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您正在收听的是TIP节目。
You're listening to TIP.
今天的嘉宾是霍华德·马克斯,他是我们这个时代最具影响力且广受尊敬的投资者之一。
My guest today is Howard Marks, who's one of the most influential and widely admired investors of our time.
霍华德是橡树资本的联合创始人,管理着约1660亿美元的资产。
Howard is the cofounder of Oaktree Capital, where he oversees about a $166,000,000,000 in assets.
橡树的成功使霍华德成为亿万富翁,但他真正非凡之处在于其思想的深度。
Oaktree's success has made Howard a multibillionaire, but what's really remarkable about him is the quality of his thinking.
在我的著作《更富有、更智慧、更快乐》中,我用整整一章描写霍华德,称他为金融界的哲人王。
In my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier, I wrote a whole chapter about Howard and described him as a philosopher king of finance.
在我看来,在我见过的人中,没有人比他更擅长解释如何在这个瞬息万变、无人知晓未来的世界里进行明智投资。
As I see it, nobody I've ever met is better at explaining how to invest intelligently in an uncertain world where everything is changing all of the time and nobody knows what the future holds.
正如本期节目你将听到的,霍华德成功的秘诀之一是他的谦逊。
As you'll hear in this episode, one of the secrets of Howard's success is his humility.
在投资界摸爬滚打五十余年后,他仍在不断质疑自己的信念,自问可能错在何处,并迫使自己适应这个持续变化的世界。
After more than fifty years in the investment business, he's still constantly challenging his own beliefs and asking himself why he might be wrong and pushing himself to adapt as the world continues to change.
霍华德引用克林特·伊斯特伍德电影中的台词总结这种心态——片中警探'肮脏哈里'说:'人贵有自知之明'。
Howard sums up this mindset by quoting a Clint Eastwood movie in which a cop named Dirty Harry says a man's got to know his limitations.
在这次对话中,霍华德坦率地谈及自己当初否定比特币可能是个错误。
In this conversation, Howard speaks candidly about why he was probably wrong to dismiss Bitcoin.
他分享了对当前市场环境的看法。
He shares his views on the current market environment.
他阐释了如何在高通胀时期成功投资,并解释了为何在多数外国投资者认为风险过高的情况下,他仍对中国市场持乐观态度。
He explains how to invest successfully in a period of high inflation, and he talks about why he's so bullish about China at a time when most foreign investors think it's way too risky to invest there.
他还谈到了诚信、公平等传统价值观的益处。
He also talks about the benefits of old fashioned values like integrity and fairness.
希望您能享受霍华德·马克斯的这堂大师课——关于如何做好投资、深度思考以及获得幸福人生。
I hope you enjoy this masterclass from Howard Marks on how to invest well, how to think well, and how to live a happy life.
您正在收听的是《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》播客,主持人威廉·格林将采访世界顶级投资者,探讨如何在市场与人生中获胜。
You're listening to the richer, wiser, happier podcast, where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
大家好。
Hi, everyone.
很高兴能在这里与霍华德·马克斯一起。
I'm delighted to be here with Howard Marks.
霍华德,非常感谢您加入我们。
Howard, thank you so much for joining us.
再次见到您真是太好了。
It's wonderful to see you again.
这是我的荣幸,威廉。
It's my pleasure, William.
霍华德,我记得您出生于1946年,大约是二战结束后的七八个月。
Howard, you were born, I think, in 1946, maybe seven or eight months after World War II ended.
显然那是个灾难性的时期,尤其对我们这样的犹太家庭来说。
So obviously it had been a disastrous period, particularly for Jewish families like yours and mine.
您的父母也经历过经济大萧条时期。
I think you grew up as the child of parents who'd also lived through the Great Depression.
我想知道,父母是如何影响您的风险态度,以及让您明白在这个充满危险与不确定性的世界里保持谨慎是明智之举的?
I'm wondering how did your parents influence your attitude to risk and your sense that it's wise to be cautious because the world is a perilous and intensely uncertain place?
首先,当你说'经历过大萧条'时,我总是想强调一个区别——他们不仅经历过大萧条,而且是在成年时期经历的大萧条。
Well, first of all, when you say lived through the depression, I always try to make the distinction, not only did they live through the depression, they were adults during the depression.
如果你当时只有五岁,可能不会有那么鲜活的记忆。
If you were five years old, you may not have a vivid memory.
那段经历可能不会留下太深的烙印。
It may not have been printed so much.
但我父母出生于世纪之初,所以大萧条时期他们已是二十多岁的成年人。
But my parents were born in the oughts, and so they were in their twenties plus in the depression.
我认为如果你经历过那个年代,就会变得风险厌恶且谨慎。
And I think that if you lived through that, you came away risk averse and cautious.
因此在我成长过程中,'未雨绸缪'和'不要把所有鸡蛋放在一个篮子里'这类谚语无处不在。
And so when I was growing up, phrases like save for a rainy day and don't put all your eggs in one basket were everywhere.
我想如果比我晚出生十年——尤其是二十年的人,可能从未听过这些话。
I think if you were born ten years later than me or certainly 20, you never heard those things.
我认为这很重要。
And I think that's important.
此外,我父亲是个世界级的悲观主义者,这也让我养成了不轻易期待好事发生的习惯。
In addition, my father was a world champion pessimist, and so that also prevented me getting in the habit of expecting good things to happen.
我常想这是否就是为什么许多伟大的价值投资者都来自犹太背景——我们确实经历了太多灾难。
I often wonder if that's why so many of the great value investors come from these kind of Jewish backgrounds where we actually experience so much disaster.
因为我记得小时候给祖母打电话,她接起电话时总会说‘喂?’
Because I remember as a kid, would phone my grandmother and she would literally answer the phone, hello?
那语气仿佛来电者是要通知她灾难降临似的。
As if someone was calling to tell her that catastrophe was arriving.
听起来这种将人生视为充满不确定性的观念,从最初就深深植根于你的世界观中了。
So it sounds like that was deeply embedded just in your view of life as a kind of uncertain enterprise from the very beginning.
没错。
Right.
在我们深入讨论犹太家庭这个话题前——虽然是你提起的——我必须说明我并非在犹太教环境中长大。
Now before we go too far on this subject of Jewish families, you raised, I have to point out I was not brought up Jewish.
我母亲本是犹太人,后来因医学未能治愈她的疾病而改信基督教科学派,之后她确实康复了。
My mother was a Jew who converted to Christian science because medicine wasn't curing some ill, and she got better.
因此她将康复归功于基督教科学派,并成为其虔诚的信徒。
So she attributed to Christian science and became an ardent follower of Christian Science.
而我则是在基督教科学派的熏陶下长大的。
And I was brought up as a Christian Scientist.
我每周日去教堂做礼拜,每周三上圣经课,而且从未饮酒或看过医生。
I went to church every Sunday, bible class every Wednesday, and, never had a drink or a trip to the doctor.
这真令人着迷。
That's fascinating.
我记得曾与你聊过这个话题,你谈到你的道德观深受母亲教诲和教堂经历的影响。
I remember once talking to you about that and you talking about how your sense of morality was deeply informed by what you learned from your mother and what you experienced at church.
这么说准确吗?
Is that fair to say?
我认为是这样的。
I think that's right.
没错。
Yeah.
那是一种宗教式的成长环境。
It was a religious upbringing.
那么后来,如果我们快进一点,你在1968年夏天开始了第一份工作,在First City National Bank,那可是1968年,一个伟大的时期。
So later on, if we skip forward a bit, you started in your first summer job at First City National Bank in 1968, in the 1968, a great period.
那正好是我出生的年份,霍华德。
That was exactly when I was born, Howard.
我想你是在1969年成为股票分析师的,那时你大概23岁左右,后来成为了First City的研究总监。
And I think you became an equity analyst in 1969, when you must have been, what, about 23 years old, and then director of research at First City.
那正是'漂亮50'股票飙升的疯狂年代。
So these were the go go years when the nifty 50 stocks were soaring.
据我所知,当泡沫在1972到1974年破裂时,你失去了研究总监的职位。
As I remember, you then lost your job as the director of research when the bubble burst in 'seventy two to 'seventy four.
我想知道那段早期非理性繁荣的经历给你带来了什么启示。
And I'm wondering what that early experience of irrational exuberance taught you.
还有,职业生涯早期这次令人谦卑的挫折,如何塑造了你对投资的看法。
And also how that humbling early setback in your career shaped your perspective on how to invest.
因为看起来你在职业生涯非常关键的早期阶段就经历了一场风暴。
Because it seems like you went through a firestorm very early at a very formative period in your career.
是的。
Yes.
回顾起来,威廉,我不确定当时是否意识到这场风暴有多严重。
In looking back, William, I'm not sure I recognized at the time how bad the firestorm was.
我以为自己做得还不错。
I thought I was doing okay.
只是那些'漂亮50'股票当时表现非常糟糕。
It's just the Nifty 50 stocks that were having a terrible time.
不过确实,我当时加入了第一国民花旗银行的投资研究部门做暑期工,这家银行后来演变成现在所称的花旗集团。
But, yes, I joined the investment research department for the summer at First National Citibank, which later morphed into they now call Citi.
我记得它当时可能是全球最大的金融机构,正如那些'漂亮50'股票一样如日中天,我们当时用'货币中心银行'这个词来指代波士顿、芝加哥和纽约的那些主要银行。
I believe it was the maybe the world's largest financial institution at the time, riding high, as were the nifty 50 stocks that most of the money center banks we had this expression, money center banks, the ones in Boston and Chicago and New York.
而且,大多数货币中心银行都奉行这种所谓的'漂亮50'投资策略,就是投资这50只股票。
And, most of the money center banks subscribed to this thing called nifty 50 investing, investing in the 50.
虽然不严格限定为50家,但都是美国最优秀且增长最快的公司。
It wasn't strictly 50, but in the best and fastest growing companies in America.
这些公司如此卓越,似乎永远不会遭遇困境。
Companies that were so great that nothing bad could ever happen.
由于它们增长迅猛且品质超群,官方信条是:不存在价格过高这回事。
And because they were growing so fast and of such high quality, the official dictum was that there was no such thing as a price too high.
关键就在于——没有过高的价格。
And importantly, no price too high.
我想,'没有过高价格'这五个字正是泡沫的典型特征。
Those four words, I think, are the hallmark of a bubble.
每次出现泡沫时,我们都会听到这种论调。
And we hear it said every time something's in a bubble.
回首往事,那是我第一次与泡沫经济擦肩而过。
So looking back, I had my first brush with a bubble.
如果你在我入职当天买入这些股票并持有五年,几乎会赔光所有本金。
And if you bought the stocks the day I reported to work and held them for five years, you lost almost all your money.
为什么?
Why?
第一,它们的价格过高,许多公司的市盈率在七十到九十之间。
Number one, they were too high, and many of them carried PE ratios between seventy and ninety.
而五年后,这个数字降到了七到九。
And five years later, between seven and nine.
所以这相当于直接从顶部砍掉了90%。
So there's 90% off the top right there.
但其次,这些被认为无比伟大的公司,本应无往不利。
But secondly, these companies that were so great, nothing bad could ever happen.
结果其中很多都被发现存在致命缺陷。
A lot of them turned out to have, feet of clay.
明白吗?
You know?
宝丽来现在在哪?
Where's Polaroid?
柯达去哪儿了?
Where's Kodak?
Simplicity Pattern公司后来怎么样了?
Whatever happened to Simplicity Pattern?
现在你还认识谁自己做衣服的?
Who do you know that makes their own clothes these days?
所以这展示了对一个概念的盲目忠诚,最终演变成泡沫并崩溃。
So it shows you the undying devotion to a concept, which became a bubble, which became a crash.
花旗银行的整体投资业绩非常糟糕,以至于1977年他们聘请了新的首席投资官彼得·维尔米尔,我们相处得很好,但他想任命自己的研究主管。
The overall investment results at Citibank were so bad that in 1977, they brought in a new chief investment officer, Peter Vermilhier, and we hit it off well, but he wanted to have his own director of research.
我帮他物色了一个叫查理·波顿的人来担任这个职位。
And I helped him land a guy named Charlie Porton for that job.
然后他问我:那么你接下来想做什么?
And then he says to me, well, what do you wanna do next?
回想起来,我觉得自己没被解雇算是幸运的。
In retrospect, I think I was lucky not to get fired.
但当然,在那个年代,美国企业界几乎等同于终身雇佣制。
But, of course, in those days, corporate America pretty much involved lifetime employment.
所以我说,你知道,我什么都愿意做,除了把余生都花在默克和礼来之间做选择。
So I said, you know, I'll do anything except spend the rest of my life choosing between Merck and Lilly.
我认为市场效率有高有低,而美国大型蓝筹股市场属于最有效率的市场之一。
There are, I believe, more and less efficient markets, and the market for the great US big stocks is among the most efficient markets.
我觉得把生命耗费在它们之间做选择多半是浪费时间。
And I think that to spend your life choosing among them is mostly a waste of time.
