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你正在收听TIP。
You're listening to TIP.
你好。
Hi there.
我非常高兴向大家介绍投资界的传奇人物乔尔·蒂林哈斯特,他是今天播客节目的嘉宾。
I'm really happy to introduce the legendary Joel Tillinghast, who's our guest on today's episode of the podcast.
乔尔是投资界无可争议的巨擘之一。
Joel is one of the undisputed giants of the investing world.
彼得·林奇在20世纪80年代聘请他加入富达公司,曾形容乔尔是有史以来最伟大、最成功的股票选股人之一。
Peter Lynch, who hired him at Fidelity in the nineteen eighties, has described Joel as one of the greatest, most successful stock pickers of all time.
乔尔自1989年起开始管理富达的低价股基金,并一直管理至今。
Joel became the manager of Fidelity's low priced stock fund back in 1989, and he still manages it to this day.
在33年的时间里,他取得了非凡的业绩,每年跑赢基准指数约3.7个百分点。
Over thirty three years, he's racked up a spectacular record, beating his benchmark index by about 3.7 percentage points a year.
正如你所知,几十年来能以如此大的优势持续跑赢市场极为罕见。
As I'm sure you know, it's extremely rare to beat the market by such a wide margin over decades.
但当你管理像乔尔这样巨额的资金时,要跑赢市场就更加困难了,他管理的资产规模大约有700亿美元。
But it's even harder to outperform when you manage an enormous amount of money like Joel, who has something like $70,000,000,000 of assets under management.
他持有的投资组合也是我采访过的所有伟大投资者中最分散的。
He also has the most diversified portfolio of any great investor I've ever interviewed.
他目前持有大约880只股票,而大多数顶尖投资者通常只集中投资于少数几只股票。
He currently owns about eight eighty stocks, whereas most of the best investors tend to be relatively concentrated in a small number of stocks.
因此,从多个方面来看,他都是一个彻底的异类。
So in multiple ways, he's a total outlier.
彼得·林奇曾表示,他惊叹于乔尔近乎超凡的能力——能够同时消化海量的关于数百家公司的信息,进行分析、提炼,并利用这些信息找到长期赢家,同时避开许多失败的投资。
Peter Lynch has said that he's amazed by Joel's almost unworldly ability to consume mountains of information about hundreds of companies at a time, analyze it, distill it, and use it to find long term winners while avoiding many of the losers.
我认为林奇在这里触及了一个非常重要的观点。
I think Lynch is onto something really important here.
这不仅仅是乔尔擅长挑选赢家,比如 Monster Beverage,这只股票在他二十年前买入后上涨了千倍以上。
It's not just that Joel is great at picking winners like Monster Beverage, which has gone up more than a thousandfold since he bought it two decades ago.
更重要的是,他也非常擅长避开输家。
It's that he's also great at avoiding losers.
当我为我的书《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》采访乔尔时,他列出了一系列帮助他避免在股票上亏钱的规则。
When I interviewed Joel for my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier, he listed an array of rules that help him to avoid losing money on stocks.
例如,他告诉我:不要支付过高的价格。
For example, he told me, don't pay too much.
不要与骗子和傻瓜一起投资。
Don't invest with crooks and idiots.
不要投资你不懂的东西。
Don't invest in things you don't understand.
他还警告说,不要投资那些周期性极强、负债沉重、追逐潮流或使用激进会计手段的公司。
He also warned against investing in companies that are deeply cyclical or heavily indebted or faddish or businesses that use aggressive accounting.
这些都是用血泪换来的投资智慧,我认为我们都应该铭记在心。
This is hard earned investment wisdom that I think all of us should take to heart.
在今天的对话中,乔尔分享了许多其他宝贵的建议,我希望这些能帮助你在未来多年中生存并繁荣。
In today's conversation, Joel shares a lot of other valuable advice that I hope will help you to survive and prosper for many years to come.
非常感谢你的参与。
Thanks a lot for joining us.
您正在收听《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》播客,主持人威廉·格林将采访世界上最伟大的投资者,探讨如何在市场和生活中取得成功。
You're listening to the richer, wiser, happier podcast where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
大家好。
Hi, folks.
我非常高兴今天能与嘉宾乔尔·蒂林哈斯特在一起。
I'm really delighted to be here with today's guest who's Joel Tillinghast.
自1989年以来,乔尔作为富达基金的基金经理,长期跑赢市场,堪称我们这个时代最伟大的长期投资者之一。
Joel has beaten the market by an enormous margin as a fund manager at Fidelity since 1989, and is really one of the great long term investors of our time.
很高兴见到你,乔尔。
So it's great to see you, Joel.
非常感谢你来到这里与我们交流。
Thank you so much for being here with us.
乔尔,谢谢你。
Joel Thank you.
我想我们可以从谈谈你早期的投资经历开始,也就是你非常早期的投资经历。
I wondered if we could start with talking a little bit about your early experiences, your really very early experiences as an investor.
我记得你曾经告诉我,你大约八九岁时就开始阅读《价值线》这类出版物,而且在1968年,也就是我出生的那年,你大约十岁时就买了第一只股票。
Because I remember you telling me once that you started reading publications like Value Line back when you were about eight or nine, and I think bought your first stock when you were about 10 back in 1968, which is the year I was born actually.
我想了解一下,你是如何在这么小的年纪就对投资产生兴趣的。
I wanted to get a sense of how you came to be interested in investing at such a precocious age.
我母亲订阅了一份名为《价值线投资调查》的出版物。
My mother subscribed to a publication called the Value Line Investment Survey.
我的祖父去世后留下了一些股票,他们想确保自己对这些股票的处理是正确的。
And my grandfather had passed away and had left a few stocks and they wanted to make sure that they were doing the right thing with them.
尽管他们也认为祖父做出了很多明智的决策,并且一直持有这些股票,但他们还是想确认自己持有的是正确的股票,并跟踪它们。《价值线》是他们订阅的刊物之一,它采用13周为一个周期,经常会提供限时优惠订阅——以更低的价格获得大约13周的内容。他们每隔两年左右就会再订一次这种优惠订阅,因为他们喜欢省钱,而且交易也不频繁。但我对这些刊物感到好奇,因为他们对此很感兴趣。
Although they also concluded that grandpa had made a lot of good decisions and just stuck with them, but they wanted to be sure that they were holding the right stocks and to track them and Valuline was one thing that they subscribed and Valuline runs on a thirteen week cycle and they would offer these teaser subscriptions where for a cheaper price you would get about thirteen weeks for a reduced price and they would get those and every two years or so they get another teaser subscription because they like to save money and weren't trading that much, but I was curious about them because they were interested in them.
里面有很多数字,而小时候我对数字着迷,喜欢计算一些东西,比如如果你把1、2、3、4、5、6、7、8、9分别乘以8,就会得到类似9、8、7、6、5、4、3、2、1的结果。
There were lots of numbers and as a kid, I was fascinated with numbers and enjoyed working out things that like, if you divide or if you multiply one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine by eight, you get something like nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, two, one.
虽然不完全精确,但我确实喜欢数字,里面有很多数字,我试图理解这些数字的含义,喜欢看到增长趋势。有一家公司叫贝克曼仪器公司,它的收益增长非常强劲,而我父亲是一位生物学家。
Not very precisely, but yeah, I liked numbers and there were lots of them and tried to understand what the numbers went and liked seeing growth progressions and a company called Beckman instruments had very strong earnings progression and my dad was a biologist.
他对一种实验室设备感到兴奋,这种设备能让他用色谱法进行测试,通过滴落蛋白质来判断其中的成分,并且速度要快得多。
He was excited about a piece of lab equipment that allowed him to do tests with chromatography where you drip the proteins out and you can tell what's in there and did it with much greater speed.
阿诺德·贝克曼是这家公司的创始人,堪称科技天才,深受生物学家和医疗界人士的喜爱,因为这些仪器真正节省了时间,让他们得以完成以前无法做到的事情。
Arnold Beckman who had founded the company is sort of a tech genius, beloved of biologists and healthcare people because these instruments really did save time and allowed them to do things that they weren't able to do before.
所以,我最早购买的两只股票之一,除了中央缅因电力公司,还有两股贝克曼仪器公司的股票。
So one of my first two purchases along with Central Maine Power was two shares of Eckman instruments.
那你哪来的钱买呢?
And how did you come up with the money for it?
我靠挨家挨户卖蔬菜、割草和收到的礼物攒了钱。
I had saved money from selling vegetables door to door, mowing lawns, gifts.
是的。
Yeah.
这两股贝克曼仪器公司的股票总共花了我大约104美元。
That was about a $104 for the two shares of Beckman instruments.
佣金高得离谱。
The commissions were huge.
但是
But
那结果怎么样?
And how did it turn out?
在接下来的四五年里,情况并不好。
Over the next four or five years, not very well.
公司的收益持续增长。
The earnings of the company kept going up.
最初的市盈率大约是40,后来不断压缩,持续下降。
The starting PE had been something like 40 and that compressed and kept falling and kept falling.
所以到1974年中期,市盈率可能已经降至大约8。
So by mid, by 1974, it was probably down to about an eight PE.
所以这有点令人失望,虽然从市场相对角度看可能还行,但以绝对美元计算非常令人失望,但我一直持有,而收益持续增长,实际上以两位数的速率增长,因为贝克曼不断推出更创新的仪器,销售良好,表现一直不错,直到被制药公司史密斯克莱恩收购,该公司与比彻姆合并,后来他们决定制药公司确实不该涉足医疗仪器研发业务。
So it was kind of disappointing, although market relative, it probably was all right, but absolute dollars it was very disappointing, but I held onto it and the earnings kept growing, and in fact they kept growing at a double digit rate because Beckman kept turning out more innovative instruments that sold well and they kept doing well until they got bought by a drug company, Smith Klein, which merged with Beecham and they later decide that drug companies really shouldn't be in the healthcare instrument research business.
于是他们又将其分拆出来。
And they spun it back out.
所以当他们最终被收购时,我获得了一些后来成为葛兰素史克的股份,同时也获得了一些贝克曼仪器的股份,这些股份后来被丹纳赫收购,但我仍然持有葛兰素史克的股份,每季度的股息大约是当初股票购买价格的两到三倍。
So I got some of what eventually became GlaxoSmithKline when they bought it out, but also some Beckman instruments, which later got bought out by Danaher, but they still have the KlaxoSmithKline shares and the dividends every quarter or something like two or three times the initial purchase price of the stock.
所以
So
我想上次我跟你谈话时,你提到仅靠葛兰素史克这一只股票,收益就已经达到了原始价格的百倍,而且还获得了分拆出来的艾尔建和丹纳赫等其他公司的股票。
I think last time I spoke to you, you had made something like a 100 times the original price just off the Glaxo, and then you'd got the spinoffs to Allergan and Danaher and all of these other things.
最让我感到不可思议的是,我原本打算在我的书《理查德·怀斯曼更快乐》中写这一部分,但最终我转向了你故事的其他方面。
And what strikes me as absolutely amazing, and I was going to write about it in my book, Richard Wiser Happier, and then I ended up focusing on a different part of your story.
但你从10岁起买入的第一只股票,至今已经持有54年了,这简直太不可思议了。
But it's an absolutely extraordinary thing that you've basically owned the first stock that you bought at the age of 10 for now fifty four years?
这太惊人了。
That's astounding.
是的。
Yep.
所以我想,经过这么长时间,这只股票现在每个季度给我的股息应该能达到我成本的三倍。
So I guess after all that time, it should be giving me dividends of three times my cost basis every quarter.
但这让我们感受到你有多么超乎寻常的耐心。
But it gives us sense of just how preternaturally patient you are.
我的意思是,这其实有一种美妙之处,因为你显然非常爱戴你的父亲,他对你来说就像一位英雄。
I mean, there's something kind of beautiful about it because obviously you also really adored your father and he was a kind of hero to you.
因此你受到了他的启发。
And so you were inspired by him.
你最初挑选的股票在某种程度上受到父亲身为生物学家的影响,这一点非常美好。
There's something kind of wonderful about the fact that your first stock pick was in some way inspired by the fact that your father was a biologist.
所以,从某种意义上说,这属于家庭的能力圈,即使当时还不属于你自己的能力圈。
So in a way it was within the family's circle of competence, even if not within your circle of competence.
某种程度上,这次最初的股票购买行为揭示了你的个性、家庭背景以及你非凡的耐心。
And in a way, there's something about this original stock purchase that is kind of revealing about who you are and your family background, your incredible patience.
但我也认为,它体现了你后来内化的一些关于投资的深刻见解。
But also I think it illustrates some really interesting ideas about investing that you would later internalize.
举个例子,即使你买了一家伟大的公司,如果买价过高,那也是一个巨大的错误。
I mean, for one thing, this idea that even if you buy a great company, if you overpay for it, it's a huge mistake.
这么说公平吗:这是这次早期投资所带来的重要教训之一?
Is that fair to say that that's one of the great lessons of this early investment?
加文,是的。
Gavin Yeah.
我想,如果你回头看像亚马逊这样最伟大的公司,你支付的价格其实并不重要;但对于像贝克曼仪器这样非常优秀但并非完美的公司来说,价格确实相当重要,因为市场会放缓,创新公司会失去优势,情况会变化,因此避免高价买入至关重要。
I guess if you have the greatest companies like Amazon looking backwards, it's not really mattered what price you paid, but for really quite excellent, but human companies like Beckman instruments, yeah, the price matters a fair bit because markets slow, innovative companies lose their edge, things change, and so not overpaying is really important.
但我觉得自己很幸运,买了贝克曼仪器这样一家极其出色的公司,而中央缅因电力公司就没那么幸运了,它虽然支付股息,但并没有给我带来多少收益。
But I guess I lucked out in having a really superb company with Beckman instruments, and not so much with Central Maine Power, which paid a dividend, but really didn't do a whole lot for me.
我记得你提到过,你最早购买的另一家公司是阿姆斯特朗橡胶公司。
I remember you saying that another of those very early companies you bought was Armstrong Rubber.
你还告诉我,每季度能收到4美元的股息,这正好和你割草坪赚的钱一样多。
And you telling me that there was this kind of miracle that you would get a $4 dividend for it quarterly, which was exactly the same amount you got for mowing lawns.
我只是想知道,投资是否有一种美感——即仅仅通过动脑筋、做出明智的决策,你就能赚钱,而无需像在院子里割草,或从父母的菜园里采摘番茄、西葫芦那样付出繁重的体力劳动?
And I was just wondering, was there a kind of beauty to investing to this idea that just by using your mind and placing these intelligent bets, you could make money without actually having to do any very vigorous work in a yard or harvesting tomatoes and and zucchini and the like from your parents' garden?
这对我来说简直太神奇了。
It was sort of amazing to me.
显然,在三个月里,我能割的草坪数量远多于阿姆斯特朗橡胶公司给我带来的股息支票。
Obviously, in three months, I could do a lot more lawns than dividend checks from Armstrong rubber.
但确实,看到不用身体劳作就能赚钱,这让我觉得非常神奇。
But, yeah, it was kind of amazing to see that you could earn money without having to physically exert yourself.
当我想到贝克曼仪器公司时,还有一件有趣的事,这在某种程度上印证了你的同事威尔·达诺夫在我书中向我提出的观点:股票跟随收益走,如果一家公司的收益强劲增长,股价最终往往会反映这一点,尽管你不想支付过高的价格。
There's also an interesting thing when I think about Beckman instruments, that in some ways it illustrates your colleague Will Danoff's point to me in my book, which is that stocks follow earnings, that eventually if a company's earnings grow very strongly, that's likely to be reflected by the stock price, albeit you don't want to overpay.
