动态渠道。

We emphasize instead what we call the dynamic channels.

对。

Right.

那么请解释一下这些动态渠道是什么，以及它们可能产生的影响。

So explain what these dynamic channels are and what their impact can be.

在动态渠道下，我们定义了一些机制，这些机制能改变一个国家的禀赋、人力资本，推动技术变革、生产力提升，并促进制度变革。

Under dynamic channels, we define mechanisms that change a country's endowments, human capital, They for change technologies, productivity, and they also change institutions.

在手册章节中，我们详细阐述了在贸易背景下特别关注的这些机制。

In the handbook chapter, we explain in detail which mechanisms in particular we have in mind in the context of trade.

我们考虑的是进入大市场的机会，那些具有高购买力的市场使国家能够达到市场规模的关键阈值，从而采用新技术。

So we are thinking of access to big markets, markets with high purchasing power that allowed countries to achieve a critical threshold of market size so that they could adopt new technologies.

我们理解学习的过程、知识共享、跨国技术转移，以及制度变革。

We understand the process of learning, of knowledge sharing, of technology transfer across borders, and also a change in institutions.

这些都是启动动态过程的渠道，从根本上改变经济结构。

So these are all channels that set dynamic processes in motion that fundamentally change the structure of an economy.

我们在本章提出的论点是，这些渠道对经济增长产生了更为深远的影响。

And it's our thesis in this chapter that these channels have been much more consequential for growth.

正是这些渠道创造了过去的经济增长奇迹。

This is what created the growth miracles of the past.

于是我们提出了这个问题：实现这些增长奇迹需要哪些条件？

Then we asked the question, what were the conditions for these growth miracles to realize?

我们识别出了三大类主要条件。

And we identified three main sets of conditions.

其一是技术因素——将生产过程分解为小环节，并将部分环节外包给其他国家的能力，这促成了全球价值链的形成与发展。

One was technologies, the ability to take a production process, split it up into little parts, and then outsource some of these parts to other countries that led to the emergence and growth of global value chains.

运输与通讯成本（如集装箱运输）的急剧下降。

The very sharp decline in transportation and communication costs, containers.

这些都是技术变革带来的。

So these are all technological change.

政策变革同样至关重要。

Equally important are policy changes.

最重要的是对多边自由贸易体制的接纳。

So most importantly, the embracing of multilateralism of liberal trade regimes.

过去多数发达国家远离产业政策，加之地缘政治稳定带来的可预测性环境。

The fact that most advanced countries stayed away from industrial policy in the past, and also geopolitical stability that generated predictability and stability.

因此所有这些贸易发展、全球价值链等才得以蓬勃发展。

So all these trade developments, global value chains, and so on, could actually flourish.

我们的核心论点是：所有这些先决条件目前正在被侵蚀。

And it's our main thesis that all these preconditions are being eroded right now.

因此我们对未来再现增长奇迹的前景持相当悲观的态度。

So we end up quite pessimistic about the prospect of generating growth miracles in the future.

我们仍认为增长是可能的，但增长奇迹似乎更难实现，因为两大关键机制——进入庞大利润丰厚的市场，以及跨境共享知识与技术的意愿——似乎已不复存在。

We still believe that growth is possible, but growth miracles seem less likely because two of the key mechanisms, so access to big markets, big lucrative markets, and this willingness to share knowledge, to share technology across borders, this seemed to no longer be here.

让我们更详细地讨论一下这些机制是如何运作的。

Let's talk in a little bit more detail about how some of these mechanisms have worked.

全球化与贸易自由化让我们得以进入那些大市场，这除了带来我们认为的静态收益——即获得更多客户外，还如何改变了发展进程？

Now access to those large markets that we got from globalization and trade liberalization, how did that change the process of development beyond simply giving you access to more customers that we think, you know, static gains?

那些动态收益是如何体现的？

How did those dynamic gains play out?

除了显而易见的能接触到更多消费者的影响外，如果我们把发展视为从传统技术向现代技术的转型过程，这种现代技术需要固定成本投入。

Apart from the obvious effect that you have access to more consumers, if we think about development as involving the transition from a more traditional technology to a modern technology, this modern technology requires fixed costs.

这里说的现代技术，不一定指人工智能或芯片生产，而单纯指经济的市场化。

And by modern technology, we don't necessarily mean AI or chips production, but simply the marketization of an economy.

你将经济活动从家庭转移到企业。

You move economic activity from the household to firms.

所有这些都需要支付一定的固定成本。

All this requires paying some fixed costs.

而对于一个非常贫穷的国家，一个非常小的经济体来说，由于没有国内市场，要覆盖这些固定成本非常困难。

And for a very poor country, and for a very small economy, it's very hard to cover these fixed costs because there is no domestic market.

因此你需要达到一个关键的市场规模，才能覆盖这些固定成本。

So you need a critical market size before you can cover these fixed costs.

如果是中国、印度、印度尼西亚这样的大国，它们可以靠自己实现这一点。

If you have very large countries like China, India, Indonesia, they can achieve this on their own.

