RWH048：押注万亿级异类人才，与亚当·夏皮罗对话

这些是我们的价值观。

These are our values.

这是我们所重视的。

This is what we care about.

你会发现，当你接触到我们圈子中的人时，他们往往具备这些特质，这既是优秀的人才，也是优秀的人品。

And what you're gonna find is that when you meet people in our orbit, they, you know, they tend to be they tend to have those characteristics, which is really great talent and really great character.

你的公司之所以对我们的听众和观众来说既有趣又有启发性，是因为你公司——东岩——的核心模式之一，就是支持那些刚成立或即将成立新投资公司的明星基金经理。

One of the reasons why your firm is interesting and instructive to our listeners and viewers is the a big part of the model of your company, East Rock, is basically to back these star fund managers who've recently launched new investment firms or about to launch a new investment firm.

因此，你已经成为识别所谓‘异类人才’的专家。

So you've become an expert in identifying what we could describe as outlier talent.

这显然是所有对投资感兴趣的人——而不仅仅是靠自己选股来管理资金的人——都需要掌握的技能。

And that's something obviously that all of us who are interested in investing, who aren't just managing our own money solely by picking individual stocks and all, like, need to figure out how to do.

所以我希望更深入地探讨一下，你们是如何识别优秀投资者的，因为我认为这对所有人都有借鉴意义。

So I wanted to home in a bit more on this whole question of how you identify great investors because I think it's applicable for all of us.

你们的做法中有一件非常不寻常的事，那就是你们并不打算找到一位优秀的人后就永远与之合作。

One of the things that's very unusual about what you do is you're not looking to find someone great and then stay with them forever.

你正在找到你所说的这种最佳结合点。

You're finding this kind of sweet spot as you describe it.

你能解释一下你在那里具体做些什么吗？

Can you explain what it is you're doing there?

因为这种见解非常独特，是你所做事情的鲜明特征。

Because it's such an unusual insight that's very distinctive to what you do.

我觉得这里面包含两个问题，所以我一个一个来回答。

I think there are two questions in there, so maybe I'll hit them one by one.

我想你之前提到过，投资的95%在于寻找机会。

I think the first thing you recited earlier, the 95% of investing is sourcing.

那个95%的说法显然有些过于精确了。

There's obviously some false precision in that 95%.

我给你另一个数字吧，这个是七五开，也带点虚假的精确性。

I'm gonna give you another you know, this one will be seventy five twenty five, and there's a bit of false precision.

但我觉得，我能识别出一位优秀投资者的75%原因，在于掌握了关于该投资者的数据，而另外25%则是某种更出色的分析和模式识别能力。

But 75%, I would say, of I can identify a great investor is having data about that investor as opposed to the other 25%, which is, you know, some superior ability of analysis and pattern recognition.

因此，这又回到了认识大量共同人脉，并通过特定流程挖掘出关于这些人的数据。

And so this comes back to knowing lots of people in common and running a certain process that really unearths that data about the person.

所以，识别优秀投资者的关键是尽可能早地与他们见面，而我们有多种方式能做到这一点。

So the key to identifying great investor is meeting them as early as you possibly can, and we have lots of ways we do that.

比如，通过反复互动，逐步构建出对他们的整体认知——包括他们的工作成果、风格以及优势。

You know, repeat interactions, and then, you know, building this whole picture of who they are and what their work product has been, what their style is, and what their advantages are.

这需要大量时间，而构建这些认知的砖块，主要来自你与共同认识的人的联系。

That takes a lot of time, and the bricks that build that all up are mainly supplied by people you know in common.

所以我怎么强调这一点都不为过。

So I I just can't emphasize that enough.

我们已经以非常有目的的方式做了将近十八年，正是通过这些互动和共同关系所积累的关于人的数据，才真正让其余的一切成为可能——比如判断出……

It's you know, we've been doing this for close to eighteen years and doing it in a very purposeful way, and it's sort of the data about the people that we get through all those interactions and all those common relationships that really make, you know, the rest of it possible, figuring out you know?

你必须回答一些关键问题，比如，是这个人本身优秀，还是他所在的公司优秀？

You have to answer key questions like, you know, was it the person or was it the firm?

对吧？

Right?

我写过关于一个颇具讽刺意味的现象：评估来自顶尖公司的人员反而更困难，因为他们的成功更有可能归因于公司而非个人。

I've I've written about how sort of ironically it's harder to evaluate people from the very best firms because it's a bit more likely that the success was attributable to the firm rather than the person.

因此，弄清楚是个人还是公司带来了成功，至关重要。

So figuring out was it the person or was it the firm is incredibly important.

那么，为什么这如此重要呢？

Now why is that so important?

我曾写过一些研究，我认为那是一篇非常出色的论文，它利用大规模数据集论证：在任何私募投资或私募股权中，做出该投资的个人在决定或预测投资结果方面，其重要性是其所任职公司的四倍。

There's, you know, there's a bit of research I've written about, which I think is a pretty brilliant paper, and it uses a large dataset to make the argument that on any private investment, any private investment or private equity, the individual who makes that investment is four times more important in determining the outcome or predicting the outcome of that investment than the firm where they worked.

一旦你明白了这一点，我认为这几乎就像以一种略微不同的方式看待世界。

And once you know that, I think, again, it's almost like seeing the world in a slightly different way.

你知道，所有这些公司都只是人的集合，有些人是真正的天才，有些人则不是。

You know, all these firms are just collections of people, and, you know, some are true outlier talent and some are not.

弄清楚谁是谁至关重要，因为你希望追随那些真正卓越的人才，那些推动成果的人；你希望在关键时刻出现时，能够获得对他们工作成果的高度集中关注，而这样的时刻往往确实存在。

And figuring out which is which is incredibly important because you wanna follow, you know, that forex talent, that person, you know, who drives those outcomes, you wanna be there when there's a moment, and there often is, there's a moment to get very concentrated exposure to their work product.

这不过是另一种说法：最终，他们中的许多人会创办自己的公司。

And that's just, you know, another way of saying, at some point, they're gonna launch their own firm, a lot of them.

这正是你可以集中接触到他们工作成果的时刻。

And that is a moment when you can get concentrated exposure to their word product.

所以

And so

对于想了解更多关于这篇论文的人，我会把它放在节目笔记中。

For people who are looking to find out more about this paper, I'll put it in the show notes.

但有一篇亚当引用的论文。

But there's a there's a paper that Adam cites.

亚当在领英上写了非常有趣的文章，我也会在节目笔记中附上链接。

Adam writes these very interesting pieces on LinkedIn that I I'll link to as well in the show notes.

在他的其中一篇文章中，目前他已经写了大约15篇，我昨天把全部都读完了。

And in one of his pieces, there are about 15 of the pieces so far, which I I read all of yesterday.

其中一篇引用了这篇名为《该追随谁》的论文，该论文分析了大约4000名私募股权经理，并研究了约13000笔交易。

And one of them cites this paper called whom to follow, which analyzes about 4,000 private equity managers and looks at something like 13,000 deals.

它得出了一些有趣的发现，比如亚当所说，当解释私募股权业绩差异时，主导某项投资的个人的重要性是其所在私募股权公司的四倍。

And it has these interesting findings, like as Adam said, this this one that when it comes to explaining differences in private equity performance, the individual who leads a given investment is four times as important as the private equity firm where they were.

那篇论文中另一个非常有趣且与你密切相关的地方是，他们指出小型基金的表现远优于大型基金。

Another thing that was really interesting in that paper that also is really relevant to you is they said smaller funds do a lot better than larger ones.

所以，你所做的很多事情，本质上就是去这些顶尖的公司——比如老虎管理公司、贝莱德、黑石、贝恩资本、高盛等等——寻找真正有才华的人，判断谁最有可能成立自己的基金，然后坚定地押注于那些由顶尖人才管理的小型基金更有可能取得优异表现。

So a lot of what you seem to be doing is basically going to these firms, you know, these great firms, whether it's, you know, Tiger Management or BlackRock or Blackstone or Bain Capital, Goldman or whatever, looking for who's really talented, figuring out who's likely to set up their fund, and then really betting on the fact that small funds run by highly talented people are likely to do well.

这至少在一定程度上是对你的策略的准确概括吗？

Is is that a fair summary of at least a part of what your strategy is?

是的。

Yes.

等等。

Etcetera.

某种程度上，我曾半开玩笑地对杰克说过。

On some level, I had Jake this slightly jokingly.

你漏掉了最重要的一点：研究表明，不仅小型基金表现更好，而且它们实际上更安全。

You're leaving out the most important part, which is research shows not only that small funds do better, but they're actually safer.

它们的风险实际上更低。

They're actually less risky.

而这正是让很多人感到反直觉的地方。

And that is the part that is counterintuitive to many people.

这可能是最难理解的部分。我把自己视为小型基金的积极倡导者，我在对话中注意到了这一点。

It's probably the hardest thing to I sort of view myself as someone who's a, you know, a bit of a champion vocal champion for smaller funds, and I noticed that in conversation.

如果我说小型基金的回报更高，人们会点头表示认同。

If I say smaller funds have higher returns, people kinda nod their heads.