而且我们知道,大多数管理大型股票资金的人,他们的表现大多不如指数。
And we know that most people who manage money in the biggest stocks, most of them don't do as well as the index.
所以这对我来说是个明智的决定。
So that was a good decision on my part.
来自摩根大通的维尔米利尔说,他们曾有个非常成功的可转换债券基金,他让我加入债券部门并创立一个可转债基金,我在1978年5月就这么做了。
And Vermeillier, who had come from JPMorgan said that where they had a very successful convertible bond fund, he said, I want you to join the bond department and start a convertible bond fund, which I did in May 1978.
你知道,这很有意思。
And, you know, it's interesting.
我从拥有75名下属、500万美元预算(在当时是笔巨款),以及投资集团所有五个最重要委员会的席位,变成了没有团队、没有预算、没有委员会的状态——而我欣喜若狂。
I went from 75 subordinates, a $5,000,000 budget in a time when that was a lot of money, and membership on all five of the investment group's most important committees to no staff, no budget, no committees, and I was ecstatic.
作为研究主管,我的工作是对400家公司各掌握两句话的结论。
As director of research, my job was to know two sentences on 400 companies.
现在我只需要深入了解少数几家公司。
Now I only had to know everything about a few companies.
我不再在人人皆知的大盘股领域竞争,而是转向了鲜有人关注的小众市场。
And I was rather than competing in the big stocks where everybody knows everything, I was competing in a small backwater that very few people were concerned with.
这里取得卓越表现的空间更大,而深入钻研少数领域带来的智力激荡也令人振奋。
And the scope for superior performance was much greater, and the intellectual excitement of knowing a few things in-depth was terrific.
这确实让我的职业生涯和生活进入了快速上升通道。
And that really put my career, my life on a great upward trajectory.
我想你也算幸运,正好赶上了迈克尔·米尔肯垃圾债券时代的开端,这个领域突然变得极其重要。
You also got lucky, I guess, that you were right there at the beginning of that kind of Michael Milken era of junk bonds when suddenly this became an area that would become extraordinarily important.
所以很明显,这其中存在纯粹的运气成分——你恰好抓住了这个惊人的浪潮。
So clearly, there's an profound element of just sheer luck that you happen to catch this amazing wave.
要知道,我深信运气的重要性。
You know, I'm a great believer in luck.
我至今已为客户撰写备忘录三十四年了。
I've been writing the memos to clients now for, I think this is the thirty fourth year.
我记得在2014年1月写过一篇题为《把握运气》的文章,直到最近它仍是反响最热烈的一篇。
I wrote one, I believe it was January '14 called getting lucky, and that one got the most responses of any until lately.
那篇文章讲述了我有多么幸运。
And it was about how lucky I've been.
我深感自己异常幸运——从出生的时机到身处婴儿潮一代的前沿,再到虽被断言不可能却仍进入沃顿商学院等等。
I feel I've been inordinately lucky, from the timing of my birth to my position at the front of the baby boom to the fact that I got into Wharton when they said I wouldn't and so forth.
但毫无疑问,1978年5月创立可转换债券基金后,那个八月份改变我人生的电话来了。
But certainly, you know, having started the convertible bond fund in May 1978, I got the call in August that changed my life.
债券部门主管来电说:'加州有个叫米尔肯还是什么的人,在做一种叫高收益债券的东西'。
It was from the head of the bond department, and he said, there's some guy named Milken or something out in California, and he deals in something called high yield bonds.
他说:'你觉得你能搞清楚那是什么吗?'
Do you think you can figure out what that is?
低评级债券一直存在,但在77、78年之前,它们的产生方式是高评级债券陷入困境后降级,即所谓的'堕落天使'。
There have always been low grade bonds, but the way they came into existence prior to '77, '78 was that they were high grade bonds that got into trouble, so called fallen angels.
迈克尔·米尔肯、德崇证券及当时其他一些人的独特贡献在于,他们提出了一个理念:只要利率足以抵消风险,就应该能够发行非投资级债券。
What Michael Milken, Drexel Burnham, and some others at the time did uniquely is they had this concept that you should be able to issue non investment grade bonds if the interest rate is sufficient to offset the risk.
这完全合理。
Makes perfect sense.
但在那个年代之前,发行非投资级债券是不可能的。
But prior to those days, it was impossible to issue a bond that wasn't investment grade.
穆迪手册中对B级债券的定义如下:不具备理想投资的特征。
Moody's in its manual defined a b rated bond as follows, fails to possess the characteristics of a desirable investment.
换句话说,就是垃圾债券。
In other words, it was bad.
而且这个定义完全不考虑价格因素。
And that was without reference to price.
如果你仔细想想,这正是对我七十年代经历的完美呼应。
And this was, if you think about it, the ideal bookend to my experience in the seventies.
我从在美国最优秀的公司亏大钱,转变成通过投资美国一些最差公司的债券安全稳定地赚大钱。
I went from losing a lot of money in the best companies in America to making a lot of money safely and steadily in the bonds of some of the worst companies in America.
这让我得出两个结论。
So it helped me to two conclusions.
关键不是你买什么,而是你以什么价格买。
It's not what you buy, it's what you pay.
好的投资源于买得好,而不是买好东西。
And good investing comes from buying things well, not from buying good things.
如果你分不清买好东西和买得好的区别,那你可能入错行了。
And if you don't know the difference between buying good things and buying things well, then you're probably in the wrong business.
但这对我来说是一个顿悟。
But it was an epiphany for me.
正如你所说,天时地利。
And as you say, right time, right place.
高收益债券行业的诞生。
The birth of the high yield bond industry.
1978年我刚入行时,市场上流通的债券规模是20亿。
There were 2,000,000,000 of bonds outstanding when I started in '78.
而如今这个数字可能已高达2万亿。
There are probably 2,000,000,000,000 today.
除了科技、互联网和风投领域,金融界几乎所有重要发展都基于风险与回报这一核心理念。
And almost every important development in the world of finance other than tech, Internet, and venture is based on this idea of risk and return.
在此之前,投资者一直认为规避风险是自己的职责。
That prior to these days, it was considered the investor's job to avoid risk.
而让世界顿悟的是:只要获得足够补偿,承担风险未尝不可——这个公式如今主导着整个投资行业。
The epiphany for the world was you can take risk if you're adequately compensated, and that formulation really runs the investment business today.
漂亮50时代,投资者完全忽视估值,认为可以不计价格买入。
In the nifty 50 era, investors had ignored valuations, assuming you could pay any price.
后来你却在垃圾债券这类廉价资产上赚得盆满钵满。
Then you make this fortune off cheap assets like junk bonds.
你很早就领悟了这些关键教训:对市场狂热保持警惕,寻找廉价标的,紧盯买入价格。
You learn these key lessons very early on about being skeptical of euphoria, seeking bargains, focusing on price.
这些策略自1978年左右以来对你来说效果出奇地好。
These things have worked incredibly well for you since maybe 1978, something like that.
但我的感觉是,这些信念近年来有所演变,部分原因是你与儿子安德鲁在疫情期间的对话。
But my sense is that those beliefs have evolved in recent years, partly because of conversations that you've had with your son Andrew during COVID.
我想知道你是否能详细谈谈这些变化,以及你与安德鲁的对话如何影响了你对估值、应对市场狂热、何时卖出等问题的看法。
And I wondered if you could talk us through in some detail what's changed, how you came to have these conversations with Andrew that I think have led some of your views about what to pay, how to deal with euphoria, when to sell, things like that.
看起来过去两年里你的思维方式确实发生了相当深刻的变化。
It seems like there's actually quite a profound evolution in your thinking that's taken place in the last two years.
嗯,这个问题足够我们聊上一个小时。
Well, well, you might could speak for the next hour just on that one question.
不过,如果你问我属于哪类投资者?
But, you know, if you said to me, what kind of investor are you?
主要分为成长型和价值型两大流派。
The main bifurcation is growth versus value.
我过去会说自己是个价值投资者。
And I would have said I'm a value investor.
价值投资关注的是当下。
Value invests because of the here and now.
成长投资着眼于未来。
Growth invests in what's on the come.
价值投资基于资产价值和现金流,而成长投资则基于遥远未来的潜力。
Value invests in on the basis of asset values and cash flows, and growth invests on the basis of potential in the distant future.
成长与价值投资的这种分野大约始于八九十年代。
This bifurcation between growth and value really arose probably sometime in the eighties or nineties.
在六十年代之前并不需要这种区分。
You didn't need it before the sixties.
当时只有一种投资方式,用巴菲特的话说就是单纯的投资,但实际上就是我们今天所说的价值投资。
There was only one kind of investing, and that was well, Buffett says it was just investing, but it was really what we call value today.
到了六十年代,才出现了所谓的成长投资。
And then in the sixties, this thing called growth investing was invented.
我记得六十年代初坐在父亲的公寓里,读着一本美林证券关于成长股投资的小册子。
I remember sitting in my dad's apartment in early sixties and reading a brochure from, I think it was Merrill Lynch about growth stock investing.
于是他们给这些股票贴上了成长股投资的标签。
And so they put the label of growth stock investing on those.
这意味着他们用价值投资的标签来区分另一类股票。
That meant they put the label of value investing to distinguish the other.
投资行业,尤其是股票投资行业,确实围绕这种区分形成了固化模式。
And the investing industry, especially the stock investing industry, really hardened around that distinction.
而且,你知道,当你向保险公司、养老基金或主权财富基金申请时说,我想请你雇佣我作为投资经理,或者说雇佣我的公司。
And, you know, when you apply to a an insurance company or a pension fund or a sovereign wealth fund, you say, I'd like you to hire me as an investment manager, you know, hire my firm.
他们会问——虽然不总是用这些词——但实际意思是:你属于哪个类别?
They say, well, which they don't always use these words, but what they say is, well, which bucket do you fall in?
因为我们有分配给价值投资的资金,也有分配给成长投资的资金。
Because we have an allocation of money for value, and we have an allocation of money for growth.
顺便说一句,我们有大盘成长股、大盘价值股、小盘成长股、小盘价值股、海外成长股、海外价值股。
By the way, we have large cap growth, large cap value, small cap growth, small cap value, foreign growth, foreign value.
这一切都是按照资金配置的类别来划分的。
It's all done on a bucket basis with allocations.
正如有人曾对我说的,这种区分某种程度上被神学化了,你知道,固化成了一种宗教。
And as somebody once said to me about this, the distinction kind of became theologized, you know, hardened into a religion.
幸运的是,由于我不在股市中操作,所以没有受到这种固化的影响。
And fortunately, since I didn't operate in the stock market, I was not affected by that hardening.
但我仍然认为,这就是我们在橡树资本以及我个人作为价值投资者的思维方式,意味着我们不去猜测未来。
But I still I mean, that's the way we thought of ourselves at Oaktree and myself as value investors, which meant we don't speculate about the future.
我们不去推测今天的事物会如何发展。
We don't guess about what today is gonna grow into.
我们基于当前属性进行投资,并适度预期这些属性会延续到未来。
We invest on the basis of the present attributes with a modest expectation that they'll continue into the future.
快进到2020年3月,疫情爆发了。
So fast forward to March 2020, the pandemic hits.
我当时在加州参加橡树资本的半年度客户会议。
I'm out in California for Oaktree's semiannual client conference.
我们取消了会议,但决定在3月11日改为线上直播。
We canceled the conference, but we decide to livestream it instead on March 11.
我们决定不在3月5日举办。
We decided not to hold it on, I think, March 5.
我们在11号举办了这场没有现场观众的会议。
And we did the conference to no audience on the eleventh.
我们进行了直播。
We livestreamed.
反响很好。
It was well received.
然后在13号,我儿子安德鲁、他妻子和宝宝来到加州躲避疫情,搬来和我们同住。
And then on the thirteenth, my son Andrew, his wife, and baby arrive in California to ride out the pandemic, and they move in with us.
你知道,整个三月、四月和五月我们都住在一起。
And, you know, for March, April, and May, we lived together.
在当今世界,三代人甚至两代成年人同住很罕见,但过去并不这么少见。
And it's rare in today's world for three generations, even two generations of adult to live together, but it didn't used to be so rare.
但结果是促成了很多精彩的对话。
But the result was great conversations.
安德鲁是一位专业投资者,思维极其缜密。
And Andrew is a professional investor, extremely thoughtful.
我会说他在这些事上很有学识,虽然这听起来像他是个学者,但他绝对不是学者,而是一个真正的思考者。
I would say intellectual about these things, although that make it sound like he's an academic, and he's certainly not an academic, but he's really a thinker.
因此我们进行了热烈的讨论,最终成果是我在21年1月写的一份题为《价值之物》的备忘录。
And so we had spirited conversations, And the result was a memo that I wrote in January '21 called something of value.
我称之为《价值之物》,首先是因为它真正探讨了人们应该如何思考价值投资,以及如何模糊价值与增长之间的界限。
I called it something of value because number one, it's really about how people should think about value investing and how they should kind of loosen the divide between value and growth.