这可能需要比实际花费更多的时间。

It would probably take more time than it took in properties.

但原则上，它们是可以做到的。

But in principle, they can do it.

看看另一个极端，新加坡或台湾，这些都是微型经济体。

Go to the other extreme, Singapore or Taiwan, these are tiny economies.

在那里显而易见的是，你需要更大的市场才能支付这些固定成本并采用新技术。

There it's obvious that you need the larger market in order to be able to pay these fixed costs and adopt new technologies.

大多数国家不像新加坡那么小，但在全球背景下它们仍然很小。

Most countries are not as small as Singapore, but they are small in the global context.

对所有这些国家而言，进入大市场、拥有庞大客户群作为覆盖固定成本能力的第一步非常重要。

And for all these countries, this access to large markets, a big customer base, is quite important as a first step towards having the ability to cover fixed costs.

这在发展初期当他们还很贫穷时尤其重要。

And it's especially important early in the development when they are really poor.

随着他们发展、变得富裕、培育国内市场，中产阶级壮大，他们可以越来越多地依赖自己的市场。

As they develop, as they grow richer, as they develop the domestic market, they have a larger middle class, they can rely more and more on their own markets.

但当他们真正贫穷时，这点至关重要。

But when they are really poor, this is crucial.

这是一个渠道。

That's one channel.

在发展过程中，这些国家利用投资和技能提升的能力时，这需要双方做出什么样的承诺才能实现？

And as during the process of development, these countries are using these ability to invest and upgrade their skills, what sort of commitment does that require from both sides for this to be able to happen?

这是个非常有趣的问题。

That's a very interesting question.

我们强调的另一个渠道是，随着国家发展，不仅关乎进入大市场，还关乎技术升级——学习、改进流程、产品和劳动力等。

So another channel we emphasize is that as countries develop, then it's not just about having access to large markets, it's also about upgrading your technology, you know, learning, improving your processes, your products, your labor force, and so on.

这通过多种方式实现。

That happens in many ways.

首先，许多国家明确投资于人力资本。

So first, many countries invest explicitly in human capital.

他们采取提升全民教育水平的教育政策。

They adopt educational policies that raise the educational level of the population.

韩国就是一个例子。

One example is Korea.

当然现在很多人会说，这是人力资本投资。

And now, of course, many people will say, well, this is human capital investment.

这并非贸易。

This is not trade.

我们的观点是：贸易创造了需求条件，使这些人力资本投资变得有价值。

The point we make is that trade created the demand conditions that made these human capital investments worthwhile.

如果没有贸易创造的需求和就业机会，政策制定者可能就不会认为采用这些政策是有利的。

Maybe without the demand and the jobs that trade had created, it would not have been advantageous to policymakers to adopt these policies.

除此之外，贸易本身也会自然催生大量学习机会。

In addition to that, there is a lot of learning that happens organically through trade.

关于通过进出口进行学习的文献非常丰富。

There is a large literature on learning through exporting and importing.

还有大量证据表明全球价值链如何促进了这种学习。

There is also substantial evidence on how global value chains promoted this learning.

因为当你把生产过程拆分，一部分在一个国家生产，另一部分在另一个国家生产时，必须确保这些部件能够兼容。

Because when you split up the production process, and one part is produced in one country, and another part in another country, you need to make sure that these parts are compatible.

因此企业需要进行跨国沟通。

So firms need to communicate across borders.

他们需要沟通，需要让他们的产品相互兼容。

They need to talk, they need to make their products compatible.

通过这个过程，他们交流知识。

Through this process, they exchange knowledge.

在知识交流的同时，他们也相互提升了技能。

And as they exchange knowledge, they also upgrade each other's skills.

所以，这在某种程度上是自然发生的。

So, that happens organically to a certain extent.

此外还有明确的技术转让。

And then there is also explicit technology transfer.

如今这个名声不太好。

This has a bad name these days.

我们常称之为技术榨取或等价交换安排。

We often call it technology extraction or quid pro quo arrangements.

但也有很多情况是，国家表示如果你想在我国投资，就必须明确与我们分享你的技术。

But there are also many cases where countries said, if you want to invest in our country, then you actually need to share your technology with us explicitly.

这对发展实际上相当重要。

And this has actually been quite important to develop.

现在回答你的问题，我们需要什么条件来实现这个？

Now, to answer your question, what conditions do we need for that?

从根本上说，需要双方都认同这种知识共享是可取的，并且需要对其有正确认识。

Well, fundamentally, you need for both sides to agree that this knowledge sharing is desirable, and you need an appreciation for it.

而这在过去几十年里确实是这样的。

And that was the case in the previous decades.

那是一个大多数企业以利润和经济效率为导向，而政府也支持这种做法的时代。

This was an era where most firms were driven by profit, by economic efficiency, and governments embraced that.

因此，如果德国或美国企业想在中国开展业务，或许需要分享技术，但最终这对他们来说是利润最大化的选择。

And so if a German or an American firm wanted to do business in China, maybe it had to share technology, but ultimately this was profit maximizing to them.

