RWH025：患者资本 与 Samantha McLemore

我的意思是，当时对这家公司、商业模式、营运资本周期和自由现金流做了大量分析，杰夫·贝佐斯深入研究了这些基本面。

I mean, there was a lot of analysis about the company and the business model and the working capital cycle, the free cash flow, Jeff Bezos analyzed the fundamentals.

你无法预知未来。

You don't know how the future is.

你对未来的了解，并不比其他人更多。

You don't know anything about the future that other people don't know.

但他认为它的定价严重偏离了价值。

But he thought it got really mispriced.

他在科技泡沫破裂后大幅加仓。

He added aggressively to it after the tech bubble burst.

因此，我们很多工作都很幸运地与迈克尔·莫维森合作，他写过一本关于预期投资的书。

And so a lot of our work, I was fortunate to work with Michael Movison, who wrote the book on expectations investing.

正是预期的调整推动了股价的变化。

So it's those revisions to expectations that drive stock prices.

价值投资的妙处在于，你是在一个低预期的有利池塘里钓鱼，但这些预期必须是错误的。

So the great thing about value investing is you're fishing in a favorable pond of low expectations, but those expectations have to be wrong.

它们必须是错误的，你才能真正赚钱，但这是一个很好的投资环境。

They have to be wrong for you to actually make money, but it's a good pond to be in.

因此，我们试图寻找低预期、恐惧和悲观情绪。

And so we try to find low expectations, fear and pessimism.

在这样的市场环境中，这正是你想要的，尤其是当市场遭受重大损失时，如果你能坚持长期投资，这反而是一个优势。

It's exactly what you want in an environment like this, where especially if the market suffered big losses, that's an advantage time to be investing if you can be long term.

是的，这绝对是比尔一直强调的教训之一。

So yeah, that was definitely one of the lessons that Bill always reinforced.

当时亚马逊的股价被严重打压，以至于很少有人还记得，而这正是我为《财富》杂志撰写关于他的文章的核心内容。

William Amazon had been crushed at the time to an extent that very few people will remember, because this was actually the core of my article about him for Fortune.

因为股价基本上从大约90美元跌到了6美元。

Because basically the stock had fallen from, I think, 90 to six.

很多人说它会破产。

And a lot of people were saying that it was going to go bankrupt.

一些非常聪明的人。

Really smart people.

我的意思是，这些人可不是傻子。

I mean, these weren't idiots.

所以，我前几天和比尔聊起这个，因为我们一周前在纽约见了面。

And so most of Bill's peers I was talking to him about this the other day because we met in New York City a week or two ago.

我们之所以回忆起这件事，是因为当时曾猛烈抨击他的人，也参加了我们那次会面。

And we were recalling this because one of the people who'd been pilloring him at the time was at the meeting that we had.

这位先生我就不点名了，以免让他难堪，但他可是投资界一位非常睿智的元老级人物，当时说：‘这公司肯定会垮，你根本不是价值投资者，你为什么要这么做？’

This guy who's like I won't embarrass him by saying his name, but he's a very brilliant elder statesman of the investing world, was saying, This is going to go bust and you're not a value investor and why are you doing this?

比尔为自己辩护，说：‘你看，这就像房利美，它的成本优势被掩盖了。’

And Bill was defending himself and was saying, Look, well, it's like Fannie Mae in that its cost advantage is concealed.

从短期来看，它亏损严重，但从长期来看，你会看到它拥有一个被至少由GAAP收益掩盖的成本优势。

So in the short term, it's losing lots of money, but in the long term, you'll see that it has this cost advantage that's concealed at least by GAAP earnings.

因此，这里存在一种误解。

And so there was a misperception there.

这似乎一直是比尔和你所做事情的核心：利用人们的误解，尤其是在真正不确定、人们恐慌的时候。

And it seemed like that was always the essence of what Bill and you were doing, was exploiting people's misperceptions, especially in times of real uncertainty when they would panic.

玛丽，确实如此。

Mary Definitely.

我们一直在寻找不同的观点，并且我们认为市场极其难以超越。

We're always looking for a variant perception and we believe the market is extremely difficult to beat.

它在实际操作中是高效的。

It's pragmatically efficient.

在大多数时候，它基本上是正确的。

It's mostly right most of the time.

因此，你能从市场中获得优势的领域并不多，信息不对称的情况大多已被竞争和监管消除。

And so there's not many areas where you can get an edge on the market and informational inefficiencies, those are mostly competed, regulated away.

要获得信息优势非常困难。

It's very hard to get an informational edge.

你可以获得分析优势，但即便如此，在当今时代，做到这一点也极其困难。

You can get an analytical edge, but again, in today's day and age, it's very, very difficult to do that.

竞争已经白热化。

It's hypercompetitive.

因此，我们认为你能获得优势的领域主要在于行为层面，即人群倾向于以相似的方式行动，这与行为金融学中关于损失厌恶和近期偏差的文献一致。

So the area where we believe you can mostly get an edge is the behavioral, the tendency of groups of people to act in similar ways to all the behavioral finance literature on loss aversion and recency bias.

当人们遭受损失时，他们的行为并不理性。

When people have losses, they don't behave optimally.

他们更有可能恐慌并抛售。

They're more likely to panic and sell.

这些情况往往创造了最佳的投资机会。

Those oftentimes create the best opportunities.

因此，如果你能发现——尤其是找到那些你非常看好的公司，而这些公司正经历某种恐慌情绪——这些就是我们最青睐的长期投资机会，大约是一比三十的回报潜力。

And so if you can find, especially if you can find companies that you really like where there's any sort of panic going on, those are our favorite one:thirty sorts of opportunities over the long term.

我的意思是，当时我为《财富》杂志写那篇文章时，我就说过：如果他对亚马逊的判断正确，这将成为有史以来最伟大的逆向投资之一，因为当时股价实在太低了。

I mean, at that time, I remember even when I wrote that article for Fortune, I basically said, Look, if he's right about Amazon, this will turn out to be one of the greatest contrarian bets of all time, because it was so low.

他建立了一个仓位，买入了公司15%的股份。

And he built this position where he bought 15% of the company.

这不仅仅是逆向投资，更是大胆得令人难以置信。

It wasn't just that it was contrarian, it was unbelievably ballsy.

我的意思是，这太激进了。

I mean, it was so aggressive.

我最近又看到他对比特币的押注，还有他的个人投资组合。几周前他还跟我说，是的，这基本上就是三位一体。

I see that again with his bets on Bitcoin these days and in his personal portfolio where he was saying to me a couple of weeks ago, he's Yeah, it's basically, it's the holy trinity.

就是比特币和亚马逊。

It's Bitcoin, Amazon.

然后我想是他投资的一家安全公司，Clear，当时它还是私营企业。

And then I guess it was this security company, Clear, that he invested in when it was still private.

你觉得，有谁能在亚马逊最受人憎恨、股价从90美元暴跌到6美元的时候，敢买入它15%的股份，这种胆量该怎么评价？

What do you make of just the sheer ballsiness of someone who was able to buy 15% of Amazon when it was most hated all the way down from 90 to six?

然后，他又在某些时候把90%以上的资产都押在比特币和亚马逊上，还用了杠杆。

And then again, to have 90 something percent of his portfolio in Bitcoin and Amazon at certain points and to use leverage.

玛丽，我们一直开玩笑说比尔胆子大得像钢铁一样。

Mary We have always joked that Bill has guts of steel.

我从未见过其他投资者能像他这样，我的意思是，许多最伟大的投资者虽然也能承受比常人更多的风险？

I have never met any other investor who can I mean, many of the greatest investors can stomach much more than other people?

我觉得这还挺常见的，但我从未遇到过任何人能接近比尔所能承受和容忍的程度。

I think that's pretty common, but I have met no one who even comes close to Bill's level of what he can stomach and tolerate.

他根本不会被股价下跌所困扰。

He just doesn't get perturbed by falling stock prices.