其次,这个标题的另一个原因是,它是疫情中的一线曙光。
And number two, the other reason for that title is that it was a silver lining in the pandemic.
能够与儿子共同生活三个月,并且如此亲密地融入他的家庭,确实是极具价值的事。
It really was something of great value to be able to live with my son for three months and, you know, so intimately also with his family.
这确实是一份特别精彩的备忘录。
Also a particularly wonderful memo.
我这么说是因为我可能读完了你过去三十年的所有备忘录,其中许多还不止一遍。
I I say this having probably read all of your memos over the last thirty years and many of them more than once.
这是一篇非常棒的文章。
It's a wonderful one.
部分原因,我认为它之所以能如此深刻地引起人们共鸣,是因为你足够谦逊地说:'看看我,作为这样一个亿万富翁般'
Partly, I think the reason it's resonated so deeply with people And is because you were humble enough to say, Here I am as this kind of billionaire kind
的投资界传奇人物
of legend in the investing
你实际上足够开放和谦逊地说:'事实上,我认为我儿子正在教会我一些我以前不理解的东西。'
you're actually open enough and humble enough to say, Actually, I think there are things that my son is teaching me that I haven't understood before.
看到一位父亲向儿子学习,有种特别的温馨感。
There's something kind of lovely about seeing a father learning from his son.
能否请你谈谈他提到的一些关键观点?比如显然他当时正在买入科技股和一些成长股,而且任何时候都不愿卖出。
If you could talk a bit about some of the key things that he said about things like, because obviously he was buying tech stocks and some growth stocks that he wasn't keen to sell at any point.
这确实对你'价格才是最重要的'以及'投资中最大的错误就是出价过高'的假设提出了实质性质疑。
And this raises real questions about your assumption that price is really what matters most and that the biggest mistake in investing is to overpay.
正如你们国家的温斯顿·丘吉尔曾评价某人时所说:'他是个谦逊的人,而且他有很多值得谦逊的理由。'
You know, as your countryman, Winston Churchill, once said of somebody, he's a humble man and he's he has a lot to be humble about.
人们喜欢那篇关于运气的备忘录,因为我向人们展示了自己真实的一面,并承认了自己的好运。
People liked the memo on luck because I showed people the personal side of myself and acknowledged my good luck.
更多人喜欢有价值的东西,我想原因相同——因为我展现了个人特质以及我的易错性和不完美。
Even more people like something of value, I think for the same reasons because I showed the personal and my fallibility or imperfections.
你知道,标普500指数将股票分为成长股和价值股两部分。
You know, S and P breaks the S and P 500 equity index into a growth portion and a value portion.
如果你问成长股的定义,它们是指那些预计未来会有很高增长率的股票。
And if you ask the definition of the growth stocks, they're the ones that are projected to have very high rates of growth in the future.
但如果你看价值股,核心就是价格。
But if you look at the value stocks, it's all about price.
低价,低市净率、低市销率和低市盈率。
Low prices, low ratio of price to book and to revenues and to earnings.
一切都与价格有关。
It's all about price.
完全不涉及公司本身。
Nothing about the companies.
安德鲁对我说的话让我印象深刻,他说巴菲特作为价值投资的王者,其重要观点之一就是当你投资时,应该把自己视为购买一家公司的一部分,而不是在买一张纸片,就像交易卡那样,而是购买企业的一部分。
And what Andrew said to me, impressed on me, is that Buffett, the king of value investing, one of his important points is that when you invest, you should think of yourself as buying a piece of a company, not buying some piece of paper, you know, like a trading card, a piece of a company.
如果你买入一家优秀公司的股票,而这家公司持续优秀、前景光明,你就应该倾向于长期持有它。
And if you buy the stock of a great company and it stays great and its future stays bright, you should tend to wanna hold it for a long time.
这确实是个重大转变。
Now this is a great departure.
他还指出另一点:那么价值投资者是做什么的?
And another thing he pointed out was, so what does a value investor do?
你知道,巴菲特常说他能以50美分买到价值1美元的东西。
You know, Buffett talks about having been able to buy dollars for 50¢.
这是什么意思呢?
What does that mean?
意思是你在阴沟里寻找你认为值1美元的东西,花50美分买下它,等它升值到1美元时卖出,然后继续寻找下一个能用50美分买到的1美元。
Means you look in the gutter, you find what you think is a dollar, you buy it for 50¢, it becomes worth a dollar, you sell it, and you look for another dollar that you can buy for 50¢.
所以这是个不断轮动的过程:买入廉价资产,期待它们价值回归,然后转向下一个廉价资产。
So it's a constant rotating process of buying cheap assets and hoping they become fully priced and then moving on to another cheap asset.
这是一种短期关系,纯粹为了获取折扣而设计。
It's a short term relationship just designed to garner discounts.
它与公司的长期潜力毫无关系。
It has nothing to do with the long run potential of the company.
不过极端情况下,这并非巴菲特过去五十年真正在做的事。
When taken to extreme, though, that's not really what Buffett has done in the last fifty years.
他称之为'雪茄烟蒂投资法'。
He called it cigar butt investing.
这可能是他在六十年代之前的做法,但此后就改变了。
Maybe it is what he did, you know, prior to the sixties, but not since.
我认为查理·芒格被普遍认为是促使沃伦停止'烟蒂投资',转而以合理价格买入优秀公司股票的关键人物。
And I think that Charlie Munger is broadly credited with getting Warren to stop doing cigar butt investing and start buying the stocks of great companies at good prices.
所以安德鲁说,这种一味追求折扣、折扣、再折扣的理念是不够的。
So Andrew said this idea of just garnering discount, discount, discount, discount, it's not enough.
你应该投资一些优质公司。
You should get on some good companies.
你应该对这些公司形成更深入的理解,并知道何时该持有数十年。
You should develop a superior understanding of those companies and know when to hold for decades.
这很有吸引力。
That's attractive.
它并不完全符合价值投资的教条,当然也不属于非价值投资,但你实际上是在寻找价值。
It doesn't fall under the canon in terms of value or of certainly not value, but you're really you're looking for value.
只是你无法精确到每一分钱,因为许多吸引力存在于未来。
You just you can't quantify it to the penny because many of the attractions exist in the future.
因此备忘录的很多内容都是在软化价值与成长之间的界限。
And so a lot of the memo was about softening the edges of this divide between value and growth.
事实上,当我们开始撰写备忘录时,我们区分了小写的价值投资和大写的价值投资,大写的V代表神学化的版本。
And matter of fact, when we started working on the memo, we made a distinction between value investing with a small v and with a capital v, that the capital v was the theologized version.
但我认为他关于必须保持更开放心态的观点完全正确。
But I think that he was absolutely right in his points about the fact that you have to be more open minded.
当一种投资学派变得像价值投资那样教条化和精确定义时,我认为这是有局限性的。
When one school of investing becomes so dogmatic and so precisely defined as value did, I think, it's limiting.
当你有更多选择时,生活变得更加模糊,但这需要一定的灵活性和开放心态。
Life is more ambiguous when you have more options, but it requires a certain flexibility and open mindedness.
我要说的是,坚持开放心态是这份备忘录最重要的信息之一。
And I would say it that insisting on open mindedness was one of the most important messages of the memo.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得对比尔·米勒来说,这始终是他竞争优势的一部分——他没有这种对价值的教条式看法。
I I feel like for Bill Miller, that was always part of his competitive advantage was that he didn't have this theological view of value.
当他观察像亚马逊这样的公司时,他看到了它有朝一日可能价值连城,尽管在1999、2000年他买入时,你无法基于传统的价值观念来购买它。
When he looked at something like Amazon, he saw that it could be worth an enormous amount one day, even though you couldn't buy it based on kind of conventional views of value back in ninety nine, two thousand when he was buying it.
确实如此。
Exactly.
事实上,他在1999年表现非常出色。
In fact, he had a very good '99.
当时大多数价值投资者都在舔舐伤口,因为科技、互联网和成长股在泡沫顶峰时飙升,而价值股却被抛在了后面。
Most value people were licking their wounds because tech, Internet, and growth stocks soared at 99 at the apogee of the bubble, and, value was left behind.
我记得米勒在99年表现非常出色,他当时正在买入亚马逊这类公司。
And Miller had a great 99 as I recall, and he's buying things like Amazon and so forth.
我遇到他时曾问,你怎么能买这些?
And I ran into him, and I said, how could you buy?
你作为一个根深蒂固的价值投资者,怎么能买亚马逊?
How could you, a dyed in the wool value investor, buy Amazon?
你知道他怎么回答吗?
You know what he said?
他说:在我看来这就是价值。
Looked like value to me.
我认为这正是你必须具备的思维方式。
And I think that that's the kind of thinking that you have to have.
要知道,我成长于五六十年代,可能还有七十年代,那时感觉世界年复一年没什么变化。
You know, when I was a boy in the fifties and sixties, maybe the seventies, it felt like the world didn't change much from year to year.
漫画书的价格总是10美分,诸如此类。
The price of a comic book was always a dime and so forth.
因此你可以基于'事物今日价值不菲,且确信其明日仍将价值连城'这一命题进行投资。
And so you could invest on the proposition of things being worth a lot today, and they're confident that they'll be worth a lot tomorrow.
但如今,一切事物每天都在变化,科技的影响无处不在。
But today, everything changes every day, and the role of technology is ubiquitous.
我认为刻意区分并声称'我只投资那些我认为不会改变的事物'是一种错误,这种想法显得相当固步自封。
And I think it's a mistake to make that distinction and to say, oh, I invest in things that I believe will not change because that seems rather closed minded.
让我们先
Let's take a
稍事休息,听听今日赞助商的信息。
quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
随着比特币持仓增长,你面临的挑战也愈发复杂。
The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.
最初简单的自主托管,如今已涉及家族遗产规划、精密的安全决策,以及需要谨慎应对稍有不慎就可能损失世代财富的复杂局面。
What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.
常规服务并非为应对这些高风险现实而设计。
Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.
这就是为什么长期投资者选择Unchained Signature——一项为认真持有比特币、寻求专业指导、稳健托管和持久合作伙伴关系的客户提供的高端私人服务。
That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.
通过Signature服务,您将拥有一位专属客户经理,他们了解您的目标并全程为您提供帮助。
With Signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.
您将享受尊贵的入门服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低的交易费用,以及独家活动和功能的优先访问权。
You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.
Unchained的协作托管模式旨在提供与全球最大比特币托管机构相同的安全级别,但面向那些偏好自主掌控私钥的用户。
Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.
了解更多关于Unchained Signature的信息,请访问unchained.com/preston。
Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.
结账时使用代码Preston10可享受首年10%的折扣。
Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.
比特币不仅关乎当下生活,更关乎世代传承。
Bitcoin isn't just for life, it's for generations.
当您正在运行
When you're running
经营小企业时,招对人能带来天壤之别。
a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.
合适的员工能提升团队士气、提高生产力,并将业务推向新高度。
The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity, and take your business to the next level.
但找到这样的人选本身就像一份全职工作。
But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.
这正是领英招聘的用武之地。
That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.
他们的新AI助手能消除招聘中的猜测,为你精准匹配符合要求的顶尖候选人。
Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.
无需筛选成堆简历,它能根据你的标准过滤申请人并突出最佳匹配,节省数小时时间,让你在遇到合适人选时快速行动。
Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.
最棒的是这些优秀候选人已经在领英平台上。
The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.
事实上,通过领英招聘的员工比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工留任至少一年的可能性高出30%。
In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.
第一次就招对人。
Hire right the first time.
免费发布职位请访问 linkedin.com/studybill,然后推广使用 LinkedIn 工作的新AI助手,更轻松快捷地找到顶尖人才。
Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.
免费发布职位请访问 linkedin.com/studybill。
That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.
条款与条件适用。
Terms and conditions apply.
知道什么让最优秀的企业脱颖而出吗?
You know what sets the best businesses apart?
在于他们如何运用创新将复杂性转化为增长。
It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.
这正是亚马逊广告借助AWS人工智能所实现的。
That's exactly what Amazon ads is doing powered by AWS AI.
每天,亚马逊广告处理数十亿次实时决策,在310亿规模的广告生态系统中优化广告表现。
Every day, Amazon ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a 31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.
最终实现的广告活动运行速度提升30%,并在大规模范围内带来可衡量的商业影响。
The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.
这正是亚马逊自身推动增长的方式。
And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.
其代理型AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统,最大化投资回报率,并让营销人员能专注于创意与策略。
Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.
亚马逊广告证明,AI驱动的广告不仅是未来趋势,更是新的竞争优势。
Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.
更棒的是,每家企业都可以运用亚马逊内部完善的相同创新方案。
And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.
了解亚马逊广告的故事,请访问aws.comai/rstory。
See the Amazon Ads story at aws.comai/rstory.
网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
好的。
All right.
回到节目中来。
Back to the show.
