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您正在收听的是TIP。
You're listening to TIP.
大家好。
Hi there.
很高兴能再次与大家在《更富有、更智慧、更快乐》播客中相聚。
It's great to be back with you on the Richer, Wiser, Happier podcast.
我们今天的嘉宾是一位杰出的投资者，名叫鲍勃·罗博蒂，他是业内最杰出的价值投资者之一。
Our guest today is a superb investor named Bob Robotti, who's one of the most eminent value investors in the business.
鲍勃是纽约市一家名为Robotti and Co公司的总裁兼首席投资官。
Bob is the president and chief investment officer of a firm called Robotti and Co, which is based in New York City.
他低调地建立了非凡的长期业绩记录，在过去四十年中以巨大优势跑赢了市场。
He's quietly built an extraordinary long term record, beating the market by an enormous margin over the last forty years.
他是一个如此谦逊、不张扬的人，以至于很容易忽视他所取得的巨大成功。
He's such a modest and unassuming person that it's easy to overlook just how successful he's been.
像鲍勃这样经验极其丰富的投资者总是值得我们密切关注，他成功驾驭了市场数十年的多个不同周期。
It's always worth paying close attention to vastly experienced investors like Bob, who've managed to navigate many different cycles in the market over many decades.
他的投资方法建立在一些永恒的原则之上，这些原则我们所有人都应该好好理解，但他还有一种非凡的能力，能够在投资环境变化并需要不同方法时进行调整。
His investment approach is built on some timeless principles that all of us would do well to understand, but he also has an unusual ability to adapt when the investment environment changes and requires a different approach.
正如你将听到的，鲍勃认为一些戏剧性的变化已经在进行中，带来了我们需要意识到的一系列新的风险和机遇。
As you'll hear, Bob believes that some dramatic changes are already underway, bringing a new set of risks and opportunities that we need to be aware of.
首先，他认为我们应该预期会有一段持续高通胀的时期，并且应该放弃任何回归低通胀和低利率美好旧时光的希望。
For a start, he thinks we should expect a period of persistently high inflation and should abandon any hope of returning to the good old days of low inflation and depressed interest rates.
他还认为，我们现在正面临一场全球能源危机，对从化石燃料到可再生能源的一切都有着巨大的需求。
He also thinks we're now facing a global energy crisis with massive demand for everything from fossil fuels to renewables.
与此同时，他看到了全球化进程的重大演变，随着中国失去其优势，竞争优势正转向印度和东南亚。
At the same time, he's seeing a major evolution in the process of globalization as China loses its edge and the competitive advantage shifts to India and Southeast Asia.
这一切对投资者意味着什么？
What does all of this mean for investors?
在鲍勃看来，我们需要认识到，过去十年最有效的策略在未来十年可能不会那么奏效。
Well, as Bob sees it, we need to recognize that the strategies that worked best over the last decade are not likely to work so well over the next decade.
例如，他认为被动投资于指数基金和ETF可能会带来明显平庸的回报。
For example, he thinks that passive investing in index funds and ETFs may turn out to be a path to decidedly mediocre returns.
同样地，鉴于其估值偏高带来的风险，我们不应指望盲目押注于像‘七巨头’这样的美国主导科技股就能大赚一笔。
Similarly, we shouldn't expect to make a killing by betting blindly on dominant US tech stocks like the Magnificent Seven, given the risk posed by their somewhat elevated valuations.
正如鲍勃所解释的，他认为我们已经进入了一个主动投资者的新黄金时代，这些投资者能够识别出被低估的个股。
As Bob explains, he believes that we've now entered a new golden age for active investors who can identify individual stocks that are undervalued.
他认为，许多最具吸引力的机会存在于市场中那些长期被忽视或不受青睐的领域。
He argues that many of the most enticing opportunities are in unfashionable areas of the market that had long been ignored or dismissed.
例如，那些真正不起眼的‘旧经济’行业中的企业，比如用于化肥的化工行业。
For example, old economy businesses in really unsexy industries like chemicals that are used in fertilizer.
他还在大量押注一系列能源相关公司，这很有意思，因为这是他自上世纪七十年代以来就深入研究的一个领域。
He's also betting very aggressively on an array of energy related companies, which is interesting because this is a sector that he's studied very deeply since way back in the nineteen seventies.
这次对话提醒我们，金融市场的钟摆不可避免地会来回摆动。
This conversation is a reminder that the pendulum inevitably swings back and forth in financial markets.
因此，最流行的投资策略最终会过度使用并失效，最热门的股票最终会被高估并失宠。
So the most popular investment strategies eventually get overdone and cease to work, and the most fashionable stocks eventually get overvalued and fall out of favor.
沃伦·巴菲特的老师本杰明·格雷厄姆在其名著《证券分析》中论述过这一现象，该书开篇引用了古罗马诗人贺拉斯的经典名言：'今之衰者，他日必兴；今之盛者，他日必衰。'
Warren Buffett's teacher, Ben Graham, wrote about this phenomenon in his famous book, Security Analysis, which begins with a classic quote from the ancient Roman poet Horace, who said, many shall be restored that now are fallen, and many shall fall that now are in honor.
倾听像鲍勃·罗博蒂这样久经沙场的投资者至关重要，他们在这个领域摸爬滚打数十年，拥有识别这些重复模式的无价能力，并能提供一种早期预警，提示市场风向可能开始转变。
It's important to listen to battle tested investors like Bob Robotti, who've played this game for decades because they have this invaluable ability to identify these recurring patterns and to provide a kind of early warning when the pendulum may be starting to swing in a different direction.
无论如何，希望你们喜欢我们的对话。
In any case, I hope you enjoy our conversation.
非常感谢你们的参与。
Thanks so much for joining us.
您正在收听的是《更富有、更智慧、更快乐》播客，主持人威廉·格林将在这里采访全球顶尖的投资者，并探讨如何在市场与人生中取得胜利。
You're listening to the Richer, Wiser, Happier podcast where your host, William Green, interviews the world's greatest investors and explores how to win in markets and life.
大家好。
Hi, everyone.
今天能和鲍勃·罗博蒂一起在这里，我感到非常荣幸。
It's a great pleasure to be here today with Bob Robotti.
鲍勃是罗博蒂公司的总裁兼首席投资官，在过去四十年里，他的投资表现远超市场平均水平。
Bob is the president and chief investment officer of Robotti and Co, and he's beaten the market by an enormous margin over the last forty years.
很高兴见到你，鲍勃。
It's great to see you, Bob.
非常感谢您加入我们。
Thanks so much for joining us.
非常感谢邀请我来到这里，能见到您真是太好了。
Thanks so much for having me here, and it's so good to be see.
很高兴见到您。
Great to see you.
我想先和您聊聊您在纽约市皇后区的童年时光。
I wanted to start by chatting with you about your childhood in Queens in New York City.
我知道你出生于1953年，和两个姐姐以及一个弟弟一起长大。
And I I know you were born in 1953, and you grew up with two older sisters and a younger brother.
我在某处读到，你住在一家名为Robotti百货店的干货店楼上的公寓里，那家店是你祖母经营的。
And I read somewhere that you lived in an apartment above a dry goods store called Robotti's Department Store that your grandmother had operated.
然后，我想大概在你一岁左右的时候，你的父亲爱德华在家里创办了一家财产和意外伤害保险经纪公司。
And that then later your I think when you were about one, your father, Edward, launched a property and casualty insurance brokerage firm also out of your home.
所以我想了解一下，在那种真正被商业包围的环境中成长是什么感觉。
And so I wanted to get a sense of what it was like growing up in that kind of environment where you really were surrounded by business.
嗯，实际情况比那要更普通一些。
Well, it's it's it's more modest than that.
我祖母那边，我祖父确实拥有那栋楼。
And my grandmother's so, my grandfather did own the building.
我们拥有那栋楼，商店就在楼下。
We owned the building, and the the store was downstairs.
我们住在楼上。
We lived upstairs.
而且，那家百货商店生意并不好，因为你知道，它已经被挤垮了，街坊邻居都想去梅西百货。
And, the department store didn't do a lot of business because, you know, it had been put out of business, you know, with people in the neighborhood wanted to go to Macy's.
坐地铁过去很方便。
It was easy enough to get in the subway and go.
所以，你知道，在几十年前，它可能确实是社区里至关重要的生意，但后来就不是了。
So, you know, back decades before, it really was probably a business that was critical to the community, but really wasn't that.
所以它不是一个兴旺的生意，但对我们来说，当我们在街区那头打棍球时，它更像是一个机会。
So it was not a thriving business, but it was more an opportunity for me when we played stickball up the block.
如果我们弄丢了小球，我就会去我祖母的店里拿一个小球。
If we lost the small dean, I would get the small dean from my grandmother's store.
所以，我成了一个能从祖母店里拿东西的来源。
So therefore, I was a source for getting things out of my grandmother's store.
然后我爸爸开始了，你知道，最初是在楼上的客厅里。
And then my dad started it, you know, kind of upstairs originally in the living room.
他创办了一家保险经纪公司。
He started an insurance brokerage business.
我想他大概在17岁的时候，得了一种病，导致他失明了。
And I guess when he was 17, he had gotten some kind of a disease that actually blinded him.
实际上，在他生命的大部分时间里，他的视力都有严重问题。
And for most of his life, actually, he was, had significant sight problems.
所以最终，他很可能是在我祖父母的帮助下，才创办了那个生意，那是在他开始在我们家做经纪业务之前。
So eventually, he did, probably with my grandparents, help start that business since before he started the that brokerage business in our house.
而这个生意，我确实算是从它起步阶段就看着它慢慢发展起来的。
And and that I did see kinda grow from the inception.
小时候，我在他的公司里帮忙，也出过一些力。
And as a kid, I worked in the business with him and helped some.
其实也没帮上太多。
Not that much.
我并不是那种从小就早早投入、做一大堆事情的人。
I was not an early kinda, like, pitching in doing a whole bunch of things.
但我确实觉得这很有意思，因为它真的让我意识到……哦，这是个玩笑。
But I do think that it was interesting because it really did give me a sense as I oh, it's a joke.
我了解财产意外险业务，因为我父亲是经纪人，但他也做核保。
It I understood the property casualty business because my father was a broker, but he did underwriting.
就像我说的，当街对面的潘加诺家需要保险时，就是那些算账的家伙，他们时不时因为非法赌博被抓。
So as I say, when the Panganos across the street wanted insurance, that's the guys who ran the numbers and got arrested every so often for making book.
所以他们来了。
So they came in.
他们选择了这家保险公司。
They went with this insurance company.
但维达罗斯家就在街区那头，他们进来后，把车停好，哪儿也没去。
But the Vedaros is up the block where they came in, they tipped the car, didn't go any place.
要知道，那地方真的非常干净整洁。
Know, it was really pristine.
他把保单放在他评级最高的公司。
He put it with his top rated company.
所以他实际上是在做核保，知道哪些公司在这里有损失风险，哪些没有。
So he was effectively underwriting, knowing which which ones have exposure to loss here and which ones don't.
所以，你知道，我从小就有一个绝佳的机会去理解保险业务是如何运作的，以及这个行业本身有多么奇特。
So, you know, how that how that works and how the insurance business works was, you know, I had a ground floor opportunity to understand a business that's a strange business.
财产现金流保险是一个自成一体的小行业，有其独特的细微之处。
Property cash flow insurance is its own little industry with its its nuance.
所以这很有趣。
So it was interesting.
那么我猜得对吗，你的家族至少有一半是来自意大利的？
And am I right in thinking your family, at least half of it, came from Italy.
对吗？
Right?
我记得我在某处读到过，你的父亲有一个很棒的名字，我不知道我发音是否正确，是巴普蒂斯特还是巴普蒂斯特·罗博蒂，他来到美国后实际上参与了帝国大厦的建造？
I think I had read somewhere that your father, who had this wonderful name, which I don't know if I'm pronouncing right, which was Baptiste or Baptist Robotti, actually helped to build the Empire State Building when he came to America?
那是我祖父，巴普蒂斯特·巴普蒂斯特·罗博蒂，结果我们住在长岛市。
That's so my grandfather, who is Baptiste Baptist Robotti, ended up we lived in Long Island City.
街区那边有一家叫吉利斯父子的石材公司，吉利斯父子已经经营很多年了。
There was a stone company down the block called Gillies and Sons, and Gillies and Sons had been in business for many years.
而且，幸运的是，他的好运来了，最初的主任绘图员是老板的儿子。
And, fortunately, his good fortune, the original chief draftsman was the son of the owner.
而那个儿子在一栋大型建筑上忘了建筑有四面，他只按三面来投标。
And the son in a major building forgot there were four sides to the building, and he only bid it for three sides to the building.
所以当他们损失了一大笔钱后，他丢了工作，而我祖父得到了晋升。
So when they lost an awful lot of money, he lost his job, and my grandfather got promoted.
这家公司做了很多石灰岩相关的工程，这在建筑行业是一个关键性的转变。
And the company did a lot of work with with limestone, and it was a critical change in construction.
对吗？
Right?
所以，没错，克莱斯勒大厦是当时与20 Exchange Place争夺最高建筑的两座大楼之一。
So the, right, the Chrysler Building was one of the two buildings that fought with 20 exchange place for the tallest building.
它是最后一座用砖建造的大楼。
It's the last brick building that was built.
它是美国乃至全世界最高的砖结构建筑。
It's the tallest brick building in America in the world.
然后，当然，当你建造帝国大厦时，就转向使用石灰岩了。
And then, of course, when you built the Empire State Building, you went to limestone.
这样你就可以竖起钢梁。
So you could put up steel girders.
然后直接把石灰岩块贴上去。
You could slap pieces of limestone on it.
所以这是一种极其高效的建造方式，而我祖父当时就在那家公司工作。
So there was an extremely efficient way to do that, and that was the company that my grandfather had worked for.
所以他当时是首席绘图员。
So he was the chief draftsman.
因此，在我们的会议室里，我们收藏了几张蓝图，其中一张来自洛克菲勒中心的47楼。
And so we have in our conference room, we have a couple of blueprints from I have it from the 47th Floor of the Rockefeller Center.