如果他相信一家公司，相信它的业务，他会根据证据改变自己的想法。

If he believes in the company, if he believes in the business, he will change his mind based on evidence.

他会更新自己的观点。

He will update his view.

但如果他相信一家公司，他就会继续买入更多股票。

But if he believes in the company, then he will buy more of the stock.

有趣的是，我们以前有个笑话，内部常说，一旦比尔达到某个程度，觉得事情糟糕到他不再喜欢某只股票时，那反而是最好的买入信号。

And the funny thing about it is we used to have this joke where internally, once Bill reached the point, if things were going badly enough that Bill decided he didn't like a stock anymore, that was the best buy signal.

如果这家公司能挺过来，那就是最好的买入信号，因为那时已经没人再卖了。

If the company was going to survive, that was the best buy signal there was because no one else was left to sell.

他是最后一个才走到这一步的人。

He's the last one to get to that point.

所以他做出了一些非常出色和正确的判断。

And so he's made some amazing and great calls.

我非常钦佩他的另一点是，他能够承受市场波动，不受情绪左右，这是一大优势。

The other thing I really admire about him, so his ability to stomach and just not get swayed and emotional in the markets is a huge benefit.

想想沃伦·巴菲特谈到优秀投资者的关键时，提到情绪稳定、对个人和机构行为的敏锐理解以及独立思考，但其中并没有提到智商。

Think Warren Buffett's, when he talks about keys for being a good investor, emotional stability, a keen understanding of the behaviors of individuals and institutions and individual thinking, There's no IQ in there.

但情绪稳定，我认为在这方面他做到了极致。

But emotional stability, again, build as good as it gets in my opinion out there.

他也是一个非常有独特思维的人。

And he's also just a very differentiated thinker.

他愿意尽早观察事物，并根据证据形成自己的结论。

He's willing to look at things early and form his own conclusions based on the evidence.

他对亚马逊就是这样做的。

And so he did that on Amazon.

他对比特币也是如此。

He did that on Bitcoin.

我的意思是，他在那里非常早地介入了。

I mean, he was very early there.

他喜欢关注新事物。

He loves to look at new things.

他把自己描述为智力上的多产者。

He describes himself as intellectually promiscuous.

所以他喜欢新事物。

So he loves new things.

他热爱学习。

He loves learning.

所以我认为，所有这些特质在投资时都是巨大的优势。

And so all of those things I think are great assets when it comes to investing.

威廉，我总是觉得，当他最尊敬的人——无论是巴菲特、芒格、坦普尔顿，还是其他伟大的价值投资者——与他意见相左时，这反而让他对某个想法更兴奋，因为我会记得，在那些早期的日子里，大概是9·11事件之后，他对我说：‘巴菲特没买，普林斯·奥卢利特没买，坦普尔顿也没买。’

William I always got the sense that when the people he respected most disagreed with him, whether it was Buffett or Munger or Templeton or any of the great value investors, it actually made him more excited by an idea because he would think, I remember in those early days, I guess it was after nineeleven, he said to me, Buffett's not buying, Prince Owlouleet's not buying, Templeton's not buying.

他说：‘当所有伟大的价值投资者都不买的时候，这反而是买入的信号。'

He's like, When all of the great value investors aren't buying, that's a buy signal.

同样地，我认为几乎在比特币这件事上，当他听到巴菲特和芒格称比特币为‘加倍的鼠药’时，这并不会让他却步，尽管他非常敬重他们。

And so likewise, I think almost with Bitcoin, when he hears Buffett and Munger talking about it as rat poison squared, It doesn't seem thirty:fifty to put

他非常钦佩他们，但这并不会让他反感。

him off much as he admires them.

你认为这里的思路是什么？

What do you think the thinking is there?

所以我见过比尔在这件事上持两种态度。

So I've seen Bill go both ways.

我真的认为他会认真听取他们的论点，以及他自身的背景和哲学。

I really do think he listens to their arguments, his background and philosophy.

他会认真考虑你论点的合理性。

He's going to listen to the merits of your arguments.

当我们为他做研究时，总是基于我们论点本身的合理性，以及我们能否用证据来支持它。

When we did research for him, it was always based on the merits of what we were arguing and whether we could support it with evidence.

所以‘加倍的鼠药’这种说法是无法说服他的。

So rat poison squared is not going to be convincing to him.

这可能参差不齐，但我们很乐意讨论它。

It might be patchy and we might love to talk about it.

这很有趣，但没有基于证据。

It's interesting, but it's not evidence based.

因此比尔会说，巴菲特在这一领域并没有特别的专业知识。

And so Bill would say there, Buffett doesn't have any particular expertise when it comes to this sort of thing.

他甚至多年来一直完全回避科技领域。

He even swore off technology broadly for many, many years.

所以如果你看看风险投资界真正了解这一领域的人，他们对此非常兴奋。

And so if you look at the people who actually know something about this in the venture capital world, they're really excited by it.

比尔会仔细阅读所有最新发布的细节。

And Bill will read all the details of what's coming out.

我的意思是，他再次成为信息的狂热消费者。

I mean, he's, again, a voracious consumer of information.

所以我认为，再次强调，如果我们把期望和基本面分开来看，我们希望期望值低，而争议、悲观和恐惧——所有这些对期望而言都是好事。

So I think, again, as I see it, again, if we kind of separate it into the expectations versus the fundamentals, we want the expectations low and controversy and pessimism and fear, and all of that's a good thing if it comes to expectations.

然后我们希望基本面良好，但那是另一套证据和我们需要分析的特征。

And then we want the fundamentals to be good, but that's a different set of evidence and characteristics of what we're looking at and analyzing there.

所以是的，其他人不同意他并不会让他退缩。

So yeah, it's not going to deter him that other people don't agree with him.

他会倾听他们的想法，如果他们提供了充分的证据，他也会改变主意，但我觉得他们必须提供充分的证据。

He will listen to what they think, And he will change his mind if they're presenting good evidence, but they have to present good evidence, I think.

克莱，我们先休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Clay Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

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好的。

Alright.

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这份指南免费提供，访问 netsuite.com/study 即可获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

netsuite.com/study。

Netsuite.com/study.

好了，回到节目。

All right, back to the show.

威廉，你最初对比特币持怀疑态度，后来逐渐转变了看法，将一部分投入了你的长期资本基金，也有一部分个人持有，那么你个人对比特币的历程是怎样的？你主张持有比特币的理由是什么？

William You were kind of skeptical originally of Bitcoin and then sort of came around somewhat and put some of it in your patient capital fund and some of it personally, or what happened in terms of your own trajectory with Bitcoin and what would your argument be for owning it?

当比尔被问到时，我们经常被问到，我们之间的主要区别是什么？

When Bill's asked, we're often asked, what are the main differences between us?

所以他会说，我的证据门槛要高得多。

So he would say, I have a much higher evidentiary threshold.

我需要看到和分析什么才能相信一件事？

What do I need to see and analyze in order to believe something?

这可能是对的。

And that's probably right.

直到今天，我还在懊悔自己没有在比尔投资比特币时跟进，他赚了一大笔钱。

And so I kicked myself to this day that I didn't invest in Bitcoin when Bill did and he made a ton of money.

我们经历了一轮巨大的比特币牛市。

We had this big Bitcoin bull cycle.

所以在2017年，比特币价格从每枚300美元涨到3000美元时，我告诉比尔，他在管理的某个基金里持有了很大的仓位。

And so in '20, I guess it was at 2017 when it before had gone from $300 a coin and when it got to 3,000, I was telling Bill, it was a big position in one of the funds he ran.

我对他说：比尔，你得减仓了。

I was like, Bill, you've got to cut this back.

它还会再次崩盘。

It's going to crash again.

你的投资组合会遭受损失。

You're going have losses in your portfolio.

当时，投资逻辑是认为比特币会取代货币，人们关注的是比特币交易量的增长。

And at that time, the investment case was about it displacing currency and people tracking the number of transactions being utilized with Bitcoin.

