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您正在收听TIP。
You're listening to TIP.
你好。
Hi there.
我很高兴向大家介绍今天的嘉宾,安东尼·金斯利。
I'm thrilled to introduce today's guest, Anthony Kingsley.
他是英国一家名为Findlay Park的公司的首席投资官,该公司专门投资美国股票。
He's the chief investment officer at an English firm called Findlay Park, which focuses exclusively on investing in US stocks.
安东尼作为Findlay Park美国基金的投资组合经理,管理着超过100亿美元的资产。
Anthony oversees more than $10,000,000,000 in assets as the portfolio manager of the Findlay Park American Fund.
在过去二十五年里,该基金累计跑赢其基准指数罗素1000指数超过1200个百分点。
Over the last twenty five years, the fund has crushed its benchmark index, the Russell 1,000, by a total of more than 1,200 percentage points.
这是一项非凡的超额收益成就。
It's a remarkable feat of outperformance.
因此,本播客节目的目标是深入探讨该公司是如何实现这些卓越回报的。
And so my goal in this episode of the podcast is to explore in-depth how the firm has generated these stellar returns.
让我着迷的是,安东尼和他的杰出前任詹姆斯·芬利以一种出人意料的简单方式取得了这一成功。
What fascinates me is that Anthony and a brilliant predecessor of his named James Findlay have achieved this success in a surprisingly simple way.
正如你将听到的,芬利公园只有一只基金、一种策略和一支团队,且全部位于同一个地方。
As you'll hear, Findlay Park has one fund, one strategy, and one team based in one place.
他们只投资于一个国家和一种资产类别,并且只收取一种不可协商的费用。
They invest in one country and one asset class, and they charge just one fee, which is nonnegotiable.
无论你是大客户还是小客户,支付的费用都是一样的。
You pay the same fee whether you're a big client or a small client.
事实上,安东尼自己支付的费用也一样,这既简单又公平。
And in fact, Anthony pays the same fee too, which is both simple and fair.
这种始终如一地强调简化,正是我在我那本《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书中深入探讨过的一个主题——在名为‘简单是终极复杂’的章节中。
This very consistent emphasis on keeping things simple is a beautiful example of a theme I wrote about at some length in my book, richer, wiser, happier, in a chapter titled simplicity is the ultimate sophistication.
通过与乔·格林布拉特、威尔·达诺夫、杰克·博格尔和比尔·米勒等投资大师的访谈,我逐渐意识到,拥有少数几个简单而稳健的指导原则,并能在顺境逆境中始终坚持,不被外界干扰,是一种巨大的优势。
What I came to realize from my interviews with investing giants like Joe Greenblatt, Will Danoff, Jack Bogle, and Bill Miller is that it's a tremendous advantage to have a a few simple, robust guiding principles that you can stick with through thick and thin so you don't get knocked off course.
我们生活在一个复杂而混乱的世界,但我认为,这种化繁为简的能力是一种超能力,不仅在投资中如此,在生活的其他领域也是如此。
We live in such a complex and confusing world, but I think this ability to simplify is a kind of superpower, not only in investing, but actually in other areas of life too.
我特别喜欢这次对话,还有另一个原因。
There's one other reason why I particularly enjoyed this conversation.
正如你将听到的,安东尼不仅是一位非常成功的投资者,还是个非常友善的人。
As you'll hear, Anton is not only a very successful investor, but such a nice guy.
他谦逊、正直、低调,这正是我非常钦佩的品质。
He's modest and decent and understated in a way that I really admire.
无论如何,我希望你们和我一样享受这次对话。
In any case, I hope you enjoy our conversation as much as I did.
非常感谢你们的参与。
Thanks so much for joining us.
您正在收听《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》播客,主持人威廉·格林将采访世界顶尖投资者,探讨如何在市场和生活中取得成功。
You're listening to the richer, wiser, happier podcast, where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
大家好。
Hi there, folks.
今天我非常高兴地欢迎我们的嘉宾安东尼·金斯利,他正从伦敦的办公室加入我们,那是我成长的城市。
I'm really delighted to welcome our guest today, Anthony Kingsley, who's joining us from his office in London, the city where I grew up.
安东尼是Findlay Park公司的首席投资官,该公司管理着超过100亿美元的资产。他还是Findlay Park美国基金的投资经理,该基金在过去二十五年中实现了极为罕见的业绩——持续跑赢市场。
Anthony is the chief investment officer at a firm called Findlay Park, where he oversees more than $10,000,000,000 And he's the portfolio manager of the Findlay Park American Fund, which has achieved the very rare feat of crushing the market over the last quarter of a century.
很高兴见到你,安东尼。
It's lovely to see you, Anthony.
非常感谢你加入我们。
Thanks a lot for joining us.
很高兴能来这里。
Great to be here.
我想深入探讨的一件事是,你们公司唯一的这只基金——Findlay Park美国基金,是如何在过去二十五年中实现每年超过12%的惊人回报的,这一表现远远超过了你们所参照的罗素1000指数。
So one of the things that I wanted to talk about in some depth is just how the Findlay Park American Fund, which is the one fund in your company, how it's racked up this extraordinary return of more than 12% a year over twenty five years, which has beaten the Russell one thousand, the index that you benchmarked against, by an absolute mile.
我认为罗素1000指数的年均回报率大约是7.2%。
I think the Russell one thousand averaged about 7.2% a year.
所以上次我查的时候,你们累计跑赢指数的幅度已经达到1200个百分点。
So when I last checked, basically you'd beaten the index by a cumulative total of 1,200 percentage points.
这真是一个非凡的成功故事。
So it's a remarkable success story.
我想了解,从你们基金的成就中,我们可以学到哪些关于如何可持续地积累财富的经验。
I want to get a sense from you of what we can learn from your fund's achievement about how to build wealth in a sustainable way.
所以我认为,最好从基金的创始合伙人开始说起,也就是詹姆斯·芬德利和查理·帕克,他们在1998年创立了这只基金。
So I figure it probably makes sense to start at the beginning with the founding thirty:fifty partners of the fund, James Findlay and Charlie Park, who launched the fund back in 1998.
关于他们,你能告诉我们些什么?
What can you tell us about them?
是的,詹姆斯。
James Yes.
我在90年代初就和詹姆斯·芬德利共事过。
I worked with James Findlay in the early '90s.
那是我作为毕业生在一家基金管理公司——外国与殖民地公司——的第一份工作,他们专注于投资信托。
That was my first job as a graduate trainee in a fund management company, Foreign and Colonial, and they specialised in investment trust.
老实说,我当时对投资一无所知,但那是个绝佳的学习场所。
Frankly, I knew nothing about investing, but it was a great place to learn.
我作为毕业生被安排到美国业务部,而那时詹姆斯正在研究美国的小型公司。
Was put on the American desk as a graduate, And James was making his way in US smaller companies.
他有一只封闭式基金和一只开放式基金。
He had an investment trust and he had an open ended fund.
坦白说,他可能是我一生中第一位导师。
And frankly, was sort of the first mentor I probably ever had in life.
他可能是我迄今为止最重要的导师。
And he's probably been the most important mentor that I've ever had.
在那些早期的年份里,他教会了我很多关于投资、管理下行风险、追求良好的复合回报率、复利的重要性——复利是世界第八奇迹。
And he just taught me so much in those early years about investing, about managing downside risk, about trying to reduce a good compound rate of return, the importance of compounding, the eighth wonder of the world.
因此,我对詹姆斯相当了解。
And so I knew James pretty well.
我不是Findlay Park的创始人之一,但我当时去做了基金管理和他略有不同的事情。
Wasn't one of the founders of Findlay Park, but I'd gone off to do something slightly different in fund management.
我们一直保持联系,他在公司成立四年后,也就是2002年,问我:'你愿意来加入吗?'
We kept in touch, and he said, four years into the business in 2002, said, Would you like to come and join?
我提到了他作为导师对我的重要性,我一直觉得,如果我不加入、不来,我可能会用余生后悔这个决定。
I mentioned his importance as a mentor to me, and I think I always thought, If I don't join, if I don't come, I might spend the rest of my life regressing that decision.
所以我在2000年代初以第三位合伙人和第四名员工的身份加入了公司。
So I joined as a third partner and the fourth employee in the early 2000s.
詹姆斯和查理各自都建立了出色的投资业绩,专注于美国小型公司。
And James and Charlie had both independently developed a really good track record of investing in US smaller companies.
于是我加入了团队,开始了我的旅程。
And so I joined the team and off I went.
我认为,对詹姆斯来说,其中一个关键经历是他曾是Foreign and Colonial的明星经理,那段时间对专攻美国小盘股的人来说非常辉煌。
And my sense is that one of the formative experiences for James was that he'd been this hotshot manager at Foreign and Colonial, and it had been kind of a great period for someone who specialized in US small cap stocks.
然后,市场在1987年著名的崩盘了。
Then I guess the market famously crashed in 1987.
我认为我说得没错,黑色星期一,也就是1987年10月19日,是美国历史上单日跌幅最大的一次股市崩盘。
I think I'm right in saying that Black Monday, which I think was 10/19/1987, was the biggest one day market drop in US history.
这正好发生在年初市场已经上涨了约44%之后。
This is coming right after a torrid period where the market had gone up something like 44% earlier in the year.
所以我认为,当我最初认识詹姆斯时,他是一位前途无量的年轻基金经理,但随后却遭遇了惨重的打击。
And so my sense is that James was sort of this hotshot young fund manager when you first knew him, who then got absolutely clobbered.
我想知道你是否记得,那次经历是如何改变了他的投资方式的。
And I'm wondering if you have a memory of how that experience changed the game for him.
是的,杰里米。
Jeremy Yeah.
所以,他在80年代末经历了一段艰难时期,比如1987年的股市崩盘。
So I mean, he had a rough experience in the late '80s, as say, 'eighty seven stock market crash.
我认为正是在那时,他决定把所有能找得到的投资书籍都读一遍,并形成了一种新的理念,更加注重控制下行风险。
I think sort of decided at that stage to read all the investment books he could and come up with a new philosophy, which was really more about managing downside risk.
所以,当我90年代初加入F&C时,他已经在这套理念的基础上,开始在美股小盘股领域重建自己的业绩了。
So by the time I joined F and C in the early '90s, he was already well on his way to building a new track record in US smaller companies using this philosophy.
但毫无疑问,这段经历对他来说意义非凡。
But certainly that experience was a pretty seminal one for him.
当时,作为我的导师,他让我去读所有这些书,比如威廉·欧尼尔的书、《股票作手回忆录》、关于巴菲特或芒格的伯克希尔·哈撒韦传记。
At that stage, he, as a mentor to me, he told me to go and read all these books, whether it was William O'Neil or Reminiscence of a Stock Operator or the Berkshire Hathaway biographies have been written on Buffett or Munger.
于是我如饥似渴地阅读了这些内容。
And so I voraciously consumed these things.
他整理了一份七到八页的投资理念,主要基于1987年股市调整的教训,以及如何应用一种新的理念,我认为其核心在于控制下行风险。
And he put together a seven or eight page investment philosophy, which was really around the learnings from the 'eighty seven stock market correction and how to apply a new philosophy, which I say at the heart of it was around managing downside risk.
在我看来,有几件事真正构成了你们方法的核心,也解释了芬德利公园在过去四分之一个世纪里的成功。
So it seems to me there are several things that are really central to your approach that help to account for the success of Findlay Park over the last quarter of a century.
希望我们能逐一详细探讨这些要点。
Hopefully we'll go through them in some detail in order.
在我看来,控制下行风险至关重要。
As I see it, this issue of managing downside risk is critical.
我很想谈谈简单性的重要性。
I'd love to talk about simplicity is really key.
使用投资理念清单,以及关注高质量企业等做法。
The use of an investment philosophy checklist and the folks on high quality businesses and the like.
我们可以按各种顺序逐一讨论这些内容。
We can go through these and other things in various orders.
但我希望先从简单性这个概念谈起,这在我的书中是一个主要主题,因为我觉得在一个极其复杂的世界里,我们所有人都感到困惑,信息铺天盖地,各种投资方法层出不穷,诱惑和陷阱也无处不在。
But I think I'd like to start by talking about this idea of simplicity, which was a major theme in my book, because I feel like in a very complex world where we're all so confused and there's such a barrage of information and there are so many different approaches and possible lures and temptations to go astray.
能够提炼出事物的本质,拥有少数几个简单的指导原则和一种简洁的方法,这实际上是一个巨大的竞争优势。
It's an incredible competitive advantage actually to be able to distill things and have a few fairly simple guiding principles and a fairly simple approach.
Findlay Park 的一个独特之处在于,你们秉持着‘保持简单’这一哲学理念。
And one thing that's distinctive about Findlay Park is that you have this philosophy, a guiding principle of keeping it simple.
所以我想知道,您能否谈谈‘简单’在 Findlay 具体是如何体现的,它如何渗透到你们所做的一切中?
So I wondered if you could talk about simplicity as it relates to Findlay, how it manifests in really everything that you're doing.
是的,当然。
Yeah, absolutely.
‘保持简单’是詹姆斯的重要理念,我认为这很可能是一个被严重低估的信条。
So keep it simple was an important philosophy of James, and I think a really probably underestimated mantra.
如果你看看今天的 Findlay Park,它的简单性非常独特,因为在过去二十五年投资美国和美国公司之后,我们只管理一只基金。
Simplicity if you look at Findlay Park today as a business, it's quite unusual because after twenty five years of investing in America and American companies, we just have one fund.
我们只有一种策略,一种投资哲学。
We have one strategy, one investment philosophy.
我们只有一支位于伦敦的团队,并且拥有一群专注的客户,其中许多人自公司创立之初就与我们同行。
We have one team here based in London, and we have a focused group of clients, many of whom have been with us since the start.
这相当不寻常。
That's quite unusual.
通常当资产管理公司取得一点成功后,我确实发现他们会说:我们还能做些什么?
Normally when fund management companies get a bit of success, I've certainly found is they say, Well, what else can we do?
我们可以推出哪些其他策略?
What other strategies can we launch?
然后他们开始多元化。
And they diversify.
他们试图扩大资产规模。
They try and asset gather.
他们本质上是在做资产募集的生意。
They're in the asset gathering business.
从一开始,我们的重点和宗旨就一直是为客户提供极具吸引力的复合回报率。
Our focus from the beginning, our purpose has always been to generate really attractive compound rate of return for our clients.
因此,我们从未真正觉得有必要推出大量不同的基金、风格、成长型和价值型、多头和空头、小盘股和大盘股,或各种不同的地域或策略——这并不是说这些方式对其他企业无效。
So we've never really seen any need to launch lots of different funds and flavours and growth and value and long and short and small cap and large cap or whatever, different geographies or different approaches, is not to say that that doesn't work for other businesses.
但从根本上说,从一开始我们就非常专注于通过一只基金实现优异的复合回报率。
But ultimately, what we've been very, very focused on from the start is trying to deliver this great compound rate of return through a single fund.
保持简单有助于集中注意力。
And just keeping it simple helps focus the mind.