这对德国有利，对美国企业有利，对中国也有利，各方都参与其中。

It was good for Germany, it was good for the American firms, it was also good for China, and everyone played along.

当时还存在一个基本信念：贸易和经济福祉并非零和博弈。

There was also a fundamental belief that trade and economic welfare are not a zero sum game.

所以中国可能受益，韩国可能受益，但最终我们都会受益。

So China may benefit, Korea may benefit, but ultimately we all benefit.

因此存在这种根本信念：当你追求经济利润和经济效率时，最终所有人都可能过得更好。

So there was this fundamental belief that when you pursue economic profit, economic efficiency, ultimately everyone may be better off.

在我们看来，这比其他任何事情都重要。

In our view, this was more important than anything.

除此之外，为了维持这些安排，你还需要能够信任其他合作伙伴。

In addition to that, in order to have these arrangements, you also need to be able to trust your other partners.

因此，你需要稳定性，你需要可预测性。

So, you need stability, you need predictability.

关于贸易机构如何实际营造这种环境，米歇尔可以谈得更多。

So, Michele can talk much more about how the trade institutions actually created this environment.

但你需要能够预知明天会发生什么。

But you need to be able to know what's coming tomorrow.

再次强调，在过去几十年里，我们曾拥有这种可预测性。

And again, in the previous decades, we had this predictability.

这同样重要。

This is equally important.

这一点或许难以融入贸易模型并量化其重要性。

This is something that's perhaps hard to sneak into a trade model and quantify its importance.

但毫无疑问，它在全球价值链的兴起中发挥了极其重要的作用，更重要的是，在过去发生的知识共享中也起到了关键作用。

But there is no question that it played a very important role in this emergence of global value chains, and also more importantly, this knowledge sharing that has happened in the past.

我们再次强调，所有这些现在都正在被侵蚀。

And again, our point is that all this is being eroded right now.

佩妮，我想对于当时不在场的人来说，很难想象全球化巅峰时期技术转让的规模有多大。

Penny, it's hard for people who weren't around at the time to conceive, I would imagine, about how much technology transfer was going on during peak globalisation.

其中一些情况在今天看来简直是不可想象的。

It would be inconceivable for some of it to happen today.

为什么人们当时完全不担心这个问题？

Why were people just not worried about it?

部分原因是他们的主要目标是经济利润。

Partly because their main objective was economic profit.

追求的是利润和经济效率。

It was profit and economic efficiency.

这也是冷战刚结束的时期。

And this was also a time after the Cold War had ended.

所以我们所有人都押注于和平与稳定。

So we all bet on peace and stability.

当时我们并不担心地缘政治或地缘政治紧张局势。

We were not worried about geopolitics, geopolitical tensions.

我们对此视为理所当然。

We took that as given.

即便当我们开始遭遇全球化的逆流，以及对供应链韧性等诸多担忧时，贸易界仍坚信我们取得的成果至关重要，已无回头路可走。

Even when we started experiencing a backlash against globalization and many worries about the resilience of supply chains and so on, there was still a very strong belief among the trade community that what we had achieved was so important that there was no way back.

这种知识传递，这种高度专业化将永远持续下去。

That this knowledge transfer, this high specialization would continue forever.

这是不可避免的。

It was inevitable.

这是无法回避的。

It was unavoidable.

若回归到不同体制，我们将损失惨重。

And there would be too much to lose by reverting to a different regime.

我认为持这种观点的人已被证明是错误的。

And I think those who believed that were proven wrong.

米歇尔，我想和你聊聊多边机构及其在此过程中扮演的角色。

Michele, I want to talk to you about multilateral institutions and the roles that they have played in this.

显然，以世界贸易组织为例，但许多其他多边机构也参与其中。

I mean, clearly, think about the World Trade Organization, but many other multilateral institutions had a hand in this as well.

除了明确制定规则外，它们还发挥了哪些作用？

What sort of hand did they have in this beyond just clearly setting the rules?

制定规则显然极其重要。

Setting the rules is obviously very, very important.

若论及世贸组织，首先想到的是它在降低关税从而减少贸易成本方面发挥了关键作用。

And if we think about the WTO, the first thing that comes to mind is the fact that, it has been instrumental in lowering tariffs and therefore lowering trade cost.

但除此之外，我认为WTO和多边规则贸易体系所做的一些重要贡献很容易被忽视。

But I think beyond that, there are some very important things that, the WTO and the multilateral rules based trade system did that are very easy to miss.

首先，如果仔细想想，基于规则的贸易体系的替代方案就是基于强权的体系。

The first thing is that if you think about it, the alternative to the rules based trade system is a power based system.

而基于强权的体系要不可预测得多。

And a power based system is much more unpredictable.

而且根据我们在强权体系中的经验，大国往往占据上风。

And, as we all know by experience in a power based system, the larger countries tend to have the upper hand.

嗯。

Mhmm.

因此基于规则的体系本质上保护了小型和发展中国家。

And so a rules based system basically protects the the smaller and developing countries.