但那时我没有看到足以让我相信这一牛市观点的证据。

Again, I didn't see the evidence at that time that convinced me to believe in that bull case.

然后我在比特币上完全错了。

And then I was completely wrong on Bitcoin.

所以它从3000涨到了20000，之后确实崩盘了，但又跌回了3000。

So it went from 3,000 to 20,000, and then it did crash, but back to 3,000.

如果你听了我的建议，他就会受损，因为即使他坚持持有，价格最终还是回到了我建议他退出的水平。

So if you listened to me, he would have been harmed because even riding through it, it just went back to where I was advocating that he get out.

这是我们一直在关注的事情。

It was something we were following.

我认为在2020年，我才把它放进我管理的基金里。

I think in 2020, that's when I put it in the fund that I run.

那时，它已经经历了一个周期，崩盘后又开始回升。

At that time, it had had the cycle, it had crashed and started resuming its rise.

看涨的理由已经转变了，不再围绕交易量追踪，因为人们认为由于成本等原因，比特币并不适合这个用途，但他们开始把它称为数字黄金。

The bull case had shifted from, it was no longer about tracking transactions and people were saying it's not great for that for a number of reasons, the cost to do that, But they were saying, and they were talking about it as digital gold.

这种说法在更早的年份就已经被提过了。

And that had been thrown around in earlier years.

但归根结底，目标只有一个。

But again, there's only one goal.

因此，那里成功的基准概率非常低。

So the base rate of success there was very low.

但有趣的是，到2020年，比尔已经在这个领域深耕了多年。

But interestingly, by 2020, Bill had been involved in this space for many, many years.

他是其中一位专家。

He was one of the experts.

他几乎每周都参加与机构的电话会议，这些机构对了解加密货币和比特币充满兴趣。

And he was on calls with institutions virtually every week who were interested in learning more about crypto and learning more about Bitcoin.

因此，黄金在投资领域中占据着一种特殊的心理空间，这种信念在广大人群中普遍存在。

So gold basically just occupies a special psychological space in the investment universe of a belief state that exists broadly among people.

因此，它似乎正沿着这条路径发展。

And so it seemed to be following that path.

随后，一些学术研究指出，比特币实际上具备一些定量特征，支持它作为数字黄金的可能性。

Then there were some academic research that suggested it actually did have quantitative characteristics that argued it could be a digital gold.

因此，我认为通胀是一个风险，如果比特币能占据类似数字黄金的位置，并拥有上行的免费期权价值，它可能成为对冲通胀的良好工具。

And so I thought inflation was a risk and it could be a good hedge for inflation if it occupied a similar digital gold place with free option value on the upside.

所以，是的，我认为我常常希望做更多细致的工作。

So yes, I think I'm oftentimes I want to do more of the detailed work.

我认为这正是比尔和我彼此互补的方式之一，但他早期的投资带来了巨大优势。

Think that was one of the ways Bill and I were very complimentary to each other, but his investing early was a big benefit.

你认为比尔对比特币的故事，有多大程度上是基于供需关系的？

How much of the story of Bitcoin for Bill do you think is really just about the supply demand case?

他只是看了看，就说：供应是有限的，需求在增长，世界上有那么多百万富翁，他们不可能每个人都买到一枚比特币，即使他们想买。

He just looks at it and he says, Well, there's limited supply, the demand's growing, and there are so many millionaires in the world and they can't all get a coin, even if they wanted one.

所有这些机构都想要它。

All these institutions want it.

所以比尔身上有一种非常中立的部分，他根本不在乎它是不是有价值的东西。

And so there's some sort of deeply agnostic part of Bill that doesn't really care whether it's a value or anything.

他只是觉得，因为它是一种稀缺资源且需求旺盛，所以价格会上涨。

That's just like, it's going to go up because it's a sort of scarce resource with demand.

玛丽？不，完全不是。

Mary No, entirely.

我认为这完全是两回事。

That's entirely I think it's two things.

一方面是供需关系，供应是固定的，这就是看涨的理由。

It's that, it's supply versus demand and there's a fixed supply and that is the bull case.

所以，如果你对一种供应固定的东西有持续增长的需求，价格就会上涨。

And so if you have growing and sustainably growing demand for a fixed supply thing, the price will go up.

而且这还涉及到基本的风险回报和预期收益。

And then it's also just basic risk reward, expected values.

如果我猜对了，我能赚多少？

What can I make if I'm right?

如果我猜错了，我会损失多少？

And how does that compare to what I lose if I'm wrong?

考虑到这些特性，如果情况顺利，上行空间会极其巨大。

And the upside, given those characteristics, if things work out well, is so extremely high.

如果它是数字黄金，价值可能达到三十万美元。

If it is digital gold, you can get values 300,000.

我认为凯西·伍德预测的是五十万美元。

I think Kathy Wood's out there with 500,000.

如果它继续以这种方式发展，这些估值并不算离谱。

Those aren't crazy values if it continues to evolve in that way.

这带来了巨大的上行空间。

That's huge upside.

而下行风险则是归零。

And then the downside is to 100%.

如果它完全消失，这是你可能损失的最大金额。

That's the most you can lose if it completely disappears.

我认为他会说，我也同意，在当前的发展阶段，它完全消失的可能性非常低。

And I think he would say, and I would agree that at this point in its evolution, it's very unlikely to completely go away.

我认为这种情况不再可能了。

I think that's no longer likely.

它可能会出现显著的三比五的亏损，

It could have significant thirty:fifty

但我认为这两个因素构成了看涨的核心，对吧。

losses, but I think those two elements are the bull case, yes.

我认为，这种愿意寻找具有巨大上行空间的非对称押注的倾向，一直让价值投资界的其他人感到不安，对吧？

I think that willingness to look for asymmetric bets with tremendous upside was always something that freaked out the rest of the value investing community, right?

因为像巴菲特这样的人显然热爱确定性并规避风险。

Because someone like Buffett really obviously loves certainty and avoiding risk.

芒格更愿意承担风险，投资像阿里巴巴这样的公司。

Munger's prepared to take more risk probably and bet on things like Alibaba.

然后你有比尔，我记得当年他被抨击亚马逊时，为自己辩护的情景，那大概是2001年，那时我刚开始采访他关于亚马逊的事。

And then you have Bill, who I remember when he was defending himself when he was being attacked about Amazon back in probably 2001 when I was probably first interviewing him about it.

他说：‘很可能这家公司会归零。’

And he said, Look, there's a pretty good chance that it's going to go to zero.

那是亚马逊股价大约六美元的时候。

This is when it was at about six.

他说：‘但如果我是对的——我觉得我大概是对的，虽然也可能错——如果我赢了，我能赚回五十倍的钱。’

And he said, But if I'm right, and I think I probably am, but I may not be, if I'm right, I'm going to make 50 times my money.

当时人们愿意买入那些可能归零、一旦失败还会公开丢脸，但潜在回报巨大的股票。

And there was a willingness to buy things where you could go to zero and be publicly humiliated if the upside was great enough.

这种思路贯穿了你和比尔在许多新兴企业、早期阶段公司上的投资，这些公司有可能成为巨大的赢家。

That seems to be a consistent stream through a lot of your investments with Bill in kind of emerging companies, early stage companies that could be enormous winners.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that?

因为这在价值投资圈里其实是非常罕见的现象。

Because it's actually, it's a really unusual thing to see within the value investing community.

你们可以说是这方面的先驱和异类，愿意承担这样的巨大风险——我认为李录也这么做。

You guys sort of pioneers and outliers in being willing to take these big I mean, I think Li Lu does it as well.

我认为李录在比亚迪早期就以类似风险投资的方式下注，并赚取了巨额回报。

Li Lu, I think made enormous amounts of money on BYD with almost like a venture capital style bet very early in its life.

是的，没错，我觉得你说得完全对。

Yeah, no, I think that that's exactly right.

