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您正在收听TIP。
You're listening to TIP.
大家好。
Hi, folks.
我非常高兴向大家介绍今天的嘉宾弗朗索瓦·罗雄，他是我在《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书中提到的伟大投资者之一。
I'm absolutely delighted to introduce today's guest, Francois Rochon, who's one of the great investors I wrote about in my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier.
弗朗索瓦在蒙特利尔经营一家名为Giverny Capital的投资公司。
Francois runs an investment firm in Montreal called Giverny Capital.
他有着卓越的长期业绩记录。
He has a superb long term record.
罗雄全球投资组合——即他管理的个人和家庭账户组合——在过去近三十年中实现了每年约14%的年化回报。
Rochon Global, which is a portfolio of personal and family accounts that he manages, has racked up annual returns of about 14% a year over nearly thirty years.
作为参考，他在近三十年间每年跑赢基准超过五个百分点。
To put that in perspective, he's beaten his benchmark by more than five percentage points a year over almost three decades.
这是一个巨大的超额收益幅度。
That's a huge margin of outperformance.
因此，当他在解释如何在市场中构建长期财富时，我们绝对应该认真倾听。
So this is someone we should definitely listen to when he explains how to build long term wealth in the market.
正如你将在本次对话中听到的，Francois作为投资者的成功基于一个出人意料的简单原则，即股票的价格最终会反映公司的内在价值。
As you'll hear in this conversation, Francois' success as an investor is based on one surprisingly simple principle, which is that the price of a stock will eventually reflect the company's intrinsic value.
沃伦·巴菲特的老师本·格雷厄姆曾用一句话解释这一原则：短期内，市场是一个投票机；但从长期来看，它是一台称重机。
Warren Buffett's teacher, Ben Graham, explained this principle by saying that in the short run, the market is a voting machine, but in the long run, it's a weighing machine.
问题是，这个过程可能需要相当长的时间，市场才能认识到一家公司的公允价值。
The trouble is it can take a pretty long time for this process to play out and for the market to recognize a company's fair value.
像Francois这样的投资者的一个优势是，他极其有耐心。
One advantage that an investor like Francois has is that he's extremely patient.
他完全乐意以合理的价格买入一家优秀的企业，然后多年持有，坚信市场最终会给予回报。
He's perfectly happy to buy a great business at a reasonable price and then just sit on it for many years in the knowledge that the market will eventually reward him.
我发现与Francois访谈非常有助于理清思路，因为他对股票市场如何运作以及如何获得卓越回报有着极其理性而清晰的认识。
I find it tremendously clarifying to interview Francois because he's so rational and clear headed about how the stock market works and what it takes to generate exceptional returns.
但我也很喜欢和他聊天，因为他是一位思想广博的人，对文学、心理学、哲学和艺术都同样着迷。
But I also love chatting with him because he's such a broad thinker who's equally fascinated by literature, psychology, philosophy, and art.
事实上，我认为他对购买杰出艺术品的热情，丝毫不亚于他对购买优秀股票的热情。
In fact, I think he's as passionate about buying great works of art as he is about buying great stocks.
正如弗朗索瓦所解释的，无论作为投资者还是艺术收藏家，他的使命 simply 就是购买最顶尖中的顶尖之作。
As Francois explains, his mission, both as an investor and as an art collector, is simply to buy the best of the best.
我希望你们能像我一样享受我们的这次对话。
I hope you enjoy our conversation as much as I did.
非常感谢你们的参与。
Thanks a lot for joining us.
您正在收听《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》播客，主持人威廉·格林将采访世界上最伟大的投资者，探讨如何在市场和生活中取得成功。
You're listening to the richer, wiser, happier podcast where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
大家好。
Hi, folks.
我很高兴今天能与嘉宾弗朗索瓦·罗孔对话，他正从蒙特利尔的办公室加入我们。
I'm thrilled to be here with today's guest, Francois Rochon, who's joining us from his office in Montreal.
见到你真好，弗朗索瓦。
It's wonderful to see you, Francois.
非常感谢你今天来到这里。
Thanks so much for being here today.
谢谢你邀请我。
Well, thank you for having me.
和你聊天总是令人愉快。
It's a delight always to chat with you.
我想我们已经有几年没见面了，自从我为我的书采访过你之后，所以能再次和你交谈真好。
It's been a few years, I think, since I interviewed you for my book, so I'm to be here with you again.
是的。
Yes.
至少五六年了。
At least five, six years.
已经很久了。
It's been a while.
是啊。
Yeah.
所以我们确实该聊聊了。
So we're overdue.
我想先问问你大约三十年前，也就是1992年底左右，当时你作为一名工程师，第一次对投资产生兴趣的那段时期。
I wanted to start by asking you about the period, I guess thirty years ago, around late nineteen ninety two, when you were working as an engineer and you first fell in love with investing.
是什么样的经历让你踏上了这段极其成功的三十年投资旅程？
What happened that set you on this immensely successful thirty year journey that you you've been on as an investor?
我认为我读的第一本书是彼得·林奇的《战胜华尔街》。
Well, I believe the first book I read was One Up on Wall Street by Peter Lynch.
那是我第一次真正接触到价值投资的概念。
And it was the first time really that I read about value investing.
也就是说，一家公司有其内在价值，而你可以在股票市场上以远低于其内在价值的价格买入它。
The idea that a company has a value that you can purchase it on the stock market way below its intrinsic value.
对我来说，这很新鲜，因为我之前根本没有投资策略，也不懂投资是怎么回事。
And to me, that was something new because I didn't have any strategy for investing or any idea how investing worked.
在我眼里，投资简直就像赌场，被一群金融鲨鱼主导。
To me, it almost looked like a casino and was dominated by financial sharks.
所以，当我读完《战胜华尔街》后，我对股市的看法一夜之间发生了改变。
So overnight, my views of what the market, the stock market was really changed when I read the one up on Wall Street.
然后我接着读了劳伦斯·本杰明·格雷厄姆的《聪明的投资者》，之后又继续阅读沃伦·巴菲特的年度信件。
And then it led to Larry, the Ben Graham book, The Intelligent Investor, and then went on to Warren Buffett's annual letters.
尤其是在1993年初阅读这些年度信件，彻底改变了我对投资世界的整体看法。
And really reading those annual letters, at the beginning of 1993, really changed my whole views of the investment world.
更重要的是，它让我对股票市场产生了真正的热情。
More importantly, it gave me a real passion to invest in the stock market.
威廉，你有着非常科学的背景。
William You had a very scientific background.
我记得曾经读到过，你刚大学毕业成为工程师时，对一些深奥的物理定理着迷不已。
I remember once reading that you were obsessed with abstruse sort of physics theorems and the like, you'd come out of college, become an engineer.
而作为孩子，如果我没记错的话，当你大约十一二岁时，就已经对报纸上股票价格的涨跌着迷了。
Then as a child, if I remember rightly, back when you were about 11 or 12, you were already fascinated by the numbers of stocks kind of moving up and down in the papers.
你认为，是什么让你从这么小的时候就开始对股票市场产生如此浓厚的兴趣？
What do you think it was that inherently fascinated you about the stock market from such an early age?
嗯，我想，像你说的，那时候人们会在报纸上阅读市场报价。
Well, I guess, like you say, in those days, you read the market quotes in the newspaper.
所以你看到整页密密麻麻的小数字，有的上涨，有的下跌四分之一？
So you have all those big page of the small numbers going up or, you know, a quarter going down a quarter?
我觉得这非常迷人。
And I just found that fascinating.
我不太明白这些数字的确切含义，但我对这些小数字非常感兴趣。
I didn't know exactly what it meant, but I thought all those little numbers interested me a lot.
我对数学也很感兴趣。
And I had interests for mathematics.
正如你所说，我后来成了工程师。
As you said, I became an engineer.
尽管我很小的时候就对股票市场感兴趣，但我曾经玩过一款叫股票行情机的棋盘游戏。
And even though I was interested in the stock market pretty young, I used to play a board game called a stock ticker.
现在我们用骰子，你会拥有我不太清楚的农产品或工业产品的股票。
Now we have dices and you would own shares of, I don't know, grains or industrial products.
我觉得这个游戏太有趣了，以至于我记得自己用电脑做了一个更复杂的版本，这让我更加着迷。
And I found that board game so fascinating that I remember I made a version on a computer much more sophisticated, so it got even more interested.
但那时在我看来，股市的价格其实就像是我在电脑上编程时用的随机公式一样。
But I think the view at that time to me is that the prices of the stock market was really you know, when I programmed it on the computer, I used random formulas.
所以这就像一个赌场。
So it was just like a casino.
价格的涨跌完全取决于是否猜中正确的数字。
Things would go up and down based just on the odds of hitting the right numbers.
因此，对我来说，通过工程学实现的科学、物理和数学，是更理性的一种谋生方式。
So it's to me, science, physics, and mathematics through engineering was a more rational way earning a living.
但后来，因为受到巴菲特、格雷厄姆和彼得·林奇的影响，我发现你可以用理性去分析公司、理解公司的价值，这深深触动了我，因为我一向喜欢理解事物，希望一切都有道理。
But when later, because of Buffett and Graham and Peter Lynch, I discovered that you could use your rationality to analyze companies and understand the values of companies, it really it struck a chord with me because that I was someone that liked to understand things, and I wanted things to make sense.
你显然也非常执着，我记得你曾经告诉我，你年轻时读过彼得·林奇那本著名的《战胜华尔街》，大概读了十遍。
You were also obviously pretty obsessive because I remember you once telling me that I think read Peter Lynch's other famous book, Beating the Street, something like 10 times in your youth.
然后，据我回忆，我们在上一次访谈中提到，你开始阅读巴菲特的作品。
Then I think, as I remember from our last interview, you started to read Buffett.
然后我想在1993年初，你告诉我，你actually写信给他，他给你寄来了从1977年到1992年的所有年度报告。
And then I think in early nineteen ninety three, you told me, you actually wrote to him and he sent you all of these annual reports for, I think, the stack from 1977 to 1992.
我的意思是，这本身也是一件非同寻常的事。
I mean, that's kind of an extraordinary thing to do as well.
你写信给巴菲特时，心里在想些什么？
What were you thinking in writing to Buffett?
当你真正深入研究这十五年的年度报告后，你到底学到了什么？
Then what did you actually learn once you started to really dig into those fifteen years of annual reports?
我认为，从很小的时候起，我就一直是个自学的人。
Well, I think from a very early age, I was a self learner.
所以我总是希望通过读书、年度报告或其他任何资料来了解事物。
So I always wanted to know things by reading books or annual reports or anything.
因此，我很快意识到，沃伦·巴菲特是投资领域的伟大大师。
So pretty quickly, understood that Warren Buffett was the great master of investing.
对我来说，写信给他，请求他寄来所有已出版的资料，只是研究这位伟大大师的合乎逻辑的做法。
To me to write it, to ask that he sends me everything that is written that is available was just a logical things to to do, just to study the great master.
而且，回到艺术的类比，如果你想成为一名伟大的画家，你就需要研究过去的伟大大师。
And, to go back to the art analogy, if you I think if you wanna become a great painter, you wanna study the great masters of, of the past.
所以你会去博物馆，观看克劳德·莫奈或梵高这些伟大艺术家的作品，向他们学习。
So you go to museums, and you just look at Claude Monet or Van Gogh, all those great artists, you learn from them.
当我刚开始时，我就这么做了，直到今天我仍在继续。
And that that's what I did when I started and still doing it today.
所以，作为一名工程师，显然让你产生共鸣的还有‘安全边际’这个概念，对吧？
So obviously, as an engineer, one of the things that presumably resonated for you was also this idea of the margin of safety, right?
当巴菲特和芒格谈到它时，他们常常以桥梁为例来说明。
When Buffett and Munger talk about it, they would often talk about it in terms of a bridge.
你能谈谈这个在我看来极其重要的概念吗？
Can you talk about that notion, which seems to me just vastly important?
哦，是的。
Oh, yes.
没错。
Yes.
本·格雷厄姆将‘安全边际’这三个词作为价值投资的关键。
Ben Graham made it as his key to value investing is he chose those three words, margin of safety.
七十年后，我认为这仍然是三个最恰当的词。
And, you know, seventy years later, I think there are still the the three right words.
作为一名工程师，这深深引起了我的共鸣。
And, as an engineer, it's truly resonated with me.
我认为，这种安全边际原则不仅适用于估值，还可以延伸到企业的质量、管理者的素质以及资产负债表的质量等方面。
And I would say that also this marginal safety principle, I think, can be extended to more than just valuation, but in terms of the quality of a business, the quality of managers, and the quality of balance sheets also.
今年我们看到，那些资产负债表杠杆过高的公司，会因利率上升而受到严重打击。
So we see it this year, the companies that have a little too much leverage on the balance sheet, they can be quite hurt by the increase of interest rates.
因此，你不仅要在估值上留有安全边际，也要在企业运营的各个方面都保持安全边际。
So you you want a margin safety, not just on valuation, but on all the important part of running a corporation.
我还记得你曾经告诉我，安全边际的理念贯穿了你生活的每一个领域。
I also remember you once saying to me how this idea of the margin of safety really runs through every area of your life.
我记得你曾说，希望我们以后能多聊聊你的艺术收藏。
I remember you Hopefully, we'll get to talk more about your art collecting later.
但我记得你曾经对我说，你买过一件很棒的艺术品，并且你以无息的方式分四年支付。
But I remember you saying to me once that you bought some great piece of art and you timed it the payment over four years in some interest free way.
所以你一直在控制承诺的金额。
And so you were kind of keeping the commitments down.
同样，对于你的办公室开支之类的，你也非常谨慎。
And likewise, with the cost of your office and the like, you were very careful.
我记得你曾经对我说，即使你的收入下降80%，你依然能生存下去。
I think you once said to me that if your revenues dropped by 80%, you'd still survive.
你依然能撑得住。
You'd still be able to hang in there.
