RWH044：如何战胜市场——与布莱恩·劳伦斯对话

然后你去剑桥大学攻读硕士学位，位于英国。

Then you went to Cambridge to get a master's degree in England.

我们试图让你变得更有教养。

We tried to civilize you.

接着你去了哈佛商学院，并于1993年毕业。

And then you went to Harvard Business School and graduated in 1993.

所以你的简历可以说是再完美不过了。

So it's about as as polished a resume as you could have.

然后你去了拉扎德公司工作了大约十一年。

And so then you went to Lazard for about eleven years.

对于不了解的人，拉扎德是一家传奇性的老牌公司，成立于1848年。

And Lazard, for people who don't know, is this kind of legendary August firm that had been founded in 1848.

所以我在想，当你从拉扎德离职、于2004年创立自己的公司Oak Cliff时，你在投资银行和私募股权领域（包括与你父亲合作时）所学到的技能，是否帮助你成为了优秀的股票选择者？

So I'm I'm wondering when you came out of that and and you decided leaving Lazard in 2004 and and set up your own firm, Oak Cliff, were there skills that you'd learned in investment banking and also in private equity where you'd done work with your father that have helped you as a stock picker?

是的。

Yes.

投资银行的很多方面对选股并没有帮助，但有一种特定类型的投资银行业务——并购业务——确实有一些有用之处，我想或许一个故事能说明这种差异。

There were a lot of things about investment banking that are not useful to being a stock picker, but there are some things about that particular type of investment banking, which was the, the merger and acquisition business that were and I think maybe a story will kind of illustrate the difference.

我在2001年1月成为合伙人，当时资深合伙人米歇尔·达维维说，那是我余生中最糟糕的一天，因为我的所有合伙人现在都会把我视为竞争对手，我必须自己开拓业务。

I was made a partner in January 2001, and, Michel Davivay, the the senior partner at the time, said it was the worst day of the rest of my life because all of my partners would now consider me to be a competitor, and I had to generate my own business.

那真是个有趣的第一天。

That was a fun first day.

于是我开始思考，如何才能提出一些对他人有吸引力的想法，也许能让他们聘请我来做并购业务。

So I was thinking about how I could come up with ideas that would be relevant to people to maybe hire me to do merger and acquisition business.

2001年11月，我在阅读亚马逊公司的10-K报告及其他财务信息时，注意到它的股价跌到了大约6美元。

And in November 2001, 10 k reading different financial information, 10 k's and 10 q's and other things for amazon.com, I noticed that, you know, the stock was down, I think, at, like, $6.

当时，杰夫·贝佐斯为拓展欧洲业务发行了20亿美元的债券，这些债券的交易价格仅为面值的40美分。

And, the bonds, there were $2,000,000,000 worth of bonds that Jeff Bezos had sold to finance expansion into Europe, and they were trading at 40¢ on the dollar.

因此，债券市场认为这家公司的价值仅为8亿美元，但其资产负债表上却有8亿美元的现金。

So the bonds were saying that the company was worth $800,000,000, but there was $800,000,000 in cash on the balance sheet.

所以，债券市场在2001年11月传递的信息是：亚马逊的业务价值为零。

So what the bonds were saying was that the value of Amazon's business November 2001 was zero.

而且，我认为亚马逊公司早在1994年或1995年就成立了。

And, I think the firm had been you know, Amazon had been around for they've been founded in maybe 1994, 1995.

所以，大家都知道亚马逊网是做什么的，但债券市场却认为它价值为零。

So, you know, this Amazon's you know, people know what amazon.com is, and the bonds are saying it's worth zero.

这很有趣。

That was interesting.

那为什么债券会值零呢？

So why are the bonds worth zero?

所以，你知道，受过训练。

So, you know, trained.

我做过很多财务分析。

You know, I've I've done a bunch of financial analysis.

债券之所以值零，是因为信用分析师——由雷曼兄弟的拉维·苏里亚领导，他非常聪明——正确地指出：如果你是一家运营亏损、营运资本为负的零售商，又面临圣诞节，那你肯定会破产。

Bonds are worth zero because credit analysts led by a guy named Ravi Surya, who was a, a guy at Lehman Brothers, very, very smart, had properly pointed out that if you're a retailer with a negative operating margin and negative working capital facing Christmas, you're gonna go bankrupt.

历史上从未有过一家零售商在运营利润为负、营运资本为负的情况下还能挺过圣诞节。

Like the never in the history of retailing had a retailer ever survived Christmas with negative operating profit, negative working cap.

供应商会撤回支持，圣诞节后一切就会崩溃。

The suppliers would pull their support, thing will collapse after Christmas.

好的。

Okay.

为什么它的经营利润率是负的？

Why did it have negative operating margin?

它有一个盈利的美国图书、音乐和视频业务，还有一个亏损的欧洲业务。

It had a a US book music video business that was profitable, and it had a European business that was unprofitable.

你可以关闭欧洲业务，只留下盈利的美国业务。

You could shut the European business and be left with a profitable US business.

这很明显。

It was obvious.

你只要看财务报表就能明白。

You could just read it in the in the financial statements.

为什么会有负的营运资本？

Why was there negative working capital?

他们的库存周转率达到每年18次。

They were turning their inventories 18 times.

如果杰夫·贝佐斯想卖一本《战争与和平》，他每天只需要卖一本；而伦·雷吉奥经营的巴诺书店，则需要在每一家750家门店都备上一本。

If if Jeff Bezos wanted to sell a copy of War and Peace, he needed, like, one copy a day, Len Reggio running Barnes and Noble needed one in every one of his seven fifty stores.

当你在亚马逊购买一本书时，信用卡公司当天就向你收款，并立即支付给亚马逊。

When you bought your book at Amazon, the credit card company paid you that day, paid Amazon that day.

没有应收账款，而应付账款却非常高，因为你长时间不向图书供应商付款。

There was no accounts receivable and very high accounts payable because you didn't pay your book suppliers for a long time.

对于一家快速增长的公司来说，负的营运资本并不是实力薄弱的表现。

Negative working capital for a company that's growing is not a sign of weakness.

这就是迈克尔·布隆伯格如此富有的原因。

It's the reason Michael Bloomberg is so rich.

你提前支付你的彭博终端订阅费用。

You pay for your Bloomberg subscription in advance.

负的营运资本意味着杰夫·贝佐斯正从供应商那里获得贷款。

Negative working capital meant that Jeff Bezos was being lent money by his suppliers.

于是我带着这个想法去找了巴里·迪勒。

So I took this idea to Barry Diller.

对吧？

Right?

巴里·迪勒认为这是他五年来听过的最好的主意。

And Barry Diller thought this was the best idea he'd been brought in, like, five years.

他雇我们去收购亚马逊债券的控股权，占亚马逊债券的三分之一。

He hired us to buy a controlling position in Amazon's bonds, a third of Amazon's bonds.

这是我年轻投资银行生涯中最激动人心的时刻之一。

It was one of the most exciting moments of my young investment banking career.

这将是一笔巨额佣金，非常高调的交易。

It was going to be an enormous fee, very high profile transaction.

然后他打来电话说，我重新考虑过了。

And then he called up and he said, I've reconsidered it.

我不能做了，因为我是一家上市公司，我必须运营一家上市公司。

I can't do it because it's I'm I'm I'm the I'm the I operate a public company.

这会公开披露。

It'll be publicly disclosed.

这对我来说要做的事来说太复杂了。

It'll be too complicated for what I'm trying to do.

他是对的。

And he was right.

但不管怎样，我试着让沃尔玛来做这件事。

But, anyway, I tried to get Walmart to do it.

我试着让弗朗索瓦·皮诺来做这件事。

I tried to get Francois Pino to do it.

没人愿意做。

No one would do it.

于是我去找拉扎德的总法律顾问，问：我能否个人购买这些债券？

And, so I went to the general counsel of of Lazard, and I said, could I please buy these bonds personally?

因为我已经做了所有这些工作。

Because I I've done all this work.

我只是想拿出我净资产的很大一部分来购买这些债券。

I just wanna take a a big chunk of my net worth and buy these bonds.

拉扎德的总法律顾问说，无论如何你都不能购买这些债券。

And the general counsel of Lazard said, under no circumstances can you buy the bonds.

这会构成利益冲突。

That would be a conflict.

因为如果你之前谈过的某个客户或潜在客户回来表示他们想这么做，就会构成利益冲突。

Because if one of the clients, prospective clients you've talked to about this comes back and says, that they wanna do it, it'll be a conflict.