这类似于风险投资组合。

It is similar to venture portfolios.

如果你看这些投资组合，它们整体表现很好，但主要依靠少数几个巨大的赢家大幅上涨来驱动，其余的都是失败者，我认为公开市场的风险更低。

If you look at those portfolios, they do really well, but it's driven by a handful, a small number of huge winners that go up a ton and the rest are losers, I think the risk is lower in the public markets.

嗯，也许直到最近，这些非常早期的公司才开始上市。

Well, maybe until recently when you had these really early stage companies come public.

但我认为关键在于，如果我们是对的，我们会获得什么；如果我们错了，我们会失去什么，以及这里的期望价值。

But I think this idea of what do we make if we're right and what do we lose if we're wrong and the expected value there.

在投资组合层面，必须管理风险和敞口，尤其是当你持悲观态度时。

Then at the portfolio level, have to manage the risk and the exposure, but especially if you have pessimism.

这些早期阶段的公司更容易被误解。

These earlier stage companies, can be more likely to be misunderstood.

我的意思是，我听过巴菲特说过，他喜欢的三个标准是：未来十二个月的收益、有90%的把握五年后收益会更高、以及50%的可能性每年能实现7%的复合增长。

I mean, I've heard Buffett, what he likes is, I heard the three criteria like 15 times next twelve months earnings, 90% confidence the earnings will be higher five years and 50% likelihood it can compound growth at 7% a year.

挑战在于，市场对具有这些特征的资产定价非常有效。

The challenge is the market's pretty efficient at pricing things with those characteristics.

由于利率如此之低，价格已经相当高了。

With rates so low, the prices are pretty high.

在一些早期阶段的公司中，尤其是在当今这种环境下——股价下跌了80%、90%、95%，而市场只关心未来一周或一个月——你可能会发现一些宝石，这些公司在五年后可能完全不一样。

Some of these earlier stage companies where the market, especially in an environment like today where names are down 80%, 90%, 95%, and the market just cares about the next week, month, you can find some gems, that could look entirely different in five years.

而市场也会大幅修正对这些公司的估值，从亏损企业转变为看起来截然不同的企业。

And the market would meaningfully revise how it valued those companies from a money loser to something that looks much different.

我们在进行分析时，关注的是基本面中支持这种可能性的理由。

We're looking when we're doing analysis at reasons to believe that's the case in the fundamentals.

我们并不是随意下注，然后说我们希望市场是错的。

We're not just taking shots and saying, so we want to believe the market's wrong.

我们希望有独特的见解，但更重要的是，这种观点能带来丰厚的回报。

We want that variant perception, but this idea that you can make a lot of money.

如果你观察基金经理如何实现回报，通常只需要少数几个大赢家就够了。

If you look at how managers deliver returns, oftentimes it only takes a few big winners.

这是比尔很早就传授给我们的经验，用以抵消大量亏损。

This is a lesson Bill imparted very early on to offset a lot of losers.

所以如果你有两三只股票涨了十倍，一只涨了五十倍，就能弥补很多亏损。

So if you have a couple, one, two stocks that are up 10 times, one stock that's up 50 time, that pays for a lot of losers.

甚至本·格雷厄姆，我认为他的大部分回报都来自盖可保险，巴菲特也是如此。

And even Ben Graham, I think most of his returns came from Geico, Buffett the same thing.

再次强调，这需要时间，投资于高质量的企业。

Again, that's time in a high quality business.

如果你对市场不理解、商业模式难以看清、或者市场没有足够长远的眼光去看到其长期潜力的公司抱有很低的预期，你依然可以获得这类回报。

You can get those sort of returns if you have really low expectations on something the market doesn't understand, a business model where maybe you can't see, the market can't see, or isn't looking out far enough to see what it might be over the long term.

威廉，我记得很多年前比尔曾经对我说过，有人对他投资组合做了一项研究，跟他说：‘是的，如果你剔除AOL或者戴尔，你的表现就会落后于市场。’

William I remember Bill once saying to me many years ago, someone had done a study of his portfolio and said to him, Yeah, if you took out AOL or you took out Dell, you would have trailed the market.

他却说：‘是的，但我确实持有AOL和戴尔。’

And he's like, Yeah, but I owned AOL and Dell.

他还说：‘这是有意为之的。’

And he said, And that was intentional.

他告诉我：‘我一直在寻找那种可能上涨50倍的公司。’

He's like, I was looking for companies like that that could go up 50 times.

所以我很想知道，当你思考你投资组合中的这一部分时——因为这只是你投资组合中的一个类别，你还有传统的经典价值股，以及像亚马逊、谷歌那样的稳定复合型公司。

And so I'm curious when you think about this portion of your portfolio, because it's only one bucket of your portfolio, because you also have the old style classic smelly value stocks, and then some kind of steady compounders like the Amazons and the Googles and the like.

但当你关注这些可能成长为巨头的早期企业时，你究竟在寻找什么？

But when you're looking at these early stage things that could become huge, what are you looking for?

这个类别中的公司具备哪些特征，才有可能成为50倍股、100倍股？

What are the characteristics of the companies in this bucket that could become 50 baggers, 100 baggers?

玛丽，我们始终在寻找某种理由，相信市场当前的预期并未反映我们所看到的企业基本面。

Mary What we're always looking for is some reason to believe that market's current expectations aren't reflecting the fundamentals that we see in the business.

意思是，这一点在所有情况下都类似。

Mean, that's similar across everything.

而且要有一些理由相信这些公司有很大的上涨空间。

And some reason to believe that these things could go up a lot.

我们在这类公司中寻找的一些因素包括巨大的总体可服务市场。

Some of the things we look for with these companies, large total addressable market.

因此，它们在所处市场中具备某种竞争优势。

So some competitive advantage within the market that they're operating.

我们希望相信那里有一个引人注目的商业模式。

We want to believe that there's a compelling business model there.

在过去几年里，有许多公司上市，但人们对它们的长期商业模式提出了很多疑问。

There's a lot of companies that came public over the last few years where there were a lot of questions about the long term business model.

我们希望在这方面做深入研究。

We want to do the work there.

因此，我会再次说，市场对这家公司的某些方面理解不足，而我们拥有优势。

And so I would say, again, that the market doesn't understand something about the business and that we have an edge.

所以我认为这些是它们的共同点。

So I think those are the similarities.

如果我们是对的，那么潜在的上涨空间就非常大。

Then if we're right, obviously the upside is quite significant.

举个例子，现在有好几个案例，但我们已经持有几年的是Farfetch。

So an example of this, I think now is, there's a couple of examples, but one that we've owned for a few years now is Farfetch.

这是一家奢侈品电商平台。

And this is a company that has a luxury goods marketplace.

他们还为奢侈品公司提供所谓的平台服务，本质上是为奢侈品公司提供技术基础设施，有点像AWS。

They also have what they call platform services for luxury goods companies, which is basically they provide the tech backbone for luxury companies, kind of similar to AWS.

此外，他们还拥有一些奢侈品品牌。

Then they own some luxury brands.

它目前亏损中。

It's losing money.

这是我们几年前买入的一只股票，当时他们在收购New Guards Group之后，市场认为这笔交易非常糟糕。

It's one of these names that we bought it a few years ago after they did a deal for New Guards Group and the market thought this is a terrible deal.

当我们做这项研究时，我们认为这是一笔非常好的交易。

When we did the work, we thought it was a great deal.

市场在短期内误解了某些东西。

There was something the market misunderstood in the short term.

因此，股价最初下跌，但随后市场意识到这笔交易其实很好。

Hit, so the stock initially traded down, but then the market realized this deal was good.

之后，它又受益于新冠疫情期间发生的各种情况，以及在中国进行的其他交易。

Then it was benefited from all sorts of things going on with COVID and from additional deals they'd done in China.

因此，股价从10美元涨到了75美元。

So the stock went from 10 to 75.

