RWH032：警惕的投资者与克里斯·布洛姆斯特兰

是的

Yeah.

这很有趣。

And it's interesting.

我前几天读了几篇关于他的讣告，但外面的信息并不多。

He I I read a couple of obituaries of him the other day, and there isn't much out there.

我的意思是，我觉得在普林斯顿校友刊物和他居住地的本地刊物上有一些记载。

I mean, there's something, I think, in a Princeton alumni publication and a local publication from the place where he lived.

他于2002年以99岁高龄去世。

And he he died at 99 in 2002.

而如今，距离他出生已经一百二十年了，我们还在谈论他。

And here we are, a hundred and twenty one years after he was born, hundred and twenty years after he was born, and we're still we're still chatting about him.

这真是了不起。

It's an amazing thing.

对吧？

Right?

这表明，当你遇到真正非凡的人时，他们会留下持久的影响。

It shows that when when you meet someone who really is remarkable, it it leaves this kind of enduring mark.

所以我很高兴有机会谈论他。

So I'm glad to have a chance to talk about him.

我想了解你认为基思在你身上看到了什么，因为从某种意义上说，你本不是一个他可能会以这种方式选中并托付家族财富的人，毕竟已经过了这么多年。

I I wanted to get a sense of of what you think Keith saw in you because in some ways, you were a kind of unlikely person for him to to pick up in that way and to entrust with his family's fortune after all of those years.

因为你当时大概三十岁左右，对吧？

Because you must have been about 30, right?

你曾在科罗拉多大学博尔德分校学习金融，并在一家银行信托公司工作，管理资金几年，还管理过一只平衡型共同基金。

And you'd studied finance at the University of Colorado in Boulder, and you'd worked at this bank trust company, and you managed money for a few years there, and you managed a balanced mutual fund there.

你显然聪明、有抱负且有才华，但我很好奇是否还有其他原因，比如你父亲是海军陆战队员并曾在海军服役，或者他曾在普林斯顿打过橄榄球。

So you were clearly smart and driven and talented, but but I'm wondering if there was other stuff, like if the fact that your father was a marine and he had served in the navy, or if it was the fact that he played football at Princeton.

你在科罗拉多大学时非常认真地打过橄榄球。

You played football very seriously at the University of Colorado.

也许他从你身上看到了某种深深触动他的东西。

Whether there was something that he saw in you that just resonated really deeply with him.

我不知道。

I don't know.

我们一见面就特别投缘。

We immediately hit it off.

我们见面那天，我在办公室，下午早些时候接到他侄子的电话，他说：我正坐在这里。

On the when I on the day we met, I was in my office and received a call early afternoon from his nephew who said, look, I'm sitting here.

我和我叔叔在一起。

I'm I'm with my uncle.

他说：我叫鲍勃·史密斯，我和我叔叔鲍勃·史密斯在一起。

He said, my name is Bob Smith, I'm with my uncle Bob Smith.

我们一个朋友说，我们该见个面。

And we a friend of ours said we should get together.

我们能见个面吗？

And could we get together?

我伸手去拿日历安排时间，说：当然可以。

And I reached for my calendar to set a date, and I said, sure.

我非常乐意。

I'd love to.

他说：不。

He said, no.

我的意思是，现在，就今天。

I actually mean, like, right now, today.

于是我开车过去，我们整个下午都坐在一起，晚上还一起去吃了晚饭。

And so I wound up driving out, and we sat around for, oh, the afternoon and wound up going to dinner that night.

我们大概聊了九到十个小时。

And so probably spent nine or ten hours talking in.

你知道，他非常喜欢股市和商业。

You know, he had the I mean, he he loved the stock market and he loved businesses.

我还没看过他的投资组合，但他一直提到他持有的所有公司。

And I hadn't seen the portfolio, but, he would he'd been bringing up all of the companies that he owned.

我想，这可能只是因为我能深入讨论他持有的每一家公司，而这得益于我作为投资者这几年所积累的经验。

And I suppose it might have been just my ability to talk about just about everything he owned in-depth with just the work that I'd done just for the few years that I'd been an an investor.

我当时29岁。

I was 29 years old.

我们创办了这家公司。

We started the firm.

我们在12月开始，就在我的三十岁生日之前不久。

We started in December just slightly before my thirtieth birthday.

但正如我所说，我们花了超过一个月，将近一个半月的时间，经常交谈、稍作规划，只是去了解他作为一个普通人。

But as I say, we spent over a month, month and a half talking pretty regularly and strategizing a bit and just getting to know him as a human being.

是的，我不确定当时我们聊了多少我的个人经历，但从性格和气质上来说，我觉得我们很投缘。

Yeah, I'm not sure we got into much of my life story at the time, but from a personality standpoint and from a temperament standpoint, I think we hit it off.

我非常喜欢他讲述1928年经历的故事。

I loved his story about what he had done in 1928.

我喜欢他寻找其他企业的那种方式。

I loved how he'd go about finding other businesses.

减少税务负担这个理念深深打动了我，也契合了我到那时为止所学到的一切。

The the the notion of minimizing the tax burden all resonated with me and, you know, what I had learned to that point.

就在那时，我进入了伯克希尔的世界，但直到后来才意识到伯克希尔哈撒韦这家公司，为时已晚。

And and at that point, I was in in the Berkshire world when, you know, when I finally, too late, discovered Berkshire Hathaway.

但我直到1996年才开始关注伯克希尔，当时他们发行了B类股票，我觉得股价太高了。

But I didn't follow Berkshire until 1996 when they when they issued the b shares and found the stock too expensive.

我对招股文件的首页感到震惊。

Was stunned at the front page of the offering document.

他们发行B类股票时，你知道，无论是董事长还是副董事长，都没觉得这些股票的定价足够合理或被低估，因此他们不会建议家人购买，我就想，这世界上还有谁会这么做？

When they did the b shares, they, you know, broke the chairman and the vice he's not neither the vice chairman nor the chairman find the shares sufficiently, you know, reasonably valued or undervalued to we wouldn't recommend it for purchase to our families and thought, well, who in the world does this?

我当时正在慢慢理解伯克希尔，那时我已经读完了自1977年以来所有董事长的信件。

And was getting my mind around Berkshire and at that point had read probably all the chairman's letters back to 1977.

这让我产生了强烈的共鸣。

And so that resonated with me.

我早已形成了自己对高管薪酬、股票期权以及会计手段被滥用的看法。

I'd already developed my own thoughts on executive compensation and stock options and the way accounting was abused.

这既是沃伦·巴菲特的理念，也是鲍勃·史密斯的理念。

That was very much a Warren Buffett thing, and that was very much a Bob Smith thing.

所以我认为这纯粹是我们对企业的兴趣。

So I think it was just our I think it was our interest in businesses.

如今，我发现我所有的朋友都热衷于坐在一起讨论股票。

I find myself today, my whole friend group are folks that just love to sit around and talk about stocks.

如果我们不谈股票，就会觉得无聊。

If we're not talking about stocks, we kind of get bored.

他和我都喜欢谈论市场和股票。

He and I love to talk about the markets and stocks.

后来，当我们一起工作时，这段友谊才真正深化了。

And then and it was later as we were working together that the friendship really evolved.

我逐渐真正了解了他这个人，你知道，任何参军上战场、经历战斗、目睹死亡、眼见朋友逝去的人，通常都不会谈论这些事。

And I I got to really understand who he was as a man and, you know, anybody that's off to war and and and is in battle and sees death and experiences friends dying, we usually don't talk about it.

他曾说，自己一生中很少谈论战争。

And he had said he rarely in his lifetime had talked about the war.

但不知为何，他对这段过去非常坦诚、毫无保留。

But for whatever reason, he was very, very candid and very open about that chapter in his past.

你知道吗，我特别喜欢战争史，尤其是二战史和独立战争史。

You know, I'd love war history, World War two history, revolutionary war history.

所以我对这些非常着迷。

So I was fascinated with that.

但那只是他的克制。

But it just his his it was his temperance.

那是他一贯的平和态度。

It was it was his even keel approach.

你知道吗？

You know?

他并不担心自己错过了科技泡沫。

He wasn't concerned that that he was missing out on the tech bubble.

他说，这出戏我早就看过了，进场太晚了。

He said, I've seen this picture show before, and it's getting in badly.

我们在思维方式和看待世界的方式上有很多共通之处，可能超越了股票市场和经济本身。

And there was just a lot of commonality to the way we thought and looked at the world, probably beyond the stock market and the economy.

但这很合适。

But it was a good fit.

从性格上来说，很匹配。

From a personality standpoint, it was good.

但我觉得，如果我们是同一代人并且早些认识，我敢说我们会成为最好的朋友。

But I think had we been in the same generation and known each other, I think we would have been best friends.

所以你创办了Semper Augustus投资集团。

So you started the Semper Augustus Investment Group.

那是1998年底到1999年初，你们正式启动的。

It was sort of late nineteen ninety eight, early nineteen ninety nine you got launched.

那时候，我正好开始认真从事财经记者的工作。

So, really, this is about when I was starting very seriously as a financial journalist.

所以我记得亲身经历这些事，并为《福布斯》、《财富》和《金钱》等杂志撰稿。

And so I remember living through this stuff and writing for magazines like Forbes and Fortune and Money.