他说，在什么样的世界里，我建议客户去做的事反而成了我的利益冲突？而且，拉扎德由安德烈·梅耶在五六十年代建立时，本来就会大量购买这些债券，因为这正是我们过去的做法。

He said, in what world is doing what I'm advising a client to possibly do a conflict, a, and, b, the Lazard that that Andre Mayer built in the fifties and sixties would be buying a ton of the bonds because that's what we used to do.

总之，他们不让我买这些债券。

Anyway, they wouldn't let me buy them.

大约一年后，这些债券的价格涨到了面值。

Like, a year later, the bonds have gone to par.

股价也开始从6美元上涨到3000美元。

The stock has started its march from 6 to 3,000.

我了解到，以40美分买入这些债券的人是沃伦·巴菲特和比尔·米勒。

And I learned that the buyers of the bonds at 40¢ were Warren Buffett and Bill Miller.

随后，Lazard公司被一位名叫布鲁斯·瓦瑟斯坦的天才银行家收购。

And then, the firm Lazard is taken over by a guy named Bruce Wasserstein, very talented banker.

他进来后，得知了我与巴里·迪勒之间的这次互动。

And he comes in, and he sees that I've had this interaction with Barry Diller.

他对我说：每隔六周就去找巴里·迪勒一次，带一个新点子去，争取另一个任务。

And he says, go call on Barry Diller once every six weeks with a new idea and get another assignment from him.

我对布鲁斯·瓦瑟斯坦说：我每六周可没新点子。

And I say to Bruce Wasserstein, I don't have an idea every six weeks.

我根本不可能每六周就冒出这样的点子。

I'm just not gonna have an idea like that.

我们来回讨论了一阵子，你知道的，我对Lazard非常尊重。

And there's some back and forth, and, you know, I have I have a lot of respect for Lazard.

那是个了不起的地方。

It's an amazing place.

但那种高质量的创意和愿意采纳它的客户出现的频率太低了。

But the frequency of an idea that good and a client willing to do it is too infrequent.

因此，设立橡树岭作为执行低频创意的平台，是运用相似技能但不同心态的一种新方式。

And so the idea of setting up Oak Cliff as a place to do infrequent ideas, it's a different application of a similar skill set, different mentality.

不要为了聊天而与客户交谈。

Don't talk to clients just to talk to clients.

只有当你有话要说时，才去与客户交流。

Talk to clients when you have something to say.

在这种情况下，现在的客户是那些信任我们并托付资金的人，包括我自己的钱和我家人的心血。

And in this case, the clients now are people who trusted us with money and and, you know, my own money and my family's money.

我想详细谈谈橡树岭，以及它作为集中价值投资力量的实验室，因为这确实是一次关于集中价值投资的精彩实践。

I I wanna talk about Oak Cliff in detail and and about it as a kind of laboratory for what I would call the power of concentrated value investing because, really, it's a it's a it's a beautiful experiment in concentrated value investing.

为了设定背景，它始于2004年6月左右，距今将近二十年了。

And it it started just to set the scene, it started I think you launched in June 2004, so a little, a little less than twenty years ago.

最初由600万美元的家庭资金启动。

Started with $6,000,000 in family money.

现在，我认为管理的资产大约是2.7亿美元。

Now I think it's about 270,000,000 in assets under management.

对你影响很大的一个人是克里斯·戴维斯的祖父谢尔比·卡伦·戴维斯，他于1995年去世，是一位著名的投资者，但我们的许多听众可能不太了解他。

And one of the great influences on you was Chris Davis' grandfather, Shelby Cullen Davis, who died back in 1995 and was a famous investor who a lot of our listeners won't know much about.

你能谈谈谢尔比·卡伦·戴维斯，以及他在哪些方面启发了橡树岭吗？

Can you talk about Shelby Cullen Davis and how in some ways he inspired Oak Cliff?

因为从某种意义上说，他恰恰是你在拉扎德所面临问题的反面——在那里你无法把自己的钱投到自己所说的想法上。

Because in a way in a way, he he was the opposite of the the problem that you had at Lazard where you couldn't put your money where your mouth was.

谢尔比·卡伦·戴维斯确实把自己的钱和自己的观点真正投入到了投资中。

Like like, Shelby Shelby Carlton Davis was somebody who really invested his own money and his own ideas.

所以告诉我们他是谁，以及为什么他激励了你。

So tell us who he was and why he inspired you.

是的。

Yeah.

谢尔比是个非常聪明的人。

Shelby, very smart man.

你知道，他在学术上，嗯，是博士。

You know, he academically, you know, PhD.

他不知怎么地在20世纪40年代成了纽约州的一名保险检查员，花时间研究保险公司向纽约州及其他司法管辖区提交的各种报告。

He ended up somehow an insurance inspector for New York State in the nineteen forties and spending time studying the various reports that insurance companies would file with New York State and other other jurisdictions.

直到今天，保险公司仍然受到各州的监管。

Insurance companies to this day are regulated by the states.

所以它们向证券交易委员会提交财务报表，但向它们提供保险业务的各州提交监管报告。

So they they file financial statements with the SEC, but they file regulatory reports with the, with the states in which they, they provide insurance.

通过仔细研究这些州级监管报告，他在理解保险公司方面获得了优势。

And by looking closely at the state regulatory reports, he had an edge understanding insurance companies.

非常聪明。

Very smart.

他一生中找到了各种投资标的，但早期的和持续的优势在于保险公司。

He found different things to invest in his whole life, but the early edge and a persistent edge was insurance companies.

1947年，他用妻子家族提供的20万美元开始投资。

And with $200,000 of his wife's family's money, in 1947, he started investing.

他拥有一家经纪公司，我们可以称它为戴维斯公司，专门买卖证券。

And he had a brokerage firm, should we call them Davis and Co, which bought and sold securities.

我想他在纽约证券交易所拥有一个席位。

I think he had a seat on the New York Stock Exchange.

这为他带来了一点收入。

That provided a little bit of income for him.

但这20万美元，他从未使用过别人的钱，只是基于他对保险行业的理解，集中投资于少数几个想法。

But the $200,000, he never took other people's money, and he he just invested it in in a concentrated set of ideas largely from his, understanding of the insurance business.

到他去世时，48年后，这20万美元变成了8亿美元，实现了四千倍的回报，年化复合收益率约为19%。

And that 200,000 by the time of his death, forty eight years later, was $800,000,000, which is a 4 thousand to one return, about 19% compounded.

这个例子深深打动了我。

And that example really spoke to me.

还有一个相关的例子。

There was a related example.

我的祖母，也就是我父亲的母亲，还有她的母亲，我的曾祖母，她们是在大萧条时期长大的。

My grandmother, my father's mother, and her mother, my great grandmother, they grew up in the depression.

我的曾祖父去世了。

My great grandfather died.

你知道，母亲和她的三个女儿，其中一个就是我的祖母，陷入了相当艰难的财务状况。

You know, mother and and her three daughters, one of whom was my grandmother, were left kind of in a, sort of a tough financial position.

她们，你知道的，找了工作，比如房地产经纪人之类的，但她们也自己选股。

They, you know, they they got jobs, real estate brokers, whatever, but they they also picked stocks.

她们只用自己的钱，不像保险检查员那样有专业优势。

With just their own money, they they didn't have an edge as the insurance inspector.

她们拥有的是常识。

What they had was common sense.

这种常识是这样的：找你理解的产品，比如家乐氏麦片、好时巧克力，还有AT&T这家电话公司。

The common sense was like this, find products you understand, Kellogg's cereal, Hershey's chocolate, you know, AT and T, the phone company.

所以你明白产品是什么，就去读年度报告。

So you understand what the product is, get the annual report.

你其实并不懂报告后面的内容，因为你没有接受过银行家的训练，也没上过商学院，或者类似的专业教育。

You don't really understand what's in the back because you haven't trained as a banker, gone to business school, or anything fancy like that.

但在前面，有一封来自首席执行官的信。

But, in the front, there's a letter from the CEO.

首席执行官的这封信说得通吗？

Does the letter from the CEO make sense?

这个人说的是行话，还是表达得很清晰？

Does this guy speak in jargon, or is he speaking clearly?

A。

A.

B，他们是否支付的股息每年都上涨？因为无论公司做什么，如果每年都给你更多钱，那情况肯定不会太糟。

And b, are they paying a dividend that always goes up because whatever the company is doing, if it's always sending you more money each year, it can't be that bad.

然后持续再投资这些股息。

Then just continuously reinvest the dividends.

