RWH050：与杰森·茨威格谈《聪明的投资者》

利用杠杆买入这只股票，趁它还没再涨之前抢购这个ETF，或者觉得这只股票很便宜，又或者听某个市场专家说股市即将崩盘或直线上涨。

Use leverage to buy this and, you know, grab this ETF before it goes up more, or this stock is cheap, or this market expert thinks, you know, stocks are about to crash or go straight up.

所有这些都让投资者觉得，获胜的方式就是和机构投资者玩同样的游戏。

And it all has the effect of making investors feel that the way to the way to win is to play the same game as institutional investors.

作为个人投资者，我应该通过选股来击败标普500指数，频繁交易，忽略税收和交易成本，并时刻用手机关注市场动态。

As an individual, I should try to beat the S and P 500 with individual stock picks and trade as often as necessary and ignore taxes and trading costs and stay constantly updated on my phone.

而格雷厄姆真正想说的是，赢得这场游戏的唯一方法就是停止参与。

And what Graham is really saying is the only way to win the game is to stop playing.

你必须玩自己的游戏。

You have to play your own game.

不要试图去玩专业投资者玩的游戏。

Don't try to play the game that professional investors play.

好好想想。

Think about it.

我的意思是，从长期来看，大约三分之二到80%的专业基金经理表现都跑输标普500指数，很多时候甚至跑输其他基准指数。

I mean, over time, you know, something between two thirds and 80% of all professional fund managers underperform, certainly the S and P 500 and often other benchmarks as well.

这主要是因为试图战胜市场所产生的摩擦成本。

And that's mainly because of the the frictional costs of trying to beat the market.

如果你选择玩这个游戏，你就必须通过交易来参与。

And if that's the game you're playing, you have to trade to play it.

而格雷厄姆则建议忽略市场先生。

And Graham instead is saying tune out mister market.

停止听那些告诉你因为今天发生了某种行动你就必须参与的人的话。

Stop listening to people who tell you that because some sort of action is going on today, you have to participate.

相反，你应该等待机会出现，而这本质上是一种逆向思维的表现。

Instead, you should wait for opportunity to come along, and that's a function of basically being contrarian.

比如在2020年新冠崩盘期间，不要躲在现金里，反而应该进场买入。

You know, during the COVID crash in 2020, instead of hunkering down in cash, step up and buy.

在2022年市场下跌期间，也要挺身而出买入。

And, you know, during the decline in the market in 2022, Step up and buy.

做与主流宣传相反的事，而不是随波逐流。

Do the opposite of what the prevailing propaganda tells you instead of trying to go along with it.

当他提到让你避免他人判断的错误时，他真正想说的是要独立思考，培养自主性。

When he says to spare you the mistakes of other people's judgment, what he's really talking about is thinking for yourself and becoming independent.

最不幸的是，自互联网出现以来的至少二十年里，金融行业在广告以及手机应用、经纪网站等产品开发中，主导的宣传一直是：只要你拥有和专业人士相同的工具，你就能与他们竞争。

And the really unfortunate thing is that for at least twenty years ever since the Internet came along, the dominant propaganda in the financial industry, both in advertising and in product developments like apps on your phone or brokerage websites has been that if you have the same tools as the professionals, you can compete with them.

你可以超越专业人士。

You can outperform the professions.

但为什么我要试图超越那些表现不佳的人呢？

But why would I wanna try to outperform people who are underperforming?

我更愿意与市场先生竞争，而不是模仿他的行为。

I would much rather compete against mister market rather than try to do what he's doing.

这正是格雷厄姆在这里想要传达的核心教训：你应该把他人的情绪视为反向指标，并站在均值回归的对立面。

And that's really a lesson that Graham is driving at here, which is that you should take the emotions of other people as contrary indicators, and you should be taking the other side of regression to the mean.

当其他人充满热情时，你需要保持怀疑。

When other people are enthusiastic, you need to be skeptical.

当其他人沮丧绝望时，你需要保持乐观。

When other people are despondent, you need to be optimistic.

而且，我记得我曾经问过沃伦·巴菲特这个问题，比尔·米勒也提到过，书里也是这么说的。

And, you know, I once asked Warren Buffett about this, and I and Bill Miller as well, and the book said the same thing.

我说，你们经常被描述为投资时毫无情绪波动。

I said, you know, you people often describe you as unemotional when you invest.

但真的是这样吗？还是说你们其实是反向情绪化？

But is that really it, or is it that you're inversely emotional?

你们会从捕捉到他人的负面情绪中获得一种兴奋感，而从他人的热情中感受到危险或警觉。

You get a kind of excitement from picking up on other people's negative feeling, and you get a sense of danger or caution from other people's enthusiasm.

巴菲特和米勒也都说，用‘反向情绪化’来描述比‘无情绪’或‘理性’要准确得多。

And in Buffett and Miller as well said, yeah, inversely emotional is a much better better way to describe it than unemotional or even rational.

这其实就是采取与他人主导情绪相反的态度。

It's just taking the opposite of other people's dominant emotional state.

我惊讶的是，在你对某一章的评论中，你曾深入谈到个人投资者相对于专业人士所拥有的优势。

I was surprised that at one point in your commentaries on one of the chapters, you you talked in some depths about the advantage that individual investors can have over professionals.

而我们通常把个人投资者看作是‘冤大头’。

And and we usually regard individual investors kind of as the mug.

让我感到非常有趣的是，你提到机构面临的限制已经像锁链一样沉重，而个人曾经面临的障碍却已逐渐消失。

And, it was very interesting to me that you said, actually, there's a you said the handicaps on institutions have become as heavy as chains while those formerly faced by individuals have fallen away.

你能谈谈为什么实际上，如今只要是个有纪律、拥有良好投资流程和方法的个人投资者，就能表现得相当出色吗？

Can you talk a little bit about why actually the individual now almost for the first time has at least an individual who's disciplined and has good processes and procedures for investing actually do really pretty well.

你知道，从历史上看，如果回溯几十年，美国股市（我相信全球其他市场也是如此）的大部分交易量都是由个人投资者完成的。

So, you know, historically, if you go back decades, most of the trading volumes in certainly in The US stock market and I'm sure in other markets around the world was done by individuals.

机构通常只是买入并持有，往往出于税务原因，有时也有其他原因。

Institutions bought and held, you know, often for tax reasons and sometimes for other reasons as well.

而个人则因为他们的股票经纪人促使他们频繁交易。

And the individuals traded because their their stock brokers were making them trade.

这很自然地导致交易成本极高，因为这是零售价格而非批发价格——批发方很少交易，而零售方却在频繁交易。

And it was naturally, it was extremely expensive to trade individual stocks because it was a retail rather than a wholesale price because the wholesale purchases of stock were not doing much trading, and the retail purchasers were.