我们的利益与客户高度一致,我们认为是这样。
Mean, we're very aligned our, we think, our clients.
我们只有一只基金,如果这只基金表现不佳,我们也没有其他基金可以依赖,所以我们必须做得很好。
We've got one fund and we better do pretty well because we've got other funds to fall back on if that one doesn't do well.
我们的利益与客户完全一致。
We're all very aligned with our clients.
这不仅有助于明确该做什么,也有助于明确不该做什么。
And it helps focus the mind on what not to do often as much as what one should do.
我认为我说得没错,你曾经告诉我,你们只收取一种费用,没有任何人能享受费率优惠,就连你们自己这样的基金合伙人也支付同样的费用。
I think I'm also right in saying you once told me that you just have one fee as well, like that there are no fee breaks for anyone who comes along, that that even the partners in the fund like yourself pay the same fee.
为什么这一点很重要?
Why is that important?
我认为保持简单有很多优势。
Well, I think keeping it simple just has a lot of advantages.
如果你为不同客户设置不同的收费结构,你就会忘记给这个客户什么、给那个客户什么。
And so if you have different fee structures for different clients, you sort of forget what did you give that client and what did you give that client?
下一个客户来了,你会花上好几个小时去谈判费用,头都大了。
The next one comes along, and you end up spending hours and hours negotiating on fees, and your head starts spinning.
正如我所说,我们从未真正把资产规模增长当作业务的关键。
As I say, we've never really focused on asset gathering hasn't been key to our business.
如果我们能实现优异的复合回报率,希望我们的收费足够有竞争力,让客户觉得他们获得的回报物有所值。
Thought if we can deliver a really good rate of compound performance, hopefully we can have a fee that's competitive enough that people will feel that they're getting value in terms of the return that we're able to deliver.
所以是的,我们只有一个基金,没有单独账户,只有一个收费结构。
So yeah, we've just got one fund, no separate accounts, one fee structure.
我们都认为,既然客户在支付这笔费用,为什么我们不该支付同样的费用呢?
We all think, well, our clients are paying that fee, why shouldn't we pay the same fee?
因此,当我们在通讯或报告中公布基金的表现时,比如连续25年12%的复合回报,这个数字已经是扣费后的净收益。
And so when we quote in our newsletter or in reports the performance of the fund, 12% compound for twenty five years, that is a net of fees number.
我们之所以能这样报价,与其他一些资产管理公司不同,是因为我们只有一种收费结构,而他们必须报gross收益,因为他们为不同客户设置了多种收费结构。
The reason we can quote that, unlike maybe some other asset management firms, is we only have one fee, whereas they have to quote it gross because they've got a lot of different fee structures for different clients.
这也是保持简单的一部分,这样你就能专注于自己最擅长的事情。
It's part of that, just keeping it simple, and you can then focus on what you do best.
在我们看来,就是投资。
In our case, we think investing.
我认为,你们没有把自己列为最优惠待遇方,而是让客户和你们享受相同的待遇,这种利益高度一致非常棒。
There's also a really nice alignment of interest there, I think, with the fact that you're not the most favored nation, giving yourselves a much better deal than your clients.
我觉得这真的很不错。
I think that's a really nice thing.
我深受触动。
I was very struck.
我想起我们第一次见面交谈,是在我受邀去参加你们二十五周年庆典并作为演讲者的时候。
Think one of the first times we met and talked was when I came to your twenty fifth anniversary celebration to be a speaker there.
我记得你当时把我介绍给了詹姆斯·芬德利,他是个出人意料地安静、谦逊、有魅力的人,非常低调。
I remember you introduced me to James Findlay there, who's a surprisingly kind of quiet, modest, charming guy, very humble.
我记得你告诉我,当你接手公司时,他曾对你说过一件事,如果我没记错的话,他只是对你说:善待股东,公平对待他们。
And I remember you saying to me that one thing he had told you when you were taking over the firm, if I'm quoting this correctly, he just said to you, Treat the shareholders right, treat them fairly.
这么说,这一直是一个重点,对吗?
Is that fair to say that that was always kind of an emphasis?
当然了。
Oh, definitely.
我的意思是,詹姆斯教会了我很多。
I mean, James taught me so much.
我们光是讨论我从他那里学到的所有东西,就能坐上好几个小时。
We could be here for hours just discussing all the things that I've learned from him.
我要说的是,他是个非常谦逊、低调的人,但在我看来——我接触过许多伟大的投资者——他是我见过的最伟大的投资者之一,虽然名气极低,却极其成功。
And one thing I will say is he's a very humble, low key guy, but in my opinion, and I've come across many great investors, one of the greatest investors I've ever come across who has a very, very low profile, but extraordinarily successful.
从道德品质上来说,他是个超棒的人,堪称AAA级品格。他很早就教会我,好消息可以等,但如果有坏消息,你必须告诉客户。
A super guy in terms of kind of morals, I'd say AAA character, who taught me early on that the good news can wait, but if you've got bad news you must share that with the client.
你必须始终对客户诚实坦率,如果投资组合有变动,或者有什么地方出了问题,都要及时告知。
You must always be honest and open with the client and share if you made a change in the portfolio or something's not going right.
我的意思是,这一点如此明显,以至于在早期的通讯中,他几乎总是以一种反向营销的方式介绍这只基金。
I mean, it's so much so that in those newsletters in the early years, certainly he used to almost sort of negatively market the fund in newsletters.
我们也不确定表现会有多好,所以如果你想要一些科技类投资,或许应该去找专门的科技基金,或者你不该把所有的美国资金都投入这只基金。
We're not quite sure how well we're going to do, and so if you want a bit of technology, ought to probably go and find a technology fund, or you shouldn't have all your American money in this fund.
他极其坦诚和透明,这一点深深影响了我。
He was incredibly open and honest, and that stuck with me.
所以是的,这实际上一直是我生命中一股强大的力量。
So yeah, I know it's been kind of a powerful force in my life, actually.
是的。
Yeah.
你提到的那份通讯很不寻常,就是公司每季度发出的15到20页的通讯,内容丰富,充满建议。
The newsletter that you're referring to, which is unusual, is this 15 to 20 page quarterly newsletter that the firm sends out, which is very rich and full of advice.
所以我认为,这也是另一点——沟通的清晰性。
So I think that's another thing, actually, just the clarity of the communication.
你清楚自己能得到什么,而且知道它名副其实。
You know what you're getting and you know it's what it says on the tin.
你刚才提到他是你见过的最非凡的投资者之一。
And so you were mentioning that he's one of the most extraordinary investors you've met.
我知道你认识我书中写到的很多人物,比如霍华德·马克斯、比尔·米勒、尼克·斯利普和凯·苏卡里。
I know that you know a lot of the people I wrote about in my book, whether it's the Howard Marxes or the Bill Millers or the Nick Sleep and Keh Sukari is.
当你看詹姆斯时,他并不出名,一直保持低调,尽管他取得了巨大的成功,但他的性格和人格中有哪些特别突出的地方?
When you look at James, who's not well known, who's kept a really low profile, although obviously he's had huge success, What in terms of his temperament and personality stands out?
是什么让你看到他时,觉得一个伟大的投资者就该有这样的思维模式?
What makes you actually look at him and think, Oh, that's what a great investor needs to be wired like?
这些就是伟大投资者的性格特质。
Those are the personality traits of a great investor.
是的。
Yeah.
他非常冷静,用查理·芒格的话来说。
So he's very level headed, to use a sort of Charlie Munger word.
他非常理性。
He's very rational.
他的性格非常好。
He's just got a very, very good temperament.
当事情进展顺利时,他从不自我吹嘘。
When things are going really well, he's not strong on self congratulation.
同样,当事情不顺时,事实往往是,当股市对某物进行惩罚时,实际情况并没有股价表现得那么糟糕。
Equally, when things are going badly, often the truth is when the stock market is penalizing something, it's not quite as bad as it may seem when you look at the share price.
所以我认为他性格很好。
So I think he's got a good temperament.
他很理性。
He's rational.
他关注基本面。
Focuses on the fundamentals.
他是个自下而上的基本面股票选择者。
He's a fundamental bottom up stock picker.
所以我认为,这些性格特质可能使他相比其他人更具优势。
So I think those would be some of the things in terms of temperament that give him an advantage perhaps versus some others.
我认为,多年来这家公司另一个引人注目的特点是,它从来都不是特别注重营销。
I think another thing that's been striking in terms of the simplicity of the firm over the years is that it was never that marketing oriented.
我的意思是,我记得你曾经告诉我,它基本上已经软性关闭了大约二十年,你只有大约50个英国和欧洲的机构客户,仅此而已。
I mean, I think you told me at one point that it had basically been soft closed for something like twenty years, that you had about 50 institutional clients in The UK and Europe, and that was about it.
所以人们无法直接投资,必须通过财富管理人进行。
So people couldn't invest directly, they had to go through a wealth manager.
因此,你们所做的事情也带有一种低调的特质——你们只是专注于一项清晰而明确的任务,即在数十年间为客户创造有吸引力的回报。
So there was also something about the quietness of what you were doing, that you were just going about this very clear and focused task of trying to deliver compelling returns over decades for clients.
这么说公平吗?也就是说,这和诺马德的尼克和扎克有点类似,一切都聚焦在回报上,而不是追求规模扩张或提升声誉之类的。
Is that fair to say that it wasn't I mean, is something a bit like Nick and Zach at Nomad, that it was all focused on the returns and not really on building scale, building your reputations and the like.
确实如此。
Very much so.
我的意思是,詹姆斯和我都认识扎克,了解他们在早期阶段所做的事情,我们当时经常进行一些很好的交流。
I mean, James and I know and Zach well and what they were doing in those early years, and we used to have some good conversations.
在很多方面,情况是相似的。
In many ways it was similar.
我的意思是,我们提到通讯稿的一个原因就是詹姆斯写这份通讯稿时,他就是整个市场部门。这成了一个绝佳的方式,让詹姆斯和查理在投资股票、访问公司、前往美国、会见管理层的同时,始终专注于股票投资,并及时向投资者更新情况。
I mean, one of the reasons we were talking about the newsletter one of the reasons that James wrote that newsletter was he was the marketing department, and it was a great way to while James and Charlie invested in stocks, to stay focused on investing in stocks, visiting companies, going to America, meeting the managements, and just keeping the investors up to date.
在那些日子里,我们总是说:我们会发出通讯稿,但如果投资者想见我们,随时打电话,我们会亲自上门拜访。
We always sort of said in those days, said, We'll send the newsletter out, but if investors want to see us, give us a call, we'll come and see you.
我们的许多客户都在英国,接触起来非常方便。
And many of our clients are here in The UK, just easy to access them.
但很多人对这份通讯稿已经很满意了。
But many of them were quite happy with the newsletter.
所以,正如我所说,我们的重点始终是通过投资美国的多元化投资组合,实现有吸引力的复合回报率。
So it was really a focus, as I said, to produce attractive compound rate of return by investing in a diversified portfolio in America.
复利就像查理·芒格说的那样,是世界第八奇迹,千万不要无谓地打断它。
And compounding is just, as I said, it's like the eighth wonder of the world, as Charlie Munger says, never interrupt it unnecessarily.
我的意思是,我们已经这样持续了二十五年。
I mean, we've been going that for twenty five years.
我们在扣除费用后实现了12%的年复合回报率,相当于增长了大约17到18倍。
We've compounded at 12% after fees, so that's about 17 or 18X.
但我们真正想做的,是让这种模式持续下去。
But really what we want to do is we want to keep that going.
詹姆斯在董事会里,但他并不管理这只基金。
James is on the board, but he's not running the fund.
如今管理这只基金的是另一个团队。
We've got a different team running the fund today.
我在某个阶段仍会参与。
I'm involved at some stage.
希望在很久以后,会有一个新的团队来接手,但我们希望保持这种复利增长。
Hopefully in a long time from now, there'll be another team that's running this, but we want to keep that compounding.
如果你能持续保持这种复利记录,正如你比大多数人更清楚的那样,长期来看你能取得非凡的成果。
And if you can keep that compounding record going, as you know, you better than most know, you can produce extraordinary results over time.
我的意思是,如果我们未来二十年还能实现12%的回报,那么两代人之后,你的回报将大约达到300倍,这相当了不起。
Mean, if we're able to generate another 12% over the next twenty five years, then you have a 300x return approximately over two generations, and that's sort of pretty extraordinary.
所以我认为,一直以来我们都理解复利的力量。
So I I think think it's always been this understanding of compounding.
你必须持续参与其中,你知道,我们当然有过一些好年份,也经历过一些艰难的年份,但我们从未让自己彻底崩溃。
You've got to stay in the game, you know, you cannot of course, we've had some good years, we've had some tough years, but we've never blown ourselves up.
我们在这种复利的旅程中始终没有退出,这从一开始就是我们的核心重点。
We stayed in the game on this compounding journey, and that's really been the focus from the beginning.
对詹姆斯、查理和我来说,这带来了丰厚的回报,希望我们能有足够的客户来维持一项成功的业务。
For James, Charlie, myself, it's just produced a great return, and hopefully we'll have enough clients to run a successful business.
所以,正如你过去告诉我的,这家公司的巨大成功实际上取决于管理下行风险,避免做任何太愚蠢的事,以免打断这种复利进程。
So as you've said to me in the past, a huge amount of the success of the firm actually hinges on managing downside risk and just not doing anything too stupid so that you don't interrupt that compounding.
我想详细谈谈你们是如何做到这一点的,因为在我看来,这是我们的听众能学到的最实用的教训之一。
And I want to talk in some detail about how you do that, because it seems to me that's one of the most practical lessons that our listeners can learn.
因为正如查理所说,要聪明很难,但避免愚蠢却相对容易。
Because as Charlie would say, it's really hard to be smart, but it's pretty easy not to be stupid.
这在我看来,是投资成功中极为关键的一部分。
And that seems to me such a huge part of success in investing.
有一件事很引人注目:我上一次查看时,自查理和詹姆斯1998年创立该基金以来,你的基金在市场下跌的31个季度中都保持了正收益。
And one thing that's striking is that your fund, when I last checked, basically in '31 down quarters for the market since Charlie and James founded the fund back in 1998.
在这31个下跌季度中,该基金在其中29个季度的表现优于市场。
In 31 of those down quarters, the fund has outperformed in 29 of the 31.
因此,它不仅取得了出色的回报,而且风险低于市场,减少了彻底崩溃、灾难或永久性资本损失的可能性——无论你如何定义这些风险。
So it kind of has a remarkable record of not only racking up good returns, but with less risk than the market, with less risk of total implosion or disaster or permanent loss of capital, however you want to define it.
你能解释一下你们是如何做到这一点的吗?
Can you explain how you go about this?
你们在实际操作中是如何避免灾难的?
How in very practical terms you go about avoiding disaster?
是的,这绝对是关键。
Yeah, no, it's absolutely key.
正如你所指出的,我们在大多数这些季度中下跌幅度都低于我们所参照的基准,从而建立了这样的业绩记录。
As you pointed out, we've built the record by going down less than the benchmark that we've been measured against in most of those quarters.
