RWH034：通往财富的捷径——与彼得·基夫对话

最棒的是，这些优秀的候选人已经在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工，至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

请前往linkedin.com/studybill免费发布职位，然后推广你的职位以使用LinkedIn Jobs的新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

条款和条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

好的。

Alright.

我想让你们想象一下，在夏季高峰期的奥斯陆度过三天。

I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.

你将享受到漫长的白昼、绝佳的美食，以及漂浮在奥斯陆峡湾上的桑拿房

You got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on

的

the

而你每一次交谈的对象，都是真正塑造未来的人。

Oslo Fjord, and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.

这就是奥斯陆自由论坛。

That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.

从2026年6月1日到6月20日，奥斯陆自由论坛将迎来第十八年，汇聚来自全球的活动家、技术专家、记者、投资者和建设者。

From June 1 through the third twenty twenty six, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its eighteenth year bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the world.

其中许多人正活跃在历史的最前沿。

Many of them operating on the front lines of history.

在这里，你可以亲耳听到人们如何利用比特币应对货币崩溃，如何利用人工智能揭露人权侵犯，以及在审查和威权压力下构建技术的故事。

This is where you hear firsthand stories from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses, and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures.

这些都不是抽象的概念。

These aren't abstract ideas.

这些是现实中的人们正在使用的工具。

These are tools real people are using right now.

你将与大约2000位非凡人士同处一室——异议人士、创始人、慈善家、政策制定者，这些是你不仅会聆听、还会共进晚餐的人。

You'll be in the room with about 2,000 extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with.

在三天里，你将体验到震撼人心的主舞台演讲、关于自由科技与金融主权的动手工作坊、沉浸式艺术装置，以及在会议结束后仍持续进行的对话。

Over three days, you'll experience powerful main stage talks, hands on workshops on freedom tech and financial sovereignty, immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the sessions end.

这一切都将在六月的奥斯陆发生。

And it's all happening in Oslo in June.

如果这听起来像是你感兴趣的场合，那你运气不错，因为你可以亲自到场参加。

If this sounds like your kind of room, well, you're in luck because you can attend in person.

标准票和赞助者票已在oslofreedomforum.com开放购买，赞助者票提供深度参与、私人活动以及与演讲者的小团体交流时间。

Standard and patron passes are available at oslofreedomforum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events, and small group time with the speakers.

奥斯陆自由论坛不仅仅是一场会议。

The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference.

这是一个理念与现实交汇的地方，是那些亲历未来的人们正在构建未来的地方。

It's a place where ideas meet reality and where the future is being built by people living it.

初创公司行动迅速。

Startups move fast.

借助人工智能，它们交付产品更快，并更早吸引企业客户。

And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.

但大单带来了更大的安全与合规要求。

But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.

SOC 2 并不总是足够。

A SOC two isn't always enough.

适当的安全措施可以促成交易，也可能导致交易失败。

The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.

但哪位创始人或工程师能抽身离开，花时间去处理这些事呢？

But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?

Vanta 的人工智能与自动化功能，能在数日内帮助你为大单做好准备。

Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.

Vanta 持续监控你的合规状态，确保未来的交易不会受阻。

And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.

此外，Vanta 会伴随您一起成长，并在每一步都提供及时的支持。

Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.

随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望，Vanta 深知所需内容及时机，并已打造了最快、最简便的路径帮助您达成目标。

With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to get you there.

因此，认真的初创公司都会早早借助 Vanta 实现安全合规。

That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.

我们的听众可通过 vanta.com/billionaires 获得 1000 美元优惠。

Our listeners can get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问 vanta.com/billionaires，立减 1000 美元。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

好的。

All right.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

是的。

Yeah.

我想花一点时间谈谈你所犯的最大错误，因为你最近说，我最大的错误就是过早卖出了那些优秀的企业，你把这称为‘沉默的杀手’——你过早地卖掉了那些具有复利效应的公司。

I wanted to dwell for a moment on that idea of the biggest mistakes you've made because you said recently that my biggest mistakes have been early sales of great businesses, and you described that as the silent killer where you you sell compounders too soon.

既然我们正在讨论你的错误，我能问你一个让你心悸的问题吗？关于Pool Corp，这正是一个很好的例子。

And while we're dwelling on your mistakes, can I can I cause you heart palpitations by asking you about Pool Corp, which is a pretty good example of this?

医生。

Doctor.

当然。

Sure.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为Pool Corporation是我投资生涯中犯过的最大错误。

I think Pool Corporation's the biggest mistake I've ever made in my investment career.

正如你所说，过早卖出是投资界的‘高血压’，是一种沉默的杀手。

And like you said, selling early is the high blood pressure of the investment business, it's a silent killer.

人们总是会谈论那些买进后归零的企业，或者下跌了50%、75%的企业。

And people will always talk about the business they bought that went to zero or the one that went down 50% or 75%.

是的，这很糟糕，你需要避免这种情况。

Yes, that's bad, you want to avoid that.

但你过早卖出的那些后来增长了十倍甚至二十倍的公司，才是我职业生涯中真正的杀手。

But the business that you sold too early that went on the compound tenfold or twentyfold after that, And my career has been the real killer.

我以合适的价格买入了Pool Corp。

I bought full corp at the right price.

我可以跟你讲一个有趣的故事，关于我去路易斯安那州科文顿拜访管理层的经历，那地方可算不上商业中心。

Interesting story that I could tell you about going down to visit management in Covington, Louisiana, which is not exactly a business mecca.

但无论如何，它完全符合我们的所有标准。

But in any event, it checked all our boxes.

曼尼·佩雷斯·德·拉·梅萨当时还是董事会主席，我想他当时也是首席执行官。

Manny Perez de la Mesa, who was still the chairman of the board, I think was the CEO then.

他曾在通用电气工作，背景出色，对资本配置有着深刻的理解，而Pool Corp是一家非常出色的企业。

He'd been in GE, he had a great background, he understood capital allocation beautifully, and Pool Corp was a terrific business.

对于那些不太了解这家公司的听众，我来告诉你们，这是一家卖面包的公司。

For those of your listeners who aren't familiar with it, I'll tell them that a bread.

它是一家泳池用品和设备的分销商，毛利率在中个位数水平。

It's a distributor of pool supplies and equipment, and it gets margins in the mid single digits.

大多数分销商的毛利率在低个位数，但泳池设备拥有独特的特许经营权，使其能获得远超普通分销商的惊人回报。

Most distributors margins in the low single digits, but pool equipment has this unique franchise that permits it to get these ridiculously high returns for a distributor.

这些惊人的回报乘以频繁的库存周转，意味着它们能获得极高的资本回报率，完全符合复合型企业的所有特征。

And those ridiculously high returns multiplied by frequent inventory turnover mean they get huge returns on capital and do everything that you want a compounder to do.

我买对了，但后来在投资组合中贬值了四到五倍后就卖掉了，因为我被一些关于估值和经济状况的错误想法影响了。

Well, I bought it right and sold it after depreciating four or five times in our portfolio because I allowed some erroneous thinking about valuation and probably about the economy that creeped into my thinking.

全屋建筑在一定程度上与建筑周期相关。

Full construction is somewhat linked to the construction cycle.

所以我可能让所有这些因素影响了我的判断，最终彻底清仓了这个仓位，而当时我已经从这笔投资中获得了四到五倍的回报。

So I probably let all these things influence my thinking and when I'm selling the position in its entirety and having made, like I said, four or five times our capital on the business.

我认为自那以后，它的价值已经上涨了约十倍。

I think it's appreciated about tenfold since then.

这教会了我一件事：你必须要么做投资者，要么做经济学家，很少有人能同时胜任两者。

So what that taught me was that you either have to be an investor or an economist, Not many people can be both.

我不认识任何富有的经济学家，所以我更愿意做个投资者。

I don't know any wealthy economists, so I'd rather be an investor.

因此，我尽量屏蔽那些可能影响你思维的经济信息，通常这些影响是负面的。

And so I just try to tune out some of this economic stuff that can infect your thinking, usually negatively.

是的。

Yeah.

我昨天读了你写给股东的信，其中有一封是2020年8月写的，那时正值新冠疫情高峰期。

I I was reading your letters to shareholders yesterday, and there was one from, I guess, August 2020, so in the middle of the COVID pandemic.

你写道：我们无法预测经济或市场的走向，更不用说病毒了。

And and you wrote, we have no predictions about the direction of the economy or markets and certainly not the virus.

病毒的走势、最终持续时间及其对经济的影响都是不可知的。

The trajectory of the virus and its ultimate duration and impact on the economy are unknowable.

可知的是，偶尔会发生一些难以想象的事情。

What is knowable is that on occasion, the unthinkable happens.