所以这是一个零售市场，定价方式也像零售市场一样。

So it was a retail market and it was priced like a retail market.

我记得我上高中时做的第一笔交易，当时一笔往返交易的成本，我想大概是5%到6%。

I mean, I I still remember the first trade I ever made when I was in high school and I think my cost for a round trip trade was, I don't know, it was five or 6% has leased.

我确实赚了钱，即使扣除了经纪费用，但如果经纪人没有剥削我，我本可以赚得更多。

And I actually did make money even after even after my brokerage costs, but I would have laid a lot more if the broker hadn't, you know, robbed me.

那时，我认为他只是按当时公认的标准佣金收费。

And that was just the way that I'd think he was just charging from what's then was regarded as a standard commission.

我觉得他甚至没有做任何不公平或不正当的事情。

I don't think he was even, you know, doing anything unfair or improper.

过去，交易单只股票的成本非常高。

It's just it used to cost a ton to trade an individual stock.

当然，现在你可以几乎免费地交易股票。

And of course, now you can trade a stock for close to free.

这并不是完全免费的，因为买卖价差仍然存在，即使你的经纪人是声称交易免费的Robinhood，也会从中抽成。

It's not completely free because there still is a spread between the bid and ask price that your broker will skim off even if your broker is Robinhood, which insists that trading is free.

这种成本并不微不足道，但在大多数情况下远低于1%。

And that cost isn't negligible, but it's well under well under 1% in most cases.

机构必须交易大量股票。

Institutions have to trade huge blocks of stock.

我的意思是，他们通常持有单只证券数百万甚至上千万股。

I mean, they often own millions, tens of millions of shares of a single security.

要进入或退出这种仓位，成本极高，不仅体现在佣金或买卖价差上，还包括执行成本，比如时间延迟。

And to get into that position and out of that position is incredibly expensive, not just in terms of commission or spread, but also, you know, the total implementation cost, which include the delay.

你知道，如果我是一名专业投资经理，原本没有持有，比如英伟达的股票，但决定真的想持有，我可能需要好几周时间，才能以不至于对我极为不利的价格建仓。

You know, if I'm a professional portfolio manager and I don't own, you name it, NVIDIA, and I decide I really wanna own NVIDIA, it could take me weeks to build up a position at a price that isn't incredibly disadvantageous to me.

因为我不想让我的经纪人赚大钱，也不想承受巨大的买卖价差。

Because I'm not I don't wanna make my brokers rich, and I don't wanna eat a big spread.

我可能不得不每天买几百股，直到累积起完整的仓位。

And I'm I might have to buy a few 100 shares a day until I amass my entire position.

如果在这段时间里股价上涨了，我就承受了巨大的机会成本。

And if the stock runs up over that period, I've incurred an enormous opportunity cost.

这笔成本会直接降低我的理论收益，也解释了为什么我的基金表现不如预期——因为我管理的资金太多，建仓花了太长时间。

And that comes out of my hypothetical return and helps explain why my fund has not performed as well as it should have because it took me too long to build up the position because I manage so much money.

但如果是个人投资者，决定喜欢英伟达，我只需掏出手机，直接买入就行。

But if I'm an individual investor and I decide I like NVIDIA, I just grab my phone and buy it.

我可以使用限价单，这样就不会因为不利的价格波动而吃亏，而且几乎不需要任何成本。

And I can use a limit order so I don't get gypped on an adverse price move, and it'll essentially cost me nothing.

我可以无论好坏都持有它。

And I can hold it through good times and bad.

我不用担心客户会解雇我，因为我根本没有客户。

I don't have to worry that my clients will fire me because I don't have any.

也许我得担心朋友和家人怎么想，毕竟我会把我的所有操作都告诉他们，但我比大多数机构更有优势。

You know, I might have to worry about what my friends and family think because I, you know, tell them everything I'm doing, but I'm in a better position than most institutions.

我没有管理费吗？

I can I have no expense ratio?

持有这只股票对我来说没有任何成本。

Doesn't cost me anything to own the stock.

而且，我还可以把大部分资金投入一个全股票市场基金，比如一个持有美国或全球所有股票的ETF，这样我就不用担心错过市场的整体上涨机会。

And furthermore, I could put most of my money in a total stock market fund, like, you know, an ETF that owns all the stocks in The US or all the stocks in the world so that I have no fear of missing out on the general upside in the market.

然后，用一小部分资金，我可以进行集中押注，密切关注这些公司，把握机会并从中获利。

And then with a small portion of my money, I can make concentrated bets and pay close attention to those companies and see as opportunities develop and, capitalize.

这些对如今大多数专业基金经理来说都是极其强大的优势，简直是一种奢侈。

And those are all really powerful advantages that are a total luxury for most professional fund managers nowadays.

他们恨不得拥有这些优势。

They would kill to have those advantage.

我在重读这本书时，有一个非常强烈的体会——我想我这些年读过好几次了——那就是格雷厄姆对防御型投资者和积极型投资者的区分。

I think one of the things that came through very strongly for me on this reading of the book, which I I I guess I read a few times over the years, is the distinction that Graham makes between defensive and enterprising investors.

这不仅关乎你是聪明的投资者还是鲁莽的投机者，还关乎你是否具备成为积极进取型投资者的条件。

So not only this question whether you're an intelligent investor or a reckless speculator, but also this question of whether you're equipped to be enterprising and aggressive.

你能谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk about that?

因为我认为，确实，作为个人，我们拥有优势。

Because I think, well, it's true that we have advantages as individuals.

当然，你在整个写作生涯中多次强调过一点：你必须对自己是否真正具备赢得这场游戏的能力有清晰的自我认知。

Obviously, one of the points you've made many times over the course of your writing career is that you have to have some self awareness about whether you're actually equipped to win this game.

是的。

Yeah.

没错。

Exactly.

所以，是的，我非常喜欢格雷厄姆提出的这个区分，尽管它听起来很简单，但实际上非常精妙。

So, yeah, I, I love this distinction that Graham drew, and it is very sophisticated even though it sounds very simple.

和往常一样，他比他的时代超前了几十年。

And as usual, he was decades ahead of his time.

我的意思是，你还记得威廉吗？当你我刚开始涉足投资行业的时候。

I mean, you'll remember William when when you and I first started, you know, covering the investment business.

当时，基金公司、股票经纪人和财务顾问把个人投资者分成三类是非常普遍的做法。

It was extremely common for fund companies, stock brokers, financial advisors to bucket individual investors into three piles.

对吧？

Right?

你是保守型、稳健型还是进取型。

You're conservative, moderate, or aggressive.

人类喜欢三分类的东西。

And human beings love things in threes.

对吧？

Right?

就像A B C、一二三、圣父、圣子、圣灵，你懂的，随便举个例子。

Like a b c, one two three, father, holy ghost, you know, you name it.