我们的目标是跟上市场步伐。
What we try and do is keep up.
我们努力在牛市中跟上,在熊市中跌幅更小。
We try and keep up in a good market, go down less in a bad market.
如果你理解复利的力量,我们就在努力避免任何单一股票造成永久性资本损失。
If you understand the power of compounding, we're trying to avoid permanent capital loss in any individual stock.
你不可能总是对的,但我们的出发点是,如果我们错了,会损失多少,而不是如果我们对了,能赚多少?
You can't always get that right, but we're trying to our starting point is how much can we lose if we're wrong rather than how much can we make if it right?
我认为这很可能与许多投资者的做法相反。
And I think that is probably contrary to a lot of investors.
投资者看到某个光鲜亮丽的标的或股票时,会想:这看起来非常令人兴奋。
Investors look at some shiny object or stock and they go, This looks very exciting.
他们考虑的是,如果判断正确,能赚多少。
They think about how much they can make if they're right.
我们的出发点显然是希望获得良好的回报并实现长期复利,但我们的起点是:是的,但如果我们错了,会损失多少?
Our starting point is obviously we want to make good returns and compound over time, but our starting point is, yeah, but if we're wrong, how much are we going to lose?
理解这一点很重要:如果你的资产下跌了三分之一,你就需要上涨50%才能回到起点。
And understanding that if you're down a third in a stop, you've to go up 50% just to get back to where you started.
如果你下跌了50%,你就需要让资金翻倍。
If you're down 50%, you've to double your money.
因此,如果你能避免这种下行风险,你就能通过——用你的话说——始终不犯愚蠢的错误,实现非常良好的复利回报率。
And so if you can avoid that downside capture, you can produce a really good compound rate of return by, to use your words, by being consistently not stupid.
你知道,有太多机会让人被最新的潮流、时尚、迷因股或IPO狂热所裹挟,或者被最新的AI概念之类的东西吸引。
You know, there are so many opportunities to get carried away by the latest fad or fashion or meme stock or IPO frenzy, or there's the latest AI thing or whatever it is.
在过去的二十五年里,你可能被卷入的各种事情层出不穷。
Over twenty five years there's been no end to things that you could have got sucked into.
因此,通过坚持一种投资理念——不是仅仅口头应付,而是真正严格执行,并在选择公司时坚定不移地遵循——你就能逐步建立起这样的业绩记录。
So by having an investment philosophy, which you don't just pay lip service to, but you stick to, you use rigorously when selecting your companies, You can build this track record over time.
当然,随着时间推移,公司会成长,并享有良好的顺风助力。
Of course, over time companies grow and they have nice tailwinds.
几个月前我听了你和汤姆·盖纳的一期播客,他提到,即使不玩雪橇的人,也能顺利滑到终点。
Was listening to a podcast that you did with Tom Gaynor some months ago, and he was talking about even the person that doesn't do the luge can still get down there.
这可不是在逆风上坡滑行。
It's not like you're sort of luging uphill.
你拥有不少顺风助力。
You've got some nice tailwinds.
用你的话说,通过始终避免愚蠢、控制下行风险,你能够长期获得非常不错的复合回报率。
To use a phrase, your phrase, by being consistently not stupid, avoiding downside risk, you can produce a really good compound rate of return over time.
这正是我们所做的,即使我们犯了很多错误。
That's sort of what we've done, even while making lots of mistakes.
某种程度上,你的方法也带有汤姆·盖纳的特质:集中但又相对分散。
In some way, it's interesting also, there is an element of the Tom Gaynor about your approach where it's relatively concentrated, but relatively diversified.
这是一种中间道路,在渴望集中投资以超越市场和通过分散投资来确保生存之间存在张力。
There's a kind of middle way, a tension between the desire to concentrate so that you can outperform and the diversification that enables you to survive.
所以我看了你最近的一份文件,发现你管理的资产中约有42%集中在前15只股票上,这算是相对集中,但你又持有59只股票,这又算相对分散,这在某种程度上让你比那些更激进的人更难跑赢市场——比如我写过的尼克和扎克,他们最终会把大部分资金押在10只股票上。
And so I looked at one of your most recent documents and it seemed like you had about 42% of your assets under management in the top 15 stocks, which is relatively concentrated, but you own 59 stocks, which is relatively diversified and sort of makes it quite difficult in some ways to outperform compared to some of the more aggressive people I've written about who, like Nick and Zach, who would get to a point where basically have most of their money in 10 stocks.
你是如何思考生存与超越、分散与集中之间的这种张力的?
How do you think about that tension between survival and outperformance or diversification-
是的,这是个非常好的问题。
Yeah, no, that's wonderful question.
我认为这在某种程度上与性格有关。
I think it's to some extent to do with temperament.
要知道,这并不是说尼克和扎克,或者其他拥有十只股票投资组合的人不擅长这么做,但通常情况下,即使基本面没有太大的变化,任何一只股票在一年内的高低波动幅度都非常大,你会经受考验。
Know, it's not to say that Nick and Zach or some other folks who have a 10 stock portfolio aren't brilliant at it, but usually invariably the high low in a stock in any one year, even if the fundamentals haven't changed that much, is quite wide and you get tested.
而如果我们发现的——特别是对于芬德利公园和我们的性格而言——如果某个仓位过重,有时就很难再加仓。
And if you've got what we have found, certainly for Findlay Park and our temperament, if you've got too much in a position, it's difficult sometimes to add to it.
你知道,投资需要你在心理上保持主动。
You just you know, investing is you know, you need to be on front foot in terms of psychology.
如果你稍微处于被动状态,而且某个持仓过多,你就会想:是啊,我这个仓位已经太多了,没法再加了。
If you're just on the back foot a little bit and you've got a bit too much of something, you go, Yeah, but I've a bit too much of this, I can't add to it.
如果你有一个适度集中的分散化投资组合,比如你提到的,基金前30%的仓位,或者前15只股票占到40%左右,你是在下注,但同时你也能承受这种波动,让复利发挥作用。
If you've got a diversified portfolio with some degree of concentration, you know, top 30% plus of the fund, as you mentioned, top 15, you know, low 40s, you're making bets, but you can also just live with that volatility and let the compounding do the work.
比如德州仪器,我们已经持有十多年了。
And so, you know, take Texas Instruments we've owned for more than a decade.
我的意思是,它是一家模拟半导体领域的周期性业务。
I mean, it's a cyclical business in analog semiconductors.
我的意思是,它也是一个增长型业务。
I mean, it's a growth business.
随着时间推移,电子元件在通信设备、工业产品、汽车和消费品中的占比不断提升,他们销售的模拟产品也越来越多,并逐渐赢得一些市场份额。
Over time, the electronic content of communication devices, of industrial products, of cars, of consumer products goes up and they sell more analogue products and they gain a little share.
但天啊,半导体周期真是波动剧烈。
But boy, do you have semiconductor cycles.
所以,你知道,这十年来它是一只表现惊人的股票,但波动性很大。
So, you know, it's been an amazing stock over ten years, but it's volatile.
对我们和Findlay Park的投资风格,以及我们想要实现的目标而言,我们更希望持有60只股票,每只仓位在2%、3%或以上,并且是那些我们能安心持有的标的。
For us and the Findlay Park temperament and what we're trying to deliver, we would just like to have 60 stocks with 2%, 3% positions, 3% plus positions, and with things that we can live with.
我们可以安心持有,让这些企业的复利效应发挥作用,而不会感到过度焦虑。
We can live and let the compounding of those businesses do the work without getting too stressed.
我们希望晚上能睡得安稳,也希望长期为客户提供稳定的投资回报。
We like to sleep at night and we want to deliver we try and deliver a consistent return for our clients over time.
这并不是说其他人用10只股票就做不到很好。
It's not to say that others don't do it well with 10 stocks.
这仅仅是适合我们的方式。
It's just what's worked for us.
我认为,与我所写过的许多人的做法不同,他们往往是独自做出非常独立决策的‘独行侠’,有时是两个人,比如尼克和扎克,但更多时候是一个人,比如莫尼什·帕布里,或者像霍华德·马克斯和布鲁贾什这样的两人组合。
I think another thing that's distinctive from the approach of a lot of the people I've written about who tend to be lone wolves making very independent decisions, or maybe there are two of them sometimes in the case of Nick and Zach, but often one in the case of someone like Monish Pabrai, or maybe two with Howard Marks and Brujkash.
我的意思是,通常都是小团队。
I mean, usually smallish teams.
你们却有一个相当大的团队。
You have a fairly large team.
我想你们的投资团队通常有十三、十四、十五人左右,并且你们采用一种双人负责每只股票的机制,从而确保有内置的讨论和辩论。
Have, I think, typically about thirteen, fourteen, 15 people in your investment team, and you have this system of two people covering every stock so that there's built in debate.
你能谈谈这种团队方式如何帮助你们避免愚蠢的错误,防止被你们未曾考虑到的事情突然袭击吗?
Can you talk about how that team approach also protects you against stupidity, against the likelihood of being blindsided by something that you just hadn't thought about?
当然。
Absolutely.
我的意思是,我们采用这种共同负责的模式,这或许有点不寻常。
I mean, we have this co coverage model, which is perhaps a little unusual.
当一个投资想法正在被研究、向团队汇报,或者进行持续跟踪时,总会有两个人作为专家在关注这只股票。
When an idea is being researched or reviewed to the team or indeed, you know, just ongoing coverage, you've always got a couple of people who are sort of experts looking at that.
这意味着他们可以就这个问题进行健康的讨论,从而避免个人确认偏见。
And that means that they can have, you know, a healthy debate about it and you don't get, individual confirmation bias perhaps.
但最终,进入投资组合的每只股票都会提交给整个团队审议。
But ultimately every stock that goes into the portfolio is reviewed to the whole team.
我们会对现有股票进行复审,也会审查新股票,而共同负责的团队会将这些股票带到团队中讨论。
We review existing stocks, we'll do re reviews, we'll review new stocks, and that co coverage team will bring them to the team.
归根结底,我们只是想找到正确的答案。
Ultimately, we're just trying to get to the right answer.
文化很重要,我们可能会聊一聊文化。
Culture is important, and we might probably talk about culture.
但我们有一种信任文化,鼓励倾听他人的想法,也积极倡导提出新观点。
But we've got a culture where we trust, where ideas we want to hear from other people, ideas are encouraged.
我当然不是所有问题和想法的答案,也非常愿意倾听别人的意见。
I certainly don't have all the answers or ideas, and I'm very open to listening to others.
十五年来,我们从未互相大声斥责,但同样,我们也会对每个想法进行严格的检验。
No one's shouted at each other in fifteen years, but equally, we do kick the tires pretty hard.
我们会就我们的想法进行非常开放和坦诚的讨论。
We have a very open and honest conversation about what we think.
我的意思是,最终我们只是想找到正确的答案。
I mean, ultimately, we're just trying to get to the right answer.
我的意思是,最终决定权在我手中,决定哪些股票进入基金。
I mean, the ultimate decision lies with me in terms of the stock going into the fund.
但很多时候,我和团队及投资组合经理的意见是一致的,比例大概是三比五。
But very often I'm in agreement thirty:fifty with
团队和投资组合经理推荐的股票,我们会进行非常开放的讨论。
the team and the portfolio managers recommending it, we have a very open debate.
我觉得这很有趣。
I thought it was interesting.
昨晚我翻阅了你们的一份文件,上面提到你们投资团队的激励机制基于三个支柱。
I was looking through one of your documents last night, and it said the incentive schemes for your investment team members are based on three pillars.
其中一个显然是工作质量,另一个是业绩,第三个是协作。
And one of them obviously is quality of work, another is performance, and the third is collaboration.
我觉得这很有趣,你能谈论这些宏大的理念,比如‘我希望你具有合作精神’。
And I thought that was interesting that you can kind of talk about these grand ideas like, Oh, I want you to be collaborative.
但如果你根据员工是否具有合作精神来支付报酬,就更有可能真正获得你所激励的行为。
But actually if you pay people based on whether they're collaborative, it's much more likely that you'll actually get what you're incentivizing for.
这确实如此。
Oh, it's so true.
再借用查理·芒格的一句话,他总说,我一直认为激励的力量很重要,但我在一生中却始终低估了激励的力量。
And to use another Charlie Mungerism, always says, I've always thought the power of incentives were important, and yet I consistently underestimated the power of incentives in my lifetime.
你给我看激励机制,我就给你看结果。
And, you know, show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome.
如果你只根据业绩来激励员工,就会出现一群各自为战的战斗机飞行员。
And if you just incentivize people purely on performance, you'd get a bunch of fighter pilots doing their own thing.
如果你同时根据业绩、态度或合作精神,以及你如何帮助团队来激励员工?
And if you incentivize people on performance and attitude or collaboration, or how are you helping the team?
你如何参与讨论?
How are you are you involved in the debate?
你在提供反馈吗?
Are you giving feedback?
你在批判性地评估一个想法吗?
Are you critically appraising an idea?
你在提出建议吗?
Are you suggesting?
这有助于强化这种文化。
It helps reinforce that culture.
最终,我认为在我们的体系中,这会带来更好的决策。
And ultimately, I think in our system, it leads to better decisions.
是的。
Yeah.
我认为,一旦你真正理解了激励机制,它就会改变你对生活中许多事情的看法。
I think this understanding of incentives, once you actually get it, it transforms your view of so much in life.
这几乎涵盖了所有方面。
It's sort of everything.
不是所有方面,但非常重要。
Not everything, but enormous.
所以,是的,我认为在管理你的业务时,这是一个非常务实的举措。
And so, yeah, I thought that was a very pragmatic move in managing your business.
这让我想到,哦,这不仅仅是说说而已。
It made me think, Oh, it's not just talk.
实际上,它在激励机制上就是这么设计的。
It's actually it's structured that way in terms of incentives.
我还想问你一下,关于如何避免灾难,你曾经在电话里跟我提到过一张 laminated 的纸,上面写着‘避免投资错误’。
I wanted to also ask you about, in terms of avoiding catastrophe, a laminated piece of paper that you have that you mentioned to me once when we were on the phone that you said is titled Avoiding Investment Mistakes.
这张纸有多大帮助?
How helpful is that?
我的意思是,上面写了什么?
I mean, what's on it?
你如何通过查看这份常见投资错误清单来提醒自己不要犯傻?
What do you do to remind yourself just not to be stupid by looking at that list of common investment mistakes?
是的。
Yeah.
所以我们显然会关注这份我们试图寻找的清单,但多年来,我们也制作了一张 laminated 的清单,记录了我们一贯犯错的地方,用以提醒自己。
So obviously we focus on this checklist of things that we're trying to find, but over the years we've produced a laminate of, you know, where we've consistently got things wrong and just to remind ourselves.
这些错误可以归类为业务、财务、管理、流程和估值等方面。
And so those can be, you know, grouped under, you know, the business, financial, management, process, valuation.
我可以详细说说,总共大概有三四十条。
I mean, I can go into sort of, you know, it's probably about 30 or 40 points in total.
它们都只是一些提醒。
And they're all sort of just reminders.