意想不到的恐怖袭击会发生，房地产泡沫会破裂，或者疫情会爆发。

Unforeseen acts of terrorism occur, real estate bubbles burst, or a pandemic emerges.

这意味着我们必须拥有资产负债表坚如磐石、业务模式卓越且持久，能够抵御难以想象的经济困境，并由我们信任的、会为我们最佳利益行事的道德管理者经营的企业。

This means we must own businesses with both bulletproof balance sheets and outstanding and durable business models that can withstand unthinkable economic hardship, which are run by ethical managers whom we can trust to act in our best interests.

这在我看来是一个非常重要的洞见，我的意思是，某种程度上，它又回到了斯多葛主义。

And that strikes me as such an important insight that you I mean, in a way, it gets back to stoicism.

对吧？

Right?

就是控制我们能控制的，放手我们无法控制的。

It's like controlling what we can control and letting go of what we can't control.

而且只是认识到经济、市场、病毒等走向本质上是不可知的，除非你可能是索罗斯、德鲁肯米勒之类的人物。

And and just recognizing the fact that the direction of the economy and the market and viruses and stuff is just not really knowable, unless maybe you're Soros or Druckenmiller or someone like that.

我不确定。

I don't know.

对。

And Right.

因此，这种认知——谦逊地承认这些是不可知的——在我看来是长期投资成功的第一步。

And so just that recognition, having the humility to recognize that that's not knowable strikes me as a a really important first step in long term investment success.

是的

Yeah.

所以，当我指导年轻投资者时，我会告诉他们：做出选择。

So one of the things I tell young investors when I'm mentoring them is make a choice.

你要么是经济学家，要么是投资者，除非你是你提到的那五个人之一。

You're either an economist or an investor, unless you're one of those five people you mentioned.

我只是打个比方，世界上可能只有五个人能一贯准确地告诉你美元走势、石膏价格、油价或资金成本会如何变化。

And I just rhetorically say there's probably five people on the planet who can consistently tell you what the dollar's going to do, what the price of gypsum is going to be, what oil might be, or the price of money.

我对这些一无所知。

I know none of those things.

我根本没有足够的心理带宽去为这些事情留出任何空间。

I simply don't have enough mental bandwidth to be able to allocate any room at all to these things.

我尽力以一种方式投资，让这些因素最终变得无关紧要。

I do my best to invest in a manner where those things are ultimately going to be unimportant.

这引出了你在书中提到的一个非常重要的观点。

This leads to a real important point that you made in your book.

霍华德·马克斯谈到，如果你在过去七千个月里只有四十四个月持有市场，那么你就错过了全部的市场回报。

Howard Marks talks about if you were owning the market for what, forty four months out of the last seven thousand months or something like that, you know, you you miss a 100% of the market return.

是的。

Yeah.

有时候，即使只错过几天，你也错过了几乎全部的市场回报。

And sometimes even if you miss a few days, you miss almost all of the market return.

还有博士。

And Doctor.

亚利桑那大学的亨里克·梅森贝纳教授在他的研究中对此做了精辟的阐述，这项研究也在你的书中某处被引用过：自1926年以来，4%的上市公司创造了超过五年期国债收益的全部回报。

Henrik Messenbeiner at the University of Arizona put a fine point on this in his study, which is also referenced at some point in your book, since 1926, 4% of all public companies have accounted for 100% of the return in excess of the five year treasury.

这意味着其余96%的公司累计回报仅相当于五年期国债的水平。

That means the other 96 cumulatively added up to return from the five year treasury.

这凸显了这项事业的难度——当你所考察的96%的企业都无法创造价值、无法为你收取的费用提供正当理由时。

That puts a real fine point on how difficult this business is, when 96% of the businesses at which you're going to look are not going to add value and help you justify your fees.

你曾与贝塞默银行有过一次非常有趣的交流，你跟我分享了这段对话，我认为它触及了成为一名成功长期投资者所面临的核心困境。

You had a very interesting exchange with Bessemerbijn that you shared with me that I think is it gets at a really central conundrum in the challenge of being a successful long term investor.

所以对于不了解的人，亨里克·贝森宾德是亚利桑那州立大学的一位教授。

So for people who don't know, Henrik Bessenbinder is this Arizona State University professor.

正如彼得所说，他做了一项非常重要的研究，回溯了从1926年到2016年的数据，最终得出结论：好吧。

And as Peter said, he he did this really important study where he goes back, I think, from 1926 to 2016, and he ends up saying, okay.

基本上，4.3%的股票创造了美国市场所有的净收益。

So basically, 4.3% of stocks created all of the net gains in The US market.

因此，我的朋友杰森·茨威格写了一篇典型地睿智而深刻的报道，指出：这表明寻找下一只超级股票，就像在一片巨大的干草堆里寻找几根针。

And so my friend Jason Zweig wrote a characteristically smart and insightful article about this saying, well, this shows that searching for the next super stocks is like hunting for a few needles in an immense field of haystacks.

所以像贝森宾德这样的人会说，好吧。

And so people like Bessebinder would say, well, so okay.

这就是为什么大多数主动投资策略会失败的原因。

So this is why most active strategies fail.

对吧？

Right?

因为基金经理们的分散程度不够，所以他们错过了那些真正带来全部收益的少数股票，比如亚马逊、苹果、家得宝之类的。

Because people the fund managers aren't diversified enough, and so they miss out on owning those few stocks that actually accounted for all of the gains like the Amazons and the Apples and the Home Depots and the like.

但你得出了另一个结论，我认为这也是理解这一研究的一个非常重要的角度。

But you came to another conclusion, which I think is also a really important way to read it.

你能解释一下你对贝森宾德研究的略微反叛性的解读吗？

Can you explain your slightly subversive reading of Besenbinder's study?

是的。

Yeah.

我喜欢你用‘反叛性’来形容，因为我觉得这正是它的本质。

I love your characterising of subversive because I think that's exactly what it is.

我说，太好了。

I said, hallelujah.

这意味着，如果有人有能力找出那4%的股票，他就能大获全胜。

This means someone who's got the ability to figure out what those 4% are is going to kill him.

如果你打算从事这一行，我认为你必须内心坚信，是的，我能找到那些优秀的企业。

And if you're going to be in this business, I think you have to have internal belief that, yeah, I can find those great businesses.

毕竟，我们每天都在做什么呢？

After all, what are we all doing every day?

我的意思是，我认识并尊重的这个行业里的大多数人，都在一心一意地寻找那百分之四的公司。

I mean, most of the people that I know and respect in this business are doing nothing but looking for those four percenters.

所以我说，这真是个非常好的消息。

And so, I said, this is really, really good news.

这意味着，那些具有优质眼光并采取集中投资组合的人将会获胜。

This means someone who's got a quality bent and a concentrated portfolio is going to win.

从某种意义上说，这支持了博格的观点，而沃伦和查理也认同这个观点：大多数人应该投资指数基金。

Supports in one sense, the Bogle argument, which Warren and Charlie endorse that most people ought to be in index funds.

但对于那些足够优秀、能够识别出优秀企业并大量买入的少数主动管理者来说，我认为贝森宾德的研究真是个好消息。

But for those few active managers who are good enough to identify the great businesses and buy them in quantity, I thought Best and Binder's study was really good news.

是的。

Yeah.

我个人其实从两个角度都理解了这一点。

I sort of interpreted it both ways personally.

我的意思是，我想我很久以前就直觉地这么做了，因为我一直持有几只指数基金，也总是把妻子和孩子的钱投入指数基金，因为我觉得他们不该为我那种自以为能战胜市场的幻想买单。

I mean, I guess I guess intuitively, done this a long time ago because I I've always owned a couple of index funds, and I I always put my wife's money and my kids' money in index funds because I thought they shouldn't pay for my delusions in thinking that I could beat the market.

但至于我自己的钱，虽然我也持有一些指数基金，但我通常会投资于我信任的人管理的非常集中的基金，因为其中一个可能只持有10只股票，另一个大部分资金也集中在八到十只股票左右，但总共可能持有约20只股票。

But then with my own money, typically, I although I do have a couple of index funds, I've tended to own very concentrated funds run by people I trust because so, you know, one of them has maybe 10 stocks, another has most of its money in about eight or 10 stocks, but probably owns about 20 stocks.

所以我认为，你可以从不同角度解读这些数据，但确实有很强的理由认为你应该集中投资。

And so I do I do think there's you can interpret the data in different ways, but there is a really strong argument for saying that you wanna you wanna concentrate.

但如果你不够出色，这种做法就可能灾难性了。

But then but then that's kind of disastrous if you're not good.

是的。

Yeah.

我完全同意你的看法。

I completely agree with your assessment.

对整个投资群体而言，这意味着你应该把钱投入指数基金。

For the investing community, it means you ought to put your money in an index fund.