所有东西都分成三类。

Everything comes in threes.

金融行业很喜欢这个说法，因为它简单、易记。

And the financial industry loved it because it was simple, It was catchy.

它省了人们很多工作，他们只需对每个客户说：你听起来很保守。

It saved people a lot of work, and they would just take every client, and they would just say, you sound conservative.

好的。

Okay.

你80%买债券，20%买股票。

You go 80% in bonds, 20% in stocks.

你听起来是中等风险。

And you sound moderate.

我们会给你配置60%股票和40%债券，这样你就显得激进了。

We're gonna give you 60% stocks and 40% bonds, and you sound aggressive.

所以我们可能会给你全部配置股票，或者90%股票，或者如果我比较激进，我甚至会建议你加杠杆，买超过100%的股票。

So we're gonna give you all stocks or 90% stocks, or maybe if I'm aggressive, I'll recommend to you that you even leverage and, you know, buy more than a 100% in stocks.

你根本不需要花几秒钟以上去思考，就能意识到这有多荒谬，因为人的类型远不止三种。

And, I mean, you don't have to think about this for more than a few seconds to realize that it's ridiculous because there's more than three kinds of people.

而且，人们是很复杂的。

And furthermore, people are complicated.

他们在生活的某个方面很保守，在另一个方面却很激进。

They're conservative in one aspect of their life, and they're aggressive in another.

你知道，他们会玩蹦极。

You know, they bungee jump.

他们会偏离雪道去滑雪。

They, they ski off the trail.

他们周末开赛车，却把所有钱都存在货币市场基金里。

They, you know, they drive race cars on the weekend, and then they keep all their money in a money market fund.

我的意思是，你不能这么简单地把人分类。

I mean, you you can't pigeonhole people that simply.

所以格雷厄姆提出了一个更有用的实际区分方法，他只描述了两种类型的投资者，我认为这种划分方式非常实用，因为它确实适用。

And so Graham had a much more useful practical distinction, and he described only two kinds of investors, and in this case, I think that's a really useful way to divide the investing population because it actually applies.

他说，你要么是防御型的，要么是进取型的。

And he said, you're either defensive or you're enterprising.

如果你是防御型的，并不意味着你不喜欢风险。

And if you're defensive, it doesn't mean that you don't like risk.

也不意味着你不想承担风险。

It doesn't mean you wanna you don't wanna take risk.

并不意味着你把所有钱都放在现金里，或者应该一直保持这样。

It doesn't mean you have all your money in cash or should keep it there.

它的意思是，你不想花时间精力去从事主动投资的工作。

What it means is you don't want to be bothered doing the work, putting in the time and effort to be an active investor.

你所防范的是压力、时间投入和持续监控带来的负担。

And what you're defending yourself against is the stress, the time commitment, the monitoring,

这个

the

成为积极投资者的代价。

expense of being an active investor.

当然，积极并不意味着你频繁交易，但它确实意味着你会交易。

And, of course, active doesn't have to mean you trade a lot, but it does mean you trade.

另一类投资者是积极型投资者。

And then the other category of investor is enterprising.

积极型投资者是愿意投入时间、精力、努力和承诺的人。

And an enterprising investor is somebody who is willing to put in the time, the effort, the energy, the commitment.

我觉得大多数人都是防御型的。

And, you know, I would say most people are defensive.

如果你是，那就无需投入那么多工作。

And if you are, then you don't have to put in the work.

你不必花时间，也不必投入华尔街和金融行业希望你投入的精力。

You don't have to spend the time and commit the energy that Wall Street and, you know, the financial industry would like you to do.

而另一种现实是，如果你以为自己是进取型投资者，实际上却是防御型的，那么迟早你会发现自己并非无懈可击，因为你会在2021年参与交易GameStop、AMC、Bed Bath & Beyond，还沾沾自喜。

And the alternate reality is that if you think you're enterprising when you're actually defensive, sooner or later, you will discover that you're not defectless because you will be there in 2021, you know, trading GameStop and AMC and Bed Bath and Beyond and thinking, whoopee.

你知道，每天我都能赚150%，但转眼间，这些股票就下跌了80%到90%。

You know, every day I'm making, you know, a 150% on my money, and the next thing you know, these stocks go down 80 or 90 per percent.

2022年对所有人来说都是一场血洗，突然间你开始说：天哪。

2022 was a bloodbath for everybody, And all of a sudden, you're saying, wow.

我以为自己懂行，但实际上我只是碰巧在对的时间待在了对的地方。

I thought I knew what I was doing, but I really was just in the right place at the right time.

我不喜欢这种感觉，因为现在我知道自己已经超出能力范围了。

And I don't like this feeling because now I know I'm out of my debt.

我不明白为什么我会亏钱。

I don't understand why I lost money.

我不明白该如何挽回我的损失。

I don't understand how to reverse my losses.

这就是困难所在，也正是金融行业极力劝说人们成为进取型投资者的原因，即使他们根本不是——因为这些人才是经纪公司赚取最多利润的群体。

And that's the difficulty, and that's why it's so important to the financial industry to try to talk people into being enterprising even if they're really aren't because those are the people that brokerage firms make the most money off

的。

of.

你对那些近年来因自以为更积极、更懂行而惨遭重创的投资者的描述，让我们引出了另一个极其核心的原则。我在写书的过程中，突然意识到这不仅仅适用于巴菲特、芒格和格雷厄姆。

Your description of all of those investors who got eviscerated in recent years by kinda thinking they were more aggressive and more knowledgeable than they were brings us to another really, really central principle that I think as I was working on my book, it struck me sort of almost revelatory that it wasn't just Buffett and Munger and Graham.

而是几乎我所写的每一位人物，比如霍华德·马克斯、乔·格林布拉特。

It was Howard Marks, Joe Greenblatt, everyone I was writing about practically.

这正是最重要的一项原则，即安全边际。

This was the single most important principle, which is the margin of safety.

因此，第二十章标题为‘安全边际：投资的核心理念’，开篇便是一句至关重要的话：在古老的传说中，智者最终将人类历史的全部经验浓缩为一句话——这一切终将过去；若要我们以三个词概括稳健投资的精髓，我们提出这句格言：安全边际。

And so chapter 20 is titled margin of safety as the central concept of investment, and it begins with this just critically important sentence where he writes, in the old legend, the wise men finally boil down the history of mortal affairs into the single phrase, this too will pass, Confronted with a like challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we venture the motto margin of safety.

这在许多方面都美得令人惊叹。

It's so beautiful on so many fronts.

我的意思是，写得实在太精彩了。

I mean, it's it's it's brilliantly written.

字里行间充满了他对古典文学的深刻理解。

It's steeped in his knowledge of classical literature.

它捕捉到了某种至关重要的东西。

It's, it captures something so essential.