我们鼓励每个人时不时看看自己桌上贴着的这张 laminated 清单,再次提醒自己避免犯蠢。
Encourage everyone to just look at this laminated sheet that they have on their desks every now and then, again, just to avoid sort of stupidity.
但其中很多内容其实都是关于管理的极其常识性的建议。
But a lot of it is just incredibly common sense on management.
寻找你可以信赖的管理团队。
Look for management that you can trust.
寻找在行业内有良好业绩记录的首席执行官。
Look for CEOs who've got a track record in the industry.
小心那些出售股票或给出激进业绩指引的管理层。
Be careful about management who are selling stock or giving aggressive guidance.
小心那些过于油嘴滑舌的管理层。
Be careful about managements who are too smooth talking.
小心那些长期使用高杠杆资产负债表并不断收购合并的管理层。
Be careful about managements who are running the business with consistently levered balance sheets and rolling up acquisitions.
正如你提到的激励机制问题,要警惕那些激励与股东利益不一致的管理层。
Look at to your point about incentives, be careful of managements whose incentives are not aligned with those of shareholders.
这些只是关于管理层方面的一些要点,我们还可以深入探讨业务层面或流程层面,但这些都是我们多年来积累的经验,帮助我们避免永久性资本损失。
So those would be just, you know, a handful just on the management side, and we could go into the business side or, you know, the process side, but it's just lessons over time that we have learnt that help us avoid permanent capital loss.
你们是否特别容易犯某些错误或出现行为偏差?
And are there mistakes and behavioural glitches that you're particularly prone to?
因为我记得以前和你聊过Markel这家公司,你说过:‘是的,我们愚蠢地卖掉了Markel。’
Because I remember talking to you about things like Markel once, and you said to me, Yeah, we stupidly sold Markel.
他们遇到了一些短期问题。
They had some short term issue.
也许有几笔糟糕的收购,或者承保方面出了问题,但你当时觉得这太荒谬了。
Maybe there were a couple of bad acquisitions or there were some underwriting issues, but you're like, It was nuts.
太蠢了。
Was dumb.
我本该继续持有的。
I should have held it.
有没有一些事情是你必须警惕的,因为这与你自身的思维模式有关?
Like, are there things that you have to be aware of because it's part of your own wiring?
是的。
Yeah.
谢谢你又提醒我关于马克尔的事。
Well, thanks for reminding me about Markel again.
不客气。
My pleasure.
但在估值方面,为了避免错误,我们经常提醒自己的一点是:当遇到一家极好的企业时,不要卖得太早。
But on valuation, this avoiding mistakes, one of the things there that we remind ourselves on is don't sell too early when it's a fantastic business.
当你拥有一家增长良好、资本回报率高、结果具有高度确定性的优秀企业时,仅仅因为股价变得稍贵就卖出,有时这些其他因素其实足以支撑其高估值。
When you've got a good business that's growing, that's got high returns on capital, where there's a high degree of inevitability of outcome, just because the stock gets a little bit expensive, sometimes those other things can justify a high valuation.
这一点,我们一直把它作为避免错误的重要提醒。
And that you know, that is on our avoiding mistakes.
我可以告诉你,如果我们当时更重视这一点,我们的复合回报率本可以远高于12%。
I can tell you, you know, our return would have been meaningfully higher than 12% compound if we'd paid more attention to that.
你知道,我们像芬利公园这样的团队,长期以来一直很擅长识别符合我们检查清单的优秀公司。
You know, we're quite what I'd say Finley Park are quite good at have been quite good at over time is identifying good companies that meet the checklist.
但我们并不总能很好地执行,这意味着有时候我们会过早卖出股票。
What we've not been so good at always is execution, which means that sometimes we've just sold stocks.
我们对自己感到相当满意。
We've been quite pleased with ourselves.
我们赚了三倍的回报,但那些股票后来却涨到了十倍甚至十五倍。
We've made three times our money, but they've gone on to be 10 baggers or 15 baggers.
你只是想,天哪,这真是蠢到家了。
And you just think, my gosh, that was one:thirty really dumb.
让我们短暂休息一下,听听今天赞助商的消息。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
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When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.
合适的员工能提升团队水平,提高生产力,推动你的业务更上一层楼。
The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.
但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。
But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.
这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。
That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.
他们的全新AI助手通过为你匹配真正符合需求的顶尖候选人,消除了招聘中的猜测成分。
Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.
无需再翻阅大量简历,它会根据你的标准筛选求职者,并突出显示最匹配的人选,帮你节省数小时时间,在合适的人选出现时迅速行动。
Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.
最棒的是,这些优秀的候选人已经在LinkedIn上。
The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.
事实上,通过LinkedIn雇佣的员工,至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手雇佣的员工高出30%。
In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.
一次就招对人。
Hire right the first time.
请免费在 linkedin.com/studybill 发布您的职位,然后推广它以使用LinkedIn的新AI助手,让寻找顶尖候选人变得更轻松、更快速。
Post your job for free at linkedin dot com slash studybill then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.
免费发布职位请访问 linkedin.com/studybill。
That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.
条款和条件适用。
Terms and conditions apply.
好的。
All right.
我想让你们想象一下,在夏季高峰期前往奥斯陆度过三天。
I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.
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你将拥有漫长的白昼、令人惊叹的美食、漂浮在奥斯陆峡湾上的桑拿房,而且你所有的对话对象都是真正塑造未来的人。
You got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on the Oslo Fjord, and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.
这就是奥斯陆自由论坛。
That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.
从2026年6月1日到6月20日,奥斯陆自由论坛将迎来第十八年,汇聚来自世界各地的活动家、技术专家、记者、投资者和建设者。
From June 1 through the third twenty twenty six, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its eighteenth year bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the world.
其中许多人正站在历史的最前沿。
Many of them operating on the front lines of history.
在这里,你可以亲耳听到人们如何使用比特币应对货币崩溃,如何利用人工智能揭露人权侵害,以及在审查和威权压力下构建技术的故事。
This is where you hear firsthand stories from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses, and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures.
这些不是抽象的概念。
These aren't abstract ideas.
这些是人们当下正在实际使用的工具。
These are tools real people are using right now.
你将与大约2000位非凡的人物同处一室——异见者、创始人、慈善家、政策制定者,这些是你不仅会聆听、最终还会共进晚餐的人。
You'll be in the room with about 2,000 extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with.
在三天的时间里,您将体验到富有力量的主舞台演讲、关于自由科技与金融主权的动手工作坊、沉浸式艺术装置,以及在会议结束后仍持续进行的深入对话。
Over three days, you'll experience powerful main stage talks, hands on workshops on freedom tech and financial sovereignty, immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the session's end.
这一切都将在六月的奥斯陆发生。
And it's all happening in Oslo in June.
如果这听起来像是您会喜欢的场合,那您运气不错,因为您可以亲自到场参加。
If this sounds like your kind of room, well, you're in luck because you can attend in person.
标准票和赞助者票可在 oslofreedomforum.com 购买,赞助者票提供深度参与机会、私人活动,以及与演讲者的小团体交流时间。
Standard and patron passes are available at oslofreedomforum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events, and small group time with the speakers.
奥斯陆自由论坛不仅仅是一场会议,它是一个理念与现实交汇的地方,未来正由亲历者们在这里构建。
The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference, it's a place where ideas meet reality and where the future is being built by people living it.
初创公司行动迅速。
Startups move fast.
借助人工智能,它们的开发和发布速度更快,也更早吸引到企业客户。
And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.
但大单交易也带来了更大规模的安全与合规要求。
But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements.
SOC 2 并不总是足够的。
A SOC two isn't always enough.
正确的安全措施可以促成交易,也可能毁掉交易。
The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.
但有多少创始人或工程师能抽出时间来处理这些,而不耽误公司建设呢?
But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company?
Vanta 的人工智能和自动化功能,能让您在几天内准备好应对大客户的需求。
Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.
而且 Vanta 会持续监控您的合规状态,确保未来的交易不会被阻拦。
And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked.
此外,Vanta 会随着您的业务一同成长,并在每一步都提供及时的支持。
Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way.
随着人工智能改变法规和买家的期望,Vanta 清楚需要什么以及何时需要,并已打造了最快、最简便的路径帮助您达成目标。
With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to get you there.
这就是为什么认真的初创公司会早早选择 Vanta 来确保安全。
That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta.
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访问 vanta.com/billionaires 即可享受 1000 美元优惠。
That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.
好了,回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
所以我认为你们流程中一个非常独特的地方是,它围绕着另一个经过装订的清单展开,那就是你们的投资理念清单。
So I think a really distinctive aspect of your process is that it's built around this other laminated thing, which is your investment philosophy checklist.
如果我没理解错的话,你基本上是借鉴了詹姆斯·芬德利早期写下的关于市场有效策略的七八页信念内容,并将其转化为了一个投资理念清单。
And if I'm right in thinking, you basically took what James Findlay had done early on in terms of writing down seven or eight pages of his beliefs about what works in markets, and you then turned it into an investment philosophy checklist.
你能谈谈你是如何完成这个过程的吗?它如何帮助了你?在制定这种具体、固定的投资理念清单时,你是否受到了阿图·葛文德或其他人的启发?
Can you talk about how you went about that process and how it benefits you and how it was influenced by Atul Gawande or whoever in figuring out the importance of having this type of very tangible written down, written in stone philosophy checklist?
我从大约 2015 年开始,断断续续地与詹姆斯共事了二十年,但自从我职业生涯起步以来,如我所说,我于 2002 年重新加入了芬德利公园。
So, I've been working with James for twenty years in sort of 2015 on and off, but since the start of my career, as I mentioned, and then rejoined Findlay Park in 2002.
我们一直关注网站上那份文件,那是詹姆斯基于 1987 年经验撰写的投资理念,它是一份非常具有持久价值的文档。
And we'd always looked at this document on the website, which was James' investment philosophy from, you know, the 1987 experience, and it was a pretty timeless document.
但我觉得当我2015年左右接任首席投资官时,他们对我说:‘孩子长大了,让他自己试试吧。’
But I think the thing when I became CIO, I mean, handed over to me in sort of 2015, 'sixteen and said, The kid's grown up, let kid have a go.
所以我们曾有一段时间是联合首席投资官,后来他正式交棒给我,我说:‘拥有这份投资哲学很好,但我们怎么知道它真的被落实了呢?’
And so we were sort of joint CIO for a while, then he sort of handed over to me, and I said, Well, look, it's great to have this investment philosophy, but why don't how do we know we're implementing it?
我感觉在某些时候、某些情况下,我们并没有完全贯彻它,尤其是当新成员加入时。
And I didn't feel in all cases all the time we were implementing it, and especially as you bring new people in.
我当时读了阿图·葛文德的那本书,《清单革命》,大概就是那时候,或者几年前。
I'd read this Atul Gawande book, know, the Checklist Manifesto, I think at around that time or maybe a few years before.
书中提到,飞行员在起飞前会使用检查清单,即使他们完全知道该怎么做。
And the idea that a pilot has a checklist, and before they take off, they run through the checklist.
即使他们知道该怎么做,他们依然会逐项核对检查清单。
Even though they know what to do, they run through the checklist.
外科医生在手术室里也会使用检查清单,即使他们早已熟知手术流程。
A surgeon in an operating room has a checklist, even though they know what to do.
基金经理们却往往没有这样的检查清单。
You run through a checklist, fund managers tend not to have that.
他们以为自己能记住所有事情,甚至能靠一份八页的文档记住一切。
They think they can keep everything in their head and they can remember everything in an eight page document.
我知道自己没聪明到能这么做。
And I know that I'm just not smart enough to do that.
于是我跟团队说,我们为什么不把这份文件改成一份检查清单呢?
So I said to the team, why don't we try and put this checklist into Sorry, put this document into a checklist?
这真的是团队共同努力的结果。
And so it was really a team effort.
我们将其精简为29个要点。
We distilled it into 29 points.
七八年过去了,我们至今仍在使用它。
And seven or eight years on, we're still using it.
这些年来我们稍作了一些调整,修改了几个问题,但核心内容依然是自九十年代初以来经过验证的投资理念。
We've tweaked it a little bit over the years and tweaked a few questions, but essentially it is the investment philosophy that's been tried and tested since the early nineties.
我认为,它已经证明了自己的价值。
And it's proved its worth, I think.
这很有趣。
It's funny.
我第一次和查理·芒格交谈时,曾问他是否使用过清单。
I once asked Charlie Mungo, when I first spoke to him, I think, about his own use of a checklist.
他说:不,我都能记在脑子里。
He's like, No, I can just keep it all in my head.
我当时说:是的,但我觉得其他人做不到这一点。
And I was like, Yeah, but I don't think anyone else can do that.
我觉得——没几个人
I don't think- Not many
能像查理·帕克那样。
people are like Charlie Parker.
我的意思是,我是个智力很普通的人。
Mean, you know, I'm a person with very average intelligence.
我根本记不住所有这些事情。
I simply can't remember all of these things.
所以你就把它们写在清单上。
And so you put them down a list.
但这些问题本身,再次强调,都是常识。
But the questions themselves are, again, it's common sense.
其中超过一半与业务相关。
More than half of them relate to the business.
也就是业务质量和业务竞争优势。
So a business quality and business competitive advantage.
最终,我们想弄清楚什么是真正的质量。
And ultimately, we're trying to get to what is that quality?
我们希望投资于那些具有持久竞争优势的质量企业,这样我们才能对结果的必然性充满信心。
We want to invest in quality businesses that have enduring competitive advantage so that we can feel confident about the inevitability of the outcome.
而其他一些问题则涉及财务、自由现金流、杠杆、管理激励、对管理团队的信心、企业文化与使命。
And then a number of the other questions are around finance, financials, free cash flow, and leverage, and management incentives, and confidence in management, culture, purpose.
但其中很大一部分都与业务质量和竞争优势有关。
But the big chunk of them are related to business quality and competitive advantage.
我们试图投资于高质量的企业,这些企业能产生良好的回报,你可以长期持有,让它们复利增长。
We're trying to invest in high quality businesses that generate good returns, where you can just hold them and let them compound.
让我感到好奇的是,这份检查清单的三大核心部分之一,似乎聚焦于管理层,比如我们会问:我们是否认同他们的企业使命和文化?
It was curious to me that one of the three big chunks of the checklist appears to be about management and asking questions like, do we like their corporate purpose and culture?
他们是不是优秀的资本配置者?
And are they good capital allocators?
你能谈谈为什么你如此重视所投资公司的文化和使命吗?
Can you talk about this issue of focusing on the culture and purpose of companies that you invest in?
因为这听起来有点模糊、抽象。
Because it's a bit of a nebulous, vague thing.
但事实证明,这一点极其重要,无论是像伯克希尔或好市多这样的公司——我认为你都持有它们——还是亚马逊。
Yet it turns out to be hugely important, whether it's a company like Berkshire or Costco, both of which I think you own, or Amazon.
我记得你曾经说过,对于与文化相关的问题,你会在检查清单上给自己双倍评分?
And I think at one point, didn't you decide to give yourself a double score on the checklist for questions related to culture?