你和威尔之间是不是有什么不同呢?
Is there something I mean, in some ways there's a difference between you and Will, right?
你更注重估值。
You're more valuation conscious.
你能谈谈这家公司如何体现你和威尔之间的这种根本差异吗?威尔在某种程度上是你这一代另一位伟大的富达投资大师,他一直陪伴着这一切。
Can you talk a bit about how this company maybe illustrates that fundamental difference between you and Will, who in some ways is the other great thirty:fifty fidelity investor of your generation who's been there for all of this time?
是的。
Yeah.
价值是从此刻起至永恒的股息的现值;回顾过去,除非你的股息折现率非常高,否则贝克曼仪器公司实际支付的股息表明,即使在40倍市盈率下,它也相当被低估,但这种股票非常罕见。
Value is the present value of dividends from here to eternity and retrospectively, unless you had a very high dividend discount rate, the realized dividends on Pacman instruments have said it was really pretty undervalued even at 40 times earnings, but that's a rare stock.
我认为市场上存在巨大的利益群体。
And I think there are big constituencies in the market.
你可以将市场建模为拥有三到四种不同类型的参与者。
You can model the market as having three or four different types of agents.
一种参与者说:给我一些现在正以非常明显且公开的方式变得更好的东西。
One agent says, give me something that's getting much better right now in a very visible and public way.
所以没人会说它任何坏话。
So nobody's going to say anything bad about it.
威尔擅长这个,而我对此一窍不通。
Will is good at this, I'm terrible at that.
第二类参与者会问:你怎么才能战胜市场?
The second set of agents says, how can you beat the market?
通过拥有那些未来盈利增长以及整体业务扩张速度远超市场预期、且前景更清晰的公司,你就能战胜市场。
It's by having companies that grow earnings and probably the rest of their business at above average rates further into the future than people are imagining with higher visibility than people think.
我认为这之所以有效,是因为人们的注意力分散,容易被眼前发生的事情分散注意力,惊叹于‘它变得越来越好’。
And I think that this works because people's attentions are scattered and they're distracted by what's happening now and wow, it's getting so much better.
但我认为威尔的卓越之处在于,他思考的是:这个业务在五到十年后会不会变得大得多?
But I think what Will is fantastic at is thinking about will this business be much, much bigger five or ten years from now?
这是同类中最好的吗?
And is it the best in class?
他不希望在任何价格倍数较低的领域中排名第三。
He doesn't want to have the number three in anything that's a cheaper multiple.
他想要的是同类中最好的。
He wants the best in class.
他想要的是那个能让你自信谈论其五年或十年后前景的商业赢家。
He wants the business winner where you can confidently talk about where they'll be in five years or ten years.
这需要巨大的进入壁垒。
It takes big barriers to entry.
这需要领域专业知识。
It takes domain expertise.
一位专注而卓越的领导者,有时威尔会对此着迷,并将其视为与亿万富翁的赌注。
A focused and brilliant leader, sometimes Will gets obsessive about this and, pushes it as bet with billionaires.
威尔,杰夫·贝佐斯会做出正确的决定吗?
Will Jeff Bezos make the right decision?
嗯,历史记录表明是的。
Well, the track record says yes.
马克·扎克伯格呢?
Will Mark Zuckerberg?
嗯,历史记录总体是积极的,但我有一些担忧,但这也是你需要评估的一部分。
Well, the track record is mostly positive, but I have my concerns, but that's part of what you're evaluating.
所以某种程度上,我认为,当我观察你和威尔·丹霍夫之间的差异时,你们俩都找到了适合自身性格的投资方式。
So in a way, part of the moral, I think, when I look at the differences between you and Will Danhoff is that you've both found ways to invest that suit your personality.
我记得你曾经告诉我,威尔非常擅长建立关系,并且在判断人方面非常有直觉,比如很早就判断出杰夫·贝佐斯的潜力,或者在与埃隆·马斯克初次见面时,就敏锐地察觉到马斯克在特斯拉所做的事非同寻常,并早早投资了特斯拉。
So I remember you saying, for example, once to me that Will is great at building these relationships and is very intuitive at judging people like Jeff Bezos, or he incredibly early in meeting Elon Musk and seeing that there was something special about Musk that Musk was doing at Tesla and made a very early investment in Tesla.
这样说公平吗:成为一名非常成功的投资者,关键之一在于了解自己的能力和性格,明白自己擅长什么。
Is that fair to say that in some way, part of the key to being a very successful investor is to understand your own abilities and temperament, what you are strong at.
所以你们在玩完全不同的游戏。
So you're playing a very different game.
你们仍然利用股价最终会跟随收益这一事实,但你们更偏向价值投资。
You're still exploiting the fact that the stock price eventually will follow the earnings, but you're much more value oriented.
你比Will更保守。
You're much more defensive than will.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为股价最终会跟随盈利。
I think stocks will follow earnings.
我对人们预测未来太远的能力持怀疑态度。
I'm skeptical of people's ability to look too far out into the future.
凯西·伍德,你是喜欢她还是讨厌她?
Kathy Wood, do you love her or do you hate her?
我钦佩的是,她试图展望遥远的未来,而我认为很少有人这么做,但她同时也在变化最快、路径依赖最强、历史经验最少的领域中进行探索。
What I admire is she is trying to look into the distant future, which I think not enough people do, but she's also trying to do it in the area where things change the fastest, things are the most path dependent, and there's little history to tell you what to do.
如果你为她辩护,说她可能懂得不多,但她对所讨论行业十年后的走向,了解得远比其他人多。
And if you're defending her and say, she may not know much, but she knows a whole lot more than anybody else about where the industry she's talking about will be in ten years.
我认为Will则是基于我能够信任的原料或假设在做这件事。
And I think Will does that with ingredients or assumptions that I can trust.
他主要看的是业绩记录,因为企业是由人来经营的。
He does look at track record mostly, businesses are run by human beings.
因此,说像埃隆·马斯克或杰夫·贝佐斯这样的管理者非常出色,能让你对未来更有信心,这种信心甚至超过市场。
And so saying this is a really amazing manager in Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos or whoever is, gives you confidence in the outlook and more confidence than the market.
人们很难评估这一点,我认为这正是威尔做得特别出色的地方。
It's hard for people to value that and I think that's part of what Will does so well.
但我现在在这样做时更加谨慎,因为我的一些企业更像大宗商品业务,你无法看得太远。
But I am trying to do that with more caution because some of the businesses that I have are more commodity like, and you can't look so far.
我倾向于避开这些纯大宗商品业务,威尔也是如此,这意味着像能源这样的领域对我们来说比较困难,因为它们对自己的命运掌控有限。
I tend to shy away from those, the super commodity businesses as does Will, which means that something like energy is somewhat tough for us because they don't have as much control over their destiny.
管理者有好有坏,定位也有优有劣,但你很难找到那些能自主设定议程的公司——没有人通过焦点小组说:‘天啊,我们需要亚马逊网络服务’,但现在它却成了亚马逊利润的最大贡献者。
There are better managers, there are worse managers, there are better positioning, there's worse positioning, but you don't have companies able to set their own agenda and it will gravitate to companies that are setting their own agenda where no focus group said, gosh, we need Amazon World Services, but now it's the biggest contributor to profits at Amazon.
我想回到你早期作为投资者的一些经历,因为我知道,你在八九岁的时候就开始研究《价值线》,大学毕业后竟然真的在价值线公司找到了工作。
I wanted to go back to some of your earlier experiences as an investor, because I know amazingly after you had been studying Value Line as a young kid of eight or nine, you ended up getting a job at Value Line later on after college.
我记得你曾经告诉我,你当时年薪一万三千三百美元,在皇后区工作,还赢得了股票投资奖。
I think you told me once that you were paid 13 thirty:thirty thousand dollars a year and worked in Queens and won the stock investing prize.
我在曼哈顿工作,但住在
I worked in Manhattan, but lived
皇后区。
in Queens.
我想知道,你是否从价值线公司那种公式化的投资方法中学到了什么,比如如何应对情绪,或者如何思考价值与增长之间的关系等等。
I was wondering if you learned anything from the value line formulaic approach to investing in terms of how to deal with emotion or just how to think about the relationship between value and growth and the like.
价值线这个名字来源于他们所谓的‘价值线’。
The value line got its name because they have what they call a value line.
他们将收益或现金流乘以平均市盈率,得出股票的公允价值。
They multiply earnings or cash flow times average multiple and say, this is the fair value of the stock.
因此,股票被低估或高估了。
And so it's undervalued or overvalued.
这是一种对价值投资的过度简化版本,但它确实是价值投资。
And it's an oversimplified version of value investing, but it is value investing.
我认为这对我影响很大。
And I think that influenced me a lot.
他们还有一个所谓的及时性评级,主要是判断这是否是一个好的短期交易,或者未来一年内的交易?
And they also have what they call a timeliness rank, which is more a, is this a good short term trade or trade over the next year?
及时性评级涉及许多因素。
And there it's a bunch of things that go into the timeliness rank.
收益增长是否迅速?
Are the earnings rising fast?
股价是否在上涨?
Is the stock price rising?
但回到价值线本身,这其实是威尔的座右铭的再次强调:股票和收益是相伴而行的,或者至少其价值是如此。
But going back to the value line itself, it's a reiteration of Will's mantra, stocks and earnings go together, or at least the value of it does.
最终,增长率、内在价值的增长和股价本身会趋于一致吗?
That there'll eventually be some kind of convergence between the growth rate and the growth in intrinsic value and the and the stock price itself?
是的。
Yeah.
价值线的理念是,如果你使用一个固定的市盈率,当收益上涨50美分时,公允价值就会上涨5美元,这显然过于简化,但方向是正确的。
The idea of value line that if you have a fixed multiple of can and the earnings go up by 50¢, then the fair value is up $5, which is obviously oversimplified, but directionally correct.
然后你在德雷塞尔、伯恩汉、兰伯特公司担任金融期货研究分析师,大约从八十年代初的1982年到1986年,待了四年。
And then you ended up spending about four years as a financial futures research analyst at Drexel, Burnham, Lambert, I think, from the early eighties around 1982 to '86.
在你的书里——这本书非常棒,就放在我身后,叫《大钱,小思考》。
And in your book, which is excellent, which I have behind me, which is big money, think small.
抱歉。
Sorry.
我老是把书名记错。
I keep getting the name wrong.
但这是一本非常有趣的书。
But it's a it's a really interesting book.
我昨天又重读了一遍。
I was rereading it yesterday.
这是一本非常有帮助的书,谢谢你写这本书。
It's it's a very helpful book, so thank you for writing it.
在你的书中,你描述了一段极具启发性的经历:你试图判断是否能预测经济统计数据,并在1983年左右,用保证金交易利率期货进行了早期押注。
In your book, you described this really formative experience of trying to figure out whether you could predict economic statistics and then making an early bet using futures on margin, on interest rates back in, I think, about 1983.
你能谈谈当时发生了什么,以及你从中学到了什么吗?
Can you talk about what happened and what you learned from that?
因为听起来,这段负面经历对你成为什么样的投资者产生了相当大的影响。
Because it sounds like that negative experience also had a pretty big impact on the type of investor you'd become.
是的。
Yeah.
有一部分原因是,那时我还在商学院读书,背负着很多学生贷款,预算很紧,尽管我在工作,但并没有多余的钱用于交易。我在德雷塞尔的工作是担任研究经济学家。
For part of it, I was still that time, I was still in business school and had lots of student loans and a tight budget, even though I was working and so didn't have that money to trade and what my job at Drexel was as a research economist.
我的一部分工作是为客户设计对冲利率风险的套期保值方案,但经纪业务的大部分交易量来自活跃交易者,他们经常围绕经济数据进行交易。
Part of that is putting together hedging packages for customers that wanted to hedge their interest rate risk, but a lot of the volume of a brokerage business was with in active traders, a lot of them traded around the economic statistics.
所以,如果就业数据看起来强劲,他们就会看空债券。
So if employment was looking robust as it may have recently, then they'll say bearish for bonds.
而我的工作是预测:生产者价格会上涨0.2%还是0.4%?
And my job was to forecast, will producer prices be up 0.2% or 0.4%?
这其中有一些技巧,因为有些统计数据会用到其他已经发布的数据的片段。
And there are some tricks because some of the statistics use bits and pieces of other statistics that have already been released.
所以如果你有工业生产数据,你就对GDP有了一些了解。
So if you have the industrial production number, you know something about the GDP.
如果领先指标当时受到更多关注,但其中一些组成部分已经发布,比如标普价格。
If you leading indicators were then got much more focus, but some of the components had already been released like S and P prices.
你知道失业救济申领人数和其他一些数据。
Well, you knew that jobless claims and other things.
因此你可以做出更好的预测,而这些信息当时还没有完全被市场掌握。
So you could come up with a better estimate And it wasn't then completely in the market.
问题在于,我周围有很多人赚的钱比我多得多,我想:天啊,我在这方面还算不错,能预测PPI、GDP和其他统计数据,那我能不能靠交易这些来赚钱呢?
The problem, lots of people around me who were making much more money than I was, and thought, wow, can't I, I was moderately good at it, forecasting PPI and GDP and the other statistics, and well, can I trade this to make money?
于是我这么做了,起初只做了一份合约,我想是国债期货,一份合约价值一百万美元,但你只需缴纳一千或一千五百美元的保证金就能买入。
And I did this, it started with one contract, I think, and a futures contract on t bills, I think was a million dollars, but you could buy one by putting up margin of a thousand dollars or $1,500.
问题是,你必须缴纳变动保证金。
The problem was you had to put up the variance margin.
所以如果价格下跌了3000美元,你就得补上亏损,否则就会失去保证金,被强制平仓,如果你不是德雷塞尔的员工,账户很可能被关闭,即使你是员工也可能如此。
So if the price went down by $3,000 you had to cough up the loss or lose your deposit and get sold out of the position and probably get your account closed if you were not a Drexel employee, maybe even if you are a Drexel employee.
前四个月进展得非常非常顺利。
It went really, really well for about four months.
我想是从一月份开始的,那时我正要进入商学院的最后一年,我赚了大约四万美元,考虑到我当时收入低、净资产几乎为零,这真是棒极了。
I'd say it started in January as I was heading to my last year of business school and I managed to make about $40,000 which given my income and lack of net worth at the time was truly fantastic.
我当时想着可以用这笔钱还清学生贷款,那些贷款在我看来比现在一些学生背负的负担要轻得多。
It was thinking I could pay off my student loans, which were I guess less burdensome than it seems like some students today are stuck with.
但到了五月初,临近毕业时,市场也发生了变化,我的好运到头了——我猜人们总忍不住想加仓,不断加注。
But then in early May, as I was heading towards graduation, the market also changed and my lucky streak, I guess there's a temptation to pyramid and keep adding to the positions.
如果你赢了,就会想加大赌注,觉得这没什么不好,但这背后有很多前提条件。
If you're winning, you wanna press your bets and say that's not a bad thing to do, but it comes with a lot of caveats.
如果你用的是借来的钱,那简直是糟糕透顶的主意。
If you're doing it with borrowed money, it's a terrible idea.
但如果全是闲钱,我会说,可以把赢的赌注押到极限。
But if it's all mad money, I'd say push a winning bet as far as you can.
我记得,你后来发现利率突然开始下跌,而你当时却押注它们会飙升。
And you then found, if I remember rightly, that interest rates suddenly started to tumble when you were betting that they would surge.
是的。
Yes.
所以,我有4万美元的本金,却拥有大约2500万美元的名义敞口,这对我来说作为交易对手来说比例严重失衡。
And so where I'm going is with 40,000 in equity, I had something like $25,000,000 worth of notional exposure, which was really disproportionate to anything else for me as a counterparty.