举个例子，WTO的支柱之一是最惠国待遇原则（MFN）。

And just to give you an example, one of the pillars of the WTO is, the most favored nation rule or MFN.

它规定了什么？

What does it say?

简单来说，如果一个国家给予某个大贸易伙伴关税优惠，就必须将这项优惠延伸给所有其他国家。

Basically says that if a country gives a tariff concession to a large partner, it has to extend that concession to everyone else.

这显然保护了小经济体在关税谈判中的不对称地位。

And so this clearly protects the small economies in asymmetries in in tariff bargain.

第二个容易被忽视的方面是，WTO和区域贸易协定通常都包含重要承诺。

Now the second aspect that sometimes gets overlooked is that the WTO and the regional trade agreements as well tend to have an important commitment to them.

因此当政策制定者试图推行某些对整体经济有利、但可能影响特定特殊利益的改革时...

So when policymakers trying to implement some changes that are good for the economy as a whole, but may affect some special interests in particular.

这可能很困难。

It may be difficult.

WTO和区域贸易协定提供了一种承诺机制，帮助推动了这些福利改善的改革。

And the WTO and the regional trade agreements have provided a commitment device that has helped making these, welfare improving reforms.

因此我认为，总体而言，多边贸易体系的弱化——即我们现在看到的基于规则的贸易体系弱化，其中一大例证就是WTO争端解决机制遭遇的困境。

So I think in general, the weakening of the multilateral trade system, the rules based trade system that we are seeing now, and one big example of this is the troubles that there have been at the dispute settlement at the WTO.

嗯。

Mhmm.

这些显然对全球经济整体都是坏消息，但对发展中经济体尤其不利。

Those are obviously bad news for the global economy as a whole, but particularly bad news for developing economies.

正如Penny所说，贸易被视为不仅是跨越政治分歧的存在，更是一条通往政治和解的途径。

And as Penny was saying that it was seen that trade I mean, it wasn't just happening in spite of political differences, but it was a route to a political reconciliation, if you like.

当时有一种理念认为，如果我们都进行贸易往来，那么我们也能和睦相处。

There was the idea that if we all traded together, then we would get along together as well.

还有哪些促进增长但在当今政治环境下行不通的类似例子？

Other examples of that that helped growth, but which politically just would not fly today?

特别是在冷战结束后，我们获得了相对的地缘政治稳定，各方对多边贸易机构的重要性达成了共识，这对贸易增长和全球价值链的发展起到了关键作用。

So especially after the end of the Cold War, we had the relative geopolitical stability, and there was a consensus around the importance of the multilateral trade institutions, and that was instrumental for trade growth and the growth of, global value chains.

当时的逻辑是经济效率应优先于其他考量，这使得即便是政治制度迥异的国家之间也建立了非常紧密的贸易关系。

Now because the logic was that economic efficiency was to be prioritized over other things that led to very intense trade relationships even between countries that were very different politically.

显然，最先想到的例子就是美国和中国，因为这是两个政治观点截然不同的体系。

And, obviously, the first one that comes to mind is US and China because those are two systems that are very different from a political point of view.

我们在此要强调的是，关于贸易合作的效率论证依然和过去一样具有说服力。

The point that we are trying to make here is that the deficiency argument for trade cooperation remains as valid as before.

变化在于这种合作在实践中变得更加困难，而发展中国家实际上可能被夹在这些大型参与者之间的竞争中。

What has changed is that this cooperation is more difficult in practice, and developing countries may, in fact, be caught in the middle of these rivalries between large players.

让我们看看接下来会发生什么。

And let's have a look at what happens next.

我们一直在讨论的从超级全球化时期到今天的故事，主要涉及商品贸易。

The story we've been talking about from the period of hyperglobalization up to today has been mostly about goods.

但现在贸易的许多领域已经实现了数字化。

But we have digitization now in many areas of how trade is done.

这为服务贸易创造了更便利的环境。

That creates an environment where services can be traded more easily.

这是否会在未来产生类似的变革性影响？

Could this have a similar transformative impact in the future?

所以我认为这是个价值十亿美元的问题。

So that's the billion dollar question, I think.

是的。

Yes.

我们试图从乐观和谨慎两个角度来看待这个问题。

We try to see it from both sides, the optimistic and the more cautious, side.

从乐观的角度看，服务贸易确实增长得相当快。

On the optimistic side, it has been true that services trade has been growing quite fast.

如果我们关注流媒体电影等数字产品，这一领域一直非常活跃。

If we focus on digital products like streaming movies, this has been very dynamic.

世贸组织和其他机构的一项研究表明，过去二十年里，这类数字贸易平均每年增长8%。

So there was a study by the WTO and other institutions that showed that on average in the past twenty years, the growth of this digital trade was 8% per year.

从乐观的一面来看，许多商业或IT服务领域存在类似企业间合作或知识转移的模式，这对全球供应链制造业至关重要。

And still on the optimistic side, many of the business or IT services, they have the same type of firm to firm collaboration or knowledge transfer that have been important for manufacturing global supply chains.