当时这些杂志里总有一种盲目的信任，它们会报道那些烂公司，你知道的，有人仅仅靠一点小额投资就赚了500万美元。

And and there was always this kind of credulousness in some of these magazines where they'd be writing about these crap companies that, you know, someone had just made $5,000,000 off their tiny investment.

那非常令人陶醉，甚至让人头晕目眩。

And it was very it was very intoxicating and sort of head spinning.

同时，我天生就是一个反叛的局外人。

And at the same time, I I was kind of a born contrarian outsider.

所以我从来没买过任何科技股，我觉得这简直蠢透了。

And so I I sort of I'd never owned any tech, and I looked at it like, this is just moronic.

当时，我最终选择了投资马丁·惠特曼。

And I ended up investing with Marty Whitman at the time.

对我来说，这一切都显得疯狂，但确实非常令人着迷。

And so I I it it for me, it'll all sort of seem nuts, but it was it was very intoxicating.

我对你为公司取的名字印象深刻，因为它显然是在讽刺这是一个明显的泡沫。

And I I I was struck by the name that you chose for your firm because it was a sort of ironic nod to the fact that this was clearly a bubble.

这不仅与1929年有相似之处，也与17世纪有平行关系。

That that there was a parallel not only with 1929, but also with the seventeenth century.

你能谈谈为什么你把公司命名为‘永恒奥古斯都’吗？

Can you talk about why you call the firm Semperor Augustus?

这个美丽名字背后的历史内涵究竟是什么？

What the the historic connotations of this beautiful name actually are?

这其实是一种反叛的倾向，我不确定这是与生俱来的，还是后天习得的，或者由个人经历塑造的。

Well, it really was a contrarian bias, And I don't know if that's innate, if it's born, if it's learned, if it develops based on your life history.

但从一开始，我就发现自己非常反叛，充满怀疑。

But I found myself very contrarian, very skeptical from the get go.

我买的第一只股票很快就破产了，这让我从一开始就对投资持怀疑态度。

The first stock I bought shortly went bankrupt, and that makes you fairly jaundiced right out of the gate.

因此，我一直对所读到的一切都保持相当的怀疑。

And so I've always been fairly skeptical of everything I've read.

但我热爱金融和金融历史。

But I love finance, financial history.

即使在大学时，我也如饥似渴地阅读一切能接触到的资料，试图理解投资的奥秘，最终读到了金德伯格的《泡沫、恐慌与崩盘》，以及《大众的疯狂》和奥地利学派的所有著作。

Even in college, I was reading everything I could trying to figure out the investing game and eventually got to Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes, and extraordinary popular delusions and madness of crowd and all the Austrian school.

在17世纪30年代荷兰首次出现的投机狂潮中，‘永恒的奥古斯都’是当时价格被炒得最高的郁金香球茎。

And during what was the first real mania in for tula bulbs in Holland in the sixteen thirties, the Semper Augustus was the most inflated of the bulbs.

关于这一事件有很多精彩的故事，人们也在争论它是否真的是一场泡沫。

There are great stories about that episode and there are debates as to whether it really was a bubble.

但当时房地产确实存在泡沫，经济和贸易也都有泡沫。

But it didn't But there was bubble in real estate and there was a bubble in the economy and there was a bubble in trade.

这一现象的延伸，可能是那群喜爱郁金香的收藏家，而荷兰人一直都很喜欢花卉。

The extension of that was probably this group of collectors that like tulips and the Dutch have always liked flowers.

无论如何，在1637年的高峰期，Semper Augustus是所有郁金香球茎中价值最高的。

In any event, the Semper Augustus was the most highly valued of all the tulip bulbs at the peak in 1637.

以今天的美元计算，我不确定它能卖到三四百万美元。

In today's dollars, I don't know what would have gone for 3 or $4,000,000.

据说，当时一个球茎的价格就能买下阿姆斯特丹河畔的一套公寓。

They say you could have bought a flat on the river in Amsterdam for the price of 1 bulb.

有趣的是，这种球茎本身存在基因缺陷。

Interestingly, the bulb itself was genetically flawed.

它无法繁殖，而正是这种缺陷造就了你如果看过那种花的照片，就会看到的红白相间、绚丽夺目的条纹。

Couldn't reproduce, which was what produced the if you know the picture of the flower, the red and white brilliant streaking in the bulb.

是的，我认为我们聚在一起的部分原因，史密斯先生

Yeah, I thought part of the reason we got together, Mr.

和我，就是意识到存在泡沫。

Smith and I, was this sense that there was a bubble.

这个泡沫首先再次出现在蓝筹股中。

The bubble was, again, first in blue chips.

当时还不是科技泡沫，科技泡沫是后来发展起来的。

The bubble was not the tech bubble yet, the tech bubble developed.

那些大盘蓝筹股，比如通用电气和可口可乐，在1998年左右开始下跌，差不多就是我们公司刚成立的时候。

Those big blue chips, the GEs and the Cokes rolled over in 1998, about the time we were starting the firm.

投资组合。

Portfolio.

我们不可能找到比这更好的时机了。

We couldn't have done that at any better time.

然后在最后那个阶段，所有小盘股变得非常便宜，中盘股也变得非常便宜，一些日本公司也变得非常便宜，伯克希尔自己在收购通用再保险后也变得非常便宜。

And then in that last period is when all the small caps really got cheap and the mid caps really got cheap and some Japanese companies really got cheap and Berkshire itself really got cheap after they bought in Gen Re.

伯克希尔的股价跌了一半，正是在股价下跌一半之后，我们以1.05倍账面价值的价格购入了它。

Berkshire got cut in half, and it was only after the stock dropped by half that from three times book, we paid 1.05 times book for it.

到1998年，科技泡沫已经愈演愈烈。

The tech bubble by the '8 was raging.

既然知道这是个泡沫，又怎么会愚蠢到在泡沫中间创办一家公司呢？

And believing it was a bubble and what a fool to start a business in the middle of a bubble.

所以，我一直在想，总有一天要创办一家公司，并一直钟爱‘Semperor’这个名字。

So the the use of the Semperor, which I'd that I always kinda thought I'd start a firm at a point and harbored that name.

我想，天哪。

Thought, oh my god.

有人会抢先注册这个名字，真希望他们真这么做了。

Somebody's gonna beat me too, and I wish they did.

我每天都在祈祷，别有人抢先用了‘Symphor Augustus’这个名字。

I was praying every day that nobody would beat me to the name of Symphor Augustus.

我其实翻出了《大众的疯狂》这本书，正是在这本书里，我第一次读到了17世纪30年代的郁金香泡沫。

I actually I dug out extraordinary popular delusions in the madness of crowds, which is the book where I think you first read about the tulip mania bubble back in the sixteen thirties.

书中有一段优美的文字，描述了中央奥古斯都如何被严重高估，以及投机者多么急于获得这些郁金香。

And there's this beautiful passage in it that I where it's talking about how crazily overvalued the central Augustus was and how it says so anxious were the speculators to obtain them.

有人提出用12英亩建筑用地的永久产权来交换这种特定的郁金香——哈勒姆郁金香，而另一个人则用一辆新马车、两匹灰马和一套完整的马具买下了一株。

The one person offered the fee simple of 12 acres of of building ground for this particular tulip, the Harlem tulip, and and then another guy, bought one for a new carriage, two gray horses, and a complete set of harness.

还有一个令人惊叹的故事，虽然荒谬至极，我确信它不真实，但我觉得太精彩了，懒得去核实：有个人据说前来交付某样东西给……

Then there's an amazing story that's worth telling just because it's so ridiculous, which I'm sure is untrue, but I think I it it's too good to fact check where some guy basically comes, I think, to deliver something to this

一名工人。

A laborer.

工人。

Laborer.

是的。

Yeah.

是一名水手。

It's a sailor.

木匠。

Carpenter.

它说这位水手是个单纯的人。

It says the sailor, simple soul.

他看到一个以为是洋葱的东西，就把它带走了。

And he sees what he thinks is an onion, and he takes it with him.

他坐在一堆绳子上，吃着这个‘洋葱’，却没意识到自己实际上在吃一种极其珍贵的皇帝奥古斯都郁金香。

And he's he's sitting on a bunch of ropes and he's eating the onion and doesn't realize that actually he's eating this unbelievably precious Semperor Augustus tulip.

于是他最终因对商人犯下重罪而被逮捕。

And so he ends up getting arrested for felony against this merchant.

但接着有一段非常优美的描述，我只想提一下，因为整个情节突然崩塌，这与1637年的记载惊人地相似——就像2000年3月互联网泡沫破裂、‘尼飞50’泡沫破裂，或最近科技股崩盘、某些加密货币暴跌时的情形。

But then there's this really beautiful passage that I I just wanted to refer to because it all bursts, and it's so reminiscent, this account from 1637 of what's happened in March 2000 when that bubble burst or with the nifty '50 or with more recently when when tech stocks started to blow up or certain cryptocurrencies blew up.

它描述了信心如何突然从这整个体系中消失，人们开始违约，突然间每个人都手握一文不值的东西，没人愿意接手。

And it talks about how suddenly the confidence starts to starts to go out of this this thing and people start to default, and people are suddenly left with these these valueless things that nobody will take.