但对于投资领域中那些站在另一端的人——也就是投资从业者本身而言，这意味着：如果你足够优秀，能够找到那些长期能够复利增长、创造超额价值的企业，并且正确地买入它们，那就是个好消息。

But for the people who are on the other side or in the investment community itself, it means, if you're good and you can find those businesses that are going to compound and create above average value over a long period of time and buy them right, it's good news.

它有两种解读方式。

It's got two interpretations.

威廉，你对集中投资的看法也深受梅森·霍金斯的影响，我多年前曾采访过他，虽然不算太久以前，那是我写《投资界的伟大思想》一书的时候。

William And your view of concentration was also very much influenced by Mason Hawkins, who I interviewed many years ago, but not that many years ago, but for the Great Minds of Investing book that I wrote.

你能谈谈，听梅森谈论集中投资时，你所经历的顿悟吗？

Can you talk about the your your epiphany that came from listening to Mason talk about concentration?

是的，当然。

Yeah, sure.

那是在纽约的一次大会上，我都记不清具体是什么会议了，但当时的情景依然历历在目。

Was in some conference up in New York and I can't even remember what it was, but I remember at the moment like it was yesterday.

那时我正试图形成自己的投资理念，读着巴菲特和玛格丽特的观点，心想：没错，这听起来很有道理，但该怎么应用呢？

As this person who's trying to form an investment philosophy and reading Buffett and Margaret saying, Yeah, that makes sense, but how do you apply this?

我听到梅森在对一个投资团体演讲时说：‘为什么要去持有你第四十好的投资想法呢？’

I heard Mason say in his speech to an investment group, Why own your fortieth best idea?

我当时就想：对，这正是我一直在寻找的智慧。

And I said, yes, that's some of the wisdom that I have been searching for.

持有你第四十好的投资想法，意义何在？

What is the point of owning your fortieth best idea?

假设一个投资组合中均匀分布着40家公司。

Let's say it's an equally distributed 40 businesses in a portfolio.

如果你足够幸运，其中一家公司的价值翻倍，它只会为你的投资组合增加2.5个百分点。

If you're lucky enough to have that business double in value, it will add exactly two and a half percentage points to your portfolio.

有谁能够找到40家如此出色的企业呢？

Who is smart enough to find 40 businesses that are that good?

我肯定不是这样的人。

Well, I'm certainly not one of them.

于是我开始想，一个 manageable 的数量是多少呢？

So I figured, well, what's a manageable number?

我觉得20家已经很多了。

I said, well, 20 sounds like a lot.

15家听起来还不错。

15 sounds okay.

10家听起来更好，因为我根本无法在脑海中深入掌握15家公司的财务细节。

10 sounds even better because I just can't keep the financial details of 15 businesses in my head with any depth.

所以我一直觉得，持有10到12家我足够了解、值得投入大量投资者资金和我个人资金的企业，让我感到很安心。

So I just always felt comfortable owning 10 or 12 businesses that I thought I could know well enough to risk sizable amounts of investor capital and my own capital.

值得注意的是，你也通常会长期持有这些企业，因此这些是你非常熟悉的企业。

And it's worth noting that you also tend to hold them for a long time, so these are businesses that you know very well.

我的数学不算好，但前几天我随手在信封背面算了一下你的持仓，看起来你大约有35%的资产集中在前三大的持仓上，前十大持仓可能占到了60%左右。

I also mean, my math is not great, but I was counting up your holdings on the back of an envelope the other day, and it looked to me like you have about 35% of your portfolio in your top three holdings and maybe 60 or so in your top 10.

所以你的投资组合确实相当集中，强调长期持有那些你认为极其优秀、可能属于那4%的企业。

So it is a pretty concentrated portfolio with long term an emphasis on long term holdings that are businesses that you regard as really superior, that could be part of that 4%.

是的，如果我们看13F报表，里面确实有很多杂项，但你的说法基本是对的。

Yeah, there's a lot of clutter in our 13F if you look at it, but you're essentially right.

我认为我们的前三家企业至少占了资产的35%到40%，而前十大企业轻松占到75%到80%的资产。

Think that our top three businesses are at least 35% to 40% of our assets, and the top 10 are easily 75% or 80% of our assets.

在核心持仓之外，还有一支小规模的后备团队。

There's a small farm team above and beyond the core holdings.

所以，我印象中，前三名是微软——我想你大约十年前，也就是2013年左右买入的；美国铁塔公司——你持有超过二十年，已经涨了一百倍；还有马克尔公司，你也持有很长时间了。

So the top three, I think, when I looked were Microsoft, which I think you bought initially about ten years ago, I think in 2013, and American Tower Corp, which you've owned for well over twenty years and has been a 100 bagger, I think, and Markel, which you've owned for a long time.

我想请你谈谈其中的几个例子，作为你寻找那些伟大企业的参考——那些真正起决定性作用的4%的卓越企业。

And I wondered if you could talk about a couple of those as a kind of illustration of what it is you're looking for when you're looking for these great businesses, the 4% of great businesses that make all the difference.

比如，微软这样的公司是如何体现你所寻找的特质的呢？

How does a company like Microsoft, for example, embody what it is you're looking for?

嗯，这三家企业各自代表了通往投资成功的不同路径。

Well, each of those three businesses illustrates a distinct path to getting to investing.

当我们买入微软时，鲍尔默还在掌管公司，当时没人喜欢他，也没人看好微软。

So when we bought the Microsoft, Balmer was still in charge there, And nobody liked him, nobody liked Microsoft.

它被视为科技行业的恐龙。

It was technology dinosaur.

他们当时宣布要收购诺基亚——那是一家当时还重要的手机公司，但如今已无人关心其手机业务。

They had announced that they were going to buy Nokia, which is a cell phone company back then that nobody cares about today, at least from the standpoint of cell phones.

我认为微软同意以大约80亿到100亿美元的价格收购它。

I think Microsoft agreed to pay something on the order of 8 or $10,000,000,000 for it.

但市场估值在公告发布时，恰恰下跌了与收购价相等的金额。

But the market valuation went down by that amount, by the purchase price, literally when they made the announcement.

股票市场在三十秒内就完全否定了诺基亚的全部收购价格。

The stock market wrote off the entire purchase price of Nokia in thirty seconds.

我们一直在研究一些旧科技公司，比如微软、eBay和其他一些公司。

We had been looking at some of the old technology businesses like Microsoft and eBay and some others.

我们得出了一个简单的算术结论：仅微软的Outlook业务——也就是你的电子邮件、PowerPoint、Excel和Word——就几乎遍布美国每一个办公室，并且主要覆盖了全球。

And we came up with some simple arithmetic that the Microsoft Outlook business alone, that is your email, your PowerPoint, your Excel and your Word, that was in virtually every office in The United States and mostly around the world.

仅这一项业务的自由现金流价值就约为每股1.8美元。

It was worth about $1.8 per share in terms of free cash flow.

当时，股票价格低于30美元。

And so the stock price was under 30 at the time.

所以我们说，我们为Outlook业务支付的估值倍数在十几倍到二十几倍之间。

So we said, Well, we're paying a mid to high teens multiple for the outlook business.

除此之外，还有服务器业务、Windows业务以及微软拥有的其他所有软件业务。

There's everything else on top of that, whether it's the server business, the Windows business, all the other software businesses that Microsoft owned.

我们可能并不完全理解这些业务，但我们的顿悟时刻出现在我和同事吉姆·罗尼望着我们位于宾夕法尼亚大道华盛顿办公室的窗外时，我们眺望爱德华·默罗公园那边的世界银行和国际货币基金组织，仅从我们的视角就能看到这些建筑上大约两三百扇玻璃窗。

Said, We may not understand those, but our moment of epiphany came when my colleague Jim Rooney and I were looking out our office window, the building in Pennsylvania Avenue in DC, and we looked out over to Edward Murrow Park at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, there's probably 200 or 300 glass windows on these buildings that we can view just from our vantage point.

我们注意到，每一扇窗户后面都有一台电脑，而这些电脑很可能都安装了微软的操作软件。

We made the observation behind every single one of those windows is a computer and that computer probably has Microsoft operating software on it.

Outlook业务也几乎出现在每一台电脑上。

The Outlook business is probably on every single one of those.

而且它长期以来一直稳如泰山。

And it ain't gone anywhere for a long time.

我们愿意为这项业务支付15、16、17倍的自由现金流，也许其他部分还会有所好转。

We're willing to pay fifteen, sixteen, 17 times free cash flow for that business and maybe something good will happen to the rest.

至于其他部分是什么，那已经是历史了。

Well, what the rest is, is history.

萨提亚上任后，我们都知道他后来如何改变了这项业务。

Satya came along and we know what he's done with the business since then.