这么说公平吗？——这种安全边际的理念贯穿了你生活的方方面面？
Is that fair to say that this idea of the margin of safety runs through pretty much your entire approach to life?
我认为你必须这么做。
I think you have to.
如果你从事投资行业几十年，迟早会经历一段非常艰难的时期，比如市场下跌50%。
If you're in the investment business, probably for decades of investing, you'll go through a very tough time at some point, you know, the market being down 50%.
收入下降50%对许多公司来说都是巨大的打击。
So revenue that's down 50%, it hurts a lot of companies.
所以你的目标是能够度过这样的时期，即使这在你职业生涯中只发生一次。
So your goal is to be able to survive such period even if it happens only once in in your career.
从第一天起，我就一直非常谨慎，始终确保支出不超过收入的50%，以保持安全边际。
So from day one, I've been always very, very prudent and always have a margin safety in terms of keeping expenses no more than 50% of revenues.
所以回到最初，你从1993年7月开始为家人投资，并推出了所谓的罗尚全球投资组合。
So to go back to day one, you you started investing money for your family in July 1993, and you launched what was called the Rochon Global Portfolio.
当时，你平时还是工程师，只是在周末和晚上兼职做投资。
And at the time, you were still working as an engineer during the week, you were kind of moonlighting as an investor on weekends and in the evenings.
如果我没记错的话，你每个星期天都会去图书馆阅读《价值线》和年度报告等资料。
If I remember rightly, you were spending your Sundays at the library reading Value Line and annual reports and the like.
这是一段非常愉快的经历吗？
Was it a very joyful experience?
我的意思是，你是不是被巴菲特、格雷厄姆、林奇等人所写的内容深深吸引？
I mean, were you just sort of intoxicated by what you were reading of Buffett and Graham and Lynch and the like?
哦，确实是。
Oh, it was.
这就像发现如何把铅变成黄金一样。
It was really like discovering how to turn the lead into gold.
那种感觉，当然，我当时经验还不多。
That was a feeling that, obviously, I didn't have that much experience yet.
我可能有点天真。
I was perhaps a little naive.
但那是一个令人兴奋的时期，非常激动人心。
But, that was an exciting period, very excited.
我记得读过六七十年代和八十年代的老《价值线》杂志，试图找出那些曾经以极低估值交易的公司，然后研究这些投资后来发生了什么。
And I do remember reading old value lines from the sixties, from the seventies and eighties, and, you know, trying to identify companies that at some point were trading at very, very low valuation and studying afterward what had happened to those investments.
我记得读过1973年或1974年的Valeria、H&R、Brock的报告。
And I remember reading, I think, the 1973 or '74 Valeria, H and R, Brock.
我认为在1973至1974年的调整中，该股票下跌了80%。
And I think the stock went down to 80% in the correction of 7374.
后来，我想它的交易市盈率只有四到五倍。
And at some point, think it traded at, you know, 4 or five times earnings.
所以这些是令人兴奋的时期，因为我发现，如果你能识别出优秀的企业，并以合理的价格买入，你就能获得非常好的回报。
So these were exciting times because I discovered that if you could identify great companies and be able to purchase them at reasonable valuation, you could do very, very well.
我想在最初，今天依然如此，但最初你还能找到一些估值极低的优秀企业。
And I would say at the beginning, it still happens today, but in the beginning, you could find some very great companies trading at very, very low valuations.
因此，当我刚开始购买企业时，头几年我表现得非常好，因为那时有大量绝佳的机会。
And so, you know, when I started to really purchase companies, the first few years, I did very, very well because there were great opportunities in those days.
我不是说现在没有了。
I'm not saying there's not any more.
可以说，今天比九三年、九四年时要难一些。
Let's say it's a little harder today than it was probably in 'ninety three, 'ninety four.
所以你在发现真正投资的乐趣后，大概三年就离开了工程行业，去蒙特利尔的一家投资公司工作。
So you quit engineering after maybe three years of discovering the joy of real serious investing and went to work for an investment firm in Montreal.
我感觉这是一次令人失望的经历，让你看到了机构资产管理的诸多弊端。
I have the sense that it was a disillusioning experience and showed you a lot about the disadvantages of institutional money management.
你能谈谈发生了什么吗？
Can you talk about what happened?
你在那儿看到了什么，让你觉得：是的，我想进入这个行业，但我想为自己工作，这样我就能遵循我想遵循的规则，而不是以这种错误的方式行事？
What you saw there that made you think, yeah, I wanna be in this business, but I wanna work for myself so I can follow the rules that I wanna follow instead of doing it in this misguided way?
嗯，我不确定这是否是错误的。
Well, I don't know if it's misguided.
我认为大多数基金经理都是真诚地尽其所能。
I think most money managers are sincere doing their best.
我真的这么认为。
I really do.
所以当我在这家管理机构客户的大型公司工作时，他们也尽了最大努力。
And so when I worked at that big firm that managed institutional clients, they did the best they could.
而且，你知道，他们面临着客户对季度业绩甚至至少对年度业绩表现的压力。
And, you know, they had pressure from the clients to do well on a quarterly basis or at least on a yearly basis.
所以我只是在现实生活中意识到，我不敢说我是幻灭了。
So I just realized in real life, I wouldn't say I was lost illusions.
我意识到，在现实生活中，很难保持长期的视角。
I just realized that in real life, it's hard to have a long term horizon.
在这种情况下，你的客户——那些机构客户——必须与你拥有相同的时间跨度，关系才能顺利运作。
Your clients, in those cases, the institutional clients, have to share your time horizon for the relationship to work.
因为如果你的客户不给你实现股权投资回报所需的时间，那么以这种方式投资就是浪费时间。
Because if your clients don't give you the time horizon you need to get the rewards from equity investing, it's a wasted time to to invest that way.
所以我意识到，这个行业中的大多数人，其实都拥有保持长期视角的奢侈条件。
So I realized that most people in the business, you know, have the luxury of having a long term horizon.
因此，当我意识到这一点时，我就想：如果我真的想按照我认为最佳的方式投资，我就必须创办自己的公司。
So, you know, when I realized that, I said, well, if I really want to invest the way I believe is the best way to invest, I have to start my own firm.
在21世纪初开始聚集客户时，我花了很多时间向所有客户解释：我们需要双方都具备长期视角，不要过于关注短期业绩。
And when I started to gather clients in the early two thousands, I really took the time to explain to all those clients that we needed to have both of us have a long term horizon and not to focus too much on the short term results.
我不记得确切是什么时候开始谈论我的‘三规则’的，但很早我就意识到这个规则的重要性，它基本上是说：每三年中，有一年股市会下跌。
And I don't know exactly when I started to talk about my rule of three, but pretty early on, I thought the importance of that rule and which is basically one year out of three, the stock market will go down.
你所购买的股票中，每三只就有一只会让你失望。
One stock out of three that you'll purchase will be a disappointment.
而且至少每三年中会有一年，你的表现会跑输指数。
And at least one year out of three, you'll underperform the index.
我认为，如果你从一开始就接受这一点，就能更好地应对市场波动和你在证券选择上犯的错误。
And I think when you accept that from the start, you deal better with market fluctuations, the mistakes you all made in securities.
你必须从一开始就接受，你们总会有一些年份表现跑输市场。
And you have to accept from the start that you all have years you all underperform the market.
即使你做得很好，深入研究了公司，并做出了明智的长期决策，你也可能连续两三年表现跑输市场，你必须能够接受这一点。
Even if you do a good job and you study the company very well and you made some intelligent long term choices, you can have two or three years in a row that you underperform, and you have to be able to accept that.
这似乎也表明，‘三规则’是一个根本性的提醒：作为投资者，你需要保持谦逊，因为你购买的股票中有三分之一可能表现不佳，三分之一的时间你会跑输指数，三分之一的年份股市会下跌10%或更多。
It seems also that that rule of three is a fundamental reminder that you need to be humble as an investor, that a third of the stocks you purchase are likely to do poorly, a third of the time you're gonna underperform the index, and a third of the years, the stock market's gonna fall by 10 or more.
这相当于从一开始就给自己做好心理准备，培养一种现实而谦逊的预期，以应对你要 navigating 的崎岖地形。
It's kind of wiring yourself in a way from the start, conditioning yourself from the start to have fairly realistic and humble expectations about the roughness of the terrain you're gonna have to navigate.
是的。
Oh, yes.
而且我认为，随着时间的推移，要保持谦逊甚至变得更加谦逊是非常困难的，因为这是一个非常艰难的行业。
And I think as the years go by, I think it's very hard not to to be to stay humble and get even a little more humble because it's a very tough industry.
当你想在许多年里——不仅仅是三四年，而是数十年——战胜股市时，这非常艰难，我认为你必须具备极大的谦逊。
It's a very tough when you want to beat the stock market over many, many years, not just three or four years, but over decades, I think you you have to be armed with a lot of humility.
而且我认为，谦逊是帮助你成为更好投资者的催化剂，因为你总想学习更多、理解更多。
And you're always I think humility is kind of the catalyst to help you become a better investor because you always want to learn more and understand more.
我发现，这实际上是一种有助于学习过程的好工具。
I think it turns out that it's kind of a a good tool to help in the learning process.
你投资方法的核心有一个非常根本的洞见，这个洞见反复出现在你给股东的信件中——你的季度信、年度信，我过去几天怀着极大兴趣阅读了这些信件。
There's a very fundamental insight at the heart of your approach to investing, which comes up again and again in your letters to shareholders, your quarterly letters, your annual letters, which I've spent the last few days reading with great interest.
这些信件非常出色。
They're fantastic letters.
谢谢。
Thank you.
威廉，这个洞见听起来如此显而易见，但你帮助我深深印在脑海中，正如你所说，从长远来看，股市总是反映公司的公允价值。
William And the insight really, which sounds so obvious, but that you've helped me to kind of pound into my own head, is as you put it, that the stock market always reflects the fair value of companies over the long term.
你能谈谈公司内在价值与股价随着时间推移趋于一致的这一观点吗？
Can you talk about this idea of the convergence of a company's intrinsic value and its stock market value over time?
因为在我看来，这是一个最根本的洞察，而大多数将市场视为赌场的投资者根本无法理解。
Because it seems to me an absolutely foundational insight that most investors who are treating the market kind of as a casino simply don't understand.
一旦你理解了这一点，就有点像理解了物理定律。
Once you understand it, it's a little bit like understanding the laws of physics.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为，对于股票市场来说，存在一种悖论：在短期内——短期可能是几年——任何股票甚至整个股市的报价都可能是非理性的、不可预测的，且完全偏离内在价值。
Well, I think that's a kind of with the stock market, there's a kind of a paradox because in the short term, and short term can be a few years, in the short term, the quotations of any stocks or even the general stock market can be irrational, unpredictable, and totally out of sync with the intrinsic value.
但在更长的时间范围内，所有力量似乎都会相互平衡。
But in the longer term, all the forcers seems to to balance themselves.
而且，股票市场中的每一个报价最终都会影响一家公司的内在价值，任何公司都是如此。
And the every quotation in the stock market eventually will affect the intrinsic value of a company, any company.
我认为没有任何例外。
I don't think there's any exceptions.
因此，这种悖论一旦被你理解，你就会明白关键在于：首先，要理解你所投资的业务，从而对你认为它值多少钱有一个大致的判断。
So this paradox, once I believe you understand that, you can see that the key ingredients is first to understand the businesses you invest in so you can have a general view of what you think it's worth.
但第二部分，你需要有耐心。
But the second part, you have to be patient.
你必须接受，获得良好的股市回报可能需要数年时间。
You have to accept that it can take some years for the rewards to be returned to you in terms of a good return to the stock market.
但我认为，解决这个悖论的关键就在这里。
And but I think here lies the key way to deal with this paradox.
你必须把自己视为你所持有公司股份的拥有者。
You have to consider yourself as an owner of the the shares of the company we you own.
自从1996年我开始投资以来，我深受沃伦·巴菲特的启发。
And since I think I started in 1996, I was inspired by Warren Buffett, of course.
我开始衡量投资组合中各家公司的所有者收益。
I started to measure the owner's earnings of the companies in the portfolio.
所以简单来说，我会尝试将我的投资组合视为一家家公司，并衡量其内在价值一年比前一年增长了多少。
So very put very simply, I would say that I would try to see my portfolio as a holding of companies and try to measure how much the intrinsic value of the portfolio has increased the one year compared to the previous year.
这非常简单，只需将你所持所有公司的收益加总，并与前一年进行比较即可。
And this is done very simply by just adding the earnings of all the companies you own and compare it with the the previous year.
通过这样做，我认为我让自己对市场的报价更具抵抗力。
By doing this, I think I helped myself get more impervious market quotations.
我知道，在长期、许多年里，如果我在所有者收益方面是正确的，股市的报价最终会反映这一点。
And I know that over the long part, over many, many years, if I'm right in the owner earnings part, the quotations of the stock market will eventually reflect that.
从1996年至今，我的经验表明，我们所持公司所有者收益的增长与股市报价之间存在着非常强的相关性。
And so far, my experience has been since '96, that there's been a very, very strong correlations between the increase of the owners owning the companies we own and the the quotation of the stock market.
当我阅读您的股东信时，这种相关性如此显著，以至于值得仔细审视这些数字。
The correlation is so striking when I look at your shareholder letters that it's worth actually kind of dwelling on the numbers.
比如，在其中一封信中，您提到从1996年到2015年底的二十年间，贵公司的内在价值增长了1102%，而其股票价值增长了1141%。
Like, there was one point in one of the letters where you said over twenty years from 1996 to the end of two thousand and fifteen, your company's intrinsic value increased by 1102%, and the value of their stocks increased by 1141%.
因此，内在价值增长1102%，股票价值增长1141%，两者极其接近。
So incredibly close, 1102% for the increase in intrinsic value, 1141% for the increase in the value of the stock.
正如您在股东信中一再指出的，这绝非偶然。
So as you point out again and again in the shareholder letters, this is not a coincidence.
