RWH013：稳扎稳打，赢得大胜 W/ 托马斯·鲁索

他说，当你找到真正便宜的东西时，就应该大量买入。

And he said, When you find something that's really cheap, you should load up on it.

这让我也想到了你，他愿意专注于少数几个非常好的想法，然后长期持有。

And that sort of reminds me of you as well, his willingness to concentrate in a few really good ideas and then hold them for a long time.

是的。

Yeah.

这是个非常好的观点。

It's a very good point.

但他确实非常集中。

And he was super concentrated, though.

他会把20%、30%甚至更多的资金投入某一项具体持仓，而整个投资组合只有三到四项持仓。

He would have 20 plus 30 plus percent in in this specific holding and would have three or four holdings in a portfolio.

这是一个非常重要的观点。

So it's very important point.

你不知道市场会往哪个方向走，所以你需要承担这种市场风险。

And you don't know which way the markets are going to go, and so you wanna have that market risk.

因此，他在市场不利于短期表现的时候，有过很多次这样的情况。

And so he would have had plenty of times when when the market was not conducive to near term performance.

但无论如何，显然，他凭借对那些自己最有信心的公司判断更准而非更错，最终长期占据主导地位。

But, anyways, obviously, he reigned supreme over time by virtue of being more right than wrong on those companies that he felt most, conviction towards.

另一点是，与此同时，他在如何管理风险方面也有很好的直觉。

Now the other thing is, at the same time, he had good instincts in in how to how to manage risk.

我记得我刚入职时有一个持仓叫约翰·布莱尔公司。

I remember one of the positions when I really started out there was called John Blair.

约翰·布莱尔是一家媒体代理公司，其业务与电视广告代理机构试图更广泛地将广告投放给那些并不了解观众的广播公司有关。

And John Blair was a media rep company, and it had to do with the fact that TV agency advertising agency was trying to place advertisement more more, broadly into into users' hands who didn't know the user, the broadcasters.

后来出现了一群被称为媒体顾问的人，他们帮助安排所有这些广告投放。

And this group came up called media consultants, let's just say, who helped place all that stuff.

而且它

And it

这是一家叫约翰·布莱尔的公司，他们持有该公司很大一部分股份。

was a company called John Blair, and they owned a big piece of the company.

他们与管理层非常亲近，其他方面也是如此。

They're very close to the management, all the rest.

但当我1984年到达时，他们感到担忧，因为广告代理机构中的主要持仓及其内部动态正在发生变化。

But by the time I arrived, which was 1984, they were worried because the big position of and and the dynamics within the ad agency were changing.

因此，他们希望确保自己不会在这一变化发生时被抛在后面。

And so they wanted to make sure that they wouldn't be left behind as that change took place.

于是，他们作为团队进行了一次深入的研究。

And so they did some deep dive research as a as a team.

人们聚在一起，进行深入研究，发现这项业务正面临风险。

People clustered together, deep dive research, and they realized the business was at risk.

一旦意识到这一点，他们便不幸地发现，这项业务在公开市场中正在不断萎缩。

And so once realized, they had this sad misfortune of realizing it was at risk as it was eroding in the public market.

我刚到时，它的股价是42。

So it was at 42 when I showed up.

它曾是39。

It was 39.

然后降到36，接着是31。

Then it was 36 and then '31.

他们正在做这项工作，但对所了解到的情况越来越感到不安。

You they're doing the work and increasingly uncomfortable with what you're learning about.

在某个时刻，这种下滑趋势出现后，比尔说：好吧。

And at some point, that trajectory downwards, Bill then said, okay.

对交易员说：卖出。

To the trader, sell.

卖出。

Sell.

以什么价格卖出？

And, at what price?

就卖出。

Just sell.

关键是比尔已经认定，公司的好日子已经过去，他没有陷入华尔街一种极其常见的心理：嗯，是的。

And the point was Bill had resolved that, that the business has better times are behind them, and he didn't fall prey to this unbelievably typical feeling in Wall Street, which is to say, yeah.

确实如此。

It's true.

它已经受损了。

It's it's impaired.

一旦价格回到最近的高点，我就卖出，然后把资金投入到别处。

As soon as it gets back to the, you know, the recent highs, I'll let go and sell it, and then, we'll put the capital somewhere else.

但显然，价格从未回到最近的高点。

But, course, it never gets back to the most recent highs.

这是一个陷阱。

It's a trap.

所以他没有陷入这种困境。

And so he did not suffer that.

他把想法想透了。

He finished the thoughts.

这些想法表明，情况已不复从前，该卖了，赶紧卖。

The thoughts suggested something that is no longer as it once was, and time to sell and then sell.

因此，我认为这是从那次培训中我学到的最重要的一课之一。

And so I I think that's one of the more important lessons that I've carried from that training.

我想说，回顾我自己的优缺点，其中一个缺点是我可能没有比比尔那么果断，在是否卖出这个问题上，我更容易屈从于人性的本能——即等到价格再高一点才卖出。

And I'd say that, you know, as as I think of my own pluses and minuses, the one one one minus would be that I probably am less decisive as as was Bill on that notion of than sell and fall prey to that human instinct, which is then sell, but a little higher.

不过，这很有趣。

It was interesting though.

我能看出来，当你对像奥驰亚或富国银行这样的公司改变看法时。

I could see when you changed your mind about something like Altria or Wells Fargo.

但真正到了动手抛售的时候，你却非常果断。

You were pretty ruthless when it actually came to pulling the trigger and getting rid of them.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that?

因为正如我们后面会谈到的，你持有的很多股票长达三四十年。

Because you I mean, as we'll get to, you own a lot of stocks for thirty, forty years.

但当你看到像富国银行或奥驰亚这样的公司偏离了你原本喜欢的特质时，你几乎立刻就清仓了。

And yet when you saw something like Wells Fargo or Altria shift away from what you liked, you sort of dumped them instantly almost, it seems.

是的。

Yes.

嗯，这正是我应该做的。

Well, that's what I'm supposed to.

这正是我们应该做的。

That's what we're supposed to do.

这就是为什么我刚才建议要把它做得如此出色。

That's to build that's why I was just suggesting build it so well.

你举了两个重要的例子。

And you pick two important examples.

我的意思是，奥驰亚当时有充分的理由认为自己拥有一个非常光明的未来。

Mean, Altria had every reason to think that they had a quite glorious future.

它们是从卡夫公司遗留下来的部分，你知道的，拥有国内烟草业务，还有一系列其他相关业务，而且股价也相对便宜。

They were what was left standing, from the company Kraft, you know, and so they had they had the domestic tobacco business, then they had a host of other related businesses, and the shares were modestly priced.

它们本有机会确保股票回购持续增加。

They they had every opportunity to make sure buybacks increase.

但不知为何，原因很可能在于高管薪酬方案中，否则无法解释这一行为。

But for some reason, and it's most likely found in the executive compensation package because you can't make sense of it otherwise.

某天，毫无预兆地，这个业务——精心打造的国内香烟业务，品牌领导者万宝路，占据了51%的市场份额。

Out of the clear blue, one day, this business, which was sort of thoughtfully put together domestic cigarettes, the brand leaders, Marlboro, they had they had 51% of the market.

尽管该业务在衰退，但其下滑速度却会持续加快。

And even though the business is declining, it will continue to accelerate on the decline.

所有数据都表明，这是一项富有成效且有望带来丰厚回报的投资。

It all penciled out to being a fruitful and likely to be rewarding investment.

但更重要的是，它并未捕捉到可能让这一业务从沉闷的价值型资产转变为热门风口的潜在机遇。

But on top of that, it wasn't capturing the exciting prospects to what might shift it from being considered dull in value to being sort of a hot fire.

因此，他们转而投入350亿美元，购买了一种降低风险的产品，以帮助吸烟者戒烟。

And so they stepped across the way and bought into a position for $35,000,000,000 on a reduced risk product to help smokers quit smoking.

同时，他们还以110亿美元（我认为是这个数字）收购了一家大麻公司，该公司通过香烟、糖果等形式销售其大麻产品。

And they came upon a, at the same time for $11,000,000,000, I think the number was, a cannabis company that would express their cannabis products through joints and through candies and all the other stuff.

他们收购了这家公司。

And they bought that.

因此，他们一举大幅提高了资产负债表的杠杆。

So in one fell swoop, they had massively leveraged up their balance sheet.

其中一个是JUUL，

Of them was JUUL,

对，这是有争议的。

right, which is controversial.

JUUL才是主要的。

Jewel was the big one.

从他们购买到最近注销最后部分，花费了345亿美元。

Cost them 34 and a half billion dollars from the time they bought it to the time they just recently wrote off some of the final bits.