我们认为我们的安全边际只是一个合理的倍数。

We thought our margin of safety was modest multiple.

我们觉得自己支付的是我们认为最重要且最易理解的那部分业务。

Thought we were paying for what we consider to be the most important and understandable part of the business.

当然，他们的资产负债表非常强劲，并且正在回购股票。

And of course, a great balance sheet and they're buying back stock.

我认为史蒂夫·鲍尔默受到了不公的批评。

I think Steve Ballmer gets bad rap.

他可能不是名人堂级别的首席执行官，但他上任时公司的股价已经非常高了。

He may not have been the hall of fame CEO, but he also came in when the stock was extremely high priced.

如果你看他担任CEO期间的表现，自由现金流、盈利以及所有重要指标都实现了良好的增长，资本回报率也很不错。

And if you look at his tenure as CEO, free cash flow and earnings and all the important stuff compounded nicely, Returns on capital were nice, were good.

他们也犯过一些错误，我认为他因为个人风格问题在形象上失分了。

They made some mistakes and I think he lost style points because of his personal approach to the business.

他无法控制自己上任时股价已经高达30到40倍市盈率这一事实。

He couldn't control the fact that he came in with an extraordinarily high stock price with a 30 or 40 multiple on it.

最终，萨提亚上任后为公司带来了非凡的成就。

Ultimately Satya came in and has done just incredible things for the business.

他并不是恰好在股价低迷时上任，而是在资本配置方面做出了卓越的贡献，无论是推动Azure的发展，还是他做的其他诸多事情。

He didn't happen to just come in when the stock price was low, he came in and did magnificent things from a capital allocation standpoint, whether it's booting up Azure to many of the other things that he's done.

这就是微软的发展路径。

So that's the path to Microsoft.

我们只是在安全边际上，以折扣价买入一家优秀的企业——也就是这家运营商企业。

We're simply at a margin of safety and we're buying a great business, the outlet business that is, at a discounted price.

彼得，似乎还有一个共同主题，我想也和美国铁塔公司一起探讨一下，这个主题同样适用于微软，那就是你总是在寻找这些简单的长期趋势。

It also seems like, Peter, there's a common theme which I'd like to explore as well with American Tower, but which also applies to Microsoft, which is that you're always looking for these simple secular tailwinds.

你能谈谈微软和美国铁塔公司的情况吗？你似乎也看到了这一点，而且你在汽车行业的几项投资也是如此。

And and can can you talk about that both with Microsoft and with American Tower, where there's a sense that you're which which I also see with your your you have several investments in the automotive business.

你似乎总是在寻找那些拥有长期增长动力的领域——虽然这么说有点混用比喻。

It seems like you're always looking for something where there's a long secular runway that that that that to mix metaphors.

你知道，我们每一个大型账户级投资背后，都伴随着长期的结构性趋势。

You know, every mega account battery we've only had a long secular tailwind behind it.

当然，我们在买入微软时并不知道这一点，但趋势确实存在。

And of course, we didn't know that at the time we bought Microsoft, but it was there.

至于美国铁塔公司，这是一个有趣的故事，我是在1998年左右发现它的，当时它还是美国广播系统公司的一个前身部分。

In the case of American terror, which is an interesting story, I discovered it in, I think, 1998 when it was part of a predecessor company called American Radio Systems.

很多人不知道，美国塔台是在上世纪90年代末从美国广播公司分拆出来的。

Lot of people don't realize that American terror was spun off from American radio in the late 1990s.

美国广播公司由已故的史蒂夫·多奇经营，他是一位卓越的首席执行官，杰出的价值创造者。

American radio was run by the late Steve Dodge, who was a fabulous CEO, a great value creator.

另一个没有传统行业背景的人，他是耶鲁大学的英语专业毕业生。

Another guy who didn't have the analog path into this business, He was an English major at Yale.

我想他可能在别处拿过MBA，但这并没有影响他。

I think he might've gotten an MBA somewhere, but he didn't let that hurt him.

他是一位持续创造价值的人，也是个很棒的人，我可以给你讲一些关于他的故事。

And he's just a serial value creator and a great guy about which I could tell you some stories.

几年前，他在佛罗里达州骑自行车时不幸遭遇事故去世。

Died tragically a few years ago in a bicycling accident down in Florida.

但他当时经营的美国广播系统本身就是一个非常出色的业务。

But he was running American radio systems, which itself was a terrific business.

那是地面广播业务，在互联网出现之前，这是一项极其赚钱的生意，因为如果你拥有一个城镇里主导的广播电台，比如纽约的WNEW，广告商别无选择，只能找你投放广告。

Was terrestrial radio, which until the internet came along was a fabulous business because if you own the dominant radio station in town, if you own NEW in New York, you had no choice but to advertise with them.

运营一个广播电台，除了少量内容成本外，几乎不需要其他花费。

It cost nothing except for a small amount of money for content to run a radio station.

1996年《电信法案》通过后，为数字通信铺平了道路；随着数字通信的爆发，史蒂夫开始接到一些人的电话，他们希望在自己的广播塔上安装数字手机天线。

And after the Telecom Act of 1996, I think it was, paved the way for digital communications, after the explosion of digital communications, Steve began to get some calls from people who wanted to hang digital cell phone antennas on his radio towers.

数字通信需要比旧式模拟通信密集得多的蜂窝站点网络，因为信号的传播特性——即信号传输距离——要短得多。

Digital communications requires a much denser network of cell sites than the old analog because the signal propagation characteristics, which means the distance that the signal will carry are much lower.

你需要更多的蜂窝站点。

You need a lot more cell sites.

但人们希望把蜂窝站点建在史蒂夫的塔上。

But people want to put cell sites on Steve's towers.

他们想到，也许我们可以把这些塔整合成一项业务。

They get the idea, well, maybe we can start aggregating these towers into a business.

美国塔公司的一份SEC文件中有一个脚注，提到了一个名为‘美国塔系统’的员工股票期权计划。

There's a footnote in one of American Tower's SEC filings that made reference to a separate stock option program for the employees of something called American Tower Systems.

仅此而已。

That's all it was.

那只是短短一句话，但我读了。

It was a single sentence, but I read it.

于是我给史蒂夫打了电话，我和他关系很好。

And I called up Steve with whom I had a great relationship.

我们聊了很长时间，谈到了广播业务以及其他各种事情。

We talked about the radio business and other businesses and other things for a long time.

你可能会以为我打给了马里兰州福特米德的国防情报局，然后问了一些令人尴尬的问题。

Well, you would have thought I called the defense intelligence agency in Fort Meade, Maryland, and then asked uncomfortable questions.

他直接挂断了我的电话。

He basically hung up on me.

所以我意识到，这件事背后一定有什么值得深入调查的东西。

So I knew that there was something here at which to look that required further inquiry.

我们后来弄清楚了，那是一个手机塔业务，也大致了解了它的规模是否大过一个面包盒级别的生意。

What we figured out then it was a cell tower business and we got some sense for, is it bigger than a breadbox type economics?

我们知道它们很不错。

Understood that they were good.

所以我们决定买入，我们当时已经在美洲广播领域持有大量仓位，但还是继续增持，因为我们认为这个业务迟早会以某种方式被剥离出来。

So we to buy, we already had a huge position in American radio, but we bought more American radio because we figured that this business was going to be externalized in one way, shape or form.

这就是为什么他们为这项业务单独设立了股票期权计划。

That's why they had a separate stock option program for it.

果然，他们最终把它分拆了出去。

But sure enough, they did, they wound up spinning it off.

它的股价涨到了每股24美元。

It went to $24 a share.

记住，即使在分拆之前，一级市场就已经有人开始对它极度兴奋了。

Remember there's a one issued market, even before it was spun off, people started to get really excited about it.

在一级市场上，股价一度涨到18或20美元，后来人们意识到这是一个多么棒的业务——你的年运营成本只有1万美元，而租金可能超过10万美元，任何人都能算得清楚。

Went to 18 or $20 in the one issued market, then went to $44 a share after people figured out what a great business to sell to our business was, where your operating costs are $10,000 a year and your rents might be over $100,000 a year and anybody can do the math.

你唯一需要假设的是：数字通信会不会增长？

And the only assumption that you had to make was, were digital communications going to grow or not?

这可是iPhone出现很久以前的事了，我们当时谈的完全是语音通信。

And this is long before the iPhone, so we're really talking about voice.

因此，这就是你必须做出的核心假设。

And so that was the pillar assumption that you had to make.

数字通信会扩张还是会萎缩？

Are digital communications got expand or not?

我们假设它们会扩张，所以我们大量买入。

We made the assumption that they were, so we bought a lot of it.