他们能直观地理解为什么会是这样。

They they sort of understand intuitively why that might be the case.

然后我说，顺便提一下，它们风险更低。

Then I say, oh, and by the way, they're less risky.

这时，对话就中断了。

And then I then then the conversation's lost.

但数据确实支持这一点，我也写过相关内容。

But it's there in the data, and I do write about that as well.

是因为它们更挑剔，因为资产较少，所以交易数量更少，不需要寻找那么多项目来配置资本吗？

Is it because they're more discerning that they have fewer deals because they have less assets, and they don't they don't have to find so many deals to put their capital to work?

这些规模小、集中度高的基金为什么风险更低？

What what makes these small concentrated funds less risky?

是的。

Yeah.

有趣的是，这种情况在私募股权和对冲基金中似乎都成立。

And and what's interesting, it seems to be the case in private equity and hedge funds.

在这两种情况下，原因各不相同。

So and those two cases, it'll be for different reasons.

但没错，规模较小的基金通常能从更优厚的投资标的中进行选择。

But, yes, smaller funds are choosing from a generally more more favorable set.

它们做的交易更少，因此能为每笔交易投入更多时间。

They are doing fewer deals, so they're spending more time on each deal.

你知道，年轻的基金经理背负着更大的压力。

You know, younger managers just have more at stake.

早期的交易必须成功。

Those early deals must work.

所以在私募方面，有一整套相关因素。

So there's a there's a whole series of factors on the private side.

而在公开市场方面，我认为其中一些因素依然适用，但除此之外，还有灵活性的问题。

And then on the public side, I I tend to think it's, you know, some of those factors, but in addition, it's the nimbleness.

你知道，当你是一个较小的基金时，你可以避开那些对你不利的空头头寸，或者某种趋势。

You know, when you're a smaller fund, you can get out of the way of, you know, a short that's going against you or, you know, some trend.

你知道，你可能在应该做成长型投资时却持有了价值型股票，而市场走势完全不利于你。

You know, you may be caught sort of long value when you should be long growth and everything's going against you.

如果你规模较小，流动性就会更好。

If you're smaller, you just have greater liquidity.

你有更好的能力来调整仓位并及时脱身。

You have a, you know, better ability to move things around and get out of the way.

但这种情况在公开市场和私募市场似乎都成立。

But it it seems to be the case for public sign privates.

这种‘年轻经理人更值得关注’的观点非常有趣，甚至有些颠覆性，我想稍微深入探讨一下。

This idea that younger managers are the place to be is really interesting and kind of subversive, and I I wanted to unpack it a little bit.

你在其中一篇文章中提到过。

You you quote in one of your pieces.

你说，在普通的创业中，60岁的初创企业创始人创建有价值企业的概率大约是30岁创始人的三倍。

You said, in normal entrepreneurship, a 60 year old startup founder has a roughly three times higher chance of creating a valuable business than a 30 year old founder.

这一结论基于东岩数据科学家、科学顾问塞思·斯蒂芬斯-戴维多维茨指出的研究，他还撰写了《别相信你的直觉》这本书。

This is based on something that was pointed out by, an East Rock data scientist, science adviser, Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, who also wrote this book, Don't Trust Your Gut.

然后你继续说。

And then you continue.

但在投资公司中，年轻创始人明显占主导地位。

But in investment firms, there is a clear concentration of younger founders.

因此，这是你发现的一个颇具颠覆性的结论：在投资领域，通常人们认为应该押注阅历丰富的中年人或老年人——也就是那些白人老男人，而你却在寻找这些年轻、有冲劲的创始人，并通常与他们合作三到五年。

And so this is one of the kind of subversive findings that you've had that actually instead of betting on grizzled middle aged people or old people, usually in the investment business, old white people, old white men, you're looking for these young, hungry founders, and then you'd seem to invest with them typically for about three to five years.

你能解释一下吗？

Can you explain that?

因为这让我有些困惑，也挑战了很多人关于如何投资的固有偏见和传统观念。

Because it's it's sort of it sort of messes with my head and messes with a lot of the with the kind of prejudices and orthodox opinion that a lot of people have about how to invest.

当然。

Sure.

有可能。

It's possible.

你知道，我觉得有时候我得注意用词，因为‘年轻’可能会让人联想到某种过于极端的含义。

You know, I feel like sometimes I have to be careful with the vocabulary because young can connote something that may be a little too extreme.

关键在于这些公司是新成立的，由具有某种特定背景的人创立，而这种背景并不一定非得是年龄非常小的人。

The key thing is that the firms are young, that they're recently founded by somebody who has a certain profile, and that profile doesn't necessarily have to be, you know, very young in in age and, you know, in years.

关键在于，这个人受过良好训练并且有成功经验。

The key, is really that the person is is very well trained and proven.

也就是说，他们曾在投资公司工作了十年、十五年，甚至二十年。

So, you know, that means they worked at an investment firm for ten or fifteen or even twenty years.

在私募股权领域，创始人通常年纪稍大一些；对冲基金则相对年轻一些。

In in private equity, the founders tend to be a bit older, hedge funds a bit younger.

但关键并不在于人的年龄。

But the key is not so much the age of the person.

关键是他们符合某种特定的背景，而且他们接受了良好的训练。

It's that they sort of fit a certain profile that, again, they've they've trained well.

他们已经证明了自己的能力。

They've proven themselves.

然后他们以一种非常重要的方式决定押注自己，在这个特定的时刻孤注一掷。

And then they've decided in in a very significant way to bet on themselves and bet on themselves at this particular moment.

因此，这存在非常显著的正向筛选。

So there is very significant positive selection.

这些大多数人原本在顶尖的投资公司工作，赚了很多钱，却选择离开去开创全新的事业，而这充满风险。

Most of these people are you know, had really good investment firms and making a lot of money, and so they are walking away from that to start something new, and, you know, it's risky.

他们接受了大幅降薪。

They're taking a big pay cut.

当你思考利益一致时，我会去观察。

And, you know, when you think about alignment, I look.

我认为利益一致是这个世界上最引人入胜的话题之一。

I think alignment of interest is one of the most fascinating topics there is in the world.

而真正的利益一致几乎从来不是关于，威廉，你投一美元，我投一美元，我们合起来五十一美元，然后就说我们利益一致了。

And alignment is really almost never about, you know, William, you know, I put in a dollar, you put in a dollar, we're $50.50 and we're aligned.

你知道，那种方式几乎是衡量利益一致最糟糕的方式。

You know, that that's almost the worst way to measure alignment.

真正的利益一致更多地关乎一个人真正承担的风险，以及这对他意味着什么，还有他们如何选择构建自己的激励机制、收益和亏损。

You know, real alignment has a lot to do with what the person is really risking and what that means to them and and, you know, how they're choosing to create their, you know, their incentives and their upside and their downside.

所以当一个人放弃一份在顶尖机构、拥有优秀同事和诸多舒适条件的高薪工作，去创办自己的投资事业时，你就能知道，他们已经深思熟虑，并且选对了时机。

And so when somebody walks away from a very high paying job or prestigious job at a great place with great colleagues and lots of comforts to start their own investment, you sort of know that they've given that a lot of thought, and they've picked they've picked their moment.

对吧？

Right?

他们大致知道自己擅长什么。

They they sort of know what they're good at.

总的来说，他们在传递一个信号：我所擅长的这件事——无论是投资生物科技公司，还是只信奉房地产，或者不管我擅长什么——现在都是做这件事的好时机。

And in general, they're signaling, you know, this thing I do, whether it's, you know, I invest in, you know, biotech companies or I I just trust real estate or, you know, whatever it is I'm good at, it's a good moment to do that.

人们通常不会在不适合的时机去创办公司。

People don't, you know, don't tend to start the firm when it's not a great moment to do that.

当然，这种情况确实会发生。

It does happen, of course.

但这样一来，你就有了那些押注于自己的积极选择的人。

But so you have this positive selection of people betting on themselves.

就我们的流程而言，非常重要的一点是我们不能诱导他们离开当前的位置。

And, you know, in terms of our process, it's very important that we don't induce them to leave where they are.

因此，我们绝不会到处去大型私募股权公司游说人们，说：嘿。

So we're, you know, we are not, by any stretch, trolling around large private equity firms telling people, hey.

现在是离开并创办自己公司的绝佳时机。

You know, now's a great time to leave and start up your own shop.

这种我所说的积极选择，只有当创始人真正下定决心去做，并且并不需要外部推动时才会发生。

They you know, this whole positive selection that I'm talking about, it only happens if, you know, the person, the founder is really committed to doing it, and they don't really need an outside inducement.

他们只是觉得这是自己必须去做的事，相信自己能够做到，并认为现在是合适的时机。

They're just it's something they, you know, feel they need, believe in themselves that they can do, believe it's the right moment.

也许可以总结一下，你问我为什么我们会选择这种特定背景的人，他们通常稍微年轻一些。

And maybe to summarize, you are asking me why, you know, why do we choose people of this particular profile, which are, you know, skew a bit younger.