你能谈谈安全边际这个概念吗？为什么它对这些伟大的投资者来说变得如此核心？

Can you talk a bit about the concept of margin of safety and why it's something that's become so central for all of these great investors?

是的。

Yeah.

我想，让我来谈谈这个。

And I think there's a there's a let me take it.

我会这样开始，威廉，然后我会稍微换个角度来谈。

I'll I'll start that way, William, and then I'll take it in a slightly different direction, I think.

所以，归根结底，安全边际的意思就是，当你购买一项资产时，要确保你支付的价格不超过它的实际价值。

So, you know, at heart, all the margin of safety means is that when you buy an asset, you wanna make sure you don't pay more for it than it's worth.

如果你回想一下2020年或2021年，当时数百万人以为自己在投资，实际上他们只是在投机，因为他们没有做足功课。

And, you know, if you think back to 2020 or 2021 when millions of people thought they were investing, when they were speculating because they had not done their homework.

他们没有把股票当作企业来估值。

They had not valued these stocks as businesses.

他们只知道其他人正在买入，而且价格在上涨。

All they knew was that other people were buying them and they were going up.

所以，这些人都根本没有考虑过安全边际。

And so none of those people gave a moment spot to a margin of safety.

你知道的吧？

You know?

如果你因为一大群人都在买，就买了太瑞雅（Tilray）——一家大麻公司，或者尼古拉（Nikola）——一家电动卡车公司，那你几乎会亏掉所有投入的资金，除非你恰好在正确的时间离场。

And if you bought Tilray at, you know, marijuana company or Nikola, electric truck company, just because a whole bunch of other people were buying it, you know, you lost pretty much everything you put in unless you got out at just the right moment.

如果你试图为这类公司计算安全边际，我想你会得出结论：要么根本不存在安全边际，要么根本无法衡量它。

And if you had tried to calculate a margin of safety for companies like that, I think you would have either concluded that there is none or it's impossible to say what it is.

从最基础、对个人投资者最适用的角度来说，如果你没有读过一家公司近三年的年报（10-K），也没有读过过去四个季度的季报，那你对这家公司其实一无所知。

And in the most basic terms that are applicable for individual investors, if you haven't read, say, three years of a company's annual reports, it's 10 k, and you haven't read the past four quarterly reports, you don't know anything about the company.

你只知道它的股价。

You only know about the stock.

如果你只知道股价一直在上涨，那你根本无从知晓是否存在安全边际，或者它究竟是多少。

And if the only thing you know is that the stock has been going up, you have no clue what the margin of safety is or whether there is one.

当然，专业投资者会以非常正式的方式计算安全边际。

And professional investors, of course, will calculate a margin of safety in very formal ways.

你知道，他们可能会使用折现现金流模型、股息模型，以及各种版本的股息贴现模型，但这并不是一个简单或普遍认同的解决方案。

You know, they might use a discounted cash flow model, dividend, various versions of dividend discount models, and it's not a trivial or universally agreed solution.

我的意思是，当你计算安全边际时，你很可能得出的是一系列估值，而不是一个具体的点值。

I mean, when you calculate a margin of safety, you're probably gonna come up with a range of values, not a point, not a specific point.

但个人投资者需要明白的是，如果你没有研究过一家公司，而只了解它的股票，那么你对安全边际根本一无所知，因为你甚至不知道是否存在安全边际。

But what individual investors need to realize is that if you haven't studied a company and all you know about is the stock, then you're literally clueless about what the margin of safety is because you don't even know if there is one.

但自格雷厄姆时代以来，出现了一个非常重要的变化，那就是分散投资实际上已经变成了一种免费的资源。

But there is one very important development that has occurred since Graham's day, and that is that diversification has effectively become a free good.

在市场中，你可以像我之前提到的那样，购买一只全股票市场基金。

And in the marketplace, you can buy, as I mentioned earlier, you can buy a total stock market fund.

你可以购买一只全球股票市场基金。

You could buy a total international stock market fund.

如果你更偏好债券。

You prefer bonds.

你也可以在债券市场做同样的事情。

You can do the same thing in the bond market.

你也可以在房地产领域这样做。

You can do that for real estate.

你可以在大多数主要资产类别中这样做，这能提供一种不同类型的安全边际。

You can do that for most major asset classes, and that can provide a different kind of margin of safety.

它并不能为你所购买的特定独特资产提供安全边际，但它确实为你提供了后台保障，以防你因该资产价值归零而损失全部资金。

It doesn't provide a margin of safety for a specific idiosyncratic asset that you may be buying, but what it does do is it provides you insurance in the background against the risk that you could lose all your money if this thing goes to zero.

因为如果你持有整个市场，你就能够承担对市场某一部分进行特定押注的风险。

Because if you if you own the entire market, you then can afford to make a specific bet on a piece of the market.

这并不是格雷厄姆真正设想过的，尽管他在晚年的一些著作中曾暗示过，指数基金可能是一个即将出现的发展方向。

And that is not something that Graham really contemplated, although he hinted at it in some of the things he wrote late in his life when it looked as if index funds might be a development on the horizon.

正如你所知，我几十年来一直倡导指数基金。

And as you know, I've been an advocate of index funds for, you know, decades.

而且这并不仅仅是因为我认为试图战胜市场是徒劳的。

And it's not purely because I think in fact, I would say it's not because I think attempting to beat the market is futile.

这是因为这是最有效的投资方式。

It's because it's the most efficient way to invest.

你能接触到整个资产类别的表现，如果你就此止步，那也没问题。

And you have exposure to the performance of the entire asset class, and it's fine if you stop there.

但如果你想追求超越市场表现，那么将指数基金作为投资组合的基础是非常好的，然后你可以叠加一些你真正了解的特定公司或其他资产。

But if you wanna try to outperform, then it's really good to have that index fund as the base of your portfolio, and then you can overlay a few specific debts in companies or other assets that you feel you really know something about.

昨晚我读完这本书后一直在想，是的。

I was looking last night after reading the book and was yeah.

正如我在我的书中所写的，我总是在指数投资和想要超越市场的愿望之间犹豫不决。

I'm you know, as I as I wrote about it in my book, I'm I'm always torn between indexing and the desire to, to try to outperform.

我很感兴趣地发现，我们家庭投资的三分之一都在指数基金上。

And I was interested to see I I think I have a third of our family's investments in deck.

我总是情感上有些纠结，但我觉得至少我不希望我的妻子和孩子因为我的妄想而受苦。

And I'm I'm always sort of torn emotionally, but I feel like, at least I don't want my wife and kids to suffer for my own delusions.

所以我通常都会为他们的投资选择指数基金。

So I tend always to index their their investments.

但确实有一些。

But it's some yeah.

我喜欢这样的想法：指数基金至少应该作为投资组合的基础。

I I like the idea that index funds should at least be a sort of foundation on which the portfolio is built.