正如你可能知道的，美国铁塔公司在人们发现铁塔租赁业务后，卷入了土地争夺战，当时AT&T、GTE等运营商正在出售他们的铁塔资产，因为运营商必须决定他们是想提供服务，还是进入房地产行业。

And as you probably know, the American terror got caught up in the land grab when people figured out the sell terror business and the carriers like AT and T and back then GTE and others were selling their their terror portfolios, because the carriers had to figure out whether they wanted to sell service or be in the real estate business.

当然，为了适应无线通信的增长，以及数字频段传播特性较差的特点，网络塔和基站的数量必须大幅扩张。

Of course, the network towers and cell sites had to expand dramatically to accommodate the growth in wireless communications combined with the lower propagation characteristics of the digital capable frequencies.

关键是，铁塔和基站的数量在很长一段时间内必须呈指数级增长。

The point is, I mean, the number of sell sites and sell towers had to grow exponentially for a long period of time.

人们看明白了这一点，在互联网泡沫期间将这些股票推高到了极不合理的价位，这进一步推动了这些股票的上涨。

People figured this out and they bid up these stocks to really unsustainable prices during the .com boom, which helped further fuel the rise in these stocks.

美国铁塔公司过度负债了，就像所有铁塔业务的参与者一样，他们几乎不得不这么做，因为当时爆发了土地争夺战。

Well, American Tower got over levered and like all of the people in the cell tower business did, they almost had to because there was a land rush.

你没有第二次机会去购买一座通信塔。

You don't get a second chance to buy a cell tower.

一旦买下，就再也无法挽回。

Once it's bought, it's gone.

所以这是一个错误。

And so that was a mistake.

因此，股价在很短的时间内从每股44美元跌至不到80美分。

So the stock went from $44 a share to under 80¢ a share in a fairly short period of time.

我记得你和查克·艾克尔，作为美国通信塔的早期坚定支持者，确实去拜访了史蒂夫·多奇。

And you and Chuck Acre, as I remember, who was also a very early believer in American Tower, actually went to visit Steve Dodge.

这恰恰说明了一个重要观点：在你的职业生涯中，你真正押注的是个人，是个人的素质。

And this this kinda illustrates an important point, which is that throughout your career, you're really betting on the individual, the quality of the individual.

你能跟我们讲讲那次与史蒂夫·多奇的会面吗？当时他刚经历股价从44美元跌至80美分左右的打击，而这部分原因正是源于他的失误。

Can you tell us about that meeting with Steve Dodge, the founder and CEO, at this moment where he's just His been stock has gone from 44 to 80 something cents, and it's partly because of his mistakes.

是的。

Yeah.

生意就像人一样，会犯错，也会经历困难时期。

Well, businesses are like people, they make mistakes and they have hard times.

所以美国铁塔公司也经历了艰难时期和重大错误，那就是在互联网泡沫破裂时过度杠杆化。

And so American terror had its hard time and its big mistake, which was getting over levered in the .com bust.

还有一些相关业务。

Are also some adjacent businesses.

他们当时还试图启动一个电信枢纽业务，但胃口太大，超出了自身能力，结果在过程中过度杠杆化了。

There's a teleport business that they were trying to boot up at the same time, but they were just bitten off a lot more than they could chew and they got over levered in the process.

所以史蒂夫同意见我和查克。

So Steve agreed to see me and Chuck.

于是有人去拜访史蒂夫，他说：‘我给你们一小时。’

So someone went up to visit with Steve and he said, I'm going to give you an hour.

他说：‘你们明白吗？我正努力拯救我的公司，这需要我全身心投入，但你们从早期就支持我，表现得像我的合伙人，而不是股票的租客。’

He said, You understand that I have a business that I'm trying to save It requires my full time and attention, but you guys were here early on, you act like my business partners, not like renters of the stock.

所以我们会给你们一小时。

So we'll give you an hour.

我们去了波士顿，与他们见面。

We went up to Boston and visit with them.

史蒂夫平时是个聪明又随和的人，他依然聪明，但肯定不再随和了。

And Steve, was ordinarily a smart, laid back guy, he was still smart, but he certainly wasn't laid back.

他显得非常紧张，神情严肃。

He was action faced and he was quite grave.

他又说：给我一小时，我得去救我的生意。

And he said again, Give me an hour, I got a business to fix.

我会回答你们所有合法范围内能回答的问题。

I'll answer whatever questions you have to the extent it's legal for me to do so.

你们尽管问，然后我就得去想办法挽救这个生意。

So have at it and then I got to go see if I can fix this business.

他举起手——不是真的举手，而是比喻性地、象征性地说道：这是我的错。

And he held his hand up, not literally, but rhetorically and figuratively, and said, This is my fault.

是我搞砸的。

I did it.

其他人没有任何责任。

Nobody else is responsible.

这是我职业生涯中发生过的最糟糕的事情。

It's the worst thing that's ever happened to me in my business career.

我认为我可以解决这个问题，但这里没有任何把握。

I think I can fix it, but there is no certainty here.

顺便说一下，你的听众可能会感兴趣。

And so by the way, your listeners might be interested.

问题出在一个2亿美元的债券到期，这个债券是在互联网热潮期间，由某位投资银行家强加给他们的，公司可以选择用现金或股票偿还。

The problem was a $200,000,000 bond maturity that was roaming But during the go go years of the .com stuff, some investment banker had foisted upon them and it was payable either in cash or in shares of stock at the company's election.

如果公司拿不出现金，就必须提供股票。

If the company could not come up with cash, they had to come up with stock.

所以在2002年，所有从事这一行业的人——当时美国电塔公司被视为电信股，因为它的租户是电信公司，尽管它本质上是一家房地产企业——但它的融资渠道是基于电信板块的。

So in 2002, nobody who was in this business, and American Tower at that time was considered a telecom stock because of who its tenants were, even though it was a real estate business, but it was banked on the telecom side.

电信行业的银行家们被要求缩减他们的贷款规模。

The telecom bankers have been instructed to shrink their plugs.

没有两亿美元可用于偿还这笔债券。

There's not $200,000,000 available to take care of this bond.

因此，套利者意识到，他们不得不以股票形式偿还。

And so the arbitragers figured out, well, they're going to have to pay it off in stock.

所以最佳策略是尽可能做空股票，同时买入债券并做空股票。

So the thing to do is short as much stock as you can, buy the bond and short the stock.

因为如果你压低股价，他们理论上必须交付无限数量的股票来偿付两亿美元的债券。

Because if you drive down the price, they have to deliver theoretically an infinite number of shares to satisfy a $200,000,000 bond.

所以如果你持有这笔债券，你就可能拥有整个公司。

So you could own the whole business if you own the bond.

于是他们尽可能多地买入债券，并同时做空股票对冲。

So they'd buy as much of the bond as they could and short stock against it.

但这个策略并没有成功。

But that strategy didn't work out.

史蒂夫通过联系私募股权界，成功筹集了两亿美元，偿清了这一债务。

Steve was able to find $200,000,000 by going to the private equity community, satisfied that obligation.

在过去十八个月里，股价曾从最高每股3美元涨到5美元。

The stock since went from as high as $3.00 $5 a share within the past eighteen months.

从那以后，股价大幅下跌。

It's down a lot since then.

威廉，这个故事的重点是，史蒂夫行事正直，他完全承担了自己行为的责任。

The point behind that story, William, is that Steve acted honorably, he accepted full responsibility for what he did.

史蒂夫并不是一个人做的这件事。

Steve did not do this alone.

他身边有一群优秀的人。

He had some great people around him.

因为史蒂夫是个正直的好人，所以他身边围绕的也是正直优秀的人，其中最重要的一位就是首席财务官布拉德·辛格。

Because Steve was an honorable good guy, he had honorable good people around him, not the least of which was Brad Singer as chief financial officer.

接下来，我想讲一个关于布拉德的简短故事。

And I'll segue into a brief story about Brad.

我打算去纽约参加一个会议，看到他正拖着一个行李箱走在街对面。

I was going to some conference up in New York and I saw him on the other side of the street dragging a suitcase.

于是我穿过马路去陪他，我说：纽约天气这么热，你干嘛拖着行李箱？

And so I crossed the street to join him, I said, It's a hot day in New York, why are you dragging your suitcase?

他回答：因为公司需要省钱。

And he said, Well, firm needs to save money.

当时他身边没人，所以没人盯着他。

He didn't have anybody with him at the time, so he wasn't being watched.

所以他才在省钱。

So he was saving money.

当别人没看着的时候，他依然做正确的事，这正是诚信的定义之一：无人注视时仍做正确的事。

He was doing the right thing when people weren't watching, which is one definition of integrity, doing the right thing when people aren't looking.