结果证明，这造成了约340亿美元的资本损失。

It turns out to be about $34,000,000,000 of capital destruction.

而且，当他们购买这两项资产时，我们就知道有问题了，这完全说不通，因为他们如此愿意加杠杆，并且违背了沃伦多年来一直强调的原则：为什么人们会做出如此愚蠢的决定？

And, anyways, when they bought that and both of those, we knew that that there was trouble, and, and it made no sense given their willingness to leverage up so much and and compromise what they, as Warren says, over the years, Warren has often been asked, why do people do really stupid things?

这正是其中之一。

And this would be one of them.

沃伦说，你永远无法真正知道原因，但他提到有一种情况：非常聪明的人，不知为何，渴望得到那些他们无法拥有、也不需要的东西，为此甘愿冒险赌上自己真正拥有和需要的一切。

And Warren said, you never really know why, but he said there is this situation where very smart people, for some reason or other, want what they you see, they're willing to risk what they have and they need for that which they can't have and don't need.

这显然就是一个典型案例。

And so that was clearly a case.

如果你考虑到他们采取这些行动时所承担的宏观风险，这在某种程度上是一种类似自杀式的心理。

If you thought about the macro risks you're picking up by making those moves as they did, it was, you know, in some ways a form of, you know, suicidal kind of psychology of some sort.

而在大麻业务上，情况也类似，只不过引爆的时间更慢一些。

And then with the same sort of thing with the, cannabis, it was just a slower fuse.

我之所以对Juul如此详细地展开，真正的问题在于，他们发现自己拥有了一款面向法律禁止接触的年轻用户的营销产品。

The trouble why why I go to such colorful lengths with Juul, the real issue there was they found themselves with this product that they marketed to younger users than they legally are allowed to.

这款产品迅速在特定年龄群体中走红，引发了大量家长乃至有影响力家长的强烈不满。

And it hit it hit that particular age group, and it created a real roar among parents and many well positioned parents.

整个过程最终演变成了一场惩罚。

And and the whole process really became one of punishment.

我们不想继续留在这里，所以卖掉了它。

And we didn't wanna stick around, so we sold it.

这完全是合理的。

And that was perfectly reasonable.

我们从未对此后悔过。

We've never looked back on that.

另一个是什么，另一个是？

The other one what was the other

比如富国银行，也陷入了声誉风险的领域。

Well, Wells Fargo, which also got into reputational risk territory.

没错。

Exactly.

他们为什么要冒险赌上自己拥有的东西呢？

And and, again, why ever would they risk what they had?

我对整个事件有一个稍微不同的看法。

And then, you know, I have a sort of a a spin on that whole saga, which is slightly different.

我认为，监管缺失、缺乏自我监督文化的一部分原因，是那些有权做出错误决定的人，而这种自我监督机制本应从理查德·克罗切克——我想他的姓是克罗切克——时代就开始存在了。

And I think that part of the lack of supervision, part of the lack of culture as it related to self policing, those who were in a position to make bad decisions, the self policing process that would have been there since Richard, Kroczek, I think his last name was.

他担任首席执行官数十年，之前的管理者也是如此。

He was the CEO for decades, and other prior managers.

他们都因富国银行在1999年底危机达到顶峰时收购诺尔特银行而分心。

They were all distracted because of the acquisition that Wells Fargo made of Norwest at the end of the collapse of nineteen ninety nine, I guess it was, when, with the banking crisis hit such a such a hard wall.

不。

No.

对不起。

I excuse me.

是雷曼兄弟的倒闭造成了这一结果。

It's the Lehman Brothers collapse, which created this outcome.

你可以想象一下，在富国银行，我认为管理层在那个周五晚上回家时，以为自己会被摩根士丹利收购，而那个非凡周末里盛行的狂热最终导致他们反而收购了诺尔特银行。

If you can imagine this, at Wells Fargo, I think management from Wells Fargo went home that Friday night thinking that they were going to be acquired by Morgan Stanley and, you know, the froth that existed over that extraordinary weekend ended up that they ended up instead buying, Norwest Bancorp.

两种文化从未真正融合，它们差异极大。

Two cultures never really melded, and they were just extraordinarily different.

一种是西海岸风格的。

One was West Coast based.

一个总部设在夏洛特。

One was based in Charlotte.

而且，它们的价值观不同，是两家截然不同的银行。

And, they didn't share values, and they were very different banks.

我认为这导致了大量领域缺乏监管。

I think that left an awful lot of pockets unsupervised.

与其回头去理清麻烦，我的决定反映了我这样的信念：麻烦将持续很长时间，因为解决方案带有强烈的政治色彩。

And rather than go back and unravel the trouble, my decision reflected my belief that the trouble was going to endure for a very long time because there was a very strong political tone to the solution.

花旗支付了数十亿美元的罚款，但这些罚款丝毫没有表明它们是足够的。

There are many billions of dollars that were paid in penalties by Wells, and none of those had any any suggestion that they were sufficient.

人们只是觉得这种情况会持续很久。

There was just a sense that this would go on for a very long time.

事实上，直到今天，他们仍在为雷曼破产期间发生的行为以及随后的不当行为支付巨额罚款。

And in fact, even today, they're still paying out large penalty payments from that conduct that took place during the period of the collapse of Lehman and the misbehavior that followed.

在这种情况下，我们有一个立场，认为它能为我们提供与我们非常敬重的J先生所管理的类似风险敞口。

In that case, we had a position that we felt, could provide us with much the same kind of exposure run by a person who we quite esteemed named J.

B。

B.

戴蒙德，那是摩根大通。

Diamond, and it was JPMorgan.

因此，考虑到我们预见到威瑞森未来几十年将面临的政治挑战，我们决定退出，并发现 Jamie 的持股比例当时也和威瑞森一样偏低。

So we sort of we came out of Wells in light of the political challenges that we knew that they would face, believe that they would face for the coming decades, and found Jamie to have his shares were equally lower as were Wells' at the time.

于是我们做了一次置换，此后一直持有摩根大通的仓位。

So we sort of made a swap and had a position since then at JPMorgan.

你的许多声誉都建立在对像雀巢这样的优秀消费公司进行长期投资上，我认为这可能是你的第二大持仓，你自1986年左右就开始持有。

A lot of your reputation has been built on these very long term investments in great consumer companies like Nestle, which I think is probably your second largest position, which you've owned since I think about 1986.

布朗福尔曼公司，拥有杰克丹尼威士忌，我认为你自1987年起就一直持有。

Brown Forman, which owns Jack Daniels, which I think you've owned since 1987.

是的。

Yep.

情况一样。

Same thing.

喜力，那是哪家？

Heineken, which is what?

八十年代末、九十年代初，大概是那时候？

Late '80s, early '90s, something like that?

1986年。

'eighty six.

1986年。

'eighty six.

太惊人了。

Amazing.

所以这些高产的年份。

So these productive year.

是的。

Yeah.

所以这些公司你已经持有三十六年左右了。

So these companies that you've owned for thirty six or so years already.

你能谈谈这些企业如何体现你所做事情核心的两大原则吗？即再投资的能力和承受痛苦的能力？

Can you talk about what these businesses embody in terms of the two great principles really that are at the heart of what you do, this capacity to reinvest and the capacity to suffer?

因为我认为这是一个极其重要的理念，深刻揭示了是什么让一家公司能够在数十年间保持韧性。

Because I think it's such a profoundly important idea, such a great insight about what makes a company durable over decades.

是的。

Yes.

对。

Yeah.

对。

Yeah.

那你选一个吧，海尼根、布朗·福曼，随便哪个，汤姆。

So take your pick, Heineken, Brown Forman, whichever you want to talk about, Tom.

对。

Yeah.

我觉得它们真的非常相似。

I think they have really so much the same.

我的意思是，你从那些拥有强大品牌的产品开始，这些品牌足够强大，以至于消费者不相信有任何替代品能与之媲美。

I mean, you start with products that with strong brands, with strong enough brands, the consumer doesn't believe there could be an adequate substitute for.

当我们评估任何投资的潜在价值时，这就是我们最初的出发点。

That's sort of what we start with when any assessing the potential merit of any investment.

这会是一个持久的原因吗？

And is that going to be an enduring reason?

还是说它会被浪费、挥霍，或者被竞争所取代？

Or is it something that can be wasted and frittered away, or is it one that could be competed away?

你知道，如果你回到三十年前一起长大的那些人，他们仍然开着同样的车，或者拥有那些能定义他们身份、并向他人展示自我的东西，这些就依然是持久的。

And, you know, the the people who you grow up with, if you go back thirty years later, and they're still having their same cars or whatever it is that might define who they tell other people they are by what they have remain enduring.