这种相关性简直令人惊叹。
The correlation is kind of amazing.
这太惊人了。
It is amazing.
我认为这背后是价值投资方法的基本原理。
I think the fundamental process that lies behind the approach of value investing.
如果价值在二十年内增长了，比如说一千百分比，那么市场也会使股票价值增长一千百分比。
If the value increases, but let's say a thousand percent over twenty years, the market will increase the value of the stocks by a thousand percent.
但在一两年或三年内，任何事情都可能发生。
But over a year or two or three, anything can happen.
所以这就是为什么我说这有点像悖论。
So that's why I say it's kind of a paradox.
但如果你持续关注你所拥有的公司发生了什么，最终股市会反映这一点。
But if you keep focusing on what's happening to the companies you own, eventually the stock market will reflect it.
所以，如果我理解正确的话，你方法中看似基本的一点是，你在寻找那些内在价值增长速度远超平均水平的杰出公司。
So one of the things that seems, if I understand this correctly, to be fundamental to your approach is that you're looking for outstanding companies that basically are increasing their intrinsic value faster than the average.
因此，如果你预期——你经常提到，美国股市历史上可能每年上涨百分之六或七，再加上大约百分之二的股息，类似这样。
So if you expect You often talk about how stocks historically maybe go up six or 7% a year in The US, and maybe there's a 2% dividend, something like that.
所以，假设历史上你预期的回报率是8%到9%。
So let's say historically you'd expect an eight or 9% return.
你寻找的是那些能够比这个水平多增长约五个百分点的杰出公司。
What you're looking for is outstanding companies that can grow maybe five percentage points faster than that.
这是否是对你的方法的一个公正总结？这种方法看似简单，但显然执行起来极其困难。
Is that a fair summary of what seems like a pretty simple approach, but obviously is incredibly difficult to pull off?
没错。
It is.
这正是我追求的目标。
It is what I'm aiming for.
我不太记得确切数字了，但我认为自1996年以来，我们投资组合的股东收益平均增长，如果包括股息在内，年化接近13%。
I don't remember exactly, but I think since 'ninety six, the increase in the owners earning portfolio on average, and if you include the dividend, it's close to 13% annually.
因此，按每股收益增长来看，可能略高于12%，而股息则不到1%，因为投资组合中的许多公司并不派发股息。
So it's probably a little more than 12% in terms of earnings per share growth and perhaps less than 1% of dividend because many companies in the portfolio don't pay dividend.
所以这13%的回报，正如你所说，大概比股市平均水平高出四到五个百分点。
So that 13% is probably, like you say, four or 5% better than than the average of the stock market.
比如说标普500指数，过去二十五年可能正如你所说，增长了大约9%。
Let's say the S and P 500, which probably has grown exactly as you say, probably 9% over the last twenty five years.
这正是我所追求的。
That's what I'm trying to do.
当我为投资组合买入一只股票时，我会寻找一家公司，我相信其未来的盈利增长加上股息收益率，合计能接近每年13%。
When I purchase a stock for the portfolio, to find a company that I believe if you combine the earnings growth going forward and the dividend yield, become closer to 13% annually.
你如何应对避免为这些卓越公司支付过高价格的压力？
How do you deal with the pressure not to overpay for these outstanding companies?
因为你在年度信件中有一部分谈到了过去犯过的错误。
Because there's section of your annual letter where you talk about your mistakes in the past.
值得称赞的是，每份报告你都会详细回顾各种错误。
Much to your credit, every report you go through various mistakes.
它们几乎总是属于错失机会，而非错误决策。
And they almost always are errors of omission rather than commission.
它们是你未能买入的那些机会。
They're things where you fail to buy them.
在我看来，年复一年，你未能买入这些股票并错失巨大回报的原因，往往是因为它们的价格比你预期的略高一些。
And it seems to me repeatedly year after year, the reason why you failed to buy them and miss out on huge returns is because they were slightly more expensive than you wanted them to be.
那么，你如何以你能承受的价格获得这些杰出的公司呢？
So how do you get these outstanding companies at prices that you can bear?
这并不容易，因为如果我要从逻辑上分析，假设我要持有某家公司十年，它每年的收益增长达到12%、13%或14%，那么为了获得股票层面的回报，市盈率可能会略有下降，但不能降幅太大。
It's not easy because if I wanna be logical here, if I'm gonna own a company, let's say, for ten years, that's gonna grow its earnings by twelve, thirteen, 14% annually, to get that reward in term of the stock, there can be a slight decrease in the p ratio, but not too much.
因为假设你在十年内将收益提高了四倍，但市盈率却从，比如说，30倍下降到20倍，那么你的年化回报率就不会达到15%，因为未来某个时候市盈率出现了收缩。
Because let's say if you quadruple your earnings over ten years, but the p ratio goes out from, I don't know, 30 to 20 times, you don't earn 15% annually on your investment because there was some p contraction at some point in the future.
所以，理想情况下，你希望未来的市盈率与你买入时的水平相近。
So, ideally, you want the p ratio in the future to be similar to what you're paying.
因此，我并不一定在寻找那种交易价格远低于其内在价值的‘廉价’公司。
So I'm not necessarily looking for a, let's say, a bargain company that trades up way below its intrinsic value.
当然，如果我能遇到这样的公司，我会很高兴。
Of course, I like it when I do.
但对我来说，如果我能找到一家卓越的公司，并且未来它的市盈率与我买入时大致相同，那就再好不过了。
But to me, if I can find a great companies and in the future, the p ratio is similar to when I purchase it.
如果我对增长率的判断正确，这当然会是一项投资。
If I'm right on the growth rate, of course, it can be an investment.
危险在于，如果你稍微付多了，就会提前几年折现未来的增长。
The danger is that if you overpay a little bit, you kind of discount it a little a few years in advance, the the the future growth.
此外，这又回到了本·格雷厄姆的买入股票时要留有安全边际的原则。
Also, it go back to Ben Graham to have this margin of safety when you purchase a stock.
但正如你所说，我犯了一个错误，因为我想让市盈率比股票实际交易价格更低，结果错过了优秀的投资机会。
But like you said, I made the mistake of not purchasing great companies because I wanted that p ratio to be lower than the stock traded that I missed great investment because of that.
所以，关键是要找到正确的平衡：既要坚持安全边际的原则，同时也要意识到，如果你支付的价格略高于预期，但公司的增长率足够高，即使投资期末市盈率略有收缩，你仍然能获得不错的回报。
So it's to find the right balance of, you know, keeping the margin of safety principle in line and always at the same time, trying to see that perhaps if you pay a little higher than you'd like to, the growth rate of the company will be high enough that even if there is a little shrinkage of the p ratio at the end of your investment, you'll still do okay.
因此，如果你能找到一家每年增长20%的公司，即使十年后市盈率略有下降，你大概还是会表现不错。
So if you can find a company that can grow by 20% a year and you lose a little bit on the p ratio after ten years, you'll probably do okay.
所以，我认为我犯过的许多错误，比如没有投资Intuit、FactSet Research或星巴克。
So I think many mistakes I did can be Intuit or FactSet Research or Starbucks.
我可能没能预见到它们的增长率会远高于12%或13%。
I fail probably to see that the growth rate would be much higher than 12 or 13%.
我不太记得确切数字了，但我觉得FactSet研究公司的年增长率大概是18%，因为我已经关注它二十多年了。
I don't remember exactly, but I think in terms of FactSet research, it was probably 18% annually, the growth rate, since I've been watching it for more than two decades now.
所以它的市盈率理应比我愿意支付的水平高得多。
So it warranted a much higher PE ratio than I was ready to pay.
所以我认为这是一个重要的教训。
So I think that's one big lesson.
当你找到一家杰出的公司时，你必须能够接受更高的市盈率。
When you do find an outstanding company, you have to be able to pay a higher PE ratio.
是的。
Yeah.
我记得，弗朗索瓦，你曾写过，你过早卖掉了FactSet，错失了二十年二十五倍的回报；或者没能买入QuickBooks，错失了32倍的收益；又或者眼睁睁看着Fox Factory Holdings在六年内暴涨500%却未能抓住机会。
I remember, Francois, you you writing about, I think, selling FactSet too early and missing out on a 25 fold gain over two decades, or failing to buy QuickBooks and missing out on a 3,200 percent return, or watching Fox Factory Holdings soar 500% over six years and missing out on that.
我想知道，你为什么要在股东信中设立一个叫‘错误讲台’的板块，用查理·芒格的话说，就是让你自己直面错误？
I'm wondering, what's the benefit of having this section of your shareholder letter called the podium of errors, where you, to use Charlie Munger's phrase, you rub your nose in your own mistakes?
这除了让你自我惩罚之外，还有什么实际好处？
How is it helping you other than a degree of self flagellation?
我认为这让我保持谦逊，因为你不需要费力寻找就能发现自己的错误。
Well, I think it keeps me humble because you don't have to search very hard to find mistakes you've made.
但每年设定三个错误的‘ podium ’，让我通常在一月份回顾上一年，思考：我该选哪三个年度最佳错误？
But having this yearly podium of three mistakes, it makes me think usually in January at the end of the previous year, you know, to look up, what would I choose the three best mistake of the year?
它迫使你回溯过去的决策，无论是你买过的，还是没买过的。
It forces you to go back and pass decision, both in things you did purchase and the ones you did not purchase.
我认为每年在年报中保留这一部分，有助于建立一种持续从过去决策中学习的机制。
I think of having this section in the annual letter every year, I think it builds kind of a process of always trying to learn from your past decisions.
我认为，观察那些你没有投资的公司，比如FactSet这样的绝佳案例，能让你确保未来不再犯同样的错误。
And I think looking at companies that you didn't buy, let's hope that by studying those and to the example very good examples of facts set into it, You wanna be sure that in the future, you don't make the same mistakes.
所以，也许现在有一些公司，我觉得它们很棒，但市盈率有点高。
So perhaps, let's say for instance, there's little bit today, which I think is a great company, but the p ratio is a little high.
这让我想到，或许我应该从过去的错误中吸取教训，适当接受比原本预期更高的价格。
Makes me think perhaps I should learn from the past mistakes and perhaps pay a little higher price than I would like to.
我希望自己能通过关注这些错误，不断学习并改进，成为一个更好的投资者，尽量避免重复犯错。
And I hope I can always improve and become a better investor all the time by focusing on those mistakes, but also to learn from those mistakes and try not to repeat them too oftenly.
但这很有挑战性，因为我觉得过去一年里，许多非常聪明的价值投资者都失败了，他们学到的一课是，多付一点钱也是可以的。
It's challenging, though, because I I think of a lot of the really smart value investors who've come undone over the last year, one of the lessons that they learned is that it was okay to pay more.
于是他们放宽了标准，结果当许多高质量公司股价暴跌时，他们发现自己买贵了。
And so they kind of relaxed their standards and then came undone when a lot of very high quality companies plunged that they had overpaid for.
所以这很危险，对吧？
And so it's dangerous, right?
你可能会从错误中学到错误的教训。
You can learn the wrong lesson from your mistakes.
你能谈谈这一点吗？
Can you talk a bit about that?
因为这正是一个永恒的悖论，我认为，没错，这确实很难。
Because this is one of those eternal paradoxes, I think, where, yeah, it's difficult, right?
因为情况也在变化。
Because the conditions change as well.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为本·格雷厄姆在他的书中提到过，在牛市中对一家优秀公司支付过高价格并不是最大的错误。
Well, I think Ben Graham talked about that in one of his book, that the biggest mistakes you make is not in the bull market overpaying for a great company.
因为最终，你知道，盈利会持续增长，市盈率也会恢复到正常水平，投资表现还是会不错的。
Because eventually, you know, earnings will keep growing and the the PE ratio will get back to normal level and it'll do okay.
牛市中最大的错误是购买质量差的公司，这些公司在熊市后无法恢复，因为它们不盈利，或者市盈率曾经过高。
The biggest mistakes in in the bull market is to to purchase companies of poor quality, and they don't come back after the bear market because they're not profitable or the PE ratio was so high.
我的意思是，你支付的市盈率必须有一个上限。
Mean, there has to be a limit to the PE ratio you pay.
我认为，如果你以100倍市盈率买入一家公司，而在熊市中市盈率跌至20倍，那你就会亏损80%。
I think if you pay a 100 times earnings for a company and the PE ratio goes down to 20 times during the bear market, you're down 80%.
虽然盈利增长需要很多年，才能让你在熊市后回本到原来的五倍水平。
It takes a lot of years for earnings to grow, though you can get back to five times your the level during the bear market.
所以，你支付的市盈率必须设定一个上限。
So there has to be some limit to the p ratio you have to pay.
我不知道确切的合理数字是多少，但我知道绝对不是100倍。
I don't know what's the right number, but I know it's not 100 times.
债务市场令人痛苦，但有时你仍需专注于公司本身。
Debt markets are painful, but sometimes you have to still focus on the company.
只要公司的内在价值以良好的比率增长，那么保持耐心可能是明智之举，接受这样的事实：如果你以30倍市盈率买入，而在调整期间市盈率降至20倍，你的损失将达到33%。
As long as the company is growing its intrinsic value at good ratios, probably it's a good time just to stay patient and accept that if you pay, let's say, 30 times earning, it goes down to 20 times earning during a correction, you're down 33%.
但如果你对公司判断正确，最终盈利将继续增长，股价将弥补所有损失，甚至获得更丰厚的回报。
But if you're right on the company, eventually earnings will keep growing and the stock will recuperate all the losses and even more gain good returns.
当然，如果你以高市盈率买入，就必须接受这种下行风险。
But if you pay a high PE ratio to accept that there is that downside, of course.
威廉，让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。
William Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
当你经营一家小企业时，聘用合适的人才至关重要。
When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.
正确的员工可以提升团队素质，提高生产力，并将你的业务推向新的高度。
The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.
但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。
But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.