我好像记得，当你问他什么是资本最大的破坏者时，他就是那个回答你的人。

I seem to remember he was the guy also who told you once when you asked him what was the single biggest destroyer of capital.

他是不是说，是无聊？

And didn't didn't he say boredom?

他说，是管理者们实在坐不住，非要干点什么。

That it was managers deciding they just couldn't couldn't sit on their hands.

管理上的无聊

Management boredom.

所以我问布拉德，上市公司最大的价值破坏者是什么？

So I asked Brad, what's the biggest destroyer value among public companies?

我话还没说完，你就说‘管理上的无聊’，意思是他们拿到钱就去花，花在一些愚蠢透顶的事情上。

And I didn't even get the question up before, you said management boredom, which means they go out and they get some money and they go spend it on something one:thirty stupid.

董事会不能无所作为，而我们

Boards of directors can't sit on their hands and we're

是为了一些事情拿报酬的，对吧？

getting paid fees for something, right?

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

当你经营一家小企业时，雇对人至关重要。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

正确的员工能提升你的团队，提高生产力，把你的业务推向新的高度。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人本身就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们的新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

与其翻阅一堆简历，它会根据你的标准筛选申请者，并突出显示最匹配的人选，帮你节省数小时时间，在合适的人选出现时快速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是，这些优秀的候选人已经都在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工，至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费发布职位至linkedin.com/studybill，然后推广职位以使用LinkedIn招聘的新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

这就是 linkedin.com/studybill，免费发布您的职位。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

条款和条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

每一家企业都在问同一个问题。

Every business is asking the same question.

我们如何让人工智能为我们所用？

How do we make AI work for us?

可能性无穷无尽，而盲目猜测风险太高。

The possibilities are endless and guessing is too risky.

但袖手旁观绝非选项，因为有一件事几乎可以肯定：您的竞争对手已经在行动了。

But sitting on the sidelines is not an option because one thing is almost certain, your competitors are already making their move.

借助甲骨文的 NetSuite，您今天就能让人工智能发挥作用。

With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite 是全球超过 43,000 家企业信赖的头号人工智能云 ERP 系统。

NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

这是一个统一的套件，将您的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合为单一数据源。

It's a unified suite that brings your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into a single source of truth.

这种关联的数据让您的AI更加智能，不再只是猜测。

That connected data is what makes your AI smarter so it doesn't just guess.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，您可以使用任何您选择的AI工具连接到真实的业务数据，并提出您曾经有过的所有问题，从关键客户到现金状况再到库存趋势。

And now with NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect to your actual business data and ask every question you ever had, from key customers to cash on hand to inventory trends.

无论您的公司年收入是数百万还是数亿，NetSuite都能帮助您保持领先。

Whether your company earns millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead of the pack.

目前，NetSuite免费提供商业指南《揭开AI的神秘面纱》，请访问netsuite.com/study获取。

Right now, NetSuite's free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南免费提供，访问netsuite.com/study即可获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

netsuite.com/study。

Netsuite.com/study.

2026年，您终于要付诸行动了。

2026 is the year you finally do it.

这一年，你不再只是搁置这个想法，而是真正把它变成现实。

The year you stop sitting on that idea and actually turn it into something real.

我们都有那些本可以更上一层楼的技能、想法和副业，但梦想与行动之间的区别，在于迈出第一步。

We all have skills, ideas, and side projects we know could be more, But the difference between dreaming and doing is taking that first step.

Shopify 为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切工具。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经迈出了这一步，从家喻户晓的大品牌到刚刚起步的初创者。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already taken this leap from massive household brands to first time founders just getting started.

使用 Shopify，打造你的梦想店铺非常简单。

With Shopify, building your dream store is simple.

你可以从数百个精美的模板中选择，并自定义以匹配你的品牌风格。

You can choose from hundreds of beautiful templates and customize them to match your brand.

设置也非常快捷，内置的 AI 工具能撰写产品描述，甚至帮助编辑产品图片。

Setup is fast too, with built in AI tools that write product descriptions and even help edit product photos.

随着你的成长，Shopify 也会与你一同成长，帮助你从一个仪表盘处理更多订单，并拓展至新市场。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you, helping you handle more orders and expand into new markets all from one dashboard.

在2026年，停止等待，立即用Shopify开始销售。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月1美元的试用版，今天就开始在shopify.com/wsb上销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

在新的一年里，让Shopify陪伴你听到第一声成交。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

这多年来，对你克服对削减像美国铁塔这类资产的执念来说，也是一个至关重要的教训。

Which has also been a crucial lesson for you in terms of overcoming your addiction to trimming things like American Tower over the years.

对吧？

Right?

因为你从和史蒂夫·多奇的会议出来后，我认为你把仓位增加了三倍，然后股价就一飞冲天了。

Because you you came out of that meeting with Steve Dodge, I think, and tripled your position, And then it just kind of shot to the moon.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，这些年来股价上涨了一百多倍。

I mean, it went up over a hundredfold over the years.

所以减持这部分一直是个错误。

And so trimming that was kind of always a mistake.

对吧？

Right?

是的。

Yeah.

那是个错误。

It was a mistake.

在某一时刻，它的涨幅超过了300倍，而目前的股价仍比当初高出200倍。

And it went up over 300 fold at one point and is now still up 200 fold at its current price.

但它就像微软，自上世纪80年代初或80年代中期就上市了。

But it's like Microsoft, which has been public since the early 1980s or sometime in the 1980s.

我认为，它在过去两周内创下了历史新高，这意味着在它作为上市公司的七千到八千天里，只有十天是卖出微软的好时机。

Well, I think it reached an all time high within the past two weeks, which means in the seven thousand or eight thousand days to be a public company, there's been ten days of which was a good time to sell Microsoft.

那么，那段它几乎原地踏步的漫长时期，对吧？

Well, was that long period where it kind of went nowhere, right?

确实如此。

That's true.

所以我的观点是修辞性的，你明白我的意思。

So my point is a rhetorical one, you get the idea.

这让我想起达斯汀·宾德的研究：4%的股票贡献了100%的回报。

And this goes back to Dustin Binder's study that 4% of the stocks account for 100% of the return.

如果你能发现其中一只4%的股票，并相信自己持有了这样的股票，那么只需要一个极其有说服力的理由，你才会考虑卖出——但没人能给出好答案，因为没人知道一家公司的永久性最高点在哪里。

If you can find one of those 4% and believe you own one of those 4%, it'll only take a really super convincing argument to get out of Nobody has a good answer for this because nobody knows where the all time forever top is in a business.

查克略显简洁地说道：让他们持续复利，直到不再复利为止。

Chuck somewhat laconically says, Let them compound till they stop compounding.

我没有比这更好的答案，但我知道，这些企业是稀缺的。

And I don't have a better answer than that, but I do know that, you know, these businesses are scarce.

一旦你拥有了其中之一，我所能想到的最好做法就是永远持有它。

And once you own one, you wanna hold on to it for forever is is best I can come up with.

我的意思是，

I mean,

你又提出了一个关于评估管理层诚信与品质的重要观点，我认为这与萨提亚·纳德拉在微软的情况一致——他是在你买入股票大约一年后上任的，这对你来说真是幸运。

you've raised another important point about this whole issue of judging the the integrity and the quality of the management, which I think is consistent with Satya Nadella at Microsoft who came in much to your good fortune about a year after you bought the stock.

你的朋友兼我的朋友汤姆·盖纳，他是马克尔公司的首席执行官，而马克尔显然一直是你的重仓股；还有美国铁塔公司的史蒂夫·多奇。

Tom Gaynor, a friend of yours and mine, who's the CEO of Markel, which obviously has been a huge position for you, and also Steve Dodge at American Tower.

这引出了一个非常重要的问题，因为你过去曾说过，投资于你喜爱和钦佩的首席执行官是至关重要的。

And this raises a really important question because you've said in the past that investing with CEOs you like and admire is essential.

但你究竟该如何做到这一点呢？

But how the hell do you go about it?

我的意思是，当你去拜访一家公司或评估其财务报表时，你实际上是在做什么，来判断他们是否是一个值得长期合作的好人？

I mean, what are you actually doing when you go visit a company or you're assessing their financial statements actually to assess whether they're a good person that you're willing to partner with over the long run?

这极其困难，几乎不可能做到。

That's incredibly hard, and it's almost impossible do.

最终，你得自己下注，尤其是在现在，我觉得首席执行官们被《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》和《多德-弗兰克法案》束缚得如此严重。

And ultimately, you have to go buy your gun, Particularly these days when I think CEOs feel so constrained by Sarbanes Oxley and Dodd Frank.

他们的一言一行都太过刻板。

They're so scripted.

每次他们开电话会议、与投资者交流，或有投资者关系人员做记录时，旁边总有个律师在场。

There's a lawyer in the room every time that they're giving a conference call or talking to investors or an investor relations person taking notes.