文中说，悲痛的呼喊四处回荡，每个人都指责自己的邻居。

And it says, the cry of distress resounded everywhere, and each man accused his neighbor.

那些设法致富的少数人隐藏了自己的财富，不让同胞知晓，转而投资于英国或其他国家的债券；而许多曾在短暂时期内脱离平凡生活的人，又被打回原形，重新陷入默默无闻。

The few who had contrived to enrich themselves hid their wealth from the knowledge of their fellow citizens and invested it in the English or other funds, many who, for a brief season, had emerged from the humbler walks of life were cast back into their original obscurity.

许多大商人几乎沦落到乞讨的地步，许多贵族世家的财富也遭到不可挽回的毁灭。

Substantial merchants were reduced almost to beggary, and many a representative of a noble line saw the fortunes of his house ruined beyond redemption.

因此，这件事有着一种奇妙的共鸣。

And so there's something just so wonderfully resonant about it.

对吧？

Right?

这简直就是人性的一部分，一再重复上演。

Like, this this is just sort of a part of human nature, and it just kinda repeats itself again and again.

在过去四个世纪里，甚至更久以前，这种情况就一直在发生。

And it's done it for certainly the last four centuries and obviously much further back than that.

我原以为我们再也不会看到1999年底或2000年初那种情景了。

I thought we'd never see what transpired in late ninety nine or early two thousand again.

世界上的那些巨头掌控了共同基金市场一半的资金流入，持有同样二十只股票，而这些股票的估值最终变成了凯西·伍德在2021年左右的那种水平。

The Janus' of the world capturing half of all of the flows into the mutual fund complex and owning the same 20 stocks that all traded at what wound up being Cathie Wood you know, circa 2021 type valuations.

会计方面的过度行为，薪酬方面的过度行为。

The excesses in accounting, the excesses in compensation.

而我们现在就在这里。

And, you know, here we are.

我们又做了同样的事。

We did the same thing.

是的。

Yeah.

在上一个周期里，我们也做了同样的事。

We've done the same thing in the last cycle.

而最近这一年来、一年半的时间里，感觉和上世纪九十年代末、甚至整个2000年发生的情况非常相似。

And this last period here in the last year, year and a half feels an awful lot like what happened in the late nineties and even throughout 2000.

你在2000年3月经历了大崩盘，然后有了复苏。

You had the big break in March 2000, you had a recovery.

总会有一次反弹。

There's always a recovery bounce.

那是1929年。

It was 1929.

市场从3月跌至1941年，但在1937年之前已回升至1990年1月的水平。

The market fell from March to '41, but it recovered to 01/1990 and change by 1937.

当然，之后又出现了抛售，但那是第二次世界大战期间。

Then of course it sell off again, but that was World War II.

2000年3月之后出现了反弹，随后又大幅下跌。

You had a recovery in 2000 from March, you had a big sell off.

我认为，尽管期间经历了大幅抛售，标普500指数直到那年9月才达到最终高点。

And I don't think the S and P 500 hit its eventual high until September of that year, despite a big sell off in the interim period.

所以去年纳斯达克指数暴跌超过30%，纳斯达克100指数也是如此。

So had the big sell off last year in the NASDAQ over 30%, the NASDAQ 100.

标普指数按总回报计算下跌了约18%。

S and P was down 18 and change on a total return basis.

你看，这些指数现在都正逼近2021年的收盘水平。

Here you are, these indices are all closing in on their 2021 closing prices.

你经历了这次反弹行情，一些实际企业的估值也开始变得合理。

You've had this recovery rally and valuations in some of the real businesses were starting to get reasonable.

我认为很多曾经非常投机的东西现在仍然被洗刷得差不多了。

I think a lot of the stuff that was so speculative is still somewhat washed out.

这些公司中，有些根本不该存在，但今年却上涨了100%、200%、300%甚至400%。

This, you've got recoveries in businesses that really shouldn't exist that are up 100, 200, 300, 400% this year.

它们还没回到之前的水平。

They're not near back to where they were.

那些巨头，五大或七大公司已经恢复了。

The generals, the big five or seven companies have recovered.

但同样的事情也发生在微软、太阳微系统和甲骨文在2000年首次崩盘时，它们都曾大幅反弹至九月份。

But that same thing happened when Microsoft first broke and Sun Microsystems first broke and Oracle first broke during 2000, they all had a big recovery back to September.

所以然后

So And then

接下来的两年，2001年和2000年，它只是缓慢下跌，

it just ground down over the next two years, 2001 and 2000 and

这是一段三年的痛苦期，但没人相信会这样。

it was three years of pain, but nobody believed it.

你当时不相信第一次抛售。

You didn't believe the first sell off.

我认为，如今有一种狂热情绪，尤其是科技圈的人重新变得乐观，相信我们正重回高速增长的轨道。

I think there's this ebullience today, there's this bullishness that's returned among the tech crowd in particular that believes that we're backing off to the races.

正如鲍勃·史密斯对上世纪二十年代所说，你知道，我以前见过这场戏，历史总是重演，而我们正在重演它。

As Bob Smith said of the nineteen twenties, you know, I've seen the show before and history repeats, and we're repeating it again.

这是一种极其强大的幻觉，马德·克劳斯就是查尔斯·麦凯，这本书非常值得一读。

And, that's the extraordinary powerful delusions, Mads Krause is Charles McKay, and it's a wonderful read.

我第一次读它的时候，结果发现是删节版。

My my first read of it, and I read it many times, turns out to be the abridged version.

后来我发现还有一个完整版，我已经买了三本，但还没读过，不过读它大概会像读《战争与和平》或《圣经》一样。

Turns out there's a a giant version, which I've now bought three copies of, which I haven't read yet, but it's it's gonna be like reading war and peace or the bible.

这是一本相当厚重的书。

It's it's a it's a pretty weighty tome.

是的。

Yeah.

这真的很有意思。

It's really fun.

你并不完全确定它是否事实准确，但正如汤姆·加农可能会说的，它在大方向上是正确的，而且非常精准。

You don't know entirely whether it's factually accurate, but as as Tom Gannon might say, it's directionally correct, and it's it's Precisely.

它做得非常优雅。

It's elegantly done.

其中一件非常有趣的事情是，我认为我在我的书里简要提到过，约翰·坦普尔顿爵士非常喜爱这本书，以至于他在20世纪80年代通过坦普尔顿基金会重新出版了它，并为此写了序言。

And one of the things that's very interesting actually is that I I I think I write about this briefly in my book, that sir John Templeton loved the book so much that he republished it through his Templeton Foundation back in the nineteen eighties, and he wrote a forward.

所以我在书中提到，他的序言实际上为金融狂热提供了一剂理性的解药。

And so I was saying in my book that that his forward basically offered a rational antidote to financial insanity.

因此，坦普尔顿在序言中说，投资者避免流行谬误的最好方法是关注价值，而不是前景。

And so what Templeton said in his forward is he said the best way for an investor to avoid popular delusions is to focus not on outlook but on value.

他谈到了扎根于具体估值指标和对公司基本面价值进行批判性分析的重要性。

And so he talked about the importance of grounding yourself in very specific valuation measures and in a critical analysis of a company's fundamental value.

这与你职业生涯中所做的一切非常契合。

And that very much meshes with what you've done through your career.

我的意思是，你在致客户的年度信件中几乎到了偏执的地步，会以令人难以置信的细致程度拆解伯克希尔的财务报表，深入到脚注和其他细节，真正解释这些企业的经济价值。

I mean, you're you're almost a maniac in your annual letter to clients where you you tear apart the financial statements of Berkshire in unbelievable detail, and you're going into the footnotes and the and the like and and really explaining what the economic value of these businesses is.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that?

这种投资体系的重要性，某种程度上，是完全不同的另一套系统，对吧？

The importance of, in a way, this whole other system of investing, right?

一方面，我们有赌场，里面挤满了这些骗子。

On the one side, we have the casino where it's full of these charlatans.

就像你提到过的骗子炒作，无论是SPAC、加密货币交易还是迷因股票，这些行为让人们通过大力推广自己的SPAC或诱使人们投资严重高估的基金，不择手段地赚取数亿美元。

Like you've talked about charlatan promotion, right, whether it's the SPACs or crypto trading or meme stocks and the like, all these things where people are somewhat unscrupulously making hundreds of millions of dollars from heavily promoting their SPACs or luring you into massively overpriced funds and the like.

从某种意义上说，你早年的经历就是对这种赌场式运作的初步接触。

And and in a sense, your early your early life was a kind of introduction to the casino element of it.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，当你上大学时，你亏钱的那只股票——我记得你亏了大约七千美元——那是你读了报道、在街头听人谈论、看了《华尔街日报》后，盲目下注，结果才意识到：天啊，我对这东西根本一无所知。

I mean, back when you were at college, the stock that you lost money on, where you lost, I think, something like $7,000 was something where you'd read about it and heard on the street in the Wall Street Journal and kind of rolled the dice and then realized, oh god, I knew nothing about this.