这就是LinkedIn职位的优势所在。
That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.
他们的新AI助手通过为您匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。
Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.
无需再翻阅大量简历，它会根据您的标准筛选申请人，并突出显示最匹配的人选，为您节省数小时时间，并在合适人选出现时帮助您快速行动。
Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.
最棒的是，这些优秀候选人已经存在于LinkedIn上。
The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.
事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。
In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.
一次就招对人。
Hire right the first time.
免费在linkedin.com/studybill发布您的职位，然后推广它以使用LinkedIn职位的新AI助手，让寻找顶尖候选人变得更轻松、更快速。
Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.
免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill。
That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.
适用条款和条件。
Terms and conditions apply.
想象一下，借助真正理解您客户的科技来扩展您的业务。
Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.
这就是 Alexa 和 AWS AI 背后的故事。
That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.
每天，Alexa 在 17 种语言中处理超过十亿次交互，同时将客户摩擦降低 40%。
Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.
这不仅仅是让生活更便捷，更是关于转变客户互动并创造新的收入来源。
It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.
在幕后，AWS AI 驱动着 70 多个专用模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业如何以信心和安全性大规模部署 AI。
Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.
Alexa 的 AI 能力在亚马逊庞大的运营中经过实战检验，实现了规模化的真实可衡量影响。
Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.
这些相同的创新现在为其他企业提供了经过验证的框架，以提升效率、解锁新的收入来源并获得持久的市场优势。
These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams, and gain a lasting market edge.
在 aws.com/ai/rstory 了解 Alexa 的故事。
Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.
那就是 aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
你的比特币资产越多，面临的挑战就越复杂。
The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.
最初简单的自托管，如今已演变为涉及家族传承规划、复杂的安保决策，以及一个错误就可能损失数代财富的境况。
What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.
标准服务并未为这些高风险的现实情况而设计。
Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.
因此，长期投资者选择 Unchained Signature——专为认真持有比特币的人士提供的高端私人客户服务，提供专业指导、稳健托管和持久的合作关系。
That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.
使用 Signature，您将配有一位专属客户经理，他了解您的目标，并在每一步为您提供帮助。
With signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.
您将享受白手套式入驻服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低交易费用，以及优先参与独家活动和功能的权益。
You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.
Unchained 的协作托管模式旨在为那些希望自行保管密钥的人提供与全球最大的比特币托管机构同等的安全级别。
Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.
了解更多关于 Unchained Signature 的信息，请访问 unchained.com/preston。
Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.
结账时使用代码 Preston 10，可享受首年 10% 折扣。
Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.
比特币不仅仅是为了生活。
Bitcoin isn't just for life.
它是为了世代传承。
It's for generations.
好的。
Alright.
回到节目。
Back to the show.
你引用了一段本杰明·格雷厄姆在 1958 年演讲中曾引用的精彩语句，这段话最初源自罗马作家奥维德的《变形记》，我想。
You've quoted a wonderful line that Ben Graham famously quoted in a speech of his from 1958 that that comes originally from the Roman writer Ovid, I think, from his Metamorphoses.
这个故事大约有两千年的历史，正如你在其中一封股东信中所解释的，太阳神菲比斯对他的儿子——名字我总是记不住，大概是法厄同——说，他想驾驶马车飞越天空。
So this is about 2,000 years old where, as you explained it in one of your shareholder letters, the sun god Phoebus says to his son, whose name I can never pronounce, maybe Phaeton, something like that, who wanted to fly their chariot through the sky.
这位睿智的神父说：你走中间的道路会更安全。
The wise father god says, You will go safer in the middle road.
当然，太阳神无视了这番忠告，失去了对马匹的控制，坠落凡间，几乎因点燃大地而毁灭世界。
And and, of course, the sun ignores this, loses control of the horses, and and crashes to earth and almost destroys the world by setting it on fire.
你曾表示，你在投资中始终遵循中间道路，我认为这正描述了你刚才所说的：如何平衡对卓越增长的渴望与支付合理价格、不操之过急的需求。
And you've said that you consistently followed the middle road in investing, which I think kind of describes what you were just saying, like how to balance this desire for growth, for outstanding growth and a desire to pay the right price, not to get too ahead of your skis.
你能谈谈这种‘中间道路’的理念吗？这似乎是你方法的核心。
Can you talk about that idea of the middle road, which seems fundamental to your approach?
是的。
Yes.
我认为中间道路有多种理解方式。
I think the middle road, there's many ways to to see it.
就我们的投资流程而言，我会说，首先，我们寻找那些能够以很高比率提升内在价值的优秀公司。
But in terms of our investment process, I would say, first, we look for great companies that grow the intrinsic value at quite high ratio.
不，我们不想要那些每年增长50%但必须支付极高市盈率的革命性公司。
No, we don't want the revolutionary companies that, you know, grow 50% a year, but you have to pay a very high P ratio.
有时，比尔·林奇说，更多公司是被撑死的，而不是饿死的。
And sometimes, Bill Lynch used to say that more companies die of indigestion than from starvation.
他这句话的意思是，试图增长过快的公司有时会自取灭亡。
So what he meant by that is that companies that try to grow too fast sometimes create their own doom.
因此，我们寻找那些能提升内在价值的公司，但对于年增长率超过20%的公司，我们会保持谨慎。
So we look for companies that grow their intrinsic value, but we're fair prudent toward companies that grow at more than 20% annually.
因此，这种情况下，中庸之道就是指那些每年将内在价值增长约20%的公司。
So the middle of the road in this case would be companies that grow their intrinsic value, let's say, to 20% annually.
在估值方面，我们当然希望以很低的市盈率买入。
And in terms of valuation, of course, we like to pay very low multiple.
但即使是优秀公司，我们也不愿支付过高的市盈率。
But even for great companies, we don't wanna pay too much a high multiple.
正如我所说，我们不希望未来经历市盈率下降。
Like I said, we don't wanna experience a PE reduction in the future.
所以，再次强调，中庸之道是寻找那些估值不一定很低，但也不会过高的公司。
So, again, the middle of the road is to find probably companies that are not necessarily trading at very low valuation, but not too high valuation either.
比如说，市盈率二十到二十五倍。
So let's say twenty, twenty five times earnings.
我认为在市值方面也是如此。
And I think also in terms of market cap.
当然，非常年轻的公司可以快速增长，但风险也更高。
Of course, very young companies can grow very fast, but they're more risky.
通常，它们还没有在自己的业务周围建立起护城河。
Usually, they're not they don't have a a moat yet around their castle.
所以，我们通常希望找到那些有良好历史记录、能为业务建立护城河的公司。
So usually, want companies that have a good history of building a moat around their business.
对于非常年轻的公司来说，通常还达不到这一点。
Usually, you don't get that for very young companies.
而对于非常大的公司，是的，它们可能拥有护城河，但它们已经过于主导了。
And with very big companies, yes, they can have a moat, but they're so dominant.
它们太大了。
They're so big.
它们很难实现高增长率。
It's hard for them to grow at high ratios.
比如，我在想宝洁或可口可乐这样的公司。
You know, I'm thinking Procter and Gamble or Coca Cola, for example.
它们是伟大的公司，但它们的年收益增长很难超过6%到7%。
Great companies, but, you know, they won't grow earnings much more than six or 7% annually.
所以，中间路线是找到一家足够大、足够成熟、拥有强大竞争优势和坚固护城河的公司，但同时又不至于大到失去未来的增长前景。
So the middle of the road here would be to find a company that is big enough, old enough that they have a strong competitive advantage, a big moat around their business, but at the same time, is not too big so that they don't have any growth prospects in the future.
所以我认为，同样地，这种中间路线原则也适用于我们投资过程中的规模选择。
So I think, again, the the mineral of role the road applies in our investment process here in terms of size.
并不是指大盘股、中盘股、小盘股这样的分类，而是指它们在未来增长路径上所处的位置。
Not necessarily in terms of big cap, large cap, small cap, but really in terms of where they are in their path of growth in the future.
我认为你在多元化策略上也采取了非常中庸的方法。
I'd say you also have a very middle of the road approach to diversification.
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对吧？
Right?
你能谈谈你是如何平衡集中投资和分散投资的好处的吗？这样你既有机会跑赢市场，又更有可能生存下来。
Can you can you talk about how you balance the benefits of concentration and diversification so you have a chance of outperforming, but also are more likely to survive?
是的。
Yes.
我研究过的许多伟大的基金经理，比如菲利普·费雪、格伦·格林伯格，当然还有沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格，他们大多数时候都高度集中持仓。
Many of the great money managers that I studied, you know, Philip Fisher, Glenn Greenberg, of course, Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, most of the time they were very concentrated.
比如说，有时只有10只股票，举个例子。
Let's say, sometimes 10 stocks, let's say, for instance.
他们表现得非常出色。
And they've done very well.
他们等待时机，确保有巨大的安全边际，因此取得了很好的回报。
And they waited for the right opportunity with a very large margin of safety and they've done well.
但就我个人而言，根据我的经验，我觉得10只太少了。
But for myself, from my personal experience, I thought that 10 is a little low.
我更倾向于持有大约20到25只股票，感觉这样更安心。
And I was more, I felt more comfortable with something like 20 to 25 names.
所以一只证券的典型权重大约在35%左右。
So a typical weight, between 35%, let's say, in single security.
基于近三十年的经验，我认为投资组合中持有约25只股票，能很好地平衡风险：即使一两只投资出错，也不会对组合造成太大伤害。
And from the almost thirty years experience now, having around 25 names of portfolio, for me, seems to be the right balance between having enough securities that if you make one or two mistakes, it doesn't hurt too much the portfolio.
同时，我认为25只股票的集中度足够高，不至于过度分散。
And at the same time, I think 25 names is concentrated enough so that we're not too diversified.
你知道，持有的股票越多，回报就越接近标普500指数。
That, you know, the more names you have, the closer to the S and P 500 returns you'll have.
所以你不希望投资组合中股票数量太多，因为跑赢指数的概率会迅速下降。
So you don't wanna have too much names in portfolio because the odds of beating the index go down very quickly.
所以我认为这对我们的策略来说是合适的平衡。
So I think that's the right balance for us.
因此，这大概是一个折中的方案。
So, again, it's probably middle of the road here.
这种平衡正好，有足够的证券实现适当分散，但又不至于过多而变得过度分散。
It's the right balance having enough securities of, yeah, proper diversification, but not too much so they are too diversified.
你另一个非常基本的原则是，预测市场几乎是徒劳的。
Another really fundamental tenet of yours is that it's basically futile to make market predictions.
你说，人们总是写信给你，或者在电梯里拦住你，问现在是不是投资的好时机？
You say that people are always writing to you or grabbing you in elevators or whatever and saying, Is now a good time to invest?
你能谈谈这个非常根本的见解吗？即试图预测市场走向、经济趋势，或任何你认为过于复杂而无法知晓的宏观或地缘政治因素，其实是一场你不想参与的游戏？
Can you talk about this really fundamental insight that it's just a game you don't wanna play, trying to predict where the market's going, where the economy's going, or any of these big macro or geopolitical things that you deem too difficult to know?
是的。
Yeah.
我从未试图预测股市。
Well, I never tried to predict the stock market.
我认为市场是不可预测的。
I think it's unpredictable.
对我而言，一个非常有用的教训是，幸运的是，这些并非我自己的错误，而是我观察其他伟大投资者的经历。
And one lesson that was very useful to me, and lucky enough, it was not mistakes I did myself, but just watching other great investors.
我不点名了，但我记得一位非常非常聪明的投资者，他是个选股高手。
You know, I won't name names, but I remember a very, very brilliant investor that was a great stock picker, really.
但他非常谨慎，总是保留20%的现金。
But he was very prudent and he always kept 20% in cash.
所以他的投资，比如股票，年回报率是14%，但由于有20%的现金几乎不产生收益，他的整体回报率被拉低到了每年11%。
So his investments, the the stock CEO, let's say, did 14% annually, but having the 20% in cash yielding close to nothing reduced his overall results to 11% annually.
我观察到这一点后，心想：这说不通。
So I observed that and I said, this doesn't make sense.
他是个如此出色的选股者。
He's such a great stock picker.
为什么不做100%投资，直接接受股市的涨跌呢？
Why not be a 100% invested and just live with the ups and downs of the stock market?
我从中学到了很多。
And I learned a lot from that.
于是我对自己说，我的目标、我的使命是找到优秀的企业，成为优秀企业的股东。
So I said to myself, my goal, my mission is to find great companies, to be an owner of great companies.
目标不是预测市场会如何表现。
It's not to predict what the market will do.
当你持有现金时，某种程度上你是在试图预测股市。
And when you have some cash, in in some ways, you're you're trying to predict the stock market.
你试图等待市场回调，以便投入你保留的那5%、10%或20%的现金。
You're trying to wait for a correction to invest that five, ten, 20% in cash that you keep.
据我观察，能够成功做到这一点的概率并不高。
And I think the odds of being able to achieve that, from my observation, are not that high.
所以你从来都不持有现金吗？
So do you never really have any cash?
是的，我不持有。
No, I don't.
当你在短期内遭受重创时，比如我们现在所经历的这种非常痛苦和不适的情况，即使是许多非常谨慎的投资者也受到了严重打击。
And then when you get whacked in the short term, like we're seeing at the moment, which is a pretty painful and uncomfortable situation, and even for a lot of very prudent investors who are getting hit quite hard.
你是如何应对这种情绪上的压力的？
How do you deal with it emotionally?
当然，我个人并不喜欢这样。
Well, personally, of course, I don't like it.
这并不是一种愉快的体验。
It's not a pleasant experience.
我总是努力回到一个理念：我们拥有的是公司，应专注于这些公司正在发生的事情。
I try to always go back to the idea that we own companies and try to focus on what's happening with the companies.
每当出现市场回调或熊市时，我都会尝试看看是否有办法优化投资组合。
And what I try to do is every time there's a correction, a bear market, I try to see if there's ways to improve the portfolio.