这种观念就是，品牌——这正是我们通常专注的核心——之所以有价值，是因为它们帮助人们用简短的方式描述自己是谁，通过自己拥有什么来体现。

And that notion that, you know, brands, which is what would at the heart of what we tend to specialize in, brands are valuable because they help people shorthand describe who they are by what they have.

如果你穿一件Izod衬衫，打一条Ferragamo领带，或者背一个6000美元的爱马仕包，它们都承载着对你身份和个性的确认。

If you wear an Izod shirt, if you wear a Ferragawa tie, if you wear this Hermes bag for $6,000, they're all laden with with the confirmation of what and who you are.

我认为这是一种更高层次的需求，我必须认为它比大多数人所认为的更加持久。

And I think that's such a high order of need states that I had to think of it as more enduring than most people do.

大多数人会说，比如我们持有瑞士历峰集团的仓位，而历峰集团旗下拥有梵克雅宝和卡地亚，这两者都是奢侈品行业的巨头。

Most people would say, for example, we own a position in, Richemont, and Richemont has a you know, owns in turn, Van Cleef, and they own in turn Cartier, which are two really titan of the, industry the luxury goods industry.

人们会说，没错，但这是周期性的，因为在经济下行时，人们会停止购买。

And, and people say, yeah, but that's cyclical, you know, because, you know, that in a downturn, people stop.

我倒觉得，他们会停止购买婚戒吗？

I sort of say, will they stop giving out wedding bands?

他们会停止购买结婚戒指吗？

Will they stop wedding rings?

他们会停止购买劳力士手表吗？你知道，在某些国家，当一个年轻女性年满25岁时，就会收到一块劳力士手表，诸如此类的情况。

Will they stop, you know, the Rolex watch, which in certain countries, you know, when when a young woman turns 25, she gets a Rolex watch, things like that.

我相信，这些商品的非必需性远没有人们想象的那么高。

My belief is that they're not nearly as discretionary as people think they are.

最能说明这一点的例子就是苹果公司。

And the best example of that at all is Apple.

苹果的Macintosh笔记本电脑。

Apple Macintosh laptops.

如果你认为这是非必需品，那你一定没有十几岁的女儿或儿子。

If you think that that's a discretionary purchase, then you don't have a teenage daughter or son.

我不知道当时看起来怎么样。

I I don't know what it seemed.

但不管怎样，你回家后给他们买了一台价格合理的日立台式机，结果立刻看到孩子在你面前崩溃了，因为这台电脑根本没法用。

But anyways because you go home and deliver to them their favorite your reasonably priced Hitachi desktop and watch your child fall apart immediately in front of you, because it it just won't do.

他们需要那种来自苹果产品的归属感，而这正是这个业务中非常出色的部分——用户粘性、不愿更换品牌以及高昂的转换成本。

They need the the sense of belonging that comes to that blowing back apple, and and, it's a fabulous part of that business, which is the, stickiness, the, unwillingness to switch, the high switching costs, I guess you call it.

因此，正是这个品牌才是我们真正看重的。

And so that brand is what is what we really find.

以历峰集团为例，其总的潜在市场是全球珠宝业。

In the case of in the case of Richemont, their total addressable market is jewelry, global.

而在这一市场中，只有10%是品牌化的产品。

And of that market, only 10% of that market's branded.

其余90%则是我们作为全球两大最强珠宝品牌股东所面对的潜在市场。

The balance, 90%, is is the addressable market, which we have in front of us as shareholders of the two most powerful jewelry brands in the world.

因此，这一立场使我们能够重新投资，确保他们拥有合适的门店、合理的价格以及创新的产品，因为你不能显得过于创新，因为这一切都关乎传统。

And so that's a position which allows us to then reinvest into making sure that they have the right the right locations, pricing goods at the right price, coming up with the right innovations because you don't wanna seem overly innovative because it's all about traditions.

因此，我们看到了一种业务模式，如果我有选择或能力的话，我愿意100%拥有它。

And so we see there the kind of business that I would like to own a 100% myself if I had the choice or the ability to.

但我们并没有。

But we don't.

因此，我们在这家上市公司中找到了这样的存在。

And so we we then find it to exist in this example in the public company now.

那么问题来了，约翰·鲁珀特呢？

Then the question is, what about Johan Rupert?

他是掌控历峰集团的家族继承人。

He's the family heir to the fortune that controls, the respond.

他会投入足够多的资金吗？

Will he invest the right amount of money?

他会偷工减料吗？

Will will he cut corners?

即使没有丰厚的华尔街薪酬包，他还会这么做吗？

Will he do even lacking a a big Wall Street package for compensation?

他还是会像不可审查的企业负责人那样行事吗？

Will he nonetheless do the same thing as unreviewable head of the business?

我们对此的回答是否定的。

And our answer to that is no.

他们在做决策时会考虑到我们。

That they do think of us when they make decisions.

这是我的信念。

This is my belief.

我见过他。

I've met him.

我相信他在思考外部股东以及他对他们的责任。

I do believe that he thinks about the outside shareholders and the duty that he has to them.

因此，这解决了代理成本问题。

And so that checks off the agency cost.

再投资的能力得到了验证，因为你们正在将10%的市场转化为90%的非品牌市场。

The capacity to reinvest is checked off because, you know, you're converting 10% to 90% of the market that's not branded.

顺便说一下，这个故事在海尼根在非洲销售啤酒时也同样成立。

That same story, by the way, is true of of selling beer at Heineken in Africa.

同时，我买入了历峰集团的仓位。

At the same time, I bought the, Richemont position.

我们买入了海尼根的仓位，我们的看法是，他们拥有领先的啤酒品牌，并且拥有来自全球的现金流，尤其是在增长放缓的市场中。

We bought the Heineken position, and and that belief was that they had the leading beer, and they had cash flow from around the world, especially from markets where the growth rates had slowed.

因此，他们拥有资本，也拥有市场存在。

And so they had capital and and they had presence.

他们拥有长期存在的市场地位，就像卡地亚和雷西斯那样。

They had presence, long standing presence, much like Cartier and Reese's mind.

他们在那些已有一百年历史的市场中拥有存在感。

They had presence in markets that are a 100 years old.

因此，非洲每天消耗的4亿桶啤酒类液体中，只有1%是用西方设备瓶装酿造的。

And so the trick is of the 400,000,000 barrels of beer like liquids consumed each day in Africa, only a 100 of that is bottled, brewed traditionally with the equipment of the West.

它经过了巴氏杀菌。

It's pasteurized.

它被装瓶了。

It's bottled.

它被征税了。

It's taxed.

它被营销了。

It's marketed.

因此，三分之一，或者说实际上四分之一的市场是西方风格的，而其余四分之三则是我们待开发的整个潜在市场。

So one third, or actually one fourth of the market is Western style, and the three quarters that await our total addressable market.

这项投资的依据在于来自西方的成熟现金流。

The investment case will be made by the mature cash flows that come from the West.

这就是喜力在1986年建立的模式，并一直延续至今。

Now that's kind of the way Heineken set up in 1986, and so it played its way through to the day.

它通过进入新国家和推出不同品牌持续增长。

It kept growing by new countries, kept growing by different brands.

他们最近推出了零点零酒精的喜力啤酒，这是一种无酒精的喜力啤酒，已成为该国销量第一的无酒精啤酒。所有让他们取得成功的原因，去年他们更是因疫情期间的交易而幸运地赢得了印度20%的市场份额，因为他们此前25年一直与该业务合作，因此在收购时最具优势。

They came up with Heineken zero point zero recently, which is an alcohol free Heineken, which is the number one alcohol beer free beer in the country, and all the things that made them made them succeed to, just last year when they had the great fortune of, winning 20 percentage points of the Indian market through transactions that took place during the, the pandemic, with they were the best positioned to buy it because they were partners with that business, for the prior twenty five years.

所以当他们收购后，现在拥有了该业务60%以上的份额，终于可以开始实现我们长期以来希望印度实现的目标：开发一款瓶装、征税、定价有吸引力的啤酒，现在这一切都在喜力的掌控之下。

So when they bought it, they now had 60 plus percent of the business, and they can begin to do what we've long wanted India to do, which is to develop a bottled beer, taxed beer, attractively priced beer that's now under Heineken's watch.

这凝聚了全球领先酿酒商的全部管理洞察力与能力，他们将把这些优势带给一个充满渴求的饮酒大国。

So that has all of the management insight and capability of the world's leading brewer, and they're going to deliver that to a nation of thirsty drinkers.

汤姆，我真的很惊讶。

I I was amazed, Tom.