我奶奶1995年去世时，我想她持有的股票价值500万美元，而大多数股票的买入成本低于当前的股息收入。

When my grandmother died in 1995, I think, she had $5,000,000 worth of stock, and the cost basis on most of the shares was less than the current dividend payment for the shares.

对吧？

Right?

这是一个非常有力的例子。

That's a very powerful example.

直到她生命的尽头，你知道，如果她家里的窗户开始腐烂，她会抱怨花800美元修窗户，但她却拥有如此出色的股票投资组合。

And to the end of her life, you know, if if there were a window that was rotting out in her house, she'd be complaining about paying $800 for this window, but she had this amazing stock portfolio.

所以，谢尔比的例子、我祖母的例子，以及以系统化、有纪律、深思熟虑的方式投资所带来的力量，深深打动了我。

So the Shelby example, the example of my grandmother, the power of investing with a systematic, disciplined, thoughtful way really spoke to me.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为，谢尔比·库伦·戴维斯的故事中蕴含着一系列美好的启示。

There are a series of beautiful lessons really for you, I think, in in Shelby Cullen Davis' story.

比如，如果像他那样持续滚动一个雪球长达四十八年而没有遭遇灾难，那真是令人震撼。

Like, the the the fact the fact that a snowball if you keep the snowball rolling for forty eight years as he did without catastrophe, it's it's just overwhelming.

正如你所说，他拥有竞争优势，因为他专注于自己比别人更了解的领域，这是另一个关键的教训。

The fact that he had a competitive advantage, as you said, because he was focusing on an area where he knew more than other people is another critical lesson.

而且还有

And then also

关于谢尔比，有一个教训是我并不想效仿的，你知道，你可以在《戴维斯王朝》这本书里看到这一点，这本书讲述了谢尔比本人，还有他的儿子，也叫谢尔比·戴维斯，以及克里斯和他的兄弟姐妹们。

one lesson about Shelby that I was not eager to emulate, and, you know, you can you can see it in this book Davis dynasty, which, you know, it it talks about Shelby and, and then his son, who was also named Shelby Davis, and then and then Chris and his and his siblings.

老谢尔比非常喜欢杠杆。

Shelby senior really liked margin.

他一辈子都保持着50%的杠杆率。

He was 50% levered the whole time.

集中持股投资本身带来的正常波动，我们稍后可以讨论，可能会涉及这个话题，而杠杆进一步放大了这种波动。

The normal volatility that concentrated stock investing brings to you, which we can talk about later, we might get to that subject, was accentuated by the margin.

因此，他那4000比1的回报率，如果去掉杠杆会低一些，但波动幅度简直令人难以置信。

And so his returns, that 4,000 to one unlevered would have been less, but the the swings were just unbelievable.

我的意思是，我记得在1973到1974年期间，他可能一度亏损了80%。

I mean, I think there was one point in '73, '74, he might have been down 80%.

对我来说，这种心理状态非常引人入胜。

And that for me, the the psychology of that is fascinating.

我年轻的时候见过谢尔比。

I I don't you know, I I met Shelby when I was young.

我当时太年轻，没能问他这些问题。

I was too young to ask him these questions.

如果我当时有能力，我真想和他聊聊那种感觉是怎样的。

I would have loved if if I had the ability, would I would wanna talk to him about what that felt like.

我喜欢在市场全面下跌时，做一个拥有无杠杆资产负债表、手握现金、持有看跌期权的人。

I I like to be the guy when everything is coming down who has, you know, who has an unlevered balance sheet, who has cash to deploy, who's bought put options.

我喜欢这样建立韧性。

I like I like to build resilience like that.

谢尔比喜欢以一种我不会感到舒适的方式加杠杆生活。

Shelby enjoyed enjoyed enjoyed levering his life in a way which I don't think I would I would be comfortable doing.

我认为他的故事也揭示了投资行业一个核心矛盾：即使你作为选股者极其聪明，但如果你无法掌控基金的资本，你就非常脆弱，因为人们总会在最糟糕的时刻撤资，像比尔·米勒这样的人多年来就经历过这种情况，他非常出色。

I think I think his story also gets at a really central conflict in the investment business, which is you can be incredibly smart as a stock picker, but if you don't have control over the capital in your fund, you're really, really vulnerable because people can bail out at the worst possible time, which obviously has happened with people like Bill Miller over the years who's brilliant.

布鲁斯·伯克维茨是另一个例子，他们俩都曾做客我的播客，因为人们对这种波动实在难以承受。

And Bruce Berkowitz is another guest, both both of them guests on the podcast, you know, because it's so uncomfortable for people to have that kind of volatility.

所以，这正是我想和你深入探讨的一个重要话题，实际上，你在几年前格兰特会议上的精彩演讲中也提到过这一点。

And so this is this is a big subject that I wanna talk to you about this, which actually is something that you talked about in the very good speech that you you gave to to Grant's conference a couple years ago.

我想你之前提到过投资者面临的两大挑战。

That I think you were talking about the two great challenges for an investor.

一方面，你必须获得优异的回报。

So on the one hand, you've gotta make great returns.

另一方面，你还得把这些回报真正交付给股东。

And on the other hand, you've gotta deliver those returns to the shareholder.

因此，谢尔比·卡尔姆·戴维斯的优势在于，他没有股东会在最糟糕的时刻撤资。

And so Shelby Calm Davis had the advantage that he didn't have a shareholder who could bail out on him at the worst possible time.

所以，让我们谈谈这个结构性问题，因为它极其重要。

But so so let let's talk about this this structural issue because it's hugely important.

对吧？

Right?

你需要找到一种好的投资方法，但更重要的是，你必须能够坚持下去。

You need to you need to find a good approach to investing, but then you actually need to be able to stick with it.

而这正是谢尔比这样的资深投资者成功做到的事情。

And that's one of the things that obviously, shall we senior manage to do?

是的。

Yes.

因此，理解你的优势是什么非常重要。

So it's very important to understand what your edge is.

如果你不知道自己的优势是什么，那你根本就没有优势。

Like, if if you don't know what your edge is, you don't have an edge.

那么，我们在橡树岭可能的优势来源有哪些呢？

And so, you know, what are our potential sources of edge at at Oak Cliff?

我觉得有三个。

Like, know, there I think there are three.

分别是分析性、信息性和结构性的优势。

There's analytical, kind of informational, and structural.

对吧？

Right?

分析性优势，我们是否在分析方面更出色？

Analytical, are we better at analyzing?

我们在分析公司方面比其他投资者更聪明吗？

Are we smarter at analyzing companies than than other investors?

我觉得我们很聪明。

I I think we're smart.

我的意思是，有很多更聪明的投资者。

I mean, I think there are smarter investors.

有很多聪明人正在尝试做我们做的事。

There's lots of smart people out there trying to do what we do.

所以我认为我们在分析方面并没有太大的优势。

So I don't think we have very much of an analytical edge.

信息方面，我们持有15只股票。

Informational, we own 15 stocks.

这比那些持有150只股票的共同基金经理少得多。

That's a lot fewer than a mutual fund guy who owns a 150 stocks.

因此，我们确实如此，这一点从我们与首席执行官们的交流中可以得知。

So we are and we know this from our conversations with CEOs.

当我们与一位CEO坐在一起，经过三个月对这家公司的深入研究并专注于此之后，我们提出的问题比大多数其他投资者更有信息优势。

When we when we sit with a CEO having done three months of work on his company and really focused on it and we we ask him questions, we are better informed than most other investors.

我们的目标是成为信息最充分的投资者，这为我们带来了一定的优势。

Our objective is to be the most informed, and that that gives us something of an edge.

但我们的主要优势是结构性的，我们已经向其他人士和客户开放了橡树岭，以建立一个资产池，使我们能够将研究成本分摊到更大的资产群体中。

But our main edge is structural, and, you know, we have opened up Oak Cliff to other people, to clients in order to have a pool of assets that allows us to spread the cost of research across a greater pool.

但在这样做时，我们一直非常谨慎，确保清晰明确。

But what we've done is we've been very careful as we've done that to be clear.

这是一个长期的游戏，我确信这减少了我们筹集的资金总额。

This is a long term game, and I am sure that that has diminished how much money we've raised.

我的意思是，我们总共筹集了8500万美元，并已分配了8200万美元。

I mean, we've raised a total of $85,000,000, and we've we've distributed $82,000,000.

在过去的二十年里，橡树岭净筹集的资本为300万美元，而我们现在手握2.7亿美元。

The net capital raised by Oak Cliff is $3,000,000 over its twenty year history, and we're sitting on 270,000,000.

所以，这根本不是一个募资项目。

So it this is not a fundraising operation.