他们是创始人，所以他们的公司确实偏向年轻化。

They're founders, so their firms certainly skew younger.

为什么这是一个好的选择？

Why is that a good place to be?

也许总结一下，存在正向筛选。

And and maybe just to summarize, you know, there's positive selection.

人们离开高薪工作，选择相信自己并在特定时刻行动，这是否传递出强烈的信号？

Are there strong signal in people leaving high paying jobs to make them bet on themselves and doing it in a particular moment in time?

再次强调，他们会非常有策略地考虑，好吧。

Again, they're gonna be pretty strategic in saying, alright.

如果我擅长收购生物科技公司，那我就会在生物科技领域价格低迷、机会众多时离开并创立自己的公司。

If what I'm good at is buying biotech companies, I'm gonna leave and set something up when biotech is cheap and the opportunity set is strong.

所以这是一种正向筛选。

So there's positive selection.

这是一个不错的起点，但绝不是终点。

That is a good place to start, but certainly not the place to finish.

如果你处于我们的位置，你也需要执行一个非常严谨的流程，来确定在这个群体中你想要支持谁。

You also if you're in our position, you need to run, you know, very rigorous process to determine who it is within that group you wanna back.

而且，我想我们之前已经稍微讨论过我们的流程了。

And, you know, in there, I think we've talked a little bit about our process.

我很乐意再多谈一谈。

I'm happy to talk about it more.

但一旦你建立了正向筛选的机制，抓住了正确的时机，那么所有事情就都朝着正确的方向发展了。

But once you have that setup of the positive selection, the right moment in time, then you sort of have all things, you know, really going in the right direction.

你拥有的是那些极其渴望让这些早期投资成功的创业者。

You have somebody who is incredibly motivated to make those early investments work.

对吧？

Right?

如果这些投资失败了，他们离开高薪工作就是个巨大的错误。

If they don't work, made a horrible mistake by leaving behind their high paying job.

因此，他们的专注度极高。

So there's incredible focus.

他们可以在较小的场景中发挥作用。

They can play in smaller situations.

这是一个新成立的公司。

It's a new firm.

他们通常会投资于规模较小的项目。

You know, they're generally gonna be investing in smaller stuff.

这往往正是低效性更高、多重扩张机会更多、各种有利因素集中的地方。

That tends to be where there's greater inefficiency, opportunity for multiple expansion, all sorts of good things.

因此，这正是背后的理念和直觉所在，而真正的验证在于数据——正如我之前写过的，我们确实发现，规模较小的基金和较小的投资项目平均表现更好，且风险更低。

And so, you know, that's that's really the theory and the intuition behind it, and then the proof is really in the data, which is we we do find, again, back to some of the things I've been writing, we do find that smaller funds and smaller deals tend to do better on average and, and tend to be less risky.

因此，这种直觉与实际结果高度吻合。

And so the intuition seems to really match the the results.

而支撑这一结论的部分数据，我也会尽量在节目笔记中附上，比如《机构投资者》2019年的一篇文章，其中分析了2012年至2019年间1591只基金的研究。

And and part of the data that this is built on, which I'll also try to remember to include in the show notes, there's a there's a 2019 article from Institutional Investor, which talks about a study of, I think, 1,591 funds from 2012 to 2019.

他们关注的是成立不到三年的早期生命周期基金，以及这些基金如何超越更老牌的基金。

They're focused on these early life cycle funds that are less than three years old and how they beat older funds.

这里有一些有趣的数据，还有一些有趣的轶事证据。

So there's interesting data here and then also interesting anecdotal evidence.

在更偏向轶事的方面，你正在寻找那些可能带来成功的关键特质。

And on the more anecdotal side, like, you're you're looking for certain qualities that are likely to lead to success.

你在领英的文章中提到过一些，我想重点聊聊其中几个。

And you've written about some of them in in your piece on LinkedIn, and I I wanted to zero in on a few of them.

其中之一就是你所说的内在的拼搏欲望。

One of them is just what you call an intrinsic desire to hustle.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that a bit?

因为在我看来，我记得在我的书里，我曾经写过，听起来很简单、很陈词滥调，但后来我意识到，在某个阶段，成功的秘诀不过就是一种强烈的成功渴望。

Because it seems to me I mean, I remember in my book, I think I I wrote it at some point, and it sounds so simple and platitudinous, but at some point, I I think I I realized that at a certain point, the secret to success is nothing more complex than a fervent desire to succeed.

就是那种近乎无法忍受失败的强烈渴望。

It's that just sort of just such hunger that you almost, like, couldn't bear to fail.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为当人们拥有这种特质时，他们会倾向于一种投资类型。

I I think when people have that, it drives them to an investment type.

也许用一种过于简单的方式来定义两种投资类型吧。

I guess, an overly simple way where I I might define two investment types.

它们是受判断驱动的投资类型。

They're they're investment types that are driven by judgment.

对吧？

Right?

我看到一家公司。

I see a business.

我看到它周围有很强的护城河、定价权，以及以高回报率向企业投入资本的机会。

I see a lot of moat around it, pricing power, you know, opportunity to invest capital into the business at a high rate of return.

我会做出某种判断。

You know, I sort of make a judgment.

你知道，这可能是一家即将被拍卖的公司，很多人都知道它，但我对它的看法和其他人不同。

You know, this is maybe a company that's up for auction, and lots of people know about it, but I see it a different way than others.

这是一种完全正当的投资方式，很多人在这方面非常成功。

And that is a, like, a perfectly legitimate way to invest, and a lot of people have been very successful at that.

作为旁观者，要判断谁会成功、谁的判断力更强，要难得多。

As someone observing the investor, that's much harder to know who's gonna be successful, who's gonna have better judgment.

另一种我们倾向于选择、我们支持的人也倾向的投资类型，需要极大的努力，因为它们更偏向于隐蔽型，优势不在于某人判断出这是一家未来十年、二十年的优秀企业，而在于一些基于更优数据的简单洞察。

The other investment type, the one that we gravitate to and the people we back gravitate to, require this tremendous amount of hustle because, you know, they're more of the hidden variety, and the advantage is not so much that somebody has a judgment that this is a great business for the next ten, twenty years, but it's actually some really simple insight based on better data.

对吧？

Right?

你之前提到的塞思，如果你参与了这场对话，我想他会说，在更好的数据和更好的数据分析之间，他每次都选更好的数据。

You know, Seth, who you referred to earlier, you know, I think if you were part of this conversation, he would say, you know, between better data and better data analysis, you'll take better data every time.

新的数据，别人没注意到的数据。

New data, things in data that others haven't seen.

如果你能接触到新的数据，那么你就不必成为世界上最顶尖的数据科学家，也能得出新的洞察。

If you have access to new data, then, you know, you don't have to be the best data scientist in the world to draw a new insight.

这在某种程度上与此类似。

And this is a little bit the equivalent of that.

有些投资，其优势显而易见，但发现这些投资需要极大的努力——培养专业技能、建立特殊关系、开发独特的信息渠道。

Some investments, it's very simple to see why they have a certain advantage to them, but finding those investments requires, you know, really the the hustle of developing and, you know, special expertise, special relationships, special ways of sourcing.

我想给我们的听众读一段非常精彩的引文，这段话来自你的一篇文章，你在文中谈到了这种内在的、渴望的拼搏精神，即拒绝那些唾手可得的东西，去寻找那些隐藏的机会。

There's a very nice quote that I wanted to read to our listeners that came from one of your articles where you were talking about this intrinsic desired hustle and to reject the things that are easily on offer and go find the things that are hidden.

你写道：‘当我还在高盛工作时，大家常说，公司内部的人只是等电话响了才接，而公司外部的人则主动走出去，翻遍每一块石头，建立新关系，招募人才，并从这些努力中发展自己的事业。’

And you wrote, when I worked at Goldman Sachs, a common saying was that there were inside the building people who just picked up the phone when it rang and outside the building people who hit the streets, turned over rocks, built new relationships, recruited talent, and grew their own businesses from that work.

这种渴望走出办公室、主动拼搏的精神，往往是发现差异化投资的关键。

This desire to hustle and get outside the building was often the key to finding differentiated investments.

这让我想起了彼得·林奇在比尔·米勒职业生涯早期分享的一个简单洞见，他说：‘听好了。’

And it it really reminded me of, Peter Lynch's simple insight that he shared with Bill Miller very early in Bill Miller's career where he he said, look.

其实就只有一个档位。

There's really just one gear.

比尔问：‘你难道就不能慢下来吗？’

And Bill was like, you know, can you ever slow down?

他回答：‘不能。'

And he's like, no.

不是真的。

Not really.

你知道，在某个时刻，如果你无法维持那种节奏，你就得停下来。

You know, at a certain point, you just have to stop if you can't keep up that pace.

你认为这种观点更准确吗？你真的需要那种强度吗？

Do you think that's more or less true that you just need that intensity?

是的。

Yes.

我想稍微有一点保留意见。

I guess with a little bit of a caveat, though.