所以，某种程度上，我把你的职业生涯看作是对投资中赌场元素的摒弃，转而转向坦普尔顿所谈论的方向——扎根于基本面估值，这才是让你安全的关键。

So in a way, I see your career as a kind of renunciation of the casino element of investing and a shift towards what Templeton is talking about, which is, no, ground yourself, anchor yourself in fundamental valuation, and that's what's gonna keep you safe.

这在我看来对我们的听众来说是极其重要的一点，因为这正是他们抵御骗子、不道德的推广者和泡沫的方法。

And this strikes me as such an important thing to explore for our listeners because this is this is how they're gonna protect themselves from charlatans and and unscrupulous promoters and and bubbles.

抱歉。

Sorry.

这个问题有点冗长，但现在轮到你了。

It's a long winded question, but the stage is yours.

为什么？

Why?

不。

No.

我认为，回顾起来，对我而言最好的事情就是我那时阅读了所有能接触到的东西。

I think in retrospect, probably the best thing that could have happened to me was having I was reading everything.

我的意思是，当我从工程学院转到科罗拉多大学的商学院时，我就爱上了投资。

Mean, I I'd fallen in love with investing when I moved from the engineering school to the business school at Colorado.

当时没有投资课程。

There were no investing courses.

我们也没有学生自主管理的基金。

We didn't have a student run fund.

这可不是哥伦比亚商学院。

This was not the Columbia MBA program.

这是通过布斯商学院传授的学术金融。

This was academic finance via the Booth School.

有效市场假说。

Efficient market hypothesis.

金融学是在企业环境中教授的。

Finance was taught in a corporate setting.

所以如果你在做现金流折现分析，那也是基于项目，而不是如何评估一家企业。

So if you were running DCFs, it was on a project basis and not on how to value a business.

但我一直在商学院图书馆里阅读所有能找到的资料。

But I was reading everything in the library, the in the business school library.

我发现自己来到了丹佛市中心一家破旧的书店，买下了我能找到的所有投资类书籍并认真阅读。

I was found myself at the tattered covered bookstore downtown Denver, buying and reading all of the investing books that I could find.

我做了大量的技术分析，包括蜡烛图图表。

I was doing a lot of technical analysis, candlestick charting.

我逐渐转向了比尔·奥尼尔的CANSLIM方法，这至今仍是一种有效的方法。

I'd gravitated toward Bill O'Neill's CANSLIM method, which was a it's still a thing.

这是一个缩写词。

It's an acronym.

它本质上是一种动量策略：当收益和股价同时突破时，就是你投入资金的时机。

It's essentially a momentum based strategy of when earnings are breaking out and the stock price is breaking out, that's when you put your money to work.

所以，当我以为自己已经懂够多的时候，我读到了一篇关于一家挪威大型原油运输公司的街头专栏文章。

And so that's all I knew when I thought I knew enough, but I'd read this, heard on the street column on this Norwegian, very large crude carrier company.

为什么不呢？

Well, why not?

这对我来说完全说得通。

This makes total sense to me.

于是我说服了一位零售经纪人，带着我全部的积蓄——7000美元，那是我大学和高中暑假打工存下的奖学金余款，一股脑儿全投了进去。

And so I convinced this retail broker walked into the office with all of my money, my $7,000 which was some leftover scholarship money and everything I'd saved from my summer jobs in college and in high school and plunked it all down.

经纪人甚至建议我，谨慎起见，如果这是你所有的钱，最好分散投资。

The broker even bought a little bit, and he said, you know, prudently, you should probably diversify if this is all of your money.

我说，这简直是稳赚不赔。

I said, this is such a sure thing.

但我根本不知道自己在做什么。

But I had no idea what I was doing.

我的意思是，我从未读过资产负债表或损益表。

I mean, I had never read a balance sheet or an income statement.

我从未接触过任何财务报表分析。

I hadn't been exposed to financial statement analysis in the least.

所以，当你把所有钱都亏光时，你会意识到：天哪，我要么得换个完全不同的爱好，要么就得搞清楚到底发生了什么。

And so, you know, when you lose all your money, you realize, good lord, I either need to get a way different hobby or I better figure out what the heck happened.

于是我不得不给挪威写信，索要他们的财务报表。

So I had to write a letter over to Norway to get the financial statements.

通过阅读这些报表，我逐渐明白了，虽然我当时毫无专业知识，但我意识到这个企业的结构杠杆率极高——它是一个清算型结构，拥有四艘旧船，打算让它们运营一段时间后报废，然后通过出售废料获利，所有人都以为能赚一大笔钱。

And as I learned by reading them, and I'm not sure I would I had no expertise, but I realized this thing was so levered, the structure of the business, which was a liquidating structure, they had these four ships, they were old, they were going to run them around for a while and then scrap them and sell the scrap for a profit, and everybody was going to make a bunch of money.

但它的杠杆率太高了，资产质量也太差。

But there was so much leverage, they were such bad assets.

我学到了两件事。

I learned two things.

我明白了这是一个糟糕的生意，资本结构也很糟糕。

Learned this was a bad business, it was a bad capital structure.

我还明白了，价格必须合理。

I also learned price, you have to pay a reasonable price.

如果企业本身还不错，但你支付了过高的价格，仍然可能损失大量资金。

Had it been a reasonable business but overpaid, you could have lost a whole bunch of your money.

因此，我很快意识到，保护自己的唯一方法就是关注企业的质量以及你为这种质量所支付的价格。

And so I've just very quickly, as I learned, realized the only way to protect yourself is with the business quality and the price you pay for that business quality.

于是，我变成了一个对价格极度执着的人。

So I became really a price zealot.

当我进入信托公司，也就是老联合密苏里银行的工作环境时，那是一家价值投资型的银行。

And And when I found myself in a professional setting in the trust company in the old United Missouri bank, it was a value shop and it was a bank.

投资组合中有数百只股票，而银行董事长并非投资者，却强制要求保留25%的现金储备。

Hundreds of stocks in a portfolio and the chairman of the bank who was not an investor mandated 25% cash reserves.

但当时根本不存在基本面分析。

But there fundamental analysis going on.

人们会分析市盈率、市净率、市销率、市现率和股息收益率。

There were analysis of PEs and price to books and price to sales and price to cash flows and dividend yields.

我不确定当时是否真正理解什么造就了一家优秀的企业，以及优秀企业与周期性企业之间的区别——周期性企业在合适的价格下可能是好企业，但在错误的价格下则是糟糕的企业。

I'm not sure there was that much going on in terms of a genuine understanding of what makes a great business and the differentiation between a great business and a cyclical business, which can be a great business at the right price, but a terrible business at the wrong price.

这些道理是我多年后才逐渐领悟的，但我很快就打下了坚实的基础。

I came to that all over the years, but I got grounded very quickly.

然后是企业本身——弄清楚它如何运作，是否是一家好企业，最终才是你为它支付的价格。

Then the business itself, trying to figure out how it works, whether it's a good one, and then ultimately the price you pay for it.

很多人在1999年和2000年，以及几年前学到的教训是：即使你拥有一家优秀的企业，如果价格过高，也是一项糟糕的投资——这已成为一种流行的说法。

And the lesson that so many people learned in '99 and 2000 and that they learned a couple of years ago is even if you've got a great business at the wrong prices, it's fashionable to say, You know, the the the a great business at the wrong price is a terrible investment.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的消息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

当你经营一家小企业时，雇佣合适的人才至关重要。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

合适的员工能提升团队素质，提高生产力，推动你的业务更上一层楼。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们的全新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

它不再让你逐份翻阅简历，而是根据你的标准筛选申请者，并突出显示最匹配的人选，帮你节省数小时时间，在合适人选出现时迅速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是，这些优秀人才已经活跃在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

前往 linkedin.com/studybill 免费发布职位，然后推广职位以使用LinkedIn Jobs的新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位请访问 linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

条款和条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

每一家企业都在问同一个问题。

Every business is asking the same question.

我们该如何让AI为我们所用？

How do we make AI work for us?

可能性无穷无尽，而盲目猜测风险太高。

The possibilities are endless and guessing is too risky.

但袖手旁观并不是一个选择，因为有一件事几乎可以肯定：你的竞争对手已经在行动了。

But sitting on the sidelines is not an option because one thing is almost certain, your competitors are already making their move.

借助甲骨文的NetSuite，你今天就能让AI发挥作用。

With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite是超过43,000家企业信赖的首选AI云ERP系统。

NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它是一个统一的套件，将你的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合为单一数据源。

It's a unified suite that brings your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into a single source of truth.

这种互联的数据让AI更聪明，不再只是猜测。

That connected data is what makes your AI smarter so it doesn't just guess.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，你可以使用任何你选择的AI工具，连接到你的实际业务数据，提出你曾经有过的每一个问题，无论是关键客户、现金状况还是库存趋势。

And now with NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect to your actual business data and ask every question you ever had, from key customers to cash on hand to inventory trends.

无论你的公司年收入是数百万还是数亿，NetSuite都能帮助你保持领先。

Whether your company earns millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead of the pack.

现在，NetSuite免费提供商业指南《揭开AI的神秘面纱》，访问 netsuite.com/study 获取。

Right now, NetSuite's free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南免费提供，访问 netsuite.com/study 即可获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

2026 年，你终于要行动了。

2026 is the year you finally do it.