你就像长期资本管理公司一样。
You were like the long term capital Yeah.
你是大学生中的长期资本管理公司。
Of You were the long term capital of college students.
没错。
Yeah.
如果全部是自有资金,而且利率朝你预期的方向变动,那当然很好,但当时全部都是借来的钱。
If it was all equity and rates were going in that direction, in your direction, then say, that's great, but it was all borrowed money.
所以在几周内,我基本上把那4万美元全亏了回去。事后回想,我不确定他们是关闭了我的账户,还是只是建议我最好暂时远离这个市场休息一阵子。
And so over a couple of weeks, I basically lost back all of the $40 and in a agreed thing, I don't know if they shut down my account or just said, you know, I think it would be a good idea to take a holiday from this for a while.
亏掉这4万美元让我非常痛苦,因为当时我感觉自己特别聪明。
And it was hurting so much from losing back the $40,000 because it felt so smart.
哇,这太棒了。
Like, wow, this is great.
让我们来算一下年化收益。
Like let's annualize that.
每个月它赚了1万美元。
That's 10,000 a month that it was making.
你觉得它后来怎么样了?
What do you think it did
我都输给你了,全没了。
I lost to you it all
全亏回去了。
back.
乔尔,那种亲身经历损失和恐惧的切身体验。
Viscerally, Joel, like that experience of actually going through that pain and fear of loss.
这种刻骨铭心的情感经历,是如何塑造了你对投资的看法?你是否因此意识到,为了作为一名成功的投资者生存下去,你必须变得更为保守和防御性?
How did that searing emotional experience actually shape your view of investing and whether you how in some ways conservative and defensive you realized you needed to be in order to survive as a as a successful investor?
除非你借贷所依赖的资产能产生足以覆盖借贷的现金流,否则不要用借来的钱做任何事情。
Don't do anything with borrowed money unless the thing you're borrowing against is giving you an income stream that can cover it.
你绝不能成为被迫出售的一方。
You never ever want to be a forced seller.
为什么股票的价格会低于其实际价值?
Why would stocks sell for less than they're worth?
这背后有大量行为层面的原因。
There's a whole bunch of behavioral reasons.
其中一个原因是人们被迫抛售持仓,每次金融危机都会发生这种情况:某些资产因为必须出售而以荒谬的低价被抛出。
One of them is people get forced out of their holdings and it happens every financial crisis that something gets sold at an absurd price because they had to.
因此,对我来说,绝不使用杠杆,这与其说是保守,不如说是认识到利率、GDP等许多人都了解的因素。
And so no margin for me, I think it's not so much conservatism, but a recognition that interest rates, lots of people know about this GDP, lots of people know about this.
我真的有很强的优势吗?
Do I have a really good edge?
可能没有我在一家规模较小的上市公司中拥有的优势那么大,因为在那种情况下,我能更清楚地了解管理层的想法。
Probably not as much as I might with a smallish public listed company where management and know what they're thinking.
让我们短暂休息一下,听听今天赞助商的话。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
当你经营一家小企业时,雇佣合适的人才至关重要。
When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.
正确的员工可以提升你的团队,提高生产力,并将你的业务推向新的高度。
The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.
但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。
But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.
这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。
That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.
他们的新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人,消除了招聘中的猜测成分。
Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.
它不再让你翻阅大量简历,而是根据你的标准筛选申请者,并突出显示最匹配的人选,为你节省数小时时间,帮助你在合适人选出现时迅速行动。
Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.
最棒的是,这些优秀候选人已经存在于LinkedIn上。
The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.
事实上,通过LinkedIn招聘的员工至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。
In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.
一次就招对人。
Hire right the first time.
前往 linkedin.com/studybill 免费发布职位,然后推广职位以使用LinkedIn Jobs的新AI助手,更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。
Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.
免费发布职位请访问 linkedin.com/studybill。
That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.
条款和条件适用。
Terms and conditions apply.
想象一下,借助真正理解客户的科技来扩展你的业务。
Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.
这正是Alexa和AWS AI背后的故事。
That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.
每天,Alexa在17种语言中处理超过10亿次互动,同时将客户摩擦降低40%。
Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.
这不仅仅是让生活更便捷,更是关于转变客户互动并创造新的收入来源。
It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.
幕后,AWS AI驱动着70多个专用模型协同工作,打造自然对话,证明了企业如何以信心和安全性大规模部署AI。
Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.
Alexa的AI能力在亚马逊庞大的运营中经过实战检验,实现了规模化的真实可衡量影响。
Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.
同样的创新现在为其他企业提供了经过验证的框架,以提升效率、解锁新的收入来源并获得持久的市场优势。
These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.
在aws.comai/rstory了解Alexa的故事。
Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.
访问aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
你的比特币资产越多,面临的挑战就越复杂。
The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.
最初简单的自托管,如今已涉及家族传承规划、复杂的安保决策,以及应对单次失误就可能损失数代财富的状况。
What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.
标准服务并未针对这些高风险的现实情况设计。
Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.
因此,长期投资者选择 Unchained Signature,这是一项专为认真持有比特币者提供的高端私人客户服务,提供专业指导、稳健托管和持久的合作关系。
That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.
使用 Signature 服务,您将配备专属客户经理,他们了解您的目标,并在每一步为您提供帮助。
With Signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.
您将享受全方位的入职服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低交易费用,以及优先参与独家活动和功能的权益。
You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.
Unchained 的协作托管模式旨在为那些希望自行保管私钥的人提供与全球最大比特币托管机构同等的安全水平。
Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.
了解更多关于 Unchained Signature 的信息,请访问 unchained.com/preston。
Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.
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比特币不仅仅是为了生活。
Bitcoin isn't just for life.
它是为世代传承而存在的。
It's for generations.
好了,回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
所以,道德的一部分是否在于,对我们几乎所有人来说,除非我们恰好是乔治·索罗斯或斯坦利·德鲁肯米勒之类的人物,否则就应该避免试图通过这些宏观预测赚钱?
So is part of the moral just that for almost all of us, unless we happen to be George Soros or Stanley Druckenmiller or someone like that, we should just avoid trying to make money off these macro predictions.
这实在太难了。
It's just too difficult.
即使对你这样当时毕生都在试图做宏观预测的人来说,从某种意义上说,这也太难了。
Even for someone like you who was spending your whole life at the time trying to make macro predictions, it just was too difficult in a sense.
我认为,如果你花全部时间像乔治·索罗斯那样去做,或许能做到,但这超出了我的能力范围。
I think if you spend all your time trying to do it like George Soros that you can can do that, but it's beyond my skill set.
而且我认为,总体而言,这非常困难。
And I think it's very difficult generally.
而目前我们正面临一场即将来临的利润衰退,分析师们来找我,问:你有兴趣买入住宅建筑商的股票吗?
And right now we have an impending profit recession and analysts come to me saying, you interested in buying the home builders?
你有兴趣买入Meta,也就是旧的Facebook吗?
Are you interested in buying Meta, the old Facebook?
即使在相当具体的情况下,判断哪些已经被折价也很困难,而要弄清楚整个经济和综合统计数据中的变动因素,这简直是一场极其艰难的游戏。
And figuring out what's discounted even in a fairly specific case is really difficult, but figuring out what the moving pieces are for a whole economy and for aggregated statistics, it's it's a really tough game.
你必须像乔治·索罗斯那样出色,才能做好这件事。
And you've got to be amazing like George Soros is to be able to do that well.
所以,当你在审视公司时,比如富达有大约130名股票分析师团队向你推荐这类投资,比如住房股、能源股等等,
So in a way, when you're looking at companies, when you you have a team of something like a 130 stock analysts at Fidelity, right, who come to you and they pitch stuff like this, the housing stocks and energy stocks and the like.
你根本不会去考虑宏观因素吗?
Are you really not thinking that much about macro stuff at all?
你只是在看它们是否具备基本面优势,比如是否有良好的护城河,是否拥有持久的竞争优势,是否价格低廉,现金流是否可预测。
You're just looking to see whether they're fundamental things like whether they have a good moat, whether they have enduring competitive advantage years, whether it's cheap, whether the cash flow is predictable.
你关注的是什么?
What are you focused on?
如果房子着火了,你就没法关注建筑品质,但我并不会忽视当前的事件。
If the house is burning down, you can't focus on the architectural qualities, but I do not ignore current events.
但通常这并不能明确说明我的做法。
But usually it isn't conclusive about what I'm doing.
我确实有宏观观点,但我更希望分析师能帮助我设想不同的情景。
I do have macro opinions, but mostly I want analysts to help me imagine different scenarios.
如果英国利率再上调100个基点,抵押贷款利率也随之上升,会怎样?
What if British interest rates go up another 100 basis points and mortgage rates follow?
这对英国房屋的可负担性会产生什么影响?
What will that do to affordability of homes in The UK?
这对消费者支出会产生什么影响?
What will that do for consumer spending?
这对我们要讨论的公司会造成多严重的后果?
And how catastrophic is that for the companies that we're talking about?
这可能完全没有影响,也可能产生非常大的影响。
And it might be not at all, or it could be a very big impact.
有时公司可能拥有更强的竞争地位,更能抵御这类冲击。
And sometimes companies can have a more competitive position and be better placed to withstand those kinds of shocks.
有时它们的处境会更糟,这正是我希望分析师能提供的信息。
And sometimes they can have worse positions, and that's what I want from analysts.
由于该基金持有大量英国股票,其中包括两家住宅建筑商,因此这是一个相关的问题:它们的股价便宜,是因为售价低于其账面净资产价值,还是因为房价下跌会严重打击它们在未来一两年内获得合理利润的能力?
Since the fund has a bunch of British stocks and has two home builders, it's a relevant question to sort of, like, are they cheap because they're selling for less than their stated net asset value, or will this be too devastating for housing to for them to make a decent profit in the next year or two?
因此,你不能忽视宏观环境,但鉴于你的基金换手率极低,你似乎也在寻找那些能够在长期内挺过困难宏观环境的公司。
So you can't really ignore the macro environment, but it seems like given your very, very low turnover in the fund, you're also trying to find companies that are gonna be okay over the long run, sort of in they're gonna muddle through difficult macro environments.
这样的描述准确吗?
Is is that a a fair description?
是的。
Yeah.
我在寻找我认为威尔也在寻找的东西,那就是一开始就有强大基础的适应性强的公司。
I'm I'm looking for what I think Will is looking for, which is adaptive companies that have a strong hand to start with.
没有人知道未来,但有些公司比其他公司更具适应性。
Nobody knows the future, but some companies are more adaptive than others.
接下来是一家英国零售商,该基金曾经主要持有街边商店和目录业务,它们本可能在互联网时代彻底失去地位,但事实上,它们成功地将目录业务转型为线上销售,如今线上销售已成为主要利润来源,并且增长良好。
Next, a UK retailer, the fund holds used to be mostly high street stores with a catalog business, and they could have completely lost their position during the Internet age, but in fact, to repurpose catalog into internet selling and now it's the majority of profits and is growing well.
所以这是一个很好的适应性。
So there's a good adaptation.
我认为你总是需要一个具有适应性的管理团队。
I think you always want an adaptive management team.
我认为这正是我们花大量时间与管理层会面、了解他们思维的秘诀之一。
And I think that's part of the secret sauce of why we'll spend so much time on meeting management and understanding their thinking.
另一位与你关系密切的传奇投资者,来自富达基金,上几代人中的佼佼者,部分原因是他正是当年将你推荐到富达、让你得以加入彼得·林奇团队的人。
Another legendary investor of the last couple of generations from Fidelity that you're very closely associated with partly because he was the person who really got you hired at Fidelity as Peter Lynch.
我想能否深入聊聊你是如何来到富达、与彼得共事的故事,以及你从他身上学到了什么。
And I wondered if we could talk in some depth about the story of how you came to be there and work with Peter and what you learned from him.
因为我特别喜欢这个故事——某种程度上,它要追溯到你在德雷塞尔、柏林和兰伯特经历了一段略显沮丧的时期之后,转而加入了美国银行金融期货部门。
Because I love the story of I mean, in a way it goes back to after your slightly disheartening experience at Drexel, Berlin and Lambert, you ended up at Bank of America Financial Futures.
而我的理解是,你后来经历了一点存在危机,意识到自己走错了方向,于是开始联系那些著名的投资者,列出一份你想为之工作的顶尖人物名单。
And then my sense is you had a little bit of an existential crisis and decided I'm going in the wrong direction and you started to reach out to famous investors and draw up a sort of short list of people you wanted to work for.
你能告诉我们当时发生了什么吗?你给谁写了信?又是如何与彼得·林奇取得联系的?
Can you tell us what happened, who you wrote to, and then how you came to be in contact with Peter Lynch?
我的名单上有马里奥·加贝利、迈克尔·斯坦哈特、乔治·索罗斯、彼得·林奇,还有
My short list was Mario Gabelli, Michael Steinhardt, George Soros, Peter Lynch, and
我认为迈克尔·普赖斯也是另一位巨头
Michael Price, I think, was another giant
迈克尔·普赖斯。
Michael Price.
对。
Yeah.
那个共同基金的人。
The mutual shares guy.
我试图联系他们安排面试,但效果不太好。
And I tried to get interviews with them, but didn't do very well.
我确实亲自见到了马里奥·加贝利,但当时没见到其他人。
I did get to meet Mario Gabelli in person, but not the others at that time.
我给彼得·林奇打过几次电话,但他的秘书宝拉·沙利文最后问:‘是哪位打电话?’
And I called up Peter Lynch a couple of times, but his secretary Paula Sullivan finally said, who's calling?
她让我直接接通了。
And she put me through.
我简直惊呆了。
And I was just floored.
在经历了其他求职尝试后,我本以为会见到研究主管或人力资源部门的人,这些都没问题,只要能达到目的就行,但我们的通话很愉快,聊了几只股票,还安排了面试,我飞了过去,面试原定上午9点开始,我以为中午前后就能结束,我爸爸也会在那时来接我,但面试一拖再拖,到了下午2点,他们把我带到了彼得·利兹的办公室,彼得那里不断有人进出。
After my other job search, I was expecting to go to a director of research or human resources department, all of which would be fine if it produced the desired result, but we had a good call and talked about a few stocks and I got an interview scheduled and I flew out and the meeting or the interviews were supposed to start at 09:00 and I thought they would be done by noonish and my dad was going to meet me there noonish, but the interviews kept going on and around 02:00, they got brought over to Peter Leeds' office and Peter had lots of people dropping in.
彼得非常信奉两分钟演示法,把它作为筛选工具,他对任何想法都会认真考虑。
Peter was a great believer in the two minute drill, the quick pitch and as a screening device, he would consider absolutely anything.
所以面试过程有些分心,但我非常兴奋地观察彼得·林奇如何应对各种 pitches。
So the interview itself was somewhat distracted, but I was thrilled to watch Peter Lynch in action fielding all of these pitches.
我们确实有一段正式的面试环节,但原本计划从下午2点到2点半结束,结果拖到了将近4点45分,而彼得正想结束一天的工作。
And we did actually have an interview light component, but this was supposed to go from 02:00 to 02:30 then wind up, but it got to be about 04:45 and Peter was trying to wind down for the day.
我想他给卡罗琳——他的妻子——打了个暗号,我忘了具体是什么,但他有个暗语方式,用来表示‘我五点到’、‘六点到’或‘七点到’,好让晚餐安排妥当,但到了4点45分,他终于决定结束。
And I think he did make one of those coded calls to Carolyn, his wife forgot what it was, but he had a coded sort of way of saying, I'm arriving at five or I'm arriving at six or I'm arriving at seven so the dinner would be all right, but around 04:45, cut it off.