但我们对客户说的是，这是一场长期的游戏。

But what we do with our clients is we say, this is a long term game.

你需要把这一点深植于自己的心理认知中：这是长期的，而且不应该是你净资产的很大一部分。

You need to put this in a place that's in your own psychology that says long term, and this should not be a huge amount of your net worth.

对我们来说，这笔钱占了我们净资产的很大一部分，但这是我们的工作，我们对此感到安心。

It's a big amount of our net worth, but it's our work, and we're comfortable with it.

但对你个人而言，不应该是你净资产的很大一部分，而且我们募集的资金有一半被锁定三年，我们要求每位新客户至少将四分之一的资金锁定三年。

But for yourself, it shouldn't be a big piece of your net worth, and you you have to we we half of the money that has been raised by us is locked up for three years, and we ask that every new client lock up at least a quarter of their capital for three years.

你可以每年取回其中的6%，这类似于巴菲特在五十年代中期对其早期合伙基金的做法。

You could have 6% of it back each year, sort of a a thing that that Buffett used to do in the mid fifties with his early partnerships.

你可以给他一些资金，每年取出6%作为生活费，但要把这笔钱放在长期投资的位置上。

You could give him some money and take out 6% each year to to live on, but put this in a place that is long term.

我们这样做的目的是，在市场下行时，我们希望拥有一批能够预期、不因之沮丧，甚至可能将此视为机会而追加投资的客户群体。

And what we're trying to do with that is as we go through a downturn, we wanna have a client base that expects it, is not upset by it, and possibly gives us more money in response to that downturn being an opportunity.

这一直是我们的有意为之，我认为这是我们的一大优势来源。

And it's been very intentional, and I think it's a big source of advantage for us.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的发言。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

好的。

Alright.

我想让你们想象一下，在夏季高峰期的奥斯陆度过三天。

I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.

你有漫长的白昼、绝佳的美食、漂浮在奥斯陆峡湾上的桑拿房，而且你所有的对话对象都是真正塑造未来的人。

You got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on the Oslo Fjord, and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.

这就是奥斯陆自由论坛。

That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.

从2026年6月1日到6月20日，奥斯陆自由论坛将迎来它的第十八个年头，汇聚来自世界各地的活动家、技术专家、记者、投资者和建设者。

From June 1 through the third twenty twenty six, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its eighteenth year bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the world.

其中许多人正活跃在历史的最前沿。

Many of them operating on the front lines of history.

在这里，你可以亲耳听到人们讲述如何用比特币应对货币崩溃、用人工智能揭露人权侵害，以及在审查和威权压力下构建技术的故事。

This is where you hear firsthand stories from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses, and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures.

这些不是抽象的概念。

These aren't abstract ideas.

这些是现实中的人们正在使用的工具。

These are tools real people are using right now.

你将与大约2000位非凡的人物同处一室——持不同政见者、创始人、慈善家、政策制定者，这些是你不仅会聆听，还会共进晚餐的人。

You'll be in the room with about 2,000 extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with.

在三天里，你将体验到震撼人心的主舞台演讲、关于自由科技与金融主权的动手工作坊、沉浸式艺术装置，以及在会议结束后依然持续的对话。

Over three days, you'll experience powerful main stage talks, hands on workshops on freedom tech and financial sovereignty, immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the session's end.

这一切都将在六月的奥斯陆发生。

And it's all happening in Oslo in June.

如果这听起来像是你感兴趣的场合，那你运气不错，因为你可以亲自到场参加。

If this sounds like your kind of room, well, you're in luck because you can attend in person.

标准票和赞助者票已在oslofreedomforum.com开放购买，赞助者票提供深度参与、私人活动以及与演讲者的小团体交流时间。

Standard and patron passes are available at oslofreedomforum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events, and small group time with the speakers.

奥斯陆自由论坛不仅仅是一场会议，它是一个让思想与现实交汇的地方，一比五十，

The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference, it's a place where ideas meet reality one:fifty and

未来正由亲历者们亲手构建。

where the future is being built by people living it.

最近有一项投资频频登上头条，却一直藏在众目睽睽之下。

There's one investment making the headlines lately that's been hiding in plain sight.

我们大约在2020年首次了解到这个群体，自那以来，投资者已投入约13亿美元。

We first found out about this group around 2020 and investors have allocated about $1,300,000,000 since then.

这是一种资产类别，自1995年以来整体表现超越标普500指数，且与之相关性近乎为零——不是黄金、房地产，也不是加密货币。

It's an asset class that's outpaced the S and P 500 overall with near zero correlation since 1995, not gold, real estate, or crypto.

这是一种通常只对超级富豪开放的策略，其表现独立于其他主流市场。

It's a strategy typically exclusive to the ultra rich that's moved independently of other popular markets.

但现在，你可以访问masterworks.com/billionaires，投资由班克西、巴斯奎特和毕加索等艺术家创作的数百万美元艺术品的份额。

But now you can go to masterworks.com/billionaires to invest in shares of multimillion dollar artwork by artists like Banksy, Basquiat, and Picasso.

Masterworks在2021年成为独角兽初创公司，由一位连续创业者和顶级百大艺术收藏家领导。

Masterworks became a unicorn startup back in 2021 led by a serial entrepreneur and top 100 art collector.

截至目前，他们已完成26笔交易，年化净回报率分别为14.6%、17.6%和17.8%，已向投资者支付数千万美元。

They've posted 26 sales to date with annualized net returns of 14.6%, 17.6%, and 17.8 with tens of millions of dollars paid out.

作为我们的听众之一，您可以访问 masterworks.com/billionaires 获取优先访问权限。

As one of our listeners, you can go to masterworks.com/billionaires for priority access.

那就是 masterworks.com/billionaires。

That's masterworks.com/billionaires.

过往表现并不能代表未来收益。

Past performance is not indicative of future returns.

请参阅 masterworks.com/cd 上的重要披露信息。

See important disclosures at masterworks.com/cd.

如果您经营企业，最近很可能也产生过同样的想法。

If you run a business, you've probably had the same thought lately.

我们如何让人工智能在现实世界中发挥作用？

How do we make AI useful in the real world?

因为潜在收益巨大，但盲目尝试进入这一领域风险很高。

Because the upside is huge, but guessing your way into it is a risky move.

通过甲骨文的 NetSuite，您今天就可以让人工智能发挥作用。

With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite 是全球排名第一的AI云ERP系统，已被超过43,000家企业信赖。

NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它将您的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合到一个统一的系统中。

It pulls your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into one unified system.

而这种互联互通的数据，正是让您的AI变得更智能的关键。

And that connected data is what makes your AI smarter.

它能够自动化日常事务，提供可操作的洞察，帮助您降低成本，同时自信地做出快速的AI驱动决策。

It can automate routine work, surface actionable insights, and help you cut costs while making fast AI powered decisions with confidence.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，您可以使用自己选择的AI工具，直接连接到您的真实业务数据。

And now with the NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect directly to your real business data.

这并非额外附加功能，而是内置在支撑您企业运营的系统中的AI。

This isn't some add on, it's AI built into the system that runs your business.

无论您的公司年营收达到数百万还是数千万，NetSuite都能助您保持领先。

And whether your company does millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead.

如果您年收入至少达到七位数，请前往netsuite.com/study获取他们的免费商业指南《揭开AI的神秘面纱》。

If your revenues are at least in the 7 figures, get their free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南免费获取，网址是 netsuite.com/study。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

netsuite.com/study。

Netsuite.com/study.

好的。

Alright.

我们继续节目。

Back to the show.

追溯橡树崖的起源，某种程度上，它不仅受到谢尔比·卡伦·戴维斯的影响，也受到巴菲特的影响——你早在2004年就与他进行过一次重要会面。

Going back to the origins of Oak Cliff, in a way, it also grew not only out of the influence of of Shelby Cullen Davis, but also the influence of Buffett, who you had an important meeting with back in 2004.

那次会面中，最重大的洞察是什么？它如何真正塑造了你对像你这样的主动选股者所面临机遇的理解？

What what was the big insight that came out of that meeting that really shaped your sense of what the opportunity was for an active stock picker like you?

是的。

Yep.

对。

Yeah.

那是2004年。

It was o four.

我发现自己和他坐在同一个房间里，那似乎是由爱丽丝·施罗德为一群股票选股人组织的一次会面。

I found myself in a in a room with him, and, it was it was a meeting, I think, organized by Alice Schroeder for stock pickers with Buffett.