这感觉像是默认选择。

It feels like the default.

是的。

Yes.

而且，你知道，这一点对于个人投资者尤其成立。

And, you know, this is especially true, of course, for individual investors.

我的意思是，如果你管理的是专业投资组合，我想很难让人愿意为你把他们95%的资金都投入指数基金而付费。

I mean, if you're running a professionally managed portfolio, I think you're gonna have a hard time convincing people to pay you for putting 95% of their hedge in next month.

不过，仔细想想，现在确实有很多理财顾问在这么做。

Although there are a lot of financial advisers out there who do that now that I think about it.

但我认为，如果你这么做，很难运营一只基金。

But I think you'd have a hard time running a fund doing that.

但你的结果可能会更好，因为你只会投资那些你真正有优势的领域，而投资组合的其余部分则跟踪市场。

But your results might well be better because then you would only invest in the things where you felt you had a real advantage and the rest of the portfolio would track the market.

所以，如果你错了，你的表现也不会差太多。

So if you turned out to be wrong, you wouldn't you wouldn't underperform by much.

而如果你是对的，那么大幅跑赢市场的潜力就在这里。

And if you turned out to be right, here's the potential to outperform by a lot.

我们知道，股票回报的分布是非常偏斜的。

And we know that the distribution of stock returns is very heavily skewed.

大多数公司、大多数股票在长期内并不能赚钱，但那些赚钱的股票却能带来巨额回报。

Most companies don't most stocks don't go don't make money over time, but those that do make a ton.

在长期内，只有极少数股票能上涨10000%甚至更多。

And there's a very limited number of stocks that can go up 10000% or more over in the long run.

如果你恰好抓住了其中一只，又没有用其他150项投资稀释它，而是将其叠加在指数基金之上，你就可能实现非常显著的超额收益。

And if you happen to catch one of those and you don't dilute it with, you know, a 150 other investments, but you simply add it on top of an index fund, you could have some you could have really significant outperformance.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

不。

No.

这不是你的错觉。

It's not your imagination.

风险和监管正在加剧，客户现在要求提供安全证明才能开展业务。

Risk and regulation are ramping up, and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是为什么Vanta是一个变革者。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta自动化您的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合到一个AI驱动的平台上。

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无论您是在准备SOC 2审计还是运行企业GRC项目，Vanta都能确保您的安全并推动交易顺利进行。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

与其追逐电子表格和截图，Vanta为您提供超过三十五个安全与隐私框架的持续自动化。

Instead of chasing spreadsheets and screenshots, Vanta gives you continuous automation across more than thirty five secondurity and privacy frameworks.

像Ramp和Ryder这样的公司使用Vanta后，审计时间减少了82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长争取更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

如果我现在正在运营一家初创公司或扩大团队，这正是我想要的平台类型。

If I were running a startup or scaling a team today, this is exactly the type of platform I'd want in place.

立即前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

那就是 vanta.com/billionaires。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

你是否曾想探索在线交易的世界，却不敢尝试？

Ever wanted to explore the world of online trading, but haven't dared try?

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Plus 500 让你接触到多种多样的交易工具。

Plus five hundred gives you access to a wide range of instruments.

标普500、纳斯达克、比特币、天然气，以及更多品种。

The S and P five hundred, NASDAQ, Bitcoin, gas, and much more.

探索股票指数、能源、金属、外汇、加密货币等更多领域。

Explore equity indices, energy, metals, Forex, crypto, and beyond.

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See a trading opportunity, You'll be able to trade it in just two clicks once your account is open.

不确定自己是否准备好了？

Not sure if you're ready?

没关系。

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Plus500为您提供无限时长的免费模拟账户，内含图表和分析工具，供您练习使用。

Plus500 gives you an unlimited risk free demo account with charts and analytic tools for you to practice on.

凭借二十多年的丰富经验，Plus500是您通往市场的门户。

With over twenty years of experience, Plus500 is your gateway to the markets.

访问 plus500.com 了解更多信息。

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期货交易存在亏损风险，并不适合所有人。

Trading in futures involves risk of loss and is not suitable for everyone.

并非所有申请人都能通过审核。

Not all applicants will qualify.

Plus500，交易更有优势。

Plus 500, it's trading with a plus.

亿万富翁投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Bill Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略之一——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于拥有超过6亿美元投资规模且分配收益率达7.97%的Fundrise收益基金，这一被动收入策略已向各类规模的投资者开放。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄利率下滑，私人信贷在近几年成长为万亿美元级资产类别也就不足为奇了。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

立即访问 fundrise.com/wsb，几分钟内投资 Fundrise 收入基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金 2025 年的总回报率为 8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为 7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往表现不预示未来结果，截至 2025 年 1 月 20 日 12:30 的当前分配率。

Past performance does not guarantee future results, current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细阅读投资材料，包括目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多相关信息请参阅 fundrise.com/income 上的收入基金招募说明书。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundrise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

好的。

Alright.

我们继续回到节目。

Back to the show.

你曾在对其中一章的评论中提到一项非常有趣且重要的研究，那就是亨里克·贝森宾德关于股东财富增值的开创性研究。

There's a very interesting and important study that you mentioned in in your commentary on one of the chapters, which is this seminal study by Henrik Bessenbinder on shareholder wealth enhancement.

正如你在评论中所解释的，他研究了1926年至2022年间约28,000只美国股票。

And he basically looks, as you explain in your commentary, at 28,000 or so US stocks from 1926 to 2022.

这是一个非常长的时间跨度，涵盖了大量股票。

So a very long period and a very large number of stocks.

他得出的结论是，在这约28,000只股票中，近59%的股票在其整个历史期内实际上让投资者亏了钱。

And he basically concludes that nearly 59% of all of those 28,000 or so stocks actually lost money for investors over their full histories.

你还指出，这项研究还显示，仅有966只股票——约占总数的3%多一点——贡献了美国股市的全部净收益。

And then you point out that, the study also shows that only 966 of those stocks, which is basically 3%, little more than 3% of the total, accounted for the cumulative net gain of the entire US stock market.

因此，这里有一个非常有趣的现象，即卓越企业、真正的赢家具有不成比例的重要作用。

And so there's something really interesting here about the outsized importance of great businesses of the real winners.

我曾在播客中以及私下与多位人士讨论过这一点，他们也对此发表了大量看法。

And various people I've talked to on the podcast and privately have commented a lot on this.

比如，我曾在播客中采访过的杰出投资者彼得·奥基夫就表示，他的工作就是找到那少数几只表现优异的股票，而这些股票在某种程度上是可以识别的。

Like, some some like Peter O'Keefe, who's a remarkable investor who I interviewed on the podcast, said his job is to find that small number of stocks that outperform, and they're identifiable to some extent.

这基本上就是他整个事业的核心。

And that's that's his entire business, basically.