之后我们大幅减仓，但仍持有，因为我们仍然认为这家公司长期来看有巨大潜力。

So we cut back a lot then, but still held it because we still thought there was significant potential for the business over the long term.

它在短期内仍在亏损。

It's losing money in the short term.

它受到了俄罗斯、中国和汇率波动的影响。

It's been hit by Russia, China, FX.

所以股价又回到了五美元，出现了巨大的跌幅。

So it's gone back to five and so huge declines.

但尽管面临短期逆风，我们仍然看到这家企业长期的潜力。

But we still see that sort of potential longer term for the business despite the near term headwinds.

他们是唯一一家为奢侈品行业开发这项技术的公司。

They are the only company building this technology for the luxury industry.

而且他们已经与该领域的许多公司达成了合作。

And they've made deals with a lot of companies in the space.

里奇蒙特是最大的一家，随着业务推进，未来几年其商品交易总额将翻倍。

Richemont is the biggest one that will double their GMV, gross merchandise value, as it comes on over the next few years.

但今年他们正在引入菲拉格慕和尼曼 Marcus。

But this year they're bringing on Ferragamo, Neiman Marcus.

因此，我们可以看到基本面中许多积极的因素，而这些是仅看当前的损益表和现金流量表无法察觉的。

So we can see a lot of positive things in the fundamentals that you can't see if you just look at the current income statement and cash flow statement.

但当我们展望未来几年该业务的前景时，我们认为这家公司被严重误解和错估了价格。

But as we look at the implications for the business over the next few years, we think that the company is materially misunderstood and mispriced.

因此，这些就是我们在分析这些公司时所关注的类型。

So those are the sorts of things we're looking for when we analyze these companies.

看起来，在过去几年里，凯西·伍德等人追逐的许多颠覆性创新公司，尽管曾被寄予厚望、极具颠覆潜力，却都被严重高估了。

It seems like so many of these disruptive innovative companies that Cathie Wood and the like were chasing after in the last few years that had incredible hype behind them, an incredible potential to be extraordinarily disruptive, got hugely overvalued.

有些人甚至说，是的，我愿意支付50倍甚至100倍的销售额。

There were people who were like, Yeah, I can pay 50 times sales or a 100 times sales.

你曾在一次访谈中提到，Snowflake一度达到了155倍的营收估值。

Think you mentioned in one interview, Snowflake at one point was 155 times revenues.

在我看来，人们从比尔在亚马逊上的成功，以及尼克·斯利普和扎克在亚马逊上的成功中，学到了错误的教训——我曾在《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书中写过，像尼克、扎克和比尔这样的聪明价值投资者，其实通过买入优质企业并长期持有，重新定义了价值投资。

And it seemed to me that in some ways people were learning the wrong lesson from Bill's success with Amazon and Nick Sleep's success, Nick and Zach's success with Amazon, which I'd written about in Richer, Wiser, Happier, where these really smart value investors like Nick, Zach, and Bill had kind of reinvented value investing by buying great businesses and holding them for a very long time.

于是，这逐渐变成了一种新的教条：人们认为，既然这些公司正在抢占市场，那我几乎愿意为任何价格买单。

So it had become kind of this new orthodoxy where people were saying, Well, I'm kind of prepared to pay almost any price because these companies are making this land grab.

毕竟，亚马逊之所以成功，是因为它进行了大规模的市场抢占，而贝佐斯极其耐心地推迟了回报，坚持投资业务。

It's just as Amazon paid off because they made this enormous land grab and Bezos was incredibly patient in deferring gratification and getting the rewards for investing in the business.

人们于是心想，也许这又是另一个亚马逊。

People sort of thought, Well, maybe it's Amazon again.

所以感觉钟摆摆得太远了，价值投资圈里的很多人接受了这种新信仰，结果因此遭受了损失。

And so it feels like the pendulum kind of swung too far and everyone in the value or a lot of people in the value investing community got that new religion and then got killed as a result.

你能谈谈这些公司巨大的潜力与理解不同投资方式（如基于巨大可服务市场等）之间的冲突吗？同时也要警惕脱离估值的危险。

Can you talk about that conflict between the tremendous potential of these companies and the benefits of understanding these different ways of investing, based on huge addressable market and the like, and also the dangers of becoming untethered from valuation.

玛丽，这是个很棒的话题。

Mary This is a great topic.

这是我非常热衷的一个话题。

It's one I'm really passionate about.

我完全同意你的观点。

I agree with you completely.

有趣的是

And it's interesting on

我们可以停一下。

We can stop that.

这已经是我的最爱了。

That's my favorite sentence already.

这样的时刻太罕见了，萨曼莎。

Moment anyone's, It's so rare, Samantha.

不，抱歉，你继续说。

No, sorry, carry on.

玛丽，我真的认为，如果你观察巴菲特的演变，他的思路一直是一致的，从捡烟头投资到像GEICO这样的高质量复合型公司，就像比尔投资亚马逊、NixSleep一样。

Mary I really do think, if you look at Buffett's evolution, it was in the same vein from cigar investing to high quality compounders with Geico, Bill with Amazon, NixSleep.

再次强调，我在这个行业中最喜欢的一点就是资本周期和行为周期。

Again, one of my favorite things in this business is capital cycles, behavioral cycles.

当我刚入行时，正值科技泡沫的低谷，而能源和全球周期性行业则因中国新兴市场的增长而大幅上涨。

And so when I first got in, it was at the bottom of the tech bubble and then energy global cyclicals had this huge move up driven by emerging China's growth.

这正是比尔的连胜被终结的原因，因为他从未特别看好这些公司，因为它们在整个周期中都无法获得高于资本成本的回报。

That's what ended the streak for Bill because he had never been a huge fan of those companies because they didn't earn above their cost of capital through the cycle.

因此，到了2005年、2006年，只有这类公司表现突出。

And so getting into 2005, 2006, that was the only group of companies, those sorts of companies that outperformed.

而最近，你又看到了成长型股票的这一轮周期。

And now more recently, you've seen this cycle for growth.

这达到了一个阶段，我们始终非常注重估值。

And it reached the stage where, again, we are always very valuation sensitive.

这在我们整个投资组合中都至关重要。

That's key across our whole portfolio.

所以我们正在做估值工作。

So we're doing the valuation work.

我们并不总是对的。

We're not always right.

我们在分析中会犯很多错误，但如果某项资产的价格超过了我们对其价值的估算，我们就会卖出。

We make plenty of mistakes on the work, but we're gonna sell something if it exceeds our estimate of what it's worth.

我们会耐心让盈利的持仓继续增长，但我们会密切跟踪我们认为这家企业实际值多少钱。

We're gonna be patient and let our winners run, but we're gonna track quite closely what do we think the business is worth?

我们在Peloton上市时就持有它，并在泡沫期间以超过100亿美元的价格卖出了，因为我们无法合理论证它的定价已经反映了苹果那样的长期增长和估值水平。

And we owned Peloton at the IPO and sold it during the bubble at greater than a $100 because we couldn't make a valuation case where like it's pricing in Apple type duration and level of growth.

所以我认为，有些人把优质复合型企业的论点推得太远了——至少在最近这次熊市之前，他们认为任何价格都可以为一家公司找到理由。

And so I think some people have taken the quality compounder argument so far that at least before this most recent bear market, they thought you could justify paying any price for a company.

但显然你不能。

But obviously you cannot.

如果价格太高，即使是一家优秀的公司也可能成为糟糕的投资。

You can have a great company that's a poor investment if the price is too high.

这一点尤其如此。

And that's especially true.

我认为，如果利率上升或甚至保持稳定，风险会更高。

I think the risk is even higher if interest rates are rising or even stable.

你不会拥有那种顺风优势。

You're not going to have that sort of tailwind.

所以我认为，在成长型领域，有很多优秀的投资者。

So I think in the growth space, you have a lot of great investors.

但他们中很少有人真正关注估值这一部分，而我们始终如此，一直如此。

Few of them are really sensitive about that valuation piece, And we always are and always have been.