当时房间里大概有十五到二十个人，他正在跟我们讲述选股是什么样子。

And there were maybe maybe 15 or 20 of us in that room, and he was telling us about what stock picking was like.

我们向他提的问题，归根结底都是：我们怎样才能像你一样，但更快地做到？

And, you know, the questions we were asking him kind of all boiled down to, how do we become like you but faster?

他说：很遗憾，那是不可能的。

And, he said, well, unfortunately, that's not gonna happen.

这是一场持久战。

It's a long game.

但他提出了两个好消息。

But two pieces of good news, he said.

只要你相信美国的资本主义，你就应该期待进步，也就是整体向上的趋势。

As long as you believe in American capitalism, you should expect progress, you know, a general ups upturn.

只要你不做蠢事，随着市场整体和经济整体的增长，你应该会表现不错。

As long as you don't do stupid things, you know, you you you should do well as as the market grows in general, as the economy grows in general.

但真正给你带来助力的是，一只股票的平均股价一年内上下波动高达80%。

But the real tailwind for you is that the average share price of a stock goes up and down by 80% in a year.

我记得当时心想，这简直太疯狂了。

And I remember thinking to myself, that's just insane.

他在第一点上我还能理解，但在第二点上，他肯定是疯了。

I I he's I I get him on the first point, but on the second point, he's he's lost his marbles.

于是我回到纽约，找出了Value Line的电子版，开始计算数据。

So I went back to New York and got out a, you know, electronic version of of Value Line and started crunching the numbers.

那时候我认为可能有4500家上市公司。

There were I think it might have been 4,500 public publicly traded companies back then.

现在我觉得大概只剩下3800家了。

I think we're down to 3,800 now.

但这些数字依然没变。

The numbers are still the same.

如果你取每一家美国上市公司52周最高价除以52周最低价，再减去1，对大约4000家上市公司都这么做。

If you take fifty two week high divided by fifty two week low, subtract one for every one of the, let's say, 4,000 publicly traded companies in The United States.

这代表了每年52周最高价超过52周最低价的百分比。

And so it's it's a percentage by which the fifty two week high has exceeded the fifty two week low each year.

当你计算这些数据，回溯二三十年，你会发现，所谓平静的年份——基本上每四年中有两三年是平静的。

And you crunch these numbers, you go back twenty, twenty five years, you find that in a calm year, which is basically every two or three years I'm sorry, two or three years out of every four is a calm year.

标普500中的平均股票价格波动幅度为40%，而小型公司的罗素2000指数波动幅度则达到60%。

Average stock in the S and P goes up and down by 40%, and the Russell two thousand, the smaller companies goes up and down by 60%.

而在危机年份，比如发生疫情、金融危机、乌克兰战争之类事件时，股价上下波动幅度会达到100%甚至150%。

And in a crisis year, like you have a pandemic or a financial crisis or, an invasion of Ukraine or something, things go and down by a 100 or a 150%.

所以巴菲特选择80%这个数字，实际上是在选取这个平均值。

So Buffett by picking 80% was picking this average number.

这非常惊人。

And it's extraordinary.

像一些大公司，我记得在格兰特的演讲中我提到过，比如谷歌。

Big companies like, I think in the grants talk I was talking about, Google.

我的意思是，谷歌在过去一年里的股价在90多到150之间波动。

I mean, Google should Google in the last year has traded between the low nineties and 150.

谷歌。

Google.

好吧。

Okay.

有多少人使用谷歌？

How many people use Google?

它的七项服务中，每一项的用户都超过十亿。

It's more than a billion users of each one of seven of its services.

从投资角度看，有多少人关注谷歌？

How many people cover Google from an investment point of view?

有多少人真正理解谷歌？

How many people understand Google?

基本上，地球上每个拥有智能手机的有意识个体都知道谷歌是做什么的。

Basically, if you're a sentient being on earth with a smartphone, you know what Google is.

然而，在过去五十二周里，其股价波动了70%、65%、70%。

Yet the value of its stock is varied by 70%, 65%, 70% in the last fifty two weeks.

这是一件非凡的事。

That's an extraordinary thing.

如果你已经做了足够的功课去理解这家企业的业务，当信心危机出现时，它就会成为一个非常丰厚的机会，因为在那大约一个月的信心危机期间，你可以像TransDigm那样——它在2020年3月和4月航空旅行彻底停滞时，销售飞机备件——迅速评估出它即使在没有航空旅行的情况下也能撑三年。

If you've if you've done the work to understand the business and the the crisis of confidence comes in it, becomes a very rich opportunity because what you can do during the the month or so that it's it's having that crisis of confidence, your TransDigm in the middle of, which sells, you know, replacement parts for aircraft in in March and April 2020 as air travel came to an end, you could quickly do work to see that it could survive for three years with air with no air travel.

所以股价从，我不知道，600美元跌到了200美元。

And so the stock went from, I don't know, 600 to 200.

你可以买入大量TransDigm的股票，而现在它的股价是1100美元。

You could buy a lot of transdime, and now the stock is 1,100.

你知道，这正是我们所做的。

You know, that that's that's what we do.

这太重要了，我想请正在听的朋友们停下来好好想想，因为这和大多数人玩的游戏根本不同。

It's this is so important, and I I I kinda wanna pause and have people who are listening kind of dwell on this because it's such a it's such a fundamentally different game than most people are playing.

这一点我在写书时就提到过，当时我采访了你的朋友乔·格林布拉特，也在写查理·芒格时提到过——芒格用渔夫用矛捕鱼的形象，极其优美而深刻地表达了这一点：作为投资者，你应当站在溪边，手持长矛。

And I this is this is this is something that I wrote about in my book when I was interviewing your friend Joe Greenblatt and also in writing about Charlie Munger, that in a sense you know, Munger expressed it so beautifully and so eloquently in his image of the spear fisherman, that basically what you should be doing as an investor is standing by the side of a stream with a spear.

而偶尔，一条肥美多汁的鲑鱼会游过，带来新的机遇。

And then once in a while, a fat, juicy salmon will swim by a new spirit.

然后你可能在接下来的六个月或更长时间里，完全不进行任何买入操作。

And then you might go back to doing absolutely nothing in terms of purchasing for the next six months or more.

因此，整个游戏的核心就是极其耐心地等待这些罕见、不频繁但被严重错估的机会，然后以查理所说的‘胆识’果断抓住它们。

And so the whole game really becomes one of waiting very patiently for these rare, infrequent, extraordinary mispriced opportunities that then you seize with what Charlie would call gumption.

而我认为，大多数人从根本上都无法理解这一点。

And that that's something that I think fundamentally most people don't understand.

甚至连大多数专业基金经理玩的也是完全不同的游戏。

Even most professional money managers are playing a very different game than that.

你能就此观点展开说说吗？

Can you can you just sort of riff on that idea?

因为我觉得这几乎像是一种截然不同的哲学。

Because I think it's this is almost like a different philosophy.

这就像是试图向那些坚信地球是平的人解释，地球其实是圆的。

It's like a it's like trying to explain to people who think the world is flat, that the world is round.

因为一旦你明白这是一种非常美妙的方法，你就仿佛拨云见日，豁然开朗。

Because once you get that this is a really beautiful approach, there is a sense in which the scales kind of fall from your eyes.

是的。

Yeah.

我想我首先要说的是，这并不是真的在溪边等待。

I think the first thing I'll say is it it it's not really waiting by the stream.

而是要拼命工作。

It's working like heck.

回到关于不费力的优雅这个观点。

Back to that point about sprezzatura.

为了理解这些企业——你所拥有的企业，以及你希望拥有的企业——并做好准备，因为你可能在周二就必须做出决定，这其中投入了巨大的工作量。

There's an enormous amount of work that's going into trying to understand these businesses, the businesses you own and then the businesses you wish you owned, to be prepared because you might have to make a decision on a Tuesday.

你希望已经完成了这些准备工作。

You want to have done the work.

这其中投入了大量工作。

There's a lot of work going into it.

第二点是，母亲们告诉女儿们，爱上一个有钱人同样容易。

Then the second piece is, mothers tell daughters it's just as easy to fall in love with a rich man.

你需要研究那些优秀的公司。

You want to study the businesses that are good businesses.

这种理念有不同的类型，但我们的做法是，除非一家公司满足三个条件，否则我们不会去研究或参与其中。

There are different flavors of this, but our flavor is we we don't wanna study a business and be involved with the business unless it's just a there's, like, three things.

我们想要一个自然垄断的企业。

We want a natural monopoly.

我们想要一个理性的双头垄断企业。

We want a rational duopoly.