这一年，你不再只是空想，而是真正将它变为现实。

The year you stop sitting on that idea and actually turn it into something real.

我们都有自认为本可以更出色的技能、想法和副业，但梦想与行动之间的差距，就在于迈出第一步。

We all have skills, ideas, and side projects we know could be more, but the difference between dreaming and doing is taking that first step.

Shopify 为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切工具。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经跨越了这一步——从家喻户晓的大品牌到刚刚起步的初创者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already taken this leap from massive household brands to first time founders just getting started.

使用 Shopify，打造你的梦想店铺非常简单。

With Shopify, building your dream store is simple.

你可以从数百种精美的模板中选择，并自定义以契合你的品牌。

You can choose from hundreds of beautiful templates and customize them to match your brand.

设置也非常快速，内置的AI工具可以撰写产品描述，甚至帮助编辑产品图片。

Setup is fast too, with built in AI tools that write product descriptions and even help edit product photos.

随着你的业务成长，Shopify也会与你一同成长，帮助你从一个仪表板处理更多订单并拓展至新市场。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you, helping you handle more orders and expand into new markets all from one dashboard.

在2026年，别再等待，立即用Shopify开始销售吧。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月1美元的试用版，今天就前往shopify.com/wsb开始销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

在新的一年里，让Shopify陪伴你聆听你的第一个成功声音。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

我被你说的两件事深深触动了，过去几天我花了大量时间阅读你过去的文字，听了很多你的访谈和访谈记录。

I I was struck by two things that you said I spent a ridiculous amount of time over the last few days reading reading through old writings of yours, listening to lots of interviews and and transcripts of your interviews.

我特别注意到有几件事，我觉得我们的听众非常有必要内化，因为它们如此重要且根本。

And I was very struck by a couple of things that I think are really worth our listeners internalizing because they're so important and so fundamental.

其中之一是你提到，价格是我们所做一切的首要驱动因素。

And one is that you said price is the paramount driver of what we do.

另一个是你刚才提到的一点，我觉得值得停下来深入探讨，那就是你拥有双重安全边际，双重安全边际指的是：a）你支付的价格，b）企业的质量。

And the other is that something you you alluded to a a moment ago that I think it's worth pausing and dwelling on, which is that you you have a dual margin of safety, and the dual margin of safety is a, the price you pay and b, the business quality.

我很少看到有人同时从这两个方面来讨论安全边际——它不仅仅是你支付的价格，还包括企业的质量。

And I don't really see a lot of people talking about both of those things in terms of margin of safety, that it's not just the price you pay, but also the quality of the business.

你能稍微谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that a little?

因为在我看来，这是一个非常重要的洞见。

Because it seems to me a very important insight.

我记得你对吉姆·格兰特说过，我们在业务质量和管理质量上非常有纪律。

And I remember you saying to Jim Grant, we're very disciplined on business quality and management quality.

同样地，后来你与格伦艾尔的彼得·考夫曼交谈时，他向你提到了他的六项标准清单，只有满足这些条件，才能称得上是高质量的业务。

So and likewise, later, you talked with with Peter Kaufman at Glenair, and he talked to you about his checklist of six agencies that you have to have to satisfy in order really to have a high quality business.

因此，质量问题似乎至关重要。

So this whole issue of quality is really critical, it seems.

这绝对是所有事情的重中之重。

Well, it's it's it's paramount to everything.

很多东西只能通过时间积累、反复实践和犯错来学会。

A lot of it can only be learned over time through repetition, through making mistakes.

但你可以从资产负债表入手，轻松判断杠杆水平，并在附注中寻找表外负债，发现那些文化不是为所有者、股东服务，而是为管理层服务的地方。

But you very easy to start with the balance sheet and simply discern leverage levels and within footnotes, try to find off balance sheet liabilities, places where a culture is not run for the benefit of the owner, the shareholder, but it's run for management.

因此，你会花时间阅读委托书，弄清楚真正驱动管理者的是什么，以及他们的薪酬结构如何。

And so you spend your time in the proxy statements there, figuring out what really drives managers and how they're compensated.

你试图寻找经典价值投资者的护城河——那种让企业持久耐用的特质，最终你会偏爱寡头垄断，也就是那些难以被渗透的领域。

You're trying to find the classic value investor moat, the thing that makes a business durable, and you wind up loving oligopolies, you know, places that are impenetrable.

但与此同时，在我的世界里，在我们的世界里，你必须具备灵活性，我认为要更广泛地定义业务质量。

But at the same time, at least in my world, in our world, you've got to have the flexibility to, I think, more broadly define business quality.

同样，我们今天持有相当数量的周期性企业，但我们已经发现了一些经济结构发生变化的地方，从过度竞争转向了更明显的寡头垄断结构。

Again, we own a fair number of cyclical businesses today, but we've identified places where you've got some changing economics, where you've gone from hyper competition to more of an oligopoly structure.

以位于圣路易斯的化工企业奥林为例，这是一家大宗商品化工企业，

In the case of a commodity chemical business, Olin, here in St.

我们在这上面赚了大量钱，你知道，投资界有一半的人根本没听说过它，但它已经是一家上市百年企业了。

Louis, which we've made an awful lot of money on, you know, half the investing world hadn't heard of it and it's been public company for a century.

自20世纪30年代以来，它一直是股息贵族。

They've been a dividend aristocrat since the 1930s.

但这家企业属于氯碱行业，他们将盐和盐浆电解，在分子两侧分别生产氯气和烧碱。

But it's a business that is in the chlor alkali world, they take salt and a slurry of salt, electrify it, and make chlorine and caustic soda on either side of the molecule.

他们还通过这一过程拓展了乙烯基和环氧树脂业务。

They've got a vinyls and an epoxy business through it.

我亲眼见证了这个行业在陶氏与杜邦合并时的整合过程。

And I saw this industry consolidate when Dow merged with DuPont.

你看到Olin为了反垄断原因收购了一批资产，这使得五六年以前，Olin在氯碱领域成为成本最低的生产商，同时通过收购乙烯和环氧树脂业务实现了垂直整合。

You saw Olin pick up a bunch of assets, for antitrust reasons, which at this point then five, six years ago made Olin the low cost player in this in this, chlor alkali world, vertically integrated as well by picking up the vinyls business and the epoxy business.

我意识到，未来十年内将不会有新的产能投入建设。

What I realized was you're going to go through a period of a decade where nobody's going to build any supply.

如果我们的人口和工业生产持续增长，而Olin又是全球成本最低的生产商，那么中国将无法向市场出口产品。

If we have population growth and industrial production growth, Olin being the low cost producer in the world, China's not going be in a position to export product onto the market.

他们没有像Olin那样拥有低成本的原料——Olin的工厂位于墨西哥湾沿岸，天然原料气就在工厂旁边。

They don't have low cost feedstock, natural gas the way an Olin would with its plants on the Gulf Coast, with natural gas feedstock sitting right next to the plant.

无论如何，这种正在形成的稀缺性成为了一种安全边际。

In any event, that scarcity that was developing became a margin of safety.

我能够穿透他们因收购而背负的沉重债务，看清其真实价值。

And I was able to look through what was a fairly encumbered balance sheet with the debt they had to take on.

到了疫情时期，这家公司的业务和股价变得非常便宜。

You got to the pandemic and the business, the stock got really cheap.

我们当时以十几美元的中高位价格买入。

We were buying it in the mid to high teens.

股价跌至每股10美元，总股本为1.65亿股。

The stock got down to $10 a share on 165,000,000 shares.

市值降至16亿美元。

Market cap gotten down to 1,600,000,000.

我们的成本约为20亿美元。

Our basis in it was about 2,000,000,000.

按正常化现金流计算，该业务的现金流水平处于中期周期的25亿美元左右。

And on a normalized cash flow basis, the business went in a kind of a mid cycle level due 2 and a half billion in cash flow.

因此，我们支付的代价不到现金流的一倍。

So we paid less than one one times cash flow for it.

但在疫情期间，他们众多产品在环氧树脂领域的终端市场——尤其是汽车行业——放缓并关闭了工厂。

But in the pandemic, things the the the end markets for so many of their their product in the epoxy world, the auto industry slowed and closed plants.

你知道，波音和空客都停产了，因此涂料业务也受到了影响。

You know, Boeing and Airbus closed, so the pain and coatings businesses slowed.

乙烯基产品的终端需求，比如乙烯基墙板和房地产建设，也略有放缓。

End use for vinyls, vinyl siding, housing market, housing construction slowed a bit.

因此，从资本配置的最佳角度来看，当股价这么低的时候回购股票是最优选择，但他们资产负债表上的债务太多了。

And so, you know, the the most optimal thing to do with capital would have been to buy the stock back when it was that cheap, but they had too much debt on the balance sheet.

随着经济和业务复苏，他们将债务从超过40亿美元削减至27亿美元。但正因为预见到即将到来的供需失衡，我们得以忽略其原本可能比我们预期更杠杆化的资产负债表，如今在周期中位水平下，其资产负债表已变得极为健康。

As the economy and the business recovered, they've paid down the debt for over 4,000,000,000 to $2,700,000,000 But knowing that you had this coming supply demand imbalance allowed you to look through what was probably a more levered balance sheet than we ever would have done to where it's now a pristine balance sheet on a mid cycle basis.