因此，我会卖出投资组合中那些不如其他公司被低估，或者在经济衰退时基本面不如以往强劲的公司。
So I'll sell companies in the portfolio that either are not as undervalued as others or that perhaps the fundamentals are not as strong as usually when there's a recession.
你可以看出哪些公司强劲，哪些公司不如预期那样强大。
You can see the the companies that are strong and those are less strong than you hope for.
因此，我会努力优化投资组合，因为每次熊市都会带来机会。
So I'll try to improve the portfolio because there will be opportunities with every bear market, there's opportunities.
所以，每次市场回调时，我都会尝试卖出或减少那些基本面不如预期、估值下降幅度不如其他公司多的持仓，同时增加我认为最被低估的公司持仓。
So and that's what I've been trying to do every time there's a market correction, probably sell or reduce holdings that either the fundamentals are not as strong as hoped for or that valuation has not come down as much as the others and increase the ones that I believe are the most undervalued portfolio.
如果我这样做是对的，从技术上讲，当市场反弹时，投资组合的未来前景将会改善。
If I'm right doing this, technically, when the market do rebound, the the portfolio will have improved prospects going forward.
这就是我正在努力做的。
So that's what I'm trying to do.
在过去的几个月里，有没有什么特别重大的举措？比如你发现某个市场领域遭受了严重打击，于是你抓住机会大幅升级了投资组合？
Is there anything particularly dramatic that you've done over the last couple of months where you think, yeah, I've I've seen some kind of disruption where some area of the market's been really clobbered, and I've I've actually kind of seized the opportunity to upgrade the portfolio dramatically?
我不敢说有多戏剧性，但我们大概进行了三四笔交易，要么卖出或减持某项持仓，要么买入或增持另一项持仓。
I wouldn't say dramatically, but probably we purchased we made three or four trades, either selling or reducing one holding or buying or increasing one other holdings.
我们已经做了三四笔，而且我们正考虑进行更多操作，因为最近几天，投资组合中的许多证券价格大幅下跌，有些已经达到了非常有吸引力的水平。
We've done three or four, and we're we're thinking of doing more because in the last few days, many of the securities and portfolio has gone down quite a lot, and some are getting at very, very attractive level.
就像我常说的，卖掉一家估值为其内在价值60%的公司，去买一家估值为其内在价值40%的公司，这是合乎逻辑的。
And like I always say, it makes sense to to sell a company that, I don't know, trade at 60% of intrinsic value to buy one that trades at 40% of intrinsic value.
在我们的市场中，经常会出现这样的情况。
And in our markets, you'll have things like that.
弗朗索瓦，你能提一两个你最近买入的标的吗？我知道这要几周后才会公开，但找一个最能体现你操作风格的例子。
Can you mention one or two things, Francois, that you've been able to pick up that are particularly I mean, this won't come out for a few weeks, but something that epitomizes what you do.
所以这更多不是关于选股，而是体现了你的投资理念，某种程度上符合本·格雷厄姆所说的：让市场成为你的仆人，而不是你的主人。
So not so much a stock pick as something that gives a sense of your approach to, in a way, what Ben Graham said, that you're making the market your servant, not your master.
是的。
Yeah.
我们已经持有超过两年的一只股票是Five Below，我认为这是一家非常出色的企业。
Well, one stock that we already own for a little more than two years is Five Below, which I think is a great, great company.
在某个时候，股价下跌了大约35%到40%，我们反而增加了持仓。
And the stock went down probably 35, 40% at some point, and we increased it.
我想我们减少了Wow的持仓。
Think we reduced the Wow.
我记得我们减持了Dollarama，这是一家优秀的加拿大公司。
Well, I remember we reduced Dollarama, which is a fine company, a great company in Canada.
但当时这两家公司的市盈率差不多。
But I think the two were trading at similar PE ratios.
但我相信，未来几年Five Below的增长速度将远超Dollarama。
But I believe that Five Below will grow much faster in the years to come than Dollarama.
所以多拉玛在收入和利润方面可能更稳定一些。
So probably Dollarama is a little more stable in terms of their revenues and profits.
因此市场给予它更高的估值倍数，因为如今市场青睐稳定性。
So market gives it higher multiple because these days, the market likes stability.
但我认为在五年内，Five Below的表现会更好。
But I think over five years, Five Below will do better.
所以我们卖出了看起来吸引力较小的股票，增持了更具吸引力的股票。
So we just sold one that looked less attractive and increased the one that is more attractive.
或许我可以再举一个例子，就在我们交谈时，CarMax的股价下跌了20%。
Perhaps if I could took take another example, one stock that is down 20% today as we as we are speaking is CarMax.
我认为它已经跌到了67美元。
I think it's down to 67.
我相信，虽然我不确定具体时间，但在五到六年内，这家公司每股盈利可达12美元。
And I believe, I don't know exactly when, but within five or six years, the company can earn $12 a share.
所以如果在2027年或2028年我的预测准确，股价67美元对应每股12美元，这只股票至少有三倍的上涨空间。
So at 67, if I'm right on that $12 a share, let's say in 2027 or 2028, this is a stock that could triple in value at least.
所以我认为这是一个绝佳的机会。
So I think it's a great opportunity.
它目前规模虽然略小，但已经是我们的前五大持仓之一。
It's already Well, it's a little lower today in terms of size, but it's already in our top five holding in the portfolio.
但这正是我们可以加仓的一个例子。
But this is an example of a company we could increase.
当然，上个季度的业绩略显失望，但我知道我持有CarMax已经十五年了。
Of course, the results the last quarter were a little disappointing, but I know that I've been owning CarMax for fifteen years.
我知道，没错，这是一家很棒的公司，但它是一家周期性公司。
I know that, yes, it is a great company, but it is a cyclical company.
当经济放缓时，销售额会下降，对此你必须接受。
When there's a slowdown in the economy, sales go down, then you have to accept that.
但如果你有长期视野，我认为这仍然是一个绝佳的机会。
But if you have a long term horizon, I think that's a great opportunity.
过去一年，该股票下跌了50%。
The stock is down 50% in the last year.
我不认为内在价值下降了50%。
I don't think the intrinsic value has gone down 50%.
威廉，你最大的很多持仓都是你持有多年的股票。
William A lot of your biggest holdings are things that you've owned for many years.
我翻看了你过去的一些持仓，我记得你在2000年3月科技泡沫顶峰时以每股不到30美元的价格买入了伯克希尔哈撒韦，而现在，即使在大幅下跌之后，B类股的价格也达到了270美元左右。
I was looking through various old holdings of yours, and I think Berkshire Hathaway you bought in March 2000 at the height of the tech bubble when it was under $30 a share, and now it's what, dollars $2.70 even after This is for the B shares, after dipping fairly substantially.
你在2005年买入了CarMax，2010年买入了Dollarama，股价都上涨了。
CarMax you bought in 2005, Dollarama 2010, and it's gone up.
我认为CarMax是2007年买入的。
I think CarMax was 2007.
好的。
Okay.
正好在2008年危机前买入，时机完美。
At a perfect time, just before the 2008 thing about it.
哦，没错。
Oh, yeah.
Visa，你从2010年就开始持有。
Visa, you've owned since 2010.
谷歌（Alphabet）从2011年开始持有。
GoogleAlphabet since 2011.
Markel从2013年开始持有。
Markel since 2013.
如果你看看这些在你投资组合中非常核心的持仓的共同点，像这样的公司有哪些共同特征，能体现你对卓越企业的筛选标准？
If you look at the common denominator among these very sort of integral positions in your portfolio, what do companies like that have in common that illustrate what you look for in an outstanding business?
我认为你提到的这些公司，都兼具出色的管理层和不仅仅是好企业，更是独特的业务。
Well, I think all the companies you mentioned, a combination of having great managers, but not only great businesses, but kind of unique businesses.
而且，我认为拥有这两者的结合，意味着我相信这些公司具有某种特殊性，使它们具备强大的竞争优势。
And, you know, the idea of having both is that I believe these companies are something special that gives them strong competitive advantage.
但如果非要我用一句话总结，我认为它们拥有独特的商业模式。
But if I had to summarize in one sentence, I believe they have a unique business model.
我的意思是，Visa和万事达卡确实很相似，但我觉得这两家公司一起，是你能找到的最出色的企业之一。
Mean, if your Visa is very similar to MasterCard, of course, but I think the two together, they're as great businesses as you can find.
我认为谷歌字母是一家极好的企业。
I think Google Alphabet is fantastic business.
我的意思是，它如今真正主导着我们的世界。
I mean, it's really dominating our world today.
我不确定具体数字，但他们可能间接占据了互联网上约40%的广告份额。
I don't know exactly the number, but they're probably at 40% of all ads on the internet or something like that indirectly.
我认为CarMax是一家非常独特的企业。
I think CarMax is a very unique business.
我认为他们每年在美国售出的二手车中占据了大约4%的市场份额。
I think they've got something like 4% market share of all the used cars sold in The US every year.
我认为目前最接近的竞争对手是Carvana，但Carvana至今尚未盈利。
And I don't think probably the closer now is Carvana, but Carvana is not profitable yet.
因此，我认为CarMax拥有非常独特的企业模式，并且管理得非常好，依我看来也是如此。
So I believe that CarMax has a very unique business model and very well managed, in my opinion also.
此外，资本配置对我们所关注的公司来说至关重要。
And, capital allocation is very important in the companies we look for.
你提到伯克希尔·哈撒韦，但我们也可以说说Ametek、Constellation Software或MTY Food。
You talk about Berkshire Hathaway, but we could talk also of Ametek or Constellation Software or MTY Food.
我认为这三家公司都有着非常出色的智能资本配置历史。
I think those three companies have a very strong history of intelligent capital allocation.
如果你打算持有一家公司十年，那么你大部分的回报将来自于多年来智能的资本配置。
And if you're gonna own a company for ten years, a lot of your returns will be the fruits of intelligent capital allocation over the years.
这是我们非常看重的一个重要标准。
And that's one very important criteria we look for.
显然，多年来你主要投资于美国，但你的投资组合中有一部分是加拿大公司，这对我们其他人来说尤其有趣，因为你作为长期居住在加拿大的人，拥有本地的洞察力。
You obviously have invested primarily in The US over the years, but there's an important component of your portfolio that's Canadian companies, which is particularly interesting for the rest of us since you obviously have local knowledge as someone who's lived in Canada for a long time.
我记得有一次，我想是我们上次交谈时，我不确定你是否已经投资了Constellation Software，但我对这家公司非常着迷，因为它的首席执行官——或者说他们称他为总裁——在某些圈子里拥有类似宗教般的追随者。
I remember once, I think last time we spoke, I don't know if you had already picked up Constellation Software, but I'm fascinated by that company because the CEO, or I guess the president he's called, has a kind of cult following.
在某些软件界人士眼中，他常被视作贝索斯或巴菲特那样的人物。
He's sort of often viewed in the same way as a Bezos or a Buffett in certain circles of the software world, for example.
你能谈谈这个吗？
Can you talk about that?
因为我记得你曾经说过，整个对Constellation Software的投资都是基于你认为马克·伦纳德是一位非凡的领导者。
Because I remember you saying at one point that really that entire investment in Constellation Software was based on the fact that you thought Mark Leonard was this extraordinary leader.
是的。
Yes.
我记得就像昨天一样，大概是2013年的一个圣诞派对。
I remember as yesterday, I think there was a Christmas party in 2013.
我当时在一位朋友那里。
I was at some friend.
我一个非常年轻的朋友问我，是否知道Constellation Software这家公司。
And a young friend of mine, very young, he asked me if I know this company Constellation Software.
我有点惭愧，因为我以为自己了解所有优秀的企业。
And I was a little ashamed because I thought I knew all the great companies.
所以我回答说：不，我不了解。
So I said, no, I don't.
所以我想那几乎是圣诞前夜。
So I think it was almost on Christmas Eve.
我读了2000年，大概是2012年康斯特拉尔软件公司由马克·伦纳德撰写的年度报告。
I read the 2000 well, probably 2012 annual report of a cancellation software written by Mark Leonard.
我记得当我读到那份报告时，是一见钟情。
And I remember when I read that, that was love at first sight.
我说，这正是我喜欢的那种人。
I said, this is my kind of guy.
我知道，因为二十年来我读过无数年报，那篇是我见过的最好的之一。
I knew it because twenty years of reading out of reports, that was on the best I've read.
当然，我又做了一些额外的研究，查阅了这家公司的资料，阅读了历年致股东的信，试图全面了解这家公司。
And I, of course, did a little more research, read about the company, read the annual letters, tried to understand everything about the company.
大概一个月后，我想是在我读完年报的第二天，我买了一些股票来跟踪它。
And probably a month later I I think the the day after I read the annual report, I bought a few shares just to follow it.
但一个月后，我们对该公司的投资规模很大，并且从未卖出过一股。
But a month later, we made a sizable investment in the company and never sold a share.
所以，那差不多是九年前的事了。
So that was almost nine years ago.
所以，你见过他了吗？告诉我吧？
So And have you met him and told me?
是的，
Yes,
见过几次。
a few times.
我觉得他是个很棒的人。
And I think he's a great guy.
他是个了不起的人，杰出的商人，堪称顶尖。
He's a great human being, a great businessman, and as great as you can find.
是什么让他在商业领袖中脱颖而出？
What makes him stand out as a business leader?
这是个好问题。
That's a good question.
你知道，人们总想用某种科学方法来评估管理者。
You know, people want some scientific approach to, you know, assessing managers.
是什么让一个优秀的管理者成为管理者？
What makes a great manager a manager?
但我记得一位朋友说过：‘这就是那种你愿意让他娶你女儿的人。’
But I remember a friend of mine said, Well, this is the kind of person you'd like him to marry your daughter.
我认为这概括了所有优秀的管理者，无论是汤姆·盖纳、马克·伦纳德，还是TY食品的斯坦利·莫特。
And I think that sums all the great managers, either Tom Gaynor or Mark Leonard or Stanley Mott at TY Food.