因此，我认为在价值型领域，很多人已经进入了这类公司。

So I do think in the value space, a lot of people have gotten into these sort of companies.

我从未见过任何价值投资者会做类似Snowflake这样的事，而Snowflake正是一个我从未听人说过它有任何缺点的公司的好例子。

Haven't seen any value investors do the snowflake thing, and that was a great example of a company that I have never heard a bad thing about the company.

人们喜欢这家公司，喜欢它的竞争优势，但估值却高得离谱，以至于一切都必须完美无缺。

People love this company, they love the competitive advantage, but the valuation just got so high that everything had to go right.

预期极高，市场、公司和你自己要想在这种情况下表现良好，一切都必须顺利进行。

Extremely high expectations, everything has to go right for the market, for the company, for you to do well in those sorts of situations.

如果我们再经历一个像七十年代那样的十年，风险就会高得多。

If we have a decade more like the seventies, the risk is just much, much higher.

我仍然认为，我们在许多没那么极端的公司中也能看到类似的情况。

I still think we see that around in many companies that aren't quite so dramatic.

我最近一直在思考这个问题，因为我最近在瑞士与盖伊·斯皮尔共度了一周，我为播客采访了他，同时也每年帮他撰写年度报告，这某种程度上只是个借口，好让我能和他多聊几天。

I've been thinking about this a lot recently because I spent a week with Guy Spier in Switzerland recently, and I interviewed him for the podcast, but also I help him with his annual report every year, partly just an excuse to spend a few days chatting with him.

过去几年里，这一直是他最大的困扰之一：他那些非常聪明的价值投资朋友都告诉他，去买Spotify、Netflix、Twilio、Salesforce这样的股票。

And this was one of the big sources of agony for him over the last couple of years is that all of these really smart value investor friends of his were telling him, Buy things like Spotify, Netflix, Twilio, Salesforce.

这些是他非常钦佩和喜欢的人，还有Carvana。

And these were people he really admires and likes, Carvana.

他研究这些公司的商业模式时，会感到非常兴奋。

He would look at them and he'd get really excited when he was studying the business model.

但当他看到Roku之类公司的股价时，心就沉了下去，因为这些公司的估值简直荒谬地高。

And then his heart would just sink when he would look at sort of Roku or something and would just see how absurdly overvalued these things were.

我不知道，你们似乎总是对高估值有更多耐心和容忍度，但与此同时，你们也投资于那些看起来不太讨人喜欢的公司，比如航空公司、旅游股、嘉年华邮轮，或者挪威邮轮这类人们讨厌的公司。

I don't know, you guys always seem to have more patience with more tolerance for high valuation, but at the same time, you were also investing in these sort of ugly things like airlines and travel stocks and Carnival cruise lines and the like, or Norwegian cruise lines, things that people hated.

你们的投资组合中同时包含这两类资产，这很有趣。

It's interesting that you have both of these buckets in your portfolio.

玛丽，是的。

Mary Yeah.

我认为在高估值方面，亚马逊是我们长期持有的最典型的例子，它一直看起来很贵，或者至少很长一段时间都显得估值过高。

I think in terms of the high valuation stuff, Amazon would be the poster child for the name that we've owned for so long that has always looked expensive or maybe for a long time has looked expensive.

但我认为，我们对它的信念始终是：它一直被低估了。

But I think, again, our belief there is that it's always been undervalued.

它的总可服务市场巨大，零售业务就达到5万亿美元。

It has such a huge total addressable market, 5,000,000,000,000 on the retail side.

他们发明并创建了AWS。

They invented and created AWS.

它拥有我们见过的最优秀的管理团队之一，可能在数据纪律、以证据为本和财务敏锐度方面是最出色的。

It has one of the best management teams we've ever met, maybe the best in terms of their data discipline, evidence based, financially sophisticated.

你会惊讶于有多少公司甚至无法理解，企业应该以每股自由现金流作为核心优化指标。

I mean, you would be surprised how few companies can even understand that the proper metric to engineer the business for is free cash flow per share.

这家公司早在其最初的年度报告中就已明确了这一点。

This is the company that had it in its initial annual report.

因此，所有声称自己是下一个亚马逊的公司，在许多关键方面——比如它们优化的目标和股份稀释——实际上并不像亚马逊那样行事。

And so all these companies that claim to be the next Amazon of this or that or the other, they don't actually behave like Amazon in many material ways around what they're optimizing for and their share dilution.

所有这些对长期发展至关重要的因素。

And so all the things that matter long term.

对于这类公司而言，困难在于将投资与成本结构区分开来。

Then what's difficult with these sort of companies is to separate out the investment from the cost structure.

像沃尔玛这样的公司，在扩张过程中，你可以分析单店的经济效益、损益表，然后发现所有对未来增长的投资都体现在现金流量表中，即新开门店。

With a company like Walmart, as they were growing, you could analyze the store unit economics, you could analyze the income statement, and then you could see that all of the investment in future growth was coming through the cash flow statement, new stores.

对于亚马逊这样的公司，或者更多以研发和技术投入为主的数字公司，要理解它们的情况就更困难了。

With companies like Amazon or more digital companies where it's R and D based or technology spend, it's harder to understand what that looks like.

因此，我们花了很多时间研究这类公司，试图理解它们的长期运营模式以及长期估值会是什么样子。

So we spend a lot of time with that one or any names like this, trying to understand the long term operating model and what the valuation would look like over a longer term time horizon.

所以你说得对，很多这类公司，我们曾长期持有奈飞，表现非常不错，但两次卖得太早了。

And so you're right, many of those companies, we owned Netflix for many years, did very well, sold it too soon twice.

但这基于我们的估值卖出纪律。

But that was based on, again, our sell discipline around the valuation.

我们在买入和卖出时都很敏感。

We are sensitive both on the buy side and the sell side.

我们并不会永远持有所有这类公司。

We don't just own all of these sort of names forever.

我认为我们持有的其他复合型公司，大多数现在看起来更便宜。

I think the other compounders that we own, most of them look cheaper.

所以像谷歌母公司Alphabet这样的公司，即使以当前的盈利计算，也便宜得多。

So a name like Alphabet is much cheaper even on the current earnings now.

早期阶段的公司会关注那些亏损的公司。

The earlier stage companies, again, will look at money losing companies.

很多人甚至不会这么做。

A lot of people won't even do that.

但我们正在深入分析：这家业务能否盈利，未来五到十年的价值会如何？

But we're doing a lot of analysis around, can this business make money and what's the value over the next five or ten years?

威廉，回到亚马逊这个话题，我想在你的投资生涯中，一个了不起的事情是，你多年来花了不少时间与杰夫·贝佐斯相处，因为比尔经常和他一起吃饭。

William To go back to this question of Amazon, one of the remarkable things, I guess, in your investment career is that you've got to spend a fair amount of time with Jeff Bezos over the years, because Bill would have these dinners with him fairly regularly.

我想知道，能否谈谈你与这位时代伟大CEO如此近距离接触的经历，你从中学到了什么？

I wonder if you could just talk about what that experience has been like, what you've learned from being so close to one of the great CEOs of our time.

我非常幸运。

I've been very fortunate.

但我没参加过那么多场晚宴。

Haven't got to attend as many of those dinners.

我真希望每年都能参加。

I wished I'd gone every year.

如果每年都能参加就好了。

Would've been able to go every year.

我花了许多年才得以坐到那张桌子旁。

It took me many, many years to get a seat at that table.

但我刚加入时的2003年，有一次经历：比尔为所有客户举办了一场大型投资会议。

But one of my first experiences in 2003, right after I joined, Bill had a big investment conference for all of our clients.

杰夫·贝索斯是主讲人，他做了关于洗衣机的演讲，说互联网就像电力的早期阶段，最初他把它比作一台洗衣机——它会伤害人，得搬出去用，非常笨重，效果也不好。

And Jeff Bezos was the speaker, and he gave the washing machine talk where he talked about the internet being like the early days of electricity, where initially he compared it to this washing machine and it would hurt people and it would be outside and you have to go over there and it was really clunky and it didn't work well.