这个保留意见是，你并不总是必须成为那个人，我想说的是，彼得·林奇那种始终以极高转速奔跑的人，是不是真的要永远如此。

And the and the caveat is, you know, you don't always have to be the person you know, I guess I'm trying to picture Peter Lynch and his desire to be that person running at that incredibly high gear, you know, sort of forever and ever.

我认为，随着投资者逐渐成熟，他们会通过各种策略来实现类似的工作成果。

And, you know, I I think as investors mature, they find ways to produce a similar work product, you know, through, you know, through strategies.

而我所能想到的最好的例子就是人。

And, again, the best one I can think of is people.

我的意思是，这听起来可能有点重复，但如果你有一个优秀且高度契合的网络，你就未必需要亲自长期维持这个网络，因为对大多数人来说，这并不可持续。

I mean, this may sound repetitive, but if you have a great network, you know, great and well aligned network, then you don't necessarily have to be the one, you know, doing that forever network because it's not sustainable for most people.

你的问题让我开始更多地从个人角度思考，我想我基本上可以一直做这份工作。

Your question is has me thinking, I guess, you know, a little bit more on a on a personal level, but I think I can do this job pretty much forever.

我热爱它。

I love it.

我认为我的工作强度一直很高，但我从我们这个契合的网络所创造的特殊机会中获得了极大的回报。

And I think I work at a, you know, at a pretty high year, but I get I get so much out of the fact that this aligned network we have creates these special opportunities.

所以在某种程度上，我处于一个相对优越的位置，不需要像二十年前在高盛时那样，去到处寻找愿意出售长期投资组合的银行。

So on some level, I'm it's a privileged position where I don't have to, you know, be the one like I was at Goldman Sachs twenty years ago, you know, trying to find, you know, some bank somewhere that'll sell some long portfolio.

对吧？

Right?

你需要找到创造杠杆的方法，这样才更可持续。

It's a you find ways to create leverage, and then and then it's more sustainable.

在我的职业生涯中，我花了很多年才意识到网络的力量。

I think I was very, very slow in my career to figure out the power of a network.

我想可能是因为我是英国人，所以觉得这种想法听起来有点令人尴尬，好像我是在利用别人，让人觉得我在占便宜。

And I think maybe maybe because I was English, I felt sort of embarrassed about the idea that it would seem somehow exploitative, you know, that people would sort of feel like I was taking advantage.

所以每当我的朋友变得非常成功时，我常常会几乎停止和他们联系，因为我怕他们会觉得我在利用他们。

So I often found when a friend of mine became really successful, would sort of almost, like, stop talking to them because I didn't want them to feel like I was exploiting them.

我的意思是，这简直太自我挫败了。

I mean, it was so self defeating.

后来我越来越意识到，当你试图解决任何问题时，能够去找你信任的、非常聪明的人，这真的非常有帮助。

And then I looked at it increasingly, and it's so it's so helpful that when when you're trying to solve any kind of problem, you can go to people you trust who are really smart.

这简直是一个惊人的捷径，你不必非得以每小时120英里的速度狂奔。

And it's just such an incredible shortcut where you don't have to run a 120 miles an hour.

我大概一年前见到你时，印象特别深刻。

And I was very struck when I met you, I think, a year or so ago.

我想是因为你的一个朋友，以前负责林肯中心并担任罗宾汉基金会主席，把你介绍给了我的文学经纪人——他是位了不起的经纪人，吉姆·莱文，他代理着雷·达里奥、埃里克·施密特、萨提亚·纳德拉这些人。

I think it was because a friend of yours who used to run Lincoln Center and be president of the Robin Hood Foundation put you in touch with my literary agent who's an unbelievable literary agent, Jim Levine, who represents all these people like Ray Dalio and Eric Schmidt and Satya Nadella and stuff.

他说：‘你应该去和威廉聊聊。’

And he said, well, you should talk to William.

所以我们聊起了写作之类的话题。

And so we ended up talking about writing and the like.

我突然意识到，这可能已经成为你的一个真正的秘密武器——能够通过认识的人，找到你信任、并且能把你引荐给其他你信任的人的能力。我不是说我自己有多了不起，但关键是总能弄清楚：我该信任谁，谁又能帮我联系到下一个值得信赖的人？这是一种非凡的竞争优势。

And it struck me that maybe that's become a real sort of secret weapon for you, this ability to figure out through a you know, not that I was such a great person to talk to, but, you know, always to be able to figure out who who do I trust who's gonna be able to put me in touch with someone else who they trust It's an extraordinary competitive advantage.

我觉得你说得对。

Oh, I think that's right.

在某种程度上，这正是投资这个职业令人欣喜的地方。

It's, on some level, it is what's wonderful about investing as a career.

对吧？

Right?

当我跟考虑从事投资的年轻人交谈时，我喜欢指出一点：从某种意义上说，所有知识都是相关的，所有人也都相关。

Is and I guess when I talk to younger people who are considering investing as a career, one of the things I like to point out is on some level, all knowledge is relevant, you know, and all people are relevant.

查理·芒格当然说过，要做一个学习机器。

So, you know, Charlie Munger, of course, says be a learning machine.

我想补充的是，投资的特别之处在于，它能激发你成为一台学习机器的动力。

And I guess the wrinkle on that I would put is what's great about investing is its motivation to be a learning machine.

你可以阅读任何东西——历史、科学、小说、诗歌，这些都与投资艺术相关，因为投资的范围太广了。

You can read anything, history, science, novels, poetry, and it is relevant to the art of investing because investing is so broad.

它关乎模式。

It's about patterns.

它关乎趋势。

It's about trends.

它关乎知识，而人在这其中占据了极其重要的部分。

It's about knowledge, and people are just such a huge part of that.

因此，你知道，由于这种共同的追求，你最终建立和探索的关系——看吧。

And so, you know, the relationships that you end up making and exploring because of these this sort of common thing of, look.

我们都在踏上一段学习更多、提升自我能力的旅程。

We're all on this journey to learn more about just about everything and be better at what we can do.

你知道，这为许多重要的关系提供了绝佳的基础。

You know, you it's it's a great basis for a lot of important relationships.

我想再次强调一点，对我们听众或观众来说，引用你刚才提到的查理·芒格，我过去也多次写过他。

I think the thing I wanna emphasize for our listeners or viewers, again, to cite Charlie Munger, who you just quoted and who I I I I've written about a lot in the past.

查理说，你看。

Charlie said, look.

如果我们有一个非常简单的原则——这是我问他关于如何从他和沃伦那里学习如何过上幸福生活时，他提到的。

If we have a very simple this is when I asked him about, you know, how what we could learn from him and Warren about how to have a happy life.

他谈到了他们之间的关系，不仅彼此之间，还包括与所有伴侣的关系。

And he talked about their relationships, not only with each other, but with all of their partners.

他说，看，我们有一个非常简单的规则：如果你想拥有一个好伴侣，就要做一个好伴侣。

And he said, look, we have a really simple rule, which is if you wanna have a good partner, be a good partner.

所以，这再次非常像你的原则，即你想要思考如何帮助他人并为他们创造机会。

And so, again, very much like your principle that you wanna think about how you're helping other people and making opportunities for them.

因此，我认为这在某种程度上是我最大的顿悟。

And so I think that in a way was the big realization for me.

与其担心人脉建立是利用性和 cynical 的，一旦你开始反过来想，说不，我想认识这些人，我要帮助他们，对他们是慷慨的，而不是带着太强的目的性，这在某种程度上就变成了一种完全不同的游戏。

Instead of worrying that somehow networking was exploitative and cynical, once you start to invert it and you start to say, well, no, I wanna meet all of these people, and I'm gonna help them, and I'm gonna be generous with them and not really have such an agenda, it kind of it becomes a whole different game in a way.

这有引起你的共鸣吗？

Does that resonate at all?

哦，当然。

Oh, absolutely.

我认为在我们的组织里，包括我自己在内，我们从给别人职业建议中获得很多乐趣。

I I think I think in our our organization, and and I include myself, like, we get we get a lot of pleasure out of giving people career advice.

那些在大型投资公司工作、正在考虑下一步该做什么的人。

People who are at larger investment firms and are trying to decide what to do.

那些正在考虑进入金融和投资领域的人。

People are thinking of going into finance and investing.

你可以从长远角度来看待这件事，因为我们认为，这种付出最终会回馈到我们自身。

And you can look at that as being sort of long term in that, you know, we think that comes back to our benefit over time.

但除此之外，确实也有某种内在的愉悦感，这不仅对业务有好处。

But that's but there there's something, yeah, intrinsically enjoyable about that along with being, you know, good for business.

所以，是的，所谓‘先给予’的理念——提供建议、引荐人脉、分享专业知识，把人与专业知识连接起来。

And so, yeah, you know, give first that whole idea of, you know, give advice, give introductions, give expertise, you know, connect people to expertise.

这种价值观，我认为非常有效。

That's a value that, look, I think works really well.

我认为这对我们的帮助很大。

I think it's worked well for us.

我认为这对很多人也都很有效。

I think it works well for lots of people.

是的。

Yeah.

我认为这实际上是成功的关键秘诀之一，所以我才想停下来多谈一谈。

I think I think it's actually one of the the great secrets of success, which is why I wanted to pause and dwell on it a bit.