我非常兴奋地看着形形色色的人来来往往,做着各种 pitches,而我了不起的父亲则在富达公司门口等了我整整五个小时,这真让人感动。
And I was just thrilled by watching watching all the people come and go in the different pitches, and my fabulous dad was waiting there down at the doorstep of Fidelity to meet with me and had been there for five hours, which was amazing.
但没错。
But yeah.
我还想提一点,不过你可能太谦虚了,不肯承认这些,乔尔,但你的书前面有一段非常优美的序言,是彼得·林奇写的他的版本。
I also wanted to report a little but you're probably too modest to admit any of this, Joel, but there's a beautiful forward to your book where Peter Lynch gives his version of it.
他说,他的助理宝拉·沙利文对他说:‘你得跟这个叫乔尔的人谈谈。’
He says that Paula Sullivan, his assistant, said to him, You've got to talk to this guy, Joel.
他一直打电话来,人特别友善。
He keeps calling and he's so sweet.
他来自中西部,我觉得他可能是个农民。
He's from the Midwest, and I think he might be a farmer.
于是,按照彼得的说法,他说:‘我告诉宝拉,我可以给他五分钟’,这很有意思,因为正如你所说,他对任何事都持开放态度。
So then the way Peter tells the story, he says, I told Paula I can give him five minutes, which is very interesting because as you say, he was open to anything.
他愿意接受两分钟的简报,或者五分钟,或者任何时长。
He was prepared to take a two minute pitch or five minutes or whatever.
彼得说,我们最后聊了一个多小时,你一直向他推荐股票,比如波多黎各的水泥、克莱斯勒和旧金山储蓄与贷款公司,他对此非常感兴趣。
And what Peter said is we ended up speaking for over an hour and you kept pitching him stocks like Puerto Rican cement and Chrysler and San Francisco savings and loan, which he was very intrigued by.
他说,尽管我觉得他曾告诉我他拥有大约400家储蓄贷款机构,但他仍然印象深刻。
Said, despite the fact that I think he once told me he owned about 400 savings and loans, he was very impressed.
他在叙述中说,随后立即打电话给富达投资决策部门的负责人,说:我们必须雇用这个人。
And he said in his account, he said he then immediately called the head of Fidelta's investment decision and said, We've got to hire this guy.
他简直不可思议。
He's unbelievable.
他是我见过的最强的人之一。
He's as strong as anyone I have ever met.
这真是一件令人惊叹的事,对吧?
It's a kind of amazing thing, right?
我的意思是,那次通话中发生了一些非凡的事情。
I mean, something extraordinary happened in that first call.
有趣的是,从我们今天这场对话,以及上次在富达办公室的会面中,我能看出你是个非常温和的人,对吧?
And it's interesting because I can see from this conversation that we're having today and also from the last time we met in Fidel's office, you're a very gentle soul, right?
你是个安静、略带羞涩的人。
You're a quiet, slightly shy person.
你不像那种张扬的华尔街人士。
You're not like a brash Wall Street person.
有一件很了不起的事,关于1:50这个事实
And there's something kind of amazing about one:fifty the fact
彼得对你如此开放,这么快就看到了你的才华。
that Peter was so open to you that he kind of saw your talent so quickly.
是的。
Yeah.
我对此非常感激。
I'm so grateful for that.
我觉得人生是路径依赖的,我在那里得到了一个幸运的机会。
I think it's life is path dependent, and I got a lucky break there.
这真是一件了不起的事。
It's an amazing thing.
我有个年轻朋友,叫萨缪尔·戈德堡,住在以色列,他非常聪明,曾是国际象棋选手和柔道冠军,还当过狙击手,这让我对他性格有了些了解,他痴迷于价值投资。
I have a a young friend, a guy in Israel called Samuel Goldberg, who's a very a really, really smart guy, former chess player and judo champion and the like, who was also a sniper, which I think gives a sense of the sort of temperament that he would have, who's obsessed with value investing.
他上周给我写了信,问我该怎么获得实习机会?
And he wrote to me last week and was saying, How do I get an internship?
作为一个对价值投资着迷的人,我该怎么做?
What do I do as someone who's obsessed with value investing?
我想从你这里了解一下,那些真正想进入这个行业、显然对价值投资有着近乎宗教般体验的年轻人,
And I sort of wanted to get a sense from you of what do young people who actually want to get started in the business, who clearly have this almost sort of religious one:fifty experience
他们深刻认同价值投资并渴望入行,却不知如何入门,该怎么办?
of understanding value investing and being deeply drawn to it and want to get started, but don't really know how to break in.
你该怎么做?
What do you do?
因为对于萨缪尔,我真的不知道该给他什么建议。
Because I had no idea really what to tell Samuel at all.
投资这行,我觉得很难。
Investing period, I think it's hard.
我从未有过暑期实习,但现在这变得重要多了。
I never had a summer internship, but it's become much more important.
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我认为配对流程太漫长、太官僚了,但像他这样的人应该给研究主管写信,比如富达的帕姆·霍尔丁和蒂姆·科恩。
Pairing process is too long and too bureaucratic for my taste, but it say someone like him should send a letter to both the director of research, which at Fidelity would be Pam Holding and Tim Cohen.
他们还应该给网站上公布的指定人力资源招聘人员发一封邮件。
And they should also send one to the designated human resources recruiter and that you can find on the website.
这确实很难,那些毕业于哈佛、耶鲁、普林斯顿和沃顿的人都是优秀的人才,但他们有内部优势,因为很多面试——我不太喜欢这种方式,是的。
It is tough, it's the people who attended Harvard, Yale and Princeton and Wharton are fabulous people, but they have the inside track on this because a lot of the interviews, I don't like the way this is Yeah.
但实际上,像他这样的人,以及所有其他在外面的人,都应该给目标公司研究主管或人力资源部门写信。
Handled actually, but I'd say a person like him and all the hers who are out there should send a letter to the director of research at a firm that they want or to the HR department there.
你多年来显然招聘过很多人,因此你肯定见过许多后来成为明星的年轻分析师。
And you've obviously done lots of hiring over the years, and so you've obviously sort of seen lots of the young analysts who become stars later.
我想知道,当你思考你寻找的是什么,以及彼得·林奇在你身上看到的是什么时,是不是那种强烈的专注、竞争意识,以及对股票那种近乎无法解释的深深着迷?
And I'm curious, when you think of what you look for and also what Peter Lynch saw in you, is it that kind of intensity, that competitiveness, that deep fascination with stocks that you almost can't explain?
你和他所寻找的那种‘关键特质’到底是什么?
What is it that you and he look for that's that X factor?
好奇心就是:为什么是这样?
Curiosity is like, why is this so?
我认为,太多错误都源于人类倾向于填补缺失的信息,并对所看到的事物做出过多假设。
I think so many mistakes come because of the human capability of filling in what's not there and assuming too much about what it is you're looking at.
因此,我认为好奇心是最重要的,而雇主通常希望找到真正渴望这份工作的人。
And so I'd say curiosity is number one and employers generally, they want people who really want the job.
就像,对一个人说‘我爱你’,多久说一次才算太多?
It's like, how often is too many times to tell someone I love you?
永远不会太多。
It's never too much.
雇主们也希望听到这句话。
And the employers want to hear it.
即使他们知道你想要这份工作,也要明确表达出来,让它真实可信。
Even if they know that you want the job, spell it out for them and make it real.
因为就我而言,这很容易,因为我曾有过令人失望的雇主,所以我非常渴望为我完全敬佩的人工作。
Because in my case, it was easy because having had a disappointing employer or two, I really wanted to work for people who I totally respected.
所以,如果你面试的是你真正非常想要的工作,就不要害羞。
So if you are interviewing with the job that you really, really want, don't be shy.
告诉他们。
Tell them.
在采访你和威尔·丹诺夫,还有多年前的杰夫·温尼克时,我深受触动,温尼克是你这一代的另一位巨擘,我认为你们三人都某种程度上受到彼得·林奇的指导,你们身上都有一种强烈的专注感。
I was very struck in interviewing you and Will Dannoff, and many years ago, Jeff Vinick, who is another of the giants of your generation, who were all, I think all three of you in some ways mentored by Peter Lynch, there's an intensity to all of you.
我记得威尔曾经对我说过:我只是更在意。
I remember Will saying to me at some point, I just care more.
我还记得他告诉我,他是如何在周五下午发现特斯拉的。
And there was a way I remember him saying to me that the way he found Tesla was on a Friday afternoon.
他当时说:为什么我们没有周四的傍晚呢?
He was like, Well, how come we don't have Thursday late afternoon.
他问:为什么过了下午4点半就什么都没有了?
He's like, How come there's not anything after 04:30?
于是他们去见了那家额外的公司。
And so they went to see this one extra company.
同样,杰夫·温尼克告诉我,他每天晚上陪完四个孩子(那时他有四个孩子)后,等孩子们睡了,还会再读好几个小时的书。
Likewise, Jeff Finnick told me that he would get back in the evening after hanging out with his, I think, four kids in those days and would then do several hours more reading after they went to bed.
这么说,当你回顾你在富达见过的最成功的投资者时,他们是不是都极其专注、极具竞争力、充满动力且充满热情的人?
Is that fair to say that when you look at the most successful investors you've seen in your cohort of Fidelity, they're just really intense, profoundly competitive, driven, passionate people.
是的。
Yeah.
我觉得这是必须的。
I think it's sort of required.
彼得从来都不怎么度假,对吧?
Peter never really took a vacation, right?
我的意思是,在他十四年的职业生涯中,他有没有休过一天假?
Mean, in his fourteen years, did he ever take a day off?
是的。
Yeah.
我认为他实际上比刚才提到的任何人都更专注,这也许正是他担任主动基金经理的年限较短的原因。
I'd say he was actually more intense than any of the people just referenced, which may be also why the years as a active fund manager were shorter.
所以这种状态很难持续。
So it's hard to sustain.
而且
And
这就是为什么彼得需要那个暗号来告诉卡罗琳他什么时候会到。
that was why Peter needed the secret code to tell Carolyn what time he would be at.
我想其中一个暗号是,约翰逊先生要来了,所以把食物放进烤箱里,因为他当然想和杰先生谈话。
I think one of them was actually, mister Johnson is coming in, so just put the food in the leave the food in the oven because, of course, he wanted to talk to mister Jay.
你曾经对我说过,彼得是你见过的最具灵活性的投资者,他拥有惊人的能力,能在短期交易和长期投资之间切换。
You said to me once that Peter was the most flexible investor you'd ever seen, that he had this incredible ability to switch between short term trading and long term trading.
你能谈谈这一点吗?
Can you talk a bit about that?
因为我觉得,由于他并没有待太久,对吧?
Because I think sometimes because he wasn't around for that long, right?
他担任了十三或十四年的主动基金经理,然后就辞职了。
He had a thirteen or fourteen year stint and then he quit.
人们总是会怀疑,或者说有种偏见,认为他真的有那么厉害吗?
There's always this suspicion that or sort of prejudice that, you know, was he really that great?
他能持续下去吗?
Would he have been able to sustain it?
你能谈谈是什么让他如此特别吗?
Can you talk about kind of what what it was that made him so special?
他总是对事物的工作原理感到好奇。
He was always curious about how things worked.
他当然希望投资那些当前正在迅速改善的公司,但他实际上也持有某些公司多年,比如克莱斯勒和房利美,还有一些其他公司,但他总是通过对话持续关注,指出:‘这将在明年帮助你。’
He did of course want companies that were getting much better right now, but there are companies that he held for several years actually, Chrysler and Fannie Mae, some others, but he was always checking in in the conversations if he would highlight, this will help you next year.
这将在未来几年帮助你,以房利美为例,它们在接下来的一年、再下一年以及之后的年份中,都有大量高成本债务即将到期。
This will help you in the years beyond where in Fannie Mae's case, they had a bunch of high cost debt that was rolling off in the coming year, but also in the next year and the next year after that.
因此,利息差和收益改善的前景非常可观。
So the visibility to improved interest margins and earnings was huge.
那么,你认为从与彼得共事中学到的最根本的东西是什么?
So what would be the most fundamental thing you think you took from working with Peter?
如果有一件事真正持久地影响了你管理资金的方式,那会是什么?
If there's one thing that's really had an enduring influence on the way you manage money, what would it be?
我不确定自己能否复制他的思维灵活性。
I'm not sure that I can copy his mental flexibility.
他完全愿意在事实发生变化时改变自己的想法。
He totally willing to change his mind when the facts are different.
我认为我们很多人固守自己的信念,试图为错误的东西辩护,还试图委婉地表达这一点。
And I think a lot of us get entrenched in our beliefs and try to defend something that's wrong and trying to delicately say this.
我在政治中看到很多这种情况,无论是哪个政党,他们错了却还不断为自己的错误添加更多借口。
I see a lot of this in politics in both parties where they're wrong and they pile on further justifications for mistakes that they made.
彼得不会容忍这种行为,或者至少不会太多。
Peter would have none of that or a little of that.
他会改变自己的想法。
He would change his mind.
他似乎还拥有非凡的能力,能够从大量不同的信息来源中提取信息并将其整合起来,这一点我也能看到你身上有。
He also seems to have had an incredible ability to take information from a mass of different sources and piece it together, which is something that I see with you as well.
因为我知道你在早年曾是一名分析师,研究过天然气、煤炭或其他各种东西。
Because I know that you, in your early years, you were an analyst studying natural gas or coal or all of these other things.
你的技能和他的一部分相似,就是能从经济的某个领域获取零散信息,并将其应用到其他领域。
It seems like part of your skill as well as his is to take little pieces of information from one area of the economy and apply it elsewhere.
是的。
Yes.
他作为一名天然气分析师时,确实经常这么做。
He absolutely did that as a natural gas analyst.
如果我告诉他天然气价格上涨了25美分,他会问:这对管道公司意味着什么?
If I got him the news that gas prices are up by 25¢, he would say, what's that mean for the pipelines?
这对天然气分销公司意味着什么?
What's that mean for the gas distribution companies?
这对生产商意味着什么?
What's that mean for the producers?
这对化工企业意味着什么?
What's that mean for the petrochemical companies?
这会引发一连串的连锁反应,虽然不一定有定论,但它能告诉你应该向这些公司提出哪些问题,而他在这方面非常出色。
And there's a whole bunch of knock on, it may not be conclusive, but it tells you what you should be asking all of those companies from one piece of information, and he was fantastic at that.
我记得比尔·米勒曾告诉我,他在成为基金经理之前,作为军方情报分析师的早期经历对此非常有帮助,因为那种方式是一种拼图式的思维——你会从某个领域获取看似微不足道的信息。
I remember Bill Miller saying to me that his early experience as an intelligence analyst in the military before he became a money manager was incredibly helpful precisely for that because you would have this mosaic approach where you would take information from one area, something that seemed minor.
但一旦你将它与其他几条信息结合起来,就能看到别人察觉不到的模式。
But once you combined it with a few other things, you could see a pattern that other people couldn't see.
我认为这是因为,当你做得不好时,这被称为轶事而非科学。
I think it is because people when you do it badly, it's called anecdotal and scientific.
当你做得好时,格拉德威尔会称之为薄片分析。
When you do it well, guess, Gladwell would call it thin slicing.
当我为我的书《乔:更富、更睿智、更快乐》在波士顿采访你时,我来问你,能否解释一下你那非凡的回报率,这真的令人难以置信。
When I interviewed you in Boston for my book, Joe, Richer, Wiser, Happier, I came and I asked you basically to explain your extraordinary returns, which are really incredible.