我们想要一个低成本运营商。

We want a low cost operator.

我们为什么需要这些呢？

And why do we want those things?

我们想要这些，因为它们能产生持久的现金流。

We want those things because they have durable cash flows.

你知道，如果一个企业因为这三大特征中的某一个而成为好生意，你就有很大的信心，当你预测它未来的现金流时，它们最终会在一个并不太宽的不确定性范围内实现。

You know, if if something is a good business because of one of those three characteristics, you have a lot of confidence that when you when you forecast its cash flows out into the future, you know, you they'll turn out within some band of of of uncertainty that's not that wide.

这就是你所拥有的。

That's what you've got.

无论是什么因素导致市场对其估值偏低，如果你能把研究重点放在这些因素是否只是暂时的上，那就很好。

And whatever disturbance is causing it to be valued more cheaply by the market, if you can turn your research attention to whether or not that is a temporary thing.

亚马逊债券的交易价格是否低到仿佛企业价值为零，是因为负营运资本是坏事还是好事？

Are those Amazon bonds trading as though the business is worth zero because negative working capital is a bad thing or a good thing.

实际上，这正是问题的核心。

Like, that's really what that was.

那么，你是否在观察一家正在经历暂时性信心危机的好企业？

And so are you are you looking at a good business that's undergoing a temporary crisis of confidence?

而且，你知道，还有公司行为方面的问题。

And the you know, there's there's corporate actions.

有些业务会被分拆，而新所有者因为不理解自己得到了什么，而导致误解。

Things can get spun off, and they're misunderstood because the the new owner doesn't understand what he's been given.

一位新的首席执行官可能会加入并改变战略。

A new CEO can come in and change the strategy.

可能会出现一些被低估的新商业机会，或暂时的挫折。

There can be some new business opportunity that is underappreciated, temporary setback.

对我来说有趣的是，真正好的想法并不多。

And what's interesting to me is that there are not that many good ideas.

因此，这必然要求一个集中的投资组合，因为我并不是每六周就能找到这样的机会。

And so necessarily, this requires a concentrated portfolio because I I don't have an idea like this every six weeks.

你可能会看到我们一整年都不做任何操作。

You may see us do nothing for a year.

另一点是，这种投资方式——如果你看看福布斯400强，看看谁靠选股取得了成功——

Another thing is that this investment practice, although this is what really if you look at the Forbes 400, you look at who's done well picking stocks.

这基本上就是人们所采用的方法。

This is basically what people do.

但真正实践这种做法的人却非常少。

It's practiced by so few people.

我的意思是，我在ValueX会议上看到过一个估算，你我都参加过在瑞士举办的那些会议。

I mean, the the estimate that I saw, you know, at a ValueX conference, you and I have attended those in Switzerland.

我记得在吉姆·格兰特的演讲中也提到过这一点。

You know, I talked about it in the in the in in the talk for Jim Grant.

也许只有1%的股票市场是以这种方式管理的。

Maybe 1% of the equity market is managed this way.

当我查看这些数据时，全球股票市场的规模是8万亿美元。

At the time I looked at the statistics, it was an $80,000,000,000,000 equity market.

全球所有市场——美国、中国、欧洲——其中8000亿美元是以这种集中持仓、长期持有并坚定信念的方式管理的。

All of the markets in the world, US, China, Europe, and, 800,000,000,000 was managed in a way that looked like this concentrated positions that were held for a long period of time with conviction.

8000亿美元占8万亿美元的比例。

800,000,000,000 out of 80,000,000,000,000.

而在那8000亿美元中，40%属于伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司。

And of the 800,000,000,000, 40% was Berkshire Hathaway.

所以，这确实很有趣，这个方法能让你赚很多钱，但实践它的人却很少。

So, yeah, it's it's it's interesting that this idea, which it can make you a lot of money, but it's not practiced by a lot of people.

为什么？

Why?

我认为一个原因是，如果你犯了错误，那会非常明显。

I think one reason is that if you make mistakes, it really shows.

你无法躲在平均值后面。

You can't just hide in the average.

其次，这需要一种心态，有些人可能更喜欢筹钱而不是研究企业，或者有些人不喜欢这种策略带来的波动性。

And two, it requires a a mindset that some people may not like studying businesses as much as they like raising money, or some people may not like the volatility that they deliver for themselves.

有些人可能想更快地做，或者以不同的方式做。

Some people may wanna do it faster or more differently.

赚钱的方式有很多。

There are lots of ways to make money.

但对我而言，这种方式始终最合理。

This is the one that always just made most sense to me.

我真的很喜欢研究企业。

I really like studying businesses.

我喜欢尝试理解世界上正在发生的事情，也喜欢进行不频繁的、你知道的，押注于那些少见的投资理念。

I like trying to understand what's happening in the world, and I like placing infrequent, you know, bets, you know, investing in infrequent ideas.

是的。

Yeah.

从性格上讲，这对我来说非常合理。

It makes tremendous sense to me temperamentally.

我的意思是，我本身不具备这样的能力，因为我还不够执着，也不够感兴趣，但我已经把我的钱交给了那些这样操作的人。

It's I mean, I'm I'm I'm not capable of doing it because I'm not obsessive enough or interested enough, but I've I've outsourced my money to people who do it this way.

所以从性格上讲，我完全认同你的观点。

So temperamentally, I'm totally aligned with you on this.

有趣的是，这种高度集中的价值投资方式，正是我们从巴菲特、芒格、乔尔·格林布拉特、比尔·米勒等人身上看到的有效方法。

And it's interesting that it's this this approach of very concentrated value investing is what we've seen to work from people like Buffett and Munger, Joel Greenblatt, Bill Miller.

但正如你在过去几天我反复阅读的年度报告中所指出的那样，回溯到2004年，你提到一个巨大的挑战：在这些不可避免的业绩低迷期，投资者往往会失去对基金经理的信任。

And yet, as you've pointed out in in your ex excellent annual reports, which I've been reading over the last couple of days, going back, I think, all the way to 2004, you point out that one of the big challenges that makes this so difficult to execute is that that investors end up the shareholders tend to lose faith in their fund managers during these inevitable periods of underperformance.

在你的一封信中，你提到伯克希尔·哈撒韦自身曾经历过三次市值下跌一半的时期。

And in in one of your letters, you pointed out that Berkshire Hathaway itself has seen these three periods when it lost half of its value.

所以，我想是在1973到1975年、1998到2000年，以及2008到2009年期间。

So back in, I think, '73 to '75 and then '98 to 2000, and then again in 2008 to 2009.

你还指出，在近六十年里，伯克希尔跑输标普500指数的年份大约占了三分之一。

And then you also pointed out that even Berkshire underperformed the S and P about a third of the years over nearly six decades.

所以我仔细查看了你过去二十年的回报情况。

And so I was looking through your returns over the last twenty years.

如果我没算错的话，我认为你有八年跑输标普500指数，但在这二十年里，你仍然以显著优势超越了标普500指数，高出超过100个百分点。

And if I counted correctly, I think you had underperformed the S and P eight out of twenty years, and yet you've outperformed the S and P by a decent margin more more than a 100 percentage points over those twenty years.

你能谈谈这个根本性挑战吗？要充分利用集中价值投资这种模式的优势，你就必须能够承受我记忆中乔·格林布拉特向我描述的那种‘表现不佳的痛苦’——那些表现不佳的时期，你会看起来像个傻瓜，心理上极其煎熬。

Can you talk about this fundamental challenge that to take advantage of the beauty of this approach of concentrated value investing, you need to be able to handle what I I remember Joe Greenbott describing to me as the pain of underperformance, that there are these periods of underperformance where you can look like a fool and it's psychologically incredibly painful.

是的。

Yeah.

显然，这里存在着某种东西。

Well, there's there's clearly something out there.

有一家叫达巴尔的公司，专门做关于共同基金资金流动的有趣研究。

There's a there's a firm called Dalbar, which does interesting studies of, mutual fund flows.

很多人关注这样一个事实：主动型基金经理往往跑输大盘，这被用作投资指数基金的理由。

And, you know, a lot of people focus on this fact that active managers tend to underperform the index, and that that's an argument given for investing in index funds.

我们可以稍后再回到这个问题。

And we can come back to that in a bit.

对大多数人来说，这是一个非常合乎逻辑的选择。

That's that is a very logical choice for most people.

直接投资指数基金，然后置之不理。

Just invest in the index fund and forget it.

你知道的。

You know?

让指数自己去运作吧。

Just let let the index do it.