然而，保持谨慎的理由也有很多。

Now there are many reasons though to be cautious.

我就列举三点。

So let me just mention three.

首先是许多前景广阔的可贸易服务对技能要求极高。

The first one is that many of these promising tradable services are quite skill intense.

需要具备语言能力。

You need to have language skills.

需要掌握IT技能。

You need to have IT skills.

嗯。

Mhmm.

因此要想在这些领域取得成功，还需要对人力资本进行重大投资。

And so in order to be successful there, you also need to have an important investment in human capital.

这与我们在制造业看到的经验截然不同。

That's very different from the experience we've seen in manufacturing.

需要谨慎的第二个原因是政策。

The second reason to be cautious is policy.

许多发达经济体乃至普遍的经济学家都倾向于认为服务贸易比货物贸易受到更多监管。

Many advanced economists and many economists in general tend to have services that are more regulated than goods trade.

存在诸多国内法规限制各国向这些市场出口服务的能力。

There are many domestic regulations that limit the ability of countries to export into those markets services.

这种情况可能会改变，但正如许多人所说，贸易的未来可能在服务业，贸易保护主义的未来也可能转向服务业。

So that may change, but you know, as many people say, the future of trade may be in services, maybe also the future of trade protectionism is going to be in services.

如果发达经济体的就业面临冲击风险，这也意味着服务业监管可能保持严格甚至进一步加强。

If there is a risk that jobs in advanced economies will be impacted, that also implies that the services regulations may remain high or even go up.

最后一个需要谨慎的原因是，服务贸易可能对经济其他领域产生积极的溢出效应。

And then the last reason to be cautious is that services trade may generate positive spillovers on the rest of the economy.

但这些对整体经济的积极溢出效应是否足以带来我们曾在制造业见证过的同类型转型，仍是一个尚无答案的重要问题。

But whether these positive spillover effects on the rest of the economy are sufficient to create the same type of transformation that we have seen with manufacturing, there remains, an important question that so far has no answer.

关键在于，服务贸易的重要性很可能会与日俱增。

The bottom line is that services trade will likely be increasingly important.

它能否创造出口导向型增长奇迹，则是个更难回答的问题。

Whether it can generate the kind of, export led growth miracle is much more difficult to answer.

超级全球化还催生了那些超长的全球价值链。

Hyperglobalization also created those very long global value chains.

我们后来发现，特别是疫情期间，链条中某个环节的中断可能对全球经济造成重大冲击。

We found out later, especially during COVID, that disruptions to one element in the chain can create large disruptions to the global economy.

而全球南方许多国家正是最容易受到气候变化影响的国家。

And many countries in the global South are those that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

这是否会影响他们未来通过贸易实现经济转型的能力？

Will this in future affect their ability to create transformation in their economies through trade?

在我看来，所谓新冠疫情暴露全球价值链脆弱性的说法是种误解。

In my view, this claim that the COVID pandemic exposed the vulnerability of global value chains is misguided.

嗯哼。

Uh-huh.

供应链确实遭受了冲击，这一点毋庸置疑，但我会把‘全球’这个词去掉。

It's absolutely clear that supply chains suffered, but I would take the word global out.

如果说有什么不同的话，全球供应链展现出了惊人的韧性，若没有全球供应链，我们的处境会糟糕得多。

If anything, global supply chains proved incredibly resilient, and we would have been much worse off without the global supply chains.

我想举一个辉瑞CEO伯拉提到的例子，他指出生产辉瑞疫苗需要来自14个不同国家的65种原料。

I would like to give one example that comes from the Pfizer CEO, Berla, who pointed out that in order to produce the Pfizer vaccine, you needed 65 ingredients that came from 14 different countries.

而这还发生在疫情最严重的时期。

And that was at the height of the pandemic.

因此，供应链确实经历了危机，这一点千真万确。

So it's absolutely true that the supply chains experienced the crisis.

但想想美国曾面临的卫生纸危机，主要是纸制品短缺，对吧？

But if you think about the big crisis we had in The United States on toilet paper, mostly paper goods, right?

这些主要涉及的是国内供应链。

These were mostly domestic supply chains.

它们与全球供应链毫无关系。

They had nothing to do with global supply chains.

但我非常认同这一观点：全球供应链可能难以应对地缘政治风险。

But I'm very sympathetic to the point that global supply chains may not be resilient to geopolitical risk.

这是两回事。

That's different.

这种担忧在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后浮出水面。

And that concern surfaced after the invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

所以在我看来，那是一个转折点。

So to me, that was a game changer.

我承认，全球供应链已被证明极易受到地缘政治的影响。

And I accept that, that global supply chains have proven very vulnerable to geopolitics.

因此，推动多元化是合理之举。

And so there is a valid effort to diversify.

这一点毋庸置疑。

There is no question about that.

我想说我完全赞同Penny刚才关于全球商业中心和韧性的观点。

Let me just say that I fully subscribe to what, Penny just said on GBCs and resilience.

这是政策讨论中常见的误解，甚至在这里也是如此。

It's a misconception that you see very often in the policy discussions here, even over here.