过去几年我一直阅读您的股东信。

I had been reading your shareholder letters for the last few years.

是的。

Yes.

昨晚吃饭时，我跟妻子提到您一封信里的一个惊人数据，我认为每年有两千万印度人达到法定饮酒年龄。

And I was telling my wife over dinner last night this amazing statistic from one of your letters, which is that I think 20,000,000 Indians per year advance to legal drinking age.

所以未来五年，我们将迎来一亿人的全新市场。是的。

So over the next five years, we're gonna have this new market of a 100,000,000 people Yes.

海尼根能够做到这一点。

That a Heineken can deliver.

这似乎非常典型地体现了你们正在做的事情。

And that that seems very emblematic of what it is you that you're doing.

没错。

Exactly.

你们正在推动这一扩张，没错。

You're hitting this expansion Exactly.

进入新兴和发展中市场。

Into emerging and developing markets.

本周早些时候，我与海尼根的管理层会面，我们讨论了他们未来再投资的重点方向。

And I met who I I was with Heineken management earlier this week, and, we were talking about their priorities of where will they reinvest going forward.

正如我所说，他们在印度充满干劲。

And they have, as I said, India, they're extraordinarily charged up.

我认为这是一个互利的机会。

I think it's a mutual opportunity.

按数据统计，如今印度人每年消费1.5升啤酒。

And by measurement, the Indians today, consume 1.5 liters of beer per year.

他们喜欢啤酒。

They like it.

随着国家人均可支配收入的增长，他们越来越喜欢喜力旗下的金鹰啤酒，这是公司的核心品牌。

They are becoming more their consumer disposable income is growing as a nation, and they have a fondness for for Kingfisher beer, which is the brand that is at the heart of the company.

因此，我非常兴奋，他们将有能力投入数亿美元，从一个年消费量仅为1.5升的市场开始扩建。

So I am ecstatic they will have the capacity to spend hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars building from a market that could that has one and a half liters.

相比之下，印度人均30升，中国38升。

By contrast, India is 30 China is 38 liters per capita.

美国是66升。

The US is 66.

德国是99升。

Germany is 99.

捷克共和国高达每人142升。

The Czech Republic is a 142 liters per capita.

喜力在所有这些市场都有业务存在。

Heineken has has presence in all those markets.

在捷克市场，142升的消费量，他们也有业务布局。

A 142, the Czech market, they have they have a presence there.

无论如何，我们再高兴不过了。

Anyways, we couldn't be happier.

我们现在处于一个位置，我们最长期的投资之一即将迎来重生。

We're in a position now where one of our longest standing investments is is about to rebirth itself.

他们在另一个领域——巴西——也取得了惊人的成功，通过一系列有趣的步骤和转变，他们在巴西销售的喜力啤酒瓶装量超过世界任何其他市场。

One other area that they've succeeded in amazingly through a lot of interesting steps and turns is Brazil, where they sell more Heineken than in glass bottles than in any other market in the world.

在饮料行业投资有一个细微差别，那就是如果你在某个发展中新兴市场足够庞大，你就有能力使用可回收的可重复使用的玻璃瓶来服务该市场。

There's a nuance in investing in the beverage industry, which is that if you get if you're large enough in one of the developing emerging markets, you will have the ability to serve that market using recyclable returnable glass bottles.

如果你想象一个30美分的瓶子，作为一箱六瓶装的一部分，一旦售出就再也不回收，那么这六瓶装的包装成本就是1.80美元。

And if you think about a 30¢ bottle as a part of a of a six pack that goes out and never comes back, that's a dollar 80 of packaging costs in that six pack.

如果瓶子能回收，每瓶成本就从30美分降到3美分。

If the bottles come back, instead of 30¢ a bottle, it's 3¢ a bottle.

你取六个这样的瓶子，成本就从1.8美元降到了18美分。

And you take six of those, it's 18¢ instead of a dollar 8.

因此，他们将拥有显著的竞争优势。

And so they will have some substantial competitive advantage.

他们将建设全新的绿色场址销售渠道和酿酒设施，同时受益于可回收玻璃瓶带来的额外利润。

They will be building fresh greenfield route to market and brewing, and then they'll have the benefit of that extra margin that comes from the returnable glass bottles.

他们占据了60%以上的市场份额。

And they have, you know, 60 plus percent of the marketplace.

因此，成熟市场的现金流将支持其扩张。

And so mature market cash flows come to support the build out.

他们在这项支出上的回报率很高，这非常好，因为如果没有这个强劲的需求引擎，他们就会难以找到资金的投放方向。

They have a high rate of return on that spending, which is great because otherwise the money would just sort of they'd struggle with with how to place it if they didn't have this, thirsty engine kicking in.

因此，我们有着非常长期的预期。

And so, we have a very long term feeling.

但在未来几个月，我将花大部分时间评估他们重新配置资本的能力有多大，以及他们如何巩固消费者在印度市场中的信念——即没有其他产品能替代或让他们放弃这款产品。

But I will I will spend most of my time over the coming months because some of this is just coming to fruition, just assessing how big the capacity is for them to redeploy capital and how will it secure their belief among the consumers in India that there's no other product that they would rather do or or can do without.

所以，关于那两千万，你是对的。

So this But you were right on that on that 20,000,000.

这是一个惊人的数字。

That's amazing number.

这很好地说明了再投资能力的重要性。

So that's a great example of this importance of the capacity to reinvest.

我想请你简单举个例子，比如雀巢投资奈斯派索，或者伯克希尔投资GEICO，来说明你另一个非常核心的主题——忍耐力。

I wondered if you could just quickly run us through an example of something like Nestle investing in Nespresso or Berkshire investing in GEICO as an example of this other really central theme of yours, which is the capacity to suffer.

是的。

Yes.

嗯，是这样的。

Well, is.

奈斯派索就是一个完美的例子，正如你所想象的，当初提出这个想法时曾引发相当大的抵触情绪。

Perfect example of it is Nespresso, which as as you can imagine, bet some degree of hostility when even proposed.

奈斯派索计划推出一种高端、上门配送的单杯咖啡系统，使用一种极其新鲜的咖啡胶囊，喝起来仿佛来自专业咖啡师的手艺，但实际上它只是从你厨房里一个放在橙汁榨汁机旁的小设备中制作出来的。

It was proposed to be Nespresso was going to be a premium, home delivered premium individual coffee serving kit, where there's a cartridge that's so fresh in its release that it will feel like you have it from a a real barista, but it's actually coming from your kitchen, a little device that sits next to your orange juice press.

无论如何，他们看到了这个机会。

Anyways, they saw the opportunity.

这非常困难。

It's very hard.

我不知道你们有没有尝试过在家制作意式浓缩咖啡。

I don't know if any of you have tried to brew home espresso.

这很难做到，因为这是一种欧洲人的技巧，我们做不到。

It's hard to do it because you've just it's some European trick that they get, we don't.

这是一个很好的平等工具，因为它能产出一杯出色的咖啡，但成本很高。

And this is a great equalizer because it's a great cup that comes out, but it costs them.

他们在这一产品上花了十五年才盈亏平衡。

And they they did not break even for fifteen years on this.

在这期间，董事长好几次取消了这个产品。

And the product was canceled by the chairman several times along the way.

那些执着的、近乎狂热的、充满使命感的人，藏身于海涅和雀巢内部，把我们拉到一边说：我们不会让你失败，他们坚持了下来。

And zealot mess messianic, people buried inside Heine and Nestle pulled us to the side and said, we're not gonna let you die, they kept it going.

然后他们又克服了一些更长时间的障碍。

And then they passed some more hurdles that went a little longer.

但如今，它已成为一个50亿美元的平台，其中约35亿美元来自咖啡胶囊（利润相当可观），另外15亿美元来自机器设备，这些设备他们只是转手销售，利润微薄，真正赚钱的是一次性胶囊。

But today, it's a $5,000,000,000 platform, sort of 3 and a half billion in capsules, which are quite profitable, and the other one and a half is machinery, which they sort of pass through, which has some marginal profits, but they really make the money of the disposable, cartridge.

这是一个很好的例子。

And that's a good example.

另一个很好的例子，我来和你们分享一个国内的案例。

Another good example would be I'll share this one with you because it's domestic.

关于雀巢的好处，就像喜力一样，就像我们之前讨论过的其他公司一样，我的目标是进入那些人口仍在增长、消费者不断升级的地方。

The beauty about Neste, again, is just like Heineken, just like others that we've spoken about, my goal is to tap into the places in the world where the populations are still growing, consumers' advancing.