这对你的重要性非同寻常。
It's inordinately important to you.
没错。
That's right.
我认为,当你回望一些公司并思考它们为何成功时,虽然并不总是如此,但文化常常被低估了。
I think when you look back and you look at certain companies and why they've been successful, it's not always the case, but often culture is something that's been underestimated.
因此,那些显然重视股东利益的公司很重要。
And so companies that obviously look after shareholders are important.
我们在这里的目标是盈利和为股东创造回报。
We're trying to make a profit here and a shareholder return.
但我相信,那些善待员工、拥有良好Glassdoor评分、员工满意度高的公司,以及那些重视客户并具备强大客户价值主张的公司,更有可能取得成功。
But I believe that companies that look after their employees that have good glass door scores and where you've got satisfied employees, companies that look after their customers and have a strong customer value proposition, are well placed to succeed.
所以,文化和使命——在我们考察的事项中,我们不喜欢那种产品是客户必需的、但客户却痛恨这家公司的企业。
So culture and purpose, I mean, of the things that we look at is we don't like businesses where they have a product that customers have to have, but customers hate hate the company.
它们拥有定价权,因为客户别无选择,无处可去。
They've got pricing power because the customers have got no choice and nowhere else to go.
最终,我认为这并不会带来一个必然良好的结果。
Ultimately, don't think that leads to a very inevitable outcome.
而像好市多这样的公司,持续让客户感到愉悦,善待员工,给予他们优厚的薪酬,将这些因素结合起来,就能通过关注所有利益相关者并建立良好的文化,长期实现超常回报。
Whereas if you're like a Costco and you are permanently delighting customers, you look after your employees, you pay them well, you put all these things together, you can deliver supernormal returns over time by considering all the stakeholders and building a good culture.
我认为我们在芬德利公园也在努力这样做。
I think we try to do that at Findlay Park.
我认为芬德利公园成功的原因之一,坦率地说,是我们有着明确的目标:为客户提供卓越的回报,同时营造一种让员工能充分发挥才能、享受工作并为利益相关者创造价值的环境。
I think one of the reasons for the success of Findlay Park is frankly, you know, a very focused purpose to generate great returns for our clients, and a culture of creating environment for employees to do their best work, to have fun, and to deliver you know, to deliver for our stakeholders.
所以我认为,文化与使命,我们过去可能低估了它们的重要性,因此我们现在特别重视这两点。
So I think culture and purpose, I believe we've probably underestimated in the past, and that's why we've sort of double scored it.
我们特别重视一些因素,比如文化、定价能力以及无杠杆情况下的回报率,这些我们认为是关键的超级因素。
A few questions we double score like culture, like pricing power and returns without leverage, a few things that we think are kind of super factors.
所以当你在判断一家公司的文化时,显然会进行大量尽职调查,与部门负责人、前员工乃至竞争对手交谈。
So when you were trying to figure out the culture of a company, you're obviously doing a lot of due diligence in talking to divisional leaders and former employees and the like, and competitors.
你会寻找他们说法中的不一致之处,比如有人会说:‘是啊,是啊,这真是个很棒的工作环境。’
Are you looking for inconsistencies in what they're saying to see whether someone is saying, Yeah, yeah, no, it's a lovely place to work.
但当你跟其他人聊的时候,却发现:‘天啊,真希望我的老板别那么讨厌。’
Then you talk to people and you're like, God, I just wish my boss weren't such a ass.
是的,我的意思是,要随着时间推移逐渐拼凑出完整的图景。
Yeah, I mean, build up a picture over time.
你研究一家公司时,会接触管理层,也会接触不同层级的管理者。
You cover a company and you meet management, you meet different levels of management.
如今,通过Glassdoor以及其他渠道,你可以获得员工反馈和满意度方面的数据,了解存在的问题。
Obviously Glassdoor and in her side there's other ways getting data these days on employee feedback and satisfactions, where some of the issues are.
在我看来,员工满意度与股东回报之间存在某种关联。
And if you're in the top I mean, is a correlation in my opinion between satisfies employees shareholder returns.
如果你是标普500中Glassdoor评分排在第500位的公司,你大概很难实现出色的回报。
And if you're the five hundredth company in the S and P 500 on the Glassdoor scores, you're probably going to be challenged to deliver really great returns.
因此,我们有一些外部数据来源,可以访谈管理层。
So there's some outside data we We can can interview managements.
我们也可以借助专家网络,接触员工、前员工和竞争对手,以了解情况。
Can also use expert networks to access employees, former employees, competitors to get a sense of that.
我们非常关注领导层。
We're very focused on the leadership.
每当领导层发生变化时,这可能会如何影响企业文化?
Anytime the leadership changes, how does that how might that impact the culture?
所以我们是逐步建立起对企业的整体认知的。
So we build up a picture over time.
我们整理了一份大约六个问题的清单,帮助我们深入探究企业文化。
Produced a list of sort of half a dozen questions that help us probe on culture.
什么是企业文化?
What is the culture?
它在整个组织中是如何体现的?
How is it manifested throughout the organisation?
组织?
Organisation?
它随着时间发生了怎样的变化?
How has it changed over time?
为什么它会随着时间发生变化?
Why has it changed over time?
因此,我们还开发了一系列问题,帮助我们深入探究这个问题。
So there's a series of questions also we've developed to just help us sort of get to the bottom of it.
你永远无法获得完整的图景,但随着时间推移,你可以逐步构建起一幅画面,而我们确实已经尽力了。
You never really get a full picture, but you can build up a picture over time, and we've certainly given it a good go.
我也深深注意到,你们的文件在ESG方面涉及得非常广泛。
I was also really struck by the extent to which your documents really deal extensively with ESG.
显然,最近在美国出现了对ESG的反弹,围绕这一议题的分歧十分严重。
And obviously there's been an ESG backlash here in The US recently and lots of polarization about the issue.
我多少能理解那种观点,即存在绿色洗牌的风险,华尔街非常擅长推销任何东西。
And I guess I have some sympathy towards the view that there is a danger of greenwashing and that Wall Street is pretty good at selling anything.
只要他们能通过宣称某产品符合ESG标准来销售,他们就会这么做。
If they can sell stuff by saying that it meets their ESG criteria, they'll do it.
我认为对此保持一定程度的怀疑态度是恰当的。
I do think it's appropriate to be somewhat cynical about it.
但我同样认为,环境、社会福祉和公司治理这些议题至关重要。
I also think these issues of environment and social good and governance are hugely important.
我认为,利用这种反弹和虚伪的指控来否定这一真正重要的事情,存在真正的危险。
And I think there's a sort of real danger of using that backlash and the allegations of hypocrisy to kind of dismiss this thing that's actually really important.
因此,我很感兴趣看到ESG在你们的检查清单中占据多大比重。
And so I was interested to see the extent to which ESG runs through your checklist.
我认为你们还使用了一种负责任的投资评估标准,包含大约19个与气候和环境、人力资本、商业道德和声誉、网络安全以及数据隐私相关的因素。
And I think you have also a responsible investment gauge that you use that has something like 19 different factors related to climate and environment and human capital and business ethics and reputation and cybersecurity and data privacy and all of these things.
你能谈谈ESG如何真正成为发现可持续发展企业并实现长期成功的重要方面吗?
Can you talk about this whole issue of ESG actually being a really important aspect of finding businesses that are sustainable and achieving long term success.
这实际上是一种务实和实用的做法,而不仅仅是我们应该在政治上争论的问题。
So it's actually a practical and pragmatic thing and not just something that we should be debating politically.
是的。
Yeah.
不,不是的。
No, no.
谢谢你,威廉。
Thanks, William.
我很感谢有机会讨论这个问题,因为你知道,我认为钟摆曾经大幅偏向一个方向,而现在似乎又大幅偏向了另一个方向。
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this because you know, I think the pendulum swung a long way in one direction, and now it seems to be swinging a long way in the other direction.
我认为我们采取的是更为务实的方法。
I think we take rather a more pragmatic approach.
我的意思是,ESG到底是什么?
I mean, what is ESG?
它可能是ESG,也可能是SGE,或者谁知道是谁定了ESG这个顺序。
It could be ESG, it could be SGE, it could be you know, I don't know whoever chose the order of ESG.
目前,E(环境)方面受到了很多关注。
The E seems to be getting a lot of attention at the moment.
但事实上,我们认为管理得当的公司最有可能为我们的客户带来出色的复合回报。
But the truth is that we believe that responsibly managed companies are best placed to produce great compound rate of return, compound returns for our clients.
因此,我们非常关注这些因素。
And so we do pay close attention to those factors.
我的意思是,良好的治理是我们考察公司时的一个重要因素。
I mean, governance, good governance, is an important factor when we look at companies.
它有没有一个合理的董事会?
Does it have a sensible board?
管理层的激励机制是否与股东利益一致?
Are management incentives we talked about incentives aligned with those of shareholders?
这些激励机制合理吗?
Do they make sense?
我们是否信任管理层能够良好且成功地运营这家公司?
Would we back management to run this company well and successfully?
因此,治理(G)因素完全融入了我们的理念检查清单中。
And so the G is that's absolutely integrated into our philosophy checklist.
同样,社会(S)因素也融入了我们的理念检查清单中。
Equally, the S is integrated into our philosophy checklist.
我们希望投资那些能为客户提供良好价值主张的公司。
We want to have companies that are delivering good customer value propositions.
我提到了Glassdoor的评分。
And I mentioned the Glassdoor scores.
我们希望投资那些最终善待员工、关心员工,并创造良好环境让员工能充分发挥潜力、茁壮成长的公司,从而吸引和留住最优秀的人才,实现成功。
Want to have companies that ultimately are treating employees well, looking after employees, and creating an environment where they can do their best work and thrive, and they can retain and attract the best people so that they can be successful.
所以,你知道,我们一直认为其他利益相关者也很重要,当你考虑到客户和员工时,股东也会获得更好的回报。
So, you know, thinking about we've always thought about other stakeholders, you know, that when you think about customers and employees, you get better results for shareholders.
我们谈到了好市多,还有很多很多其他的例子。
We talked about Costco, and there are many, many other examples.
因此,这一点已经融入我们的流程中。
So that is integrated into our process.
在环境(E)方面,我们投资了许多公司,它们提供的产品和服务有助于创造一个更可持续的世界。
On the e side of things, we've got many companies that we think are providing products and services that are helping to create a more sustainable world.
例如,我们持有的建筑保温材料公司TopBuild,是我们的重要持仓之一。
For example, some of our building insulation companies we own TopBuild, we own a nice holding in that, it's one of our bigger holdings.
它们是为住宅和商业房屋提供保温材料的主导企业。
And they are the dominant company in providing insulation to residential and commercial houses.
也就是住宅和商业物业。
Well, residential houses and commercial properties.
当然,隔热材料实际上是减少碳足迹的最佳方式之一。
And of course, insulation actually is one of the best ways that you can reduce your carbon footprint.
所以这并不意味着TopBuild在我们的理念检查表上得分不高。
So now it doesn't mean that actually TopBuild is not a high scoring company on our philosophy checklist.
最初的出发点是,这是否是一个好企业?
The starting point is, is it a good business?
它是否符合我们的标准?
Does it fit?
但它也可能带来机遇。
But it can also create opportunity.
因此,对我来说,ESG是一种融入我们投资流程的工具,帮助我们管理机遇与风险。
And so for me, I see ESG as a tool that is integrated into our investment process that helps us manage both opportunity and risk.
管理风险,特别是下行风险,同时寻找机遇。
Manage risk, downside risk, and find opportunity.
我们在这里采取非常务实的态度,希望在这方面从未进行过绿色洗白。
And we take a really pragmatic approach here, and hopefully we've never greenwashed here on this front.
我们通常不会在ESG相关的材料中使用幻灯片,但我们一直都在实际推进这项工作。
Tend not to have slides in our pack around ESG, but we just sort of get on and do it we've always been doing it.
我们确实有一个负责任投资评估体系,会关注其他因素并整合其他信息和数据。
We do have this responsible investment gauge where we look at other factors and pull in other information and data.
同样,这有助于我们管理机遇与风险。
Again, help us manage opportunity and risk.
威廉,是的。
William Yeah.
我注意到你们的务实态度:一方面,你们仍然持有像EOG资源公司和康菲石油这样的化石燃料公司,我认为它们是低碳的油气生产商。
I was struck by that pragmatism where on the one hand you do still own some fossil fuel companies like EOG Resources, which I think is a low carbon producer of oil and gas, and Conoco as well.
但正如你们过去所指出的,这些公司在能源转型中仍将发挥重要作用。
But these are companies that, as you've pointed out in the past, are going to play an important role in the energy transition.
但与此同时,你们在2021年还向评估清单中增加了一个问题:该公司是否是气候经济的净受益者?
But at the same time, you also have a question, I think you added in 2021 to your checklist where you say, is the company a net beneficiary of climate economics?
所以你们的做法非常务实。
So it's very pragmatic.
这表明环境方面存在一种趋势,我们希望与这一趋势保持一致。
It's saying there is a trend here in terms of the environment, and we want to align ourselves with that trend.
我们希望确保不会被它突然击中,但也不至于陷入意识形态的极端,我
We want to make sure that we're not blindsided by it, but also not the Yeah, ideological, I
我觉得这是对的。
I think that's right.
我的意思是,我们一直力求务实。
I mean, we've always tried to be pragmatic.
我的意思是,显然这是一个重要的趋势。在我看来,尽管在言辞和基金管理公司声称自己是否与之对齐方面,风向可能略有变化,但如果你看看企业本身,看看它们在做什么,就能明显看出它们正在减少环境足迹、向更可持续方向发展的强劲势头。
I mean, clearly I think it is an important trend, which in my view, although the tide may be shifting a little bit in terms of the rhetoric and the fund management companies saying I'm aligned with it or I'm not aligned with it, if you look at businesses, if you look at what businesses are doing, there's clear momentum to reduce their environmental footprint and become more sustainable.
我认为这是一个持久的趋势,因此我们提出了一个问题。
I think it is an enduring trend, and so we have got a question there.
一个问题是,我们29个问题中的一个。
One question, one point on our 29 question.
但同时,我们也充分认识到必须实现能源转型,如果没有化石燃料,世界今天就会停止运转。
But at the same time, we've fully recognized that there needs to be an energy transition, and the world would simply stop functioning today if we didn't have fossil fuels.
那么,我们如何通过负责任管理的企业,以负责任的方式实现从A到B的转变呢?
And so how do we we get get from A to B in a responsible way through responsibly managed businesses?
因此,我们从未采取过一种剥离策略,比如只投资于AAA评级的ESG公司。
And so we've never operated a sort of divestment strategy here of saying, Well, we only want to be in AAA rated ESG companies.
我们采取了更加务实的方法。
We've taken a much more pragmatic approach.
事实上,在我们的负责任投资评估指标(RIG)中,像EOG这样的公司,在我们所关注的所有因素上得分相当高。
And in fact, on our RIG, our responsible investment gauge, a company like EOG actually scores quite well relative to all the sort of factors that we look at.