现在回到气候议题上。

Now going back to the climate, issue.

首先想到的是静态比较优势理论。

So the first thing that comes to mind goes back to the static comparative advantage.

这是因为气候变化主要将影响旅游业等领域，而发展中经济体，特别是低收入国家往往专注于这些领域。

This is because climate change is mostly going to affect sectors like tourism, where developing economy, especially low income countries, tend to specialize.

以低收入国家为例，其出口的50%来自农业，约20%来自旅游业。

So low income countries, for instance, their exports 50% of their exports are in agriculture, around 20% is, tourism.

因此气候变化对这些行业的任何冲击，都将对发展中国家的贸易产生重大影响。

So any disruption that climate change will have on these sectors will have important implications for trade of developing countries.

但我们一直试图强调的——这与Penny在我们对话开始时讨论的内容一致——是动态力量非常重要。

But what we are trying to say consistently to what Penny discussed at the beginning of our conversation is that the dynamic forces are very important.

这些动态力量与各国融入全球价值链的事实密切相关。

And these dynamic forces were very much related to the fact that, countries would integrate in global value chains.

通过融入全球价值链，我们将获得对结构转型至关重要的知识和技术转移。

And through this integration in global value chains, we'd have knowledge and technology transfers that were fundamental for structural transformation.

由于气候变化特别影响某些地区及这些地区内的特定国家，这些地方可能变得风险更高。

Because of climate change that affects particularly certain regions and certain countries within certain regions, those locations may become risky.

正因风险增加，跨国公司不太可能选择在这些地方开设新工厂。

And because they become risky, they are less likely to be targeted by multinational firms to try to open up new factories.

因此风险在于，气候变化可能为这些国家融入全球价值链并从中获益设置新的成本壁垒。

And so the risk is that climate change may just create another layer of, cost of barrier for these countries to integrate into global value chains and therefore to benefit through trade.

举个具体例子，若某国可能受海啸或飓风影响，当气候变化使这类灾害更易发生时，全球价值链就不太可能将该国纳入其中。

Just to give a concrete example, if you're in a country that may be affected by tsunamis or hurricanes, when the prospect of such destruction becomes more likely because of climate change, it's less likely that global value chains would make that country part of the chain.

这是其一担忧。

So that's one concern.

这也正是我们再次强调动态渠道的原因——从静态角度看，诚如米歇尔所言，农业和旅游业确实会使发展中国家和贫困国家受到不成比例的影响。

And that's why, again, we emphasize these dynamic channels, because from a static point of view, it's true, as Michele said, that because of agriculture and tourism, we would expect developing countries, poor countries to be disproportionately affected.

但实际上国际货币基金组织已指出其中也存在机遇。

But actually, it's the IMF that has shown that there are also opportunities.

例如稀土等对绿色政策至关重要的矿产资源，非洲许多国家就拥有丰富储量。

So for example, if you think about rare earths or some other minerals that are critical for green policies, There are many countries in Africa that are very richly endowed with such resources.

理论上，绿色增长也会催生对非洲富集资源的需求。

So in principle, green growth would also create demand for resources that are abundant in Africa.

但这样一来我们又回到了静态渠道——自然资源依赖。

But then we are back to these static channels, to natural resources.

甚至有人会提及'资源诅咒'，对吧？

And if anything, people talk about the natural resource curse, right?

确实，你可能拥有所有这些天赋和丰富的资源，但这绝对不意味着它们必然带来增长和发展。

So, yes, you may have all these endowments, all this abundance, but there is absolutely no guarantee that this will lead to growth and development.

当然，我们现在也看到了产业政策的回归，其中一些政策直接针对贸易。

Now we've also seen the return, of course, of industrial policy, some of it targeted directly at trade.

我们能否知道这其中有多少只是全球贸易的暂时现象，又有多少会永久存在并影响我们所讨论的这种结构性转型？

Can we know how much of this is just a temporary feature of global trade, and how much is going to stick around permanently and so have an effect on this sort of structural transformation that we're talking about?

对此，我的诚实回答是，我不知道哪些产业政策会对全球贸易产生永久性影响。

Here, my honest answer is that, I have no idea what industrial policies, will have a permanent impact on global trade.

我认为产业政策对经济学家来说始终是个非常棘手的问题。

I think industrial policy is always a very tricky issue for economists.

我认为大多数经济学家都认同一个事实：在市场失灵时，产业政策可能会有所帮助。

I think, most economists agree with the fact that industrial policies can be helpful where there are market failures.

当进入实证分析时，关于哪些产业政策有效以及在什么条件下有效，已经存在许多分歧。

Already when you move to the empirical analysis, there are many divergences of what industrial policies work and under what conditions.

而当前形势的问题在于存在巨大的不确定性。

And here, the problem is with the current situation is that there is a huge amount of uncertainty.

当然，我们看到这些政策——尤其是美国当前的政策——正在频繁变化。

These policies, of course, we see it, especially in The US right now, are changing quite frequently.

这些政策可能并不总是完全一致，因为它们试图实现不同的目标。

They may not always being fully consistent because they try to achieve different goals.