因为在他们建完帝国大厦之后，大萧条来临，接着洛克菲勒中心建成，那之后就全是石灰岩建筑了。
Because then after they did the Empire State Building, depression came, and Rockefeller Center was built, then it's all limestone.
所以他并没有参与那个项目。
So he didn't work on that.
他曾在圣约翰葡萄园工作。
He worked on Saint John Of The Vine.
所以他很幸运，恰好在正确的时间出现在正确的地点，你知道，在大萧条时期得到了一份极好的工作。
So he was fortunate, happened to be at the right place at the right time, and, you know, ended up with a phenomenal job during the depression.
因此，他确实做得相当不错，并且积累了一些钱。
And so, therefore, really did pretty well and accumulated some money.
所以我们拥有一些房地产，比如，就在我们长大的街区附近。
And so we owned some real estate, like, that was down the block from the neighborhood we grew up in.
所以，这确实给了家庭一个很好的起点。
And so, therefore, that gave, you know, the family, you know, definitely a good sounding, place to start from.
然后你去了一个相当古老且著名的耶稣会高中，我想，之后又去了巴克内尔大学。
And and so you went off to quite an old and distinguished Jesuit high school, I think, and then went to Bucknell University.
我记得听说你毕业时，你说，作为会计专业的学生，成绩是C，而且你没有用功。
And I remember hearing that you had graduated, you said, with a c as an accounting major and that you didn't apply yourself.
你不是一个好学生。
You you weren't a good student.
是这样吗？
Is that right?
你年轻时并不是特别有干劲或雄心勃勃吗？
You just were not hugely driven or ambitious as a as a youngster?
嗯，我有干劲也有雄心，但不是在学习方面。
Well, I was driven and ambitious, but not for studies.
因此，在高中时期，我的表现还算不错。
And so therefore, in in high school, I did reasonably well.
你知道，在文法学校阶段，我逐渐进步，成为了我们班的毕业生代表。
You know, each progressively so in grammar school, I was the valedictorian of my class.
但到了高中，我表现还行，所以排在年级前三分之一。
But then in high school, I did okay, so I was the top third.
但是，你知道，我当时忙着踢足球和做其他事情，只是偶尔学习一下。
But, you know, I I was busy trying to play football and do other things and, you know, occasionally did some studies.
不过那就是我当时的状态。
But that's what I did do.
我在高中最后两年一直在考虑大学要去哪里，因为我知道自己会混日子。
I spent my junior, senior year figuring where I was gonna go from college because I knew I was gonna goof off.
我知道自己会得个C，所以我想，能进的学校越好，从那个大学拿到的C也就越有分量。
I knew I was gonna get a c, and I figured the better the school I can get into, well, then the better the c from that university.
结果呢，巴克内尔大学、拉法耶特学院、里海大学、科尔盖特大学，这些就是我认定自己能够得着的那个层次的学校。
So as it turned out, you know, Bucknell, Lafayette, Lehigh, Colgate were the companies that schools that I identified that I thought were in the tier that I could get to.
当然，这也是我申请的专业方向，因为我的语文成绩只有490分。
And, of course, that was also what I applied as a major because my verbal score is four ninety.
所以，你看，我就是个来自皇后区的孩子。
So, like, I'm a kid from Queens.
我连话都说不好。
I can't speak.
我连英语都写不好。
I can't write English.
不过，我数学确实考了710分。
So, but I did get a seven ten in math.
所以，当我申请巴克内尔大学时，他们有一个非常好的工程学院。
So, therefore, when I applied to Bucknell, they have a really good engineering school.
我不打算申请那里，因为录取难度会更大，但他们当时有一个商学院，没什么人申请。
I'm not gonna apply there because it'd be harder to get in, but they have a business school that at the time nobody applied to.
那个商学院是偏数学方向的，因此，我希望能侥幸被录取，尽管我本不该进入那所学校。
So it was mathematically oriented, and therefore, I could hopefully speed in when I shouldn't have gotten into the school.
最终我成功进入了巴克内尔大学，并且以C的平均成绩毕业了。
And I ended up I got into Bucknell, and and I graduated with my c.
所以，事情的发展完全如我所料。
So I got exactly what I thought would happen.
我确实实现了自己的期望，但你知道，从整体来看，那可能也带来了失望。
I did I fulfilled my, expectations, you know, my disappointment probably in aggregate from that.
所以，是的，情况就是这样，当然，我将成功的很大一部分归因于我拿到了那个C，以及当我进入巴克内尔大学时面临的问题：我该选什么专业？
So, yes, that that was and and, of course, I I attribute large part by success to the fact that I got that c and the fact that so when I got to Bucknell, the question was, what major do I have?
有管理专业，也有会计专业。
There's a management major and there's accounting major.
所以我就这样加入了橄榄球队，然后我和所有橄榄球队员聊天，我说，好吧。
So here I am on the football team, so I'm talking to all the football players and say, okay.
那么哪个专业更容易，管理学还是会计学？
So which is the easier major, management or accounting?
他们说，哦，会计学教授都是男的，你知道的，就选会计专业吧。
And they say, oh, the accounting professors are guys, you know, become an accounting major.
所以我就是这样选择了会计作为我的专业。
So that's how I selected accounting as my major.
所以我当时是通过商学院进去的，你知道，那时候商学院是巴克内尔大学里比较容易进的部分。
So I got in through, you know, the the business school, which is the easier part of Bucknell at the time.
然后我成了一名会计师，因为会计专业的课程比较简单。
And then I became an accountant because it was the accounting program was easy.
所以当我以C等的成绩毕业时，嗯，我不可能进八大会计师事务所工作。
And so when I graduate with a c, well, I'm not gonna get a job with the big eight accounting firms.
所以，你知道，当时有——不是四家，是八家，但我还是没机会进去。
So, you know, four there were there were not four, but eight of them, but still that wasn't gonna end.
在纽约，有25家大型会计师事务所，但你知道，我一家都进不去。
In New York, there were 25 large accounting firms, but, you know, none of them could I get a job with.
所以，最终我得到的工作是，我父亲童年时期的朋友叫弗雷德·普格利西，他在普格利西有一家小型会计师事务所。
So, therefore, it ended up the job I did get was, my my father's childhood friend was a guy named Fred Puglisi, and he had a small accounting firm in Puglisi.
在我最后一年的1月份，他给了我一个实习机会，而我没有出洋相。
January in my last year, he gave me an internship, and I didn't make a fool of myself.
因此，他觉得，好吧。
So therefore, he thought, okay.
也许这家伙只是没有全力以赴，但他足够聪明。
Maybe the guy just didn't apply himself and is smart enough.
于是我开始为帕斯托里诺-普格利西工作，我正好落到了合适的位置，从而开启了所有这些塑造了我人生的机遇。
And so I started working for Pastorino Puglisi, and I fell into the right place that therefore opened up all these opportunities that formed my life.
是的。
Yeah.
安东尼·帕斯托里诺原来是你生命中一个极其重要的人物。
Anthony Pastorino turns out to have been an incredibly important figure in your life.
我前几天还在读关于他的资料，因为他也是马里奥·加贝利的教授，我们稍后会讨论到马里奥，他后来成为了你人生中的重要人物。
And I I I was reading about him the other day because he also he also was a professor to Mario Gabelli as well, who who we'll discuss later, who became an important figure in your life.
实际上，我认为你和马里奥最终都获得了道林学院的安东尼·帕斯托里诺会计学杰出教授席位。
And so and, actually, I think you and Mario ended up in Dowling the Anthony Pastorino distinguished professorship in accounting.
那么请跟我们讲讲他，以及他做了哪些事情，引导你走上了这条极其幸运的道路，将你引荐到像特威迪·布朗和马里奥·加贝利刚起步的公司这样的地方？
So tell us about him and what he did that kind of set you on this extraordinarily fortunate path by directing you to places like Tweedy Brown and Mario Gabelli's nascent firm?
事情就是这样发生的。
So that's what happened.
所以，当我得到那份工作时，我也意识到会计这个职业是有对错之分的。
So so now when I get the job for them, I also realized accounting is a profession that there's a right answer and a wrong answer.
它不像是在问‘你怎么看？’
It's not like, what do you think?
‘说说你的观点。’
Give me your views.
这是有对错之分的。
This is this is right and wrong.
所以我确实在巴克内尔大学毕业四天后，就开始在佩斯大学攻读MBA。
So I did start my MBA at Pace University four days after I graduated from Bucknell.
我每周去四个晚上，每晚学习三个小时，周末则用来学习。
And I went four nights a week, and I went for three hours in evening, and I spent the weekend studying.
当然，这最终成为了一段很棒的经历。
And, of course, that ended up being, a great experience.
因此，结合我在一家小型会计师事务所的工作经历——在那里我既做过审计，也做过税务，还在一家25人的事务所里轮岗过。
So the combination of working for a smaller accounting firm where I spent time in audit, spent time in tax, and moved around to 25 person firm.
所以，你白天应用，晚上学习会计概念，这样当你实际应用时，概念就变得容易了。
So, therefore, you're applying during the day, and that's night you're learning the concepts of accounting, and, therefore, the the concepts become easy when you actually apply it.
所以会计对很多人来说是个无聊的专业、无聊的学科，但当然，对我来说并非如此。
So accounting is a boring major, boring subject for many people, but, of course, it wasn't.
你知道，它是鲜活的，我能看到它在实际中运作，以及它为你提供的关于公司的信息。
You know, it was, I could see it live and in action and the information it gave you about companies.
就是这样。
And as that was it.
帕斯托里诺的业务分为两部分。
The business of Pastorino had two pieces.
其一，我会在纽约最差的社区进行日托中心的审计工作。
One, I would do day care center audits in the worst neighborhoods in New York.
当时是1975年。
And so this is 1975.
对吧？
Right?
纽约市濒临破产边缘。
New York City is about ready to go bankrupt.
企业和个人纷纷逃离纽约市。
There's been urban flight out of New York businesses and individuals.
所以，那是一个艰难时期，我得去非常混乱的街区。
So, therefore, it was a tough time, and I would go to very tough neighborhoods.
这就是事务所业务的一部分。
So that was the one part of the practice.
但事务所的另一部分业务是，有许多投资顾问是普拉斯·阿雷纳·波利斯的客户，其中一位就是特威迪·布朗。
But the other part of the practice was there were all these investment advisers that were the clients of, of Plus Arena Police, and one of them was Tweedy Brown.
所以情况就是这样。
And so that's what it was.
我在那里的四年期间，每年都会花两到四个月的时间参与特威迪的审计工作。
For four years that I was there, I worked on the audit of Tweedy for two, three, four months of the year.
因此，那是在一个成长的关键时期，一段塑造性的经历。
And so that was a formative experience at a formative time.
对吧？
Right?
因为正如我提到的，那时的时机对我来说再合适不过了。
Because as I mentioned, the timing of that could not have been more opportune for me.
那是1975年。
It's 1975.
所以你有1973年、1974年，市场调整，股市下跌了50%。
So you have '73, '74, the market correction, market down 50%.
一个关于股票的决定。
One decision stocks.
对吧？
Right?
不管你花多少钱买的。
Didn't matter what price you paid for them.
你都买了。
You bought them.
你拥有它们是因为你绝对总是能从中赚钱。
You owned them because you absolutely always make money at them.
可能在某些方面已经到达了我们今天所处的位置，并且已经到来并进行了修正。
Potentially arrived to where we are today in certain ways had come and corrected.
因此，正如我所说，它是价值投资的发令枪。
And therefore, it was, as I said, the starting gun for value investing.
所以，Tweedie在经营了几十年后一夜成名，因为他们所做的以及他们做事的方式正是天时地利人和。
So Tweedie became an overnight success after being in business for decades because what they did and how they did it was something that was at the right place at the right time.
他们拥有的是那种正确的公司。
They owned the right kind of company.
所以，在我价格互惠基金份额中的他们，加贝利、韦恩，甚至巴菲特都在那时开始闻名，因为价值投资股票的表现确实大幅超越。
So them in my price mutual shares, Gabelli, Wayne, even Buffett became well known around that time because value investing stocks really substantially outperformed.
因此，我恰好在那时步入这个领域。
And so therefore, I happened to walk in.
然后在特威迪公司，对吧，当时谁在那里？
And then at Tweedy, right, who was there?
嗯，当格雷厄姆·纽曼公司关门时，隔壁邻居就是特威迪布朗公司。
Well, when Graham Newman closed up, shop next door neighbor was Tweedy Brown.
于是汤姆·纳普走到了隔壁，接着沃尔特·施洛斯也走到了隔壁，我在那里的时候他们就在办公室。
And so Tom Knapp walked next door, and then Walter Schloss next walked next door, and they were in the office when I was there.
埃德·安德森是被查理·芒格招募来管理特威迪的，因为克里斯当时太年轻无法管理。
Ed Anderson was recruited from Charlie Munger to come in to run Tweedy because Chris was too young to run at the time.
所以约翰·斯皮尔斯刚刚开始在那里工作。
So John Spears had just started working there.
所以，你知道，所有这些人都围坐在交易台旁，办公室就在某个地方。
So, you know, all these people were at and they sat around the trading desk, and it's in office in some place.
我知道Tweedy持有什么，他们买了什么，以及他们为什么持有。
And I knew what Tweedy owned, what they bought, why they owned it.
然后，其中一位退休的合伙人名叫乔·赖利。
And then one of the retired partners was a guy named Joe Riley.
他最初来自Tweedy, Brown, and Riley公司。
He's originally Tweedy, Brown, and Riley.
莱利每天都来。
Riley was in every day.
审计师就和他坐在一起。
That's where the auditor sat with him.
早上六点半，我们讨论投资。
And at 06:30, we talk about investing.
所以我看到他发的一条推文。
And so I I saw a tweet he did.
我看到了他们持有哪些股票。
I saw what they owned.
乔和我一起工作，带我走了一遍投资流程。
Joe worked with me, went through the investment process.
所以，这让我对投资有了很好的入门体验。
So, you know, it was a great introduction to investing.