显然,多年来你的部分优势在于这种识别模式的才能——你能观察像1999年互联网泡沫这样的时期,然后说:是的,这看起来有点像72、74年漂亮50时期的前兆。
Part of your advantage, obviously, over the years has been this gift for patent recognition that you could look at a period like 1999 during the .com bubble and say, Yep, this looks a bit like the period before 'seventy two, 'seventy four with the Nifty fifty.
你还会在全球金融危机前的泡沫时期再次观察到类似情况。
You would look again during the bubbly period before the global financial crisis.
你会说:没错,这看起来又是其中一次。
You'd say, Yep, this looks like another one of those again.
我正在纠结的部分——我认为《价值备忘录》提出的观点——就是在当前时期进行判断的极大困难性:一方面历史似乎在押韵,存在过度繁荣和过多的冒险行为。
Part of what I'm wrestling with that I think something a value memo brings up is just the tremendous difficulty of looking at our current period where, again, there's a sense in which history is rhyming and that there's excess and excessive exuberance and too much risk taking.
但另一方面,你在《价值备忘录》中提出的问题是:是的,有时候世界确实不同,正如坦普顿说的投资中最昂贵的话——'这次不一样'。
But then there's also this question that you're raising in that Something of Value memo, which is, well, yes, sometimes the world is different and Templeton's most expensive words in investing, that the most expensive words are, this time is different.
但正如你过去所说,有时候确实不同,而且在当前这种快速变化的时期,更可能频繁出现不同情况。
Well, sometimes as you've said in the past, it is different and it's likely to be different more frequently in a period like this with very rapid change.
我想知道你是如何应对这种相当痛苦的矛盾的。
I'm wondering how you grapple with that really kind of painful conflict.
这确实是个难以解开的难题。
It's a really difficult one to unravel.
嗯,确实如此。
Well, it is.
你提出了一个很好的问题。
That's a great question you ask.
就像投资中的大多数事情一样,这个问题也没有简单的答案。
There's no easy answer as there isn't to most things in investing.
我第一次听到'这次不一样'这句话是在1987年10月11日的《纽约时报》上。
The first time I heard those words, this time it's different, was New York Times, 10/11/1987.
当时我读到一篇安妮丝·华莱士写的文章。
And I read an article that was written by Annise Wallace.
标题是《这次并没有什么不同》。
The title was this time it's not any different.
她在文中描述了人们如何盲目追随'这次不一样'的说法,但就连坦普顿也承认,有20%的情况确实会有所不同。
And she went on to describe how people fall in line behind this time it's different, but that even Templeton allowed that 20% of the time things really are different.
如果你假设事物一成不变,过去的规则依然适用等等,生活会轻松许多。
Life is easier if you postulate that things don't change, that the rules of the past apply, etcetera.
当你不得不在流沙上生活时,情况就复杂多了。
It's more complicated when you have to live on shifting sands.
顺便问一下,1987年10月11日有什么特别之处?
By the way, what was special about 10/11/1987?
那是黑色星期一(10月19日)前八天。
It was eight days before Black Monday, which was October 19.
如果有听众认为标普或道指当年下跌11%就是惨烈的一年的话——
And if anybody who's listening to this podcast thinks that it would be a wrenching year if the S and P or the Dow lost 11% that year.
试试一天内暴跌22%的滋味。
Try losing 22% in one day.
这就是黑色星期一发生的事。
That's what happened on Black Monday.
当然,那篇文章发表得正是时候。
And, of course, that article was well timed.
完全正确。
Exactly right.
基本上,文章指出人们正在抛弃估值标准,认为这次会有所不同。
And, basically, what it said is that people are throwing out valuation norms in the belief that this time is different.
特别是当时有一种叫做投资组合保险的产品,它声称只要购买这种保险,就能在不增加额外风险的情况下增加股市投资比例。
And in particular, there was a product around called portfolio insurance, which basically said you could increase the amount you have in the stock market without taking any incremental risk if you'll just hire on for portfolio insurance.
这又是'这次不一样'的另一种表现形式,结果同样行不通。
And that's another form of it's different this time, and it also didn't work.
那些购买了投资组合保险的人损失惨重。
The people who had portfolio insurance lost a lot of money.
所以,是的,如果不相信能盲目套用过去的规则,生活会变得极具挑战性。
So, yes, it makes life very challenging to not believe that you can blindly apply the rules of the past.
顺便说一句,坦普顿在八十年代曾说过,大约20%的情况确实会不同。
And by the way, Templeton said back in the eighties, I think it was, that 20% of the time it really is different.
现在我要说这个比例远超过20%。
Now I would say it's much more than 20.
事物总是在不断变化。
Things change all the time.
因此很难依赖常规标准。
And so it's very hard to rely on the norms.
许多人在2020年陷入困境,因为一旦美联储和财政部在疫情期间实施经济救助措施,作为受益者的信息科技股便一飞冲天。
A lot of people got into trouble in '20 because once the Fed and the Treasury enacted their rescue measures for the economy during the pandemic, The information stocks, which were the beneficiaries, took off.
很快,尤其是基于它们低迷的盈利,这些股票的市盈率达到了极高的水平。
And pretty soon, especially on their depressed earnings, they were at extremely high PE ratios.
许多人说,这是个异常现象。
And a lot of people said, it's an anomaly.
这是个错误。
It's a mistake.
这不可能是真的。
It can't be the case.
它们太贵了。
They're too expensive.
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那些认为这次会不一样的人简直是异想天开。
And the people who think it's different this time are smoking something.
而那些在2020年错过这些股票的人,业绩确实非常糟糕。
And the people who missed those stocks in 2020 really had very inferior results.
所以再次强调,保持开放心态和灵活性,寻找卓越的机会,找到一家能连续15到20年保持15%或20%年增长的公司。
And so, again, open minded, flexible, find something great, find a company that can grow at 15% or 20% a year for fifteen to twenty years.
几乎不可能准确评估其内在价值,但你可能想长期持有它。
It's almost impossible to put a an intrinsic value on it, but you might wanna stay with it.
我在推特上邀请大家提出今天可以问你的问题。
I ask people on Twitter to suggest questions that I could ask you today.
我在这个播客中的做法是,当我采用某位听众的问题时,会寄给他们一本我亲笔签名的书《更富有、更智慧、更快乐》作为感谢。
One of the things I do in this podcast is when I use someone's question, I send them a signed copy of my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier, as a thank you.
令我印象深刻的是,在收到的50多个问题中,有相当一部分都在问同一个核心问题:如果你重新开始,会遵循哪些人生原则?
What struck me here was I was looking at more than 50 questions that came in from people, and a whole array of them basically were asking the same thing, which was essentially what principles would you live by if you were starting over?
有位叫Ashutosh Parashar的听众(如果我没念错名字)问道:如果你今天从零开始,会采取哪些不同的做法?
There's someone called Ashutosh Parashar, if I'm pronouncing that correctly, who said, If you were starting out today, what would you do differently?
或者你会沿用当初创业时的那些原则吗?
Or would you apply the same principles you did when you started out?
我的感觉是大家读过你的《价值投资备忘录》后都在说:等等
And my sense is that people have read your Something of Value memo and they're saying, Well, wait a second.
那么我现在该怎么做?
So what do I do now?
我们从霍华德之前的备忘录和两本非凡著作中汲取的这些理念,现在还适用吗?
Do these ideas that we internalized from Howard's previous memos and his two extraordinary books, do they still hold?
大卫·帕克还问:你是否仍坚持'决定投资好坏的不是买什么,而是以什么价格买'这一观点?
David Park also said, Do you still stand by your statement that it's not what you buy, it's what you pay that determines a good investment?
还是说你儿子关于'买入复利型企业并长期持有更优越'的理念影响了你?
Or has your son influenced you on the superiority of buying compounders and holding for long periods of time?
如果非要总结的话,重新开始你会怎么做?
If we could draw a conclusion, what would you do if you were starting over?
考虑到你的观点已经演变,你还会投资同类困境资产吗?
Given that your views have evolved, would you still invest in the same sort of distressed assets?
你还会寻找便宜货吗?
Would you still be looking for bargains?
你会寻找持有期限更长的标的吗?
Would you be looking for things with a longer duration?
如果现在重新开始,会有什么改变?
What would change now if you were starting?
听着,威廉。
Well, listen, William.
当然,我当时的做法是符合时宜的。
Certainly, what I did was right for the time.
我是从1968年开始的。
I started in '68.
要是在1998年我能转向更扩张性的策略,当时就押注亚马逊或苹果就好了,但我没有。
It would have been great if in '98, I would have switched to something more expansive and jumped on Amazon at the time, but I didn't or Apple.
顺便说一句,我提到维尔梅耶曾问我,接下来你想做什么?
By the way, I mentioned Vermeillier said to me, what do you wanna do next?
他让我创办一只可转换债券基金。
And he asked me to start a convertible bond fund.
那对我来说再合适不过了。
That was perfect for me.
为什么?
Why?
固定收益信贷非常适合我,因为作为一个非乐观主义者、非梦想家,信贷能让你从资产中获得下行保护。
Fixed income credit was perfect for me because as a non optimist and a non dreamer with credit, you get the downside protection from the assets.
而且你知道,你有充分的支持,风险也受到约束。
And, you know, you're well supported, and the risk is constrained.
我常对人说,如果彼得·维米利亚当初对我说:‘我要你创办一只风投基金,并在三十年后亚马逊成立时发现它’,那我肯定会一败涂地。
And I always tell people that if Peter Vermiglia had said to me, I want you to start a venture capital fund and find Amazon when it's created in thirty years, I would have been a disaster.
所以其中一个重要教训是,你必须像超级碗周日人们说的那样‘量力而行’,做符合你个性、禀赋和思维方式的事。
So one of the important lessons is you have to play within yourself as they say on Super Bowl Sunday, And you have to do the things that fit with your personality, your makeup and your mindset.
因此我认为,我当时的选择对那时的我来说非常正确。
And so I think what I did was great for me at the time.
我本可以更早变得灵活一些、多一些信念,安德鲁指出了这一点。
I could have become more flexible and a little more of a believer earlier, and Andrew points that out.
你知道吗?
You know?
其中一件事是,你之前谈到大萧条时期对父母那代人的影响。
One of the things that happened, you talked earlier about conditioning parents from the depression.
在我资产管理生涯初期,有几次我作为怀疑者成功站出来指出市场过度乐观的泡沫,有时还相当引人注目,当时我说'这好得不像真的'。
In the beginnings of my money management career, I was successful a few times in sometimes in a prominent way in blowing the whistle on excesses to the upside in being a skeptic and in saying, well, no, that's too good to be true.
我们都经历过市场某些阶段,人们把那些好得不像真的事情定价进去。
And we've all lived through periods in the market when people are pricing in things that are too good to be true.
安德鲁在我们同住时指出,这已成了我的习惯,几乎是条件反射。
Andrew pointed out when we lived together that that became a habit with me, something of a knee jerk.
所以这种思维定势确实让我对新想法封闭了。
So that conditioning really made me closed to new ideas.
如果目标是开放,那么你就不应该对事物持封闭态度。
And if the goal is open mindedness, then you shouldn't be closed to things.
备忘录里有句话说得很好,你说,在这个新世界里,保持好奇心、深入探究事物、并试图从底层真正理解它们,而非轻易否定,这一点非常重要。
There's a great line in the memo where you say, it's very important in this new world to be curious, look deeply into things, and seek to truly understand them from the bottom up rather than dismissing them out of hand.
是啊。
Yeah.
嗯,在2020年,人们看不起一些信息股、科技股。
Well, in '20, the people looked down at the some of the information stocks, tech stocks.
他们说,哦,那股票的市盈率都80倍了。
They said, well, that's selling at a PE of 80.
肯定不是什么好主意。
Can't be a good idea.
但话说回来,你不该有这些铁板钉钉的规则。
Well, but, again, you shouldn't have these hard and fast rules.
投资的美妙之处就在于它有这么多不同的方面。
And the great thing about investing is there are so many different hands.
另一方面,针对提问的读者,你总得相信点什么。
On the other hand, in in response to your reader who asked the question, you gotta believe in something.
你总得在某处划清界限。
You gotta draw the line someplace.
所以如何将坚持标准与保持开放心态结合起来,目前还不明确。
So now exactly how you integrate having standards with open mindedness is not clear.
而且,威廉,说实话,以免有人忘记,归根结底,卓越的投资源于卓越的洞察力。
And, you know, the truth is, William, lest anyone forget, in the end, superior investing comes down to superior insight.
所以你在投资中做的每件事都是一把双刃剑。
So everything that you can do in investing is a two edged sword.
如果你集中投资且判断正确,你会赚更多钱。
If you concentrate and you're right, you'll make more money.
如果你集中投资但判断错误,你会亏更多钱。
If you concentrate and you're wrong, you'll lose more money.
如果你加杠杆且判断正确,你会赚更多钱。
If you lever up and you're right, you'll make more money.