我的意思是,你真的是个异类,对吧?
I mean, you're a real anomaly, right?
我的意思是,我认为你过去三十二年每年跑赢市场约3.7个百分点。
Mean, I think you've beaten the market by about 3.7 percentage points a year over thirty two years.
这是一项惊人的业绩。
It's an astonishing performance.
我们对话中一个特别引人注目的地方是,你主要聚焦于列举所有那些查理·芒格所说的典型愚蠢行为——你努力避免的所有事情。
And one of the things that was really striking about our conversation was that you focused really primarily on listing all of the standard stupidities, as Charlie Munger would describe them, all of the things you try to avoid.
我不禁想,我们能否就此多聊一点?因为我觉得这种做法极其有益——毕竟,要模仿你、乔·丹诺夫或彼得·林奇这样的优秀投资者所具备的积极特质非常困难,但要应用你所坚持的这一原则却容易得多:至少识别出所有那些愚蠢、缺乏原创性的行为,正如查理所说,这些正是投资中导致灾难的根源。
And I wonder if we could talk about that a bit, because that strikes me as such an incredibly helpful approach to Because it's so difficult to imitate the positive qualities that someone like you or Will Danoff or Peter Lynch have, but it's much easier to apply this principle that you have of at least identifying all the dumb things, the unoriginal era, as Charlie would describe it, that leads to so much disaster in investing.
你能谈谈你具体避免了哪些事情吗?
Can you talk about some of the things that you just avoid?
因为你一直在不断接到分析师们向你推销各种投资标的,对吧?
Because you're constantly having analysts come and pitch you stuff, right?
你手下有一支由130名分析师组成的团队,不断向你推荐各种东西。
You have this army of 130 analysts pitching you stuff.
你都在说‘不,这个不做,那个也不做’。
What are you just saying, No, not doing that, not doing that.
这些都是我绝不会再犯的错误。
These are mistakes I'm not repeating.
我想你应该先反思一下,你认为自己的投资方法究竟是什么?
I think you wanna start by doing a little introspection about what do you think your approach is?
你为什么可能会有优势?
Why why might you have an edge?
如果你是个动量投资者,我确实见过很多成功的动量投资者,甚至可能比成功的价值投资者还多,但你应该明白这一点。
And if you're a momentum investor, I've seen actually lots of successful momentum investors, maybe even more than I've seen successful value investors, but you should know that.
当你身处2021年时,你必须意识到,那些曾经表现优异的科技股并没有变得更好。
And when you're in the 2021, you have to realize things are not getting better in the tech stocks that had worked so well.
你得思考一下:我是成长型投资者,还是价值型投资者,或者像我这样,是试图融入一些成长因素的价值型投资者——因为成长本就是价值的一部分,你必须理解这一点。
And you have to think about, am I a growth investor, am I a value investor or am I a, in my case, a value investor who tries to include some growth aspects to, because growth is part of value, have to understand that.
而你试图做的事情,会造就你的盲点。
And those what you're trying to do creates your blind spots.
因此,大多数时候,动量投资者最丰厚的利润来自股价高于公允价值、并出现大规模跟风买入的时候。
So most of the time, the fattest piece of the momentum profits of the momentum investor come when the stock is above fair value and it's just a colossal piling on.
所以价值投资者会说:快跑,快跑,赶紧逃离,但如果你是个有技巧的动量投资者,这个反应是错误的——你可能会想,这只股票现在才刚开始获得认可,会有更多人注意到它。
So a value investor says, run, run, run away, but that's the wrong impulse If you're trying to be a skilled momentum investor, you might say, it's just now getting recognition and more people will recognise this stock.
同时,作为价值投资者,我通常会忽略短期波动,除非出现某种迹象表明:天啊,这彻底推翻了我所有的预期价值。
At the same time, as a value investor, I kind of ignore short term movements, unless there's something that says, wow, this throws my whole expected value into the trash.
现在供应商不再给他们发货了,商店根本不可能再赚到我原先以为的那种利润。
There's no way the store will ever make the kind of profits I thought now that vendors are not shipping them merchandise.
所以我认为,一些盲点源于你的投资方法,你必须意识到这些盲点。
So I think some of the blind spots come from what your approach is and you have to be aware of those blind spots.
了解自己,以及你如何应对挫折?
Knowing yourself and how do you react to the setbacks?
你对自己诚实吗?
And are you truthful to yourself?
你会不断找借口,证明自己所做的一切并非错误吗?
Are you going to come up with endless justifications for why what you did was not a mistake?
还是你会坦诚面对,说:‘是的,我搞砸了?'
Or will you go to the confessional and say, yep, I blew it?
你提到的一句话让我印象深刻,乔尔,你说避开自己的无知能带来巨大改变。
You said something that really stuck with me, Joel, where you said staying away from your own ignorance can make a huge difference.
所以,这不仅仅是对自己情绪反应的自我认知。
So it's not just self awareness in terms of how you'll react emotionally.
了解
Knowing
你的能力圈,或者更乐观地说,你的专业领域——在哪个行业你比普通人懂得更多?
your circle of competence or I guess more optimistically, the circle of expertise where do you know more than the average guy about this industry?
你对这家特定公司了解得比普通人更多吗?
Do you know more than the average person about this specific company?
有些行业,比如保险,很难把握,因为它涉及一系列假设,你通常很难判断这些假设是保守的、激进的还是中性的,但当这些难以验证时,你就无法得到保护。
And there are whole industries where insurance is difficult because it's a whole series of assumptions and you can generically way know whether the assumptions that they're making are conservative, aggressive or average, but that doesn't protect you when that's hard to verify.
所以保险的某些部分让我感到害怕。
So there are parts of insurance that scare me.
我认为AIG就是一个例子,他们进入了自己都没意识到的另一个业务领域;如果他们审视这些衍生品,就会发现信用保险是一种低概率、高严重性、高度相关的业务。
And I think the AIG was a case where they had gotten into a different business than they realized where if they looked at the derivatives, they'd say credit insurance is a low rate online or a highly correlated, high severity, very low frequency business.
然后他们会意识到,这对保险公司来说相当可怕,而不是觉得这挺疯狂的。
And then, oh, that's kind of terrifying to an insurance company rather than this is kind of wild.
因为我投资AIG亏了钱,所以我心有不甘。
Since I lost money on AIG, I'm bitter.
所以我假设管理层可能没有这么做。
And so I'm assuming that management might have not done this.
生物技术让我生物学家父亲感到失望,因为这里有太多精彩的实验,而我很难判断创新的路径。
Biotech to my biologist dad's disappointment, because there's so much cool experimentation and there, it's so hard for me to tell the path of innovation.
有第一阶段、第二阶段、第三阶段,还有商业化。
There's phase one, there's phase two, there's phase three, there's commercialization.
即使有时药物获得批准并上市,销量仍可能令人失望,而预测这些可能性超出了我的能力。
And sometimes even if it does get approved and goes on the market, the sales will disappoint and handicapping those odds is beyond my ability.
某种程度上,知道你无法建模、无法真正估算未来的现金流和增长,似乎就足以让你避开这一领域。
In a way, knowing just that you can't model that, that you can't really figure out the cash flows and the growth in the future, that seems to be almost enough to keep you away from that.
但你也曾告诉我,这会让你情绪异常激动。
But you also said to me, you know it's gonna make you crazily emotional.
是的。
Yeah.
像富达的杰出分析师艾琳·坎托波利斯这样的人,我非常信任她,但作为投资组合经理,除非我能亲自验证她的想法,否则我无法这么做。
There are people like Fidelity's brilliant analyst, Irene Cantopolis, and I trust her a great deal, but as a portfolio manager, I can't do it unless I can verify her thoughts to myself.
所以这是一个我避而远之的领域。
And so it's an area that I stay away from.
你给我列了一堆东西。
You listed for me an array of things.
我喜欢你对我说的这句话,我在我的书里引用了:不要支付太多。
I I love this quote where you said to me, I quote this in my book, you said, don't pay too much.
不要投资那些容易过时和毁灭的企业。
Don't go for businesses that are prone to obsolescence and destruction.
不要和骗子与傻瓜一起投资。
Don't invest with crooks and idiots.
不要投资你不理解的东西。
Don't invest in things you don't understand.
不要投资你不懂的东西,远离自己的疯狂。
Don't invest in what you don't know and stay away from your own craziness.
我只是觉得这是一份很棒的清单,你知道,在我们开始思考该做什么之前,先有一份明确的清单,告诉我们哪些地方我绝对不去。
And I I just thought that was a wonderful list of things where, you know, you before we start thinking about what we should do, just to have a list of things where we know I'm just not going there.
这不是我能赢的游戏。
It's not a game I can win.
是的。
Yeah.
你怎么能赢过乔丹?
How do you beat Jordan?
你该跟他下棋,而不是打篮球。
You play chess against him rather than basketball.
我最近经常思考这个问题。
I actually think about this a lot recently.
自从我写了关于你和查理·芒格的那一章,标题是《别当傻瓜》之后,我思考得更多了,我开始意识到玩那些我有能力赢的游戏有多么重要。
I think much more since I I wrote the chapter about you and Charlie Munger about just It's called Don't Be a Fool, where I just think about the importance of playing games that I'm equipped to win.
我渐渐意识到,有些游戏——在情感上、智力上,以及在热情方面——我根本不可能在挑选个股这件事上真正获胜。
It's been kind of a crushing realization that there are certain games where emotionally and intellectually and in terms of my passion, I'm just never gonna really win at the game of picking individual stocks.
这根本不适合我。
It just doesn't suit me.
能够意识到我应该去采访别人,这让我感到无比清晰和解脱。
And it's been incredibly clarifying and liberating to say, well, so, yeah, so I should be interviewing people.
我应该写书,但承认自己不适合玩某种游戏,这确实有点痛苦。
I should be writing books and I should It's just But it's it's kind of painful to admit that you're not suited to a game.
确实如此。
It is.
这尤其困难,因为那些职业玩这个游戏的人,大多毕业于顶尖学校,他们知道自己能学会,但尽管我多年断断续续地努力,我还是搞不懂生物科技。
And it's especially tough because the people who professionally pay play the game disproportionately went to selective schools and they know that they can learn, but despite years of intermittent effort, I still don't get biotech.
很难对自己说:是的,我确实有很多不擅长的事情。
And it's kind of hard to tell yourself, yeah, there are plenty of things that I'm not particularly good at.
我记得查克·阿克曾对我说过:我们不可能和所有女士跳舞。
I remember Chuck Acre saying to me, we we can't dance with all the ladies.
我突然意识到,哦,他有一个非常狭窄的池塘,他就在那里钓鱼,并且有纪律一次又一次地坚持下去。
And I I just suddenly realized, oh, he's got this, like, really narrow pond in which he's fishing and he has the discipline to do it again and again and again.
所以,是的,这种自我认知以及选择正确游戏的能力,对我来说至关重要。
So yeah, that self awareness and the ability to choose the right game seems to me critical.
但像卡特雷这样的人还有一个非常显著的特点,就是他非常专注,对吧?
But what's also really distinctive with someone like Katkray, he's very focused, right?
他的投资组合非常集中,只有少数几只重仓股。
He has a very narrow portfolio of a few major holdings.
你在这一点上非常不同,你极度分散投资,甚至比我认识的其他任何伟大投资者都更分散。
You're really unusual in the you're massively diversified or almost more than any other great investor I know.
我前几天看富达低价股时,记得你持有了大约八十只股票。
I think when I looked at Fidelity low price stock a couple of days ago, I think you owned something like eight eighty stocks.
这种策略背后的哲学是什么?
What's the philosophy behind that?
因为要实现你所做到的成就几乎是不可能的。
Because it's almost impossible to pull off what you've pulled off.
我记得比尔·鲁安曾经对我说过,我所遇到的唯一一个能通过极度分散的投资组合取得卓越业绩的投资者就是彼得·林奇。
It's like the only I remember Bill Rouhain saying to me once, the only other investor I've ever come across who can do really well with a hugely diversified portfolio is Peter Lynch.
而你似乎是第二个。
And you seem to be the second one.
那么你是怎么做到的?为什么选择这种方式?
So how do you do it and why do you do it that way?
把它看作两个投资组合。
Think of it as two portfolios.
其中一个,虽然可能更多,但可以看作是两个投资组合。
One, although it could be more, but think of it as two portfolios.
其中一个是由长期高信心的持仓组成。
One of them is for long standing high conviction holdings.
我确实有一些相当大的持仓。
I do have some fairly chunky holdings.
联合健康保险占基金的比重超过5%。
UnitedHealth is over 5% of the fund.
加拿大超市Metro紧随其后。
Metro, the Canadian supermarket is close behind.
AutoZone也是一个非常重要的持仓。
AutoZone is also a very substantial holding.
如果你只看前50或100只股票,你可能会说,这实际上是一个相当集中的基金,甚至相对于富达来说也是如此。
If you took just the top 50 or 100 stocks, you might say this is actually fairly concentrated fund, even relative to Fidelity.
我和摩根、萨姆一直讨论的一个问题是
And one of the ongoing discussions that had with Morgan and Sam is
这些是你成功的两个例子,那些不
These are your two successes that people who don't
两个成功案例。
two successes.
是的。
Yeah.
什么对他们有用,因为他们希望基金能为他们带来收益,而我认为他们仍在摸索适合自己的方式。
What will work for them because they want the fund to work for them, and I think they're still figuring out what works for them.
但有一点暗示,5%可能过于集中了,因为实际上还有其他富达基金没有任何5%的重仓股,尽管威尔蒂亚诺夫有几只。
But there was a hint that maybe 5% was too chunky because actually there are other Fidelity funds that do not have any 5% bets although Wiltianov has several.
因此,从某种意义上说,他们确实有集中押注,而且这种集中体现在基金持有加拿大超市Metro 10%的股份,这已经达到了监管允许的最大集中度。
And so in a sense, they do have concentrated bets and there are concentrated bets in the sense that the fund holds 10% of Metro Canadian supermarket, which is as large and as concentrated as the regulations allow.
让我们短暂休息一下,听听今天赞助商的声音。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
你知道是什么让最优秀的企业脱颖而出吗?
You know what sets the best businesses apart?
是他们如何利用创新将复杂性转化为增长。
It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.
这正是亚马逊广告在做的,由AWS人工智能驱动。
That's exactly what Amazon Ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.
每天,亚马逊广告处理数十亿次实时决策,优化整个310亿美元广告生态系统的广告效果。
Every day, Amazon Ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.
结果是广告活动运行速度快了30%,并在大规模上带来可衡量的业务影响。
The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.
这正是亚马逊自身推动增长的方式。
And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.
他们的智能AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统,最大化投资回报率,并赋能营销人员专注于创意和战略。
Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.
亚马逊广告正在证明,人工智能驱动的广告不仅仅是未来,更是新的竞争优势。
Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.
更棒的是,每一家企业都可以应用亚马逊内部完善的同一套创新方法论。
And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.
前往 aws.comai/rstory 了解亚马逊广告的故事。
See the Amazon ad story at aws.comai/rstory.
网址是 aws.com/ai/rstory。
That's aws.com/ai/rstory.
初创公司行动迅速。
Startups move fast.
借助人工智能,它们交付速度更快,并更早吸引企业客户。
And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.
但大单带来了更大的安全与合规要求。
But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.
SOC 2 并不总是足够。
A SOC two isn't always enough.
正确的安全措施可以促成交易,也可能导致交易失败。
The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.
但哪位创始人或工程师能抽时间离开公司建设去处理这些事呢?
But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?
Vanta 的人工智能和自动化功能能让您在几天内准备好大单所需的一切。
Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.