我想起芒格说过，我观察哪些方法有效、哪些无效，以及为什么。

I I think of Munger saying, I I observe what works and doesn't work and why.

而这种建立在信任基础上的关系模式，似乎至关重要。

And this model of actually building relationships built on trust and the like seems seems absolutely critical.

所以回到你正在寻找的那些潜在优秀投资者的特质问题上——这些投资者已经在公司中展现出某种程度的卓越，但你尚无法确定是公司本身的作用，还是他们个人的贡献，直到他们真正独立创办公司并证明自己。

So to go back to this issue of the qualities that you're looking for in potentially great investors or investors who've sort of shown a degree of greatness in companies, but you can't quite tell if it was the company or them until they really get out there and prove themselves at their own firm.

你还曾谈到毅力和韧性的重要性，并提到你更倾向于关注那些展现出不轻言放弃、能够承受苦难能力的人。

You've also written about the importance of grit and resilience, and you've talked about actually liking to look at people who've demonstrated an ability not to give up and to endure hardship.

你能稍微谈一谈这一点，还有你提到的另一个品质，也就是在压力下依然能做出冷静且富有成效的决策的历史吗？

Can you talk a little bit about that and also this other quality that you've identified, which is just, as you put it, a history of calm and productive decisions made while under pressure?

因为这种坚韧与韧性，加上保持冷静的能力，似乎是成功的重要预测指标。

Because it seems like that combination of grit and resilience and an ability to be calm, those are huge predictors of success.

是的。

Yes.

我想，要挑选优秀的投资经理，关键在于全面深入了解他们是谁，以及他们的工作成果如何。

I guess the way I would dig into that is to say the key to choosing good investment managers in my mind starts with getting this very detailed picture of who they are and what their body of work has been.

你知道，你在寻找的是——这里再次说明，希望你能掌握相关数据。

And, you know, you're looking for you know, here's where it becomes again, hopefully, you have the data.

你有这些故事，也有来自旁观者对他们在不同情境下表现的观察和洞见。

You have these stories, and you have these insights from people observed, you know, observed them in different contexts.

因此，你可以识别出诸如克服某些挫折或艰难时刻这样的特质。

And so you can identify things like overcoming, you know, some setback, some difficult moment.

你还能观察到一些事情——我要稍微转向另一个话题，那就是：究竟是环境造就了他们，还是他们成就了环境？

You can observe things like I'm gonna veer into a slightly different area, which is back to the was it the container or was it them?

你可以直接观察他们是如何进行投资的。

You can observe literally how they did their investments.

或者，这些投资背后都有完整的故事。

Or, you know, there there's a whole story behind those investments.

它们是如何被发现的？

How are they found?

他们是如何保持严谨的？

How are they diligent?

动用了哪些资源？

What resources were brought to bear?

引入了哪些合作伙伴？

What partners were brought in?

这项投资是如何在组织内部被说服和推进的？

How is the investment you know, sort of sold internally to the organization?

你知道的。

You know?

你怎么知道投资委员会是如何被说服支持这项投资的？

How did you know, how is investment committee convinced of the investment?

而你越是能获得这种详细的图景，就越能运用一些常识和直觉去判断，好吧。

And by you know, the more you can get this detailed picture, the more you can, you know, use some level of common sense and intuition to see, alright.

这个人真正地投身于一项新事物，找到了新的资源，没有依赖公司里人人都能使用的现有资源，而是找到了一种新的做事方式。

This person really pushed into something new and, you know, found a new resource, didn't rely on the resources that were available in the firm to everybody, but found a new way of doing something.

最终发生的情况是，我想这有点是我们这个行业的特点，但我们确实倾向于支持那些在原公司不太可能担任领导角色的人。

And what ends up happening you know, I guess this is a a little bit of a quirk of what we do, but, you know, we do end up backing people who were less likely to run the firm where they were.

他们在大公司工作，每年做的投资数量可能比平均水平少。

You know, they're at a big firm, and they probably do a smaller number of investments per year than average.

他们的标准更高。

Their bar is higher.

他们把项目带到委员会时，讨论会短一些，因为大家都清楚，所有工作都做得妥当。

They tend to be the people who they bring a deal to committee, and the conversation's a little bit shorter because everybody knows, you know, that all the work was done the right way.

投资逻辑相当清晰，甚至显而易见。

Investment thesis is sort of clear, maybe even obvious.

而且，你知道，这些人的性格类型也略有不同。

And, you know, the personality types are a little different.

你知道吗？

You know?

他们更倾向于埋头专注于自己的工作。

They're little bit more heads down doing their work.

也许他们就在角落里。

Maybe they're off in the corner.

大家都知道他们做的工作质量很高，但由于他们选择专注和投入时间的方向，他们未必被视为组织中的明日之星。

Everybody tends to know that what they do is high quality, but they're not necessarily perceived as, you know, the rising star in the organization because what they choose to focus and spend their time on.

但再说一遍，我并不是在给你描述一个固定模式，重要的是要记住，真正优秀的投资者和创始人形形色色，所以我不会对这一点过于具体化。

But, again, I don't wanna I'm I'm giving you one sort of pattern I see, but it's also important to remember, you know, that really good investors, really good founders come in, you know, lots of different shapes and sizes, and so I wouldn't wanna be too specific about this.

关键在于，再次强调，要对这个人、他们的工作成果以及人际关系网络有一个非常清晰的了解。

The key, again, is just getting this very clear picture of the the person and their body of work and their network of relationships.

然后，运用你所提到的这个视角来判断：他们是否真的经受过考验？

And then, you know, applying this lens that, you know, you're asking about of, have they really been tested?

他们是否经历过困境？

Have they been through hardship?

他们是否为自己安排了一种能够做出明智决策的生活方式？

Have they set up their life in a way where they can make good decisions?

所有这些方面。

All those sorts of things.

当你看到时，你就会开始明白。

And then you start to know it when you see it.

威廉，我们先短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的介绍。

William Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

不，这不是你的错觉。

No, it's not your imagination.

风险和监管正在加剧，而客户现在只愿意与能提供安全证明的企业合作。

Risk and regulation are ramping up and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是为什么Vanta是一个变革者。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta 自动化您的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合到一个由人工智能驱动的平台上。

Vanta automates your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust together on one AI powered platform.

无论您是在为 SOC 2 做准备，还是在运行企业 GRC 计划，Vanta 都能让您保持安全并推动交易顺利进行。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

与其追逐电子表格和截图，Vanta 能为您提供跨越 35 多个合规与隐私框架的持续自动化。

Instead of chasing spreadsheets and screenshots, Vanta gives you continuous automation across more than 35 and privacy frameworks.

像 Ramp 和 Ryder 这样的公司使用 Vanta 后，审计时间减少了 82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长腾出了更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

如果我现在正在运营一家初创公司或扩大团队，这正是我想要部署的平台类型。

If I were running a startup or scaling a team today, this is exactly the type of platform I'd want in place.

立即前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问 vanta.com/billionaires 即可开始。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

你是否曾想探索在线交易的世界，却一直不敢尝试？

Ever wanted to explore the world of online trading, but haven't dared try?

期货市场如今比以往任何时候都更加活跃，而标普500期货正是理想的入门之选。

The futures market is more active now than ever before and plus 500 futures is the perfect place to start.

Plus500为您提供多种多样的交易工具。

Plus five hundred gives you access to a wide range of instruments.

包括标普500、纳斯达克、比特币、天然气等等。

The S and P five hundred, NASDAQ, Bitcoin, gas, and much more.

探索股票指数、能源、金属、外汇、加密货币及其他更多品种。

Explore equity indices, energy, metals, Forex, crypto, and beyond.

通过简单直观的平台，您可以随时随地通过手机进行交易。

With a simple and intuitive platform, you can trade from anywhere, right from your phone.

最低存入100美元，体验您一直期待的快速便捷的期货交易。

Deposit with a minimum of $100 and experience the fast, accessible futures trading you've been waiting for.

看到交易机会了吗？

See a trading opportunity?

账户开立后，您只需点击两下即可开始交易。

You'll be able to trade it in just two clicks once your account is open.

还不确定自己是否准备好了？

Not sure if you're ready?

没问题。

Not a problem.

Plus500为您提供无限时长的免费模拟账户，内含图表和分析工具，供您练习使用。

Plus500 gives you an unlimited risk free demo account with charts and analytic tools for you to practice on.

凭借超过二十年的经验，Plus500是您通往市场的门户。

With over twenty years of experience, Plus500 is your gateway to the markets.

访问 plus500.com 了解更多信息。

Visit plus500.com to learn more.

期货交易存在亏损风险，并非适合所有人。

Trading in futures involves risk of loss and is not suitable for everyone.

并非所有申请人都能通过审核。

Not all applicants will qualify.

Plus500，交易更胜一筹。

Plus 500, it's trading with a plus.