但Dalbar做了这项研究，显示那些选择主动型基金经理的普通共同基金投资者，平均而言，这些经理的表现比市场低大约每年1%，几乎就等于他们的管理费。

But, Dalbar has done this work, which shows that the average mutual fund investor who's picked an active manager, that active manager on average underperforms the market by, let's say, 1% a year, which is almost their fees.

他们的表现落后幅度正好等于他们的费用。

They underperform by the amount of their fees.

而不幸的是，由于客户在某只共同基金表现良好后立即追加投资，而在表现不佳的基金上撤资，客户的回报比主动管理型基金经理的回报低了四个百分点。

And then, unfortunately, because the clients add money to the mutual fund that's done well right after it's done well and then take money out of the mutual fund that has done poorly, the client's returns underperform the active manager's returns by four percentage points.

因此，根据Dalbar的研究，客户平均而言——他们分析的是具有统计显著性的大量资金流动数据。

And so clients on average, according to Dalbar, and they're they're looking at statistically significant amounts of fund flows.

我认为这几乎是决定性的证据。

I think it's, like, dispositive.

很难质疑他们的研究方法或数据。

It's very, very hard to argue with their methodology or their data.

客户的回报比主动管理型基金经理低四个百分点，这是一个灾难性的结果。

The clients are underperforming their active managers by four percentage points is a ruinous result.

灾难性的。

Ruinous.

我的意思是，在三十年的投资周期内，每年低四个百分点的回报，会导致退休时的积蓄减少70%，整整70%。

I mean, four percentage points of underperformance over a thirty year investment horizon leading to someone's retirement is a nest egg that is 70%, 70% less.

因此，看到如此系统性且实证上如此明显的现象，表明人类心理中确实存在某种真实的问题。

And so to see something so systemic and so empirically obvious indicates some sort of a thing in human psychology that is a real thing.

因此，结论是对于大多数人来说，投资指数基金确实更好。

And a conclusion from that is it really is better for most people to be in index fund.

而且不要套现。

And not cash out.

是的。

Yeah.

把钱留下来。

Keep your money in.

你知道的。

You know?

从心理上来说，这就是我对股票的配置。

Like, just have the the psychologically, that's my allocation to equity.

就让它留在那里。

Just keep it there.

不要在底部套现，因为这会对你自己造成真正的损害。

Don't cash out at at at the bottom because you can cause real damage to yourself.

当市场上涨时，不要疯狂地追加投资。

Don't don't add frenetically as it's rising.

你只需要采取一种稳健的年度投资策略。

You just have a measured annual approach.

我认为这样更好。

I think that's better.

这才是大多数人应该采取的正确方法。

That that's that's the right the right approach for most people.

如果你想击败市场——我们已经这样做了二十年——那是一项非常耗时、对性格要求极高的事情，虽然可以做到，但并非每个人都能胜任。

If you wanna try to beat the market, which we've done for twenty years, you know, that's that's a that that's a a labor intense, temperamentally challenging thing to do, which can be done, but not everyone can do it.

还有一项研究，或者说是1984年的一场辩论，关于格雷厄姆和多德小镇的超级投资者，沃伦·巴菲特本人与一位名叫迈克尔·詹森的人展开辩论。

And there's this there's this, study, or it was a it was a debate in 1984, super investors of Graham and Doddsville, Warren Buffett himself debating a guy named Michael Jensen.

而迈克尔·詹森实际上后来成了我在哈佛商学院的教授，真是个巧合。

And Michael Jensen actually ended up being a professor of mine at Harvard Business School, in this small world.

詹森当时主张市场是有效的，而巴菲特在1984年的成功——那时他已全职管理伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司大约十五年，并且在此之前还拥有巴菲特合伙企业的业绩记录。

And Jensen was arguing that markets are efficient and that Buffett's success in 1984, he'd been managing Berkshire Hathaway, I think, full time at that point for fifteen years, and he had the the Buffett partnership track record before that.

他显然大幅跑赢了市场。

He'd obviously widely outperformed the market.

詹森却说，你的超额收益在统计上只是一个异常现象。

And Jensen was saying, your outperformance is statistically just an anomaly.

你知道的。

You know?

你的情况完全可以用多少个标准差来解释。

You're you're you're just you can be explained by this many sigmas.

足够多的幸运猴子掷硬币，总会产生一个沃伦·巴菲特。

Enough enough lucky monkeys flipping coins will will result in a Warren Buffett.

巴菲特的回答是：实际上，还有另外八家投资公司，它们都师从本·格雷厄姆，彼此之间虽不紧密但有所了解，持有的股票也各不相同，这是它们的业绩记录。

And Buffett Buffett's response was, well, actually, there are eight other investment firms, all of whom studied with Ben Graham, all of whom kind of knew each other loosely but own different stocks, and here are their track records.

它们全都跑赢了市场。

All of them outperformed the market.

所以至少还有另外八只幸运的猴子。

So there's at least eight other lucky monkeys.

而且他有一套很优美的数学模型，说明这些幸运猴子全都幸运的概率有多低——你知道，要让这成立，可能需要无数个平行宇宙。

And and he has some beautiful math about how the probability of the lucky monkeys actually being all lucky is like, it it's you know, you'd need, like, I don't know how many alternative universes for that to be true.

但由此引出的一个观点，她也提到了，就是每一位基金经理在每年的衡量中，大约有三分之一的时间表现落后于市场。

But a point that falls out of that, which she comments on, is that every single one of the managers underperformed about a third of the time when when measured annually.

而伯克希尔·哈撒韦本身，我回去查了，过去五十四年中有十九年表现不佳。

And, Berkshire Hathaway itself, I went back and I looked for this 19 of the last fifty four years.

他已全职管理这家公司五十四年，全程由沃伦·巴菲特操盘。

He's he's been managing it fifty four years with full time Warren Hens.

在那五十四年中，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股价有十九年跑输标普指数，占总时间的35%。

Berkshire Hathaway stock has underperformed the S and P 19 of those fifty four years or 35% of the time.

你试着想象一下，那是1975年。

And you just imagine yourself, it's it's 1975.

在之前的两年里，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股价下跌了一半，而市场却持平。

Over the prior two years, Berkshire Hathaway stock has fallen by half, and the market is flat.

你会卖出你的伯克希尔·哈撒韦股票吗？

Do you sell your Berkshire Hathaway stock?

如果你这么做了，那将是一个非常糟糕的决定。

If you had, that would have been a very bad decision.

现在是1999年。

It's 1999.

伯克希尔哈撒韦的股票略有上涨，但比标普指数低了40个百分点。

Berkshire Hathaway stock is up slightly, but 40 percentage points less than the S and P.

你会卖出你的伯克希尔哈撒韦股票吗？

Do you sell your Berkshire Hathaway stock?

在1999年这么做将是一个非常糟糕的决定。

That would have been a very bad decision in 1999.

因此，这个过程中似乎存在某种因素，导致这些表现不佳的时期，这意味着这真的不适合所有人。

So there there seems to be something about this process that results in these periods of underperformance that means this is really not for everybody.

我不知道这是否回答了你的问题，但这是

And, I don't know if that's answering your question, but that's

是的。

Yeah.

这触及了一个极其重要的问题，因为这种情况可能会持续多年。

And it it gets at such a profoundly important issue because this can last for years.

对吧？

Right?

现在我记得，当你读我的书时，我们曾就这个话题发过短信，你读到了我谈到让·玛丽·阿维亚的那章。

Now I I remember you and I were texting about it when you were reading my book and you were reading the the chapter where I was talking about Jean Marie Aviat.

因为阿维亚曾对我说过，你看。

Because Aviat, there was a point where he said to me, look.

经过几年后，你开始怀疑：我是不是根本没理解？

After after a few years, you start to wonder, am I just not getting it?

就像，市场范式已经变了，而我是不是……

Like, the paradigm has changed, and maybe I'm you know?

所以，作为一名逆向、集中型价值投资者，在你表现极其出色之后，回头一看，会觉得这一切都太有道理了。

So so it's really easy after a period where you've done incredibly well as a contrarian concentrated value investor to look back and say, well, this makes so much sense.

但当你身处其中时，我有很多从事这一行的朋友，对吧。

But when you're in the thick of it and I I have a lot of friends who do this, right, professionally.

所以，我觉得就像分娩一样，人们会忘记那种痛苦。

And so and and I think like childbirth, they forget how painful it was.

当你身处其中、真正经历那段时期时，那简直是一种折磨，尤其是如果你没有结构性优势，你的大量股东往往会撤资。

And and when you're in the thick of it, when you're actually going through that period, it's kind of agony because you have a lot of your shareholders bailing out often if you're if you're if you don't have a structural advantage.