然后还有其他人说，不。

Then there are other people who say, well, no.

我应该进行指数投资，因为这样至少我的投资组合中会包含一些这样的公司，从而从中受益。

I should index because the chances are then that I'll at least have some of those companies in my portfolio and will benefit from them.

我在想，你是如何看待我们许多投资者面临的这种核心困境的？

And I'm wondering how you think about this kind of central conundrum that a lot of us are facing as investors.

是的。

Yeah.

所以，再次说明，这回到了格雷厄姆关于防御型投资者和进取型投资者的区分为何如此有力的原因。

So, again, it it this gets back to why Graham's idea of defensive versus enterprising investors is so powerful.

如果你是防御型投资者，就不必对这个问题发表意见。

If you're a defensive investor, you don't have to have an opinion on this.

你完全可以这么说：也许有些人有能力识别出那极少部分会跑赢市场的股票，但我没有能力识别出这些人。

You can simply say, maybe some people are capable of identifying that tiny minority of stocks that will outperform, but I'm not capable of identifying those people.

因此，我会直接持有整个市场，从而受益于市场指数中包含了未来的大赢家这一事实。

So therefore, I will just own the entire market, and I will benefit from the fact that in that market index is represented the big winners of the future.

而如果你是进取型投资者，那么努力识别这些公司就非常有意义。

And if you're an enterprising investor, it makes a lot of sense to try to identify those companies.

但我觉得你必须认识到，胜算并不在你这边。

But I think you have to recognize that the odds are against you.

大多数人做不到这一点，因为如果大多数人能做到，这些股票就不会跑赢市场了。

Most people couldn't do it because if most people could do it, they the stocks wouldn't outperform.

所以，那些能做到的人可能非常擅长企业估值，也许你擅长，也许你不擅长。

So, most people who can do it might be highly skilled at business valuation, and maybe you are and maybe you aren't.

但这里还有另一个因素，那就是你可能只是因为运气好才识别出了它们。

But there's another element here, which is that maybe you could identify them just because you're lucky.

也许，你知道，这周的六选一彩票抽奖中，一、二、三、四、五、六会中奖。

Maybe, you know, in the pick six lottery drawing this week, you know, maybe one, two, three, four, five, six will win.

也许我只是随便选了个幸运号码，然后就中了彩票。

Maybe I just pick the lucky number, and I win the lottery.

我的意思是，你完全可以投入大量精力去挑选这些我称之为超级股票的标的，也许你只是靠运气碰巧选中了一个。

I mean, you could put a lot of effort into trying to pick these, I call them superstocks, and you could you might be able to identify one just by luck of loans.

如果感觉这像是技能，那也没关系。

And if it feels like skill to you, fine.

我的意思是，给自己拍拍肩膀吧。

I mean, pat yourself on the bat.

但我认为重要的是要认识到，成功的概率真的非常低。

But I think it's important to recognize that the odds really are long.

如果我们想区分那些能够稳定做到这一点的人，就需要海量的数据。

And, you know, if we wanted to try to distinguish the people who can reliably do it, we would need vast amounts of data.

我的意思是，通过大量的统计检验，要判断一个基金经理是靠技能还是运气，往往需要几十年的时间。

I mean, you know, by a lot of statistical tests, it takes decades to figure out whether a portfolio manager is skilled or lucky.

当然，基金经理的业绩波动越大，与整体市场表现的差异越明显，就越需要更长的观察期才能确定是技能还是运气。

And, of course, the more volatile that manager's results are and the more they differ from the results in the market as a whole, the longer the measure measurement period you would need to establish whether it's skill or luck.

但我认为这引出了另一个观点，即在书中，我谈到了投资的两个原因。

But I think this brings us to another point, which is in the book, I talk about two reasons to invest.

我把它们称为投资作为一种努力，以及投资作为一种娱乐。

And I call them investing as endeavor and investing as entertainment.

在某种程度上，这其实只是区分防御型投资者和进取型投资者的另一种方式。

And it's really, in some ways, just another way of distinguishing between defensive and enterprising investors.

如果你把投资视为一种努力，那么你的目标就是尽可能在最长时间内以最低风险获得最大回报。

And if investing is an endeavor for you, you're simply focused on the objective of earning the greatest possible return at the least possible risk over the longest possible time periods.

在这种情况下，你同样不必担心短期结果。

And in that case, again, you don't have to worry about results.

你只需买入整个市场并持有它。

You just buy the whole market and hang on to it.

在非常长的时间跨度内，你的表现应该会不错。

And over very long periods, you should do well.

但也许投资也是一种娱乐。

But maybe investing is also entertainment.

它很有趣。

It is fun.

也许你真的很喜欢研究年度报告，去商店和公司设施实地考察，了解公司如何运营，并找出它们的竞争优势。

Maybe you really enjoy studying annual reports and going into stores and company facilities and learning how companies operate and figuring out what is their competitive advantage.

我记得很多年前曾与一位基金经理约好见面，我并不想说他已经去世了。

And, you know, I remember many years ago having an appointment with a fund manager who I I don't wanna say he's no longer alive.

实际上，我也不确定。

I actually don't know.

但那是你和我都在《福布斯》工作的时候，我去员工休息室找他，因为前台说他去了那里。

But I went to our this was when you and I were both working at Forbes, and I went to our pantry to meet him because the receptionist said that's where he went.

他正站在柜台上面，盯着汽水机的背面，屁股还露在房间里面。

And he was up on the counter looking at the back of the soda machine, and his butt was sticking out into the room.

他的鞋子还悬在柜台边缘。

And his shoes were hanging off the edge of the counter.

我当然不确定那是不是他，因为我以前从未见过他这样的姿势。

And I I wasn't even obviously, I wasn't sure it was him because I'd never seen that view of him before.

他从柜台上下来后，我问他：你在干什么？

And, he got down off the counter, and I said, what are you doing?

他说，这台机器真的很棒。

And he said, this is a really good machine.

我想确认一下它是哪家生产的。

I wanted to make sure I knew who made it.

如果你有这种心态，那么投资对你来说将永远充满吸引力。

And, you know, if you have that kind of mentality, then investing will be endlessly fascinating for you.

即使你无法超越市场，你也会获得心理上的满足，这对你来说可能非常有价值，并可能在你生活的其他方面带来额外的好处。

And even if you don't outperform the market, you will get psychic satisfaction that could be very valuable to you, and it could have ancillary benefits in other aspects of your life.

如果你自己经营生意，通过研究经营良好的公司以投资其股票，你可以学到很多关于如何良好经营企业的知识，这可能会让你成为一个更好的商人。

If you run your own business, you could learn a lot about how to run a business well by studying businesses that are run well for the purpose of investing in their stocks, and that could make you a better business person.