因此，我们尤其关注资本的重新配置，特别是当资本进入新市场时，尤其是那些我们知晓品牌曾与之有互动历史、但市场正等待更多消费能力和支出潜力的地方，而这需要投资。

So we tend to look for that redeployment of capital, especially closely when it goes into new markets, especially those new markets where we know that there's been a history of interactivity with the brands, but the market's just waiting for more spending power and more capacity to deliver inside that market, and that requires the investment.

因此，当公司表示他们正在大力投资以扩大产能，来服务一个已被证明对他们的产品需求旺盛的市场时，我们非常欣赏。

And so we we love it when companies say that they're making sizable investments to expand it into their capacity to serve a market which has proved to be thirsty for their products.

另一个不同的故事是关于EW斯克里普斯公司，这是一家由斯克里普斯家族创立的报业公司。

Then just a a different story has to do with, EW Scripps, which is a a newspaper company founded by the Scripps family.

它在全国拥有约100份报纸。

It had a 100 papers around the country.

它们都比另一家更赚钱。

They're all more profitable than the other one.

这是一门生意。

And it's a business.

日报业务，作为垄断型城镇业务，几十年来一直是消费者不可或缺的。

The newspaper business, daily newspaper business, Monopoly town businesses has been one which consumers cannot do without for decades.

如果你需要了解这一点，不妨回想一下你成长过程中住过的任何一所房子，问问自己，你所在城镇最富有的家庭是不是报业家族。

If you needed to know that, just think back on any of the houses or homes you've lived in over this you're growing up and ask yourself whether or not it was the case that the richest family in any given town you're in was the newspaper family.

我不确定是否总是如此，但通常确实如此，因为他们对本地新闻拥有非凡的垄断地位。

I don't know that that's the case, but it typically is because they had such an extraordinary monopoly on local stories.

因此，人们不得不阅读这些内容，比如谁喝醉了、谁赢了、谁是高中橄榄球队的四分卫、谁进了球。

And so people had to read those, you know, who was drunk, who won who was the quarterback of the high school football team, who scored the goal.

你知道，所有这些你必须了解的信息，才能成为社会的一员。

You know, all that stuff that you you gotta have, to be a member of a citizen.

所以现在他们没有做的是，他们没有转向互联网，而是对那些真正本地化但无法跨平台推广、从而挽救其他报纸的解决方案措手不及。

So now what they didn't do is they didn't make the turn to the Internet, and they they sort of fell flat footed on solutions that were truly local but didn't have the ability to cross over it and cure them from most of their other newspapers.

但当时有一位专业人士，他出售了斯克里普斯公司的广播电台，并获得了收益。

But there was a professional there who sold the Scripps company's radio stations and had proceeds from it.

他有一个想法，想付诸实践，于是去找了掌控董事会的家族。

And he had an idea that he'd like to do it, he went to the family that controlled the board.

顺便提一下，我还没来得及描述我们试图应用的模式中的一个关键组成部分：那些为我们执行得最好的公司，往往仍由创始家族成员经营。

As a quick aside, I haven't yet described one of the key components of the model that we that we try to apply is that the companies that execute best on our behalf tend to be still run by founding family members.

如果我们认为，可以与他们长期、稳健地增长财富的愿望建立联系，同时注意避免在过程中缴税。

If we think that we can attach ourselves to their long term desire to grow their wealth slowly but securely and to be mindful of not having to pay taxes along the way.

因此，当EW斯克里普斯出版公司被一位关键高管接触时，这位高管刚刚出售了广播业务并拥有资金，他请求公司允许他用这笔钱创办一家新的、以广告支持的有线电视公司，涵盖家居和园艺领域。

And so EW Scripps publishing company, as they were approached by one of their key executives who'd sold out the business of radio, had money and petitioned to them that they permit him to spend it on a new advertising supported cable company that would embrace both the house and the garden.

他觉得这或许可以叫做HGTV，即家居园艺电视网络。

He thought it might be called the the HGTV, Home Garden TV Network.

家族仔细考虑后，意识到他们具备这样的能力。

And the family looked it over and and realized that they had capacity.

他们有一个音乐乐队，为所有12到14个不同的电视台播放背景音乐。

They had a musical station band that played background music for all the different the 12 or 14 different TV stations.

所以他们拥有电视广告销售人员。

So they had they had television ad salespeople.

他们拥有混音设备、图形设备，以及运营一个电视台所需的一切设备，因此家居与园艺电视网可以借用这些内部资源。

They had mixing equipment, the graphics equipment, everything you needed to power up a a TV station they had so Home and Garden TV Network would borrow from some of those internal capacities.

家族表示，我们会将这些内部资源专门用于尝试让这个项目成功。

And the family said, we'll dedicate those internal capacities to try to make this work.

你有1.5亿美元，仅此而已。

And you have $150,000,000 That's it.

你可以花这笔钱。

You can spend that.

但当你花完这笔钱后，你就彻底没钱了。

But when you're done with that, you're done with it.

因此，他们第一年雇了两个人，第二年雇了七个，第三年雇了十五个，第四年雇了四十个。

And so they hired two people the first year, seven the next, 15 the next, and 40 the next.

第二年，他们的人数增加到70人，并准备推向市场。

The next year, they're up to 70 and they're ready to go to market.

在这一过程中，他们恰好亏损了1.5亿美元。

And they lost exactly $150,000,000 along that path.

因此，在他们正式开播的最后一天，他们通过损益表花掉了那1.5亿美元中的最后一笔钱。

And so the last day they stayed before they switched it on, they spent they passed through their income statement the the last money in that one fifty.

该网络开播时盛况空前，大获成功。

And it it opened to great fanfare of success.

迅速推进到今天，那家经历了这一建设过程的报纸业务承担了这项投资。

And fast forward, the newspaper business that suffered through that average that construction process underwrote the, investment.

他们的报纸业务和电视业务都因互联网而陷入困境。

Their newspaper business, the TV business, all went sort of awry because of the Internet.

但这个数字广播网络却蓬勃发展，最终以接近100亿美元的价格出售，而这项业务充分利用了他们各类媒体资产的全部力量。

But this digital broadcast network thrived, and they ended up selling it for just somewhere under $10,000,000,000 on a business that harnessed all the power of their various media related assets.

但为了交付这一产品，他们不得不承受投资支出对盈利造成的压力。

But in order to deliver that product, had to suffer through the investment spending pressure on earnings that took place.

要理解，他们的其他业务在那期间一直在赚钱。

Understand that their their other businesses were earning money along the way.

但随着建设带来的运营亏损不断增加，公司报告的净利润似乎急剧下降。

But as those operating losses from the build out mounted, it looked like the company's reported net income was going down sharply.

事实并非如此。

It wasn't.

他们仍然拥有基础业务，而亏损只是叠加在基础业务之上的。

It still had the base business, and and they had losses reported on top of the base business.

但最终，隐藏在HCTV内部的初始盈利能力最终爆发为洪流，带来了极其巨大的价值。

But at the end of the day, that beginning profitability that was concealed within HCTV ended up being a torrent, and it was an extraordinarily high, utility.

那些喜欢家庭与园艺频道的人离不开这个网络。

And people who liked the home of the garden couldn't do without that network.

如今的收视率依然非常惊人。

And the viewership today is still extraordinary.

它是用来自再投资能力的资金建立起来的。

It was built with the money that came from having the capacity to reinvest.

他们有人。

They had the people.

他们有人才。

They had the talent.

他们有设备，还有一个董事会，让管理层看起来表现得很糟糕。

They had the equipment and a board who gave the management team a capacity to look really bad.

这之所以重要，是因为他必须向公众公司汇报。

And why that matters is that he has to report to the public company.

他必须汇报，他会去公众公司说：我们度过了一个出色的季度，但数字看起来并不那么吸引人。

He has to report, and he will go to the public company and say, we had a great quarter, but the numbers don't look that interesting.

他连续三个季度都这么说，然后就会有激进投资者登门拜访。

And he says that for about three quarters in a row, and he's gonna have an activist knocking on his door.

而这位激进投资者知道，所有这些投资支出都拖累了利润，如果他们只是关闭资金阀门，利润就会大幅跃升。

And that activist knows that all of those investment spendings have burdened the income, and if they just turned off the spigot, they would show a big jump in profitability.

这会摧毁他们所建立的资产价值，但他们可以展示出更短期的收益。

It would destroy the asset value of what they built, but they could show more near term earnings.

正是这种权衡，决定了家族控制型企业为了自身财富会怎么做，而华尔街上市公司的做法则可能只是为了季度利润的短期提升。

And it's that trade off that takes place between what a family controlled company would do for their own wealth and what a Wall Street council company might do for a quarterly boost to reported profits.