他们都是杰出的人。
They're great human beings.
你希望他们来管理你的资本。
You want them to manage your capital.
我的意思是，如果我不得不离开，我总是用《吉尔igan岛》的比喻来说，如果你被困在荒岛上十年。
I mean, if I had to go away, you know, I always use that analogy of the Gilligan Island test if you're stranded on a desert island for ten years.
你知道那个《吉尔igan岛》的节目吗？
Know I you remember that show at Gilligan Island?
知道。
Yeah.
你会把资本托付给谁？
Who would you entitle your capital with?
这是我经常问自己的一个问题。
And that's one question I ask myself.
公司的首席执行官表现最好吗？
Do the CEO of the company win best?
如果我要在岛上待上十年，我会很高兴让他管理我们的资本。
I'll be happy for him to manage our capital if I'm spending ten years on an island.
我认为马克·伦纳德，我会睡得很安稳。
And I think Mark Leonard, I would sleep very well at night.
知道他在那个小岛上，管理着咨询软件，我会很安心。
This this little island knowing that he's there and managing consolation software.
汤姆·盖纳在马克尔、斯坦利·莫特在MTY食品，当然还有沃伦·巴菲特在伯克希尔，都是如此。
Same thing with Tom Gaynor at Markel or Stanley Mott, MTY Food, of course, Warren Buffett at Berkshire.
这确实是一个很好的见解。
It's actually it's a great insight.
像汤姆·盖诺这样的人，我从马克勒公司很了解，你可能已经持有这家公司十年了。
With someone like Tom Gaynor, who I know well from Markel, which you've owned, I think, for ten years now, perhaps.
是的。
Yeah.
接近十年了。
Close to ten years.
我的意思是，汤姆，你确实会。
I mean, Tom, you would yeah.
如果你突然倒下，在倒下之前，你会说：汤姆，你能确保我的家人经济上没问题吗？
You would just if you keeled over, you'd say before you keeled over, you'd say, Tom, can you just make sure my family is okay financially?
你来管理资金，确保
You manage the money and make sure
他很棒。
it's He's great.
他真的非常棒。
He's great, really.
是的。
Yeah.
这很有趣。
It's interesting.
这其实是一个很好的筛选标准，去思考你想和谁合作，不仅是作为资金管理者，更是作为首席执行官。
That's a great filter, actually, to think of who you wanna partner with, not just as a money manager, but as a CEO.
我认为，因为我们大多数人并没有以如此长远的眼光来看待投资，所以我们低估了这种信任中个人因素的重要性。
And most of us I think because most of us don't really think of our investments in such a long term way, we underestimate the importance of that personal element of that trust.
是的。
Yeah.
这些很难解释，因为它们有点主观。
And these are not easy to to explain because they're kind of subjective.
它们基于判断。
They're based on judgment.
但随着你经验的积累，我认为这种更好的判断力会随之而来。
And but, you know, as you get more experience, I think that's something that comes with experience, better judgment.
嗯，我愿意这么认为。
Well, I like to think so.
这种判断帮助我们挑选优秀的人才，因为我们听得多、看得多，能够识别出优秀的管理者，因为他们实在太稀少了。
And that judgment helps us, you know, select great people because, you know, we've heard a lot, we've seen a lot, and, we can see great managers because they're so rare.
我可能会回到艺术这个比喻上来。
And I would probably go back to the art analogy here.
当你去博物馆参观，尤其是世界上最好的那些博物馆时，很快就能看出哪些是伟大的艺术家。
When you go to museums and go to and visit, you know, the best museums in the world, pretty quickly you can see which are the greatest artists.
所以我总是说，美很难描述，但当我看到它时，我就知道那是美。
And so I always say that beauty is hard to describe, but when I see it, I know it.
我认为，如果你一生中看过很多艺术作品，你就能够识别出杰作。
And I would say that if you look at lot of art in your life, you'll be able to identify masterpieces.
对公司和首席执行官来说，也是如此。
Think it's the same thing with companies and CEOs.
如果你见过很多公司，读过很多年报，研究过很多企业，并多年来接触过许多企业家，久而久之，你就能识别出真正优秀的人才。
If you see a lot of them, if you read a lot of annual reports and you study a lot of companies and meet a lot of businessmen and businesswomen over the years, after a while, you'll be able to identify the really great ones.
我想详细聊聊艺术，因为我们的许多听众不知道，多年来你一直大量投资于艺术，并且拥有这个企业艺术收藏。
I wanted to talk in some detail about art because a lot of our listeners won't know that you've invested very heavily in art over the years, and you have this corporate art collection.
这其实是你的个人艺术收藏，只不过被称为企业艺术收藏。
Well, that's really your art collection, but it's it's called the corporate art collection.
这确实是一个企业艺术收藏。
It is a corporate art collection.
但它是由公司持有的。
It's But it's one by the corporation.
但我记得你曾经告诉我，你基本上把一半的分红收入都投入了艺术，大约四分之一
But I remember you saying to me once that you basically put half of your share of the earnings into art and and about a quarter
太疯狂了。
of really crazy.
是的。
Yeah.
不，我太喜欢了。
No, I love it.
还有四分之一，我记得你说过，你正在存钱，希望有一天能建一座博物馆。
And a quarter, I think you said you were saving to build a museum one day.
所以艺术是你生活中非常非常核心的一部分。
And so art is a very, very fundamental part of your life.
我曾经跟你聊过罗伊·纽伯格，这位伟大的艺术收藏家和基金经理，他的儿子吉米我认识。
And I once talked to you about Roy Neuberger, the great art collector and money manager whose son Jimmy I know well.
罗伊·纽伯格进入资产管理行业，主要是为了资助他的艺术收藏。
And Roy Neuberger really went into the money management business largely to fund his art collecting.
你也说过类似的话，对吧？
And you said much the same, right?
你曾经对我说过：‘是的，我进入投资行业，某种程度上也是为了资助我的艺术收藏。’
You said to me once, Yeah, I may have gone into the investing business kind of to fund my art collecting as well.
所以艺术对你而言至关重要。
So it's very fundamental to who you are.
对吧？
Right?
你的艺术收藏。
Your art collecting.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得是的。
I think so.
对。
Yes.
你之前提到的独特性这个理念非常重要，我想再多聊聊，因为你曾经告诉我，正如你在商业模型中寻找独特性一样，你在艺术中寻找的也是同样的东西。
This idea you mentioned before of uniqueness is really important, and I wanted to talk about it a bit more because you said to me once that just as you look for uniqueness in business models, that's really what you're looking for in art.
你能谈谈购买杰出艺术品和购买优秀公司之间的相似之处吗？
Can you talk about the parallel between buying great art and buying great companies?
这是一个类似的过程。
It's a similar process.
我认为最大的区别是，当我购买一件艺术品时，我从不打算出售它。
I would say probably the biggest difference is when I buy a work of art, I never wanna sell it.
就像我购买股票时，理想情况下我希望持有多年、多年、多年，但我意识到大多数股票最终都不得不卖出。
As when I purchase a stock, ideally, I would wanna keep it for many, many, many years, but I realized that most of them at some point you have to sell it.
所以我认为这是最大的区别。
So I would say that's probably the biggest difference.
但除此之外，我认为这个过程非常相似。
But besides that, I think the process is very similar.
我努力寻找最顶尖中的最顶尖。
I really try to find the best of the best.
在法语中，我们说‘la creme de la creme’。
In French, we say la creme de la creme.
所以，我想找出最伟大的艺术家是谁。
So, I want to find who are the greatest artists.
不仅如此，还要找出他们最伟大的创作时期以及最杰出的艺术作品。
Not only that, what is the greatest creation period and what were the best work of art?
我认为对公司来说也是如此。
And I think it's the same thing with companies.
你想找到最优秀的企业，但你也必须意识到，艺术家也是如此。
You wanna find the greatest companies, but you have to realize that same with artists.
企业有辉煌的时期，也有不太理想的时期。
Companies have great periods and not so great periods.
因此，你必须能够识别出，你正考虑投资的这家公司是否正处于其最佳增长阶段，这就像艺术家创作巅峰期一样。
So you have to be able to identify that probably the company that you're thinking of investing is really its best period of growth and compared to the best period of creation for an artist.
所以，我认为要能够识别这一点，你必须深入理解你所研究的艺术家和企业。
So you I think to be able to identify that, you really have to understand in-depth the artist and the companies you're studying.
但你也知道，你必须考察大量企业与大量艺术家，才能发现那些罕见的艺术家、那些罕见的优秀企业。
But, you know, it's also the fact that you have to look at a lot of companies and a lot of artists to be able to identify those rare artists, those rare great companies.
我认为彼得·林奇曾用过一个类比，说这就像寻找珍珠。
And I think Peter Lynch used that analogy that it's like looking for pearls.
你必须打开很多牡蛎。
You have to open a lot of oysters.
你打开的牡蛎越多，找到珍珠的可能性就越大。
The more oysters you open, the more pearls you're likely to find.
所以我认为这是一样的。
So I think that's the same thing.
你必须研究很多公司，或者许多艺术家的作品。
You have to look at many, many companies or the the the work of many artists.
我认为另一个必要的要素是你必须热爱这个过程。
And I think another ingredient needed is you have to love the process.
我的意思不是去博物馆看伟大艺术作品是因为我觉得那是工作。
I mean, it's not work going to museums and looking at great artworks because I enjoy it.
我真的非常热爱它。
I really love it.
对公司来说也是如此。
And it's the same thing with companies.
我想研究公司。
I wanna study companies.
我并不觉得这是在工作。
I'm not thinking I'm working.
我正在享受这个过程。
I'm enjoying myself.
没有什么比发现一家我之前不知道的新公司更让我兴奋了，就像九年前发现Constellation Software那样，哇，这是一家了不起的公司。
And nothing excites me as finding a new company I didn't know about and realizing, a little bit like Constellation Software some nine years ago, that, wow, that's a fantastic company.
我真的很高兴找到了它。
I'm really happy that I found that.
我想了解关于它的所有事情。
And I wanna learn everything about it.
所以这是一个非常相似的过程。
So it is a very similar process.
但我认为关键有两点：你必须享受这个过程，并且如果你想在艺术界和企业界识别出那些稀有的杰作，就必须广泛观察大量事物。
But I think the key thing the two key things, you have to enjoy the process, and you have to look at a lot of things if you wanna be able to identify the rare masterpieces, both in the art world and the corporate world.
你还在为我写《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书的采访中提到过一件事，让我非常着迷，但最终这本书没有收录，我希望如果我有朝一日敢再次攀登这座高峰，能在下一本书里写到它。
You also said something that really fascinated me when we when I interviewed you for my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier, where you this didn't get into the book in the end, and I I hope I'll get to write about it in my next book if I ever dare to climb the mountain again.
但你谈到了某些企业的美。
But you talked about the beauty of certain businesses.
我们以星巴克为例进行了讨论。
We discussed Starbucks, for example.
你说星巴克是一家很棒的公司。
You said Starbucks is a beautiful company.
然后你跟我谈到，巴菲特在谈到像ISCAR这样的公司时，几乎要流泪哽咽，因为那里有一种美感。
And then you talked to me about the fact that Buffet almost teared up and choked up when he talked about a company like ISCAR, that there was a kind of beauty there.
你能谈谈这种关于某些企业之美的理念吗？
Can you talk about that idea of the beauty of certain businesses?
因为大多数人都不会真正思考这一点，但它显然存在。
Because it's something that most of us don't really think about, but it's clearly there.
你看到了什么，这些在某种程度上与你看到的艺术品中的美、简洁、纯粹和完美相呼应？
What are you seeing that also, in a sense, is paralleling what you're seeing in a work of art that has a beauty and a a cleanness and a purity and a perfection to it?
嗯，这并不容易。
Well, it's not easy.
就像我几分钟前说的，美这种东西，我一看就知道。
Like I said a few minutes earlier, beauty is I I know it when I see it.
但我认为，美通常是简单的。
But I think that beauty usually is simple.
就像你说的，它纯粹，但非常简单。
Like you say, it's pure, but it's very simple.
你一看就能很快意识到，你面对的是某种特别的东西。
You look at it and very quickly you realize that you're in front of something special.
我认为，这些年来我见过的所有优秀公司，通常当我阅读它们的财务报表、查看彭博数据时，都是一家非常简单的业务。
And I think all those great companies I've seen over the years, usually when I read their when I look at the balance sheet, the Bloomberg, it's a very simple business.
我的意思是，当你看现金流量表时，资本化项目并不多。
I mean, there's not too much things capitalized when you look at the cash flow statement.
这很美。
It's beautiful.
我的意思是，你看看每年的净自由现金流，它总是产生超出支出的现金，这些盈余要么用于收购，要么用于分红，要么用于股票回购。
I mean, you you look at the the net free cash flow a year, it's always throwing more cash under spending at the excess is either allocated to acquisition or dividend or stock buybacks.
但本质上，这是一种简单的会计处理。
But basically, it's a simple accounting.
这是一项简单的业务。
It's a simple business.
他们的资产负债表也很简单。
They've got a simple balance sheet.
我记得第一年读微软的年度报告时的情景。
I remember the first year I remember reading the annual report of Microsoft.
我不记得是哪一年了，大概是1994年。
I don't know which year, probably 1994.
你知道，他们的资产负债表上什么都没有，只有大量现金，仅此而已。
You know, they had nothing on the balance sheet, excess cash, a lot of cash, but that was it.
我的意思是，理解起来多么简单，你能看到所有该费用化的支出都已费用化。
I mean, how easy it is to understand that you can see that all everything that has to be expense is expense.
没有任何资本化项目。
Nothing is capitalized.
即使如此，他们还能实现25%的净利润率。
And even after that, they make, you know, 25% net margin.
所以，我的意思是，这就是我读到这些时的体会。
So, I mean, this is the experience I have when I read that.