所以，打破他们的脚本至关重要。

So knocking them off the script is really important.

但这正好是个很好的过渡。

But it's a nice segue.

谈谈前三大的持仓。

Talked about the three top positions.

微软以传统价值投资的方式运作。

Microsoft played old fashioned with value.

这是一家很棒的业务，只是因为错误的原因而价格低迷。

It's a great business at a distressed price for the wrong reasons.

路径一。

Path number one.

路径二，美国铁塔公司本身是一家卓越的业务，拥有出色的管理层。

Path number two, American Tower was simply a great business, great managers.

我们能够以合适的价格买入，正如你之前的采访对象克里斯托弗·贝格所指出的，当时虽然存在一些阴云，但并非负面因素，只是人们并不理解这项业务。

We were able to buy it at the right price because as one of your previous interviewees, Christopher Begg pointed out, there were some clouds, not necessarily negative clouds at the original time of purchase, but people simply didn't understand the business.

结婚并收购了一家更大的企业。

Was married and signed a larger business.

所以这是路径二：卓越的业务，出色的管理层。

So that's path number two, great business, great managers.

路径三：马克尔公司。

Path three to Markel.

马克尔未必是一家伟大的企业，尽管我非常尊重那里我的主要朋友们。

Markel isn't about necessarily a great business, with all due respect to my main friends there.

但保险业的本质，尤其是财产和意外伤害保险，本身并不是一门伟大的生意。

But insurance by its nature, property and casualty insurance by its nature is not a great business.

它可以是一门非常好的生意，但一场灾难就可能在一天内抹去多年利润。

It can be a very good business, but you can wipe out years of earnings in one day, in one catastrophe.

因此，它不符合我们所看重的内在卓越企业的特征。

And so it doesn't fit the characteristic that we see, which is inherently superior business.

马克尔的团队由我们认为不仅是卓越资本配置者，而且是深思熟虑、理解对股东责任至高无上的人组成。

Martell is populated by people that we believe are not only excellent capital allocators, but thoughtful people who understand the primacy of their obligation to the owners of the business.

不仅如此，他们还深入思考与股东的关系，其所有沟通——无论是SEC文件还是财报——都直接、坦率、简洁地表达。

Not only that, they think deeply about the relationship with the owners of the business, express their All their communications from the shareholders, whether it's an SEC filing or an earnings report, are expressed directly in a straightforward managed manner.

他们使用的形容词非常少。

There's very few adjectives.

直话直说。

Tell you like it is.

事实上，他们保守的准备金政策也体现在向股东报告的方式上。

In fact, their policy of reserving conservatively extends to the way they report to their shareholders.

他们有一个信条：宁可冗余，不可不足，这是保险行业的术语。

They have this mantra of more likely redundant than deficient, which are insurance terms.

冗余意味着你有超额的准备金。

Redundancy means you have excess reserves.

不足则如字面意思，就是准备金不够。

Deficient is exactly what it sounds like, you don't have enough reserves.

所以他们的信条是：宁可冗余，不可不足。

So the mantra is more likely redundant than deficient.

我认为这一点也反映在他们向企业所有者报告业绩的方式上。

So I think it's echoed in the way they report the results to their owners of their business.

我记得几年前，他们的收益公布后，看起来不如前一年或上个季度好。

I remember a few years ago, their earnings came out and they looked like they didn't compare well to the previous year or the previous quarter or something like that.

但如果你查看10-Q报告，原因在于他们为在马克尔风险投资中收购的一家公司计提了额外的业绩奖励支出。

But if you looked in the 10 Q, the reason was they had taken an accrual for additional earn out payments to a business that they had bought in Markel Ventures.

这很好。

That's good.

你希望Markel Ventures的人因为卓越表现而获得应得的回报。

You want the people in Markel Ventures to get their earning up for superior performance.

但当然，你必须将这笔费用计入支出。

But of course, you've got to expense that.

所以这就是为什么利润看起来没那么好。

So that's why the earnings didn't look as good.

他们完全没有那种荒谬的说法，比如‘如果没有这笔对业绩奖励的应计费用，调整后的利润会更高’。

There was none of this nonsense about, well, adjusted earnings would have been higher were it not for this accrual for a nerd out.

他们只是如实告知，充分相信股东足够聪明，能够自己看懂真相，而不是被各种误导性信息牵着走，更不会提供这些关于调整后利润的胡言乱语。

They just told you exactly like it was and gave their shareholders enough credit for being intelligent enough to figure out what the truth was on their own without being led by the nos and certainly without being given all this nonsense about adjusted this, that or the next.

在你的一个播客里，查理·芒格说真话，这个词以B开头，以T结尾。

One of your podcasts, Charlie Munger calls it like it is, it's a word that begins with B and ends in T.

但他确实说对了。

But he's right.

他完全、绝对正确。

He's absolutely, totally right.

如果还有任何首席执行官或投资者关系人员在听这个播客，请立刻停止这种做法。

And if there are any CEOs or investor relations people listening to this podcast, stop doing that now.

我有两件事特别想知道。

There were two things I'd love to know.

讲道。

Sermon.

讲道。

Sermon.

是的。

Yeah.

在我们继续讨论评估管理层质量这个显然极其重要的主题之前，我想提一下你过去说过的一些话，因为我觉得这些内容非常值得听众铭记。

Well, there were a couple of things that I before we move on from this subject of evaluating the quality of management, which is clearly hugely important, a couple of things I wanted to mention that you've you've said in the past because I think they're really worth listeners bearing in mind.

首先是，你曾经说过，我有一个简单的测试：如果我要在鸡尾酒会上向一群投资者介绍这位首席执行官，我会感到高兴吗？

So the first is you once said, I have a quick test, which is, would I be happy to introduce this CEO to a group of my investors at a cocktail party?

是的

Yeah.

他或她能融入其中吗？

Would he or she fit in?

他们会感觉这个人是个合作伙伴，还是我会担心我的投资者察觉到这个人是个只顾自己、不顾别人的类型？

Would they sense that this person is a partner, or would I worry about my investors getting a whiff of a two for me, one for you kind of person?

这在我看来是一个非常有价值且实用的见解。

That seems to me a a really valuable insight and a a practical insight.

这归根结底是一门社交业务。

This is ultimately a social business.

我的意思是，不是指喝杯酒那种社交，而是像朋友之间的那种社交业务。

By that, I don't mean have a drink, but your friends kind of social business.

我们是在把人当作社会性动物来评估。

We're evaluating people as social animals.

这也是我们坐下来与人交谈、试图了解他们真正的动机、摆脱投资者关系脚本的原因之一。

That's part of the reason why we sit down and talk to people and try to get a sense for what makes them tick and get them off an IR script.

我们想了解他们是否清楚自己将如何与股东及潜在股东相处。

We want to find out if they have a sense of how they're going to relate to their shareholders and potential shareholders.

他们是否将股东视为合作伙伴？

Do they view them as partners?

还是将股东视为一个利益群体？

Or do they view them as a constituency?

他们是否认为股东只是投票决定薪酬方案的人？

Do they view them as people who are simply going to vote on a compensation package?

一旦你离开会议、门关上之后，他们是否又变回纯粹利己的人，试图尽可能多地从股东那里获取股权激励，只要ISS允许？

And once you leave the meeting and the door closed, do they go back to being purely self serving people who are trying to extract as much in the form of equity compensation from their shareholders as they can possibly get away with an ISS will permit.

所以这又回到了马克尔的故事，我应该一口气讲给你听。

So this goes back to the Markel story, which I should tell you in a breath.

我最初是在20世纪80年代中期该公司上市后不久与它接触的。

I originally met with the company shortly after it went public in the mid 1980s.

我想当时我正在约翰斯顿·莱蒙研究团队工作。

I think I was with the Johnston Lemmon research team at the time.

我见了史蒂夫·马克尔，当时他们正面临一场严重的马匹死亡问题。

I met with Steve Markel and at that time they had this huge bump of equine mortality.

我对马一无所知，只知道我怕得要死。

I didn't know anything about horses, except I was scared to death of them.

我在想，马匹死亡？

I'm thinking, equine mortality?

意思是马脑炎吗？

Is that mean equine encephalitis?

我的意思是，这听起来像是我完全搞不懂的东西。

I mean, this sounds like something I can't understand.

但结果发现，马匹死亡保险其实是一门相当不错的业务。

But turns out that equine mortality is actually a pretty good line of business to write.