特雷，让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的介绍。

Trey Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

特雷，你知道是什么让最优秀的企业脱颖而出吗？

Trey You know what sets the best businesses apart?

是他们如何利用创新将复杂性转化为增长。

It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

亚马逊广告正是这样做的，其背后依托的是AWS人工智能技术。

That's exactly what Amazon Ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.

每天，亚马逊广告都在处理数十亿次实时决策，优化着一个价值310亿美元的广告生态系统中的广告表现。

Every day, Amazon Ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

结果是，广告活动的运行速度提升了30%，并能大规模带来可衡量的业务影响。

The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

而这正是亚马逊自身实现增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

他们的自主人工智能将营销从一个资源密集型流程转变为一个智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并让营销人员专注于创意和战略。

Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告正在证明，人工智能驱动的广告不仅仅是未来，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每一家企业都可以应用亚马逊内部完善的同一创新方法论。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

前往 aws.com/ai/rstory 了解亚马逊广告的故事。

See the Amazon Ads story at aws.com/ai/rstory.

网址是 aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

初创公司行动迅速。

Startups move fast.

借助人工智能，它们交付速度更快，并更早吸引企业客户。

And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.

但大单带来了更严格的安全与合规要求。

But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.

SOC 2 并不总是足够的。

A SOC two isn't always enough.

正确的安全措施可以促成交易，也可能毁掉交易。

The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.

但哪位创始人或工程师能抽时间离开公司建设呢？

But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?

Vanta 的人工智能和自动化让企业在几天内就能准备好大单。

Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.

Vanta 持续监控您的合规状态，确保未来的交易不会被阻拦。

And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.

此外，Vanta 会随着您的发展而扩展，并在每一步都提供及时的支持。

Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.

随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望，Vanta 知道需要什么以及何时需要，并已构建了最快、最简便的路径帮助您达成目标。

With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.

因此，认真的初创公司会尽早通过 Vanta 实现合规。

That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.

我们的听众在 vanta.com/billionaires 上可享受 1000 美元优惠。

Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.

前往 vanta.com/billionaires，立减 1000 美元。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for 1,000 off.

新的一年到了，这意味着现在正是实现你一直以来梦想创业的最佳时机。

It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.

就在几年前，我启动了自己的电子商务业务，而 Shopify 正是我起步所需的完美工具。

Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.

当许多人不断将梦想推迟到明年时，我要告诉你们，现在就是把握眼前机遇的时候。

While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.

Shopify 为你提供在线和线下销售所需的一切工具。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经从普通家庭用户成功转型为刚刚起步的创业者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.

你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并使用其内置的 AI 工具撰写产品描述或编辑产品图片。

Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.

随着你的成长，Shopify 也会在每一步与你同行。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.

在2026年，别再等待，立即用 Shopify 开始销售。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月1美元的试用版，今天就开始在 shopify.com/wsb 销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往 shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

那就是 shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

今年，让 Shopify 陪伴你开启你的第一段旅程。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

我觉得你

I think you're

你看到区别了吗？

Do you see the difference?

嗯。

Yeah.

我觉得你正在谈到一个非常重要的问题，汤姆，我们过去也讨论过，从某种意义上说，存在两种心态。

I think you're getting at something really profoundly important, Tom, that we've talked about in the past, which is in a sense, there are these two mentalities.

对吧？

Right?

一种是短期心态，体现在华尔街的许多行为中，他们过度活跃、缺乏耐心，利益并不一致。

There's the short term mentality that's embodied by a lot of Wall Street, which is hyperactive, impatient, not aligned in terms of interests.

他们只关注自己的利益。

It's looking out for its own interests.

而另一种则是更缓慢、更有耐心、更审慎的心态，这正是你通过自己的投资所体现出来的。

And then there's this other slower, more patient, more thoughtful mindset that you embody with your own investment, your own investment.

努力去。

Strive to.

是的。

Yes.

对。

Yeah.

这是不同的，从某种意义上说，这完全是关于延迟满足，因为不是追求快速回报或在短期内表现良好，而是试图做那些在长期内更明智的事情。

That's a different It's all about delayed gratification in a sense because instead of going for the quick hit or looking good in the short term, it's trying to do things that are wise in the long term.

我想请你为我们详细解释一下，因为在我看来，这正是生活中的一项核心原则：在一个日益短视的世界里，真正的赢家是那些更注重长期思考的人。

And I wondered if you could unpack that a little for us because it seems to me this is one of those master principles in life that when you in a world that's becoming increasingly short term, the real prize goes to the people who are thinking more long term.

对。

Right.

但他们无法长期行动，除非有治理结构和董事会的支持，以抵御激进投资者甚至收购者的介入，就像斯克里普斯报纸的情况那样，当时那个旧业务看起来正在加速衰退。

But they can't act long term unless they have the governance and the board support that protects against the, visit from an activist or even a takeover person who feels that who often know that what looks like it's declining as it was the case in Scripps' newspapers, that that old business looked like it was declining at an accelerating rate.

他们可以轻易地看出，就像我们一样，这并没有什么奇迹可言，投资支出的减少才是导致衰退的根本原因。

They can easily figure out, as can can we, as there's no miracle on this, that the investment spending is really why why the the decline was taking place.

另一个业务实际上相当繁荣，非常感谢。

And the other business was actually quite flourishing, and, you know, thank you very much.

我认为斯克里普斯的例子是一个很好的例子。

I'd say I think the Scripps example is pretty good one.

另一个例子是伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司收取了50亿美元的保费，为某方提供承保，而该方很可能出于错误的原因，必须证明在长达十五年的时间里，350亿美元的股票指数价值依然保持不变。

The other one is this one with Berkshire Hathaway taking $5,000,000,000 of premium to underwrite for someone who very easily, possibly for the wrong reason, had to show that five you know, the $35,000,000,000 of equity index, values still added up to the number that they had to show during the course of that fifteen year period.

他们必须维持这一水平。

They had to maintain that level.

因此，当沃伦表示他会保护他们免受这一水平的下跌时，他承诺用自己整个资产负债表来弥补缺口，因为如我所说，每年年底都会进行一次市值重估，以确定客户投资组合的价值——伯克希尔承保的那四个股票交易所的总价值必须始终保持在350亿美元以上。

And so when Warren said that he'd protect them against declines at that level, he committed his whole balance sheet to making up for the shortfalls because, as I said, the end of each year, there was a mark to market that described what the client value was for the portfolio those four stock exchanges that Berkshire insured would collectively remain over 35,000,000,000 value.

这导致了这些年报告利润的减少，而且他的资产负债表上出现了一个巨大的缺口，即‘保险赔付应付款’，这意味着如果在任何时候他们想终止合约，就必须无上限地结算清偿。

And it cost his reported earnings for those years, and his balance sheet had a huge hole in it that said payables under insurance recovery, which meant that if if at any time they want to close it out, they would have to settle up without a cap amount.

当然，这个故事的结局是好的。

Of course, the story ended well.

全球市场恢复了。

The global markets recovered.

伯克希尔，你永远无法逆转这些负面报告，但实际上，他们最终并没有亏钱。

Berkshire, you never get to reverse those negative reports back, but in fact, they they didn't end up losing any money.

他们得益于这种结构，使得这一切成为可能，并且允许他们投资于那些初期看起来令人担忧、但长期前景相当稳固的项目。

They're better off for having the structure that allowed that all to take place and for them to be allowed to invest in something that has upfront optics that are troubling when when there's a sense that the long term is pretty secure.

这种权衡才是真正赋予那些与认为利差极小、仅靠运气才能勉强过关的人竞争者的力量。

That trade off is what really gives power to somebody who's bidding against a person who thinks that it's just a really tight spread and they'll be lucky to get by.

我认为，汤姆，令人着迷的是，这种对抗短期、延迟满足的理念，不仅适用于商业和投资，也适用于人生。

I think what's fascinating, Tom, is that this idea of going against the short term and deferring gratification, that it applies not only in business and investing, but in life.

我记得几年前我们讨论过一次这个话题之后——是的。

I I remember after we discussed this once several years ago- Yes.

你给我发了邮件，因为我一直向你索要书中关于这方面的例子，你说：‘今天少点果酱，明天多点果酱。’

You emailed me because I've been asking you for examples of this in books and you were like, Well, less jam today for more jam tomorrow.

《三只小猪》等童话故事，都在潜移默化中向孩子们传递延迟满足的信息。

The Three Little Piggers, etcetera, a childhood tales that inculcate thoughtful people with the message of deferred gratification.

社会已经

Society has

我发给你的就是这个吗？

Is that what I sent you?

是的。

Yeah.

你给我发了邮件。

You emailed me.