因此，我从未主修金融。
And and as a result, I never was a finance major.
我当时不知道市场是有效的，所以我不理解那种细微差别。
I didn't know the market was efficient, So I didn't understand that nuance.
相反，我认为市场相当低效，因为你可以挑选那些被严重低估的股票。
Instead, I thought it was pretty inefficient because you could pick stocks that were substantially undervalued.
对于不了解的听众来说，特威迪·布朗公司确实是一家非常了不起的机构。
And Tweedy Brown, for our listeners who don't have a sense of it, was such an extraordinary firm.
我在播客里和约翰·斯皮尔斯聊过这个，想深入了解的听众可以回去听听那一期。
I I I talked to, John Spears about it on the podcast for people who wanna go back and listen to that episode.
但是，毫不夸张地说，这里就是巴菲特买入伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司大部分股份的地方。
But, literally, this is the place where Buffett bought the bulk of his shares in Berkshire Hathaway.
他在1984年那篇著名的文章《格雷厄姆-多德都市的超级投资者》中提到了这家公司。
He wrote about the company in in his famous essay from 1984, super investors of Graham and Doddsville.
所以这些人都是真正的明星。
So these guys were real stars.
但那是在一个没人真正想做价值投资的时期。
But this was at a time when no one really wanted to do value investing.
对吧？
Right?
我的意思是，他们当时主要关注的是粉单市场上的那些微型股之类的。
I mean, they were mainly looking at these tiny stocks on the pink sheets and the like.
对吧？
Right?
你能不能给我们讲讲当时存在的机会，你是如何开始意识到，如果你真的去关注小公司，尤其是那些被低估、不太受人们关注的公司，那里存在着巨大的机会。
Can can you give us a sense of the opportunity that existed where you you started to see, oh, if you actually look at small companies and particularly undervalued companies that that are sort of off people's radar, there's a tremendous opportunity there.
因为在某种程度上，他们似乎为你的职业生涯建立了一种模板，即关注那些非常便宜、被低估且不在其他人视野范围内的东西。
Because it seems like in a way, they established a kind of template in certain ways for your career of looking at very cheap undervalued stuff that was off the off everybody else's radar.
嗯，在约翰·特雷恩的第一本书里，关于特威迪的章节被称为‘当铺老板’，因为特威迪的专长是为所有这些粉单股票做市。
Well well well, the in in the first John Trane book, the chapter on on Tweedie is called the pawn brokers because Tweedy's specialty was making markets in all of these pink sheet stocks.
而当时的粉单股票数量非常多。
And pink sheet stocks at the time, there were a lot of them.
因为这些证券是那些在1933年和1934年之前成立的公司。
Because what those were were securities that were companies that were created before '33 and '34.
所以在1933年和1934年法案出台、随之而来的注册要求实施之前，有些公司已经以某种方式上市了，因此不受美国证券交易委员会报告要求的约束。
So before you had '33 and '34, the registration that came from that, you had companies that had gone public in a way, but therefore weren't subject to the SEC reporting requirements.
所以这类公司的数量相当可观，而这最初就是Twee的差异化优势所在。
And so there was a significant number of these companies, and that was originally Twee's differentiator.
他们买入净营运资本，在那个年代这是可行的，因为这些公司也确实更加不为人知，并且不受市场青睐。
And they bought net net working capital in a time when you could do that because these companies were also a little bit definitely more obscure and then out of favor.
然后即使是市场的反复无常，可能今天的情况也有些类似。
And then even the vagaries of the market, probably somewhat similar today.
要知道，那并不是人们想要投资的市场领域。
There's you know, it's not a universe that people were looking to invest in.
他们当时关注的是那些热门蓝筹股。
You know, they were looking at the nifty fifth.
资本都流向那里了。
That's where capital flowed to.
这倒是说得通。
That would make sense.
我们就是在那里赚钱的。
That's where we made money.
你没赚钱。
You didn't make money.
所以它们是被忽视的冷门公司，因此估值被严重低估。
So they were obscure companies that were neglected and therefore had valuations that were extremely discounted.
我是个注册会计师。
So I'm a CPA.
对吧？
Right?
所以我能计算净净营运资本。
So therefore, I can calculate net net working capital.
对吧？
Right?
这并不是一个复杂的业务，也不需要我懂技术。
So this was not a sophisticated business, and it wasn't technology that I had to understand.
这就是通过查看资产负债表进行分析，寻找那些交易价格远低于企业清算价值的公司。
This was looking at a balance sheet and doing an analysis finding companies that were trading for far less than what the liquidation value of the business was.
而特威迪已经取得了成功。
And Tweedy had grown successful.
因此，你知道，最终当我创办自己的公司时，我们也做了很多粉单股票，因为我们无法有效配置资金并高效运作。
And therefore, you know, eventually, when I started my own firm, we did a lot of pink sheet stocks also because we couldn't put capital to work and to do it efficiently.
他们在这方面做得少得多，因此就打开了机会之门。
They were doing a lot less in it, and so therefore it opened up the opportunity.
而当时容易做的工作就是能够买入便宜的股票，这正是我们最初所做的。
And that was easy work to do was to be able to buy cheap stocks, and that's what we initially did.
那么，在我们继续讲述这个故事的过程中，我首先想强调几点。
So there are there are a couple of things I'd just like to highlight initially as as we keep going through this story.
对吧？
Right?
所以，当我们开始思考从您早期职业生涯中汲取与听众相关的经验教训时，第一条就是您拥有真正的技能。
So so as we start to think draw lessons that are relevant for our listeners from your early career, the first of them is you had real skills.
我的意思是，你拥有扎实的会计背景这一事实，为你带来了一定的竞争优势。
I mean, the fact that you had this hard accounting background gave you some kind of competitive advantage.
你在一个大多数人未曾涉足的领域进行探索，这本身就是一个巨大的优势。
The fact that you were looking in an area where other people weren't looking for the most part was a tremendous advantage.
我认为另一个关键因素是，你接触到的像乔·莱利那样的老一辈人，还有你提到的沃尔特·施洛斯，他基本上就驻扎在那个办公室里，对吧。
The other thing I think that was key is those that sort of older generation that you were seeing of Joe Riley, and I think you mentioned Walter Schloss who who kinda camped out in in that office Right.
就在一个角落里。
Just in a corner.
而且你也认识欧文·卡恩，我在《投资大师》一书中写过他，他活到了109岁，是另一位伟大的老一辈投资者。
And you knew Irving Kahn as well, who I wrote about in the great minds of investing who famously lived to 109 and was another of these great old investors.
他们从本杰明·格雷厄姆那里内化了一些非常永恒的原则，这些原则你很早就被灌输了。
They had kind of internalized these very timeless principles from Ben Graham that you were indoctrinated with early on.
所以我想了解一下，当你回顾在Tweedie Brown那四年的时光，你认为最重要的信条、原则是什么？
And so I wanted to get a sense from you when you think of the most important tenets, the principles that you came out of that period of four years at Tweedie Brown, what what would they be?
我想最重要的是一些基础性的、情感层面的东西。
I guess the most important things are the foundational emotional things.
所以市场是低效的，并且存在机会。
So markets are inefficient, and there is opportunity.
而这种低效性提供了巨大的机会。
And that inefficiency provides huge opportunities.
所以我从不认为市场是有效的。
And so I've never thought the market's efficient.
而且，当然，今天我认为市场，怎么说呢，效率更低，尤其是在一个时间线上。
Think and, of course, today, think that the market is, like, less efficient, especially in a timeline.
如果你以三到五年的时间跨度来看，今天投资者和市场正在犯一大堆错误，这提供了绝佳的机会。
If you look at a three to five year basis, there's a whole bunch of mistakes that investors and markets are making today and providing great opportunity.
所以我还有另一个经历，那就是我买的第一只证券，是在1975年，我确实买了纽约市住房管理局的债券。
So the other experience that I had was the very first thing I ever first security I ever bought was, in 1975, I did buy New York City Housing Authority bonds.
当时这座城市濒临破产。
So the city was gonna go bankrupt.
所以住房债券的交易价格是面值的33美分。
And so the housing bonds traded at 33¢ and a dollar.
所以我想，也许它不会涨回去了。
And so I thought, maybe it doesn't go back.
于是我就买了，你知道，用33美分买价值一美元的东西。
And so I buy, you know, a dollar for 33¢.
同样，这个价值很容易通过计算看出来。
Again, that's a value easy to do the calculation to see.
我能看出这里面有价值。
I could see how there's value in that.
而事实证明，这座城市当然没有破产，我的住房管理局债券也按面值兑付了。
And as it turned out, of course, the city didn't go bankrupt, and my housing authority bond paid off at par.
而且我在短期内还获得了可观的利息。
And I collected significant interest in the short term.
所以，我碰巧购买的第一只证券就是一家陷入困境、财务窘迫的公司。
So the very first security I happened to buy was a troubled, financially distressed situation.
另外一点是，我，我有一条原则——我不懂，我就不卖股票。
And the other thing is I I, I have the rule I don't know, I don't know sell stocks.
我倾向于永远持有某些东西，因此，最终那些被遗弃、耗尽和低迷的事物可能会分叉出巨大的机会，因为估值只会在你令人失望时下跌。
I tend to, like, own things forever, and so therefore and eventually things to fork out and potentially, like, huge opportunities come from things that have been abandoned, exhausted, and depressed because the valuation only goes down when you disappoint.
因此，潜在价值与市场价格之间的差距会越来越大，如果机会变得越来越大，机会也就越大。
And so therefore, the spread between what the value might be and what the prices in the marketplace gets wider and wider, and the opportunity, if it gets greater and greater.
我在你的一封股东信中读到一句非常精辟的话，我认为它很好地概括了你所做事情的核心，你说‘支付的价格是所有投资中最关键的因素’。
There was a very nice quote that I read in one of your shareholder letters that I thought really summed up nicely the the core of what you do, where you said the price you pay is the most critical element in all investing.
无论世界上发生什么，无论情况多么疯狂，你支付的价格是你始终可以控制的一个杠杆。
No matter what is happening in the world, no matter how crazy it is, the price you pay is the one lever you can always control.
你能再详细谈谈这一点吗？
Can you talk a little bit more about that?
因为这似乎是一个非常根本的原则，许多在我们这个时代被那些漂亮50股票冲昏头脑的人似乎都忘记了。
Because it seems like such a such a fundamental tenet that a a lot of people who've, got carried away with these kind of, the nifty 50 stocks of our own era seem to be forgetting.
嗯，在当今世界，估值显得尤为重要。
Well, today's today's world valuation is particularly important.
对吧？
Right?
而且，你知道，人们似乎已经有点忘记了这一点，但我认为这是一个关键因素。
And it's something that, you know, people have kinda forgotten, and I think it is a critical element.
当然，它常常并非真正的决定性因素。
Of course, it it frequently is not the real determinant.
所以我们最初支付的价格，正如我们经常发现的那样，在买入后的过渡期，就像许多价值投资者一样，我们买得太早，然后价值就陷入了困境。
So the value we pay initially as we frequently find that in the interim, once we buy it, as with many value investors, we buy it too soon, and the value becomes troubled.
但正如我所说，我不会卖出。
But as I said, I don't sell.
因此，当情况变得更加棘手，无论是局势还是价格因此折价更多时，我就会遵循一个反复出现的模式：买入更多。
And so therefore, as it becomes more troubled, either the situation and or the price therefore discounts more, then I have a recurring pattern of I buy more.
所以我确实说过，长期以来我们赚取最多利润的股票，往往是那些在我们买入后最初表现令人失望、股价下跌的股票。
And so I do say that the stocks that we made the most amount of money in over time are ones that initially, after our purchase, disappointed and traded down.
所以，那种有人凭经验法则认为，股价下跌20%就清仓离场、转向其他投资的想法，在我们的讨论中是完全不存在的。
So the idea that, you know, somebody has rule of thumb that, you know, down 20, I'm out of stock, I move on, kind of the that's nonexistent in our in our conversations.
当然，与此相应的推论是，巴菲特有句名言，投资的第一条规则就是不要亏钱。
And now, of course, the corollary to that is, you know, Buffett's, of course, famous for saying the first rule of investing is don't lose money.
投资的第二条规则是，别忘了第一条规则。
The second rule of investing is don't forget the first rule.
嗯，我们总是会忘记那条规则。
Well, we forget that rule all the time.
所以我们会购买那些陷入困境、财务压力大、并且存在风险的企业，包括其偿付能力方面的风险。
So we will buy things that are troubled and financially stressed and have risks to them, including the solvency of the business.
我们确实这样做过。
And we've done that.
而且我们出手太早，结果它们破产了。
And we've been too soon, and they have gone bankrupt.
但那个行业、那个产业中的机会，会以另一种形式继续存在。
But the opportunity in that business, in that industry persists in a different form.
因此，我们确保会跟进下一个买家。
And therefore, we make sure we follow the next the buyer.
以预制房屋行业为例，两千年代初就发生过这种情况，当时Wheatwood破产了，Palm Harbor也破产了，这两家公司先后都被Capco收购，或者说我们收购了Capco。
So in manufactured housing, when that happened in the early two thousands, when Wheatwood went bankrupt and Palm Harbor and, Palm Harbor went bankrupt, and both of those successively were bought by Capco, or we bought Capco.
所以我们继续这样做。
So we continued to do that.
或者当泰德沃特破产时，我又从破产中买下了泰德沃特，并且大量增持了它的股份。
Or when Tidewater went bankrupt, I bought Tidewater out of the bankruptcy again and leather loaded up on it.
因此，即使公司不复存在，机会依然持续存在，而且当压力出现、经济对压力情境以及行业经济状况不佳做出反应时，机会实际上变得更大。
So I continue to the opportunity continues to persist even if the company doesn't, and the opportunity has become substantially greater when that stress is happening and the economic response to stressful situations and poor economics and industries.