我觉得这很棒。
I think it's great.
这很完美。
It's beautiful.
这很简单。
It's simple.
很容易理解。
It's easy to understand.
这就是我想关注的。
And that's what I wanna focus.
我希望那些容易理解、拥有明显独特性和简单性的公司。
I want the companies that are easy to understand, that have clearly as something special and something simple.
问题是，情况会变化，有时公司可能多年都很强大、很出色，但行业的动态发生了变化，或者它们的收购没有达到预期效果。
The problem is things change or sometimes companies can be very strong and very beautiful for many years, but the dynamic of the industry changes or they make acquisition that turn out not as expected.
所以你也必须接受这一点：与保持静态、始终美丽的艺术品不同，企业是一个有机生命体。
So you have to accept that also, that contrary to a work of art that stays static, that stays always beautiful, companies are a living organism.
因此，它们不断变化。
So it change constantly.
所以你必须接受，今年看起来美丽的东西，五年后可能就完全不同了。
So you have to accept that what can be beautiful in one year, five years can be quite one:thirty different.
这就是投资的本质。
So that's just the nature of investing.
我认为这使得投资也变得非常有趣。
I think that makes it also very interesting.
让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
你知道最优秀的企业有什么独特之处吗？
You know what sets the best businesses apart?
就在于它们如何利用创新，将复杂性转化为增长。
It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.
亚马逊广告正是这样做的，其背后依托的是AWS人工智能。
That's exactly what Amazon Ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.
每天，亚马逊广告处理数十亿次实时决策，优化整个价值310亿美元的广告生态系统中的广告效果。
Every day, Amazon Ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.
结果是广告活动运行速度提升30%，并能大规模实现可衡量的业务影响。
The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.
而这正是亚马逊自身实现增长的方式。
And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.
他们的代理式人工智能将营销从一个资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并赋能营销人员专注于创意与战略。
Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.
亚马逊广告正在证明，人工智能驱动的广告不仅仅是未来，更是新的竞争优势。
Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.
更棒的是，每一家企业都可以应用亚马逊内部打磨完善的同一套创新方法论。
And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.
前往 aws.comai/rstory 了解亚马逊广告的故事。
See the Amazon Ads story at aws.comai/rstory.
那就是 aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
初创公司行动迅速。
Startups move fast.
借助人工智能，它们交付产品更快，并更早吸引企业客户。
And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.
但大单带来了更大的安全和合规要求。
But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.
SOC 2 并不总是足够。
A SOC two isn't always enough.
适当的安全措施可以促成或破坏一笔交易。
The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.
但有多少创始人或工程师能抽出时间来处理这些事务，而不耽误公司建设？
But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?
Vanta 的人工智能和自动化功能，能让企业在几天内准备好承接大单。
Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.
Vanta 会持续监控您的合规状态，确保未来的交易不会受阻。
And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.
此外，Vanta 会随着您的业务成长而扩展，并在每一步都提供及时的支持。
Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.
随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望，Vanta 知道何时需要什么，并已打造了最快、最简便的路径，帮助您实现目标。
With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.
因此，认真的初创公司都会早早通过 Vanta 实现安全合规。
That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.
我们的听众可通过 vanta.com/billionaires 获得 1000 美元折扣。
Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.
访问 vanta.com/billionaires，立享 1000 美元折扣。
That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.
新的一年到了，这是终于开始实现您梦想事业的最佳时机。
It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.
几年前，我启动了自己的电子商务业务，而 Shopify 正是我起步所需的完美工具。
Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.
当许多人不断将梦想推迟到明年时，我要告诉你们，现在就是抓住眼前机遇的时候。
While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.
Shopify 为你提供在线和线下销售所需的一切工具。
Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.
数百万创业者，包括我自己，都已经完成了这一跃，从普通人变成了刚刚起步的创业者。
Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.
你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并自定义它们，同时使用其内置的 AI 工具撰写产品描述或编辑产品图片。
Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.
随着你的成长，Shopify 也会在每一步与你共同成长。
And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.
在 2026 年，别再等待，立即开始使用 Shopify 销售吧。
In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.
立即注册每月 1 美元的试用版，今天就开始在 shopify.com/wsb 销售。
Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.
前往 shopify.com/wsb。
Go to shopify.com/wsb.
这就是 shopify.com/wsb。
That's shopify.com/wsb.
今年新年，让 Shopify 与你同行，聆听你的第一个声音。
Hear your first This New Year with Shopify by your side.
好的。
Alright.
回到节目。
Back to the show.
这种简单性的理念让我感到非常深刻，我甚至在我的书中专门写了一章来探讨它。
There's something about this idea of simplicity that's really profound to me, and I I ended up writing a whole chapter about it in my book.
过去几天我阅读了你们的股东信，这一点特别引起了我的注意。
And when I was reading through your shareholder letters over the last few days, this really leaped out at me.
我从你们2020年致股东的信中记下了这句话：‘一如既往，我们的理念非常简单。’
I jotted this down from your 2020 letter to shareholders where you wrote, As always, our philosophy remains very simple.
我们拥有大约20家公司，它们资产负债表稳健、会计保守、拥有持久的竞争优势，并且管理团队全心致力于股东利益。
We own approximately 20 companies with solid balance sheets, conservative accounting, a durable competitive advantage, and a management team dedicated to shareholders.
当然，我们总是非常谨慎地对待我们愿意支付的价格。
And of course, we're always cautious about the price that we're willing to pay.
这让我深刻体会到，最优秀的投资者是如何将这个极其复杂的博弈简化为一种美妙的方式。
And it really struck me as a beautiful example of the way that the best investors kind of simplify this extraordinarily complex game.
我只是想知道，您能否谈谈这种简约的理念？因为我们生活在一个如此复杂的世界里，常常感到困惑，能够将这场博弈简化为如此纯粹的本质，似乎成了一种超能力。
And I just wondered if you could talk about this idea of simplicity because we live in such a complicated world and we're also confused so much of the time that it seems like a kind of superpower to be able to reduce the game to this kind of simple essence.
是的。
Yes.
我认为这要追溯到我刚开始投资的时候。
I think it goes back to when I started to invest.
可能是沃伦·巴菲特采用了棒球的类比，并在他的《击球的科学》一书中引用了泰德·威廉姆斯的例子。
Probably it was Warren Buffett that took the baseball analogy and used the example of Ted Williams in his book called Science of Hitting.
他有一种非常系统的方法，根据球在好球区的位置来分析自己的打击率。
He had this very systematic way of analyzing his batting average depending on where the ball was in the strike zone.
因此，我认为他将好球区分成了77个区域，并计算了每个区域的打击率，发现有些区域他的打击率能达到四成，但在其他一些区域，他的打击率只有两成四。
So I think he subdivided the strike zone in 77 baseballs and calculated this batting average for every one of the seven seven zones and discovered that in some zones, he was batting 400, but then some other zones, he was batting two forty.
所以我心想，如果我想保持一个良好的打击率，我认为他确实做到了，因为他的职业生涯打击率是0.344。
So I said, well, if I wanna maintain a good batting average, and I think he did because I think his lifetime batting average is three forty four.
他必须非常有纪律性，并且非常挑剔。
Well, he had to be very disciplined and very selective.
但这种方法的缺点是，当球落在打击率只有0.240的区域时，你必须有足够的纪律性，即使球在好球区也不挥棒。
But the disadvantage of that approach is when the ball is in the area of two forty, you have to be disciplined enough not to swing, even though if it's in the strike zone.
所以当这种情况发生时，就会被判一个好球。
So when that happened, you have a a strike called up against you.
在股票市场中，情况却不是这样。
In the stock market, you don't have that.
你可能会遇到一个正中球板的完美投球，但你有权利选择不挥棒，如果你不想的话。
You can have a perfect ball in the middle of the plate, but you have the luxury of not swinging if you don't want to.
在投资领域，没有好球坏球的判罚。
You don't have any call strikes in the investment world.
沃伦·巴菲特说，这正是投资最美妙的地方。
And Warren Buffett said that's the most beautiful thing about investing.
因此，通过简化事物，我们真正想做的是专注于击球区中那400区域，在那里，如果我们挥棒，极有可能击中球，就是这样。
So by trying to simplify things, what we're trying to do really is to focus on those 400 zone in the strike zone where, you know, odds are very high that that we'll we'll have it hit if we swing and things that's just that.
当你在跟踪或分析一家公司时，越简单，获得良好回报的可能性就越大。
The more simple you get down to it when you follow or analyze a company, I think the odds of having good returns increase.
而且你有等待完美投球的余地。
And you have the luxury of waiting for the the perfect ball.
但当然，如果你从不挥棒，就很难有回报。
But, of course, if you never swing anything, you won't have much return.
所以这相当于持有现金。
So that's the equivalent of being cash.
这就是关键所在。
So that's the trick.
有时你不得不挥棒，即使那些球可能只在208、80或290的区域，而不是完美的球。
You sometimes you have to swing perhaps not perfect balls that are probably in the 208 80 or 290 zone.
有时你必须接受，由于没能等到完美投球，你的平均成功率可能会略低一些。
And sometimes you have to accept that perhaps you'll have a little lower average because you couldn't get a perfect ball.
但我认为，如果你非常有耐心，你的投资生涯中总会遇到绝佳的机会。
But I think if you're very patient, you'll have your chances in your investment career to have great opportunities.
而绝佳的机会，顾名思义，都是简单的。
And great opportunities, by definition, are simple.
我的意思是，我认为我做过的所有出色投资，都是基于非常简单的业务。
I mean, all great investments I think I've done were very simple businesses.
估值合理，而且我知道管理层非常优秀。
The valuation was reasonable, and I knew the manager knows great.
但有时当我涉足更复杂的事情时，结果并没有达到预期。
And sometimes when I get into more complicated things that it didn't turn out as well as expected.
我想你有一个简短的清单。
And you have a short list, I think.
并不是那么短的清单。
Not that short a list.
我记得读到过，你们公司密切跟踪大约三百五十只股票。
I remember reading that your firm tracks about three fifty stocks very closely.
所以你有一份公司名单，你只是在跟踪它们，等待它们变得足够便宜以便买入的那一刻？
So you have this list of companies that you're just kinda tracking and waiting for the moment when they become cheap enough for you to buy?
是的。
Yes.
而且，你提到的那300家、40家或50家公司中，有很多我们只是想密切跟踪。
And also, there's many of those 300 or 40 or 50 that you mentioned that we just wanna follow with them very closely.
也许我们并不完全确定它们是否是优质证券。
And perhaps we're not 100% sure that there are kind of securities.
我们希望确保自己非常了解这些公司，而密切跟踪它们会更容易做到这一点。
We wanna be sure that we understand the companies very well, and it's easier when you follow them very closely.
但在那大约300家公司中，可能有八九十家，甚至一百家，真正决定因素只是价格。
But out of those 300 or so, there's probably eighty and ninety or perhaps a 100 companies that really it depends just on the price.
如果价格足够低，或者估值足够合理，我们就会投资。
If the price was low enough or the valuation was reasonable enough, we would invest.
是的。
Yes.
让我感到好奇的是，回到你之前谈到的ART，从某种意义上说，这是很难评估任何东西内在价值的领域。
It's curious to me, going back to what you were talking about with ART, that in a sense, this is one area where it's very hard to assess the intrinsic value of anything.
这看起来有些武断。
It seems somewhat arbitrary.
你和你所关注的股票不同，股票你可以评估一家企业的内在价值。
You're unlike the stocks that you're looking at, where you can assess the intrinsic value of a business.
而你所收购的艺术品，很多都是当代艺术。
With the art that you're acquiring, a lot of it is actually contemporary art.
它们不是那些已经经受住三百年或四百年时间考验的古典大师作品。
It's not past masters where you know from old masters that they've survived the test of time of three hundred or four hundred years.
这几乎像是你以风险投资家的方式在对待艺术，正如你上次和我谈到的那样，你希望收购那些二十年后会被认为重要的艺术品。
It almost seems like you're approaching art as a venture capitalist, where, as you described it to me last time we spoke, looking to acquire artworks that will be considered important in twenty years.
抱歉，我刚才向你提了一些不成熟的想法，但你能谈谈这方面吗？
I'm sorry I had a lot of a lot of half baked thoughts here to you, but can you talk a little bit about that?
是的。
Yes.
我相信我对艺术有着类似的方法。
I believe I have a similar approach to art.
我不认为自己在艺术领域是个风险投资家。
I don't think I'm a venture capitalist in art.
有些是的，没错。
Some some, yes.
有些年轻艺术家，我会购买他们的作品，因为我觉得他们非常有趣。
Some young artists, I'll purchase that work because I think they're very interesting.
我相信他们有着光明的未来。
I believe they got a great future.
但我购买的大部分艺术品都来自我认为可能错了、但我相信他们已经很重要的艺术家。
But most of the artworks I purchased are from artists that I believe I may be wrong, but I believe that they already are important.
他们已经被各大博物馆认可，并拥有独特而鲜明的声音。
They already are great museums and have a singular and unique voice.
我很有把握，在五十年、六十年后，当我们想回顾这个时代最重要的艺术家时，我们会选择这些艺术家。
And I'm pretty sure that in fifty, sixty years, when we wanna, you know, look at what are the most important artists of our time, we'll select those artists.
我的意思是，比如詹姆斯·多雷尔或比尔·维奥拉，两位伟大的美国艺术家，他们对普通公众来说并不那么出名。
I mean, for instance, I think James Dorel or Bill Viola, two great American artists, they're not that well known for the general public.
但我想，任何博物馆馆长都不会否认他们是重要的艺术家，一位在光影艺术领域，另一位在视频艺术领域。
But I mean, I don't think any museum's director would argue that their important artists, one in the light art and the other in the video art.
而且我认为，任何博物馆馆长都不会否认，五十年后，他们会被称为重要的艺术家。
And I don't think any museum director would argue that in fifty years, they'll be considered important.