目前债务已降至现金流的一倍。

Debt's now one times cash flow.

股价从我们买入时的价格上涨了五倍。

The stock is up 5x from where we bought it.

而这家公司的业务更是如此——如果你根本不会新增产能，事实上他们还关停了大量低利润率的产能，这使得公司比当初我刚开始分析时更加出色，而他们现在正在回购股票。

And here's a business where, again, if you're not gonna add capacity at all, and in fact, they've taken out a lot of their lowest margin capacity, which has made the business even better than it was when I first started analyzing it, they're buying the stock back.

在过去一年半到两年间，他们的流通股数量从1.65亿股减少至1.27亿股。

They've gone in the last year and a half, two years from a 165,000,000 shares out to a 127,000,000.

公司市值从我们20亿美元的成本上升至70亿美元，但目前股价仍处于中个位数的自由现金流倍数水平。

And the stock at 7,000,000,000 cap up from our cost of 2,000,000,000 is still trading at kind of a mid single digit to what I'd call free cash.

因此，这里正是你希望管理层尽可能以最低价格回购股票的地方。

And so here's a place where you want this management team buying the stock back at as low of a price as they can get it.

所以二十年前、十年前甚至更早的利润率，并不能定义安全边际。在那种环境下，你真的需要理解这件事将如何演变。

And so margin of twenty years ago, ten years ago even, wouldn't have defined margin of safety And in that setting, but you really had to understand how this thing was going to evolve.

只要我们有信心你们能挺过疫情，我们

As long as we were confident you'd make it through the pandemic, we

就愿意将其作为重仓配置

were comfortable making it a big sized

所以这是

so it's

不仅仅是那些由我们都知道的优秀企业组成的50家公司列表，比如维萨、万事达、好市多。

not just these lists of 50 companies that get put together with all the great businesses that we all know are great businesses, the Visas, the MasterCard, the Costcos.

至少在我的世界里，你必须能够超越炼油商来看问题，而我在2000年时曾以几乎免费的价格买入了炼油股，当时标普指数中的能源板块占比从几年前的百分之十几下降到了1.5%。

At least in my world, you've got to be able to look beyond refiners, which I was able to buy for almost free in 2000 when the energy component of the S and P got down to one and a half percent from what had been double digits just a few years prior.

你知道，欧洲大型能源公司正在剥离资产，机构、捐赠基金和主权财富基金也在抛售他们的能源投资，这一切共同促成了全球各地出现真正的产能短缺。

You know, European majors were shedding assets, institutions, endowments, sovereign wealth funds were shedding their energy investments, and the whole thing aligned to where we were building, developing real shortages of capacity in various corners of the world.

我们的炼油产能太少了。

We have too little refining capacity.

我们已经将这个国家的炼油厂数量减少了一半。

We've cut the number of refiners in this country in half.

从五年前开始，我们就开始缩减实际的炼油产能。

Starting five years ago, we started shrinking actual right refining capacity.

因此，一个曾经因周期性太强而从不吸引我们的行业，现在变得非常有吸引力，因为你开始意识到，好吧。

And so a business that was so cyclical that never would have been attractive to us became very attractive because you started to say, okay.

业务质量可以通过某种稀缺性的形成来定义，这种稀缺性将在未来的周期中为你提供大量保护——当你开始从周期中去除一部分波动时。

Well, business quality can be defined through something like a developing scarcity that's gonna give you a lot of protection in the coming, what would be cycle, when you start to remove a bit of the cycle out of the cycle.

因此，我对业务质量的定义随着时间推移发生了变化。

And so my definition of business quality has evolved over time.

我们仍然在寻找最好的企业，如果把我们的整个投资组合合并成一家公司，我们的合并资产负债表基本上没有净负债。

We're still looking for the best businesses, the ones that If you take our overall portfolio and put it together as though it's a company, we essentially run no net debt on the collective balance sheet.

我们的资产负债表上净负债率约为10%，而标普500指数则超过50%。

We've got about 10% net debt on the balance sheet versus more than 50% for the S and P 500.

我们许多公司的资产负债表上都是净现金。

A lot of our companies have net cash.

它们的资产负债表上没有债务。

They don't have debt on the balance sheet.

管理层的道德、诚信程度以及会计政策的激进或保守程度，这些无形因素在定义企业质量时，成为安全边际的重要组成部分。

The intangibles of how ethical and how moral and how honest your management teams are, how aggressive or not aggressive they are with their accounting, that becomes a huge component of margin of safety when you're defining business quality.

当所有因素综合起来时，你最不应该关注的其实是价格。

And when you put it all together, really the last thing that you'd want to focus on is price.

但你只希望在价格足够低时买入这些资产、优质企业、周期性资产或一次性特殊机会，这样即使你的判断错误，企业未能展现出预期的质量，或者你预期的周期性稀缺性并未如你所想那样出现，你依然能够安然无恙。

But then you only want to buy these assets and these great businesses or these cyclical assets or these one off special situations at a price that allows you to be okay if you're wrong on your thesis and if the business doesn't exhibit the same quality or if the scarcities you think that are coming in a cyclical world don't develop as you think they're developing.

因此，价格变得极其重要，而在长期牛市的顶峰时期，投资者群体往往会忽视这一点。

So price becomes really important, and it it gets lost on the investing herd at secular peaks.

如今，科技圈完全忽略了这一点。

It's completely lost on the tech crowd today.

这轮大型企业复苏中，五大、七大甚至八大公司经历了显著增长，而我所说的‘五大巨头’在2021年时曾占标普500指数近25%，如今已大幅收缩。

This big recovery in the big five and the big seven or eight companies has seen the the the what I call the fab five shrink from what was almost 25% of the S and P 500 at the '21.

它们在2022年暴跌了36%至37%。

They got crushed down 36 or 37% in 2022.

它们几乎回到了高点。

They're almost back to their highs.

我的意思是，微软已经重回历史新高。

I mean, Microsoft is back to an all time high.

苹果也回到了历史新高，它们的比重几乎回到了25%。

Apple is back to an all time high, and they're back to almost 25%.

如果再加上英伟达和特斯拉，这七大公司占指数的30%，并且它们的集体交易市盈率已超过30倍。

You throw in Nvidia and Tesla in addition to the big five, they're 30% of the index, and they're back to trading collectively at more than 30 times earnings.

如今这些企业的规模比十年前、十二年前更大了。

And these are bigger businesses today than they were ten years ago, twelve years ago.

它们不会放缓，但价格依然重要。

They're not gonna slow, but price matters.

我的意思是，你可能看过我在2000年1月写给吉姆·格兰特的那封信，我觉得挺有意思的。

I mean, you may have seen the letter that I wrote that I think was interesting to Jim Grant that I put out in January 2000.

那时我们刚成立公司，正处在泡沫之中。

So we had just started the firm and we were in this bubble.

我对科技世界的发展、纳斯达克的市值感到非常不安。

I was so uncomfortable with what had developed in this tech world, the market cap of the NASDAQ.

我看着这个数字，过去一直追踪它，我有一个螺旋装订本，后来还有好几个螺旋装订本。

And I looked at this number, I used to track, I had a spiral binder, and then I had multiple spiral binders.

我会去看《巴伦周刊》的商业版块，那时候它非常厚。

I'd go to the Barron's business week section, which used to be really thick.

它曾经比现在整个《巴伦周刊》还要厚。

It used to be thicker than what is now the entirety of Barron's.

但他们已经删掉了很多这类数据。

And they've removed a lot of that data.

但那时完全是用铅笔手动追踪每周数百个数据点。

But, oh, it's just by pencil, just tracking hundreds of data points per week.

你注意到纳斯达克的市值数据刊登在《巴伦周刊》上，我不得不推断，实际上他们提供的是纽约证券交易所的市值。

You took note of the fact that the market cap of the NASDAQ, which was published in Barron's, I had to infer that actually, they were giving you the market cap of the New York Stock Exchange.

但通过查看微软的市值占比，你可以反推出纳斯达克的总市值。

But the market cap of the Nasdaq, when you look through to Microsoft's percentage, you can back into how big the Nasdaq was.

我就是这么做的。

This is how I did it.

尽管80%的利润来自纽约证券交易所的公司，纳斯达克的市值仍将在2000年3月超过纽约证券交易所。

The market cap of the Nasdaq was gonna pass the market cap of the the New York Stock Exchange in March 2000, even though 80% of the profits were on the side of the New York Stock Exchange businesses.

因此，我在1999年1月1日写了一封有趣的信，并在2000年发布了一系列预测。

And so I penned this fun letter at the 1999 on 01/01/2000, we published it with a series of predictions.

当时是千禧年，人们担心电脑时钟会出问题，世界即将崩溃。

It was the millennium and people were worried about clocks on computers and the meltdown of the world that was coming.

我提出了12到13个预测，时间跨度为未来15年，因为你知道，如果你做出15年的预测，就会被要求为未来的错误负责。

I put out 12 or 13 predictions for the next 15 thinking, well, you know, you're gonna get held to task for being wrong for fifteen years if you make a fifteen year prediction.

但我的第一个预测是：从今天的价格算起，微软股东在未来15年将亏损。

But I said, the first prediction was Microsoft shareholders will lose money for the next fifteen years from today's price.