在我们从你职业生涯的Tweedy Brown部分继续之前，你能告诉我们是否有任何特别难忘的时刻吗？例如在1987年，你看到那些老前辈，比如乔·莱利或欧文·卡恩斯，是如何应对极端波动的？
Before we move on from the Tweedy Brown portion of your career, can you just tell us if there were any particularly memorable moments, for example, in 1987, for example, where you saw the reaction of these old timers, the Joe Riley types or the Irving Karnes, and you saw how they dealt with extreme volatility?
嗯，所以1987年是一个非常有趣的时期。
Well, so 1987 was particularly interesting time.
对吧？
Right?
你知道，那时我创业没多久。
So, you know, it wasn't long after I had started the business.
我当时其实还没什么像样的业务。
I didn't really have much of a business yet.
市场修正了，你知道，幅度相当大。
Market corrects, you know, as much as it did.
我想起了我祖母在纽约州北部的农场，现在仍然属于我们家。
I thought about my grandmother's farm Upstate New York, still in the family.
我说，好吧，也许我可以去经营我祖父母的农场。
I said, well, maybe I'll go farm my my grandparents' farm.
但实际情况是，我们当时有一项重大投资，是一家名为菲尔公司的企业。
But what happened was one of the big investments we had was in a company called Phil Corp.
而菲尔公司（Phil Corp）是旧鲍德温联合公司（Baldwin United）的资本重组，它曾经历破产，后又从破产中恢复过来。
And Phil Corp was the recapitalization of the old Baldwin United and had been in bankruptcy, come out of bankruptcy.
还有卢卡迪亚国家公司（Leucadia National），乔·斯坦伯格（Joe Steinberg）和他的团队。
And Leucadia National, Joe Steinberg, he and Co.
他们发现了这家公司，并获得了对它的控制权。
Had identified it, got acquired control of the company.
因此，你知道，它成为了我们在1987年工作的一个焦点。
And so therefore, you know, it was a focal point of what we were doing in 1987.
所以，你知道，这只股票当时是每股5美元。
So, you know, stock traded at $5 a share.
他们拥有的资产之一，是纽约一家名为帝国保险公司的保险盈余票据。
And one of the things they had was they had a surplus note in an insurance company in New York called Empire Insurance.
我父亲曾为帝国保险承保业务，所以我之前在一次经纪人晚宴上见过这家公司的CEO。
Now my dad wrote insurance business for Empire, and so I had met CEO of the company at, like, you know, a broker's dinner one night.
因此，我给他打了电话，并和他们的首席财务官见了面，我说，哎呀。
And so therefore called him up and met with the CFO to say, gee.
你正处于去互助化的过程中。
You're in the process of demutualizing.
那就是它的本质。
That's And what it was.
去互助化进程已经进行了一年半。
The demutualization process was a year and a half in the way underway.
接下来要发生的是，股权将被分配，并作为盈余票据返还。
And what was gonna happen was the equity was gonna be distributed and returned for the surplus note.
所以他们将拥有公司75%的股份。
So they were gonna own 75 percent of the company.
公司前一年的利润是1800万美元。
The company the year before had earned $18,000,000.
所以他们将获得1300万美元的收益。
So they're gonna earn $13,000,000.
目前有1300万股流通在外。
There's 13,000,000 shares outstanding.
因此，将突然冒出每股1美元的收益。
So there's a dollar of earnings that will pop up out of nowhere.
这只股票价格是5美元。
It's a $5 stock.
卢卡迪亚、施泰因伯格公司在他控制期间的做法是出售资产。
What Lucadia, the Steinberg and company had done through the year that he controlled it where they were selling off assets.
他们通过出售资产筹集现金，偿还所有债务，并积累现金。
And as they and raising cash, eliminating all the debt, accumulating cash.
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与此同时，他们说，哦，如果我们是以亏损价卖掉的。
In the meantime, they said, oh, if it was we sold it at a loss.
他们将其计入损益表。
They took it through the income statement.
所以盈利数据看起来非常糟糕。
So the earnings look terrible.
与此同时，他们说，如果是盈利，嗯，我们本来就打算卖掉它。
In the meantime, they said if it was a gain, well, we had intended to sell it.
根据准重组会计原则，我们将把这笔账直接计入股东权益。
And under quasi reorganization accounting, we're gonna book that directly into stockholders' equity.
所以我们不会让它经过损益表。
So we're not gonna take that through the income statement.
因此，他们把所有亏损都计入了损益表。
So they're putting all these losses through the income statement.
他们，你知道的，没有报告收益，而是在积累现金，而这家保险公司将凭空出现。
They're, you know, not reporting the gains, accumulating cash, and this insurance company is gonna pop out of nowhere.
所以我就想，我很兴奋。
So I'm like, I'm excited.
这只5美元的股票价值是它的两倍、三倍、四倍。
This is this $5 stock's worth two, three, four times that.
而且它有一笔巨大的净经营亏损，他们可以把它当作一种机制来利用。
And it has a huge NOL, and they could use it as a mechanism.
然后，崩盘就来了。
Then the the crash comes.
嗯，当然，当股市崩盘来临时，一切都会下跌。
Well, of course, everything goes down when the stock market crash comes.
所以它从五跌到了三。
So it goes from five to three.
那么接下来发生的是，Leukemia公司在1987、1988年创造了巨大的价值。
And so then what happened was, Leukemia in 1987, 1988 created a huge amount of value.
Bill Corp，break corp，以及Empire Insurance的非互助化，他们最终以远低于该业务价值的价格将其私有化了。
Bill Corp, break corp, the demutualization of in of Empire Insurance, they eventually they took it private at a fraction of what that business was worth.
所以这些事情引起了我的兴趣，那时的价值是如此清晰且令人信服，感觉就像，这是一个绝佳的机会。
So those things gravitated my interest, and the value was so clear and compelling at that time that it was like, this is a great opportunity.
而且Leucadia公司也意识到了这一点，因为他们提出了所有这些交易方案，试图收购整个公司，买下全部股份，以利用市场效率低下的情况。
And confirmation that Leucadia knew that because they proposed all these transactions where they would try to buy the whole company, buy the whole thing, and to take advantage of the fact that the market wasn't efficient.
他们了解这里的价值所在，并且这些价值远低于其内在价值，所以他们采取了机会主义的策略。
And they understood what the values were here, and they were far away from what the intrinsic values were and were opportunistic.
因此，当某个比你更了解情况、真正聪明的人用自己的资本进行投资时，你很容易就能采取机会主义的态度并跟着投资。
And so it's easy to be opportunistic and invest when somebody that's really smart that really knows the situation much better than you do is investing their own capital.
如果我能，你知道，顺势而为，那将是一个绝佳的机会。
And if I can, you know, go alongside that, that's that's a great opportunity.
所以，那是一个基于事实模式和情境的机会，对我们来说至关重要且具有启发性。
So that that was a opportunity based on a fact pattern and situation that was critical and informative for us.
看起来，你投资风格的一个主要演变是，你开始理解与这些所有者兼经营者结盟的力量，比如卢卡迪亚的乔·斯坦伯格，或者最近Subsea Seven的克里斯蒂安·森蒂米特斯，或者埃塞尔公司的戈特沃尔德家族，或者西湖公司的周氏家族，你可以看到他们是非常聪明的资本配置者，所以你不仅仅是在购买便宜的股票。
It seems like one of the major evolutions that you went through in terms of your investing style was that you started to understand the power of aligning yourself with these owner operators like Joe Steinberg at Lucadia or more recently Christian Centimeters at Subsea seven or or the Gottwold family at Ethel Corporation or or the Chow family at Westlake, where you could see that there were really smart capital allocators who so you weren't just buying cheap stocks.
你身上发生了一些转变。
Something shifted in you.
你能谈谈这一点吗？
Can can you talk about that?
因为这似乎是你作为投资者自身成长中非常重要的一部分。
Because it seems like such an important part of your own evolution as an investor.
所以就是这么回事。
So that's what it is.
我们最初买的是便宜的股票，而便宜的股票往往——有时它们之所以便宜，是因为它们确实不是好生意。
So we bought cheap stocks originally, and cheap stocks frequently, sometimes they deserve to be cheap because they're really not good businesses.
但有些时候，它们由一位出色的资本配置者掌控，他也看到了同样的机会，正在买入并将其用作一个载体。
But certain times, they are controlled by someone who is a great capital allocator, who also sees the same opportunity and is buying in and is using it as a vehicle.
因此，他们如何看待这件事、会采取什么行动，以及这如何真正改变机会集合。
And so therefore, the how they think about that and what they do and how that really changes the opportunity set.
当然，这种情况通常发生在周期性低迷、正经历困难时期的企业中。
And then, of course, that's frequently in businesses that are cyclically depressed, that are going through difficult times.
所以，这需要一位拥有更长远愿景的人。
So therefore, someone who has a longer term vision.
所以，这就是它随着时间推移的本质。
So that's what it is is over time.
我们所做的就是识别这些机会，它们来自于与合适的人结盟，这些人能够抓住机遇，具备从智力层面捕捉这些机会的能力和才干，并与之同行。
That's what we've done is we've identified these opportunities that are from aligning with the right people, who can be opportunistic, who are that have the capability and have the ability to do that from an intellectual point of view to capture those opportunities to go along with that.
那么，这一点至关重要，是什么起了作用？
So that has been critical that what worked?
要与谁结盟呢？
Who do who do align with?
我该和谁一起投资？
Who do I invest with?
以及在什么情况下？
And what situations?
因为有时候不仅仅是人的问题，也不仅仅是理念一致。
Because sometimes it's not just the people, and it's not just aligning.
它是一家被大幅折价且充满机遇的企业。
It is a business that is substantially discounted and opportune.
所以，你知道，有一两家建筑相关公司并非基于更好的管理层。
And so, you know, one or two of the building related companies were not based on it was a better management.
而是因为那是一个更好的业务，处于一个正在整合的行业中，且定位极佳。
It was a better business that was in a consolidating industry that was extremely well positioned.
因此，这是多种因素共同作用的结果。
So there's a combination of factors.
我确实认为投资就像一幅马赛克。
I do say investing is a mosaic.
你需要寻找很多因素，但并非所有这些条件都必须满足，才能构成一个有吸引力的投资机会。
There's a lot of things you look for, and you don't necessarily have to have all of those pieces for it to be a compelling investment opportunity.
我们先稍作休息，听听今天赞助商的信息。
Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.
好的。
Alright.
我想请大家想象一下，在盛夏时节在奥斯陆度过三天。
I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.
你拥有漫长的白昼、令人难以置信的美食、奥斯陆峡湾上的漂浮桑拿房，而且与你交谈的每个人都是真正在塑造未来的人。
You got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on the Oslo Fjord, and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.
这就是奥斯陆自由论坛。
That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.
从2026年6月1日到3日，奥斯陆自由论坛将迎来第十八个年头，汇集了来自世界各地的活动家、技术专家、记者、投资者和建设者。
From June 1 through the third twenty twenty six, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its eighteenth year bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the world.
他们中的许多人正活跃在历史的前沿。
Many of them operating on the front lines of history.
在这里，你将亲耳听到人们使用比特币在货币崩溃中求生、利用人工智能揭露人权侵犯，以及在审查制度和威权压力下构建技术的第一手故事。
This is where you hear firsthand stories from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses, and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures.
这些并非抽象的概念。
These aren't abstract ideas.
这些都是真实的人们当下正在使用的工具。
These are tools real people are using right now.
你将与大约2000名非凡的个体共处一室，包括异见人士、创始人、慈善家、政策制定者，他们是那种你不仅能聆听，最终还能共进晚餐的人。
You'll be in the room with about 2,000 extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with.
在为期三天的活动中，你将体验到震撼人心的主舞台演讲、关于自由科技和金融主权的实践工作坊、沉浸式艺术装置，以及那些在会议结束后仍将持续很久的对话。
Over three days, you'll experience powerful main stage talks, hands on workshops on freedom tech and financial sovereignty, immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the sessions end.
这一切都将在六月的奥斯陆发生。
And it's all happening in Oslo in June.
如果这听起来像是你向往的场合，那么你很幸运，因为你可以亲临现场参与。
If this sounds like your kind of room, well, you're in luck because you can attend in person.
标准票和赞助人票可在 oslofreedomforum.com 购买，赞助人票将提供深度参与机会、私人活动以及与演讲者的小组交流时间。
Standard and patron passes are available at oslofreedomforum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events, and small group time with the speakers.
奥斯陆自由论坛不仅仅是一场会议，它是一个让思想与现实相遇的地方，也是一个由亲历者共同构建未来的地方。
The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference, it's a place where ideas meet reality and where the future is being built by people living it.
你是否曾想探索在线交易的世界，却又不敢尝试？
Ever wanted to explore the world of online trading, but haven't dared try?
期货市场如今比以往任何时候都更加活跃，而Plus500期货正是你开始交易的理想平台。
The futures market is more active now than ever before and plus five hundred futures is the perfect place to start.
Plus500为你提供种类繁多的交易工具。
Plus five hundred gives you access to a wide range of instruments.
包括标普500指数、纳斯达克指数、比特币、天然气等等。
The S and P five hundred, NASDAQ, Bitcoin, gas, and much more.
探索股票指数、能源、金属、外汇、加密货币及其他领域。
Explore equity indices, energy, metals, Forex, crypto, and beyond.
通过一个简单直观的平台，您可以在任何地方进行交易，直接用手机操作。
With a simple and intuitive platform, you can trade from anywhere, right from your phone.
最低存入100美元，即可体验您期待已久的快速便捷的期货交易。
Deposit with a minimum of $100 and experience the fast accessible futures trading you've been waiting for.
看到交易机会了吗？
See a trading opportunity?
一旦账户开通，只需点击两下即可进行交易。
You'll be able to trade it in just two clicks once your account is open.
不确定自己是否准备好了？
Not sure if you're ready?
没问题。
Not a problem.
Plus 500为您提供无限额的风险免费模拟账户，配有图表和分析工具供您练习。
Plus 500 gives you an unlimited risk free demo account with charts and analytic tools for you to practice on.
凭借超过二十年的经验，Plus 500是您进入市场的门户。
With over twenty years of experience, Plus 500 is your gateway to the markets.