如果你加杠杆但判断错误,你会亏更多钱。
If you lever up and you're wrong, you'll lose more money.
没完没了。
On and on and on.
只有一件事不是双刃剑,那就是洞察力。
There's only one thing which is not a two edged sword, and that's insight.
如果你拥有卓越的洞察力,无论在上涨还是下跌的市场中都能表现更佳——尽管个人性格也会产生影响。
If you have superior insight, you can do better in up markets, and you can do better in down markets, although your personality comes into play.
但你必须要有感觉,虽然'感觉'听起来很模糊。
But, you know, you have to have a feel, and a feel sounds wishy washy.
但重大决策很难完全基于量化分析,而量化分析的对立面就是感觉。
But it's hard to base great decisions on quantitative analysis, and that the opposite of quantitative analysis is feel.
正如安德鲁在我们同住时指出的——这也是备忘录里详细讨论的——世界已经变得更聪明了。
And, you know, one of the great things that Andrew pointed out when we lived together and which is discussed at length in the memo is that the world has become a smarter place.
当巴菲特用50美分买那些价值1美元的东西时,是因为当时很少有人理解精明投资的本质。
When Buffett was buying those dollars for 50¢, it's because very few people understood the essence of smart investing.
几乎没人知道该去哪里寻找这些'雪茄烟蒂',所以他独占了这个领域。
Very few understood where you could look for those cigar butts, and he had the field to himself.
他能以50美分的价格买入,是因为周围没人出价55美分。
He could buy them for 50¢ because there was nobody else was around bidding 55.
备忘录里有张照片,是他在奥马哈的后屋翻阅穆迪手册的场景,那手册有数千页厚。
And there's an image in the memo of him sitting in the back room in Omaha paging through Moody's manual, which was thousands of pages.
手册里记录了美国每家上市公司、每家公开交易公司的财务状况,装订成册,但有好几卷。
It had a write up on the finances of every company in America, every public company in America, in one book, but a couple of volumes.
你得有惊人的耐心、动力和坚持不懈的精神才行。
You would have to have incredible patience and motivation and stick to itiveness.
很少有人能做到,也很少有人懂得寻找大幅折价机会的理念。
Very few people did, and very few people knew the idea of looking for, big discounts.
快进到今天。
Fast forward to today.
如今,人人都有电脑。
Today, everybody has a computer.
人人都有数据终端。
Everybody has a data feed.
每个人都能筛选每家公司。
Everybody can screen every company.
每个人都明白低价买入股票的理念,他们知道市盈率仅为2倍或股价仅为现金80%的股票可能被低估了。
Everybody understands this idea of picking up stocks that are too cheap, and they understand that a stock selling at a PE of two or 80% of cash or something like that might be too cheap.
这让我想起了六十年代末在研究生院学到的有效市场假说。
And so this leads into something I learned in grad school, fortunately, in late sixties, the efficient market hypothesis.
如今市场的效率比过去高得多。
The market is much more efficient today than it used to be.
要知道,现在很难找到独特的信息。
You know, it's very hard to find a piece of information that is unique.
安德鲁上大学时经常来找我说:'爸爸,我们该买福特股票,因为他们要推出很棒的新款野马。'
When Andrew was in college, he used to come to me and he would say, dad, maybe we should buy Ford stock because they're bringing out a great new Mustang.
而我的回答总是千篇一律。
And I always answered with the same thing.
我会说:'这事谁不知道?'
I said, who doesn't know that?
投资的一大秘诀在于,当你以为发现了一条利好消息时,必须自问:这还有谁不知道?
One of the great secrets in investing, if you think you found a piece of information, you think it's positive, is you have to say to yourself, who doesn't know that?
如果这是众所周知的信息,那它很可能不会成为超额利润的来源。
And if it's commonly known, then it probably isn't gonna be the source of superior profits.
正如安德鲁所言,关于当下广泛可得的量化信息不太可能带来利润,因为所有人都掌握了这些数据。
So the way Andrew formulated it was widely available quantitative information on the present is unlikely to be the source of profits because everybody has it.
美国证交会的职责是什么?
What's the SEC's job?
就是确保所有人在同一天获得相同的信息。
To make sure that everybody has the same information on the same day.
在我刚入行时,还能获取独家信息。
When I started, you could get proprietary information.
你可以约见那些不接受其他访谈的CEO们。
You could sit down with CEOs who wouldn't talk to anybody and so forth.
但如今,所有事实性信息都已人尽皆知。
But today, everybody knows everything that's factual.
因此,作为投资者,你的优势必须来自非事实层面的判断。
So your superiority as an investor has to come from dealings which are not factual.
那些未来才会显现的事物。
Things that will develop in the future.
你必须要么对当前可获取的非量化信息有更深刻的理解,要么对未来走向有更准确的预判。
You have to either have a better understanding of non quantitative information that's available today or a better understanding of what your future holds.
我认为这两者都可以用我称之为'直觉'的东西来概括。
And I think that both of those are summed up by what I call feel.
还有我在比尔·米勒、查理·芒格、乔尔·蒂林豪斯等众多伟大投资者身上看到的那种性情优势——你比我们大多数人都更少情绪化。
Also have a temperamental advantage that I've seen with people like Bill Miller, Charlie Munger, Joel Tillinghouse, lots of the great investors, that you're just less emotional than most of us.
你能更轻松地抽身而出,冷静客观地评估概率。
It's easier for you to stand back and look at the odds dispassionately.
情绪是卓越投资的最大敌人。
Emotion is the greatest enemy of superior investing.
观察那些所谓'羊群效应'或'市场共识'中的大多数人:当经济向好、公司利润增长、财报亮眼、股价上涨时,他们会变得越来越兴奋、乐观、轻信,购买意愿也愈发强烈。
If you take a look at most people in what they call the herd or the consensus, as the economy does well, as the company's profits grow, as it reports higher earnings, as the stock rises, most people become more and more and more excited about it, more optimistic, more trusting, and more inclined to buy.
所以价格越高,他们买入得越多。
So the higher the price, the more buying they do.
最终情况开始恶化,经济下行,企业利润收缩,盈利报告负面,股价下跌,人们变得悲观沮丧,更倾向于抛售。
Then eventually things stop going so well, the economy turns down, the corporation's profits contract, the earnings announcements are negative, the price of the stock declines, people get pessimistic and depressed and more likely to sell.
因此价格越高,他们越可能买入。
So the higher the price, the more likely they are to buy.
价格越低,他们越可能卖出。
The lower the price, the more likely they are to sell.
这恰恰与我们应有的行为相反。
This is the opposite of what we should be doing.
我们本应在价格上涨时逐步减仓(尤其是当价格变得不合理时),而在价格下跌时大举买入。
We should be scaling out as the price rises, perhaps when it gets unreasonable, and we should be getting in with both feet when it falls.
显然,大多数人的情绪都与正确决策背道而驰。
So clearly, most human emotion is arrayed against doing the right thing.
而且,你知道的,类似例子还有很多,远不止这一个。
And, you know, there are a lot of other examples, not just that.
但巴菲特说过,别人行事越不谨慎,我们就越要谨慎行事,这是有原因的。
But there's a reason why Buffett said the less prudence with which others conduct their affairs, the greater the prudence with which we must conduct our own affairs.
当别人无所畏惧时,我们应当感到恐惧,因为这意味着他们会支付过高的价格。
When other people are unafraid, we should be terrified because that means they'll pay prices that are too high.
当别人恐惧时,我们应当变得激进,因为他们的恐惧让我们能以低价获得资产。
When other people are terrified, we should turn aggressive because their terror makes things available to us cheaply.
你说得对。
And you're right.
我认识的那些伟大的投资者在投资时都保持冷静,他们逆这些趋势而行。
I mean, the great investors I know are unemotional about their investing, and they go counter to these trends.
不过让我好奇的是,通过多次采访你,我一直有种印象——仿佛面对一台超级机器,你显然拥有超高的智商,同时又极其理性且善于分析。
Part of what's curious to me, though, is that I always had this image of you having interviewed you several times that I was sort of in the presence of a most superior machine that you you clearly had a lot of extra IQ points, but you're also very rational and analytical.
但后来让我困惑的是,我开始意识到其实你也有着非常敏锐的直觉。
But then what started to mess with my head was that I started to realize, well, actually you do have very strong intuition.
不仅如此,你年轻时还是位出色的艺术家,现在也是非常优秀的作家。
And not only that, but you were a good artist as a young man, you're a very good writer.
你的性格构成中有种奇特之处,这些特质看似有些矛盾,或者至少在同一个人身上同时出现是非常罕见的。
There's something curious about your makeup where there are these characteristics that seem kinda contradictory, or at least it's very unusual to see them together in the same chemical experiment.
这种对你的看法,你觉得有共鸣吗?
Does that resonate at all, that view of you?
我想是的。
I think so.
希望如此。
I hope so.
因为我讨厌被简化为单一维度,就像某个泡在培养皿里只会产出投资点子的大脑。
Because I'd hate to be able to be reduced to one dimension of, you know, some brain sitting in a tank someplace turning out investment ideas.
我敬重的投资者并非千人一面。
The investors that I respect are not all the same.
有人擅长这个,有人擅长那个,有人会画画有人不会,有人滑雪有人不滑,但他们都很聪明。
There's some right, some don't, some draw, some don't, some ski, some don't, but they're all bright.
就像巴菲特说的,如果你有160的智商,卖掉30点吧,你根本用不着那么多。
You know, Buffett says if you have an IQ of one sixty, sell 30 points, you don't need them.
但他们都很聪明,而且我认为他们几乎都不感情用事。
But they're all bright, and I think they're just about all unemotional.
但你还可以具备许多其他特质。
But you can be lots of other things.
事实上,我认为你必须能够再次得出非基于分析、非量化的结论。
And in fact, I think, you know, you have to be able to, again, reach conclusions that are not analytically based, quantitatively based.
你必须具备一定的想象力。
You have to have some imagination.
如果你回头读读我写的备忘录,比如2008年10月全球金融危机期间的那些,那时正是信贷市场的谷底。
If you go back and read the memos that I wrote, for example, during the global financial crisis, October '8, which was the bottom for credit.
那个月信贷市场正在经历一场崩盘。
It was a meltdown that was going on in the credit world that month.
或者我之前两周写的那份备忘录——我记得雷曼兄弟是在2008年9月15日破产的。
Or the one that I wrote two weeks earlier, it was I guess Lehman went out bankrupt on 09/15/2008, I think it was.
所以四天后我发布了一份备忘录,标题好像是《现在全白》之类的。
So I put out a memo four days later titled, I think it was Now White or something like that.
我想标题是《此刻的白色》。
I think it was Now White.
你根本无法判断世界是否会继续存在。
You couldn't figure out whether or not the world was going to continue to exist.
你无法证明金融机构不会崩溃,而当时很多人都认为会崩溃。
You couldn't prove that the financial institution world was not gonna melt down, and a lot of people thought it would.
许多人陷入了恐慌性抛售。
And a lot of people were absolutely panicking to sell.
没有任何实验或计算能证明崩溃不会发生。
And there was no experiment you could conduct, no calculation you could perform to prove that it wasn't gonna happen.
当时感觉就像一场大崩溃。
It felt like a meltdown.
我们目睹了贝尔斯登消失、美林被美国银行接管,接着雷曼破产,华盛顿互惠银行、美联银行相继倒下,所有人都知道下一个会是谁。
And, you know, we had Bear Stearns disappear and Merrill Lynch go into the hands of BofA, and then Lehman bankrupt, Washington Mutual, Wachovia Bank, and everybody knew who was next and who was after them.
那种感觉就像多米诺骨牌接连倒下。
And it was it felt like falling dominoes.
于是我写了一份备忘录。
And so I wrote a memo.
现在怎么办?
Now what?
我说,我们现在该做什么?
And I said, what do we do now?
我们是买还是不买?
Do we buy or don't we?
我说,如果我们买了而世界崩溃了,那也无所谓。
And I said, if we buy and the world melts down, it doesn't matter.
但如果我们不买而世界没有崩溃,那我们就失职了。
But if we don't buy and the world doesn't melt down, then we fail to do our job.
我们必须买进。
We must buy.
这并不科学。
Now that's not scientific.
这是合乎逻辑的。
It's logical.
我希望它如你所说那样合乎逻辑。
I hope it's logical as you say.
我认为我是有逻辑的,但这肯定不是定量分析或类似的东西。
I think I'm logical, but it sure wasn't quantitative or analytical or anything like that.
那是一种直觉。
It was an intuition.
有一种
There was a
深层次的直觉,因为我记得你从一位投资者那里开会回来,他一直在说,万一情况比那更糟呢?
deep level of gut because I remember you coming back from a meeting with an investor who kept saying, well, what if it's worse than that?
万一情况比那更糟呢?
What if it's worse than that?