我的意思是，如果你像盖·斯皮尔那样拥有结构性优势——大部分资金是家族资金，那你就不那么容易受到股东撤资的影响。

I mean, you have a structural advantage that's similar to Guy Spier's advantage, which is a lot of the money is your family money.

因此，你不太容易受到他人撤资的冲击。

So you're less vulnerable to people bailing out.

但你会开始怀疑，那些投资愚蠢项目却赚得盆满钵满的人，是不是发现了你还没看懂的东西。

But you you start to wonder, you know, if other people who are making tons of money investing in stupid stuff, have figured out something that you haven't figured out.

所以这会让人感到尴尬，错失恐惧感也随之而来。

So it's kind of embarrassing and fear of missing out kicks in.

我的意思是，这简直是一种煎熬。

I I mean, it's just it's torture.

所以我想问问你，关于这件事的情感和心理层面。

And so I wanted to ask you about the emotional psychological side of this.

因为昨天我们讨论这个话题时，你告诉我，我比大多数人情绪上要平静得多。

Because when we talked about this yesterday, you mentioned to me, look, I'm way less emotional than most people.

你能谈谈你需要怎样的心理机制才能承受这种痛苦吗？

Can you talk about the wiring that you actually need to be able to handle the pain of this?

是的。

Yeah.

我认为我相当清楚自己真正想做什么，比如分析企业、理解世界、建立自己的判断，寻找那些主流观点错误的地方。

I I think that I'm pretty I think in a I I think I found really what I wanna do, like analyzing businesses, trying to understand the world, developing conviction, you know, looking for places where the conventional wisdom is wrong.

我只是热爱活在这样的世界里，并且享受这个过程。

I I just I love living in that world, and, I enjoy this.

所以当事情开始对我们不利时，比如我们买进的东西价格下跌了，我其实非常享受这种时刻。

And so when when something starts to go against us, you know, we bought something and it's down, that's I I really enjoy that.

区分错误和机会，正是在这类时刻你赚到大钱的地方。

That that's really distinguishing between a mistake and an opportunity is is where you make a lot of the money doing this.

我真的非常享受这一点。

And I I just really enjoy that.

我认为很多人并不这样。

And I think a lot of people don't.

我认为他们不喜欢直面自己的错误。

I think that that they don't like confronting their own mistakes.

我真的很惊讶，你知道，达尔文似乎说过，人类的思维就像人类的卵子。

I'm really struck, You know, the, apparently, Darwin had this saying that, you know, the human mind is like the human egg.

一旦被某个想法‘受孕’，它就对新想法完全封闭了。

Like, once once impregnated with an idea, it's impervious to new ideas.

我非常重视与自己观点相悖的证据。

Like, I I I really value disconfirming evidence.

我很欢迎，你知道，我最喜欢做的事情之一就是和空头投资者交谈。

Like, I I welcome you know, the one of my favorite things to do is to talk to a short seller.

当事情开始对我们不利时，我迫切想弄清楚真相的欲望就会被激发出来。

Like, I when when when things start to go against us, like, my intensity of of desire to figure it out kicks in.

你知道，从二十年前奥克克里夫刚开始的时候，我们就一直这样走过来。

And, you know, we've we've we've gone back from the beginning of Oak Cliff, twenty years ago.

如果你以我们买入的股票是否以高于买入价卖出，或者目前仍持有但价格高于买入价来衡量是否正确，那么我们70%的时间是对的，30%的时间是错的。

If you measure being right as the stock that we bought, either we sold for more than we paid for it or it's trading now, we own it still for more than we paid for, we were we've we've been right 70% of the time and wrong 30%.

我们确实有30%的时间是明显错误的。

Like, we're definitively wrong 30% of the time.

而识别出我们哪里错了，正是我们最投入努力的地方。

And identifying where we're wrong, that's where we work most intensely.

我只是觉得，我们的思维方式就是这样。

And I I just think that's how we're wired.

此外，我们在结构上选择客户，并让客户因为正确的原因选择我们，这意味着当我们表现不佳时，不会接到电话说：天啊。

And then we've done the things that we've done structurally choosing clients, having clients choose us for the right reasons that mean that when we're down, we don't get calls saying, oh my gosh.

你承诺过我们一些不会实现的事情。

You promised us something that isn't gonna happen.

对吧？

Right?

所以，这是我们的一大优势——我们拥有理解我们所做之事的客户。

So that's that's that's a huge advantage we have, that we we have clients who understand what we do.

而且，你知道，我和每个人一样也有情绪。

And, you know, I I I have emotions like everybody else.

我的意思是，我不是没有感情的人，但我们现在持有15家公司。

I mean, I'm not inhuman, but, you know, we we own 15 companies right now.

它们的交易价格是过去12个月自由现金流的14倍。

They're trading at 14 times trailing free cash flow.

标普500指数则在22倍左右。

The S and P five hundred is at 22 times.

这些都是非常优质的企业。

These are very high quality companies.

通过不断深入了解它们，以及我们关注名单上那几十家我们感兴趣的公司，情绪就会慢慢消退，你就会生活在一个持续深入了解每一家公司的世界里。

And just learning more about them and, you know, the the dozens of companies on the watch list that we'd like, it just just the emotion drains away, and you you live in a world of, learning more about each one continuously.

我不知道。

I don't know.

也许我只是天生就是这样一种思维方式。

Maybe I'm just wired in a way that that's what happens.

Stig，我们先休息一下，听听今天赞助商的广告。

Stig Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

Trey，不是你的错觉。

Trey No, it's not your imagination.

风险和监管正在加剧，客户现在要求提供安全证明才能开展业务。

Risk and regulation are ramping up, and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是为什么Vanta是一个变革者。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta自动化你的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合到一个AI驱动的平台上。

Vanta automates your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust together on one AI powered platform.

无论你是在准备SOC 2审计，还是在运行企业GRC项目，Vanta都能让你保持安全并推动交易进展。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

像Ramp和Ryder这样的公司使用Vanta后，审计时间减少了82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长争取了更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

我喜欢Vanta让你轻松跟上合规要求，而不会完全打乱你的工作流程。

I love how Vanta makes it easy to stay on top of your compliance without it taking over your entire workflow.

它只是简化了一件通常远比必要更痛苦的事情。

It just simplifies something that's usually way more painful than it needs to be.

前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

那就是 vanta.com/billionaires。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

开始做新事情不仅困难，而且确实有点吓人。

Starting something new isn't just hard, it's honestly kind of terrifying.

我仍然记得在我真正决定开始做播客之前的那些时刻。

I still remember those moments right before I really committed to podcasting.

夜里辗转反侧，想着：如果没人听怎么办？

Lying awake at night thinking, what if no one listens?

如果这件事彻底失败了怎么办？

What if this completely flops?

或者，如果我只是纯粹在浪费时间呢？

Or what if I'm just straight up wasting my time?

尽管克服那种怀疑并不容易，但迈出这一步最终成了我做过的最好的决定之一。

And even though pushing past that doubt was not easy, making the leap ended up being one of the best decisions I've ever made.

我要说的是，当你有合适的工具相助时，事情会轻松很多。

And I'll say this, it helps a lot when you have the right tools on your side.

这就是Shopify发挥作用的地方。

And that's where Shopify comes in.

Shopify是数百万企业的电商平台，占美国电子商务总量的约10%，从家喻户晓的大品牌到刚刚起步的新锐品牌都在使用。

Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses and about 10% of all e commerce in The US, from massive household names to brands just getting started.

如果你曾经想过，如果我不知道怎么建店怎么办？

If you've ever thought, what if I don't know how to build a store?

Shopify提供了数百个精美且即用的模板，完美契合你的品牌风格，让这一切变得简单。

Shopify makes it easy with hundreds of beautiful, ready to use templates that actually match your brand.

或者，如果我没有时间做所有事情怎么办？

Or what if I don't have time to do everything?

Shopify 内置的 AI 工具可以帮助撰写产品描述、标题，甚至优化产品图片。

Shopify's built in AI tools help write product descriptions, headlines, and even enhance your product photos.

现在是时候用 Shopify 将这些‘如果’变为现实了。

It's time to turn those what ifs into with Shopify today.

今天就前往 shopify.com/wsb 注册，享受每月 1 美元的试用。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往 shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是 shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

十亿美元级别的投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于 Fundrise 收入基金，这种被动收入策略已向所有规模的投资者开放，该基金已募集超过6亿美元，分红率为7.97%。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.