访问plus500.com了解更多信息。
Visit plus500.com to learn more.
期货交易存在亏损风险，并不适合所有人。
Trading in futures involves risk of loss and is not suitable for everyone.
并非所有申请者都能符合资格。
Not all applicants will qualify.
Plus 500，交易更胜一筹。
Plus 500, it's trading with a plus.
如果你经营着一家企业，最近可能也有过同样的想法。
If you run a business, you've probably had the same thought lately.
我们如何在现实世界中让人工智能发挥作用？
How do we make AI useful in the real world?
因为潜在收益巨大，但靠猜测来涉足其中是冒险之举。
Because the upside is huge, but guessing your way into it is a risky move.
有了甲骨文的NetSuite，你现在就能让AI发挥作用。
With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.
NetSuite是排名第一的AI云ERP，受到超过43,000家企业的信赖。
NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.
它将你的财务、库存、商务、人力资源和客户关系管理整合到一个统一的系统中。
It pulls your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into one unified system.
而正是这些互联的数据让你的AI变得更智能。
And that connected data is what makes your AI smarter.
它可以自动化日常工作，呈现可操作的见解，并帮助你在自信地做出快速AI驱动决策的同时降低成本。
It can automate routine work, surface actionable insights, and help you cut costs while making fast AI powered decisions with confidence.
现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，你可以使用你选择的AI直接连接到你的真实业务数据。
And now with the NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect directly to your real business data.
这不是什么附加功能，而是内置于你业务运行系统中的AI。
This isn't some add on, it's AI built into the system that runs your business.
无论你的公司规模是数百万还是数亿美元，NetSuite都能助你保持领先。
And whether your company does millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead.
如果你的营收至少达到七位数，请前往netsuite.com/study免费获取他们的商业指南《揭秘人工智能》。
If your revenues are at least in the 7 figures, get their free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.
这本指南在netsuite.com/study免费提供。
The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.
请访问netsuite.com/study。
Netsuite.com/study.
好的。
Alright.
回到节目。
Back to the show.
当你试图评估管理层，审视这些人的特质时，无论是克里斯蒂安·森蒂米特斯、布鲁斯·戈特瓦尔德、乔·斯坦伯格、周氏家族还是其他任何人，你在寻找什么迹象，能很好地表明这是你想与之合作的人？
When you're trying to assess the management and you're looking at the qualities of these people, whether it's a Christian Centimeters or a Bruce Gottwald or a Joe Steinberg or the Chow family or whoever, like, what what are you looking for that's a good indication that this is someone you want to align with?
反过来，你又在寻找什么迹象，让你觉得，天哪，我得离这些人远点？
And what what are you looking for also inversely that makes you think, god, I'm staying away from these people?
不。
No.
我不会避开这种情况。
I don't stay away from this.
所以，在1987、1988年，Leukadia公司是机会主义的，对吧，我们是其股东。
So so in 1987, 1988 with Leukadia being opportunistic, right, we were shareholders in.
实际上，我记得艾伦·康恩介绍我认识了查克·罗伊斯，并去拜访了他和惠特尼·蒂尔森，他们说你应该买入。
Actually, I remember Alan Conn connecting me with, Chuck Royce and going to visit him and Whitney Tilson and saying you should buy.
一年后，惠特尼·蒂尔森打电话给我说，你为什么让我买菲尔科？
And a year later, Whitney Tilson calling me up and said, why did you tell me to buy Philcore?
你为什么不让我买卢卡迪亚？
Why didn't you tell me to buy Leucadia?
价值正在被转移到那里。
That's where the value is being transferred to.
你的
Your
这只股票很便宜。
the stock's cheap.
而在Leucadia，嗯，我只是看到了他们在做什么，我看到了那些机会性的情况、折价以及他们的本质。
And in Leucadia, well, I just saw what they were doing, and I saw the opportune situations and the discounts and what they were.
所以，我亲身经历了Leucadia的时期。
So so I lived through Leucadia.
我当时并不了解Leucadia，也没有像后来遇到Christian Cee时那样，对其历史有所了解。
I didn't know Leucadia and have kind of the history of it as opposed to Christian Cee when I came across him.
他早已有在适当时机收购出版业务资产的成功记录，将其资本化，改造公司，然后并入其他实体。
He had already had a record of being successful in acquiring assets in the press business at an opportune time, capitalizing that, converting the company, merging it into someone.
所以随着时间推移，他早已拥有其他人——那些在我遇到他们之前就拥有长达十年以上记录的人——的信任，这些人显然是赚钱能手，他们思考资本配置，因为他们自己持有大量股票，理解业务，不仅控制公司，还懂得如何配置资本，从而最大化投资机会。
So he had already other people as life has gone on, the gut walls of people who clearly have a long term decade long record before I came across them say these are moneymakers who think about capital allocation because they own a lot of stock themselves and understand the businesses and not only control it, but understand how do you allocate capital, therefore maximize the opportunity for investing.
所以，在这些情况下，情况确实有些不同。
So so it's it's kinda different in those situations.
因为因为那是在1987、1988年与Leucadia合作时，我并没有起诉他们三次。
Because because it was in 1987, 1988 with Leucadia, I didn't sue them three times.
所以最初，当我开始经商时，你购买的是那些价格与价值可能存在巨大差异的小公司，而这些公司由非常精明的人控制。
So initially, when I started in business and you're buying small companies that potentially have a huge disparity between price and value controlled by a really shrewd guy.
嗯，在这种情况下，那些真正精明的人会做的事情之一就是利用市场价差，因此他们会开始做他们能做的事情。
Well, one of the things that really shrewd people do in situations like that is take advantage of that market disparity, and therefore, they start to do things that they can.
因此，部分结果就是，哎呀，你知道，作为小股东，我过去常常觉得，哎呀，那不公平或不公正。
And so therefore, part of that outcome is, gee, you know, as the little minority shareholder, I used to be like, gee, that's not fair or equitable.
因此，你知道，我会成为25起集体诉讼中的指定原告。
And so therefore, I would do you know, I was the named plaintiff in 25 class action laws.
其中三起是在87年、88年针对卢卡迪亚的。
And three of them were in '87, '88 against, Lucadia.
所以，这其中存在风险。
So, there is risk in it.
而且，你知道，即使是今天，实际上，我今天还和艾伦·汗聊了聊，我们谈到了森蒂米特斯工业公司和克里斯蒂安·森蒂米特斯，以及他对森蒂米特斯工业公司未来发展的担忧。
And, you know, even today even actually, today, I was having a chat with Alan Khan, and we were talking about Centimeters Industries and Christian Centimeters and his concern about what's gonna happen with Centimeters Industries.
我说，我不知道那里会发生什么。
And I said, I don't know what's gonna happen there.
你知道吗？
You know?
而且你面临的风险是，资产价值明显不同于股票的市价。
And you're at risk that the asset value is different than clearly the trading price of the stock.
而且，你知道，价值的变动可能不会得到平均分配。
And, you know, there may be a movement of value that doesn't get equally dispersed.
就像我在这种情况下常说的，当有一个人控制着公司时，你知道，发牌权在他手里。
As I say in these situations, when there's a guy who controls the company, you know, you deal the deck.
你一份，我一份。
One one for you, one for me.
你一份，我两份；你一份，我三份；你一份，我四份。
One for you, two for me, one for you, three for me, one for you, four for me.
所以这就是风险所在。
So that's a risk.
但如果你以足够大的折扣买入，你知道，如果你最终只得到其价值的一半，那可能也是一个非常好的回报率。
But if you buy it at a big enough discount, you know, if you end up getting half of what it's worth, then that's probably a a really good rate of return.
所以，你知道，这是你必须进行计算的一部分。
And so, you know, that's part of the equation that you have to do that calculation.
那么这个东西值多少钱？机会又在哪里？
And what is this thing worth and what is the opportunity?
因此，如果我无法获得全部价值，我是否仍然能从这项投资中获得良好的年化回报率？
And therefore, if I don't get full value, do I still make a good a great annualized rate of return on that investment?
我想稍微回溯一下时间，在你1978年从佩斯商学院毕业后，通过你的教授帕斯托里诺，你得到了一份与马里奥·加贝利共事的工作，你在那里从1980年待到1983年，那时马里奥还完全不为人知。
I wanted to go back in time a little to after you graduated from Pace Business School in, I I think, 1978, and you got a job also through your professor Pastorino working with Mario Gabelli, and you were there from 1980 to 1983 at a time where Mario wasn't well known at all.
我在想，你在那里待了三年，而且你之前说过你每天都会听。
And I was wondering, you you spent three years there, and you've said before that you would listen every day.
尽管你是首席财务官，你每天还是会听他谈论他最钟爱的投资想法。
Even even though you were the CFO, you would listen to him talking about his favorite investment idea every day.
你能谈谈那些经历，以及你从非常、非常敏锐的马里奥那里学到了什么吗？
Can you talk about those experiences and what you learned from Mario who's very, very sharp?
我的意思是，我采访过马里奥很多次，而且我告诉过和他共事的朋友们，他不是一个容易相处的人，但显然非常敏锐，言辞夸张，是一位出色的研究者。
And I I mean, I've interviewed Mario a bunch of times, and I I I I've told my friends who worked with him that he was not an easy man to work with, but clearly very sharp and full of bombast and a great researcher.
那么，那段经历对你来说是什么样的呢？
And what what was that experience like for you?
嗯，当然，我们当时已经知道他是谁了。
Well, of course, we already we knew who he was.
而且，实际上，艾伦·阿贝尔森那时已经发现了马里奥，所以他的业务规模与他的个人形象、性格和声誉完全不符。
And, actually, Alan Abelson had already discovered Mario, and so therefore, his business didn't in any way match what his persona, personality, and reputation were.
当然，当我1979年开始为他工作时——他是在1977年创立公司的。
And, of course, when I started working for him in '19 he started the firm in '77.
所以，我刚开始在那里工作时，公司只有12名员工。
And so when I started there were 12 people who worked there.
他管理着700万美元的资金。
He managed $7,000,000.
业务的主要部分在于，他最初是卖方机构分析师，那是在‘五一’佣金费率改革之前，因此那是一项利润丰厚的业务。
The main part of the business was he was originally an institutional analyst on the on the sell side when before May Day rates happened, and therefore, that was a lucrative business.
而这项业务，你知道，从72年到77年就消失了，最终事情就是这样发展的。
And that business from, you know, '72 to '77 disappeared, and then it ended up that's what happened.
威廉·温特当时所在的公司被德崇证券收购了。
William Winter, where he was at, got bought by Drexel Burnham.
他在德崇证券待了三周，然后认定这不是他想做的事，于是离开并创办了自己的公司。
He spent three weeks at Drexel Burnham and decided this is not what he wanna do, so he went out and started his own firm.
所以我在那里的时候，他的主营业务是做机构经纪业务。
So his main business at the time that I was there was doing institutional brokerage business.
因此，那就是当时公司的主要经济驱动力。
And so that was the economic driver of the business.
所以，当我刚开始为他工作时，他管理的资金是700万美元，仅此而已。
And only so it wasn't $7,000,000 is what he managed when I first started to work for him.
因此，那仅仅是个开始。
And so that was only beginning.
当然，他拥有的资本数额，他有多少资金，以及他非常活跃的行业之一是有线电视和娱乐业，而那个行业当时正处于爆发式增长的阶段。
Now, of course, the amount of capital he had, how much he had, the fact that one of the industries that he was very active in was the cable industry and entertainment, and that business was in the process of exploding.
所以，你知道，这是多种因素的综合，而且他非常善于发表言论，你知道，他有一种艾伦·阿贝尔森非常喜爱并因此广为传播的个人形象。
So, you know, it's a combination of factors, and he is very quotable, very you know, has a persona that Alan Abelson then loved that therefore broadcast that.
所以这些事情都在某种程度上帮助马里奥实现了跨越式发展。
So those things all kinda helped Mario leapfrog.
因此当我离开时，情况就是那样。
And so when I left, that's what it was.
当时他只管理着83.77亿美元。
It was he only managed an $8,377,000,000 dollars.
所以那仍然是一笔相当适中的资金。
So it was still a very modest amount of money.
但这就是为什么他每天都要开晨会，因为那是他的经纪业务，他要和四位销售人员沟通，去推销他的想法，并且他会详细阐述他的投资理念。
But that's what so every day, he had his morning meeting, because it was his brokerage business to talk to the four salespeople to go out to sell the idea he had, and he'd go through his investment thesis.
这就是我所说的。
That's what I say.
我参加了一个高管MBA项目，马里奥·加贝利几乎是一对一地教了我三年，期间他详细讲解了他最钟爱的投资理念，包括它是什么以及相关公司的情况，而且他还付钱让我去听课。
I had an executive MBA program taught to me almost one on one by Mario Gabelli for three years, where he went through his favorite investment thesis of what it was and what the company was, and he paid me to attend the class.
不是我付钱给他去听课的。
I didn't pay him to attend.
所以这是一个绝佳的机会，那是一个只有12人的公司。
So it was a phenomenal opportunity, and it was a 12 person firm.
因此，我担任了首席财务官和首席运营官，那是我刚开始工作的时候，从1980年起，我们通过巴辛公司进行清算。
And so I was the chief financial officer, chief operating officer, and that was when I first started to work from 1980, we used to clear through Bashin Company.
那是1980年代，亨特家族的白银危机，白银市场崩盘，巴辛公司即将倒闭。
And that's nineteen eighties, the silver the the Hunt family, the silver implosion, and the base is gonna go out of business.
而我们是一家破产的交易商，因此，我们的资金不受保护。
And so and we're a broken dealer, so therefore, our money is not protected.
所以加贝利公司当时正处于可能损失全部资本的过程中。
So Gabelli is about in the process of potentially losing all its capital.
因此，我们不得不四处奔波，转移业务，解决这个问题。
And so therefore, we had to scurry around and go over and, you know, move the business and get that out of the way.
所以，发生了一些非常有趣的事情。
So therefore, you know so so things happened that were really interesting.
而且，那段时间我一直与马里奥进行密集的一对一合作。
And and I worked with Mario intensively on a one on one basis that entire time.