之后你说，然而，社会却创造了无数理由，让决策者错误地倾向于选择今天的更多果酱，即使这意味着牺牲明天的果酱。

And after that, you said, society has, however, created endless reasons why decision makers mistakenly prefer more jam today even at the expense of jam tomorrow.

你还说，许多投资机会源于能够站在短期主义的对立面。

And you said much investment opportunity arises from being able to take the other side of the short termism bet.

这似乎是一个非常深刻的观点：随着世界越来越短期化——无论是受到华尔街的压力、政治压力（使社会在能源消耗等方面做出愚蠢的决定），还是在我们自己的生活中，因为我们不断从手机和推特动态中获得多巴胺刺激。

That seems to be a really profoundly important insight that as the world becomes more and more short term, both because of the pressure of Wall Street, political pressure, which makes societies do stupid stuff in terms of their energy consumption and the like, but also in our own lives, right, where we have these constant dopamine hits from our phones and our Twitter feeds and the like.

你真正应该在人生中做的，是抵制这些短期诱惑。

What you really wanna do in life is push against those short term temptations.

这让你有共鸣吗？

Does that resonate with you?

我想是的。

I think so.

那么，如何实施并践行它，都是极其困难的挑战。

And then how do you implement it and how do you live it are both extraordinarily hard challenges.

因此，我观察并记录了这一过程，还经历了EW Scripps公司。

And so I observe it and I recount it and have gone through EW Scripps.

我们持有这些股份。

We own those shares.

当它们走上这条道路时，为我们带来了极佳的回报，因为它们深知观众很可能不会离开，因此可以承受短期内因适当支出而带来的利润压力——而它们手中握有由家族控制的董事会所赋予的投票权，这些董事关注的是长期收益。

They delivered a terrific result to us as they went down the path, which took advantage of the fact that they knew that their viewers would probably stay put and they could absorb the burden on the reported profits near term that the proper amount of spending would certainly generate because they had in their pocket the votes from a board that was family controlled and that was interested in long term gains.

所有这些，从某种程度上说，又回到了今天下午对话的开端，沃伦在1982年对那堂课的学生说过另一件事：作为投资者，你唯一能获得的优惠就是未实现收益的免税。

Now all of this, at some level, they would going very back to the start of this afternoon's conversation, one of the other things that Warren said, to that class in '82 was that you wanna never forget that the only break you get as an investor is the nontaxation of unrealized gains.

所以，你应该善用这一点。

So you should take advantage of that.

确保你投资的对象，正如沃伦所说，能让你一次又一次地做出正确选择。

Make sure that what you invest in, as Warren said, allows you to be right ones.

你找到一个正确的商业模式。

You come up with a business that's correct.

它具备投资能力。

It has a capacity to invest.

它拥有具有长期眼光的管理层，并受到常常不受控制的董事会保护。

It has management that's long term minded that protects that's protected by boards that are often beyond control.

他们只是致力于创造一种能够显著提升每股长期净资产价值的东西，而这是我们衡量一切的标准。

And they just set about creating something that's disruptively advancing their long term net asset value on a per share basis, which is how we settle everything up.

即使在执行过程中出现困难——这在所难免——它仍可能极大地提升这一价值。

And it could be advancing that tremendously even while reporting trouble in the execution, which is inevitable.

所以，从某种意义上说，你的一生恰恰是与短期主义相反的。

So your whole life in a way has been the opposite of short term.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，我们之前谈过你最大的持仓，比如伯克希尔、雀巢、喜力和布朗福曼。

I mean, we talked before about your your biggest holdings like Berkshire, Nestle, Heineken, Brown Forman.

这些是你持有三十五到四十年的资产。

These are things you've owned thirty five to forty years.

所以我在想，在一个所有人都越来越短视的世界里，你是如何让自己做到屏蔽大量噪音、缓慢行动、推迟决策的？毕竟一定有很多压力要求你立刻采取行动。

So I'm wondering in a world where everyone is getting more short term, how have you managed to set yourself up so that you can tune out a lot of the noise, that you can move slowly and delay decisions that there must be a lot of pressure to do something now.

我记得。

I remember

你，是的。

you yeah.

说过。

Saying

我记得你说过：别光顾着做点什么。

I remember you saying, don't just do something.

坐着别动。

Sit there.

你是如何保持这种完全逆潮流的心态的？

How do you manage to maintain that mindset, which is totally countercultural?

这真是个不错的观点。

That's a good one.

这正是我所相信并一直坚持的。

It's just what I've said I believe in.

我通过具体的例子来阐述这些信念，希望它们能在某种程度上传达出其中的内涵。

I illustrate those beliefs by examples, which I hope sort of convey the plot in some ways.

然后我会花时间让我的投资者明白，这些是我们决心坚守的核心原则，当然也会有我们不被看好的时候。

And then I spend time letting my investors know that these are core principles that that we intend to stick to, and and will there will be times when we're out of favor.

也会有我们备受青睐的时候。

There'll be times when we're in favor.

请记住，当我们极度不被看好时，我们远没有他们以为的那么愚蠢。

And please remember that when we're vice vastly out of favor, that we're never as stupid as they think we are.

而当我们极度受欢迎时，遗憾的是，我们也远没有自己以为的那么聪明。

And that when we're terribly in favor, sadly, we're never as smart as we think we are.

我认为这是一条根深蒂固的信念。

I do think that it's a deeply held belief.

我们寻找具有相似观点的投资者。

We look for investors who have a similar point of view.

这是确保你有机会利用机会的首要方法——即短期收益导致长期痛苦的情况，以及在我们的情况下利用相反的情形。

That's the number one way to make sure that you have a a fighting chance to take advantage of opportunities, where near term gain, results in long term pain and take advantage of of the opposite occurrence in our case.

你必须确保你的投资者知道，这就是你打算去做的事情。

It's just have to make sure that that's what your investors know that that's what you're setting out to do.

在这个过程中，我们难免会犯错，届时我们就不得不与某些人分道扬镳。

And along the way, we'll get it wrong, in which case, we'll have to part companies with something.

你必须警惕一种错误的思维：仅仅因为我们宣称要长期专注，就以为必须一直坚持长期立场。

You have to make sure that we guard against the temptation to misthink that just because we said we're going to stay long term focused means that we have to stay long term.

有时我们会犯错，那时就应该立即撤退。

There'll be times when we make a mistake and we're supposed to head for the hills immediately.

对于富国银行，情况并非如此，因为我们持有它很长时间，但一旦他们收购诺尔韦斯特后引发的连锁反应变得明显，我们就很快卖出了。

That wouldn't have been the case with Wells Fargo because we'd owned it for a very long time, but we sold fairly soon after the contagion that came about as a result of their acquisition of Norwest became apparent.

我们在处理Dispatch和奥驰亚时，也采用了类似的思路。

We moved with Dispatch, with Altria, the same sort of thought process.

这只是有所不同，展现了另一个方面，而我们已做好了行动的准备。

It just was it was different, and it showed a different aspect, and and we were prepared to move.

汤姆，我们已经度过了这段时期，在某些方面，你过去几年不太受欢迎，因为大约十年来，人们只要在美国随便押注任何热门科技股，就能赚大钱，而根本不用认真考虑价格和估值等问题。

We've come through this period, Tom, where, obviously, in some ways you were out of favor for a few years because for about a decade, people could just roll the dice on any hot tech stock in The US and they would make lots of money without any real consideration for price and valuation and the like.

你对这些事情非常有纪律性，而且你的投资策略也非常全球化。

You're very disciplined about these things and also very global in your approach.

然后最近泡沫破裂了，显然我们看到所有这些伟大的科技巨头纷纷跌落神坛。

And then the bubble burst recently, and obviously we've seen all of these great tech leaders come crashing down to earth.

我注意到你一直在废墟中寻找机会。

And I noticed that you've been kind of looking through the rubble.

我读了你最近的一封致投资者的信，发现你一直在废墟中寻找机会。

Was reading one of your recent investor letters that you've been looking through the rubble.

在所有这些曾经的明星股中，你对奈飞特别感兴趣。

One thing you got excited about of all of these former darlings was Netflix.

你能谈谈为什么在所有这些崩盘的热门科技股中，你偏偏对奈飞感兴趣吗？

Can you talk a bit about why of all of the hot tech stocks that have crashed Yes.

奈飞符合你的标准吗？

Netflix fits your parameters?

嗯，它是少数几个之一。

Well, it is one of a couple.

我的意思是，我们在阿里巴巴动荡期间就建仓了。

I mean, we we had a position which we started during the turmoil in Alibaba.