你还告诉我你匆忙赶回办公室,当时你想,我必须把这事写下来,因为有时候事情糟糕得令人难以置信。
And you telling me that you rushed back to your office and you were like, I've got to write about this because sometimes it's too bad to be true.
所以这实际上再次表明,对于我原本视为高级机器的人来说,其实在认识到这一点并说出‘哦,人们已经崩溃到这种程度,以至于看不到情况会好转’时,涉及了很多情商。
So that's actually a again, for somebody who I had viewed as a superior machine, actually, that's a lot of EQ involved in seeing that and saying, oh, people have melted down to this extent that they can't see that things can get better.
嗯,我认为这是对的。
Well, I think that's right.
那是在一份备忘录中讨论过的。
That was discussed in a memo.
我想那是在2008年10月12日,那是我最喜欢的备忘录之一。
I think that was 10/12/2008, and, that's one of my favorites.
它叫做《消极主义的局限》。
It's called the limits to negativism.
但你知道,作为投资者,我们的责任之一就是保持怀疑态度。
But, you know, as an investor, one of our responsibilities is to be skeptical.
大多数人认为,要做一个怀疑者,你必须在人们过于乐观时吹响警哨。
And most people think that to be a skeptic, you have to blow the whistle when people are too optimistic.
有人走进你的办公室说,我已经管理资金三十年了。
Somebody comes into your office and says, I've managed money for thirty years.
我每年能赚11%。
I've made 11% a year.
我从未有过亏损的月份。
I've never had a down month.
你必须说,不。
You have to say, no.
这好得不像真的,麦道夫先生。
That's too good to be true, mister Madoff.
但那天在那场会议上我意识到,作为怀疑者,我们的职责还包括在人们过度悲观、认为事情坏到不可能是真的时吹响哨声。
But what I realized on that day in that meeting was that our job as a skeptic also includes blowing the whistle when it's things that people are saying are too bad to be true, when there's excessive pessimism.
那就是那天的意义所在。
And that's what that day was.
我们有一只杠杆贷款基金。
We had a levered loan fund.
它当时面临被追加保证金并崩盘的危险。
It was in danger of getting a margin call and melting down.
于是我四处奔走,请求所有投资者追加股本。
So I went around to the investors asking them all to put up more equity.
而你提到的那个人对我说,如果发生这种情况怎么办?
And the one person that you mentioned said to me, well, what if this happens?
我回答说,那样的话我们仍然没问题。
And I said, well, that's we're still okay.
那如果情况比这更糟呢?
Well, what if this what if it's worse than that?
我们仍然...如果比那更糟呢?
Well, we're still what if it's worse than that?
我实在无法提出一套能让她满意的、足够悲观的假设。
And I could not come up with a set of assumptions that satisfied her as to being negative enough.
因此她拒绝参与这次资本重组。
So and she refused to participate in this re equitization.
正如你所说,我跑回了办公室。
So as you say, I ran back to my office.
我写好了备忘录,她是唯一一个拒绝参与的人。
I wrote out the memo, and she was the only one who wouldn't participate.
所以我觉得自己有责任出这笔钱。
So I felt it was my duty to put up the money.
我出了这笔钱。
I put up the money.
这是我做过最成功的投资之一,而部分动机是出于责任感。
It was one of the best investments I ever made, and I did it in part out of duty.
你提到情商。
You say EQ.
我们能做的最棒的事——虽然它本质上应该基于财务分析——
One of the great things we can do, which has nothing well, it's hopefully based on financial analysis.
但当我们能感知市场中的情绪极端,无论是过度乐观还是过度悲观时,如果能将这种感知与财务分析结合,判断资产真实价值,发现与市价的差异,并理解这种差异主要源于情绪、情感误差,那你就拥有了巨大优势。
But when we have a sense for the excesses of emotion in the market, whether it be too optimistic or too pessimistic, if you can meld that with financial analysis to have a sense for what things are worth, see the differences from where they're selling, understand the origin of the difference as coming in large part from emotion, emotional error, then you really have a great advantage.
那么,当你以五十年市场洞察的经验审视当下环境时——带着深刻怀疑,同时也带着新生的谦卑,意识到或许某些旧原则需要更新,因为今天的世界已然不同。
So when you look at today's environment as someone with fifty years of patent recognition, with deep skepticism, but also with this renewed sense of humility about the fact that maybe some of your previous principles need to be updated because we're living in a different world today.
你如何以你那种印象派的方式看待我们当前所处的这个时刻?
How do you look at this moment that we're in now in this kind of impressionistic way that you do?
你是否看到迹象表明,现在是投资者需要比平时更加谨慎的时候,太多人正在承担过多风险?
Are you seeing evidence that it's a time when investors need to be more defensive than usual, that too many people are taking too much risk?
我很好奇,想了解你是如何权衡那些已反映在价格、行为和交易结构等方面的乐观情绪的,就像你在评估市场时那样。
I'm just curious to see how you weigh the kind of optimism that's baked into prices and behavior and deal structures and the like in the way that you do when you're looking to gauge a market.
嗯,正如我之前提到的,当你不得不放弃‘事情永远不会改变’的想法,当你不能依靠公式或规则生活时,生活会变得更艰难。
Well, as I mentioned before, life gets harder when you have to give up on things never being different and when you can't live by a formula or a rule.
标普500指数在2020年2月19日达到3,300点,然后在3月24日跌至2,200多点。
And the S and P 500 hit 3,300 on 02/19/2020, and then it hit 2,200 with and change on March 24.
所以大约33天后,它下跌了三分之一。
So it was like thirty three days later, and it was down a third.
到2020年6月,它又回到了3,300点左右,接近历史高点。
By June '20, it was back around 3,300, back to the all time high.
很多人说这太荒谬了,因为我们仍然深陷困境。
And a lot of people said, this is ridiculous because we're still in a big mess.
我们仍处于疫情之中。
We still have a pandemic.
经济仍处于停滞状态。
The economy is still shut down.
我们刚刚经历了史上最糟糕的GDP季度表现。
We just had the worst quarter in history for GDP.
市场怎么可能理性地回升至疫情前的高点?
How can the market possibly be back intelligently to its pre COVID high?
于是人们开始敲响警钟,称这是泡沫。
So people started to blow the whistle and say bubble.
这是个泡沫。
It's a bubble.
而显然,现在股市比那时又上涨了三分之一。
And, obviously, now the stock market is a third higher than that.
所以现在指数大约在4500点。
So it's around 4,500.
所以任何吹响泡沫警报并选择观望的人,至少都过早行动了。
So anybody who blew the whistle on bubble and went to the sidelines was at minimum too early.
现在已经过去二十个月了。
It's now twenty months later.
我通常会是那些持谨慎态度的评论者之一,这次或许是因为我和安德鲁之间的那些对话。
I would normally have been among the cautionary commentators, and this was maybe it was because of the conversations that were going on between me and Andrew.
我无法让自己这么做,原因有两个。
I couldn't bring myself to do it because for two reasons.
首先,我认为泡沫是一种非理性的高点。
Number one, I think that a bubble is an irrational high.
我认为当前的价格并非不理性。
I think today's prices are not irrational.
考虑到低利率水平,这些价格是合理的。
They're rational given the low level of interest rates.
利率对以美元计价的资产价值有深远影响,利率越低,价值越高。
Interest rates have a profound effect on what something is worth in dollars, and the lower the interest rate, the higher the value.
因此我认为,鉴于当前利率水平,现今的估值相对合理。
So I think that today's values are relatively appropriate given the level of interest rates.
另外一点是,我过去和现在都认为我们正处在一个健康经济增长的时期。
And the other thing is I believed and believe that we're looking at a period of healthy economic growth.
所以我们有合理的价格,尽管偏低,同时经济前景良好。
So we have rational prices, albeit low, and a good economic outlook.
我不认为这是导致市场崩盘的配方。
I don't think that's a formula for a collapse of the markets.
因此我已不再给出买入、卖出或离场的建议。
And so I've given up on saying buy, sell, in out.
我现在要说的是:如果你了解自己通常的风险偏好,那么现在是该更激进还是更保守?
What I now say is if you know your normal risk posture, is today a time to be more aggressive or more defensive?
我会建议保持接近你通常的配置,或许略偏保守,主要是因为当前价格在利率环境下是公允的,但我们都认为利率会有所上升,这意味着资产价值将略有下降,而经济强度会部分抵消这一影响。
And I would say around your normal posture, maybe a little defensive, mainly because today's prices are fair given the interest rates, but we all think that interest rates are gonna rise somewhat, which means that assets will be worth less somewhat, offset somewhat by the economic strength.
但我认为现在不是采取极端行动——无论是看多还是看空——的时机。
But I don't think it's a time to take extreme action timing wise in in either direction.
我不会加大进攻性,但也不会完全躲起来。
I wouldn't ramp up my aggressiveness, but I wouldn't hide under the mattress.
你之前经历过严重通胀的时期。
And you've lived through intense inflationary times before.
能给我们这些没经历过的人(比如我)讲讲吗?
Can you give those of us like me who haven't been through this before?
53。
53.
完全没有经历过。
Didn't experience it all.
我童年的一个记忆就是父亲和叔叔在那段时期被市场重创。
One of my childhood memories was of my dad and my uncle getting smashed by the market in those days.
明智谨慎的投资者在高通胀时期该如何进行理性投资?
How do sensible, prudent investors invest wisely during inflationary times?
你会对投资组合做哪些微调,稍微调整配置,以确保既能生存又能获利?
What are the tweaks you make to your portfolio just to sort of adjust the sales a little bit so that you're likely to survive and prosper?
首先,威廉,你知道,我经常被问到这个问题。
Well, first of all, William, you know, I get this question.
这像是七十年代的情况吗?
Is this like the seventies?
那时我们曾与通货膨胀搏斗过。
And that was our bout with inflation.
第一,我认为当前通胀的某些方面是暂时的,因为供应链中断问题解决所需时间比人们预期或希望的要长,但这很合理。
And number one, I believe that some aspect of today's inflation is temporary because I think that there were supply chain interruptions which took longer to work out than people expected or hoped, but it makes sense.
你明白吗?
You know?
比如一辆丰田汽车,我认为有3万个零部件。
A Toyota, I think, has 30,000 parts.
如果其中一个零件缺货,你就暂时造不出车来。
If one of them is unavailable, you get no cars for a while.
所以这是很合理的。
So it makes sense.
因此我认为部分原因是需求激增,这源于2020年和2021年初新冠救济金发放过多。
So I think that some of this and some of it is a bulge in demand, which came from too many people being given too much money in COVID relief in '20 and early twenty one.
人为推高的需求与人为压低的供应,其中部分可能是暂时的,取决于所谓的通胀预期发展及其是否被固化。
So an artificially high demand, artificially low supply, some of it will probably be temporary depending on what happens with so called inflationary expectations and whether they get baked in.
第二,过去八九个月我们的通胀率约为7%。
Number two, we have roughly 7% inflation now for the last eight, nine months.
七十年代的通胀率大约是现在的两倍。
We had about twice that in the seventies.
第三,当时没人知道如何解决这个问题。
Number three, nobody had an idea how to fix what was going on.
我们现在尝试用通胀按钮来应对。
We tried win buttons with inflation now.
我们尝试过价格管制。
We tried price controls.
当时还设立了物价主管,但他们仍无法解决通胀问题。
We had a pricing czar, but they could figure out how to beat inflation.
现在我们都知道,你只需要提高利率。
Now we know all you have to do is raise rates.
这可能会导致经济衰退,但你可以做到。
Maybe it causes a recession, but you can do it.
另一个原因是当时私营部门工会化程度很高。
The other thing is that the private sector was heavily unionized in those days.
现在则不然。
It is not now.
工会合同中有生活成本调整条款,即生活成本上升时,工资也会相应增加。
The union contracts had cost of living adjustments where if the cost of living goes up, you get a wage increase.
但工资一旦上涨,就会传导至制造商的商品成本中。
But if you get a wage increase, it feeds through to the cost of the goods manufacturer.
这导致更多通胀,进而又有人获得加薪。
There's more inflation, and somebody else gets a wage increase.
因此形成了一个循环上升的螺旋。
So it was circular and upward spiraling.
我们的私营部门已不再有生活成本调整机制。
We don't have COLAs anymore in our private sector.
所以我认为我们不会再有当时那样的通货膨胀或利率水平。
So I don't think we're gonna have inflation like we did then or interest rates like like we did then.
我曾有一笔未偿还贷款,利率是基准利率上浮三个季度点——如果你还记得基准利率这回事的话。
I had a loan outstanding at three quarters over for something called prime, if you remember prime.
每次利率变动时,银行都会给我一张通知单。
And I used to get a slip from the bank every time it changed.
我墙上镶着那张写着'您当前贷款利率为22.75%'的通知单。
I have framed on my wall the slip which says the rate on your loan is now twenty two and three quarters.
我觉得我们不会重蹈覆辙。
I don't think we're going there.
但未来五年的通胀率将会高于过去五年。
But, you know, we'll have more inflation in the next five years than we did in the last five years.