所以，你知道，他不仅是一位伟大的投资者，也是一位出色的商人。
So, you know, he's a great businessman in addition to being a great investor.
因此，那段经历再次证明，不可能找到比这更好的机会了。
So therefore, that experience was again, couldn't invest for a better opportunity.
在分析投资、讨论投资以及运营自己业务的方式上，有哪些让你印象深刻的地方？
What stuck with you in terms of how you analyze investments, how you talk about investments, but also how you run your own business?
因为他非常精明。
Because he was he's he's shrewd.
我的意思是，他...他不是一个...我...我记得上次采访他时，这一点让我印象深刻。
I mean, he's he's a non I I it struck me when I think it was the last time I interviewed him.
他对我说，不。
He said to me, no.
我不读任何书。
I don't read any books.
我从不读书。
I never read a book.
我为什么要浪费时间看书呢？
Why would I waste time reading a book?
我每天都在读这些期刊。
I read all these journals every day.
我就是个信息狂人，对信息如饥似渴。
I'm just an information junkie, an information hound.
所以他有着非常鲜明的个性，这种对信息、对获取优势的贪婪渴望。
And I so he's got a very distinctive personality, this sort of voracious appetite for for information, for getting an edge.
有没有一些东西，仅仅是通过观察他的行事方式，你认为实际上已经影响了你，还是说你和他非常不同？
Was there stuff that just by watching him operate, you think has actually stuck with you, or are you very different?
嗯，性格上非常不同，你知道，因为他是个要求严格的人。
Well, personality is very different, you know, because he is, you know, he's a taskmaster.
为他工作很不容易。
He's hard to work for.
你知道，他是个要求很高的人，期望值很高，而且有时候如果你没有达到那些期望，他不会让你知道。
You know, he's demanding person, has high expectations, and, doesn't let you know sometimes if you don't meet those expectations.
所以，他和我不是一类人。
So, he's a different person than I am.
我觉得在保持好奇心这方面，你知道，我不太想在节目上说这个，但我其实也不读书。
I think in terms of interesting curiosity, you know, I hate to say it on air, but I don't read books either.
我特别讨厌在采访结束时，人们总是问你，你最喜欢的书是什么？
I hate that at the end of interviews, people always say to you, what's your favorite book?
你读过哪些书？
What have you read?
而我当时就想，我现在感觉自己像个白痴，因为你根本不读书。
And I'm like, I feel like I'm an idiot now because you don't read any books.
事情就是这样。
And that's what it is.
我读的是年报。
I read annual reports.
通读那些信件，你知道的。
Read through, you know, letters.
我读期刊。
I read journals.
我读所有这些东西。
I read all these other things.
所以我对事物有兴趣，但我但不读书。
So I have an interest in stuff, but I but I don't read books.
所以，所以在这方面，我们之间确实有相似之处。
And so, so there's a similarity, of course, we really do have between us in that way.
所以，是对企业以及它们如何运作和经营感兴趣。
So interest in businesses and how they work and how they operate.
而且我认为，理解那些当前没有盈利的企业的潜在收益，一直是一个关键点。
And I think that's been a critical thing is understanding the latent earnings of businesses that are not earning something today.
所以，你知道，这个说法经常出现。
So, you know, that's a phrase that comes up a lot.
当然，当你进行价值投资，投资于资产型公司时，你会谈到价值陷阱。
Of course, when you do value investing and you do asset based companies, you know, you talk about value traps.
所以，你知道，我认为价值陷阱有点像，你指的是多长的时间框架？
And so, you know, I I think that value traps are kind of like, in what time frame are you talking about?
因为，最近，大约一个月前我主持了一场晚宴。
Because, recently, I I hosted a dinner about a month ago.
当时我们大约有10个人在场，我邀请了一些仍在从事价值投资主动管理的人，他们管理的资金比以前少了很多，还包括一些不再做这行的人，因为他们转成了家族办公室，因为他们放弃了，把钱退了回去，不想再做了。
So I had about 10 of us there, and I invited a bunch of people who are still in value investing active management, managing much less money than they used to, including people who don't do it anymore because they convert it to a family office because they've given up and given back the money don't wanna do that anymore.
而我那场晚宴的主题，我称之为‘失意者的回归’。
And the nature of my dinner was I called it the restoration of the fallen.
对吧？
Right?
你知道，引用霍勒斯的那句话，格雷厄姆在《证券分析》开篇就用了。
You know, using the line from Horace that, Graham has at the beginning of security analysis.
我就是这么想的。
That's what I think.
我认为未来十年将属于选股者。
I think the next decade is going to belong to stock pickers.
而且，我不在乎那是科技公司、成长型公司、工业企业还是金融企业。
And I don't I don't care if that's technology companies, growth companies, industrials, financials.
所有这些领域都有理由去挑选个股，而不是投资指数。
All of those have reasons to pick stocks and not the index.
指数将不会胜过精选个股，而那种识别、研究、选择那些定位良好且估值具有吸引力的公司的能力，是今天可以做到的，而且现在这么做的人少了很多。
And the indexes will not outperform selecting stocks, and the ability to identify, do research, select companies that are well positioned and have valuations that are attractive, that is something that can be done today, and there are many fewer people doing that.
这在当今并不是一项富有成效的努力。
That is not a productive effort out there today.
因此，这意味着竞争格局极其有限，而这正是差异化所在。
And, therefore, that means the competitive landscape is extremely limited, and that's where the differentiation's gonna be.
它不会体现在持有指数上。
It's not gonna be in owning an index.
它将体现在持有股票上。
It's gonna be owning stocks.
所以，这就是我的观点。
And so that's what I'm saying.
这是失意者的复兴。
It's the restoration of the fallen.
选股者，主动型基金经理，在未来十年，我认为，前景光明，而且如果他们不能跑赢指数，我会感到震惊。
Stock pickers, active managers, in the next decade, I I think, have a bright future, and I think would be I'll be shocked if they don't outperform its seats.
让我们更详细地剖析一下，因为这是一个非常重要的观点，即我们将见证选股者的复仇。
Let's unpack this in more detail because it's such an important idea, this idea that we're gonna see the the revenge of the stock picker.
我最近见过你。
I saw you recently.
你说我们正在进入价值投资、选股和主动管理的新黄金时代。
You said we're entering a new golden age for value investing, stock picking and active management.
那么，在我们试图理解这为何可能时，你能否解释一下2008年后我们经历的那个完全反常、怪异的扭曲时期，它在某种程度上让人们相信了一些可能并非永久成立的原理。
So as we're trying to understand why that could be, can you explain this totally anomalous weird period of distortion that we went through after 2008 that in some way has set people up to believe something, to believe certain principles that may not turn out to be permanently true.
所以，两年前在我的信里，我谈到了金融幻境。
And so, two years ago in my letter, I talked about financial brigadoon.
并说我认为这就是我们今天所处的世界。
And said that's, I think, the world in which we live today.
所以，布里加敦，我相信你知道，这是四十年代的一部勒纳和洛伊的音乐剧，讲的是两位绅士去苏格兰旅行，在荒野上漫步时偶然发现了一个小镇，名叫布里加敦。
And so brigadoon, as I'm sure you know, it's the learner and low play from the forties, and it's about two gentlemen on a trip to Scotland, wandering across the Moors and coming across a little town, Brigadoon.
那是一个田园诗般的小镇。
It's an idyllic little town.
那里的一切都那么美好。
Everything about it is just lovely.
于是他们离开了，第二天再回来时，却发现小镇已经不复存在了。
And so they leave, and they come back the next day only to find the town's not there anymore.
然后他们问某人，发生了什么事？
And they ask someone, what happened?
布利格敦在哪里？
Where's Brigadoon?
那个人说，布利格敦每百年只出现一天。
And the guy says, Brigadoon only shows up one day a year every hundred years.
它消失了。
It's gone.
这就是我们今天所面临的情况。
And that's what we have today.
我们正处于金融危机之后，一个极其反常的时期，一个持续了很长时间的极其反常的时期。
We have post the financial crisis, an extremely anomalous period of time, an extended extremely anomalous period of time.
而它存在了这么久的事实，让人们相信这就是新的常态。
And the fact that it exists for as long as it did convinces people it was the new norm.
因此，人们思维过程和资本的扭曲正在创造机会。
And so, therefore, the distortions of people's thought process and capital is making the opportunities.
这就是为什么如今人们会说，哎呀，这些机会啊，但他们又会说，可它们表现得很差劲。
And that's what people, you know, today, they say, well, gee, these opportunities and they'll say, but they performed poorly.
是的。
Yes.
正是这种糟糕的表现，为机会的出现搭建了舞台。
The poor performance is what sets the stage for the opportunity.
其定价的估值正在为你提供这些机会，因为没有人相信情况会是那样。
The valuation of the pricing is giving you these opportunities because nobody believes that's the case.
所以，伯纳德·巴鲁克有一句话，那就是数据和信息无法替代思考。
That's so there's a a line from, Bernard Baruch, and that is data and information is no substitute for thinking.
因此，这在今天尤为关键，因为我认为，在一个经历了长时间低通胀、利率低迷甚至负利率的潜在经济环境下，人们开始相信那就是常态。
And so that's a particularly critical thing today because I think the underlying economic environment from a world of very low inflation for an extended amount of time, depressed interest rates, low, no negative interest rates, people got to believe that that was the norm.
而人们，事实并非如此，任何在那个长达十年的时期毕业并生活过的人都知道，情况就是这样。
And people it's not and and anybody who graduated and lived in that decade long period, and that's what it is.
长达十年可不是两三年，否则你可能会说，哦，不。
A decade long is not like two or three years, then you would say, oh, no.
不。
No.
你活得还不够久。
You haven't lived long enough.
你不知道。
You don't know.
你活了很长时间。
You lived a long time.
世界就是这样运转的。
That's the way the world works.
而且，即使是商界人士，我也确实认为存在一种倾向，即也许我错了，世界已经发生了变化。
And then even for people in business, I do think there's been a gravitation that, well, maybe I am wrong, and the world has evolved.
所以我真的认为，不仅仅是那些只有十年、十五年经验、只经历过一种世界的人会认为那是常态。
So I really think that it's not only people with ten, fifteen years experiences that have only lived through one world think that that's the norm.
其他人也都会这么认为。
Everybody else is going to believe that.
而这就是每个人都相信的——我们会再次回到那种环境。
And that's what everybody believes is we're gonna go back to that environment again.
因此，资本会保持现状，因为我们将会回到那种状态。
And therefore, that capital stays where it is because it's we're gonna get back to that.
而我要说的是，不对。
And I'm saying, no.
不对。
No.
不。
No.
那是一段反常的时期。
That that was an anomalistic period of time.
它不会再回来了。
It's not gonna return.
因此，你必须做好准备并投资于未来十年的经济受益者，他们与无弹道经济环境下的受益者将大不相同。
And therefore, you have to be prepared and invested on who are the economic beneficiaries in the next decade, and they're gonna be very different than who were the beneficiaries of a a non ballistic economic environment.
你在给股东的一封信中展示了一张非常有趣的图表，名为‘十年赢家’，其中展示了全球市值最大的公司如何每十年发生变化。
You had a very interesting chart that you showed in one of your in one of your letters to shareholders that was called decade winners, where you show how the world's biggest companies by market cap change from decade to decade.
所以在二十世纪七十年代，这些是由高油价驱动的能源公司。
So in the nineteen seventies, these were energy companies driven by very high oil prices.
到了二十世纪八十年代，则是主导全球经济的日本公司。
In the nineteen eighties, they were Japanese companies that dominated the the global economy.
然后你展示了在二月份，中国公司是如何崭露头角的。
Then you show how in the February, Chinese companies came to the fore.
然后在二月，那些受益于低利率以及从全球金融危机中复苏的公司。
Then in the February, companies that benefited from low interest rates and and the recovery from the global financial crisis.
所以，当你从这种接力棒传递的角度来思考这些不同的时期时，这如何帮助你理解，抱有这种近因偏见——认为‘哦，过去十年发生的事情肯定会继续，因为这就是我所看到的’——是非常危险的？
So when you think about it in terms of these kind of this kind of passing of the baton in a way, like these different periods, how does that help to inform your sense that it's really dangerous to have this kind of recency bias where you're like, oh, well, whatever happened in the last decade is bound to continue because that's what I've seen?
当然，这是近因偏见，但很容易让人相信这不是近因偏见。
Of course, it is recency bias, but it's easy to believe it's not recency bias.
当它持续了十年，你会想，哦，不。
When it's been ten years, you think, oh, no.
不。
No.
不对。
No.
不是。
No.
如果只是一年，那只能算是近因偏差。
If it was one year, that would be recency bias.
但我坚信这不是近因偏差，因为它已经持续了十年。
But I have conviction it's not recency bias because it's happened for ten years.
所以我认为这是吉姆·格兰特的观点。
So I think it's Jim I I'll attribute to Jim Grant.
有句话是这样说的：在科学和工程领域，知识是累积的；而在金融领域，知识是周期性的。
There's a line that says that in science and in engineering, knowledge is cumulative, and in finance, it's cyclical.
考虑到漫长的周期循环，人们往往会忘记这一点。
And given extended cyclical periods, the idea that people think, you know, they forget.
过往业绩并不能预示未来结果。
Past performance is not a predictor of future results.
因此，过去有效的方法未必将来也有效，这恰恰是市场存在轮动的原因。
And so therefore, what has worked isn't necessarily what's gonna work, and it's all the more reason why there are rotations.
市场存在周期。
There are cycles.
这就是我现在的观点。
And that's the phrase I have now.
这是一个否定。
It's a no.
我借用克林顿击败布什当选总统时的那句话。
I'm stealing the phrase from Clinton when he beat Bush for president.
是经济问题，笨蛋。
It's the economy, stupid.
经济环境如何？
What's the economic environment?
哪些公司将从当前的经济环境中受益，从而在经济上取得极佳的表现？
Which companies are gonna benefit from the economic environment and therefore do extremely well economically?
这些就是将会表现优异的股票。
Those are the stocks that are going to perform well.