亿万富翁投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Bill Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于Fundrise收入基金，这一被动收入策略已向所有规模的投资者开放，该基金已吸引超过6亿美元投资，派息率为7.97%。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄利率下滑，私人信贷在近几年成长为万亿美元资产类别也就不足为奇了。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

立即访问 fundrise.com/wsb，几分钟内即可投资Fundrise收入基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金2025年的总回报率为8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往表现不预示未来结果。

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

截至2025年1月20日12:30的当前分配率。

Current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括投资目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多信息可在fundrise.com/income上的收益基金招股说明书中找到。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundrise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

这让我觉得很有意思，因为虽然你显然非常注重数据，但你的做法中还带有一种近乎新闻调查的特质——你会向提供参考信息的人提出大量问题，而你获取参考信息的方式非常独特，极具个人风格，比大多数人要细致得多。

It's interesting to me because there's I mean, obviously, you're very data driven, but there is an almost journalistic side to what you're doing where you're asking a lot of questions of people who are giving references, and your approach to getting references is kind of unusual, very idiosyncratic, much more detailed than most people's.

你会关注一些细节，比如我记得读过你的一篇文章，你在其中谈到评估你所说的‘外部因素’，比如他们的工作生活是否受到稳定的家庭生活、财务储备、爱好和社交圈的庇护。

And you're looking at stuff like, I I remember reading one of your pieces where you're talking about gauging what you called externals, like whether their work life is sheltered or not by a stable family life, financial reserves, hobbies, and community.

我觉得你这样去构建一幅拼图，来判断一个人是否容易保持冷静，是否有稳定的家庭，是否具备坚韧或强烈动机等内在品质，这真的很有趣。

I thought that was really interesting that you're looking you're kinda creating this mosaic to see whether this person is likely to be calm, whether they have a stable family, whether they've got these inner qualities of of grit or intense motivation.

你所采用的这个过程非同寻常。

It's an unusual process you're going through.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

That's right.

我不希望这些看起来像是绝对的标准。

And I I wouldn't want any of those things to sound like absolutes.

人是很复杂的，这些复杂性在不同的情境、不同的环境、不同的组织中会以各种方式表现出来，你必须认真思考这一点。

Like, people are complicated, and, you know, the way those complexities all come out in different setups, different environments, you know, different organizations, You know, it's something you have to be thoughtful about.

我想，某种程度上，我有点犹豫，因为我并不想让这些成为重要的框架。

And, you know, I guess, some level, I I'm hesitating a little bit because I I don't want those are important frameworks.

它们确实是值得思考的重要方面，但你知道，当你长期做这件事时，

They're important things to think about, but, you know, you you do this for a long time and,

你知道的，

you know,

如果你非要等到每一个你希望看到的条件都满足了才行动，是的，那你得等很久。

if if you waited to have every, you know, every box checked that you'd like to see, yeah, you'd be waiting a long time.

所以，你知道，人是很复杂的。

So, you know, people are complicated.

人都是不完美的。

People are imperfect.

你知道，你真正想找的是这样一种最佳组合：某个人拥有经过验证的技能、可靠的方法，符合某些标准，有合适的人脉，时机正好，环境也合适，所有这些因素都到位。

You know, what you're looking for is this, you know, the best setup you can find of someone, you know, who has a proven skill set, you know, proven approach, you know, meets certain criteria, has people, and the time is right, and the setup is right, and all those things.

当你看到这一切都凑齐了，是的，那就是关键时刻。

And when you see that all line up, then, yeah, that's that's the moment.

你曾写道，如果要遵循一个指导原则，那就是这个。

You've written if there's one guiding principle to follow, it would be this.

家族办公室的创始人应当把目标定为：在每一个关键岗位上都安置有才能、值得信赖且品格高尚的人。

Family office founders should consider it their goal to have talented and trustworthy people of high character in every critical role.

当我试图评估一个人不仅有才能而且值得信赖时，我会关注哪些迹象来判断他是否可能欺骗你或过于咄咄逼人？

And I'm wondering when you're actually trying to assess whether someone is not only talented but trustworthy, what are the sort of things you're looking for that might be tells to see whether someone is likely to deceive you or be overly aggressive?

或者，究竟是什么让你最终决定某个人是否值得信任？

Or what is it that leads you actually to decide whether someone's a person you can trust?

答案几乎总是——我不愿重复这一点。

The answer is almost always in I hate to be repetitive.

答案几乎总是来自非常详尽的背景调查，当你和对方有共同认识的人时，你所获得的看法就来自那些真正有动机告诉你实情的人。

The the answer is almost always in, you know, very extensive referencing where you know people in common, therefore, the views you're getting are from people who are actually motivated to tell you what's really going on.

然后你必须尽一切可能加以补充，比如通过研究、通过你自己的观察和倾听，但你必须小心。

And then you have to supplement that every way you possibly can, know, through research, through your, you know, through your own eyes and ears, but you have to be careful.

我认为，就我们自己早期的经历，以及观察其他人而言，人们可能过于依赖对一个人的直觉，而相比之下，对我而言，背景调查才是更可靠的数据。

I think if anything, in our own early years and in, you know, you know, watching other people, I think people may weigh their gut instinct about a person too heavily relative to again, the the references to me are more, like, our data.

所以你要同时考虑这两方面，当然，两者都要纳入考量。

And so you look at both, you certainly, you know, take both into consideration.

而且，我认为人们对此有不同看法是合理的。

And, you know, I I think it's reasonable people can disagree.

我们尽量保持极低的容忍度，对于那些可能只是些烟雾弹、暗示可能存在隐患的事情，因为在我们的领域里，最糟糕的情况就是陷入真正的欺骗境地。

We we try to have a very and do have a very low tolerance for things that, you know, might be a little bit of smoke that would indicate that there might be an issue because, you know, the just the worst thing that can happen to you in in our world is, you know, is to end up in a situation of real deception.

我想问问你关于三位具体的基金经理，他们正好能说明你们的做法。

I wanted to ask you about three specific fund managers who are illustrations of what you do.

有很多人我们其实无法讨论，因为他们管理的基金规模很小，你并不希望他们吸引过多资产或关注。

So one of the there are a lot of people who we can't really talk about because they run very small funds, and you don't you don't want them to attract a lot of assets or attention and the like.

但有三位我马上能想到的，对他们来说问题没那么大，我认为是来自EOS的王 Jonathan，他投资酒店业；长谷川耶拿，他经营一家名为Three D Investment Partners的公司，专注于日本市场；还有蒂姆·怀特，他管理一家名为Dunes Point的私募股权公司。

But three who come to mind who that would be less of a problem for, I think, are Jonathan Wang from EOS, which invests in hotels, Kanye Hasagawa, who runs a firm called three d Investment Partners, who invests in Japan, and Tim White, who runs a private equity firm called Dunes Point.

你能谈谈其中几位吗？让他们如何体现你们在挑选人时所看重的特质？

Can you talk about a couple of them, give a sense of how they illustrate what it is you're looking for in a person?

他们各自的专业领域、细分市场，以及你们所寻找的那种优势，是如何通过他们体现出来的？

Why the kind of specialty they have, the the niches, the edge that you're looking for that they illustrate?

是的。

Yeah.

这真是个非常好的名单。

That's a that's a really good list.

我将倒着来介绍。

I'm gonna go in reverse order.

我先从蒂姆·怀特说起。

I'll I'll start with Tim White.

蒂姆在私募股权领域有着丰富且成功的职业生涯。

So Tim had, an extensive and very successful career in private equity.

在他自立门户之前，最后一份工作是在GSO。

His last job before he went off on his own, he worked at GSO.

他曾负责他们的收购业务。

He had run their buyout.

尽管GSO主要是一家信贷公司，但也设有收购部门，而他在此之前领导了这一业务，直到因收购案而基本解散。

GSO, even though his man at credit shop had a buyout effort, and he ran that before it essentially had to be disbanded because of the acquisition.

GSO后来被黑石收购。

GSO was acquired by Blackstone.

因此，蒂姆的职业履历很长，但GSO和黑石都非常希望留住他。

And so, Tim, the list goes back a while, but, GSO, Blackstone really wanted to keep him.

据我了解，他们为他提供了薪酬非常丰厚、知名度很高的职位，但这并不是他想要的。

They offered him my understanding is some very high paying, you know, sort of big name roles, and that's just not what he wanted.

他是个收购专家。

He is a buyout guy.

他喜欢收购，尤其是小型收购交易。

He loves buying you know, he loves smaller buyouts.

他热衷于发现一家有潜力的公司，然后通过自己人脉网络中的运营专家，为其带来真正的增值。

He loves finding a gem of a business to buy and then bringing in, you know, real value add through a network of of operators that are his personal relationships.

他放弃了所有这些外在的东西。

And he walked away from all the trappings.

对吧？

Right?

那些光鲜的头衔、精致的名片、高额的薪水。

The fancy name, the fancy business card, the big salary.

他毅然放弃这一切，创办了自己的公司，并且对此无比坚定。

He walked away from that to start his own firm, and he was so committed to that.

他做到了，你知道的，没有筹集任何资金。

He did it, you know, without raising any money.

他独自完成了一笔投资，资金来自他自己。

He did one investment on his own, which, he funded himself.

他之前取得过成功，所以有能力这么做。

He'd had success, so he could afford to do that.