Vanta 持续监控您的合规状态,确保未来的交易不会被阻拦。
And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.
此外,Vanta 会随着您的业务成长而扩展,并在每一步都提供及时的支持。
Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.
随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望,Vanta 深知所需内容和时机,并已构建出最快、最简便的路径帮助您达成目标。
With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there.
因此,认真的初创公司都会尽早通过 Vanta 实现安全合规。
That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.
我们的听众可通过 vanta.com/billionaires 获得 1000 美元优惠。
Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.
访问 vanta.com/billionaires 可享受 1000 美元优惠。
That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.
新的一年到了,这是终于开始实现你梦想中事业的最佳时机。
It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming about.
就在几年前,我启动了自己的电子商务业务,而 Shopify 正是我起步所需的完美工具。
Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.
尽管许多人不断推迟梦想,等待明年再行动,但我在这里告诉你,现在就是抓住眼前机遇的时候。
While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.
Shopify 为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切。
Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.
数百万创业者,包括我自己,都已经从普通家庭用户转型为刚刚起步的创业者。
Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.
你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择,并使用其内置的 AI 工具撰写产品描述或编辑产品图片。
Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.
随着你的成长,Shopify 也将一路相伴,助你稳步前行。
And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.
在2026年,别再等待,立即用Shopify开始销售。
In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.
注册每月1美元的试用版,今天就开始在shopify.com/wsb销售。
Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.
前往shopify.com/wsb。
Go to shopify.com/wsb.
那就是shopify.com/wsb。
That's shopify.com/wsb.
在今年初,让Shopify陪伴你聆听第一声新年的号角。
Hear your first This new year with Shopify by your side.
好了,回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
你觉得
Do you think
这在某种程度上是你对早年因杠杆投资惹上麻烦、因过于激进而经历亏损痛苦的内心反应,对吗,乔?
this is partly a reaction, Joe, that you internalized in some ways those early lessons from when you got in trouble investing on margin and you went through the horror of losing money with too aggressive a stance.
有什么是
Is there something is that
所以我们还没谈到另外800家公司。
So so we we didn't get to the other 800 companies.
虽然有些可能得算三个,因为其中一些只占基金的25个基点,但占公司10%的股份。
Although some, it might have to be three because some of those are 25 basis points of the fund, but 10% of the company.
所以它们是小型公司的集中持仓,有些人说这太小了,根本无关紧要,但我们还是坚持去做,因为我们认为这些小型公司非常出色。基金在流通股中确实持有相对集中的仓位,但还有大量公司,我们看到它们有一些有趣的现象——要么是潜在的优秀企业,要么是严重错配的估值,于是我不断恳求分析师告诉我更多信息,恳求券商研究员提供见解,并试图向这些公司传递信号,希望他们能主动联系我,告诉我更多情况。
So they're concentrated holdings of a small company and on that there are people who say it's too small to make a difference, but do it anyway and think we're terrific companies that are small, the fund does have a concentrated relative to the outstanding shares holding, but then there's the large amount of companies where they see something interesting going on, see either a possibly terrific business or a really dislocated valuation where I'm begging the analysts to tell me more and begging brokerage researchers to tell me more and trying to signal to the companies, reach out to me and tell me more.
当我获得更多有用信息时,我就会加仓——比如,这是一个有进入壁垒的行业,拥有顶尖的管理团队,或者市盈率只有8倍、无负债且盈利在增长,这些都是我需要进一步了解的信息。
And I add to those when I do get more and it's good more, the here's an industry with barriers to entry, there's really top notch management team or it's eight times earnings, debt free and earnings are growing where it is a request for information.
顾问们绝对讨厌这样,因为按照规矩,你应该迅速做出高信心的判断。
Consultants absolutely hate that because you are supposed to leap to high conviction.
我仍在努力学习,热切地寻找一本关于‘不该做什么’的书,该忽略哪些信号,哪些机会值得把握。
I am still trying to learn and I'm eagerly looking for a book on what not to do, what signals do you ignore, what opportunities.
我觉得像巴菲特这样的人很厉害,两分钟内就能说‘不,没兴趣’。
I think people like Buffett are great at saying, nope, not interested after two minutes.
彼得也具备这种能力,尽管他的结论有时和我的一样,那就是我想关注这个领域,寻找更多信息。
Peter also had that capability, although his conclusion was I think sometimes like mine that it puts into the, I want to watch this space and find more.
汤姆·盖纳的做法类似,他采取了一种折中的方式,既适度分散又有所集中,他可能持有大约一百到一百一十只股票,并且喜欢这些股票都在他的投资组合中。
Tom Gaynor does something similar where he has a kind of middle way approach where he's somewhat diversified and somewhat concentrated, and he looks at, he might have a hundred, hundred and ten stocks, and he likes the fact that they're in his portfolio.
他可以专注于深入了解它们,但它们更像是预备队。
He can concentrate on finding more about them, but they're sort of the farm team.
听起来听起来——但
And it sounds it sounds- But
还有更多真实的情况。
there's more that's true.
它们是隔离观察的对象,但也是一组对比标的,比如当我研究美国银行时,会想:哪些是更优秀的银行?
They are the quarantine, but it's also a set of comparators where if I'm looking at US banks and say, well, what are superior banks?
并列出几十家,然后在心里进行比较,比如马里兰州的鹰银行和加利福尼亚州的东亚银行相比如何?
And have a list of a couple dozen of them and can mentally compare and say, Eagle Bank of Maryland, how does that compare with East West Bank of California?
然后再将它们与科特鲁斯山谷银行比较,接着再和爱荷华州的西岸银行比较。
And then let's compare that with Cotereus Valley Bank and then let's compare that with West Bank in Iowa.
让我们来比较一下。
Let's compare them.
其中一部分是为了反过来提供比较,但在富国银行开始出现合规和过度销售问题之前,我的做法是,我买入的任何银行都必须和富国银行一样好,其净资产收益率和增长前景必须不低于富国银行。
Some of it is to give a comparison the other way, but before Wells Fargo started to have their issues with compliance and overselling, my approach might be any bank that I buy has to be as good as Wells Fargo needs to have a return on equity and growth prospects that are higher or the same as Wells Fargo.
而且有些银行的市净率或市盈率必须低于富国银行。
And some of it has to be selling at a lower price to book or PE than Wells Fargo.
所以有时候你可以用一只基准股票,但当我观察小型医疗保健股时,说所有股票都必须和联合健康一样好,这很难做到。
So sometimes you can have a benchmark stock, but it's hard if I look at small cap healthcare and say, everything has to be as good as UnitedHealth.
有些公司的表现和联合健康一样好,但价格贵得多。
There are companies that are as good as UnitedHealth, but they're much more expensive.
有些公司的价格比联合健康便宜,但质量不如它。
There are companies that are less expensive than UnitedHealth, but they're not as good.
所以有时候拥有一只基准股票会有帮助,但必须谨慎对待。
So it sometimes helps to have a sort of benchmark stock, but that has to be taken.
我想这会导向一个更集中的投资组合,因为有些人可能会说,这传递了一个信息:在小型医疗保健领域,如果接受22倍左右的市盈率是合理的,那就没有哪家公司能和联合健康相媲美。
And I guess that would lead towards a more concentrated portfolio because some might say that's a, there's a message in there that there's nothing in small cap healthcare that is as good if you accept that the PE of 22 or whatever is acceptable.
你最成功的投资之一就是那个,我觉得其中一个
One of your most successful investments of all time is something where I think that one
但在我们离开这个话题之前
But before we leave that
是的。
Yeah.
是的。
Yeah.
你读过任何关于如何说不的好书吗?
Have have you read any books that are any good on what to say no to?
我的意思是,我看过一些书,它们正确地指出放弃不需要的东西是好事,但我自己却很难做到,也想找一些关于该拒绝什么、该抓住什么机会的指导。
I mean, I've seen books that correctly say it's a good thing to drop what you don't need, but I suck at doing it and looking for guidance on what not to do and what opportunities to do.
因为诱惑总是想把所有女孩都亲一遍。
Because the temptation is let's kiss all the girls.
是的。
Yeah.
这正是我书中一个核心主题,不仅在你和查理那一章中,我说过不要做傻瓜。
And it's a this is a very central theme of my book, not only in the chapter about you and Charlie, where I'm saying don't be a fool.
比如,这里列出了所有需要避免的事情。
Like, here are all the things to avoid.
但我也在关于高效习惯的章节中提到了我所谓的‘减法艺术’,即我认为所有顶尖投资者都具备的一种习惯——明确哪些事情我不会做。
But also, I write in the chapter about high performance habits about what I call the art of subtraction, which is just the habit that I think all of the best investors have of saying, these are just things I'm not gonna do.
我几乎就像拥有一份‘不做清单’。
I'm gonna It's almost like having a not to do list.
我记得曾和来自《华尔街日报》的朋友杰森·茨威格讨论过这一点,他说当他观察像沃伦·巴菲特、查理·芒格、比尔·米勒这样的人时,他们都具备一种非凡的能力:承认自己并不擅长某件事,也不真正关心它,因此会疯狂地专注于其他事情。
And I remember talking to my friend Jason Zweig about this from the Wall Street Journal and him saying that when he looks at people like Warren Buffett, Charlie Munger, Bill Miller, they all have this incredible ability to say, I'm not particularly good at this thing and it's not what I really care about and I'm just going to be maniacal about focusing only on other things.
因此,我认为这种简单地说‘不’的想法蕴含着深刻而实用的智慧。
And so I think there's deep wisdom and deep practical wisdom in this idea of just saying no to things.
而沃伦正是以这一点闻名,对吧?
And it's something Warren does famously, right?
我的意思是,沃伦说过,成功人士与非常成功人士的区别在于,非常成功的人几乎对所有事情都说‘不’。
I mean, Warren says the difference between successful people and very successful people is that the very successful people say no to almost everything.
我,是的。
I Yeah.
我的意思是,这显然是我在书中深入探讨的一个主题,但我还没见过哪本书能把这个主题做得特别出色。
I mean, it's clearly a theme that I explore a lot in the book, but I haven't seen one book that does it brilliantly.
所以,是的,但也许我只是读得不够多。
So yeah, But maybe I just haven't read enough.
威廉,请如果你或你的任何听众发现了什么,请立即联系我——
William Please contact me immediately if you or any of your listeners come up with something because-
是的。
Yeah.
但你的书在这方面也做得非常好。
But your book is also very good at that.
我的意思是,你的书很好地指出了在分析公司时需要注意的那些警示信号。
I mean, your book does a great job at saying these are the red flags when you look at companies.
意思是,不要去看那些脚注太多、会计处理模糊、披露内容繁多却令人费解的公司。
Mean, don't look at companies that have too many footnotes and opaque accounting and disclosure that's extensive but incomprehensible.
不要投资于俄罗斯这样的国家,那里法治不足,也不要投资于高通胀国家如土耳其。
Don't invest in countries like Russia, where there's not enough rule of law or countries with high inflation like Turkey.
我的意思是,我认为你的书在识别许多不该做的事情方面非常出色。
I mean, you're very good, I think, in that book at identifying a lot of the things not to do.
但某种程度上,我在阅读你的书以及多年来聆听或阅读你各种访谈时,不得不从书的不同部分和访谈中收集这些内容,然后整理出一份不该做的事情清单。
But in a way, what I had to do in reading your book and also in listening to or reading various interviews with you over the years, you have to gather these things from different parts of the books and interviews and kind of compile a list of things not to do.
同样地,从查理的24种人类误判原因清单来看,我认为他其实只读过三本心理学书籍,但他以一种非常聪明的方式将它们整合起来,指出:这些是我不会去做的事。
And likewise from Charlie's list of 24 causes of human misjudgment, he was really I think he'd only read three psychology books, but he was compiling them in this very intelligent way of saying, This is what I'm not going to do.
这些就是人们犯错的方式。
These are the ways in which people screw up.
所以我认为,某种程度上,你必须自己去做这项工作。
So I do think you have to kind of do the work yourself in a way.
我还没见过任何地方把这些内容方便地整理出来。
I haven't seen it really conveniently arrayed anywhere.
我想回到你那次惊人的投资——怪物饮料公司,我记得你最初投资时它还叫汉森公司。
I wanted to go back to this amazing investment of yours, Monster Beverage, which I guess originally was Hanson when you first invested in it.
我记得当时采访你时,你说你的成本价是8美分。
And I remember interviewing you about it and you saying basically that your cost basis was 8¢.
我昨天查了一下,股价已经涨到97美元了。我知道它经过多次拆股,但至少涨了一千倍。
I checked this yesterday and it was at $97 I know it's had lots splits and the like, but it was up at least a thousand fold.
你能谈一谈吗?我知道你一直很谦虚,说只是碰巧投资了它,因为你其实喜欢果味饮料,而不是能量饮料。
Can you talk a little bit I mean, I know you've been modest about this and have sort of said you lucked into investing in it because really you love the fruit drinks, not the energy drink.
但这项投资中蕴含的教训,你已经思考了二十多年。
But there are lessons from this investment that you've had really for over twenty years, think.
我们能从你这项巨大的长期持仓成功中吸取什么教训?它涨了至少一千倍以上。
What should we be learning from this enormous success of this massive long term holding of yours that's gone up a thousand fold or more?
伟大的成功往往连受益者自己都始料未及。
Great successes are often a complete surprise even to their beneficiaries.
不要低估运气的作用,但当时的情况对我非常有利——我恰好在一家美国电子协会的饮料服务展会上遇到了它。
Don't sell luck short, but the odds were very much in my favor in that weirdly met them at an American Electronics Association beverage service.
当时这只股票的市盈率大约是10倍。
And the stock was selling for, I think 10 times earnings.
我认为它是无负债的。
I think it was debt free.
收益在增长。
The earnings were growing.
我喜欢这些产品,而且非常欣赏管理层,因为他们看起来非常专注。
I liked the products and really, really liked the management because they seemed very intense.
他们好像自己喝过两三次 Monster 饮料,但他们的战略性和积极性真的很强。
Like they'd had two or three Monster beverages themselves, but they really seemed strategic and motivated.
由于没有债务,它不会破产。
It wasn't going to go bankrupt because they had no debt.
水果饮料,这并不太受经济周期影响。
Fruit drinks, like that's not very economically cyclical.
它不会被周期性波动拖垮。
It's not gonna get waylaid by cycles.
市盈率10倍,完全没问题。
10 times earnings, totally fine.
这是10倍的收益收益率。
That's a 10 earnings yield.
所以,从某种意义上说,事情向好的方向发展的可能性远大于向坏的方向发展的可能性。
So So there was a lot more that could go right than wrong in a way.
是的。
Yeah.
看起来犯一般性错误的可能性很小。
It seemed like the general ways to screw up were minimal.
我只是看不出他们怎么会出错。
I just didn't see how they were going to screw up.
但你是怎么持有这么多年的?
But how did you hold it for so many years?
我的意思是,你已经持有它二十多年了,而它的价格涨了一千倍。
I mean, you've you've held it for, what, twenty plus years already while it's gone up a thousand fold.
能做到这一点,似乎几乎不像是人能办到的。
That seems almost inhuman to be able to do that.
是什么让你在心态或智力上能够做到这一点?
What enabled you to do that temperamentally or intellectually?
我想,大约四五年后,每股收益就超过了成本基础。
I think it was about four years or five years later, the earnings per share were higher than the cost basis.
这正是我试图向分析师们强调的一点。
And this is something that tried to push on analysts.
我真正想要的是五年后盈利的低市盈率,那时你想象的是一个可持续的世界。
What I really want is a low PE on earnings five years out, where you're imagining a sustainable world.
这并不是关于航运周期。
It's not so much shipping cycles.