格雷厄姆毫不掩饰地写道，我认为是在第二十章，他说：投资最出色的时候，就是它最像商业的时候。

And Graham wrote shamelessly, I think it was in chapter 20, he said investing is at its best when it is most businesslike.

当然，沃伦·巴菲特曾著名地表示，他因为是商人而成为更好的投资者，也因为是投资者而成为更好的商人。

And, of course, Warren Buffett has famously said that he's a better investor for being a businessman and a better businessman for being an investor.

所以，这是一个很长的回答，但我想我的结论是：即使以传统标准来看，试图超越市场的努力失败了，它也可能在其他维度上取得成功，而且完全值得你投入时间。

And so that's a long answer, but I think where I would come out is that even if the attempt to outperform the market fails by conventional measures, it may succeed in other dimensions, and it may well be worth your time.

这取决于你的性格和你是什么样的人。

And it depends on your temperament, what kind of person you are.

不过，我认为正如你职业生涯中经常做的那样，明确说明长期跑赢市场有多么困难，这一点至关重要。

I think, though, it's hugely important as you've often done over the course of your career to make clear just how difficult the game of long term outperformance is.

当我阅读这本书的第九章时，这一点尤其让我印象深刻，这一章的标题是‘投资基金’。

And it really brought it home to me when I I was looking at chapter nine of the book, which is titled investing in investment funds.

格雷厄姆提到，据我所知，他在20世纪70年代修订这本书时曾说，当时有356只共同基金，资产总额达500亿美元。

And Graham talked about how, I think, back when he was revising the book, this around the 1970, he said there were 356 mutual funds with 50,000,000,000 in assets.

因此，他谈到了在如此繁多的基金中挑选正确基金的挑战，因为选择实在令人眼花缭乱。

And so he was talking about the challenge of picking the right funds when it's so bewildering because there are so many.

你在笔记中指出，我认为如今美国的共同基金已达到6973只，资产总额高达18.8万亿美元。

And you pointed out in your in your note that I think there were now 6,973 mutual funds in The US with 18,800,000,000,000.0 in assets.

而且

And

更别提那些ETF了。

And not to mention the ETFs.

对。

Right.

而且，是的，这又增加了七八万亿美元，更不用说全球的共同基金了，你提到这些基金的资产总额已达63万亿美元。

And, yeah, which is another 7 or $8,000,000,000,000, and and not to mention all of the worldwide mutual funds, which you said have $63,000,000,000,000 in assets.

因此，挑选一只好基金的说法变得更加令人困惑。

So the talk of picking a good fund has become even more bewildering.

于是，我回溯了我们26年前刚当记者时一起工作的那段时间，你写过一篇关于Longleaf基金的精彩而有趣的文章，该基金由东南资产管理公司管理，由Mason Hawkins和Staley Cates共同管理——我之前曾为《投资界的伟大思想》采访过Mason Hawkins，而Staley Cates也非常出色。

And so then I was looking back at an article that you had written back when we were young journalists twenty six years ago working together, and you'd written a really good and interesting story about longleaf funds, which were managed by Southeastern Asset Management and co managed by Mason Hawkins, who I've interviewed before for The Great Minds of Investing and by Staley Cates who's really good.

你知道，这些人真的非常优秀、聪明且正直。

You know, these are really good, really smart, really honorable people.

是的。

Yeah.

前几天我看了他们的业绩表现。

And and I was looking at their results the other day.

这是关于Longleaf合作伙伴基金的情况。

This is for the Longleaf Partners Fund.

数据截至2024年8月31日。

This is as of 08/31/2024.

基本上，自该基金成立37年以来，它们根本没有创造任何价值。

And, basically, since inception thirty seven years ago for that fund, they've really added no value at all.

我的意思是，而且最近情况甚至更糟。

I mean, I and and then more recently, it's even it's even worse.

对吧？

Right?

Longleaf Partners基金在过去十年中的年化回报率为4.03%，而标普500指数为12.98%。

The Longleaf Partners fund has earned four point o 3% annual return over ten years versus twelve point nine eight percent for the S and P 500.

我只是想知道，这让你对这个行业的难度有了怎样的认识？

And I just wondered what that makes you think about, you know, how it clarifies the the difficulty of this game.

因为从某些方面来看，他们确实做对了所有事情。

Because they, in some ways, did everything right.

他们拥有正确的心态。

They they had the right mentality.

他们拥有正确的框架。

They had the right framework.

他们在网站上表示，他们将这一框架归功于本·格雷厄姆。

They say on their website, they they give credit to Ben Graham for providing them with this framework.

这里的教训是什么？

What what's the moral here?

嗯，我认为有几个教训。

Well, so the there's a couple of morals, I think.

一个是主动投资成本很高，这不仅仅是显性成本，比如共同基金的管理费，或者过去你可能支付的佣金。

One one is that active investing is expensive, and it's not just the explicit cost, like in a mutual funds expense ratio or in the old days, a commission you might pay.

或者如果你购买个股，显然你有经纪费用。

Or if you're buying individual stocks, obviously, you have you have brokerage costs.

这不仅仅是显性成本，还包括隐性成本。

It's not just the explicit costs, but it's the implicit costs.

你知道，如果你是一家像东南资产管理这样的大型投资公司，买卖股票的成本会非常高。

You know, if you're a large investment firm like Southeastern Asset Management, you have to pay a lot to buy and sell a stock.

这很昂贵。

It's expensive.

这会严重拖累投资组合的回报。

And that can be a real drag on portfolio returns.

但更重要的是，我认为在过去十到十五年里，历史上价值股的溢价——即廉价价值股在股市中表现出的超额收益——已经逐渐消失，甚至可能转为负值。

But more importantly, I think, is that in the past ten to fifteen years, the historical value premium, the, you know, outperformance that cheap value stocks exhibited in the stock market has kind of faded, if not disappeared, and it may even have gone negative.

关于这一现象的理论争议很大，每个人都有自己的看法。

And the theories on that are very controversial, and everybody, you know, everybody has an you know what they say about opinions.

每个人都有自己的观点，就像每个人都有自己的解剖学偏好一样，人人都对价值投资为何表现不佳有自己的解释。

Everybody has one like a certain anatomical park, and everybody has an opinion on on why value investing has underperformed.

我倾向于的解释是，到了21世纪初，所有人都认为价值投资 superior，永远不会再次跑输市场，就在那时，它停止了跑赢。

You know, the explanation I kind of favor is that by the early two thousands, everybody had mid two thousands, everybody had concluded that value investing was superior and, would never underperform again, at which point it stopped outperforming.

我个人不认为这种情况会无限期持续下去，但有一些迹象表明，它可能已经开始逆转。

And I don't personally expect that situation to persist indefinitely, but many and there's some indication that it may have started to reverse already.