马可能会咬人，我不想玩文字游戏或混淆隐喻，但我还是避开了这个领域，因为作为卖方分析师，我做过一个噩梦，梦见头条新闻写着：‘马脑炎席卷肯塔基，马克尔公司崩盘’。

Can bite you, I hate to no pun intended or mixed metaphor intended, but I stepped away from it because as a sell side analyst, I I had this nightmare about the headline saying, Equine encephalitis sweeps through Kentucky, Markel broke.

当然，那根本不是真的，也不可能发生。

And of course, that wasn't true, that wasn't going to happen.

我的意思是，他们已经对其中很大一部分进行了再保险，这实际上是个相当不错的业务线，但这就是为什么我在第一次拜访时没有参与。

I mean, they had reinsured a bunch of it and it just happens to be a pretty good line of business, but that's why I didn't get involved on the first visit.

几年后，到了上世纪90年代中期，我再次回去时，股价已经是IPO价格的很多倍，也远超我初次拜访时的估值，但那时他们的业务组合已经足够多元化，我们在介入时对这些不同业务线也有了更多了解。

And I went back years later in the early 1990s, mid 1990s, the stock was many multiples of the IPO price and many multiples of the value when I first visited them, but the book of business had diversified sufficiently and I knew a little bit more about these different lines of business when we got involved then.

我们之所以能在这种业务固有的复杂性上稍微放宽标准，是因为我们非常欣赏管理这家公司的团队。

The reason we were able to bend a little bit on the inherent difficult nature of the business was because we're enamored of the people who ran it.

我们认为他们能像巴菲特经营国家赔偿公司和其他保险业务那样运作，实现承保盈利，并逐步发展壮大。

And we thought that they could run it the way Buffett had run National Indemnity and the other insurance businesses and generate an underwriting profit and build something up.

到那时，汤姆已经加入公司，他有一段精彩的故事和出色的业绩记录。

By this time, Tom was with the business and he had a good story to tell and a good record.

我们之所以介入马克希尔，纯粹是因为人。

We got involved with Mark Hill purely because of the people.

彼得，这已经有多少年了？

And that's been how many years now, Peter?

从上世纪90年代中期开始。

Since the mid nineteen nineties.

因此，愿意与高质量的人合作，以及能够耐心等待、长期持有，这些显然都很重要。

So this willingness to to to partner with high quality people and ability to stay put and sit on your hands for a long time, these are clearly important.

关于价值观和品格评估，我想引用一句我从你的一些文章中看到的、非常欣赏的话：企业会像磁铁一样吸引那些拥有相似价值观的人。

And then just on this this question of values and character assessment, I just wanted to quote the other the other line that I really like that I picked up from some of your writings somewhere where you said, businesses will attract magnetically people who share similar values.

我们经常看到这种情况。

We see this all the time.

有才能且品德良好的人会彼此找到对方，无论是在教堂、棒球队，还是在公司里，他们总会相互吸引。

Talented people with good values find each other, whether it's a church, whether it's on the baseball team, whether it's in the corporation, they find each other.

而那些价值观较差的人也会彼此聚集，有时会形成自己的企业。

And the people who have less attractive values find themselves, and they organize themselves in the businesses sometime.

这个观点让我觉得非常深刻，它让我想起大卫·霍金斯谈到的那些吸引人的领域——比如，当人们努力追求真实时，某种特定的意识层次会发挥作用。

It's a very interesting insight to me of this idea that there's something that it sort of reminds me of David Hawkins talking about these attractive fields, you know, where a particular level of consciousness, you know, people are trying to be truthful.

他们会吸引其他同样追求真实的人。

They attract other people who are trying to be truthful.

我不知道你所说的是否真的能被实证证明，但似乎确实存在一些围绕马克尔或伯克希尔形成的群体，那些真正重视良好行为、正直、诚实、利益一致以及服务精神的人聚集在一起。

And I I have no idea if what you said is actually empirically provable, but it seems it seems like there are these cults that form around Markel or that form around Berkshire where where people who really value good behavior, integrity, truthfulness, and an alignment of interests and service and the like.

令人印象深刻的是，围绕某些价值观会形成这样的生态系统。

It it's it's really striking how there are these ecosystems that form around certain values.

在你的生活中，难道不是你总是与那些拥有相似价值观、精神信仰和思想深度的人交往吗？

Well, isn't it true in your life that you associate with people of similar values and spiritual beliefs and thoughtfulness and so on?

企业不过是围绕某种理念组织起来的人群集合。

Businesses are just collections of people who are organised around an idea.

是的。

Yeah.

昨晚我和萨拉布·马丹聊了聊这个话题，因为我们提前见面，讨论我该跟你谈些什么。

I was also I was talking to Sarab Madan about this last night because we were we were chatting in advance of our interview because I was asking what I should talk to you about.

我当时问他关于另一位投资者的事，我们正好讨论了这个问题：你如何利用自己的生态系统，就像汤姆·金所说的，把自己看作神经网络中的一个节点——当你拥有这种相互信任的网络时，你可以问网络中的人：这个人值得信赖吗？

And I was asking him about another investor, and we were discussing exactly this question of how you also use your ecosystem, as Tom Guin would say, thinking of himself as a node in a neural network, that when you have this kind of web of of mutual trust, you can ask the people in your networks, is this person honorable?

他们正直吗？

Are they decent?

他们会坑我吗？

Are they gonna screw me?

或者他们是，这同样非常有价值。

Or are they And so that's really valuable as well.

是的。

Yeah.

有些人，你也采访过一些人，他们认为拜访管理层或与管理层会面没有价值，或者他们曾试图改变这种想法。

There's some people and you've interviewed some people who don't think that it's valuable to visit management or to meet management, or they've tried to change their mind about that.

我能理解，因为很少有管理层会主动透露坏消息。

And I understand that because very few managements are going to lead with the bad news.

有些人认为他们的职责就是取悦股东。

Some of them think it's their job to charm shareholders.

我们都是有缺陷的人类。

We're fallible human beings.

我的意思是，我很容易被有魅力的首席执行官所打动。

Mean, I'm prone to being charmed by the charismatic CEO.

这种事以前发生过，以后也可能再次发生。

It's happened to me before, and it may happen again.

我希望自己随着时间推移能在这方面变得更好，没那么容易被魅力打动了，但这种事情还是会发生。

Hope to think that I get better at this as I go along and I'm less charmable, but it happens.

我想不起具体是谁了，是在你的播客里还是别人的节目里，他们说过：远离那些有魅力的首席执行官。

I can't remember who it was, whether it was on your podcast or somebody else's, but they said, Run away from the charismatic CEO.

不，不是那样。

No, it wasn't that.

是那个曾经管理美敦力公司的人，名字我马上就想起来了。

Was the guy who used to run Medtronic, whose name will come to me in a second.

最近，克里斯·戴维斯告诉我，他引用了芒格说过的一句话。

Well, Chris Davis said to me recently, he quoted something Munger had said.

我很快就要邀请克里斯·戴维斯来我的播客做客。

I have Chris Davis coming on the podcast soon.

芒格曾谈到要避开头发浓密的首席执行官。

Munger talked about avoiding CEOs with a good head of hair.

我很喜欢这个说法，而且你和我不久前刚聊过，像那些极其圆滑、善于奉承的投资银行家，虽然口才了得，但并不一定能成为优秀的投资者。

I love that, that there and and you and I talked the other you know, not long ago about, like, the danger of very, very slick, charming investment bankers who are really good glad handers, but that doesn't really make for good investors.

我的意思是，头发浓密的人确实也有其作用，但在投资行业，这有点危险。

I mean, there there is a role for people with a good head of hair, but it's it's kind of dangerous in the investment business.

说实话，我是最没资格根据一个人的头发来评判他的人。

Well, I'm I'm the least qualified person to judge someone based on their their head of hair.

关键是，如果你打算长期从事这一行，无论是做投资还是经营自己的企业，你都得具备良好的识人能力。

The point is, you've got to be able to Look, if you're going to be in this business for a long time, if you're either going to make investments or you're going to manage your own business, you better be a decent judge of people and human beings.

你必须保持怀疑态度，因为CEO首先不可能告诉你他所知道的一切，他们也不能给你使眼色或暗示，但他们必须像唐在二十多年前的那次会上告诉我们的那样去做。

And you've got to be willing to be skeptical because a CEO, first of all, can't tell you everything that he knows, and they can't give you a wink and a nod, but they've got to do what Don told us in this meeting twenty years ago, twenty plus years ago.

他们必须告诉你他们能说的部分，而且要坦诚相告。

They've got to tell you what they can and just give it to you straight on.

你得判断这个人是否在说真话，是否说出了全部真相，还是在修饰、淡化或隐瞒某些内容。

You've got to make an assessment whether that person is telling you the truth or not, whether he's telling you all the truth, or whether he's shading something or nuancing something or withholding something.

这很难做到。

It's hard to do.

真的非常难做到。

It's very hard to do.