天啊。
Oh my god.
它们可能规模巨大,然后就崩盘了。
They could be huge and then they go bust.
所以这不是我所关注的。
So that's not what I'm looking for.
我寻找的是利润的大幅增长,而当我20岁的时候,我可能更喜欢大口喝猛饮,而不是把无糖饮料倒进可乐里——这正是我当年做的,所以没错,我可能当时更想要那种增长。
I'm looking for a huge growth in earnings and having had the growth in earnings and realized that, when I was 20, I probably would have liked to monster drink a lot better than dropping no dos into a Coca Cola, which is what I did, then yeah, I probably would have wanted that.
而且,虽然市盈率更高了,但利润却高得多得多。
And it's still, the multiple was higher, but the earnings were much, much higher.
它们的管理团队依然出色。
They still had the same terrific management.
它们依然没有债务。
They still didn't have debt.
那还有什么好担心的呢?
So what could go wrong?
嗯,增长可能会停止,但消费品公司的惯性比科技产品或女性时尚产品更强,而后者——令人烦恼的是——几乎没有任何惯性,至少我买的那些股票是这样。
Well, the growth could stop, but consumer products, companies have more inertia than technology products or ladies fashions, which annoyingly have almost no inertia, at least the stocks that I buy.
我向分析师展示的一种方式是,取一些巴菲特的惊人赢家,看看它们的初始市盈率和五年后的市盈率分别是多少。
One way that I presented it for the analysts was to take some of the amazing Buffett winners and said, what was the PE entry and what was the PE five years later?
结果发现,GEICO五年后的市盈率只有1倍,富国银行也是个位数。
And it was like, GEICO was like one times earnings five years later, Wells Fargo also a single digit.
即使是可口可乐,五年后的市盈率也相当温和。
Even Coca Cola was a fairly modest multiple five years out.
这样一来,就回到了你在价值线公司时所做的工作,我记得那时有三到五年的预测。
So in a way that goes back to what you were doing at Value Line where there were these three to five year, if I remember rightly, projections.
这某种程度上是在训练你放眼更远,去判断什么是合理的估值。
In a way it was training you to look further out to see what was a justifiable valuation.
这样说公平吗?
Is that fair to say?
是的。
Yeah.
但也要说,能够自信地展望五年或十年的公司非常罕见,除非你是凯茜·伍德,而她的名单也不算长。
But also saying the companies where you can look five years out or ten years out with confidence are rare unless you're Cathie Wood, and even her list is not that long.
所以我想你不会不同意,自信地展望五年或十年是困难的,而持有那些至少能有一定把握的公司则更容易。
So So I think you won't disagree that looking out five or ten years with confidence is is difficult, and it's easier to hold on to companies where you can look with at least some confidence.
我想问你一点关于投资的情感层面的问题,因为你在书中说过一句非凡的话:你愿意深入挖掘,并承受伴随卓越回报而来的痛苦、孤独和忧虑吗?
I wanted to ask you a little bit about the emotional aspect of investing because you said this extraordinary thing in your book where you wrote, are you willing to do the digging and endure the pain, loneliness, and worry that go with superior returns.
我在思考如何应对这种痛苦的问题。
And I was thinking about this question of how to handle the pain.
我知道,例如,在最近结束的这场疯狂牛市期间,资产正大量流出富达低价股票基金。
I know, for example, that there was a period during this crazy bull market that ended recently where assets were kind of flooding out of the Fidelity low price stock fund.
想想2020年,该基金规模从大约330亿美元——一个庞大的基金——下降到可能只有200亿美元。
Think in the 2020, it went from something like 33,000,000,000, which is an enormous fund, to maybe 20,000,000,000.
你可以看到人们非理性地行动,匆忙押注于疯狂的股票。
And so you could see people acting irrationally and being hasty and betting on crazy stocks.
而你却在那里保持耐心、谨慎、着眼长期、坚持价值投资。
And you're there just being patient and prudent and long term and value oriented.
我只是想知道,你如何忍受那些伴随卓越回报而来的痛苦、孤独与忧虑?
And I'm just wondering, how do you endure the pain, loneliness, and worry that go with superior returns?
对于价值投资者来说,熊市的打击并不那么严重。
For value investors, bear markets are not as punishing.
为什么会这样?
Why is that?
这是因为如果你真的认为一只股票的内在价值是50美元,而它的价格从40美元跌到了20美元,那就会觉得这太有吸引力了,这只股票一定会反弹。
It's because if you really thought that the intrinsic value of a stock was $50 and it's dropped from $40 to $20 it's like, this is so compelling, the stock will work.
在一场狂热且略带投机性的牛市中经历长期表现不佳,是我决定退休的一个重要原因。
Dealing with the underperformance during a raging and somewhat speculative bull market was a contributing factor to my decision to retire.
真的吗?
Really?
这非常痛苦。
It was very painful.
是的。
Yeah.
这非常艰难,因为我身边几乎没有其他价值投资者,在富达内部我也希望在那段时期能有一些既能安慰自己又能对这些人产生积极影响的东西。
It's very hard because I don't have any there were a small band of value investors, fidelity, and I wish during that period that I had something that was both comforting and productive to those people.
但我什么都没有。
And I had nothing.
我没有任何话可以用来安慰自己。
I had nothing for my to tell myself.
股票的售价低于其公允价值,因此我对它们感到满意。
Stocks are selling for less than their fair value, and so I'm good with them.
但当然,如果你是个好胜心强的人,落后于基准会让人很痛苦。
But of course it hurts if you're a competitive person that you are behind the benchmark.
我记得乔·格林布拉特曾经对我说过:‘除了买便宜的东西,我还能做什么呢?’
I remember Joe Greenblatt once saying to me, what else am I gonna do except buy stuff cheap?
他说:‘我相信长期来看这会奏效的。’
He's like, I I believe that it's gonna work in the long run.
那我还能做什么呢?
And what else am I gonna do?
我没有其他方法。
I don't have another approach.
让·玛丽·阿尔维亚德也对我说过同样的话。
Jean Marie Arviard said the same thing to me.
他说:‘我还能做什么呢?'
He's like, What else could I do?
我只能做一个价值投资者。
I can only be a value investor.
买便宜的东西,以低于其价值的价格购买,这是有道理的。
It makes sense to buy stuff cheap, to buy it for less than it's worth.
这很难。
And it's tough.
对吧?
Right?
我的意思是,你经历过一段疯狂的时期,你之前就持有过游戏驿站的股票,我认为在它成为迷因股之前,它突然从不到20美元涨到了300多美元。
I mean, you went through this crazy experience where even you had owned GameStop, I think, before it became a meme stock, and suddenly it went from under 20 to over $300.
你一定在看着这一切,心里想着:我该如何以一种理智负责的方式参与这个游戏呢?
You must just be watching that and just thinking, I I just how do I play this game in any sort of sensible responsible way?
所以我买入时,一方面是觉得它被低估了,因为它一直是个稳定的现金生成者;另一方面,我有点不愿意接受现实,即电子游戏销售模式确实已经改变,他们的业务可能受到了更大损害。
And so when I bought it, it was a combination of I thought it was undervalued because it had been a consistent cash generator and a bit of reluctance to accept reality that indeed video game sales had changed and maybe their business was more impaired.
所以当股价从个位数涨到38美元时,他们卖掉了一部分股票,然后在股价达到63美元时,清仓了绝大部分持仓。
So when they lifted it off from single digits and got to 38, they sold some of the stock and blew out pretty much all of the rest when it was 63.
从那里,股价涨到了350美元左右。那么,我按照自己的投资理念行事,是否做到了应做之事?
And from there it went to like $350 So did I do what I was meant to do thinking about my approach?
是的,即使有来自Chewy的布赖恩·科恩这样懂互联网零售的人帮忙,增长潜力也受到一定限制,38美元和63美元时,股价已属于合理甚至偏高。
Yes, even with the help of the guy from Chewy, Brian Cohen, who knew about internet retailing, the possibility of the growth opportunities were somewhat challenged and it was fairly valued to overvalued at 38 and 63.
所以我卖了,但如果你苛刻一点,会说你浪费了基金持有人数十亿美元的资金,因为你在那些价位卖出,而不是等到股价涨到350美元。
And so I sold, but if you were really unpleasant, you'd say you blew away, you threw away a billion dollars worth of the fund holders money by selling at those prices and not waiting until it hit $3.50.
我唯一的辩解是,我一直在做我该做的事,而且令人烦恼的是,卖出的股数和价格都是公开记录在案的。
And my only defense is I was doing what I was supposed to do and annoyingly a matter of public record, how many shares were sold and what prices.
所以,乔尔,当你在2023年宣布将退休不再担任基金经理时,这是否部分源于这段漫长时期带来的情感和心理消耗——当一种非理性投资方式表现得更好时,你不断撞墙、逆流而行,最终感到力不从心?
So when you announced, Joel, that you were going to retire as a fund manager at the 2023, was it partly just a reaction to the emotional and psychological drain and exhaustion of going through this long period where a less rational approach to investing was doing better and it just at a certain point it becomes harder and harder to be banging your head against the wall and swimming against the tide to mix metaphors?
是的。
Yeah.
我想是的。
I think you yeah.
很难说清楚。
It is hard to tell.
我认为,过去两年里,金融市场的现实世界中出现的疯狂现象,几乎前所未有。
I think there's rarely been as much stuff that seemed crazy to me that was going on in financial markets and the rest of the real world than over the last two years.
很难预测这种情况,但确实让人情绪上感到精疲力尽。
And it's hard to handicap it, but yeah, it was sort of emotionally exhausting.
但与此同时,我父亲的生命已接近尾声,这让我开始思考死亡的问题。他最终在十二月离世,而意识到这一点,加上未能满足股东期望所带来的情感失落,让整个过程变得更加复杂。
But the other thing that was going on was my dad was getting to the end of his life, and I guess that brings thoughts of mortality, and he did finally pass in December, but realizing that, yeah, telling all of that was sort of a complicating factor along with the emotional disappointment about disappointing certain expectations of my shareholders.
我认为,基金市场的格局也发生了变化,彼得只是去了机会所在的地方。
I think also that the market for funds has has changed and Peter went where the opportunity is or was.
我也试图去寻找机会所在。
I tried to go where the opportunity is.
只要我能理解它。
If I can understand it.
好吧,足够多的资金会流向那些你非常了解的细分机会,但现代基金却令人烦恼地倾向于让你看起来像一只指数基金,我认为这对基金持有人并无好处——因为如果你要持有一只‘伪装的’指数基金,还不如直接持有指数基金本身。
Well, the enough goes to where a subset of the opportunity that you know is extremely well, but modern funds are sort of annoyingly pushing towards making you look like an index fund, which I think is not a favor to the fund holder, because if you're going to hold a closet index fund, you might as well just hold the index fund.
我记得多年前,威尔告诉我,他曾向沃伦·巴菲特请教,说:‘我管理着大约2000亿美元,您有什么建议?’
I remember Will telling me that years ago, he got advice from Warren Buffett and said, look, I'm managing, I think it was $200,000,000,000 What advice do you have?
巴菲特说要更集中精力,你不可能太过集中,但至少在你有极高信心时,做出一些占比达到三十分之一的重大押注。
And Buffett saying concentrate more, you can't concentrate that much, but at least make one:thirty bigger bets when you have really high conviction.
我认为威尔完全遵循了这一点,因为今天你会发现,在他那庞大的投资组合中,有一些7%的重仓,而美国证交会的规定限制了你持有5%及以上仓位的数量。
And I think Will has absolutely followed that because I think today you will find in his ginormous sponge, some 7% bets, the SEC regulations limit the number of 5% and higher bets that you can have.
所以我认为他确实遵循了这一建议。
And so I think he has followed that advice.
你以前跟我谈过你对死亡的感悟,这个问题一直对你有较重的分量。
You've talked to me before about your sense of mortality, and it always weighed somewhat heavily on you this question.
我记得你提到过,2011年你去日本参加投资会议,当时发生了9.0级地震,引发了袭击福岛的海啸。
I remember you talking about being in Japan, going to investment conferences and the like in 2011 when I think it was a nine point zero earthquake hit that triggered the tsunami that hit Fukushima.
那似乎对你的人生产生了深远的影响。
And it seemed like that had a really powerful impact on your life.
你能谈谈这次事件如何塑造了你对生活态度和人生贡献的看法吗?
Can you talk a bit about how that also has shaped your view of how you wanted to live your life and what you wanted to contribute?
是的,当时我在日本参加一个会议,地震发生前的周二已经有些轻微震感,其中一次持续时间很短,可能只有半分钟,我看着公司管理层和翻译,翻译说:‘哦,这是地震或余震。’
Yeah, that was an especially in I was at a conference in Japan and there had been some tremors on Tuesday before the earthquake and one of them was very brief, it might have been half a minute and I looked at the company management and translator during that, and the translator said, Oh, that was an earthquake or tremor.
由于他们看起来并不惊慌,我也就没觉得害怕,因为人们的现实感是由周围人认为什么是真实的所定义的。
And since they did not seem freaked out, I was not freaked out since people's reality is defined by what people around them think is real.
星期五就不同了。
Friday was different.
我们正在开公司会议,杯子开始在桌上滑动,眼看就要掉下来,公司的人越来越担心,于是我们通过消防通道走到底层。令人惊叹的是,日本人以他们特有的轻柔与善意,为我们提供了免费的咖啡,我很感激,但所有人都下到了底层。
We were in a company meeting and the cups started to slide around and were threatening to fall off the table, and the company became increasingly worried and we walked down through the fire escape to the bottom Floor and in amazing Japanese lightness and kindness, they served us some free coffee, which I appreciated, but everybody went down to the bottom Floor.
我试图叫出租车送我回酒店,但出租车始终没来。
I tried to get the taxi to take me back to the hotel, but the taxi never arrived.
手机没电了,我们只好回到办公室,然后步行回酒店,这段路走起来很惬意,而不是可怕的旅程,但那一夜非常难熬。
The phone, cell phones went dead and went back to the office, so we walked back to the hotel, which was a pleasant walk rather than a horrific walk, and the night was very difficult.
酒店的接待处从顶层搬到了底层,而我的房间在23楼,整栋楼在晃动,能明显看到它在摇晃,午夜时分余震不断。我们团队中另一位成员下到前台时开始哭泣,随后被安排从19楼搬到了2楼,因为最吓人的就是楼体的摇晃。
A reception got moved from the Top Floor to the Bottom Floor of the hotel, and when he, my hotel room was on the 23rd Floor and the building was swaying, you could see it was rocking and the aftershocks continued in the midnight, Another member of our group went down to the front desk and started crying and she got transferred from like the 19th Floor to the 2nd Floor because the spookier part was the rocking.
我本想告诉父亲这里发生的事,但当我打电话时,霍华德叔叔中风了,他在我回家前就去世了,因此我没能告诉父亲关于地震的事,所有飞离的航班、甚至通往机场的火车都已取消。
I had wanted to tell my dad what was going on, but when I did call, uncle Howard had a stroke and he proceeded to die before I got home, And so I didn't tell my dad about the earthquake, flights out and even trains to the airport and flights were all canceled.
所以我被延误了一天,但最终还是离开了。
So I got delayed a day, did get out.
航空公司因此赚了额外利润,但富达认为这笔钱花得值,我也是这么想的,为了逃离那里。
The airline made a extra profit on that, but Fidelity thought that it was money well spent and so did I to escape.
嗯。
Yeah.
这只是一个提醒,生命可能是短暂且出人意料的。
It was just a reminder that life can be short and unexpected.
而且这似乎正是你最终写书的部分原因——你开始思考:我希望自己的遗产是什么?