至于阿里巴巴，我们的想法是，它们在电子商务领域的广泛布局，已经让中国消费者离不开它们。

And Alibaba, the thinking there is they are absolutely positioned in a way that the Chinese consumer cannot do without them in terms of the the extensiveness of their command over the ecommerce.

事实上，希望向中国消费者销售产品的西方公司也离不开阿里巴巴。

And in fact, our western companies who wish to sell their products to Chinese consumers cannot do without Alibaba.

如果你是尊尼获加、詹姆森、喜力，或者卡地亚——卡地亚对阿里巴巴的依赖程度极高，甚至与一些电商平台存在交叉持股。

If you're Johnny Walker, you're Jamesons, you're Heineken, whatever number of Cartier for sure, that Cartier is so enamored, with Alibaba that they, have crossed shareholdings in some of the, ecommerce platforms.

它们还共同持有Farfetch的部分股份，而Farfetch是中国的一家拍卖平台。

And, they also co owned pieces of Farfetch, which is one of the auction houses in China.

因此，这两家公司股价都大幅下跌了。

So both of them had come down sharply in price.

正如你所言，我们直到十一月才持有阿里巴巴的股份，当时我们建了一个小仓位。

We hadn't owned any of them, as you suggest, up until November when we put a small position on it in Alibaba.

当时我们表示，我们明白这里最大的风险是代理成本，某种程度上，整个国家都在充当你的代理人。

And we said at the time, we understand that the biggest risk here is one of agency costs, and it's a whole nation that serves as as your agent in some ways.

他们攫取本应属于你的东西的倾向，远远超出了我们的预期。

And their proclivity to pull from you what ought to be yours was just so vastly more profound than we had feared.

我们给这个仓位打上了‘谨慎’的标签，因为我们并不确定，而这一点我们已经学到：在维护自己创造的价值方面，困难比想象中更加根深蒂固。

We marked the position with a sort of be careful stamp because we weren't sure, and that's something that we've learned is even more entrenched in in sort of the difficulty of keeping what you create.

在中国，尤其是由于房地产市场出现了巨大的干扰，而房地产在某种程度上是为崩盘而建的，这在类似情况下屡见不鲜。

There's also been in China, particularly, there's been massive, massive distractions as a result of real estate, which was built to bust in some ways, as is so often the way in that case.

这意味着，建造者赚取了巨额利润，但为他们融资的银行最终却将成本更广泛地社会化分摊。

That means that the people who who build it make an awful lot of money, but the banks that fund it end up socially, distributing out the cost more broadly.

我认为我们即将在中国经历这样一次危机。

And I think we're about to go through one of those in China.

也许我们已经身处其中了。

It may be already going through it.

关于阿里巴巴，汤姆，我的意思是，我本该提前披露这一点。

With Alibaba, Tom, which I I mean, I I probably should have disclosed before.

我持有伯克希尔，打算长期持有，但我还持有少量阿里巴巴的股份，这个仓位一直在缩小，因为已经减半了。

I I own Berkshire, which I intend to own for many years, but I also have a small position in Alibaba, which continues to get smaller because it's been cut in half.

我们的一些听众——很多人通过推特给我们发来了问题。

A couple of our listeners who We had lots of people send questions in over Twitter.

有几个人，一个是叫马特·卡明斯的，他说：如果一只股票价格跌了一半，汤姆，你的标准是什么，什么时候会买入更多，甚至将仓位翻倍？

A couple of people, one is called Matt Cummins who said, If a stock price gets cut in half, what's Tom's criteria for when to buy more and possibly double the position in that scenario?

还有一个叫Chill Daily的人问：你怎么知道什么时候该卖出一个仓位？

And a guy called Chill Daily said, How do you know when to sell a position?

我在想，像阿里巴巴这样的情况，显然你、我、查理·芒格，还有比我聪明得多的许多人，到目前为止都判断错了，你们如何决定是该套现离场，还是仅仅判断失误，或者认为中国风险太高，抑或继续持有甚至加仓？

And I was thinking with something like Alibaba, where clearly you and I and Charlie Munger and many smarter people than me have been wrong so far, how do you decide whether to cash out, whether you were just wrong, whether China's too risky or whether to stick to the position or add to it?

从几乎第一天起，蚂蚁金服就是导致股价最初下跌的催化剂，也正是在那时，我们得以在阿里巴巴上建立了一个小仓位。

Well, it's been from almost the first day, Ant Financial was the catalyst that caused the drop initially that we were able to put a small position on at the same time in Alibaba.

那是一个相当重大的金融服务业务转型，阿里巴巴从中获得了巨额利润。

And that was a fairly substantial reorientation of financial service venture that that Alibaba profited mightily from.

自从我们进行投资以来，它们的利润实际上一直大幅减少。

And it it promised to have, far less profits for them ever since really we entered the investment.

但当时曾有这种趋势的暗示，只是还不确定。

But it was that direction was suggested, but it wasn't sure.

在我们大约一年半的持股期内，这种情况变得越来越清晰和确定。

And it it's become more clear and sure over the holding period, which is about a year and a half, I guess, for us.

但这完全是有可能的。

But it's quite possible.

我们相信，估值已经随着股价下跌而下降。

It's our belief that the valuation has come down along with the share price.

而我们对某些业务增长并做出贡献的确定性则提高了。

And the certainty with which we believe some of the businesses would grow and contribute has raised.

例如，这就是云计算业务。

And and so, for example, that is the cloud business.

关于云计算业务的政治化问题，我从一位同事那里了解到，TikTok 曾经是阿里云的用户，但未来由于各种原因将不再被允许使用。

And the politicization of the cloud business, gather from one of my colleagues that TikTok had I think it's the case that they had been a user of their cloud, Alibaba's cloud business, but would not be allowed to going forward for a variety of reasons.

而最近，是关于双重上市的问题，即香港上市与会计准则变更的要求。

And then more recently, the dual listing question, the Hong Kong listing versus the requirement of changed accountings.

最后一个点让我理解了沃伦的评论，那就是你并不会因为难度更高而获得额外加分。

This is the that last one is what gave me the sense of Warren's comment, which is you don't get extra points for degrees of difficulty.

通过观察中国政府对待不同领域资本的方式，如教育考试、博彩业、董事会层面，以及金融服务行业的处理方式，所暴露出的难度层次非常多。

And the degrees of difficulty that have surfaced by watching the Chinese government treat capital across a host of different areas, whether it's educational testing, whether it's it's the casino business, whether at the board level, whether it's the way that the financial service business has been treated.

涉及的领域太多了。

There's so many areas.

最后是云业务及其各种干预。

And lastly, the cloud business with its intrusions.

有太多领域定义了这种复杂性，我意识到，与最初相比，我们在持有这些股票的每一天，都不得不做出更多需要深入了解的决策。

It's just so many areas that define complexity that I realized that we probably took on more need to know decisions that we have to make every day we hold the shares than I realized at the start.

我认为部分原因是，在持有期间，情况进一步恶化了。

And I would say in part because the situation worsened over the course of the holding period.

这是一项复杂得多的投资。

It's just it's a far more complicated investment.

当你看中国和日益增加的风险时，汤姆，假设中国入侵台湾，以及日益增加的监管风险。

When you look, Tom, at at China and the increasing risk, presumably that China invades Taiwan, the increasing regulatory risk

或者我们以当前的局势入侵台湾，但请继续说。

Or that we invade Taiwan with the current situation of the day, but go on.

嗯，我的意思是，地缘政治风险日益增加，美国和中国之间的冲突加剧，所有这些人权问题。

Well, I I mean, increasing risks geopolitically, increasing conflict between The US and and China, all of these human rights issues.

上周有人给我写信，对我说，这简直是个道德问题。

Someone wrote to me last week and said to me, it's kind of a moral issue.

你不应该投资中国。

You just shouldn't be invested in China.

这并不意味着你不能赚钱，但为什么要把钱投在那里呢？

It doesn't mean you can't make money, but why put your money there?

我最初有点忽视了这种观点。

And I sort of initially sort of dismissed it.

后来我仔细想了想，觉得他可能真的有道理。

Then I was looking at it and I was like, Actually, it's quite possible that he's right.

也许，我为什么需要这种复杂性？

Maybe, why do I need the complication?

我为什么需要这种烦恼？

Why do I need the headache?

我为什么要支持对维吾尔族和藏族的迫害？

Why should I be supporting the persecution of of Uighurs and Tibetans?

是的。

Yeah.

这是一件可怕的事。

It's a horrible thing.

你怎么看？

What do you think?

你在心里是怎么看待这个问题的？

How do you play this out in your own mind?

嗯，这只不过是我说过的那些事情之一。

Well, it's just one of those things that I just said.