相比之下,一些由第三方机构给予高评级的社交媒体公司,其得分却并不理想。
By contrast, some of the social media companies, which get quite high ratings from third party vendors, don't score so well.
因此,每个人衡量这些事情的方式都不同,但归根结底,我们是务实的。
And so everyone has their own different ways of measuring these things, but ultimately, yeah, we are pragmatic.
所以像Meta和X(前身为Twitter)这样的公司,就像Glif(前身为Prince)现在叫X一样,它们的得分并不高吗?
So things like Meta and X, formerly known as Twitter, in the same way that Glif, formerly known as Prince is now X, they don't score very well?
这些社交媒体公司,是不是那些得分不高的公司?
These social media companies, would they be ones that don't score great?
它们确实不达标。
They don't.
在芬德利公园,我们通常会避开这些公司。
And we've tended to avoid those companies at Findlay Park.
我的意思是,出于各种原因,它们在我们的投资理念检查清单上得分也不高。
I mean, for various reasons they don't score that highly on our investment philosophy checklist either.
你知道,目前芬德利公园对大型科技股的配置比例相当低。
Know, So Finley Park right now, we're pretty underweight, you know, the mega cap companies.
尽管我们是一只全市值美国基金,但我们对这些大型科技股的配置比例可能达到了历史最低水平。
We probably got about as low a weight although we're an all cap American fund, we probably got about as low a weight as we've ever had in those mega cap companies.
尽管如此,该基金的表现依然相当出色,因为投资并不仅仅关乎指数的表现,有时更关键的是你持有哪些标的。
And notwithstanding that, the fund still continues to perform quite well, because also it's not about what you Sometimes it's also just about what you own and not sort of what the index is doing.
只要其他公司表现良好,你依然能实现不错的复合回报率。
Long as you've got other companies that are performing well, you can still produce a good compound rate of return.
是的。
Yeah.
我的感觉是,也许这种情况已经变了,但几周前我的感觉是,你们持有微软、英伟达和字母表公司,这些公司你们已经持有很长时间了。
My sense, maybe this has changed, but my sense at least a few weeks ago was that you own Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Alphabet, all of which you'd owned for quite a while.
所以我想,这八个市值在三千亿到五千亿甚至一万亿美元以上的超级大盘股中,你们持有其中三个,但其他的像Meta、奈飞、特斯拉、亚马逊,
So I guess three of those eight mega cap companies that have market caps of thirty:fifty 100,000,000,000 or more, but the others like Meta, Netflix, Tesla, Amazon,
苹果,持得不多。
Apple, not so much.
这么说公平吗,你们
Is that fair to say that you
没错。
were That's right.
我们回避了这三家公司。在我们上一次的持仓报告中,有三家公司合计约占基金的10%。
Avoiding have three Our last filing, we had three companies which made up, call it, approximately 10% of the fund.
如果你看看今年以及过去几年一直推动市场的那些超级大盘股的话。
And if you look at those mega cap company, which have been driving the market this year and for a number of years.
回顾过去十年,有八家公司贡献了标普500指数60%的收益。
Think in the last decade, eight companies represented 60% of the performance of the S and P.
这些公司占指数的25%到30%,而我们的持仓大约在10%。
Those represent 25% to 30% of the index, and we're around 10%.
因此,我们的投资组合比指数更加广泛分散,而现在的指数看起来略显狭窄。
So we have a much broader diversified portfolio than index, which looks a little bit narrow today.
而且看起来你们有意识地重新转向侧重于中型股。
And it seems like you've been very consciously shifting back towards an emphasis on mid caps.
在最初阶段,这只基金主要投资于小盘股,后来略微加入一些中盘股,然后逐渐演变为全市值基金。
In its original iteration, the fund was very much a small cap fund and then a little bit mid caps, and then gradually became an all cap fund.
而现在,它似乎又重新转向对中型股的显著侧重。
And now it seems that it's shifting back towards a pretty heavy emphasis on mid caps.
这是否部分反映了,正如你所说的,那八大巨头在过去十到十二年里涨得太疯狂,估值已经不再具有吸引力?
Is that partly a reflection of the fact that, as you call them, the mega cap eight have gone kind of crazy over the last ten, twelve years and that the valuations are just not that attractive?
首先,巨头股的问题在哪里?中型股的相对吸引力又是什么?
First, what's the problem with the mega caps and what's the comparative attraction of the mid caps?
是的。
Yeah.
大型科技公司的挑战在于,过去十年左右,它们几乎独占了市场,比如谷歌在搜索领域,亚马逊在云计算领域,微软在办公生产力软件等领域。
So the challenge with the mega caps is that in the last decade or so, they pretty much had the sort of rails to themselves, you know, whether it's Google in search or, you know, Microsoft in cloud sorry, Amazon in cloud or Microsoft in, you know, office productivity and so on.
如果你看看今天的情况,竞争明显多了起来。
If you look today, there's just a lot more competition.
未来竞争还会更多,重叠也更严重。
There's going be more, there's more overlap.
谷歌、亚马逊和微软现在都在云计算领域相互竞争。
You know, Google and Amazon and Microsoft are all competing in cloud.
这已经是一个竞争更加激烈的领域了。
You know, it's just, it's a more competitive area.
在社交媒体方面,脸书面临着更多挑战,比如抖音的崛起,这些公司之间的竞争也更加激烈。
You know, social media, Facebook has got, you know, more challenges there, you know, TikTok and there's just more competition between those companies.
它们今后不太可能像过去那样随意收购其他公司了。
They're not going be allowed to acquire companies in the way they have in the past.
过去十年左右,它们的收入年均复合增长率大约为25%,这相当惊人。
They compounded revenues at sort of 25% roughly for the last decade or so, which is pretty extraordinary.
但如果估值继续上升,如果它们在未来十年再次这样做,它们的规模可能会达到GDP的三分之一。
But if the valuation's moved up, if they're going to do that again over the next decade, they probably become a third of GDP.
所以我认为这只是一个数学上的挑战。
So I think it's just a mathematical challenge.
这些公司的合计收入达到了1.5万亿美元。
This is 1 and a half trillion of collective revenue.
它们正受到来自监管和竞争层面更为严格的审视。
And it's being scrutinized to far greater extent from a regulatory perspective and from a competitive perspective.
这是其中一个角度。
That's sort of one angle.
第二个角度是我们对中型公司实际上非常看好。
The second angle is we're actually really excited about mid caps.
随着大型公司的主导地位增强,我们认为中型公司在估值上的机会正回到上世纪90年代末期的水平,那时我们更关注小型公司。
As these large cap companies have dominated, we feel that the opportunity in mid caps on valuations we're sort of going back to where we were in the sort of late 90s when we were much more focused on small cap companies.
我不会说它们被忽视了,但它们的表现不佳,因此受到的关注也更少。
And I wouldn't say they've been ignored, but they've not performed, and so they've had less attention on them.
在过去十八个月里,我们发现进入基金的创意中,大约有75%集中在30亿美元到500亿美元市值的范围内。
We are finding probably about 75% of the ideas that come into the fund over the last eighteen months have been in this sort of 3,000,000,000 to $50,000,000,000 market cap range.
因此,目前基金中约三分之二的持仓市值低于1000亿美元,而标普指数中三分之二的成分股市值超过1000亿美元,我们正朝着这个方向演变。
And so today, probably two thirds of the fund is under $100,000,000,000 whereas two thirds of the S and P is over $100,000,000,000 And we're evolving in that direction.
这里还有另一个因素,那就是去全球化,以及在走向更去全球化世界的过程中,更专注于国内市场的公司可能获得的优势。
There is another factor here, which really is around deglobalization and the advantage that maybe more domestic oriented companies are going to have as we move to a more deglobalized world.
我的意思是,这完全是另一个话题了。
I mean, that's another conversation entirely.
我很乐意深入探讨这一点。
I'm happy to get into that.
但我们更侧重于国内业务,那些将受益于美国制造业回流和近岸外包的公司,我们对这一机会非常看好。
But we've got a more of a domestic focus, companies that are gonna benefit from US reshoring, near shoring, and we're really excited about that opportunity.
是的,这些公司很多我们的听众可能都没听说过,因为它们可能是工业公司或基础设施服务公司,主要客户是美国本土市场。
Yeah, so these are companies that a lot of our listeners won't have heard about because maybe they're industrial companies or infrastructure services companies with a more domestic US buyer.
所以我看了下你们的投资组合,比如Ferguson这样的公司,主营供暖和管道设备,这些公司并不是人人都熟悉。
So I was looking at your portfolio and there are things like Ferguson in heating and plumbing, these companies that not all of us have heard of.
但我还注意到,你们以一种有趣的方式参与了人工智能热潮,尽管你们持有英伟达、微软和阿尔法贝特这些规模较大的仓位,但你们也非常重视所谓的‘采矿工具’类公司,即那些将从人工智能相关的IT支出中受益的产品和服务提供商。
But then I was also struck that you were playing the AI boom in an interesting way that although you own NVIDIA and Microsoft, which are both pretty big positions, and Alphabet, There's also a big emphasis on what you've called the picks and shovels providers of products and services that are going to benefit from IT spending on things like AI.
你能谈谈像埃森哲或盖纳特这样的公司吗?它们可能没那么庞大。
Can you talk about things like Accenture or Gartner, these things that are maybe not as huge?
它们不是这些超级巨头公司,但它们在把握人工智能热潮方面定位非常优越,而且我认为,它们的价格可能不像那些超级巨头股票那样昂贵。
They're not these mega cap companies, but they're very well positioned to take advantage perhaps of this AI boom, and they're not quite as pricey perhaps, I think, as some of these mega cap stocks.
我的意思是,也许先退一步看,我们投资组合中大约有40%属于我所说的这类‘采矿工具’型公司,这些公司大多数人觉得有点无聊,增长性不够,但我们非常喜爱。
I mean, maybe just stepping back a bit, we probably have 40% of the portfolio in what I would call sort of these picks and shovels type companies, you know, which most people find a bit boring and not growthy enough, but we absolutely love.
我所说的这类公司,通常提供的是对客户价值很高、但占其总成本比例极低的关键产品和服务。
So whether it's and what I mean by that is often they are providing, you know, essential products and services that are a high value to customer, but a very, very low percentage of their total costs.
比如信实涂料公司,油漆在整项涂装工程中的成本占比其实不高,但使用高质量的油漆却非常重要。
So you take Sherwin Williams, for example, in paint, you know, actually paint as a percentage of the paint job is not a lot, but it's, you know, having good quality paint is important.
马丁·马里埃塔公司的骨料产品。
Martin Marietta in aggregate.
用于新建工业气体设施或生物技术工厂的骨料材料。
The aggregates that go into new industrial gas facility or biotech plant.
成本占比虽然很小,但这是一个寡头垄断市场,你必须拥有这个产品,并且有一定的定价权,而且你必须在需要的时候就能拿到。
It's a pretty small percentage of the cost, but, you know, it's sort of an oligopoly, you've got to have the product, and you've got a bit of pricing power, and you just need you need to have it when you need to have it.
看看德州仪器或模拟器件公司在模拟半导体领域的表现,它们的产品单价可能只有50美分到1美元,但每辆汽车中使用的半导体内容价值可能高达几百美元。
If you look at Texas Instruments or analogue devices in analogue semiconductors, mean, sell products for 50¢ for a dollar, but the content is maybe a few $100 that goes into a car.
但这些产品至关重要,而你并不是在押注特斯拉、宝马、通用汽车或某家中国电动车公司会成为赢家。
But they're critical products, but they're not, you know, you're not betting on Tesla or BMW or GM or some Chinese EV company being the winner.
你买的是像德州仪器这样的 picks and shovels 公司,它们为全球所有汽车制造商提供模拟半导体。
You buy the picks and shovels company like Texas Instruments, and they provide analog semiconductors to all car manufacturers all over the world.
无论是中国、印度、特斯拉还是德国公司,你其实不需要那么聪明去预测谁会赢,因为只要他们需要这种产品,就会去找德州仪器。
And, you know, whether it's the Chinese or the Indian or the Teslas or, you know, the German companies, don't you actually have to be that smart and make a bet on who the winner is because if they need the product, they'll go to Texas Instruments.
我们知道,汽车中的电子化内容会随着时间推移不断增长。
And we know the auto content in cars grows over time.
这就是我所说的高价值、低成本但至关重要的产品。
So these are what I mean by high value, low cost, but critical products.
在IT服务领域也是如此。
And it's the same in IT services.
这些可以说是提供铲子和镐子的公司,无论是在IT服务领域,比如埃森哲在咨询方面,还是盖特纳在提供科技建议方面,亦或是CDW在IT服务方面,我们都非常喜欢这类公司。
These are sort of picks and shovels providers, whether it's in IT services, whether it's Accenture in consulting, or whether it's Gartner in providing technology advice, or whether it's CDW in IT services, we just love these companies.
热力科学、丹纳赫在医疗健康领域。
Thermo Fisher, Danaher in healthcare.
你知道,我们迄今为止在芬德利公园从未投资过任何制药或生物技术公司,你可能会问,安东尼,为什么呢?
You know, we have actually never invested at Findlay Park in a pharmaceutical or biotech company in our history, and you may say, Well, Anthony, why not?
问题是,我们不够聪明,无法预知哪些产品会获得批准,这些产品的生命周期是怎样的,当专利到期后,他们是否有新产品来替代?
The problem is, is we're not smart enough to know which products are going to get approved and what is the life cycle of that product, and when it comes off patent, do they have a product to replace it?
如果你是热力科学或丹纳赫,为科学家提供生命科学工具和耗材,并服务于所有制药公司、生物技术公司、仿制药公司以及印度和中国的企业,只要你相信科学在进步,那么大多数年份你的收入都会持续增长,利润率也能小幅提升,并能产生自由现金流,再将这些资金用于更多收购、分红或股票回购。
If you're Thermo Fisher or Danaher and you're providing the life science tools and consumables to scientists, and you're serving all the pharma companies, all the biotech companies, all the generic companies, all the Indian and Chinese companies, as long as you believe in science advancing, you're going to generate more revenue every year most years, and you can grow margins a bit and you can generate free cash flow and reallocate that into more acquisitions or dividends or buybacks.
抱歉,这个回答有点啰嗦,但这些正是帮助我们控制下行风险的企业类型。
These are sorry, it's a slightly long winded answer, but these are the types of businesses that help us manage downside risk.
对大多数人来说,这些公司可能相当平淡,但即使你判断错了,也不会亏太多钱。
And to most people, they might be quite dull, but you're not gonna lose a lot of money in them if you're wrong.
而且我觉得我在你们的某份报告中读到过,这些不太炫目的中型公司估值,相比大型巨头公司的估值,已经跌至近二十五年来的最低水平。
And I I think I read somewhere in one of your reports that the valuations for these slightly less exotic kind of mid cap companies are at basically twenty five year lows compared to the valuations of the mega caps.
是这样吗?这种巨大的差异让我们想起了1998年或1995年的情况?
Is is that right that there's a really big disparity that reminds us of, say, 1998, 1995?
是的。
Yeah.