在对我们对他的尽职调查中，很明显他是一个品质极高的人，极具诚信、亲力亲为、专注且勤勉。

And just, it was very clear in our diligence of him of what a just high quality person he is, super high integrity, hands on, dedicated, diligent.

而且我们有共同认识的人，这正是了解真实情况的关键。

And we knew people in common, again, which is the key to get to a real picture.

但另一个指标是，那些他曾经共事过、其实并不必急于回应推荐请求的人怎么说？

But another indicator is will people he worked for who don't really have to be quickly responsive to a reference request?

当时，我并不认识本内特·古德曼。

And so at the time, I didn't know Bennett Goodman.

我现在对他很了解，但那时我并不认识他。

I I know him well now, but I didn't know him then.

于是我给本内特发了邮件，他是GSO的G，也是蒂姆曾经工作过的GSO的创始人。

And, and I emailed Bennett who was the g in GSO, founder of GSO where Tim had worked.

我说，如果你有空，我想过来和你聊聊蒂姆·怀特。

And I said, if you have a bit of time, I'd like to come over and talk to you about Tim White.

我觉得这甚至有点不寻常。

And I think even that's a little bit unusual.

对吧？

Right?

人们通常只是要求打个电话。

People ask for a call.

他们要求约个网约车。

They ask for Uber.

那时候虽然没现在这么普遍，但他们还是会要求打个电话。

Back back then, it wasn't as in, but they asked for a call.

而我明确表示，我想亲自去见他。

And I was clear that I wanted to come meet him in person.

而且，我认为在推荐时，亲自面谈是更好的做法。

And just believe it's much better practice in referencing to try to do things in person.

他很快就回信了。

And, he wrote back then he wrote back right away.

你知道吗？

You know?

他以前从来没听说过我。

Never heard of me before.

你知道，这有点像突然的转机。

You know, it was sort of like, break.

你什么时候能来？

When can you come?

我觉得第二天我就去了他的办公室。

And and I think I was in his office the next day.

从那次会面中，情况就非常明确了。

And, it was very clear from that meeting.

他主动提到一些你可能会想听的事情，你知道的，基于对这个人信任的考察，这就是我会信赖的人。

He volunteered he volunteered some of the things, you know, that you'd like to hear based on probing of this is the person I would trust.

如果我要离开，不在身边，你知道的，需要有人帮我照顾家人和财产，这个人就是他。

If I if I was going away, if I wasn't around, you know, and I needed someone to take care of my money for my family, this is the this is the guy.

蒂姆就是这个人。

Tim's the guy.

所以，这就是品格和信誉的层次，来自一位非常精明、极其成功的对冲基金创始人，他花时间特意做出这些正面评价。

So that's the level of character and validation from, you know, obviously, a very sophisticated, incredibly successful hedge fund founder who took the time and went out of his way to make these positive comments.

而这正是你希望听到的。

And so that's what you wanna hear.

当然，这几乎就像梦想成真。

Of course, that's that's almost like the dream.

我的意思是，你知道的，你希望这样的事不止发生几次。

I mean, you know, you hope that that happens more than a few times.

于是，我们成为了蒂姆在琼斯观点下后续四项投资的主要资金来源。

And so we went on to be the primary source of capital for the next four investments that Tim made as June's point.

他用自己的钱做了一笔投资，之后几年又用我们的资金做了四笔。

So he did one investment with his own money, did four over several years with with ours.

这段合作关系非常成功，他后来将杜恩斯点发展成一家规模庞大的私募股权公司，第二支基金表现优异，如今正在运作第三支基金。

It was a very successful relationship, and he has gone on, to become a very substantial, Doon's point is now a very substantial private equity firm, had an excellent second fund, and is on their third fund.

当我提到‘杜恩斯点’这个名字时，在收购中型工业企业和注重价值提升的圈子里，我相信他们是最受尊敬的机构之一。

And, you know, when I mentioned the name Dude's Point around, in the world of buying, you know, sort of middle market industrial businesses with a lot of value add, I I believe they're one of the most respected names out there.

那像乔纳森·王这样的人呢？我认为你认识他已经很久了，他是专门收购酒店——尤其是那些不受欢迎的酒店并加以改造的专家。

And what about someone like Jonathan Wang, I I think you've known him for a very long time, who is an expert in buying hotels, particularly when they're out of favor and then transforming them?

他有什么特别之处？他身上体现了你所看重的哪些品质？

What what makes him special, and what what does he embody that you look for?

因为看起来，你寻找的这些人中，某种程度上都需要具备专业专长。

Because it seems like part of what you're looking for is a degree of specialization with these people.

他的细分领域真的很独特，对吧？其他人根本做不了，我的意思是，某种程度上，这个领域竞争没那么激烈，如果我没理解错的话。

Like, he's got such a weird little niche, right, that nobody else I I mean, it's just not as competitive in certain ways, if I'm understanding correctly.

是的。

Yeah.

是的。

Yeah.

我们正在寻找那些通过建立某种资源或专业能力来创造优势的人，而乔纳森正是这方面的典范。

We're we're looking for people who are creating an advantage, you know, through building some sort of resource or expertise, and Jonathan, I think, is a is a poster child for that.

而且，对我们来说，情况甚至更好。

And, you know, even better for us.

在某些方面，这已经好到极致了。

In some ways, this is as good as it gets.

我知道他，还记得我们一起在高盛工作的日子。

I I knew him, you know, going back to working at Goldman together.

我了解他的工作能力，也了解他的人品。

I knew the quality of his work, his quality as a person.

然后我也见证了他离开高盛后的发展。

And then I also got to watch you know, he left Goldman.

他去了诺斯伍德工作，那是一家备受尊敬的房地产私募股权公司。

He went to work at Northwood, which is a real estate private equity firm, highly respected.

他在那里建立了酒店投资能力，成为极少数拥有自身酒店运营能力的房地产私募股权公司之一。

And he built there this hotel investing capability and became one of the very few, very, very few real estate private equity firms that it had its own operating capability with respect to hotels.

因此，无需依赖第三方管理这些大型品牌酒店。

So there was no need to rely on third party managers of these large brands.

乔纳森所建立的是对酒店的深入理解能力。

What Jonathan built was this ability to really understand hotels upfront.

你知道吗？

You know?

由于他拥有真正的运营团队，他的尽职调查能力非常强，他清楚地知道收益管理是如何运作的。

So the diligence capability since he had a real operating team, you know, he knew like, he knew exactly how, you know, revenue management were working.

他清楚每一项成本明细，能够预测如果对收购的酒店采取某些措施，会发生什么情况。

He knew exactly what different cost line items were, and, you know, he could build a picture of what would happen, you know, if certain levers were pulled with respect to a hotel they acquired.

例如，将一家品牌酒店剥离品牌，转为独立运营。

For example, you know, taking a branded hotel and removing a brand and taking a hotel independent.

他在这一领域拥有丰富的专业知识。

He had a lot of expertise around that.

而且，这种运营能力让他提前洞察到那些即将进入有利时期的单一市场。

And it also, this operating capability gave him early insights on, individual markets that were poised, you know, for, you know, for an advantageous period.

他确实做到了，尤其是在佛罗里达群岛，取得了巨大成功。

And he did that, you you know, certain most notably with the Florida Keys, had a lot of success in the Florida Keys.

他在北伍德取得了这种成功，之后又在自己的公司Eos延续了这一模式。

And and he had that success at Northwood and then continued that in his firm Eos.

所以你可以看出，我非常欣赏乔纳森这个人、这位投资者以及这位平台建设者。

And so you can tell I'm a huge fan of Jonathan's as a as a person, as an investor, as a platform builder.

我认为他拥有的能力非常独特：能够提前识别价值提升的机会，然后高效地执行——快速而出色地完成，同时通过不向第三方支付过多费用，为投资者节省成本。

And I think what he has is very special, which is this ability to identify value add opportunity upfront and then execute on that and execute on it very efficiently in terms of getting it done quickly and well, but also saving his investors money by not paying, you know, third parties, you know, more than he should.

我研究你们的投资策略时感到惊讶的一点是，你曾告诉我，你们曾持有大约15到20只对冲基金，以及60到80项私募股权投资，涉及30到40个管理人。

One thing that was surprising to me as I looked at your strategy was that think at one point you told me that you owned something like 15 to 20 hedge funds plus something like 60 to 80 private equity investments with 30 to 40 sponsors.

我不确定这些数字现在是否有很大变化。

I'm not sure if those numbers have changed a great deal.

持有15到20只对冲基金这个想法让我非常感兴趣，因为我记得，很多年前——大概二十五年前——邓普顿曾对我说，普通投资者至少应该持有五只专注于市场不同领域的基金。

The idea of owning 15 to 20 hedge funds is really interesting to me because I I remember, for example, Templeton many, many years ago, probably twenty five years ago, saying to me that the average investor should own a minimum of five funds, each focused on a different area of the market.

而你就在那里。

And here you are.

你显然在与那些并非普通投资者的人打交道。

You're obviously dealing with people who are not the average investor.