因此，要思考哪些公司、哪些行业在当前以及未来一段时间内处于有利地位，这种有利地位结合了卓越的增长潜力，以及因过往表现不佳而被大幅低估的估值，而市场的普遍信念是它们未来也不会有所表现。
And so to think about what companies, what industries are well positioned today and for a combination of well positioned, excellent growth, and evaluations that also are heavily discounted because they haven't performed, and the conviction is they won't perform.
或者说，我了解那个行业，那是一个周期性很强、表现糟糕的行业。
Or I know that business, and that business is a cyclical crappy business.
企业会发生变化。
Businesses change.
这也是我谈论的内容。
That's what I talk about too.
我谈论的不是旧经济的复仇。
I talk about not the revenge of the old economy.
我谈论的是旧经济的蜕变。
I talk about the metamorphosis of the old economy.
那些长期表现不佳的弱势公司，资金匮乏，经历了整合与重组，而如今潜在的经济环境可能已大不相同，使它们从处于劣势转变为可能极具优势。
Poor companies that have done poorly for a long time are capital deprived, have consolidated, have restructured, and maybe the underlying economic environment is different where they've gone from being disadvantaged to potentially very advantaged today.
我认为这种模式有很多例子，既包括业绩不佳、整合重组，也包括潜在经济环境如今彻底改变，从而处于极佳的位置。
And I think that that there are many examples of that pattern of both the poor performance consolidation, restructuring, and yet the underlying economic environment totally changing now and therefore being extremely well positioned.
所以你在关注那些相当过时的旧经济行业，比如化工、建筑产品、木材、能源服务之类的。
So you're looking at quite unfashionable old economy industries like chemicals and building products and lumber and energy services and the like.
是的。
Yep.
为什么？
Why?
你在那里看到了什么？
What what are you seeing there?
也许你可以给我们举几个例子。
And and maybe you could give us a couple of examples.
我们其实不会特别具体地谈论个股，因为我希望这些访谈能具有更持久的价值。
We we don't really we're not that specific about stocks because I'd further these interviews to be fairly timeless.
但如果你能解释一下，像LSB工业公司或西湖化学这样的北美公司是如何体现你所看到的这种主题的——这些曾被所有热衷于微软、苹果、亚马逊、Alphabet等公司的人们所忽视的旧经济产业，如今却突然变得极具吸引力，甚至可能成为风口所在。
But if you could explain how these North American companies like LSB Industries or Westlake in illustrate this kind of theme that you're seeing where these these old economy industries that had been largely dismissed by everyone who is excited about Microsoft and Apple and Amazon and Alphabet and the like are suddenly actually extremely attractive and maybe where the action is.
所以，重申一下，我们是从下至上的个股选择者，也是价值投资者。
So, again, here we are at bottom up stock pickers, and we're value investors.
我们一直以来都是如此。
That's we've always been.
而事实是，在过去两到三、四年里，我意识到其实我并非那样。
And the fact of the matter is the last two to three, four years, I realized that actually I'm not that.
所以，在很多情况下，我其实是一个宏观自上而下的投资者，而且我不是一个价值投资者。
So I'm I'm I'm, in many cases, a macro top down investor, And and I'm not a value investor.
我真正寻找的是那些因为周期性变化和结构性变化而面临巨大增长潜力的企业。
I'm really looking for businesses because of cyclical changes and structural changes have a significant amount of growth in front of them.
因此，我真正寻找的是那些拥有显著增长机会、但估值却被低估的企业。
So I'm really looking for businesses that have significant growth opportunities and yet valuations that are depressed.
那么，为什么会发生这种情况，又是如何发生的呢？
And why did that happen and how did that happen?
经济学基本原理确实在起作用。
The economics one zero one really does work.
资本确实会从某些领域撤出，因此情况会发生变化。
Capital does get pulled out of things, and therefore things are different.
所以我们认为的两个主要主题是结构性变化，我们认为这是持续十年甚至更长时间的机遇，将决定谁是赢家。
So the two major themes that we think are structural changes that we think are decade two decade long kind of opportunities that will dictate who the winners are.
我不关心谁是输家，所以我不会做空任何东西，这部分我就不多说了。
I don't care who the losers are, so that I'm not gonna short anything, so I'm not gonna go through that part.
而是谁会成为赢家。
But who the winners are.
所以这两件事中的一件是，任何使用'去全球化'这个词的人，其实根本不明白正在发生什么。
And so those two things are one of them is it it anybody who uses the phrase deglobalization really just doesn't understand what's happening.
而正在发生的，当然是全球化的演进，因此，事物会发生变化。
And what's happening is, of course, it's the evolution of globalization, and therefore, things change.
不同的国家、公司、行业会获得优势，并且这种优势会随着时间的推移而转移。
Different countries, companies, industries become advantaged, and that moves over time.
因此，当然，如果你回顾足够久远的历史，我们大概都知道。
And so therefore and, of course, we kinda know that if you think back long enough in history.
对吧？
Right?
二战结束后，有一段时期日本经历了复苏，因此迎来了一段相当积极的时期。
Post World War two, there was a period of time where Japan had its recovery and therefore had a significant positive period of time.
然后情况是，当成本达到一定水平时，机会就转移到了韩国。
And then what happened was it got to a cost level where the opportunity migrated to South Korea.
然后韩国经历了一段相当长的时期，在此期间它得以发展并拥有了所有这些优势。
And South Korea then had a significant period of time where it grew and had all these advantages.
随着时间的推移，这种优势转移到了中国，因为中国拥有所有这些优势，包括其庞大的人口规模。
And then over time, that moved to China because China had all these advantages, including the scale of the population of the country.
因此，中国确实做得非常出色。
And so, therefore, that did really well.
而中国一直在发生的情况是——艾萨克·施瓦茨是我的一位年轻同事，他2005年从沃顿商学院毕业后，去亚洲旅行了一趟，并认为我们需要在亚洲投资。
And what's happening been happening in China for so Isaac Schwartz is a young colleague of mine who, when he graduated Wharton back in 2005, took a trip to Asians and thought we need to invest in Asia.
我说，艾萨克，我是个来自皇后区的孩子。
I said, Isaac, I'm a kid from Queens.
我不会说英语。
I don't speak English.
嗯，好吧，我不打算学一门外语。
I well well, I'm not gonna learn a foreign language.
那我怎么投资海外呢？
How do I invest overseas?
但他在2007年1月带我去了泰国，那几乎是亚洲金融危机爆发近十年后，而泰铢贬值正是那场危机的关键因素。
But he took me to Thailand in January '7, which is almost ten years after the Asia financial crisis, which was the Thai baht devaluation was a critical element to that.
这些股票当时极其便宜，资产负债表强劲，能产生自由现金流，还支付股息，股息率高达7%。
And these stocks were extremely cheap, strong balance sheet, generating free cash flow, paying dividends, 7% dividends.
所以，你看，我根本不需要会说泰语，也能明白这些企业是被大幅折价的机会。
And so therefore, you know, I didn't have to speak Thai to understand that these businesses are substantially discounted an opportunity.
就这样，他促使我进行了投资，并开始如实地看待这个世界。
So he got me to invest and think about the the world as it is.
因此，我和他一起游历了整个亚洲。
And so with him, I've traveled throughout Asia.
在他旅居亚洲的那些年里，我们拜访了500家上市公司。
We visited 500 public companies over, you know, the number of years he lived in Asia.
而且，我记得大约十五年前曾与一家韩国公司交谈过，他们那时已不在韩国本土生产服装了，因为当初韩国工资水平比朝鲜低，所以他们在那里起步，并逐渐获得了竞争优势。
And, and and that process I remember talking to a Korean company fifteen years ago that no longer made garments in South Korea where they started to do it when South Korea had a lower wage rate than North Korea because it was competitively advantaged over time.
当然，后来情况并非如此了。
Of course, it wasn't.
所以他们说，好吧，我们去中国生产吧。
So they said, well, let's go make it in China.
但他们已经不再在中国生产了。
And they weren't making things in China anymore.
他们早就去孟加拉国和越南了。
They had already gone to Bangladesh in Vietnam.
因此，企业早在一段时间前就开始逐渐离开中国了。
So businesses have been gravitating out of China at some point for a long time.
我认为这个过程将会加速。
That process, I think, is in the you know, going to accelerate.
所以，我认为这是全球化的演变。
So, therefore, I think it's the evolution of globalization.
而全球化的演变就是，你知道的，它会向南、向西转移。
And the evolution of globalization is, well, you know, it's kinda it moves south out that it moves west.
因此，下一个目的地将是拥有6.5亿人口的东南亚和拥有14亿人口的印度。
And so the next places it's going to is Southeast Asia with 650,000,000 people and India with 1,400,000,000 people.
所以，有20亿人正在经历中国四十年前所做的一些事情的复制过程。
So 2,000,000,000 people that are in the process of replicating some of what China did forty years ago.
因此，那个全球化进程及其演变意味着大规模的基础设施建设、巨大的变革以及庞大的能源消耗。
And so that that globalization process and the evolution means huge amount of infrastructure build out, huge amount of changes, huge amount of energy consumption.
因为当你踏上那个经济阶梯——日本、韩国、中国——人均能源消耗量会显著增加。
Because as you start that economic ladder, Japan, Korea, China, the per capita consumption of energy significantly increases.
所以，你将看到世界上有20亿人开始提高他们的收入水平。
So you're gonna see 2,000,000,000 people in the world start to raise their income level.
所以我认为这是一个关键因素。
So I think that that's a that's a critical factor.
全球化演变的另一个事实是，人们谈论‘回流’，这又是一个用词不当的说法。
The other fact part of globalization about evolution is people say reshoring, which, again, is a misnomer.
不是回流。
Not reshoring.
北美在任何能源密集型产业中都具备竞争优势。
It is North America is competitively advantaged in any energy intensive business.
因此，化石能源是我投资了五十年的领域。
And so energy fossil fuels is something I've invested fifty years.
我认为我对这些行业的运作方式有非常深刻的理解。
I think I have a really good understanding as to how those businesses work.
并不是说我知道六个月后大宗商品的价格会是多少。
Not that I know where the commodity price is gonna be in six months.
我完全不知道六个月后大宗商品的价格会是多少，但我清楚这些行业是如何运作的。
I have no idea where the commodity price will be in six months, but how those businesses work.
但北美地区，由于其拥有无法出口的丰富天然气资源，其能源成本与世界其他地区脱节，这是一个持久性的长期优势。
But North America, because it has an abundance of north of natural gas that you can't export, has an energy cost that's disconnected from the rest of the world, and that is a persistent long term advantage.
如果你从事的是能源密集型产业，在北美进行生产是具有竞争优势的地点。
And if you're doing something energy intensive, doing it in North America is a competitively advantaged place.
所以，五十年前我大学毕业时，我们处于竞争劣势。
So when I got out of college fifty years ago, we were competitively disadvantaged.
如今，在世界经济的很大一部分领域，我们具有竞争优势。
Today, we're competitively advantaged in a large portion of the of the world's economy.
因此，无论是欧洲企业还是亚洲企业，甚至包括那些前来北美利用这一长期机遇以获取超额利润和回报的亚洲企业，都因为这里持续的低成本能源环境而受益。
And so therefore, it's European businesses or than Asian businesses, but also Asian businesses that are coming to North America to take advantage of that long dated opportunity for excess profits and returns because of the low cost environment for energy, which will be persistent.
所以，这再次成为我思考的一个关键点。因此，如果你是一家北美的工业企业，通常市场上只剩下三家这样的企业。
So that's, again, a critical thing that I, you know, think and, therefore, if you are an industrial business in North America, frequently, there's three of them left.
并且形成了一个寡头垄断的局面，它们拥有最低的成本，因此相对于世界其他地区具有竞争优势，因为劳动力并非主要成本构成。
And there's an oligopoly that has the lowest cost, and therefore, competitively advantaged against the rest of the world because labor is not a big component.
关键在于投入成本。在许多情况下，如果你生产化学品并使用天然气作为原材料，并且你的能源由天然气或低成本电力供应，那么你就具备了竞争优势。
It's the inputs, and the inputs, in many cases, to the extent that you make a chemical and use the raw materials natural gas, and your energy is, you know, supplied by either natural gas or a lower cost electricity, you're competitively advantaged.
所以你得在北美生产氨、化肥和化学品。
So you gotta make ammonia, fertilizers, chemicals in North America.
你会在北美生产钢铁，因为你的最终市场有需求。
You're competitively you're gonna make steel in North America because you're in the end market that demands it.
你拥有国内的铁矿石。
Got You the iron ore that's domestic.
你拥有国内的冶金煤。
You got the met coal that's domestic.
你拥有低成本的能源，并且所在的行业生产的钢铁，每吨产生的二氧化碳排放量远低于世界其他地区。
You got low cost energy, and you have an in an industry that produces steel for substantially less c o two per ton than the rest of the world does.
所以，从环境角度来看，我们也具有竞争优势。
So so, environmentally, we're competitively advantaged also.
因此，这些情况已经大不相同了。
So these things are very different.
这就是为什么我说这是旧经济的蜕变，因为这些企业在结构上已经与以往有了根本性的不同。
That's why I say the metamorphosis of the old economy because these are fundamentally structurally different businesses than they've ever been.
在一段时期内，鉴于《通胀削减法案》等优势以及我们正在大力发展可再生能源，北美地区的经济活动意味着需求正呈指数级增长，因此，你处于极佳的位置，有望实现高速增长。
And in a period of time where activity in North America, given things like the inflation reduction act and all of those other advantages, as we build out renewables, mean the demand is growing exponentially, and therefore, you're extremely well positioned for high growth.
然而，估值却极为温和，因为人们会想：'哦，我知道那是个周期性很差的行业。'
And yet, valuations are extremely modest because, oh, I know that business is a cyclical crappy business.
它已经改变了。
It changed.
它已今非昔比。
It isn't what it used to be.
它如今是一只蝴蝶。
It's a butterfly today.
不再是毛毛虫了。
It's not a caterpillar.