后来有了电源插座，情况才逐渐改善。

Then you got electrical outlets and things evolved.

那时我们真的太早了。

Again, we were so early.

比尔认为，他在那次会上已经阐述了AWS的可行性。

And Bill believes that he laid out the case for AWS at that meeting.

后来我记得参加过一次比尔和杰夫的会议，当时杰夫正在征求关于如何养育孩子的建议。

And then I remember attending a meeting with Bill and Jeff where Jeff was soliciting advice about raising kids.

当时我根本不知道能坐在那张桌子旁是多么特别。

And so at the time I had no idea how special it was to have a seat at that table.

但回过头来看，这真是太惊人了。

But in hindsight, it's amazing.

我能在场，这简直太不可思议了。

It's amazing that I was there.

后来我还参加了比尔和杰夫的一些晚宴，并有机会见到他。

And then I have attended some of the dinners with Bill and Jeff and got to meet him.

他正是沃伦·巴菲特所说的那种真正的商业天才。

He is just, Warren Buffett calls him an authentic business genius.

因此，能够向杰夫学习，听比尔和克里斯·戴维斯向杰夫·贝佐斯提问关于业务的问题，这是一次难得的机会，能接触到世界上最具传奇色彩的公司之一的顶尖投资与商业智慧。

And so to learn from Jeff and hear Bill and Chris Davis asking Jeff Bezos questions about the business, that's just an amazing opportunity to have some of the best investing minds and business minds of one of the greatest companies in the history of the world.

所以我对这段经历感到非常幸运。

So I feel very fortunate for that experience.

但我想，这也是我们在研究公司时所做的事情。

But I think that's also when we're doing work on companies.

再者，多年来比尔每次会见杰夫时都会问：‘这个业务的运营利润率仍然是两位数，对吧？’

Again, Bill for many years, when meeting with Jeff would ask, okay, this is still a double digit operating margin business, right?

核心零售业务，但他们一直在投资。

The core retail business, but then they're investing.

所以他会确认杰夫是否仍然相信这一点，以及支持这一观点的证据是什么。

And so just checking in on that, that Jeff still believed that and what the evidence was for that.

我的意思是，这和我们思考这些公司的方式很相似。

I mean, that's similar to how we think about these companies.

只要我们相信几个关键的投资变量成立，就能承受大量的噪音。

Again, as long as we believe a few key investment variables are true, you can withstand a lot of noise.

所以说到巴菲特，他谈论的是哪些东西不会改变，哪些东西会保持不变，人们将来还会做什么。

And so I think to the point about Buffett, he talks about what doesn't change, what will be the same, what will people still be doing.

这和杰夫所谈的很相似。

That's similar to what Jeff talks about.

人们总是关注变化。

People always focus on change.

他说，不会改变的是，人们仍然想要低价。

And he says, what won't change is that people still want low prices.

人们永远都想要低价。

People will always want low prices.

所以我认为这是值得思考的一个有趣而重要的观点。

So I think that that's an interesting and an important thing to think about.

几周前我和比尔聊过亚马逊，他提到在一次与杰夫·贝佐斯的会议上，贝佐斯说，那大概是2002年左右。

I was talking to Bill about Amazon a couple of weeks ago and he talked about how at one of those meetings with Jeff Bezos, Bezos was saying, maybe this was around 2002 or something like that.

他问杰夫：你目前在忙什么？

He said to Jeff, What are you spending your time on?

他当时说，基本上是在巩固资产负债表，我想。

And he was saying, basically shoring up the balance sheet, I think.

然后第二年，他又问杰夫：你现在在忙什么？

And then the next year he said to him, What are you spending your time on?

他说：用户体验。

He said, The user experience.

确保用户体验出色。

Making sure the user experience is great.

比尔说，他从这一点推断出公司已经扭转了局面，只要他能专注于改善用户体验而非生存，公司就会变得卓越。

And Bill said how he extrapolated from that the company had turned a corner and was going to be great if he could focus not on survival, but on improving user experience.

我觉得听比尔讲述这件事特别有意思，因为他曾是军事情报人员，显然这构成了他早期训练的重要部分——他能够以拼图的方式，将零散的信息整合起来。

And I thought it was really interesting just listening to Bill as a former military intelligence guy, because obviously that was an important part of his early training, that he was able to take little bits of information in this kind of mosaic way and piece them together.

他还提到类似的情况，我认为是塔珀ware公司，他看到这家公司在多年未盈利后，突然宣布将举办股东日，这是多年来首次向股东进行沟通，他就说：‘我们得买入。’

And he said something similar about I think it was Tupperware where he saw this company I think it was Tupperware that hadn't made money in so many years, suddenly said they were going to have a shareholder day where they would, for the first time in years, would talk to shareholders and he was like, We need to buy.

我想他说的是：‘不，我们还需要做更多研究。’

And I think he said, you were like, No, we need to do more work.

他却说：‘不用了，不用了，这就够了。’

He's like, No, no, that's enough.

我们直接买入。

We just buy.

所以他一直在捕捉这些细微的线索。

So he was seeing these little clues.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk a bit about that?

因为你一定多次见过，当一小段信息通过正确的模式识别被解读时，它至关重要。

Because you must have seen that so many times where a little piece of information seen with the right kind of pattern recognition is absolutely critical.

确实如此。

Absolutely.

我们有时称之为三角验证。

And we would sometimes call it triangulation.

因此，从不同的人或不同来源获取相互独立的信息，如果它们都指向同一个结论，就会增强你的信心和信念。

So getting disparate pieces of information from different people or different sources that led you to the same conclusion would increase your conviction and belief state.

有趣的是，我认为比尔在2012年左右见过杰夫·贝佐斯。

Interestingly, I think Bill met with Jeff Bezos in 2012, I believe it was.

那时我们持有奈飞的股票。

And that was we had owned Netflix.

但我们2008年卖得太早了，当时我们认为流媒体是个风险。

We'd sold it too early in 2008 when we thought streaming was a risk.

然后他们主导了流媒体市场。

Then they went on to dominate streaming.

2012年，他们宣布将流媒体业务与DVD业务分拆，股价应声暴跌。

In 2012, they announced that they were going to separate the streaming piece of the business from the DVD piece of the business, and the stock tanked.

我认为之前股价是300美元，后来跌到了每股120美元。

And I think it was 300 before that and went back to 120 a share.

我记得最低跌到了50.60美元。

Think it got down to $50.60.

比尔曾与杰夫会面，杰夫问他：‘你知道Netflix吗？’

And Bill had met with Jeff and Jeff said, Hey, do you know Netflix?

比尔说：‘是的，我们曾经持有过。’

Bill's like, Yeah, we've owned it.

杰夫说：‘我们现在不持有它了。’

He's like, We don't own it now.

杰夫接着问：‘那你对它的价值有什么判断吗？’

He's like, Well, do you have a sense of what it's worth?

比尔说：‘我们的研究已经过时了。’

And Bill's like, Well, our work's not current.

于是他回来找我们，我们说：‘好吧，如果杰夫想知道这个业务的价值，我们就得去研究它到底值多少钱。’

And so he came back to us and we were like, okay, if Jeff wants to know what that business is worth, we need to do the work on what that business is worth.

所以我们开始着手研究。

So we started working on it.

后来比尔参加了另一场与约翰·马龙的会议，约翰当时说，他会以那些价格买入Netflix的每一股股票。

Then Bill attended another meeting with John Malone, where John, I think said that he would be buying every share he could of Netflix at those prices.

我想那时股价已经反弹到了90美元。

I think it rebounded back to 90 by then.

他说自己受到限制，因为其他一些投资组合的约束。

Said that he was restricted because some of his other holdings.

于是比尔说：‘这基本上就是你需要知道的全部了。’

And so Bill was like, this is basically all you need to know.