也许他们太当代了，不像毕加索或波洛克那样为大众所熟知。
Perhaps they're a little too contemporary to be known for the general public as Pablo Picasso or Jackson Pollock.
但我认为，二三十年后，甚至四十年后，他们会被认为与那些伟大艺术家同等重要。
But I think in twenty, thirty, forty years, they'll be considered probably close to be as important as those great artists.
弗朗索瓦，多年来你显然结识了一些非凡的人物，无论是投资界还是艺术界。
You've obviously met some extraordinary people over the years, Francois, both in the investing world and in the art world.
我想问问你关于其中几位的情况。
I wanted to ask you about a couple of them.
我的意思是，你当然也去见过彼得·林奇，我很想听听你的经历。
I mean, obviously you went also to meet Peter Lynch, so I'd love to hear about that.
但还有卢·辛普森，他今年早些时候去世了，显然是你生命中一个重要的人物。
But also Lou Simpson, who died earlier this year, was obviously an important force in your life.
你还提到过认识科蒂奥·塞皮·潘扎·德·迪比奥莫，我肯定把他的名字念错了，你称他为历史上最伟大的当代艺术收藏家，我想你是在2009年在意大利认识他的。
And you've also described meeting Countio Seppi Panza de DiBiomo, whose name I'm definitely mispronouncing, who you've described as the greatest collector of contemporary art in history, who I think you met back in 2009 in Italy.
你能谈谈这两个人——卢·辛普森和这位伯爵吗？我认为他们显然对你和你看待世界的方式产生了重大影响。
Could you talk about a couple of those people, Lou Simpson and this count, who I think clearly have had a big effect on you and your way of seeing the world.
哦，是的。
Oh, yes.
彼得·林奇是我最早读到的基金经理，此后一直是我效仿的榜样。
Well, Peter Lynch was the first money manager I read about and has been the model since then.
当然，他的投资非常分散。
Of course, he was very diversified.
想想他管理富达麦哲伦基金时，我记得他持有了五到六百只股票。
Think when he managed Magellan Fund, I think he owned 500 or 600 names.
这和我的做法有点不同，但他做得非常非常出色。
So it was a little different than my approach, but he did very, very well.
他对于发现伟大的公司、正处于高速增长前夜的年轻公司，有着非凡的热情。
And he really had incredible passion for finding great companies, young companies that were on the verge of having great years of growth.
至于卢克，他是那种只持有极少证券的伟大投资者之一，大概只有十到十二只左右。
And as for Luke, well, Luke is one well, was one of those great investors that own very few securities, probably 10 or 12 or something like that.
我总是钦佩他如何用一两句话就概括出一家企业的优势。
And I always admire how he could summarize in one or two sentences the strength of a business.
我记得正是因为他才投资了嘉信理财。
And I remember it was because of him who invested in Schwab.
他将嘉信理财公司与GEICO进行比较。
And he compared Charles Schwab company to GEICO.
他基本上认为，就像GEICO一样，嘉信理财对所有大型竞争对手都拥有结构性优势。
And basically saying that like GEICO, Schwab had a structural advantage to all those big competitors.
因此，他深刻理解自己所投资的公司，并非常钦佩他。
So he understood very, very profoundly the company he's invested in and admired him a lot.
他有许多值得传授的教训。
And he had lots of lessons to teach.
正如你所说，令人难过的是，他在年初去世了。
And like you say, very sadly, he passed away at the beginning of the year.
至于康潘扎，是的，我是在2009年认识他的。
As for the Kang Panza, yes, I met him in 2009.
那大概是他去世前六个月。
That was probably six months before he passed away.
那可能是我生命中最重要的时刻之一，因为我遇到了——正如我所说，我认为有史以来最伟大的当代艺术收藏家。
And that was probably one of the most important meanings of my life because I met, like I said, I think the greatest contemporary art collector of all time.
你知道，他并没有像今天一些亿万富翁那样可以随意购买任何东西的资源，这对他们来说是好事。
You know, he didn't have the resources of some billionaires today that can purchase almost anything they like, and it's good for them.
但他资源有限。
But, he had limited resources.
因此他非常非常挑剔，只能购买那些尚未广为人知的艺术家的作品。
So he was very, very selective that could only purchase artists that were not yet very well known.
他审视了每一件作品。
And he looked at everything.
我的意思是，他几乎认识20世纪50年代、60年代、70年代和80年代所有重要的前卫艺术家。
I mean, he knew almost all great artists or all important artists at the Avant Garde in the 1950s, sixties, seventies, eighties.
正如我所描述的，他的方法是大量观察众多艺术家，就像大量筛选牡蛎，寻找那些稀有的珍珠。
And exactly as I described, he had the approach of looking at many, many, many artists, like if you're printing a lot of oysters and identify the great ones, finding those rare pearls.
我认为他当时在这方面非常出色，因为他充满热情，并且精通艺术史。
And I think he was great at it then because he was so passionate, because he knew all the history of art.
我的意思是，在他家里，他收藏了所有关于艺术史的书籍，大概从意大利文艺复兴时期开始。
I mean, in his house, he had all the books on the history of art starting probably with the Italian Renaissance.
所以他知识渊博。
So he was knowledgeable.
他为人谦逊。
He was humble.
他充满好奇，凡能接触到的任何东西他都阅读。
He was curious, and he read everything he could find on anything.
这就是为什么他如此了不起。
And that's why it was so great.
我认为他当时已经成功地完成了传承，如今由后人接手了。
I think he had, I don't know, today, the succession has managed it.
但我想在某个时候，他可能收藏了大约2500件艺术品。
But I think at some point, he had probably 2,500 works of art.
其中大部分都是重要的作品。
Most of them important works of art.
所以我认为，现在许多作品都进入了博物馆，但他在早期曾购入过特鲁迪·罗伯特·莱默的作品，而唐纳德·贾德那时还完全不为人所知。
So it was I think and now that many of them are in museums, but I think he had something like Trudy Robert Reimer that he had purchased in the early years or Donald Judd was not known at all.
因此，我会说他是一位极出色的艺术品鉴赏家，可能是有史以来最伟大的一位。
So I would say he was a great art picker, probably the greatest of all time.
所以某种程度上，你所钦佩的这些人身上都有一个共同点，我也在自己的方式中看到了这一点——无论是面对杰出的艺术品还是优秀的企业，都极度挑剔，痴迷地学习，热情地钻研这个领域，广泛接触公司和艺术家，然后极其严格地筛选出高质量的对象。
So in a way, there's a common denominator with these people that you admire that I also see in in your own approach of this extreme selectivity, whether it's with great art or great businesses, obsessively learning, passionately learning about the subject, seeing companies, a lot of artists, and then being extremely selective in going after quality.
这个结论公平吗？
Is that a fair conclusion?
是的。
Yes.
因为所谓卓越的东西，定义上就是稀少的。
Because what is exceptional, by definition, is rare.
所以如果你想找到它们，就必须翻动很多石头。
So if you wanna find them, you have to lift a lot of rocks.
你得去寻找它们。
You have to look for it.
如果你不是发自内心地热爱，就无法拥有四处搜寻所需的毅力和坚持。
And if it's not something you enjoy with passion, you won't have the perseverance, the persistence necessary to look everywhere.
但当你热爱时，这就像是看棒球比赛。
But when you enjoy it, it's like watching baseball games.
如果你喜欢棒球，每天看两三场，这根本不算工作。
If you enjoy baseball and you're watching two or three baseball games a day, it's not work.
你乐在其中。
You enjoy it.
久而久之，你大概会认识所有伟大的球员，并能判断出如果你是球队经理，会选谁加入你的队伍。
And after a while, you probably all know all the great players, and you can identify which one you would put on your team if you're a team manager.
所以
So
昨晚我在想这件事，弗朗索瓦，因为我知道，我可能一直工作到午夜左右，读了你一封又一封的信，然后今天早上我早早起床，继续看下去。
I was thinking about this last night, Francois, because I, you know, I probably worked till about midnight or thereabouts, you know, reading your, you know, letter after letter of yours, and then I get up early this morning and then keep going with it.
但对我来说，这并不像工作。
And I don't know, it didn't seem to me like work.
这很有趣。
It's interesting.
真的很有吸引力。
It's really engaging.
我看着这些东西，心想：哦，原来他是这么思考的。
I'm looking at this stuff and I'm like, Oh, that's how he thinks.
这就是他所领悟到的。
That's what he's figured out.
而要真正觉得这些内容本身有趣，其实是很难假装的。
And it's very hard to fake that, actually finding it inherently interesting.
我做这项研究的快乐，不亚于看奈飞。
I'm as happy to do that research as I would be to watch Netflix.
你明白我的意思吗？
You know what I mean?
那种感觉，我觉得这贯穿于每一个职业，我想芒格也谈过这个。
That that kinda that feeling I I think this runs through every profession where I think you kinda Munger talks about this.
对吧？
Right?
你必须找到一件事，让它根本不像工作。
That you have to find something where it doesn't really feel like work.
没错。
Yeah.
你必须享受它，并对它充满热情。
You have to enjoy it and have a passion for it.
我认为你还要理解你所研究的任何领域的本质。
And I think you wanna understand also the fundamental nature of any field that you study.
所有领域，无论是哲学、心理学、艺术还是科学，都是复杂的领域。
And all the fields, either being philosophy or psychology or the arts or the sciences, they're complex fields.
它们有很多层次。
There's many layers.
但如果你喜欢它们，喜欢阅读相关内容，你会慢慢学到东西。
But if you enjoy them and you enjoy reading about them, slowly you'll learn.
这就像一种渗透的过程。
It's like kind of an osmosis process.
所以它会非常缓慢地融入你的血液中。
So very slowly it goes into your blood.
我认为这就是你产生热情的方式。
And I think that's how you get passionate.
然后这种热情会转化为具体的东西。
Then this passion is transformed into something concrete.
你可以用这种兴趣做一些有建设性的事情，比如建立艺术收藏品或证券组合。
You can do something constructive with that interest, like building an art collection or a portfolio of securities.
我记得莫尼什·帕布雷，他在某种程度上对科学、工程等领域有着类似的倾向。
I remember Monish Pabrai, who, I guess, in some ways had a similar kind of predilection for science and engineering and the like.
我想他学过电子工程。
I think he'd studied electronic engineering.
他曾对我说，当他开始研究巴菲特时，他意识到巴菲特已经揭示了投资的规律，这些规律和物理定律一样不可改变。
Once said to me that when he started to study Buffett, he realized that Buffett had kind of revealed the laws of investing and that they were as immutable as the laws of physics.
我不禁想，当你作为一名具有科学背景、工程背景、热爱物理学的人研究投资时，是否也有同样的感觉——你仿佛在破解密码，发现了那些几乎永恒不变的投资规律？
And I was wondering if you had that same sense as you were studying investing as someone who came from a scientific background, an engineering background, loved physics, did you have a sense that you were kind of cracking the code, that you were discovering these kind of laws of investing that are kind of immutable almost?
是的。
Yes.
当我刚开始时，我非常热情。
When I started, I was very enthusiastic.
我记得当我读到沃伦·巴菲特的信件时。
I remember when I read Warren Buffett's letters.
我真的觉得自己理解了一些很多人并不理解的东西。
I really felt like I understood something that many people don't understand.
我总是不明白，为什么这么多人不理解股权投资的基本原理。
And it always eludes me why many people don't really understand the fundamentals of equity investing.
我总是很好奇，为什么有人会因为投资组合下跌了25%，就担心它还会再跌10%而选择抛售。
It always intrigues me why someone would sell his portfolio because it's down 25% and he fears that it will go down another 10%.
于是他卖出，希望以后再买回来。
So he sells and hopes to buy later.
我不理解这种做法。
I don't understand that.
我的意思是，这说不通。
I mean, I don't think it makes sense.
唯一的解释是，他们让恐惧和情绪压倒了本应具备的理性。
The only explanation is that thing they let their fears and emotions get the better of the rationality that probably they do possess.
因此，投资成功的一部分，不仅在于理解这些原则，更在于拥有正确的行为。
So probably one part of the investment success is not only knowing about the principles, but having the right behavior.
每个人都会有情绪。
Everyone has emotions.
但我觉得在采取行动时，你必须保持理性。
But I think you have to be rational when you decide to take actions.
情绪是一回事，行动是另一回事。
Emotions is one thing and action's another thing.
所以你不应该凭情绪行事。
So you shouldn't act on emotions.
你始终应该基于理性和逻辑采取行动。
You always should act on reason and rationality.
我认为这正是沃伦·巴菲特反复强调的正确行为。
And I think that's the right behavior that Warren Buffett has explained, you know, over and over.
我参加年度股东大会已经二十多年了。
I've been going to the annual meeting for, I don't know, twenty three years.
每年他都会强调，面对市场波动时保持正确态度的重要性。
Every year, he explained the importance of having the the right attitude toward market fluctuations.
但这很难，因为人都是有情感的。
But it's hard because people are emotional.
有时，即使他们理解了买入并持有的概念——不应该在市场下跌时卖出，
And sometimes they even though they understand the concept of, you know, buy and hold, you should not sell in downturn.
但有些人就是很难抵抗那种害怕亏损的恐惧感。
Some people, it's just very hard to resist the fear that they have to to they could lose money.
我认为在你的书中，你提到了我的‘部落基因’理论。
And I think in your book, you talked about the my theory of the tribal gene.
是的。
Yeah.
我很喜欢这个观点。
I love that idea.
你能解释一下吗？
Can you explain it?
我觉得这是一个非常美妙的洞见。
I thought it was such a beautiful insight.
我的想法是，作为人类，我们拥有一个基因，这个基因经过数千年传承，我称之为‘部落基因’——当部落朝某个方向移动时，我们会有一种跟随部落的冲动，因为这能带来安全感。
My idea is that as human beings, we have this gene that, you know, has been passed on over thousands and thousands of years that I call it the tribal gene, that when the tribe is running one way, we have the urge of following the tribe just because it's for our own security.
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