我们的演示文稿中有一张图表,展示了中小盘股的相对估值。
We have a chart in our slide deck which shows the relative valuation of mid caps.
你也可以将它与小盘股相对于标普500指数的估值进行比较,而标普500显然是一个偏向大盘股的指数。
You can plot this against small caps as well relative to the S and P 500, which is obviously a larger cap biased index.
目前它的估值水平接近1998年底至1999年初的水平。
It is trading close to where it was in sort of late nineteen ninety eight, early nineteen ninety nine.
你知道,我们一直以来都致力于为客户实现良好的绝对复合回报率。
And you know, one of the things that we did is we always were trying to produce a good, absolute compound rate of return for clients.
你知道,小盘股和中盘股已经被过度挖掘了。
You know, small cap, mid caps got really rather picked over.
你知道,许多大型基金公司——那些你都熟知的知名机构——在2000年代关闭了它们的小盘股和中盘股基金,因为它们管理的资金太多,而这个领域之前一直很受欢迎。
You know, a lot of the big fund houses, the well known ones that you all know, closed their doors in the 2000s to small and mid cap money, they had too much money, and it had been a great area and out of favor sorry, in favor.
而且,你知道,标普500指数的公司当时并不受欢迎。
And, you know, S and P 500 companies were well out of favor.
正是在那个时候,我们做出了调整,决定实际上需要关注所有规模的公司,因为你可以用12倍市盈率买入微软,用11倍市盈率买入沃尔玛等公司。
And that was the point at which we pivoted, and we said, well, actually we need to look at all cap companies because you can buy Microsoft on 12 times earnings and you can buy, you know, Walgreen on 11 times earnings, etc.
我们可以买入那些长期表现不佳的高质量公司。
And we can buy these high quality companies that have underperformed for a while.
我们不断进化,如今,距离Findlay Park 3.0已经过去二十五年,我觉得这有点像是回归未来。
We evolved, and now I think Findlay Park three point zero, twenty five years on, I'm calling it sort of back to the future.
我们正在稍微回归到我们的初心。
We're going back a little bit to our roots.
如今,我们的投资组合更接近早期的样子,市值在30亿到500亿美元之间的中型公司占我们投资的40%以上,市值低于1000亿美元的公司占我们投资的60%以上。
Today we look more like we did in those early days with sort of mid cap companies, dollars 3,000,000,000 to $50,000,000,000 market cap companies being 40 plus percent of what we do, less than $100,000,000,000 60% plus of what we do.
这真的令人兴奋。
And it's really exciting.
在过去十年里,我们某种程度上一直坚持在这个领域。
And we sort of stayed in the game in a way in the last decade.
我们在一个零利率、资金免费的时期坚持了下来,这在某种程度上并不是芬利公园管理下行风险、低杠杆的绝佳环境。
We hung in there in a period where you had zero interest rates, free money, you know, not the best environment in a way for Finlay Park, managing downside risk, low leverage.
但现在利率回到了5.5%,资金有了真正的成本。
But now we're back at 5.5% interest rates, you know, there's a real cost to money.
我们进入了一个新时代。
We're in a new era.
现在快一点半了。
It's really one:thirty
很令人兴奋。
exciting.
我认为回归我们的根源,投资这些略微被忽视、不被看好的公司,将会非常出色。
I think going back to our roots a bit with these slightly undercovered, unloved companies is going to be fantastic.
让我们短暂休息一下,听听今天赞助商的介绍。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
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The possibilities are endless and guessing is too risky.
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Setup is fast too, with built in AI tools that write product descriptions and even help edit product photos.
随着你的成长,Shopify 也会与你一同成长,帮助你从一个仪表板处理更多订单,并拓展至新市场。
And as you grow, Shopify grows with you, helping you handle more orders and expand into new markets all from one dashboard.
在2026年,停止等待,立即用Shopify开始销售。
In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.
注册每月1美元的试用版,今天就前往shopify.com/wsb开始销售。
Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.
前往shopify.com/wsb。
Go to shopify.com/wsb.
就是shopify.com/wsb。
That's shopify.com/wsb.
在新的一年里,让Shopify陪伴你聆听你的第一个成功声音。
Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.
好了,回到节目。
All right, back to the show.
有趣的是,你们从一开始就做出的最重要决定之一,决定了Findlay Park的成功,那就是你们选择专注于一个国家。
It's also interesting that probably one of the most important decisions you guys made from the very start that determined the success of Findlay Park was that you made the choice to focus on one country.
很早就选定了美国,这要感谢James和Charlie对美国股票的专长。
Picked America very early on, thanks to the good fortune of James and Charlie being experts on US stocks.
你对美国有着独特的视角,因为你住在英国,职业生涯早期曾担任过五年欧洲股票分析师,但你花了二十多年时间分析美国股票。
You have an unusual perspective on The US because you live in The UK, you spent five years early on in your career as a European stock analyst, I think, but you spent over twenty years analyzing US stocks.
你对美国保持超然和客观,但同时又非常了解并深度融入其中。
You're detached an objective about The US, but at the same time, very knowledgeable and very immersed in it.
我觉得人们经常低估了美国的活力,他们只看到各种问题,总是说‘美国完了,看看那个即将取而代之的国家’。
And I feel like people routinely underestimate the dynamism of The US, and they look at all these problems and they always say, America's finished, look at this country that's gonna take over.
无论是几十年前的日本,还是近年来的中国,每当人们都说‘这个国家将取而代之,美国完了’时,美国衰落的预言似乎总是过于仓促。
And then whether it's Japan decades ago or then China in more recent years, these countries that everyone says, Oh, this is gonna take over and The US is finished, The predictions of The US's demise always seem to be somewhat premature.
我想知道你能否谈谈,为什么美国不仅现在是投资的绝佳之地,而且一直以来都是投资者的理想选择。
And I wondered if you could talk about why The US simply is a very attractive place to invest, not just now, but it's just such a sweet spot to be an investor.
是的。
Yeah.
不,确实如此。
No, it's so true.
我的职业生涯初期,我是在詹姆斯·芬利的美国业务团队工作,我觉得那是学习的好地方。
I mean, spent the first part of my career, I'd say, working with James Finley on the American desk, and I thought that's a great place to learn.
但事实上,最终我住在英国,我本应该主要研究英国和欧洲的公司,所以我决定做出这个转变。
But actually, ultimately, I live in The UK and I should probably cover UK and European companies, so I decided to make that switch.
五年后,我又回到了研究美国公司的工作。
After five years, went back to working with chains again.
其中一个教训是,英国和欧洲市场上高质量公司的数量远远不及美国。
And one of the lessons was there's just simply not the depth of companies, of quality companies that you have in The US.
当你确实找到一家优质公司时,会有多达35位卖方分析师关注它,这些公司早已被反复研究,估值可能已经很高,因为高质量企业的选择实在太少,它们的估值倍数普遍偏高。
Where you do have a quality company, there's 35 sell side analysts and they're picked over and they're probably actually quite highly rated because there's so few choices of high quality businesses, they're trading on quite high multiples.
美国拥有成百上千家不可能被所有人完全分析的公司,还有无数卓越的企业。
America has just got hundreds, thousands of companies that can't possibly be fully analysed by everyone and just extraordinary companies and businesses.
说到美国的优势,显然你拥有一个非常高效、高度流动的资本市场。
I mean, thinking about the America advantages, obviously you've got a capital market that's very, very liquid that works.
你有三亿消费者,对吧?
You've got 300,000,000, is it consumers?
同样,这也是你商业模式的杠杆优势。
Again, switch to sort of leverage your business model.
你有一套有利于商业的监管文化。
You've got a culture of business friendly regulation.
你有法治精神、创业精神,而且坦率地说,美国有着创立新公司的悠久历史。
You've got rule of law, entrepreneurial spirit, and frankly, just a history of America creating new companies.
我的意思是,看看今天的标普500,当我们谈论那些顶级持仓时。
I mean, look at the S and P today and when we talk about look at those top holdings.
我的意思是,现在大家都在谈论英伟达,你知道的,市值上万亿美元。
Mean, we talk about Nvidia today, everyone's talking about Nvidia at the moment, you know, trillion market cap.
我的意思是,英伟达以前在哪?
I mean, where was NVIDIA?
二十五年前,它可能根本还没被发明出来。
Twenty five years ago, it probably wasn't even invented.
美国有能力不断创新,孕育出这些公司,无论是特斯拉、奈飞、微软还是苹果,在某个阶段。
America has the ability to just innovate, bring these companies, whether it's Tesla or Netflix or Microsoft or Apple at some stage.
而你看看欧洲,看看英国,英国的新公司都在哪?
And you look at Europe, look at The UK, where are the new companies in The UK?
我们也许曾经拥有Arm,但现在已经卖掉了。
Maybe we had Arm for a while, that's been sold.
而且实际上,我认为它即将在美国重新上市。
And actually, think it's gonna be relisted in The United States.
所以根本不是这样。
So just isn't.
你看看英国,只有几家银行、一些石油公司和电信公司。
You look at The UK, you've got some banks and some oil companies and some telecom companies.
美国是一个充满活力的环境,我认为你说得对,它的潜力一直被低估。
America is just such a dynamic environment, and I think you're right, it's consistently underestimated.
当你阅读英国媒体对美国的报道时,总是充满负面情绪。
When you read The UK press around America, it's always been negative.
我本人天性比较乐观,一直对美国及其活力、推动无与伦比创新的研发,以及杰出的公司和财富充满信心。
I mean, I'm naturally a slightly optimistic person, and I'm always quite optimistic about America and its dynamism and the R and D that drives unparalleled levels of innovation and extraordinary companies and wealth.
还有极其出色的工作精神。
Also an incredible work ethic.
我昨天跟妻子说,我觉得自己昨晚大概十一点才下班,而她到十点半才下班。
I was saying to my wife yesterday, I think I finished work at about eleven something last night, and she finished work at like 10:30.
我想知道,世界上还有哪里的人会在夏末时节如此规律地拼命工作呢?
It's like, where else in the world are people just sort of routinely working that ridiculously hard at the end of summer when I don't know.
我这么说并不是为了自我夸耀。
And I sort of feel I I'm not saying that to be self congratulatory.
我只是环顾四周,看到我认识的这些人在这里都工作得非常努力,我也曾在英国和香港工作过。
I just look around and I see the people I know working really hard here, and I've worked in England, and I've worked in Hong Kong.
在香港,我认为他们的工作态度非常出色。
In Hong Kong, I think they had a tremendous work ethic.
但这里似乎有一种活力、强度和生产力,还有大量资本源源不断地流向好点子。
But it just seems like there's a kind of a dynamism and an intensity and a productivity here, and also this tremendous flow of capital to good ideas.
我觉得你讲得非常好。
I think you put it extremely well.
这就是美国梦。
It's the American dream.
实际上,美国的大学也很有意思,迈克,我儿子刚上美国的大学,我大儿子,我们刚送他到那里。
Even actually US college is interesting, Mike, just my son has just started at US college, my eldest son, and we just dropped him off there.
我的意思是,英国人通常在九月或十月开始上大学,而他八月十五日就开学了。
I mean, most people in The UK start equivalent of UK university here at the September, October.
他八月十五日就开学了。
He started on August 15.
你跟他说,在美国读书,假期可没那么多。
And you tell him, you're not going to get nearly as much holiday studying in America.
他却说,是的,爸爸,我知道,但他已经下定决心了。
He's like, yeah, dad, I know, but he's committed to that.
但无论是学习,还是人们只有两周假期,想想美国吧。
But whether it's, you know, studying, whether it's people have two week holidays, think, America.
在这里,人们通常有四五周的假期。
Here, expect five weeks, four or five weeks.
所以,是的,我们有很多国家法定假日。
So, yeah, we've got a lot of national holidays.
我觉得这是文化差异。
I think it's a cultural thing.
你觉得,单看英国,是不是有点迷失方向了?
Do you feel, just looking at The UK, that it's lost the plot a little bit?
我的意思是,随着脱欧以及像大卫·卡梅伦和鲍里斯·约翰逊这样的伊顿公学出身的前首相们带来的种种灾难——他们跟我上同一所学校——你有没有一种感觉,英国已经失去了活力,不再是一个充满动力和重要性的经济力量?
I mean, with Brexit and the like and with the disasters of all your old Etonian prime ministers who went to school with me, David Cameron and Boris Johnson, is there a sense that The UK has lost its mojo and it's just not such a dynamic and important force economically?
还是说,从商业和投资的角度来看,这个国家的前景依然相当乐观?
Or does it feel like the prognosis for the country is still pretty good in terms of business and investing and the like?
我觉得我们目前处境艰难,但我对我生活和工作的这个国家依然充满乐观,这里依然存在许多成功的机会。
I think we're in a tough spot, but I am hugely optimistic about this country where I live and work and the opportunities still in this country to succeed.
我认为英国的优势依然显著,尽管人们很容易抱怨脱欧或当前的领导层。
And I think that the advantages in The UK are still significant as much as it's easy to kind of moan and say, Brexit this or the current leadership.
我依然对英国能够渡过这一难关充满信心。
I'm still very optimistic about The UK's ability to sort of pull through this.
英国和美国之间有很多相似之处。
Think there are a lot of parallels between The UK and The US.
我认为我们必须制定正确的政策。
I think we've got to get the policy right.
我认为这是关键。
I think that's key.
但我认为我们这里仍然有很多优势。
But I think we've still got a lot of advantages here.
前几天我查看了自1997年底以来富时100指数——这个英国主要指数——与美国市场的回报率,当时我有点惊讶。
I was slightly surprised when I I was looking the other day at the returns since late nineteen ninety seven of the FTSE 100, this big British index, versus The US market.
所以这是从1997年以来很长一段时间,大约二十六年左右。
And so this is a long period of time since 'ninety seven, so what, twenty six years, something like that.
富时100指数的年均回报率为3.7%,而标普500指数虽然不算惊艳,但也还过得去,年均回报率为8.3%。
And the FTSE has averaged 3.7 a year, whereas the S and P, which hasn't been stunning but has been okay, has been 8.3%.
也就是说,在这么长的时间里,回报率一直相当低迷。
And so, I mean, just a very long period of pretty dismal returns.
为什么会这样?
Why is that?
为什么英国——这个我出生并最初在21、22岁离开前往纽约的国家——在过去二十五年里表现得如此平庸?
Why has The UK, the country that I came from and that I sort of left initially when I was about 21, 22 to move to New York, why has it been so lackluster for the last quarter century?
嗯,部分原因我们刚才已经讨论过了。
Well, think part of the explanation is what we were just talking about.
美国具备自我更新、重新构想和创造新企业的能力。
America's ability to renew, reimagine, create new businesses.
如果你把那些巨头公司从指数中剔除,只看通用电气、埃克森美孚和一些银行,结果可能并不会差太多。
If you take those mega cap companies, if you take some of those new companies out of the index and you just were to measure GE and Exxon and some banks, you probably wouldn't have a dissimilar result.
所以我认为,美国的优势在于能够创立企业,利用庞大的消费市场,并将这些优势扩展到全球。
So I think it's America's ability to create companies, leverage that over a large consumer base and then leverage those internationally.