所以，在某种程度上，正如你之前提到的，这类似于巴菲特审视铁路行业时所说的，这个曾经一直很糟糕的行业，如今已不再糟糕。
So in a way, as as you've mentioned before, it's analogous to when Buffett looked at something like the railroad industry and said, actually, this thing that was always a terrible industry is no longer a terrible industry.
没错。
That's right.
这就是我常开玩笑说的，因为1975年我大学毕业。
That that's what I always do joke because 1975, I got out of college.
我的意思是，我大学毕业时，有一家很棒的叫《华尔街日报》的企业，因为就在《华尔街日报》对面。
That's what I say is when I got out of college, there was a great business called The Wall Street Journal because there was no across the street from The Wall Street Journal.
我当时面试了一家铁路公司，然后说，这行业太糟糕了，资本密集型。
And it was a I interviewed with a railroad company and said, this is a horrible business, capital intensive.
成本太高了。
Costs are too high.
你知道，这东西亏钱亏得厉害。
You know, the thing just loses money like crazy.
你为什么要涉足其中呢？
Why would you wanna be in it?
事实上，铁路本质上是一种垄断业务。
The fact of the matter is railroads are inherently a monopoly business.
只要有一条铁路线连接此地与彼地，你就是任何物品最低成本的运输者，而且没人会再建一条新的。
To the extent that you have a rail line that goes from this place to that place, you are the low cost transporter of anything and everything, and no one's gonna build a new one of them.
因此，存在进入壁垒，所以你拥有那个优势。
So therefore, there's a barrier to entry, and therefore, you have that advantage.
所以，从结构上看，这是一个具有那些积极特性的业务。
So, structurally, it was a business that has those positive actions.
当然，如今《华尔街日报》对于那些能承受巨额亏损却无法再赚到钱的人来说，只是一种虚荣的象征。
And, of course, today, the Wall Street Journal is a vanity thing for people who can afford to lose a lot of money and can't make any money anymore.
所以，事物是变化的。
So things change.
你知道吗？
You know?
而且人们没有这样的视角，哦，事物是有周期的。
And people don't have the perspective of, oh, there are cycles.
有些事情会发生，今天正确的事情明天未必正确。
There are things that happen, and what is true today is not necessarily true tomorrow.
我记得很多年前的比尔·米勒。
I remember Bill Miller many years ago.
我记得大约在2000年或2001年，当时我为了给《财富》杂志撰写一篇关于他的特稿而跟随他四处采访时，他曾对我说，市场最大的问题在于事物会发生变化。
Think I when I was following him around back in about 2000 to write a profile or 2001 to write a profile of him for Fortune said to me the biggest problem in markets is that things change.
在我看来，过去几年里，甚至在许多价值投资者中，几乎形成了一种正统观念，即你应该持有更高质量的公司股票，以至于连价值投资者都变得有点像'漂亮50'那种类型的投资者了。
And it seems to me such an interesting thing that in the in the last few years, even among many value investors, it became almost an orthodoxy that you should own higher quality companies and that even the value investors became kind of almost like nifty 50 kind of investors.
对吧？
Right?
就像……我一直在想你是如何处理这个问题的，因为这几乎成了你们圈子里主流的、占主导地位的制胜之道。
Like like and I I was wondering how you dealt with that issue because that did become almost the dominant the dominant way to win within your community.
不。
No.
所以，在我看来，价值投资者分为两种类型。
That's so so there were two types of value investors in my mind.
对吧？
Right?
有一种价值投资者像我这样，主要持有硬资产类业务。
There's the value investor like me who hard owns hard asset kind of businesses.
而且，你知道，所以也许那也包括柯蒂斯·詹森，他几年前加入了我们，第三大道，马蒂·惠特曼的公司。
And, you know, so maybe that's also Curtis Jensen who joined us a number of years ago, 3rd Avenue, Marty Whitman's firm.
对吧？
Right?
或者说，你知道，有很多公司的例子，你知道，就是那样。
Or, you know, there's there's a lot of examples of firms that, you know, were that.
当然，他们很不幸地非常成功，并筹集了大量资金。
And, of course, they had the misfortune of being very successful and raising a lot of money.
所以，你知道，在零六、零七、零八、零九年那会儿，他们拥有数十亿甚至上百亿美元的资金。
And so, therefore, you know, back in o six, o seven, o eight, o nine, they had billions and billions of dollars.
因此，那些业务后来就大幅内爆了。
And so, therefore, those businesses then have imploded substantially.
另一类价值投资者则足够聪明，他们买入了苹果、微软，你知道的，随便哪家公司，当它还是便宜股、价值股的时候。
The other value investor who did who was smart enough, who did buy Apple, Microsoft, you you know, you name the company when it was a cheap stock, and it was a value stock.
因此，他们也很幸运，没有随着时间的推移卖掉那些东西。
And and therefore, they had the good fortune not to sell that thing over time too.
对吧？
Right?
因为他们本可以截断自己的盈利机会。
Because they would have truncated their opportunity for profits.
所以这些投资后来变得非常成功，以至于他们现在有点被套在里面了。
And so those have grown to be very successful investments that they're kinda stuck in today.
所以那些表现好的价值投资者，就是那些一直持有这些股票的人，而且他们可能还多多少少接受了这样一种想法，比如，嗯，也许更好的企业值得付出更高的价格。
So the value guys who performed well are the guys who held on to those stocks and and probably have bought in a little bit more to the idea like, gee, there is maybe better businesses are worthwhile to pay a higher price for.
你明白吗？
You know?
而且，再说一次，你听沃伦·巴菲特这么说过，因此，你会把这种理念应用到所有情况中。
And, again, you know, you hear Warren Buffett say that, and and therefore, you apply that to every situation.
哦，为了更好的企业，值得支付更高的价格。
Oh, it's a better business to pay a higher price.
那么，你什么时候会开始困惑，到底什么才是更好的企业呢？
And, you know, when do you start to confuse yourself as to what's a better business?
那么，企业是在什么时候随着时间发生变化的呢？
And and when do businesses change over time?
它曾经是一家更好的企业，但它会改变吗？
And it was a better business, but does it change?
我的意思是，让我们继续探讨这个问题。
I mean, let's continue to have that.
所以，价值投资者已经走向了两个不同的方向。
So value investors have gone two different ways.
他们要么因为购买了硬资产而内爆，因此，这些资产一直不受青睐。
They've either imploded because they bought hard assets, and therefore, things have been out of favor.
我们很幸运，因为我们管理的资金不多，而且我们拥有的资金来自那些真正长期投资、与我们合作已久、并且我们为其创造了回报的人。
And we're fortunate because we didn't manage a lot of money, and the money that we have is from people who are really long term and have been with us for a long time that we've made returns for.
因此，我之所以能够这样，是因为这是一个关键因素。
And so therefore, I've had because that's a critical piece.
如果我的资本与我不一致，那么我就无法做到我所做的事情，因为他们不会在那些艰难岁月里一直支持我，而确实有一段时间非常艰难，直到最近几年我们才做得非常好，而且我认为我们今天处于极佳的位置。
If the if my capital wasn't aligned with me, then I couldn't do what I have done because they wouldn't have stayed with me through the through the lean years, and they were definitely a bunch of lean years to the point where, you know, we've done really well the last number of years, and I think we're extremely well positioned today.
所以，这就是价值投资者的两个派别，以及他们如何随着时间的推移而有所变化，那些适应了变化的人赚到了钱，但我认为他们的投资组合中也存在估值问题，以及那些表现良好且可能继续表现良好的业务。
So so that's the two pieces of value investors and how they've kinda changed over time, and the ones that have adapted have money, but I think also have valuation issues that they have in their portfolios and businesses that have done well and could do well.
再次强调，这就是为什么我说这是选股者的十年，因为，你知道，即使是‘七巨头’，我前几天听到彭博社说‘六巨头’。
And, again, that's why I say it's a stock picker's decade because, you know, even the Magnificent Seven, I heard the Bloomberg the other day, say the Magnificent Six.
所以，他们基本上已经认定了一个，而这就是将会发生的情况。
So they've already kinda like they identified one and that's what'll happen.
这和‘漂亮50’时期发生的情况是一样的。
It's it's the same thing that happened with the nifty 50.
其中一些企业确实是卓越的企业。
Some of these businesses are they are phenomenal businesses.
股价上涨的原因是经济基本面强劲。
And the reasons the stocks have gone up is because the economics have been strong.
所以这不像互联网泡沫时期那样，当时的估值或情况毫无道理，那些企业本身一文不值。
And so it's not like just it's not what it was in the .com era where this valuations or things made no sense, and they were businesses that weren't worth anything.
这些都是实实在在的企业，取得了显著的经济回报，当然其中一些未来可能表现不佳。
The these are real businesses that have had, you know, significant economic returns, and then still some would but but some of them won't do well.
而我并不知道具体是哪些公司。
And I don't know which ones those are.
如果你选对了，就能获得不错的回报。
And if you pick the right ones, you'll do okay.
但如果你选错了，这些证券显然会面临估值风险。
And if you pick the wrong ones, you have clearly valuation risk in those securities.
当你观察那些信奉只需持有微软、苹果、亚马逊、Alphabet、Meta、Visa和强生等公司理念的投资者时。
When you look at investors who bought into the idea of just owning, you know, Microsoft Apple and Amazon Alphabet and Meta and Visa and J and J.
摩根
P.
这些超级成功的美国公司，它们受益于那段低利率时期以及从金融危机中的复苏。
Morgan, you know, these kind of super successful US companies that benefited from that period of low interest rates and the recovery from the financial crisis.
他们是否忽略了某些特别的东西，不是要指责什么，而是作为一个在这个行业里待了五十年的人，如果你能给人们一些睿智的视角。
Is there something in particular that they're forgetting that you, you know, not in terms of wagging the the finger, but if as someone who's been in this business for fifty years, if you could just give people some sort of sage perspective.
因为我认为，我们常常回顾那些事后看来似乎显而易见、事情发展仿佛不可避免的时期。
Because I think often we look back on periods where it seems obvious in retrospect and things were sort of inevitable.
我总是会想，为什么我当时没有听霍华德·马克斯的话呢？
And and I'm always like, why didn't I listen to Howard Marks at the time?
或者为什么我当时没有听巴菲特的话呢？
Or why didn't I listen to Buffett at the time?
你能从宏观角度谈谈，人们在评估那些已经如此成功的公司时，应该考虑些什么吗？
Can can you put into perspective what it is that people ought to be thinking about as they're framing companies like that that have been so successful?
嗯，我、我、我认为一个关键因素是估值。
Well, I I I think a critical thing is valuation.
所以我经常引用2011年巴菲特信中谈到固定收益的内容。
So I I regularly quote, in in the 2011 letter, Buffett made a point of talking about fixed income.
他提到了谢尔比·卡伦·戴维斯那句著名的话，说债券是无回报的风险。
And and, you know, he referred to Shelby Cullen Davis's famous line that, you know, bonds were a return free risk.
那是2011年的事。
That was in 2011.
那已经是很久以前了。
That was a long time ago.
但在这整个期间，这个问题并没有真正显现出来。
And for that entire time, that didn't come home to roost.
但我的无风险回报率是多少呢？
But, of course, what's my risk free rate of return?
因此，我看到了无风险回报率。
And so therefore, I saw the risk free rate of return.
你知道，我觉得回到两三年前，你该怎么确定无风险回报率呢？
You know, I actually think for you know, go back two or three years ago, tell me, how do you figure a risk free rate of return?
因为如果他计算的是十年期国债，但十年期国债的收益率却低于通胀率。
Because if he's figured the ten year treasury but the ten year treasury was, like, lower than what the inflation rate was.
所以十年期国债的实际回报是负的。
So the real return on ten year treasury was negative.
如果你的无风险回报率是负的，那我还得在上面加上风险溢价。
So if your risk free rate of return is negative, and then I gotta put the premium on top of that.
那这个风险溢价应该是多少呢？
Well, what's the premium on top of that?
我该从哪里开始呢？
And where do I start?
在我看来，这个基础根本就站不住脚。
So it seemed to me that the foundation was in the wrong place.
因为至少，假设这就是你的无风险回报率，根本没有任何安全边际。
Because if nothing else, there was no margin of safety in assuming that that was your risk free rate of return.
然而在房地产领域，资本化率却全都基于这些低回报率来计算。
And yet in real estate, capitalization rates were all predicated on those low returns.
所以，你明白了吗？
And so therefore you know?
因此，在我看来，真正的风险在于，我认为当今的资本配置存在严重错配。
So the real risks in my mind I because I do think I think capital today is substantially misallocated.
对吧？
Right?
资本的配置是基于一个资金免费的环境，并假设这是常态。
It's been allocated based on an environment of free money and the presumption that that's the norm.
事实上，当然，我们谈论的是公开市场，但我们尚未具体提及的另一个市场是私募市场。
And the fact that and the two and, of course, we talk about public markets, but the other market we haven't specifically referenced is the private market.
所以我认为私募市场存在巨大风险，而且有更多资金流入那里，你知道，资金被配置到私募市场，并且私募市场的估值变动缓慢。
So private markets, I think there's a huge amount of risk and more capital goes there, you know, and and it's allocated to private markets and kinda and and private markets valuations move slowly.
那么正确的回报率是多少呢？
And what's the right rate of return?
而正确的回报率，正确的回报率将由狗来决定，而不是由尾巴来决定。
And and and the right rate of return is the right rate of return is gonna be determined by the dog and not the tail.
对吗？
Right?
尾巴是美联储，而狗是通货膨胀。
The tail is the Fed, and the dog is inflation.
狗决定了利率。
The dog determines interest rates.
尾巴，也就是美联储，并不能决定利率。
The tail, the Fed does not determine interest rates.
而人们认为情况就是如此。
And people think that that's the case.
你知道，如果，如果我再在广播上说一次，在电视上说四次，你知道，就像，美联储接下来会做什么？
You know, I if if I right here one more time on the radio, four times on TV, you know, like, what's the fed gonna do next?
他们会加息。
And they're gonna raise rates.
我就想，唉。
I'm like, ugh.
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