这与微软是否是一家糟糕的公司无关。

And it had nothing to do with Microsoft being a bad business.

它是一家非常出色的企业。

It was a wonderful business.

它现在依然是个很棒的生意。

It still is a wonderful business.

只是当时的市值基于200亿美元的销售额和38%的利润率。

It was simply the price on 20,000,000,000 in sales and a 38% profit margin.

所以净利润达到了75亿美元。

So 7 and a half billion dollars in net income.

市值达到了6200亿美元。

The market cap was $620,000,000,000.

这是销售额的31倍，利润的80倍。

It's 31 times sales and 80 times earnings.

对于一家增长速度不会再像上市前十四五年那样迅猛的公司，你却在做一种外推：如果市值继续以同样速度增长会怎样？

On a business that's not gonna grow as fast as it had from its IPO fifteen or fourteen years prior, you went through an extrapolation of, well, what if the market cap were to grow at the same rate?

那样的话，你的市值就会达到数万亿美元。

Well, you'd be in the quadrillions of dollars.

如果销售额还能保持45%的增长呢？

And what if sales would keep growing at 45%?

那么，你知道，这家企业最终会消耗掉整个经济。

Then, you know, the business would essentially at a point consume the entire economy.

所以我当时是对的。

And so I was right.

十五年后，你的总回报为负。

And fifteen years later, you had a negative total return.

直到今天，从开始到结束，你在微软上的回报只有个位数，而微软如今又回到了第二大公司的位置。

Even to today, start to finish, you've made a single digit return on Microsoft, which is now back to the perch of number two largest company.

它的市盈率又回到了37倍。

It's back to 37 times earnings.

它的利润率已经恢复到了2000年的水平。

Its profit margin has recovered back to where it was in 2000.

但以那样的价格买入，至多只带来了平庸的回报，而且在十五年里，它实际上造成了亏损。

But paying that price lent, at best, a mediocre return, and for fifteen years, it delivered a loss.

而且

And

所以，克里斯，用这种视角来看当前这批顶尖科技公司，比如微软、谷歌、苹果、亚马逊等等，如果你要对未来十年、十五年做出类似的预测，像你整个职业生涯那样始终注重估值，你会避开哪些地方？

So so, Chris, applying that kind of lens to the current crop of fab companies, you know, the the Microsofts, the Googles, the Apples, the Amazons, and the like, if you were to make a similar prediction over the the next ten years, fifteen years of places to avoid being, places where if you're really anchored in valuation in the way that that you've had to be your entire career, what do you avoid?

你会建议我们的听众说，是的，这可能是一家了不起的公司。

What what would you advise our listeners to say, yeah, this might be an amazing company.

它可能是一个很棒的业务，也可能继续上涨，但胜算对你不利。

It might be a great business, and it could continue to rise, but the odds are against you.

这里要非常小心。

Be very careful here.

有哪些公司会立刻浮现在你脑海中，是我们的听众应该警惕的？

What what would be a a list of companies that trip off the the tip of your tongue that our listeners ought to be careful of?

我会对那些软件公司以及ARC投资组合中许多没有利润、未来可能也看不到利润的企业保持警惕，这些企业几乎每件事都必须完美无缺，可你却在为销售额支付荒谬的倍数。

Well, I'd be very careful of the businesses that that some of your software companies and and a lot of what's in in the ARC portfolios where you don't have profits and you may not have profits where almost everything has to go right, yet you're paying ridiculous multiples to sales.

对于没有利润却支付高倍数销售额的企业，我始终会保持谨慎。

I'd be always be careful of paying big multiples to sales for profitless businesses.

但今天的英伟达让我想起了二十三年前的微软。

But NVIDIA reminds me today so much of Microsoft, low twenty three years ago.

你看，你手握一项变革性的AI技术，而这家公司原本就靠着图形芯片做得很不错。

You know, here you are with a a transformational AI on a business that has been a very good business with their graphics chips.

但在年收入已达250亿美元、未来几年显然会快速增长的情况下，它的市值却曾达到1.2万亿美元。

But on what's trailing 25,000,000,000 in sales that's clearly gonna grow very quickly over the next few years, you had a market cap that hit $1,200,000,000,000.

我们现在对这只股票持空头头寸，但你仍需做同样的数学推算。

Now we've got a short position on this thing, but you go through the same math.

以250亿美元的营收为基础，假设每年增长20%，十年后营收将达到4000亿美元；再结合当前20%的利润率，你甚至可以预期它提升至30%、40%。

On trailing 25,000,000,000 in revenues, if you grow those revenues at 20% a year, let's say, you wind up you wind up in a decade at at at 400,000,000,000 in revenues, and then you take today's 20% profit margin, and you could look at it growing to 30%, look at it growing to 40%.

在任何一种情景下，如果你能持续十年保持20%的营收增长——这对任何企业来说都极其困难——同时将利润率提升到远超半导体行业平均水平的水平，

And in any of those scenarios, if you grow the top line at 20, which is very difficult to do for any business for a sustained period of time, and grow the margins to a very healthy level, far above what a semiconductor business is normally going to earn.

但只有当你允许它拥有30%或40%的利润率，并在此基础上给予30倍或40倍的市盈率时，才可能实现10%以上的回报。

But if you allow them a 30 or 40% margin and then you apply a 30 or a 40 multiple to earnings, only then can you make a 10 plus percent return.

我的意思是，你必须把利润率翻倍，从现在的水平提升到40%。

I mean, you have to grow the margin to 40%, double it from where it is today.

如今，一些华尔街分析师认为，未来五年内该公司的利润率将达50%，年收入增速将达到40%。

Now there are Wall Street Analysts, then in the next five years think the profit margin is going get to 50% and that the business is going to grow by 40% a year.

也许吧。

Maybe it does.

但当你开始谈论十年到十五年的时间跨度，并且为一家年销售额250亿美元、利润率20%的企业支付1.2万亿美元的估值时，即使你立即迎来收入的激增和盈利能力的大幅提升，你也必须假设没有竞争。

But when you start talking about ten and fifteen year periods of time, and you start talking about paying a trillion 2 for a business that's doing 25,000,000,000 in sales on a 20% profit margin, even if you get this immediate surge in top line growth and an immediate surge in profitability, you have to presume a lack of competition.

我的意思是，AMD，芯片领域还有其他竞争者。

I mean, AMD, there are other players in the chip world.

可能出错的地方太多了，但只有在一切顺利、所有因素都按理想方向延伸的情况下，你才能获得中低个位数的回报。

There's so much that can go wrong, but only in the case where everything goes right, when you extrapolate everything out, can you get to a mid to high single digit return.

所以我会说，英伟达，你今天支付英伟达的价格。

So I would say Nvidia, you pay Nvidia today's price.

我对微软说过同样的话。

I'd say the same thing that I did about Microsoft.

今天的英伟达投资者在未来十五年将会亏钱。

Today's investor in Nvidia will lose money over the next fifteen years.

那像交易这样的事情呢

And what about things like deal with

那像特斯拉或其他一些大公司呢？

What about things like Tesla or any of the other big names?

如果你以内在价值为锚点，而不是被动量和炒作牵着走，会不会有些东西显得特别明显？

Are there things that just seem kind of strikingly obvious if you're if you're anchored in intrinsic value and the like rather than in momentum and hype and the like.

我并不是特指特斯拉。

I I'm not saying this about Tesla in particular.

我只是想知道，有没有其他大公司也让你有这种感觉。

I'm just wondering if there are other big names that leap out at you like that.

没有。

No.

我只做空过一只股票，而且我也不是个擅长做空的人。

I've and so I've got a very short I only shorten one account, and I'm not a good short seller.

我根本不该做空。

I should I should never do it.

但我们确实从做空特斯拉上赚了钱。

But we've actually made money on our Tesla short.

我们有一个非常小的特斯拉空头头寸。

We have a very small Tesla short.

我们还有一个非常小的英伟达空头头寸。

We've got a very small NVIDIA short.

这只是我们最近才建的仓。

It's just we we just recently put on.

特斯拉的市值又快接近一万亿美元了，他们的年收入现在已经达到一千亿美元。

Tesla, what's approaching a trillion dollar market cap again, I mean, they're now at a $100,000,000,000 revenue run rate.

所有事情都必须完美无缺。

Everything has to go right.

这让我烦透了。

And bothers me to no end.

显然，今天早上埃隆还在称赞ARC的分析师，其中一位还是特许金融分析师（CFA）。

And, evidently, Elon was out this morning singing the praises of ARC's analysts, I mean, one of whom is a CFA.

当ARC几年前发布第一份关于特斯拉的研究报告时，他们做出了许多荒谬的假设，比如关于Robotaxi和特斯拉电动车销量及市场份额的预测。

And when they are they being ARC put out their first research report on Tesla a couple of years ago, you had these wild assumptions about Robotaxi and wild assumptions about the number of EVs that Tesla would sell on their market share.

甚至他们还假设，在五年内，特斯拉将自行销售汽车保险，业务量将与GEICO和Progressive相当。

And even things like, they assumed within a five year period, Tesla was going to sell its own auto insurance and they'd be writing as much business as GEICO and Progressive.