这其中会有些令人不快的方面。
Will be some unpleasant aspects to that.
重要的是要记住,过去一二十年里,世界上大多数国家都试图将通胀率控制在2%,但他们没能做到。
It's important to remember that most of the world was trying to get to 2% inflation for the last decade or two, and they couldn't do it.
他们无法让通胀率达到那么高。
They couldn't get inflation that high.
现在通胀会暂时居高不下。
Now it's gonna run hot for a little while.
对此你能做些什么呢?
What do you do about it?
这是你之前提过的问题。
That was your question some time ago.
首先,如果你是固定收益投资者,你会希望增加浮动利率工具的投资,减少固定利率工具的投资。
Well, first of all, if you're a fixed income investor, you wanna have more in floating rate instruments and less in fixed rate instruments.
当市场利率上升时,固定利率工具的价值会下降。
An instrument with a fixed interest rate becomes less valuable as the interest rate in the environment rises.
而浮动利率工具则会在利率上升时提高你的收益。
So floating rate, your interest rate goes up as rates go up.
这是件好事。
That's a good thing.
所以这个很简单。
So that's an easy one.
你应该增加浮动利率资产,减少固定利率资产,尤其要避免长期固定利率产品,因为当利率上升一定幅度时,它们的贬值幅度最大。
You wanna have more floating, less fixed, and you certainly don't wanna have long term fixed rate because they're the ones that go down the most if interest rates go up by a certain amount.
第二,房地产。
Number two, real estate.
健康的房地产市场可以成为很好的工具。
Healthy real estate can be a real good tool.
例如,如果你拥有公寓楼,当人们工资上涨时,你就可以提高租金且租客仍能负担,这是保护盈利的好方法。
For example, if you own apartments and if people's wages are rising, thus you can pass on rent increases to them and they can pay them, then that's a good way to protect your profitability.
因此多户住宅地产一直表现强劲。
And so multifamily real estate has been strong.
问题总是这样,好吧。
That's always the question is, okay.
我知道这是件好事,但价格已经涨了。
I know it's a good thing to do, but the price is up.
我该怎么办?
What do I do?
这时候就需要靠感觉了。
That's when you need to feel.
但如果房地产处于经济健康的地域且本身状况良好,你能将租金上涨转嫁给租户,这就是对抗通胀的好工具。
But if the real estate is healthy in a healthy part of the economy and a healthy geography, and you can pass on rent increases, that's a good tool against inflation.
第三种方式是投资利润增速超过通胀的企业。
The third one is to invest in companies where profits grow faster than inflation.
只要定价合理,你仍能获得正向收益。
You can still produce a positive return, assuming they're priced right.
所以这些都不是可以不经思考直接套用的公式,但都是值得关注的方向。
So none of these is a formula that you can apply without thinking, but these are the places to look.
我们稍事休息,先听听今日赞助商的消息。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
威廉,想象一下用真正理解客户的技术来扩展您的业务。
William Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.
这就是Alexa和AWS人工智能背后的故事。
That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.
每天,Alexa以17种语言处理超过10亿次交互,同时将客户摩擦减少40%。
Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.
这不仅让生活更便捷,更是在改变客户互动方式并创造新的收入来源。
It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.
幕后由AWS人工智能驱动的70多个专业模型协同工作,打造自然对话,展示了企业如何安全可靠地大规模部署AI。
Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.
Alexa的AI能力在亚马逊庞大业务中经过实战检验,实现了可量化的大规模影响。
Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.
这些创新技术现为其他企业提供了成熟框架,用以提升效率、开辟新收入来源并获得持久市场优势。
These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.
访问aws.comai/rstory了解Alexa的完整故事。
Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.
网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
新年伊始,正是实现你创业梦想的最佳时机。
It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.
就在几年前,我创办了自己的电商业务,而Shopify正是我起步所需的完美工具。
Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.
当许多人不断将梦想推迟到明年时,我要告诉你:现在就是抓住眼前机遇的最佳时刻。
While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.
Shopify为你提供线上线下销售所需的一切支持。
Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.
包括我在内的数百万创业者已经迈出这一步——从普通家庭到初次创业的商家。
Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.
从数百款精美模板中自由选择,自定义设计,还能使用内置AI工具撰写产品描述或编辑商品图片。
Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.
随着业务发展,Shopify将在每个成长阶段与你同行。
And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.
2026年,别再等待,立即通过Shopify开启销售之旅。
In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.
立即注册,享受每月1美元的试用优惠,今天就在shopify.com/wsb开始销售。
Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.
访问shopify.com/wsb。
Go to shopify.com/wsb.
网址是shopify.com/wsb。
That's shopify.com/wsb.
让Shopify伴你开启新年新篇章。
Hear your first This new year with Shopify by your side.
初创企业行动迅速。
Startups move fast.
借助人工智能,它们的产品交付更快,更早吸引企业级买家。
And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.
但大额交易会带来更严格的安全与合规要求。
But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.
SOC 2认证并不总是足够的。
A SOC two isn't always enough.
合适的安全措施能促成交易也能毁掉交易,但哪位创始人或工程师能抽得出时间从公司建设中分心呢?
The right kind of security can make a deal or break it, but what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?
Vanta的人工智能和自动化技术让大额交易准备在几天内轻松完成。
Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.
Vanta持续监控您的合规状态,确保未来的交易永远不会受阻。
And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.
此外,Vanta随您共同成长,全程提供您所需的支持服务。
Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.
随着人工智能改变法规和买家预期,Vanta清楚何时需要什么,并构建了最快、最简单的路径助您达成目标。
With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.
这就是为什么严肃的初创企业都选择早期通过Vanta实现安全合规。
That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.
我们的听众可享受vanta.com/billionaires提供的1000美元优惠。
Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.
访问vanta.com/billionaires可享1000美元优惠。
That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.
好的。
All right.
回到节目。
Back to the show.
简单请教几个其他资产类别的问题。
Just to ask you briefly about a couple of other asset classes.
显然很多人对你对比特币和加密货币的看法很感兴趣,这些观点已经发生了很大变化。
Obviously, lots of people are intrigued by your views on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, which have changed a great deal.
我想请教一下这个问题。
I wanted to ask you about that.
我还想请教关于中国的问题,这个话题最近频繁出现在新闻中。
I also wanted to ask you about China, which obviously has been very much in the news.
我知道你在那里有重大投资,但具体细节不便详谈。
I know you've had big investments there, but you can't really talk specifically about those investments.
但我注意到你曾谈到投资中国的重要性及其机遇,同时也明确指出了你所撰写的真实风险,比如社会主义意识形态与私营企业之间的冲突,或是债务规模等问题。
But I'm interested in you've talked about the importance of investing in China and the opportunities there, but also clearly there are real risks that you've written about of the conflict between socialist ideology and private enterprise or the amount of debt there, things like that.
你可以按任意顺序谈谈比特币和中国,你如何权衡它们作为我们是否应该投资的地方?
Can you talk whichever order you want to go in about both Bitcoin and China, how you're weighing them up as places we should or shouldn't be investing?
嗯,我们的讨论,也就是我和安德鲁的讨论,实际上主要聚焦在加密货币上。
Well, our discussions, that is, the discussions I had with Andrew, really, one of the main focuses was cryptocurrency.
因为在2017年,那是加密货币引起大多数人关注的一年,比特币在那之前已经存在七八年了。
Because in 2017, which was the year that cryptocurrency came to most people's attention, Bitcoin had been created seven or eight years before that.
但那年比特币从1000美元涨到20000美元,也是人们开始热议它的一年。
But that's the year that it Bitcoin went from 1,000 to 20,000, and that's the year that people started talking about it.
我当时持非常负面的态度。
And I came out very negative.
我说它毫无实质内容。
I said there's no there there.
它没有任何实质性的东西。
There's no substance to it.
它无法产生现金流。
It doesn't produce cash flow.
它无法进行内在估值,这意味着你无法明智地投资它。
It can't be valued intrinsically, which means that it you can invest it intelligently.
而且,你知道,安德鲁最重要的目标之一就是向我指出,那是一个条件反射式怀疑的例子。
And, you know, one of Andrew's greatest goals was to point out to me that that had been an example of knee jerk skepticism.
过去我曾通过抨击新事物赚了很多钱,无论是1987年的投资组合保险,还是1999年没有实际业务的电子商务初创公司。
I've made a lot of money inveighing against the new new thing in the past, whether it was portfolio insurance in 1987 or ecommerce startups with no business in 1999.
现在我们又遇到了这种情况。
And here we were.
这又是一个新事物。
This is another new thing.
所以,你知道,我已经形成习惯了。
And so, you know, I've been habitual.
这种做法一直很成功。
That's been successful.
就是这样。
That's it.
这种组合会形成习惯。
That combination produces habits.
所以我公开反对比特币。
So I came out against Bitcoin.
我大概是在6000美元时反对的,后来它涨到2万,又跌回6000。
And I probably did it when it was about 6,000, then it went to 20,000, then it went back to 6,000.
它在2018、2019年直到2020年都维持在这个水平。
And it stayed there through '18 and '19 and into '20.
到2020年4月,我记得价格还是6000美元。
And by April '20, it was, I think, still 6,000.
但安德鲁用最温和的方式告诉我,
But what Andrew said to me is that in the most loving possible way.
你根本不懂自己在说什么。
You don't know what you're talking about.
你对加密货币一无所知。
You don't know anything about cryptocurrency.
你不了解供需关系。
You don't know the supply demand case.
你不懂这项技术。
You don't know the technology.
你也不知道它的用途。
You don't know the uses.
你不能对自己不了解的事物条件反射般地持怀疑态度。
And you can't come out as a knee jerk skeptic about things you don't know about.
为了在任何领域做出卓越的投资决策,你必须比大多数人懂得更多。
And in order to make superior investment decisions in any field, you have to know more than most other people.
你显然不属于具备卓越知识的那类人。
You certainly are not in the category of the people with superior knowledge.
我仅有的只是五十年泛泛的投资经验,但在加密货币方面,我并不比其他人知道得更多。
All I had was fifty years of investment experience, generalized, but I didn't know anything about crypto that anybody else didn't know.
所以他在这件事上是正确的。
So he was right about that.
而且
And
所以这基本上是在提醒我们谦逊的重要性。
So it's a reminder of the importance of humility, basically.
同时也是在提醒我们要成为持续学习的机器,承认
And and of being a continuous learning machine and saying there
有些事情我
are things I
并不了解。
don't know about.
你知道,通常我现在每年写四份备忘录。
You know, know, usually I write about four memos a year now.
而在2020年疫情期间,我记得写了13份。
And in 2020 with the pandemic, I wrote, I think, 13.
我在三月、四月需要的时候写了很多备忘录。
I wrote a lot in March, April when it was needed.
但到了夏天情况稍缓时,我写了两篇很满意却反响平平的备忘录——《不确定性》和《不确定性之二》。
But in the summer when things were quieting down a bit, I wrote two memos that I really like that didn't get much response, uncertainty and uncertainty two.
关于思想谦逊的重要性。
The importance of intellectual humility.
什么是思想上的谦逊?
What is intellectual humility?
它意味着对方可能是正确的,并接受这种可能性。
It means the other guy could be right and accepting that.
我认为这对我们所有人都非常重要。
And I think that's very important for all of us.
关于自信——我曾写过一篇备忘录,我几乎为所有主题都写过备忘录。
And confidence, I once wrote a memo, I've written memo on everything.
但自信是非常重要的事,因为你需要一定程度的自信,否则当立场遭遇反对时,你永远无法坚守自己的观点。
But confidence is a very important thing because you need some of it or else you can never hold your positions especially when they go against you.
但你不该过度自信,以至于无视证据一路错到底,或是犯下傲慢之罪,像伊卡洛斯那样飞得离太阳太近。
But you shouldn't have so much confidence that you ride them all the way down against the evidence, or that you are guilty of hubris, and you fly too close to the sun.
所以你必须保持平衡。
So you have to balance it.
但我认为非常重要的一点是,不要认为自己无所不知,也不要认为对方总是错的。
But I think that it's very important to not think you know everything, and to not think the other guy's always wrong.
所以我觉得你是对的。
So I think that you're right.
最重要的事情之一就是知道自己不知道什么。
One of the most important things is to know what you don't know.
肮脏的哈里说过,男人必须知道自己的局限。
Dirty Harry said a man has to know his limitations.
所以我对加密货币没有强烈看法,因为我觉得自己了解不够,但我正在努力学习。
And so I don't have a strong opinion on crypto because I don't think I know enough, but I'm trying to learn.
从某种意义上说,中国是个有趣的例子,你曾提到总喜欢把未来看作概率分布。
And China in a sense is an interesting example of something where you talk about how you always like to view the future as a probability distribution.
是的。
Yes.
我在想,能否请你谈谈对中国问题的看法,比如你会如何表述——虽然我并非真正了解,但让我来列出这一系列可能性。
And I wondered if you could talk about if you look at China, how you say, well, I don't really know, but let me lay out this range of probabilities.