因此，试图预测它们长期会产生什么影响是很困难的。

So try to predict what impact they will have in the long term is difficult.

我们可以更确定的是以下几点。

What we can be more certain of is a couple of points.

首先，正如我们在本章讨论过的，产业政策的使用方式已随时间发生了变化。

The first, and we discussed this in the chapter, is that, the use of industrial policies has changed over time.

我们展示的2009年以来的新数据显示，产业政策的使用正在增加。

We show new data starting in 2009 that shows that industrial policies have been on the rise.

这种情况在发达经济体和新兴经济体中都存在，但特别是在2020年后，发达经济体中这种增长尤为显著。

This is both for advanced and emerging economies, but the especially after 2020, this increase in advanced economies has been particularly prominent.

现在你往回看。

Now you go back.

我们没有关于九十年代或二十一世纪初产业政策的完善数据，但普遍认为当时发达经济体较少使用这些政策——正如佩妮早前提到的。

We don't have good data on industrial policies for the nineties or the early two thousand, but the general perception is that, these were much less used by advanced economies, something that Penny was mentioning earlier.

因此政策光谱上出现了这种变化。

So there is this change in the policy spectrum.

第二点是这些政策的使用方式——特别是在发达经济体中——可能通过贸易影响发展中国家的发展前景。

And then the second point is how these policies are used, especially in advanced economies, may affect the prospects of growth through trade in developing countries.

这里典型的例子是：如果某项产业政策的目标是将特定产品的生产迁回国内，这显然会削弱发展中国家通过供应链和外国直接投资获取技术、知识及外溢效应的可能性。

And here, the typical example would be if the objective of a certain industrial policies is to relocate production of a certain product within the national borders, this obviously goes against the possibility of developing countries to access, technologies and knowledge, spillovers that come through supply chains and FDI.

因此这种矛盾很可能会使发展中国家的道路更加复杂化。

So there is a tension there that is likely going to complicate the path for developing economies.

地缘政治影响的一个特点是更强调贸易集团而非全球贸易。

One of the features of the impact of geopolitics has been more of an emphasis on trade blocs rather than global trade.

这会影响到发展进程吗？

Is this going to impact the process of development?

当然，确实如此。

Definitely, yes.

正如塔尼亚早些时候讨论的，有两件事对动态收益特别重要。

As Tania was discussing earlier, there are two things that are especially important for the dynamic gains.

一是市场准入，二是技术转让。

One is market access, and the other one is technology transfer.

现在分裂成不同集团会影响这两方面。

Now the fragmentation into blocks will affect both.

市场准入相当明显。

Market access is quite obvious.

如果你不在集团内，就无法进入那个市场。

If you're not in the block, you don't have access to that market.

同样，对于政策而言，如果这些产业政策的目标是将生产转移到国界内，那么这也会减少技术转让的可能性。

Similarly, for the policies, if the objective of, these industrial policies is to move production within national boundaries, then, again, this, reduces the possibility of technology transfer.

所以与分裂相关的这两个方面都值得关注。

So both these aspects that are associated to fragmentation would be a concern.

还有几点与此相关的内容。

A couple of additional points that are related to this.

首先，我们是否有证据表明分裂确实正在发生？

The first is, do we have any evidence that fragmentation is actually happening?

这方面有很多讨论。

There's a lot of discussion.

最直接的证据显然是政策，但我们是否在贸易数据中看到了这一点？

The smoking gun is obviously the policies, but do we see it in the trade data?

已有研究强调，敌对集团之间的一些分裂已经开始显现。

And there is some research that has highlighted that, some of the fragmentation between rival blocks is already happening.

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后，贸易增长出现下滑。

After the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, there's been a decline in trade growth.

这种下滑在集团内部贸易中表现得更为明显。

This decline was much more evident between blocks that trade within blocks.

因此，这是表明这种割裂正在发生的一个证据。

So that's one piece of evidence that suggests that this fragmentation is happening.

当然，正如我们所知，贸易政策正在实时发生变化。

And, of course, as we know, trade policies are changing as we speak.

所以这种变化最终将如何长期影响全球贸易，目前尚无定论。

And so the the jury's out how this will eventually impact global trade in the longer term.

我们在报告中试图阐述的第二点是，显然，这些与割裂相关的政策变化也导致了全球贸易的重新分配。

The second point that we try to make in the paper is that, obviously, these changes in policies that are associated to fragmentation also create a reallocation of global trade.

随着贸易的重新分配，实际上可能有些国家会受益。

And as trade reallocates, then it's possible that some countries actually benefit.

如果我的竞争对手在集团之外而我在集团之内，那么我面临的竞争就会减少，这一点也有证据支持。

If my competitor is out of the block while I'm within the block, my competition is reduced on my side, and there is evidence of that as well.

现在的问题是，这对发展中国家尤其是最不发达国家来说是个好消息吗？

Now the question is, is this a good news for developing countries and especially least developing countries?