约翰·马龙，世界上最好的投资者之一，会买下他能买到的每一股。

John Malone, one of the best investors in the history of the world, would buy every share he can.

杰夫·贝佐斯在询问这家公司的价值。

Jeff Bezos inquiring about what the company is worth.

所以我认为这是一种经典的做法，试图通过不同信息来源来交叉验证得出结论。

And so I think it's that classic sort of trying to triangulate different sources of information to figure out.

然后我们做了研究，发现它的估值基于美国业务的盈利倍数非常低，但公司又在国际上大力投资，尽管这些业务还处于早期阶段，但没有理由认为它们不会像美国业务那样发展。

And then we did work and we realized that it was trading at a very low multiple of The US earnings, but they were investing again, all of this internationally, but those businesses were much earlier stage, but there was no reason to believe that they wouldn't evolve in a similar manner to The US business.

你可以以美国业务盈利的五到十倍价格买入这家公司。

You could buy the company at like five or 10 times what The US business is earning.

对于这样一个处于当时发展阶段的公司来说，这是一个绝佳的机会。

For a company like that, given the stage where it was, it was an amazing opportunity.

当时我们建立了对奈飞的大额持仓。

We built up a big stake in Netflix at the time.

但关键是，我们是否在认真做估值工作？

But it's that, again, are we doing our valuation work?

我们尊重的其他人看到了什么、说了什么？其他信息来源——这是典型的拼图理论，经典的分析师分析方法。

What are other people that we respect seeing and saying different sources, mosaic theory, classic analyst analytical stuff.

是的

Yeah.

所以，在一个由于监管压力而无法获得这种信息优势的世界里，能够以不同的背景来看待信息，将现有的信息置于上下文中理解并识别模式，这似乎是这些年来你成功的关键。

So in a way, in a world where, because of regulatory pressures, you can't get such an informational edge, the ability to see the information in a different context, to take information that's out there and see it in context and understand, recognize the patterns, that seems really key to your success over these years.

是的，我认为模式识别——比尔可能会告诉你，我不确定是否同意他的观点，但他喜欢说，在这个行业里，变老的好处并不多。

Yeah, I think pattern recognition, again, Bill would probably tell you, I don't know if I agree with him on this, but he likes to say there's not many benefits of getting older in the business.

我不确定是否同意他，因为这种模式识别能力以及这些经验，你经历得越多，学到的就越多。

I don't know if I agree with him because that pattern recognition piece and having these experiences, you learn so much the more you have them.

正如比尔所说，像他这样从七十年代就开始投资的人已经不多了。

And as Bill says, there's not many people like him who are investing through the seventies.

这同样是一种优势。

Again, that's an asset.

我认为查理·芒格曾谈到，持续下去是一个巨大的优势。

And I think Charlie Munger has talked about how it is a big benefit to continue.

随着年龄增长，进入九十多岁，很少有事情会变得越来越好，但他说投资可能是其中之一。

There's not many things you get better and better at as you get older and into your nineties like they are, but he said investing can be one.

我认为比尔的观点是，当你年轻时，你可以用全新的眼光看待世界，这种不被固有世界观束缚的状态有很多好处。

I think Bill's point is when you're younger, you can look at the world with fresh eyes and there's a lot of benefits to that to not people get stuck on their worldview.

在投资中尤其重要，因为事物总是在不断变化。

And it's very important not to do that in investing because things are changing all the time.

但随着年龄增长，要做到这一点会越来越难。

It gets harder to do that as you get older.

但这种模式识别能力——比如低价、高度恐惧和悲观往往意味着更好的投资机会——

But the sort of pattern recognition piece, the fact that low prices, high fear and pessimism leads to better investment opportunities.

这再次说明了为什么我们认为这些行为优势如此持久。

Again, it's why we think these behavioral advantages are so enduring.

我把它比作节食或健康饮食。

I think of it like dieting or eating healthy.

人们不是因为不确定该怎么做而不这么做。

People don't not do that because they're not sure what to do.

他们不做是因为这很难坚持。

They don't do that because it's hard to do.

不吃饼干很难。

It's hard to not eat the cookie.

并不是说，你知道的，我该不该吃，我不确定。

It's not like, you know, should, oh, I'm not sure if I should or not.

不，其实是这样，你知道你不该吃，但它味道太好了，你还是会吃饼干，对吧？

No, it's like, know, you shouldn't, but it tastes great and you're going to eat the cookie, right?

这就像大幅抛售东西。

It's like selling things down a lot.

我的意思是，你总能找到理由。

I mean, you can justify,

在市场中，你很容易欺骗自己。

you can trick yourself in the markets a lot more.

但要骗自己相信饼干对你有好处，这很难。

It's hard to trick yourself to believing the cookie is good for you.

但在投资中，你能让自己相信，哦，这里出了这么多问题。

But in investing, you can make yourself believe, Oh, there's all these problems.

有这么多糟糕的事情在发生。

There's all these bad things going on.

所以我实际上卖掉会更好。

So I'm actually better off selling.

但归根结底，我认为在价格下跌时抛售并不是个好主意。

But at the end of the day, I think it's mostly selling things when they're down is not a good idea.

在价格非常高昂的时候买入，也不是个好主意。

Buying things when they're really high and expensive, not a good idea.

这并不是特别复杂，而是很难执行。

It's not that it's really complicated, it's that it's difficult to implement.

克莱，我们先休息一下，听听今天赞助商的消息。

Clay Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

当你经营一家小企业时，雇对人至关重要。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

正确的员工能提升你的团队，提高生产力，推动你的业务更上一层楼。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们的新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

与其翻阅一堆简历，它会根据你的标准筛选应聘者，并突出显示最匹配的人选，帮你节省数小时时间，在合适的人选出现时快速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是，这些优秀的候选人已经存在于LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn聘用的员工，至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手聘用的员工高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就聘对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费在linkedin.com/studybill发布你的职位，然后推广它以使用LinkedIn招聘的新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

要免费发布职位，请访问 linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

适用条款和条件。

Terms and conditions apply.

十亿美元级别的投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于 Fundrise 收入基金，这种被动收入策略已向所有规模的投资者开放，该基金已吸引超过6亿美元投资，分红率为7.97%。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄利率下滑，难怪私人信贷在近几年已成长为一个万亿美元级别的资产类别。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

访问 fundrise.com/wsb，只需几分钟即可投资 Fundrise 收入基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金在2025年的总回报率为8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往表现不保证未来结果。

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

当前分配率为2025年1月20日12:30的数据。

Current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多信息可在fundrise.com/income的收益基金招募说明书中找到。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundraise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

2026年，你终于要行动了。

2026 is the year you finally do it.

这一年，你不再只是空想，而是真正将它变为现实。

The year you stop sitting on that idea and actually turn it into something real.

我们都有自认为本可以更出色的技能、想法和副业，但梦想与行动之间的区别，在于迈出第一步。

We all have skills, ideas, and side projects we know could be more, But the difference between dreaming and doing is taking that first step.

Shopify 为你提供在线和线下销售所需的一切。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经迈出了这一步，从大型知名品牌转变为刚刚起步的初创者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already taken this leap from massive household brands to first time founders just getting started.

使用 Shopify，打造你的梦想店铺非常简单。

With Shopify, building your dream store is simple.

你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并自定义以匹配你的品牌。

You can choose from hundreds of beautiful templates and customize them to match your brand.

设置也非常快速，内置的 AI 工具可以撰写产品描述，甚至帮助编辑产品图片。

Setup is fast too, with built in AI tools that write product descriptions and even help edit product photos.

随着你的成长，Shopify 也会与你一同成长，帮助你从一个仪表板处理更多订单并拓展至新市场。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you, helping you handle more orders and expand into new markets all from one dashboard.

在 2026 年，别再等待，立即用 Shopify 开始销售。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月 1 美元的试用版，今天就开始在 shopify.com/wsb 销售吧。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.