我认为英国在这方面由于规模和体量的限制,处于某种劣势。
I think The UK is at somewhat of a disadvantage there in terms of the size and scale.
英国确实有很多创新和优秀的企业,但它们往往被收购了。
You do get a lot of innovation and great companies, but they do get taken out.
当它们估值达到50亿、100亿、200亿美元时,就消失了,或者重新在美國上市。
Disappear at 5,000,000,000, 10,000,000,000, 20,000,000,000 or they relist in America.
弗格森就是一个很好的例子。
Ferguson's a great example.
我的意思是,他们重新定位了自己的业务,专注于美国市场,并在美国重新上市,成为了一家非常成功的企业。
I mean, they reimagine their business to just a US business and they relist it in The United States, actually being a very successful company.
所以我认为这就是关键所在。
So I think that's it really.
这是美国创造新兴活力企业的能力。
It's America's ability to create new dynamic businesses.
英国呢,你看看它的指数,仍然由十年前、二十年前差不多的公司组成。
UK, sort of you look at the index, still composed of much the same sort of companies as ten, twenty years ago.
你曾简短提到你儿子去美国上大学。
You mentioned briefly your son going off to American University.
如果我没记错的话,你只有一个孩子。
I think you just have the one child, if I remember rightly.
几个月前我们刚开始非正式安排这次对话时,你最后时刻给我发消息说,你儿子即将在哈罗公学打最后一场足球赛,你想去现场看他比赛。
And when we when when when we first scheduled a conversation a few months ago, just informally, you you wrote to me at the last minute, and you were like, my son is about to play his last soccer game at Harrow, and I wanna go watch watch him play.
我们能改到今天晚些时候再聊吗?
Can we reschedule for later in the day?
作为有两个孩子的父母,我非常理解这一点,尽管我其实没去看过他们多少场比赛。
Which I which I I I loved as the parent of two children, although I never made it to quite many of their games.
这就引出了一个问题:你是如何平衡这份极其紧张的工作——带领十三、十四、十五位投资者,管理一百零五亿美元,运营这样一个成功的基金——同时还要兼顾家庭、生活和一些兴趣爱好呢?
And it it just raises this question of how you've managed to balance this pretty intense job of leading a team of thirteen, fourteen, 15 investors, managing 10 and a half billion dollars, managing this very successful fund, and at the same time, trying to have a family and some kind of life and some sort of hobbies.
你发现了哪些管理时间的方法,能在保持高水平表现的同时,又不让自己精疲力尽?
What have you figured out about how to manage your time and perform at a high level while also not burning out?
是的,这是个很好的问题。
Yeah, no, it's a great question.
我儿子会说:爸爸,你可能去了那场比赛,但你知道有多少其他父母——爸爸和妈妈——也都在这些比赛现场吗?你最终出席了多少场呢?
My son would say that dad, I may have gone to that match, but dad, do you know how many other dads, moms and dads are at these matches and you know, you turned out to X many?
所以,我不得不承认,我确实感到有些愧疚,但我也已经尽了最大努力。
So I'm afraid I get the, you know, I do feel rather guilty that I've, you know, I've done my best.
你只能尽力而为。
You just try and do your best.
我的一个秘诀是睡眠很少。
I mean, I think one of the secrets for me is I don't sleep very much.
从二十多岁开始,我就靠很少的睡眠撑过来。
And I, you know, since my 20s I get by on limited amount of sleep.
所以我能很好地平衡工作、家庭时间,以及我自己想做的其他事情,比如锻炼、运动或爱好。
And so somehow I can manage and balance my work, you know, my work, my sort of family time, and then the other things that I want to do for myself, you know, whether it's exercise or sport or, you know, hobbies.
我觉得我在这方面还算平衡得不错,但这确实是个挑战。
You know, I think I've balanced that sort of reasonably well, but it's, you know, it's a challenge.
你每天睡多久?
How little do you sleep?
我每晚大概睡四五个小时。
Well, I probably sleep about four or five hours a night.
事实上,今天早上我醒来时,今天日程很满,昨天晚上也很忙。
In fact, I woke up this morning and I had a very busy day today, it's a big busy day yesterday night.
我妻子通常七点起床,她七点就醒了,而我还躺在床上。
And I woke up at, my wife wakes up about seven and she woke up at 07:00 and I was still in bed.
她看着我,问我:‘怎么了?’
And she looks at me and she went, What's wrong?
怎么了?
What's wrong?
你还好吗?
Are you okay?
这让我想起,事实上,当她醒来时,我从来不在床上,因为我会在五点半左右起床,做些运动,或者开始一天的工作,我的大脑总是很活跃,我每周七天都这样。
It just reminded me that in fact, you know, when she wakes up, I'm never in bed because, you know, I get up at like 05:30 or whatever, do my, and just my brain is buzzing, I'm doing some exercise or I'm starting the day, and I do that seven days a week.
所以我觉得自己在工作、家庭和娱乐之间确实保持了不错的平衡,但这一直是个挑战。
So I feel like I actually have got a good balance between, you know, work, family, and and and play, but it's always a challenge.
这很有趣,因为我写过一些关于健康之类的话题,因此采访过很多这样的人,比如写了《我们为什么睡觉》这本书的马修·沃克。
It's interesting because I've written a bit about, like, health and the like, and so I got to interview all of these people like Matthew Walker who who wrote this book, Why We Sleep.
所以,现在几乎形成了一种宗教般的共识:你必须睡七小时以上,最好八小时,我们就是需要这么多睡眠。
So it's really become almost this religious orthodoxy that you have to sleep seven plus hours, maybe eight hours, and that we just need it.
如果你睡得少,简直就像酒驾一样危险,会对健康造成一系列灾难性的影响。
That you're basically driving drunk if you're sleeping less, and it causes all of these catastrophic effects on your health.
我对此想了很多,我不确定。
And I've thought about it a lot, I I don't know.
我觉得我整个来说每天只睡六个半小时左右。
I think I only sleep about six and a half hours on the whole.
在我职业生涯早期,我觉得我们都某种程度上推崇少睡的理念。
And and earlier in my career, I think we'd all kind of glorified the idea of sleeping less.
我记得听说过像撒切尔夫人这样的人只睡四个小时。
I remember hearing that people like Margaret Thatcher slept four hours.
我记得我以前在时代公司的一位老板,负责大约150本杂志,也规定自己只睡四个小时。
And I remember an old boss of mine at Time Inc, who was in charge of like 150 magazines, was set to sleep four hours.
这当时是一种男子气概的象征。
And this was a sort of macho thing.
我记得马修·沃克对我说过,是的,但像里根和撒切尔这样睡得很少的人最终都患上了阿尔茨海默病。
And I remember Matthew Walker saying to me, yeah, but people like Reagan and Thatcher who slept very little ended up with Alzheimer's.
所以这真是一个很有趣的问题。
And so it's a really interesting thing.
我不知道,我们被潜移默化地认为这些东西对健康有害,这在多大程度上是被灌输的,又在多大程度上是真实的。
I don't know whether to what extent we're being kind of brainwashed into thinking this stuff is really bad for our health and to what extent it's really true.
但同样地,感觉钟摆已经完全摆到了另一端。
But again, it feels like the pendulum has totally swung to the other side.
而且有一种感觉——
And there's a sense-
我的意思是,我读过马修·沃克的书,也读过《为什么我们要睡觉?》。
Well, mean, I've read Matthew Walker and I've read that Is It Why We Sleep?
我几年前读过,觉得很有道理。
I read it a few years ago, and I thought it made a lot of sense.
那是一本非常出色的书。
And it was a brilliant book.
我试着给自己这样的机会。
And I tried to give myself the opportunity.
其中一部分,就是给自己这样的机会。
Part of it is giving yourself the opportunity.
你需要给自己机会去偷懒。
You need to give yourself the opportunity to steal.
我给自己创造了机会,但我就是做不到。
I gave myself the opportunity, but I just couldn't do it.
我用了Fitbit,努力尝试、管理和监测我的睡眠,可我还是做不到。
And I had the Fitbits and I was trying and managing and measuring my sleep, I just couldn't do it.
你知道的,我失败了。
And it just, you know, I failed.
我的意思是,我可能比我的妻子早死几年,但在我一生中清醒的小时数可能实际上和她差不多,即使她比我多活十年。
I mean, figure that I'll probably die a bit earlier than my wife, but the number of waking hours that I'm awake during my lifetime might actually be similar, even if she lives ten years longer than me.
听好了,我们走着瞧吧。
Listen, we'll see.
是的。
Yeah.
所以这有点
So it's sort
我在采访马修时发现,他在私下对话中比作为公开倡导者时更坦率地谈论这个问题。
that Matthew doesn't when I interviewed him, I think he's he's more open about this in private conversation than he is as a sort of public proselytizer.
我认为他是一个非常重要的公共倡导者,睡眠极其重要。
And I think he's a very important public proselytizer, and sleep's hugely important.
但我认为他在私下里更坦诚地承认,我们之间存在着巨大差异。
But I think he's more open in private about the fact that we are very, very different.
他给我的一条很有帮助的建议是:看看周末你不设闹钟时会发生什么。
And one piece of advice he gave me that was helpful was he said, See what happens at the weekend when you don't set your alarm.
看看你白天不设闹钟时会发生什么。
See what happens during the day when you don't set your alarm.
看看你什么时候自然醒来。
See what time you wake up.
所以在新冠疫情期间,我开始这么做。
And so during COVID, I started to do that.
我再也不设闹钟了。
I just wouldn't set my alarm ever.
我仍然会在差不多相同的时间醒来,但我认为自己被严重扰乱了,因为我基本上每周要喝300杯咖啡。
I still wake up kind of around the same time, but I think I'm so screwed up by the fact that I basically subsist on about 300 cups of coffee a week.
所以我想我可能是地球上最糟糕的例子了。
And so I think I may just be the worst example on earth.
但我不想在这方面自我指涉,除了这些,你在提高生产力、应对压力以及高效运作方面,还发现过哪些对你特别有帮助的方法吗?
But I without wanting to be self referential about this, like, are there other things in terms of productivity and and handling stress and operating at a high level that you've just found very helpful for yourself?
我觉得我……我的意思是,我热爱我所做的事情。
I think I'm, I mean, I love what I do.
人们常说老生常谈,比如,你对年轻人有什么建议吗?
People say cliche, know, actually have you got any advice for young people?
那就是,追随你的热情,做你喜欢的事。
It's like, you know, follow your passion, do you do, do what you enjoy.
但我觉得自己非常幸运。
But I think I've been very lucky.
我当初对这个行业一无所知,而我是在资产管理工作还无人知晓的时候进入这一行的,我的大多数朋友那时甚至都不知道什么是资产管理。
I had no idea about this business, and I say I got a job in asset management at a time when no one knew what asset management was, most of my friends didn't.
他们知道投资银行是做什么的,而我其实并不了解。
They knew what investment banking was, and I didn't really know.
我某种程度上幸运地加入了一家了不起的公司,在那里我可以倾听并从很多人身上学习,詹姆斯·芬尼是我生命中最重要的导师,我真的很喜欢。
I sort of landed on my feet in a way in this amazing company that, you know, I could listen and learn from a lot of people, and James Finney, this greatest mentor in my life, I just love it.
我热爱我所做的事情。
I love doing what I do.
所以这使得过去三十年的生活变得非常美好。
So that makes life, you know, the last thirty years really great.
我的意思是,你不仅能赚钱,还能了解这个世界,做出一些判断,犯一些错误,然后从中学习并变得更好。
I mean, you get paid to learn about the world and make a few bets and make a few mistakes and hopefully learn from those and get better.
而且我真的热爱我所做的事情。
And it's just I love what I do.
所以我认为这对心理健康真的非常重要。
So I think that's really, really important in sort of mental well-being.
我有一位了不起的妻子,她是我的支柱。
I have an amazing wife who is my rock.
我的意思是,她非常支持我。
I mean, she's incredibly supportive.
我们从20岁起就在一起了。
We've been together since we were 20.
每当我遇到难题,比如需要解决某个问题,而工作中又没人可以倾诉时——虽然我和我的管理合伙人西蒙关系坦诚,但妻子一直帮我解决问题,应对偶尔的麻烦,或在需要做关键决策的重要转折点上给予我极大帮助。
And if I ever have issues where I'm thinking about this issue I need to solve or sometimes there's not someone at work you can talk to about it, mean I have my managing partner here Simon who we're open with, but she's been incredibly helpful in helping me solve problems and manage through the odd issue here or there, or key turning points when decisions need to be made.
我有一个非常支持我的妻子,她自己也有一个充满支持的家庭,而她本人也一直非常支持我。
I've got a very supportive she's got a very supportive family, and she's also been incredibly supportive.
这让我过得相当轻松,我想我们 somehow 找到了一种良好的平衡方式。
So it has made it pretty easy, and I think somehow we've sort of found a way to have a good balance.
她总是会说,安东尼,我希望你多休点假,别那么拼命工作,但你看,这就是我的工作,我热爱它,这是一种责任,我认真对待它。
And when you she look should always say, you know, Anthony, I'd like you to take a bit more holiday, I'd like you to work a bit less hard, but look, this is the job I have and I love it, and it's a responsibility, and you take that seriously.
现在,当你回顾过去三十年的成功时,显然你付出了巨大的努力和技能,拥有良好的原则、优秀的导师和良好的性格等等。
And now when you look back on your success over the last thirty years, obviously there's been a great deal of hard work and skill, you had good principles a good mentor and good temperament and the like.
但我很好奇,你觉得运气在其中扮演了什么角色?毕竟,你恰好进入了那个培训项目,加入了那位伟大的投资者詹姆斯·芬尼的团队。
But I'm wondering how you feel luck has factored into it, because you did just land there in that training program, the graduate training program with this great investor, James Findlay.
你很幸运地将注意力集中在了美国这个好市场上。
You had the luck of focusing on a good market with The US.
我的意思是,如果你过去二十五年专注于富时100指数股票,结果就不会这么好了。
I mean, wouldn't have been so good if you'd spent the last twenty five years focusing on FTSE one hundred stocks.
你如何分配成功中百分之三十来自运气、百分之五十来自技能的比重呢?
How do you apportion the degree of success thirty:fifty that's come from luck and the degree that's come
你觉得呢?
from skill, do you think?
我觉得这完全是运气使然。
I think it's a hell of a lot of luck.
我的意思是,正如你所说,我对资产管理一无所知。
I mean, as you said, you know, I didn't know anything about asset management.
我被安排到美国交易台,和当时的上司安德鲁·巴克尔、詹姆斯·芬利一起工作。
I sort of got put on the US desk working with Andrew Barker, who was my boss at the time, James Finley.
看到一个比我大十五岁的人——我说的‘年轻人’,其实我当时才是年轻人,但他是个三十多岁的小伙子,正在打拼,我们一拍即合,建立了默契。
And seeing this kid who was fifteen years older than me, I say kid, I was the kid, but he was a young guy in his sort of mid-30s making his way, and we hit it off, we connected.
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