这两家公司分别是该领域的第二和第三名，仅略落后于已经经营了九十年的State Farm。

Numbers two and three in the field and only slightly behind State Farm, having done this now for ninety years each.

在他们最新的报告中，ARC预测，现在距离五年还剩四年半，在其基准情景下，特斯拉的市值将增长至7万亿美元，这与一个半月前‘五大巨头’的市值相当。

In their latest report, ARC presumes in five years' time, four and a half years' time now, that in their base case, Tesla is going to grow to a 7,000,000,000,000 market cap, which is about the same market cap that the fab big five sported just a month and a half ago.

在他们的乐观情景下，市值将达到9万亿美元。今天埃隆表示，他认为这家企业将成为一家9万亿美元规模的公司，并支持机器人出租车的概念。

In their bull case, you get to $9,000,000,000,000 Elon said today, thinks this business becomes a $9,000,000,000,000 business and he supports the robotaxi concept.

我不明白。

I don't get it.

我的意思是，如果你是一家汽车制造商，那么在制造汽车时，你必然受限于传统的制造利润率和资本需求。

Mean, if you're going to be in the So you're an auto manufacturer and you're grounded by conventional manufacturer margins and capital needs when you're building cars.

如果他们真要在五年内达到ARC基准情景所预测的1000万辆产量，那你需要的产能将远超今天现有的规模。

They're really going to grow to ARC's base case in five years' time, 10,000,000 vehicles, you're going to need a hell of lot more capacity than you have today.

这需要大量资本。

That requires capital.

埃隆做的一件了不起的事是把股价推得很高，从而让他们进行了多轮融资。

The beautiful thing that Elon did was talk the stock price up so much that they had several funding rounds.

当市值接近一万亿美元时，他们通过市场交易进行了这些融资。

They went into these at the market transactions when the cap got up to close to a trillion dollars.

他们让高盛和其他机构以当时200到300倍的市盈率、20倍的市销率，分别在这里和那里卖出了50亿美元。

And they got Goldman and others to sell $5,000,000,000 here, $5,000,000,000 there at what was then 200, 300 times earnings, you know, 20 times sales.

这几乎是免费的资本，为他们在德国和德克萨斯州的扩建提供了资金。

It was almost free capital, and it provided the money to build out Germany and to build out Texas.

但全自动驾驶，特斯拉说今年就会投入生产，这根本不可能。

But the full self driving, Tesla says you're going to be in production this year, there's no way.

我的意思是，你们离获得监管机构对这项技术安全性的批准还差得远。

I mean, you're so far from getting regulatory approval from this stuff being safe.

再想想它的经济性。

And then you think about the economics.

如果特斯拉是汽车制造商，我们打算以汽车行业从未有过的惊人利润率销售汽车，同时还要靠软件赚钱。

If Tesla's the car manufacturer and we're going to sell cars at these wonderful margins that nobody in the auto industry has ever been able to do, but we're going to have software.

因此，我们的消费者将支付远高于标价的价格，因为每次升级，我们的车都会变得越来越好。

And so our consumer is going to pay a way higher price than sticker because every upgrade, our car is going to get better and better.

它不是一辆3万美元的车，而是一辆5万美元的车，但四年后的它会比今天更好，因为有软件加持。

It's not a $30,000 car, but it's going to be a $50,000 car, but it'll be a better car four years now than it is today because of the software.

我不太认同这一点。

Not sure I buy that.

我更不认同特斯拉的全自动驾驶业务从特斯拉制造部门购买汽车，而制造部门又能获得惊人利润这个概念。

And I really don't buy the concept of Tesla, the full self driving Tesla, buying cars from Tesla, the manufacturing side making wonderful margins.

现在，汽车业务就像经营出租车或现在的Uber业务一样——Uber已经摧毁了纽约市的出租车牌照制度。

Now this car side, which is the akin to running a yellow cab business or what's now an Uber, Well, Uber killed the yellow cab medallions in New York City.

Uber这个业务本身根本不赚钱。

The Uber business doesn't make any money.

至于司机，如果你算上保险、折旧、油费以及开Uber的机会成本——也就是放弃其他工作机会的损失，你会发现Uber司机其实也赚不到钱。

And the drivers, if you look through to your actual overhead of insurance and depreciation and fuel costs and the opportunity cost of your driving an Uber versus going out and having another job, the Uber driver doesn't make any money.

但突然之间，我们却要转向全自动驾驶，因为据说它更安全，人人都会接受，再也没人会自己开车了。

So but all of a sudden, now we're gonna go to full self driving because it's gonna be safer and everybody's gonna adopt this and nobody's gonna drive their own car.

我们在FSD业务方面也将获得丰厚的利润，这支撑了目前9万亿美元的市值。

And we're gonna have wonderful margins on the FSD side as well that supports what's now a $9,000,000,000,000 market cap.

这就是ARC的这些人以及现在马斯克所谈论的数字。

That's that's the number that these folks at ARC and now Elon's talking about.

标普500的总市值今天是38万亿美元，但我们将增长到9万亿美元。

The total market cap of the S and P five hundred is $38,000,000,000,000 today, but we're going to grow to nine.

你的意思是，特斯拉将超越标普500中目前占30%市值的七大科技股，而ARK预测我们将在四年半内实现这一目标。

You mean you're to be bigger than the 30% market cap today, Tesla included, that the big seven stocks make up of the S and P, and we're going to get there in ARK's prediction, four and a half years.

特斯拉说，你根本不该听别人的意见，只该相信ARK，因为他们的分析非常出色。

And Tesla says, You ought not listen to anybody but ARK because their analysis is really good.

这很危险，纯属夸大其词。

Well, that's dangerous and that's puffery.

你需要开始衡量管理层的诚信以及他们所作的承诺。

And you start to measure the integrity of management and the promises that are made.

我会尽量远离一个由妄自尊大者掌舵的企业。

I'd steer as far away from a megalomaniac at the helm of a business.

这根本不是在以任何现实的水平设定预期，但现在已经开始接近炒作。

That's just not it's not setting the expectation bar with any level of reality, but it now starts to border on hype.

当散户投资者因这种夸大其词而受到伤害时，这真让我很不满。

And when the retail investor is the one that gets harmed by the puffery, that gets my dander up a little bit.

这是我们曾在SPAC领域看到的一些骗子行为，他们真正目的只是自我致富并滥用散户投资者。

It's some of the behavior that we've seen in the SPAC world with some of these charlatans that have really just been in business of enriching themselves and abusing the retail investor.

听好了，如果你在管理对冲基金，想喝下这杯Kool-Aid并参与这个游戏，那也行，随你便。

Look, if you're running a hedge fund and you wanna drink the Kool Aid and play the game, fine, so be it.

但真正承受最大痛苦的，是那些购买股票的散户。

But it's the retail buyer of stock that is the one that really bears the brunt of the pain.

我的意思是，很多机构也被卷入其中了。

I mean, the institutions, plenty of them got wrapped up.

在1999年，有很多非常优秀的投资者沉迷于科技股的狂热，结果把自己搞垮了。

There were a lot of really great investors that drank the tech Kool Aid in '99 that blew themselves up.

他们随着纳斯达克指数下跌了整整80%，而对他们来说，价格根本不是问题。

They were down the full 80% with the NASDAQ and price was not a thing with them.

当时一切都关乎商业质量。

It was all about, well, business quality.

这一最新阶段，人人都觉得自己会成为下一个亚马逊，因为只要能无限期地赚钱，就该获得通行证，因为这项技术将会无比出色。

This latest iteration, everybody's going to be the next Amazon because you should get a hull pass for making money for an indefinite period of time because this technology is going to be so wonderful.

我建议每个人都去读一读罗伯特·戈登关于美国经济史的那本书，我忘了书名了。

I mean, everybody ought to go read Robert Gordon's book on the economic history of The United I forget the title of the book.

我在我的信中推荐过这本书。

I've recommended it in my letter.

这是一本非常长的书。

It's a it's a really long book.

他是普林斯顿大学的教授。

He's a Princeton professor.

这本书你花了两年才读完？

This is one that took you two years to read?

是的。

Yeah.

我的意思是，永远。

I mean, forever.

但这是一部精彩的历史，它基本上追溯到工业革命之后的伟大技术。

But it's a wonderful history, and it essentially goes back to the great technologies post the industrial revolution.

这些技术是如此具有变革性。

And they were so transformative.

所有这些人工智能、SaaS软件，甚至互联网，对人均实际GDP增长的推动作用，都比不上那些变革性技术的影响，你必须全面看待这一切。

All this AI and SaaS software and even the Internet is more incremental to real GDP growth per capita than some of those transformative changes were, and and you've got to put it all in perspective.

我想问你一个相关的问题。

I wanted to ask you a related thing.

你提到的这些伟大的复合型增长企业，这些真正高质量的企业。

You you this this whole issue of these these great compounders, these great businesses that truly are high quality businesses.

对吧？

Right?

多年来，你一直持有不少这样的企业，比如2000年左右开始投资罗斯百货，然后是2004年的好市多、星巴克、耐克。

And you've owned you've owned a bunch of them over the years, whether it was starting with something like Ross Stores around 2000 or then Costco around 2004, Starbucks, Nike.