And it seems like that was one of the reasons why you ended up writing your book was partly that you were starting to think about what do I want my legacy to be?
嗯。
Yeah.
我想这确实是原因之一,我希望写出像彼得·林奇那样的精彩著作,但他是个更出色的讲故事的人,而我可能太书呆子气了,所以写了一本可能更适合专业投资者和狂热的个人投资者的书。
I think that was part of it and hope that I could write something as awesome as the Peter Lynch books, but he's a more gifted storyteller, and guess I am too geeky, and produced a book that's probably more for professional investors and really avid personal investors.
我认为这是一本优秀而有价值的书,里面有精彩的故事、实用的建议,而且真实可信,是历经磨炼得来的智慧。
I think it's a good and valuable book that has it has good stories, good practical advice, and it's authentic, and it's it's hard earned wisdom.
我认为,我当然会强烈建议我们的听众去读这本书。
I think it's, I mean, I would definitely strongly encourage our listeners to read it.
我也很好奇,知道你一生中经历了许多——失去家人、工作和市场不按理性分析运转的困境,还有地震之类的灾难。
I'm also curious, knowing that you've gone through a lot over your lifetime, loss of family members, struggles with work and with markets that aren't cooperating with rational analysis and earthquakes and the like.
我想知道,对于我们这些同样面临创伤、痛苦、挫折和挑战的人,你有没有发现什么特别有帮助的方法,能让你在面对逆境时保持清醒的视角?
I'm curious if there's anything that the rest of us who also face our own traumatic and painful situations and setbacks and challenges, if there's anything that you found really helpful in dealing with adversity that has put things in perspective in some way.
请赐予我耐心,去接受我能控制的事情,也接受我无法控制的事情。
Give me patience to accept the things that I can control and accept the things that I can't.
如果一个结果不好,但你无法想到在当时的信息条件下自己还能做得更好,或者这件事根本无法控制,那就没必要为无法掌控的事情责备自己,比如,唉,如果我当初没有短暂地抛掉亚马逊股票就好了,但事实上,我确实希望投资那些能产生当前收益和现金流的公司,所以二十年前根本就没打算长期持有亚马逊。
Just because it was a bad outcome, if you can't think of how you would have done it better with the information that you had at the time, then there's no sense, or if you can't control it, there's no sense in beating yourself up on things you can't control, things where say, gosh, if I had held on to Amazon for more than briefly, would have been different, but in fact, yeah, I want companies that are producing current earnings and cash flow, so it was probably never meant to hold on to Amazon twenty years ago.
所以某种程度上,你是在对自己温柔一点,对自己宽容一些。
So in a way it's to some degree being gentle with oneself and a little forgiving of oneself is is something that you're doing.
是的,完全正确。
Yeah, absolutely.
如果事情无法控制,而且你当时也无法做出更好的决定,那就对自己温柔一点。
If you can't control it and wouldn't have made a better decision, then be gentle.
如果你在当时的信息条件下本可以做出不同的决定,那就一定要从中吸取教训,并牢牢记住。
And if you would have made a different decision with the information you had, then be darn sure that you learn that and remember that.
就我而言,喝十二杯朗姆可乐加一些啤酒是个极糟糕的主意。
In my case, having 12 rum and Cokes and some beer is a really horrible idea.
一定要记住这一点,别再重复了。
Be sure that you take away that and and don't repeat it.
但喝上几杯烈性饮料或许还不错。
But a couple of monster beverages might be good.
那是大约四十五年前的事了,但千万别再这么做了。
That would be some forty five years ago, but don't do it.
你将在大约三十二年后,也就是2023年退休时,将基金交出去,之后继续担任股票团队的高级顾问。
You're handing on the fund after, I think, thirty two years, a little more it'll be by the 2023 when you retire as a fund manager and stay on as a senior advisor to the equity team.
你将把它交给两位我认为已与你共事了十五年的人,一位是你之前提到过的摩根·佩克和萨姆·钱古茨。
You're handing it over to two people who I think have worked with you for the last fifteen years, a lady you mentioned before, Morgan Peck and Sam Changuitz.
我这样发音对吗?
Am I pronouncing that correctly?
你能告诉我们,你试图向他们传达的不仅是如何选股,还有对股东的承诺感吗?我认为,这正是你和威尔·丹霍夫身上最显著的特征——真正深切地关心你的股东。
Can you give us a sense of what it is you're trying to convey to them, not just about how to pick stocks, but about a sense of commitment to shareholders, which I think has been one of the defining characteristics both for you and Will Danhoff, this sense of actually really deeply caring about your shareholders.
你想要向下一代传达什么?
What are you trying to convey to the next generation?
因为我的感觉是,你非常关心这只信安低费率股票基金。
Because my sense is that you deeply care about this baby fidelity low price stock.
我的意思是,这是你创造出来的基金,现在你要把它交出去。
I mean, this is this is your creation that you're handing on.
努力做正确的事。
Try to do the right thing.
努力让基金的波动性低于市场。
Try to the fund is less volatile than the market.
因此,在市场下跌时,投资者更容易坚持持有。
So it's somewhat easier to hang on to in down markets.
尽管这并不能避免它们和我一样失望于基金下跌,但我觉得这不太可能让你在错误的时间抛售。
Although that doesn't mean that they're not as disappointed as I am, that it's down and you can't avoid that, but I think it's less likely to make you sell at the wrong time.
是的,我试图向萨姆和摩根强调的是,在可选的情况下,选择行业最佳的公司;除此之外,更像是霍华德·马克斯所暗示的——成千上万件小事。
Yeah, try to choose when they're available, the best in class companies is what I'm trying to push to Sam and Morgan, Beyond that, it's more like Howard Marks implied, which is a thousand little things.
你所说的‘一千件小事’是什么意思?
What do you mean about a thousand little things?
他写过一本书,最重要的事情,你知道,结论是投资中没有哪一件事是最重要的,而是有上千件小事。
He had a book, the most important thing, you know, and the conclusion is there's not a most important thing in investing, there's a thousand little things.
是的。
Yeah.
但我认为真正重要的事情是,你要以股东的身份行事,如果他们拥有你这样的知识,他们会怎么做?因为我们整天都在研究这些,我们理应拥有更好的知识,但你要做的是,就像他们拥有同等知识时会做的那样。
But I think the really big thing is do what the shareholder would do for themselves if they had the knowledge that you have, which since we spend all day on it, we should have better knowledge, but do what they would do if they had the same knowledge.
我记得你曾经对我说过,乔尔,人们经常问你,为什么你不设立对冲基金,收取2%的年费和20%的利润分成呢?
I remember you once saying to me, Joel, that people had often said to you, why don't why don't you run a hedge fund where you get, you know, 2% annual fees and 20% of the profits?
你当时对我说,我对让已经富有的人变得更富有并不感兴趣。
And you had said to me, I'm not really interested in making people who are already rich much richer.
而在我看来,你管理的富达低价股基金,大概拥有一百万名股东,管理的资产规模大约是七千亿美元。
And my sense with you with Fidelity low price stock, I think you probably have about a million shareholders, something like that, and you've been managing maybe 70,000,000,000 in assets.
我感觉你真正做到了一点,那就是你职业生涯中一个显著的特点:你非常关心自己是否为这些投资者尽职尽责。
My sense about you was that you really did One of the distinctive things about your career is the degree to which you cared about whether you were doing a good job for those people.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为威尔也非常在意这一点,但金融行业并不总是充满人性的意义,但在某些地方,你希望它能为他人提供服务。
And I think Will cares about it a great deal, but finance is not a business that is draped with a lot of human meaning, but there are places where you want it to be of service to someone.
当你回顾自己的职业生涯,经历了如此辉煌的历程,是什么让你感到满足?
When you look back on your career, having had this incredible run, what gives you a sense of satisfaction about it?
因为从某种意义上说,你刚刚经历了一段非常痛苦的时期,尽管你的长期业绩依然出色,但过去十年无疑令人沮丧。
Because you've come through this very painful period in a sense in the last few years, albeit your long term record is still great, but it's obviously been a frustrating decade three:thirty in a sense.
你回望过去,哪些方面让你感到满意?
What do you look back on with satisfaction?
我很高兴大多数基金持有人获得了令人满意的回报。
I'm glad that most fund holders have gotten a satisfactory return.
我也很高兴富达内部涌现出像摩根和萨姆这样的后起之秀,他们会继续关注股东利益。
I'm also glad that there are up and coming people like Morgan and Sam at Fidelity who will continue to try to do that, looking at the attention to shareholders.
我能看到成长团队中的一些人受到了威尔理念的影响,是的,我认为为大量普通民众带来满意回报,并培养下一代人才,这才是最重要的。
I can see people in the growth group who have been affected by Will's approach, and yeah, I think producing satisfactory results for a lot of average people, for a huge number of average people in developing talent in the next generation.
当你展望未来时,你看看,我今年54岁了。
And when you look to the future, you're you're look, I'm 54.
我现在看着你。
I look at you now.
我觉得你64岁了。
I think you're 64.
我觉得你是个相对年轻的人,不像披头士当年唱‘当我64岁’时,那感觉简直老得不行。
I think of you as a relatively young man, unlike the Beatles when they were saying, you know, when I'm 64 and it seemed incredibly old.
当你展望未来时,你觉得自己会做些什么?
When you look to the future, what do you see yourself doing?
除了显然会像给萨姆和摩根这样的年轻人提供建议之外,你打算如何度过接下来的二十年、三十年、四十年,甚至五十年——我希望如此?
Well, in addition to obviously offering advice to people like Sam and Morgan, how do you intend to spend the next twenty, thirty, forty, fifty years, I hope?
我有时在想,是否该重写并更新这本书,因为有了新的故事,有些话题可能被遗漏了,有些则可能需要加入,所以我还不确定是否要这么做。在我父亲去世前的那个夏天,我和他谈过这件事,他并不太支持。
I sometimes wonder whether I want to rewrite and update the book because there are new stories and there's some topics that I think some might be left out, some might be added, so I'm not sure if I'm going to do that, and one of the things that I had talked about with my dad in the summer before he passed, he was not so keen on that.
我当时问他关于他写过但没出版的一本书,他当时在某种程度上是在推着我。
I was asking him about a book that he had worked on but not published, and he was sort of pushing me.
他曾经对国际贸易以及它对经济和社会的影响有一些想法,觉得这非常有趣。
He had had some thoughts about international trade and how that affects economies and societies, and he thought that was very interesting.
我可能会这么做,但更有可能的是,我会对‘大钱’这件事做些小的更新。
I might do that, although I think the likelihood is more that it will update the big money thing small.
此外,我还在韦斯利安大学担任受托人,并试图与他们合作。
There's also a trustee at Wesleyan University and trying to work with them.
我没有参与投资委员会,而是校园事务委员会的成员,因此我在推动一些他们并不太想要的想法,但我正在寻找 someone 能帮助学术界撰写关于大学开支规则的文章,因为我认为所谓的‘托宾规则’存在问题,而通过更深入地审视收入,这个问题或许能得到解决。
They do not, I'm on the campus affairs committee, not the investment committee, and so I'm pushing my thoughts where they're not really wanted, but I think the I'm looking for someone to help maybe in academia write about university spending rules because I think that there is a problem with what they call the Tobin rule that really would be solved by looking more, look through income.
你多次提到你的父亲,我读过他的讣告文章,他显然是一位非凡的人物。
And you've mentioned your father a few times, I was reading his obituary essay, he's obviously a remarkable human being.
我想最后问你一个问题:有没有什么特别的事情,是他通过生活方式或对你的教导传递给你的,你可以分享给我们,以此纪念他的记忆?
And I wonder if I could just ask you as a final question, if there's anything in particular that he taught you through the way he lived his life or through things he told you that you could pass on to us, really in some ways in in honor of his his memory?
倾听每个人,观察一切,不要相信你所有的想法,持续探索。
Listen to everyone, observe everything, don't believe everything you think, keep exploring.
我父亲是一位极其善良的人。
My dad was an exceptionally kind man.
是的,继续学习。
Yeah, keep learning.
他一生都在这样做。
That's what he did all his life.
《华尔街日报》上有一篇关于蜘蛛及其织网方式的文章,这其实是他的专长,我非常怀念他关于蜘蛛丝中需要一定湿度才能产生,但随后会干燥的描述和知识。
It's a article in the Wall Street Journal about spiders and how they produce the web, which was actually his specialty and I so miss his descriptions and knowledge of apparently there's some moisture in it that is required to produce it, but then it dries off.
但要持续学习,这正是他会说的。
But keeping learning, that's what he would say.
威廉,这是很好的传承。
William That's a good legacy.
乔尔,非常感谢你。
Joel, thank you so much.
和你聊天真是太愉快了。
It's been such a pleasure chatting with you.
我由衷感谢你的慷慨,分享了你的想法,无论是通过你的书、我的书,还是今天的这次对话。
I really appreciate your generosity and sharing your ideas, both in your book, my book, and in this conversation today.
和你聊天总是令人愉快。
It's it's always a delight chatting with you.
谢谢。
Thank you.
好了,各位。
Alright, folks.
今天的对话就到这里,感谢伟大的乔尔·蒂林哈斯特。
That's it for today's conversation with the great Joel Tillinghast.
如果你想更多地了解乔尔,不妨翻翻我书中的第八章,《更富足、更明智、更快乐》,我写了关于他的几页内容。
If you'd like to learn more from Joel, you may wanna glance at chapter eight of my book, richer, wiser, happier, where I wrote a couple of pages about him.
乔尔自己也写了一本非常好的书,我强烈推荐。
Joel also wrote a very good book of his own that I would definitely recommend.
书名叫《大钱,小思考》。
It's titled big money, think small.
副标题是:偏见、盲点与更聪明的投资。
The subtitle is biases, blind spots, and smarter investing.
书中充满了关于如何更明智地投资的实用建议,同样重要的是,如何避免愚蠢且代价高昂的错误。
It's full of really practical advice about how to invest more intelligently and equally important, how to avoid dumb and costly mistakes.
我很快就会回来,带来更多精彩的嘉宾,包括一位名叫约翰·斯皮尔斯的伟大投资者,他几乎半个世纪都效力于一家名为特威迪·布朗的标志性投资公司。
I'll be back very soon with some more terrific guests, including a great investor named John Spears, who has spent almost half a century at an iconic investment firm called Tweedy Brown.
与此同时,欢迎在推特上关注我,账号是William Green seventy two,并告诉我你对这个播客的体验如何。
In the meantime, please feel free to follow me on Twitter at William Green seventy two, and do let me know how you're enjoying the podcast.
能收到你们的反馈,我总是非常高兴。
I'm always delighted to hear from you.
我们下次再见。
Until next time.
保重,身体健康。
Take care, and stay well.
感谢收听TIP。
Thank you for listening to TIP.
请通过投资者播客网络订阅《我们研究亿万富翁》。
Make sure to subscribe to We Study Billionaires via The Investor's Podcast Network.
每周三,我们向您讲解比特币;每周六,我们研究亿万富翁和金融市场。
Every Wednesday, we teach you about Bitcoin, and every Saturday, we study billionaires and the financial markets.
要获取我们的节目笔记、文字稿或课程,请访问 theinvestorspodcast.com。
To access our show notes, transcripts, or courses, go to the investorspodcast.com.
本节目仅用于娱乐目的。
This show is for entertainment purposes only.
在做出任何决定之前,请咨询专业人士。
Before making any decision, consult a professional.
本节目由The Investor's Podcast Network版权所有。
This show is copyrighted by The Investor's Podcast Network.
在转播或重播前,必须获得书面许可。
Written permission must be granted before syndication or rebroadcasting.
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