如果我们观察2018-2019年中美关税战期间的情况，会发现大量这种重新分配现象，有些国家确实获益，但获益的国家基本上都是老面孔。

Now if we look at what happened especially with The US China tariffs in 02/1819, we observed a lot of this reallocation and some countries gains, but the countries that gains were essentially the usual suspects.

像越南、墨西哥、马来西亚这些国家，它们本就深度融入全球供应链，现在变得更加紧密。

So countries like, Vietnam, Mexico, Malaysia, these were countries that were already very well anchored into global supply chains, and they became even more integrated.

而那些处于全球供应链边缘、先前未融入的国家，则未能获得任何额外的准入机会。

The countries that are at the margins of global supply chains that were not integrated before did not gain any additional access.

因此担忧在于，碎片化不一定会为欠发达国家创造更多融入全球体系的机会。

So the concern is that fragmentation will not necessarily create opportunities for less developing countries to integrate more.

在2018、2019年关税政策后，许多人指出——包括我们自己在内的多项研究表明，实际上许多国家在出口方面从这些关税中受益。

After, you know, the tariffs of 2018, 2019, many people said, there's a lot of work by ourselves, among others, that show that actually many countries benefited in terms of exports from the tariffs.

所以一种反应是这对许多发展中国家其实是好事。

So one reaction was actually this has been good for many developing countries.

这对贸易是个好消息。

This has been good news for trade.

但实际受益的国家是那些已经融入世界贸易体系的国家。

But actually the countries that did benefit were the countries that were already integrated in the world trading system.

因此这反而成为支持贸易而非反对贸易、支持保护主义的论据。

So if anything, this was an argument in favor of trade, not against trade and in favor of protection.

我们不想涉入近期政治议题，部分因为这些变化非常不稳定。

We don't want to get into very recent politics, partly because these are very volatile.

但按照集团划分的这种碎片化，直到最近仍是学术界的共识。

But this fragmentation along blocks, along block lines, this was the consensus in the literature until very recently.

然而最近政策变化的方式甚至让这种观点也受到质疑——美国最新一轮关税针对所有国家。

However, policies have changed very recently in a way that make even this view questionable in the sense that the latest round of tariffs in The US target everyone.

不仅针对非盟国，对盟友和非盟友同样征税。

So not just countries that are not allied with The US, they target allies as much as non allies.

未来形势现在真的难以预测。

The future now is really unpredictable.

现在的贸易体系是基于实力的。

Now the trade system is power based.

因此，强国正在与各个贸易伙伴单独谈判协议。

So the powerful countries are negotiating agreements with individual trade partners.

很难从这些双边协议推断出一两年后世界会是什么样子。

It's hard to extrapolate from these bilateral agreements to how the world will look a year or two from now.

我们再次生活在一个高度波动、不可预测的时代，这本身对贸易和发展就有重要影响。

Once again, we live at a time of very high volatility, unpredictability, and that itself has important implications for trade and development.

引用你论文中的话，贸易和全球化越来越不可能像过去那样为快速增长和发展提供相同路径。

Quote from your paper, it appears increasingly unlikely that trade and globalization will offer the same pathways for rapid growth and development that they did in the past.

佩尼，正如你一开始所说，真的不会再出现增长奇迹了吗？

Is it really the case, as you said at the beginning, Peni, no more growth miracles?

发展中国家不太可能出现增长奇迹。

Growth miracles are not likely for developing countries.

这并不意味着增长是不可能的。

That doesn't mean that growth is impossible.

增长可能会更缓慢。

It could be slower.

我们认为，他们将不得不越来越多地依赖本国资源。

In our view, they would have to rely more and more on their own domestic resources.

因此，稳健的国内政策比以往任何时候都更重要。

So sound domestic policies are more important than ever.

话虽如此，最贫穷的低收入国家仍然需要外国援助。

That said, the poorest countries, the low income countries still need foreign assistance.

他们很难靠自己完成发展。

It's very hard to do it on their own.

这正是重大挑战所在。

And that's where the big challenges are.

当你面临结构性政策和这些地缘政治变化时，全球经济当然会以某种形式进行调整。

When you have the structural policies and these geopolitical changes, of course, the global economy will adjust in some form.

因此，随着多边机构式微，区域合作伙伴关系可能会变得更加重要。

So as multilateral institutions weaken, maybe we'll see the regional partnerships really matter more.

随着发达经济体提高贸易壁垒，南南贸易可能会变得相对更重要。

As advanced economies raise their trade barriers, it's possible that South South trade would become relatively more relevant.

随着技术变革，服务贸易占全球贸易的比重可能会日益增加。

As technology changes, it's possible that services trade will become an increasingly more relevant share of world trade.

贸易与发展的关联在未来仍将重要，但以出口为导向的增长奇迹的条件正在改变。

The trade and development nexus will remain important in the future, but the conditions that were export led growth miracles are changing.

这就是为什么我们对这些奇迹在未来能重演持悲观态度。

And this is why we are pessimistic about the fact that these miracles can repeat themselves in the future.

虽是悲观，但有充分依据。

It's pessimism, but it's well founded.