具体来说,你会如何以这种细致入微的方式思考中国问题?既要看到局势中的风险,也要看到希望,并尝试赋予各种可能性以概率?
Like, how would you think about China in that kind of nuanced way where you're looking at both the dangers and promise of the situation and kind of trying to assign probabilities?
是的。
Yes.
你知道,我崇拜的偶像之一是投资哲学家彼得·伯恩斯坦,他大约在09年去世。
Well, you know, one of my heroes was Peter Bernstein, the investment philosopher who died around o nine, I believe.
他写过一篇备忘录,题为《风险能否被简化为一个数字?》,这是我读过最精彩的文章之一。
And he wrote a memo, which is one of the greatest things I ever read called, can risk be reduced to a number?
其中有句话他说:'存在一个范围'。
And one of the things in there is he said, there's a range.
我们不知道答案会落在这个范围内的哪个位置。
We don't know where the answer is gonna fall within the range.
有时我们甚至不知道这个范围有多大。
Sometimes we don't know the extent of the range.
中国的范围极其广阔,因为我们面对的是宏观层面的问题。
China is the range is enormous because we're dealing with cosmic questions.
顺便说一句,我们总以为自己能做经济分析或金融分析。
And by the way, we think we can do economic analysis or financial analysis.
但这些根本不是经济或金融问题。
These are not economic or financial questions.
这些都是政治、意识形态和社会层面的问题。
These are political, ideological, social questions.
但这个问题很重要,因为中国是世界第二大经济体,我有些朋友甚至能准确预测它何时会成为世界第一大经济体。
But it's an important question because China is the second biggest economy in the world, and I have friends who can tell me the date on which it will become the biggest economy in the world.
我一直认为应该在中国进行投资。
And I've always thought you should have money invested in China.
你知道,我在这个行业多年观察到一种现象:总会有新事物出现,无论是指数基金、新兴市场还是其他什么。
You know, one of the things I've seen over my years in this business is something comes up, whether it be index funds or emerging markets or something like that.
人们会说,哦,我们已经覆盖了这部分。
And people says, oh, we got that covered.
我投了2%在那上面。
I got 2% in that.
要知道,如果它很重要,2%是不够的。
You know, if it's important, 2% is not enough.
这不会带来实质性的改变。
It won't move the needle.
现在人们满足于2%,因为至少如果它后来翻了两番,他们可以说我参与了。
Now people are happy with 2% because at least if it then goes on to quadruple, they can say I participated.
他们不必自责,但这远远不够。
They don't have to kick themselves, but it's not enough.
所以如果中国将成为世界第一大经济体,并且从长远来看事情会向积极方向发展,在我看来,在中国只投2%是不够的。
And so if China's gonna become the world's biggest economy and if things work out in a positive way in the long run, 2% in China is not enough, in my opinion.
正如你所说,我们一直持有中国股票的投资。
And as you say, we've had investments in Chinese equities.
我们长期投资于中国的不良贷款,也是中国信贷的投资者。
We've been long term investors in Chinese NPLs, and we're investors in Chinese credits.
你怎么看这个问题?
How do you dope it out?
并不容易。
Not easy.
一方面,中国确实拥有经济实力、市场规模和增长潜力。
On the one hand, you do have the economic strength, size, and growth potential.
另一方面,问题在于中国将如何对待其公民、企业以及世界其他国家。
On the other hand, you have the question of how will China behave towards its citizens, its businesses, and towards the rest of the world.
因此过去六个月左右,我们听到有人说中国'不可投资'。
And so in the last six months or so, we've seen people say China is not investable.
就是这个说法。
That's the word.
不可投资。
Uninvestable.
现在每当我听到这种说法时都会竖起耳朵,因为至少这说明中国资产可能被低估了。
Now my ears perk up when I hear that because if nothing else, it introduces the possibility that China is cheap.
根据定义,任何被贴上'不可投资'标签的东西都不可能被市场热潮推高。
By definition, nothing that people describe as uninvestable can be born aloft on the winds of federation.
它没有被高估。
It's not overpriced.
也许它被低估了。
Maybe it's underpriced.
也许这正是应该投资的时机。
Maybe it's something one should do.
我并非中国问题专家。
I'm not an expert in China.
每次我去中国时他们总问我:你对中国的看法是什么?
When I go to China and they always say to me, well, what do you think about China?
我就反问:你们为什么要问我?
I said, why are you asking me?
你住在这里。
You live here.
但这是我过去六七年来的观点。
But it has been my view for the last half a dozen years.
我告诉人们的是,欧洲和日本是经济上的老年人,活力不足。
What I tell people is that Europe and Japan are economic senior citizens, not much vitality.
美国是一个成熟的经济体,表现不错,但我认为最好的几十年已经过去了。
The US is a mature economic adult doing fine, but I would argue that the best decades are behind us.
中国是一个经济上的青少年。
China is an economic adolescent.
如果你家里有过青少年,就像我一样,你就知道可能会很动荡。
And if you've ever had an adolescent in your house, as I have, then you know it can be tempestuous.
虽然有起有落,但你也知道青少年最好的几十年还在前面。
And there are ups and downs, but you also know that the adolescent's best decades lie ahead.
我把中国描述为一个经济上的青少年,这就是我之前所说的起伏的一个例子。
And I describe China as an adolescent, economically speaking, and this is an example of the ups and downs that I was talking about.
我并没有预见到任何具体的事情,但你知道,当他们开始打压营利性教育等行业时,当世界在地缘政治和军事上对他们感到担忧时,这就是我们正在讨论的情况。
Now I didn't envision anything in particular, but, you know, when they come down on for profit education, etcetera, and when the world worries about them geopolitically and militarily, that's what we're talking about here.
当你进入青春期和新事物阶段时,各种情况都可能发生。
When you get into the adolescence and the new new things, stuff can happen.
我恰好持乐观态度。
I happen to be positive.
顺便说一句,就像雷曼兄弟破产后第二天你无法证明金融体系不会崩溃一样,你也无法证明中国未来会怎样。
By the way, just like you couldn't prove the day after the Lehman bankruptcy that the financial system was not gonna melt down, you can't prove what China's future holds.
我倾向于认为中国希望成为国际社会的一员,比如上海希望成为全球金融中心之一。
I happen to believe that China wants to be a member of the world community and that Shanghai, for example, wants to be one of the world's centers of finance.
如果中国真的做出人们担心的那些地缘政治行为,那么要实现这些目标就需要极大的想象力飞跃。
And it would take a great leap of the imagination to think that those goals can be achieved if China does some of the geopolitical things people are afraid of them doing.
对于一个没有你们优势的普通投资者来说——没有香港团队、上海团队,也无法投资那些可能极其廉价的不良房产——像我这样的普通人,最明智的做法是购买投资中国或中韩印的指数基金吗?
For a regular investor who doesn't have your advantages of a team based in Hong Kong and a team in Shanghai and the ability to invest in toxic property that may be selling incredibly cheap, For regular people like me, is the smart thing just to buy an index fund that invests in China or in China, South Korea, India?
或者说,如果你想长期持有某种资产,什么才是明智的选择?
Or what would be the smart kind of long term play if you just wanted to tuck something away?
特别是在2022年的当下,正如安德鲁指出的,现成可得的量化信息已无法成为获取超额收益的途径。
Especially here in 2022 when, as Andrew points out, readily available quantitative information about the present cannot be the road to superior performance.
大多数人应该通过他人进行投资,无论是指数基金、ETF还是主动管理账户。
Most people, they should invest through others, whether it's an index fund, an ETF, or an actively managed account.
我们不会自己处理法律事务、牙科诊疗或医疗工作。
We don't do our own legal work, dental work, medical work.
我们不会自己修车。
We don't fix our own cars.
那我们为什么要自己管理资金呢?
Why should we manage our own money?
我们凭什么相信作为业余爱好者具备这种能力?
Why should we believe that we have the ability as part timers to do that?
所以依我之见,业余投资者基本上应该选择基金和专业经理人。
So the amateur should basically pick funds and managers, in my opinions.
正如你所说,你应该选择一只在其章程中包含中国的全球基金。
And as you say, you wanna go into a global fund that includes China under their charter.
我认为他们应该这样做。
That's what I think they should do.
专业人士在涉足他们不了解的领域前应该三思。
The professionals should think twice before dabbling in areas they don't know about.
如果我是专业人士,想在中国市场试试运气,我会选择投资基金。
And if I were a professional and I wanted to try a punt on China, I would go into a fund.
我不会开始挑选那些在一个我一无所知的国家里、我对其一无所知的公司。
I wouldn't start picking companies I don't know anything about in a country I don't know anything about.
再说一次,人必须清楚自己的局限。
Again, man has to know his limitations.
让我印象深刻的一点是,回顾橡树资本自1995年你共同创立之初的经营原则,你希望创建一家既能实现卓越业绩,又能走正道、诚信经营的公司。
One of the things that struck me, was looking back at Oaktree's business principles from the start, from when you co founded Oaktree back in 1995, and you wanted to create this firm that would achieve superior performance, but also would take the high road and operate with integrity.
我深感触动的是,你们的原则基本上从那时起就保持不变,除了最近你们做出了橡树资本历史上的第二次修改——将责任加入章程。
I was very struck by the fact that your principles have basically stayed the same since then, except you recently made a change, I think, for the second time in Oaktree's history, which was to add responsibility to your charter.
你能谈谈这一点吗?
Can you talk about that?
因为人们对这类事情持怀疑态度,对吧?
Because people are skeptical about this sort of thing, right?
而且总认为这只是华尔街式的粉饰和空话。
And always assume that it's just Wall Street kind of whitewashing and using verbiage.
但我的感觉是你一直是个在道德上相当严肃的人。
But my sense is that you've always been kind of morally serious.
我想听听你的看法,为什么决定做出这个改变,以及这对你来说真正意味着什么。
And I wanted to get your view on why you decided to make that change and what it actually means to you.
1995年,当我和共事八年的布鲁斯·卡什,还有我们的同事谢尔顿·斯通、理查德·马森和拉里·基尔一起离开TCW创立橡树资本时,我们五人就这样开始了橡树的征程。
Well, in 1995, when Bruce Karsh and I, who had worked together for eight years, left TCW to form Oaktree along with our colleagues, Sheldon Stone, Richard Masson, and Larry Keel, the five of us started Oaktree having left TCW.
我们坐下来——主要是我负责记录——写下了我们想如何开展业务。
We sat down, which mostly means I was the scribe, and we wrote down how we wanted to do business.
当时有两件事。
And there were two things.
一件是你提到的商业原则,另一件是投资理念。
There was the business principles that you described and the investment philosophy.
这两件事出于不同的原因。
There were two things for different reasons.
投资哲学关乎我们如何投资,而商业原则关乎我们如何处世。
The investment philosophy is how would we invest, and the business principles, how would we live?
我们该如何经营业务?
How would we do business?
正如你所指出的,诚信、坦率、开放、公平对待,这些确实是商业原则的根基。
And, for example, as you point out, integrity, candor, openness, fair treatment is really the foundation of the business principles.
它们与投资无关。
They're not investment matters.
那关乎生活之道。
That's about life.
所以这关乎我们想要的生活方式。
So that was about how we wanted to live.
正因如此,我们才将责任纳入其中,将其添加到现行的商业原则里。
And that's the sense in which we included responsibility, added it to the business principles currently.
我并不是说这样做会让我们或客户赚更多钱,而是说这就是我们应有的生活方式。
I'm not saying it's gonna make us more money or our clients more money, but I'm saying that's the way we should live.
在我看来,我们应当对地球和所有社会成员怀有责任感。
And we should feel, in my opinion, a responsibility to the planet and a responsibility to all members of society.
当我去芝加哥时,米尔顿·弗里德曼正如日中天,他是那里的神明。
And when I went to Chicago, Milton Friedman was riding high, and he was the god there.
他是自由市场的坚定倡导者。
And he was a exponent of the free market.
他认为企业的职责就是赚钱。
And he said it's the corporation's job to make money.
赚的钱越多,就说明他们做得越好。
And the more money they make, the better a job they did.
仅此而已。
And that's all.
为股东创造利润。
Make money for the shareholders.
我认为这种世界观在比尔·克林顿和乔治·W·布什执政时期达到了顶峰。
And that view of the world, I think, reached its apogee under Bill Clinton and George w Bush.
自由市场将解决所有问题。
The free market will solve all the problems.
我不认为现在还有很多人持这种观点了。
And I don't think that view is held anymore by many people.
我相信现在人们普遍认同企业和专业人士还肩负着其他责任,包括对地球和社会的责任。
And I believe that somewhat widely accepted that corporations and professionals have some other responsibilities, which include planet and society.
你提到的多样性也包括在内,对。
And you're including diversity in in Yeah.
嗯,我觉得定义非常明确。
Well, I would say definition very much.
对吧?
Right?
社会。
Society.
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