你的典型客户至少向你投资了1亿美元。

Your your typical client has a minimum of a $100,000,000 invested with you.

因此，这些客户通常是亿万富翁和十亿富翁，一些全球最显赫的家族。

So these are these tend to be billionaires and multibillionaires, some of the most prominent families in in the world.

你如何看待多元化这个问题？

How do you think of this question of diversification?

因为我自己常常在两种想法之间纠结：一方面希望足够集中，以便表现优异；另一方面又希望足够分散，以确保能够生存。

Because I often am torn personally between the idea of wanting to concentrate enough so that I'm likely to perform well and diversify enough so that I'm likely to survive.

我只是想知道，你是如何思考这个问题的？关于通过多元化实现生存，我们其他人能从中吸取哪些经验？

And I'm just wondering how you how you think about this and how you know, what kind of lessons there are for the rest of us on this issue of survival through diversification.

所以你知道，关键在于，你想要多元化，但不要过度。

So you you know, the key point, which is, you know, you want diversification but not too much.

对吧？

Right?

如果我们过度分散投资，你知道，如果不集中的话，我认为我们这个领域的大多数投资组合往往倾向于过度分散而非不足。

If we if we diversify too much, you know, if you don't concentrate and and I do think most portfolios in our world tend more towards over diversification rather than under.

我甚至应该定义一下，我想我所说的‘我们的世界’是什么，也就是，我所做的，东岩所做的，我们存在于投资世界的一个庞大分支中，但这个分支得到的关注，我认为，比对冲基金和私募股权基金要少得多，那就是，我们是为家族管理大规模资产池的管理者。

And I should even define, I guess, what I think our world is, which, you know, I I think what I do, what East Rock does, we exist in this, you know, very large arm of the investment world, but an arm that gets a lot less attention, I think, than hedge funds and private equity funds, which is, you know, we're managers of large asset pools for families.

而这构成了投资领域中的一个完整细分行业，涉及OCIO公司、内部管理的捐赠基金和家族办公室。

And, you know, that is a whole sort of sector within investing that involves these OCIO firms and internally managed endowments and family offices.

在我看来，管理大规模资产池的这个领域，我们作为一个群体其实有很多可以改进的地方，其中一点实际上可能是以一种更高级或更细致的方式思考分散投资。

That world of managing large asset pools, I think, frankly, there are a number of things that we as a group can do better, and and one of them actually is probably, you know, thinking about diversification in, you know, I'll call it a more advanced or maybe nuanced way.

所以，首先，针对你的观点，我认为我们确实看到了相当多的过度分散现象。

And so first, to your point, I I do think we see quite a lot of over diversification.

我们可以深入探讨原因。

We can get into the reasons.

在我看来，最关键的是分散投资的类型，它凌驾于其他所有因素之上。

The key in my mind, and it trumps everything else, is the type of diversification.

你知道，类型至关重要。

You know, the type is incredibly important.

你必须分散投资于真正彼此不相关的领域。

You must diversify into situations that are truly non correlated with each other.

正是这一点比分散投资的数量更能保护你。

That is what protects you more so than the amount of diversification.

这根本不在一个量级上。

It's not even close.

因此，这可能是我在一系列理由中的第一条，这些理由让我如此坚信，主动管理应成为大型资产组合的重要组成部分。

And so that is maybe item one on a fairly long list of why, you know, I believe so strongly in active management as a significant portion of a large asset pool.

我将主动管理定义为私人投资的所有形式加上绝对收益策略的结合。

And I'll I'll just define active management as the combination of private investing in all its forms plus absolute return.

为了给出一个非常简单的理由来说明为什么是这样。

And and to hopefully give a really simple reason why that's the case.

看。

Look.

如果你看一下标普500指数，其成分股中绝大多数，几乎是全部，其贝塔值都在0.5到1.5之间。

If you look at the S and P 500, the vast majority of the components of the S and P 500, overwhelming, portion of it, has a beta between point five to 1.5.

你知道吗？

You know?

所以这些公司、这些股票，它们的表现比差异更趋同，而且显著地趋同。

So those companies, those stocks, they behave, you know, together more than they behave differently, you know, by a significant amount.

要真正实现不相关的投资，你真的需要关注私募投资和绝对收益领域——我猜你对此非常在意，而我认为你也确实应该在意。

To make investments that are truly non correlated, you really need to be looking I I'm assuming you really care about this, which I think you should.

你真的需要去关注私募投资和绝对收益的世界。

You really need to be looking in the world of private investing in an absolute return.

我们的对冲基金头寸，你知道，它们的贝塔值，也就是与标普500指数的相关性，范围从大约0.5到0.6，有些甚至低至负值，实际上低于零。

And, you know, our our hedge fund positions, you know, the the betas, you know, the the relationship to the S and P 500, they range, you know, from a high of about point five or point six, some of them, down to negative, you know, actually less than zero.

所以

And so

所以对于像我这样不懂技术术语的普通人来说，我们这里真正讨论的是降低市场直接暴露风险的好处。

So so for laymen like me who are not good with technical terms, what we're really talking about here is is the the benefit of reducing your kind of raw market exposure.

所以如果市场下跌，比如标普500指数，你就不会被彻底击垮。

So so if the market gets hit, the S and P 500, for example, you're not totally crushed.

你提到指数基金的一个问题是，比如在2022年，它下跌了25%。

So you've pointed out that one of the problems with with index funds is, for example, in 2022, you had a 25% drop.

在2020年，下跌了34%。

In 2020, a 34% drop.

在2018年，下跌了19%；在2007到2009年，下跌了55%。

In 2018, a nineteen percent drop in 2007 to 2009, a 55% drop.

所以你所指的，正是我们所有长期投资者必须面对的一个根本性问题：你能承受多大的市场风险暴露？

So what you're getting at is this really fundamental problem that all of us having to deal with as long term investors, which is how much can you bear to be exposed to that market risk?

你能承受多少？

How much can you handle?

你是否真能像你在文章中所说的那样，拥有钢铁般的意志来熬过这些回撤？

And will you actually be able, as as you put it in your writing, to have the iron will to ride out those drawdowns?

如果你能做到，那就容易多了。我的意思是，我认为在我所处的投资生态中，那些集中持有长期多头头寸的人里，有些人恰恰在这些回撤期间非常有魄力，他们从心理上能应对得来。

And if you do, it's easier I mean, I I think for for some of the people I invest with in in in my sort of ecosystem who are kind of concentrated long only investors, there are people who are very opportunistic during these drawdowns, and they can kinda handle it temperamentally.

那只是世界上一小部分能够承受这种风险的人。

That's a small it's a small part of the world that can handle that.

所以我认为你正在指出一个我们都必须面对的根本性难题，这非常令人不安：你该如何降低对市场的暴露，以便在市场下跌期间能够生存下来，而不做出任何愚蠢的举动？

So I think you're getting at this very fundamental problem that all of us are trying to deal with that's very uncomfortable, which is how do you reduce your exposure to the market so that you'll survive and not do anything really stupid during those down periods?

是的。

Yes.

所以我经常被问到这个问题，听起来你也经常面对这个问题：为什么我要费心去搞这些主动管理，比如私募股权、随之而来的流动性差、收取高额费用的对冲基金，所有这些东西？

So I get the question all the time, and and it sounds like you engage with this question a lot, which is just why should I bother with all this active management stuff, private equity, all the illiquidity that goes with it, hedge funds that charge big fees, all all this stuff.

我为什么要费心去管这些？

Why should I bother with any of that?

我不如直接买ETF好了？

Shouldn't I just buy ETFs?

看看标普500在过去十年、十五年里表现如何，一路攀升。

Look at what the S and P five hundred has done for the last ten years, fifteen years, picking up.

我认为，确实有一个非常有力的理由说明人们不应该简单地抛弃另类投资，而只考虑纯公开市场的策略。

And I think that there is a very powerful argument for why people should not do you know, not just kick out alternative investing and and think about a public's only strategy.

这确实有几个组成部分。

And it really has, you know, a few components.

其中一个就是你刚才提到的，有一些研究表明，平均而言，个人投资者，比如像我这样管理大量资产的投资者，并没有完全获得市场的全部回报。

So one is the one you just referred to, which is, you know, there's there are bit of research which shows that on average, individual investors, you know, investors in my sort of seat managing a large pool of assets, they don't capture the whole return of the market.

他们总是在错误的时间买入和卖出。

You know, they buy and sell at the wrong time.

而且，这背后有多种原因。

And, you know, the and that happens for a bunch of reasons.

其中一个原因当然是，当资产大幅下跌时，心理上的痛苦难以承受。

And one of them, of course, is just the psychological pain of being down massively.

在某些时候，如果你亏损足够多，坚持持有反而变得非理性。

At some point, if you're down enough, it's actually irrational even to hold on through that.

因此，仅仅把ETF作为解决方案，从行为心理学角度来看是不妥的。

So, you know, there there are behavioral reasons not to only buy, you know, ETFs as a solution.

还有一个原因是你可能买错了标的，而且长时间处于错误的状态。

There is a second reason, which is you can buy the wrong ones and be wrong for a really long time.