但指数化投资的威力，以及当今科技行业赢家通吃的结构，可能意味着价值投资已不再是昔日那种稳操胜券的策略。

But the power of indexing and also the kind of winner take all structure of today's technology industry may mean that value investing is no longer the sure thing that it once was.

如果本·格雷厄姆今天还在世，我能问他一个问题的话，我知道我会问：

And if I could ask Ben Graham one question if he were around today, I know I would ask him.

你认为价值投资还会再次占上风吗？

Do you think value investing will again prevail?

因为过去几年来，它一直表现不佳。

Because for quite a few years now, it has struggled.

这真是一个有趣且富有挑战性的问题。

It's such an interesting and challenging thing.

对吧？

Right?

因为他写了很多关于钟摆波动的内容，而钟摆的波动显然是永恒的。

Because he he writes a lot about pendulum swings, and the pendulum swings are clearly eternal.

因此，人们普遍假设，迟早有一天，钟摆会重新摆回价值投资。

And so there's this assumption, say, that, you know, sooner or later, the pendulum will swing back to value investing.

钟摆也会重新摆回新兴市场和国际股票。

The pendulum pendulum will swing back to emerging markets and international stocks.

但存在太多不确定性，几周前我在英国进行了一次非凡的对话。

But there's so much uncertainty, and I I had an extraordinary conversation in England a couple of weeks ago.

我当时主持一个小组讨论，参与者有克里斯·贝格——我之前在播客中采访过他、弗雷德里克·布莱克福德，一位非常聪明的风险投资人，以及詹姆斯·安德森，这位传奇人物自称是超高速增长型投资者，曾就职于Daily Giver。

I was moderating a panel with Chris Begg, I've interviewed on the podcast before, Frederick Blackford, who's a very smart venture capitalist, and James Anderson, who's this legendary, as he would put it, hypergrowth investor, who was previously at Daily Giver.

詹姆斯·安德森早在2018年就写过一篇非凡的文章，我相信你之前读过，他在文中说：看。

And James Anderson had written an extraordinary piece back, I think, in 2018 that I'm sure you've read before where he was he was saying, look.

这本《聪明的投资者》是一本了不起的书，杰森做得非常出色。

This is a wonderful book, The Intelligent Investor, and Jason's done a brilliant job.

真是太棒了。

It's fantastic.

他深入研究了这些杰出的投资者，但他提出了一种可能性：也许某些根本性的东西已经改变了。

And he followed all of these magnificent investors, but he posits the possibility that something profound may have changed.

是的。

Mhmm.

他指出，在近几十年里，出现了一些公司，正如他所说，实现了超线性增长。

And what he was saying is that in recent decades, there are these companies that have, as he put it, have scaled super linearly.

是的。

Yes.

他说，这是一种暂时性的变化，还是数据中的噪音，抑或更严重的问题？

And he said, is this a temporary change that is noise in the data or something more serious?

他谈到的一点是，如果你研究格雷厄姆，你会认为存在均值回归，对吧？所有这些成长型股票最终都会令人失望。

And so one of the things that he was he was talking about was that, you know, if you study if you study Graham, you would assume there's this reversion to the mean, right, that all of these growth stocks end up kind of disappointing in the end.

我想这很符合你我这样有点逆向思维的人的口味。

And I think this kind of appeals to people like you and me who are sort of contrarian.

是的。

And Yes.

这其中还带有一种近乎道德主义的意味：那些赌增长会永远持续下去的傻瓜，最终会头破血流。

And there's something almost moralistic about it that these these idiots who who bet that growth will go on forever will get their heads handed to them.

他说，你看所有这些公司，比如谷歌、奈飞和亚马逊，自1997年上市以来，或者Facebook自2012年上市以来。

And and he says, actually, you look at all these companies like Alphabet and Netflix and Amazon since it went public in 1997, I guess it was, or Facebook since it went public in 2012.

他说，你不得不怀疑，是否真的发生了某种根本性的变化。当格雷厄姆警告人们不要参与他所谓的‘迷人而危险的预期增长领域’时，他其实已经被这个时代证明是错的。

And he says, you have to wonder if something has actually changed And that you know, when Graham was warning that you shouldn't participate in what he called glamorous and dangerous fields of anticipated growth, he was actually kinda he's he's been proven wrong by this period.

你能为我们详细解释一下吗？

Can you unpack that a little for us?

因为我觉得这是一个非常有争议且有趣的观点。

Because I think it's such a it's such a provocative and interesting argument.

是的。

Yeah.

确实如此。

It is.

我很了解詹姆斯，也非常尊重他。

And I I know James quite well, and I have a lot of respect for him.

他是一位出色的基金经理，而且非常聪明。

He's a he's a terrific portfolio manager and a and a and a very smart very smart guy.

我们曾在私下，比如早餐和午餐时，多次就这个问题辩论过，我想我的立场可能并不是一个让人特别满意的答案。

And we've debated this not in public, but over breakfast and lunch several I think where I come out on this is maybe not a very satisfying place.

我觉得这正是格雷厄姆会持的观点。

I kind of think it's where Graham would come out.

而我对这个问题的看法，是书中一个关键的观点。

And where I come out on it is it's sort of a point in the book.

格雷厄姆会回顾过去的数据，从历史重新分配的证据中得出推论。

Graham looks back at past data to draw inferences from the evidence of historical reassigns.

他会看十年的数据。

And, you know, he'll look he looks at 10.

他会看二十五年的数据。

He looks at twenty five years.

但他坚持要把时间延长到五十年。

But then he insists on extending it out to fifty years.

即便如此，他还会补充一个注意事项：这个时间段可能仍不足以让我们得出合理的结论。

And even then, he sort of throws in the caveat that this might not be a long enough period to draw a sensible conclusion from us.

但我们知道的是，金融市场中存在着巨大的噪音。

But what we do know is that there's an incredible amount of noise in financial markets.

詹姆斯·安德森很可能才是对的。

And James Anderson may well be right.

到目前为止，他确实是对的，他喜欢称这些为西海岸公司。

He certainly has been right so far that what he's he likes to call them West Coast companies.

你知道，这些公司有着这样的商业模式：充满活力、古怪的创始人，比如埃隆·马斯克、杰夫·贝佐斯、马克·扎克伯格，还有核心的原始员工团队，可能还有双重股权结构，让外部股东没有同等的投票权，以及非常长期的商业计划——比如杰夫·贝佐斯 famously 不愿意做任何在十年内无法回报的事情。

You know, these companies that have this business model of the, you know, dynamic, you know, eccentric founder, the Elon Musk, the Jeff Bezos, the Mark Zuckerberg, you know, the the closed coterie of original employees, maybe the dual class shares where outsiders don't get the same voting rights, and very long term business plans where, you know, Jeff Bezos famously didn't wanna do anything that would pay off in less than ten years.

而这种西海岸商业模式，确实为那些显而易见的赢家带来了巨大成功。

And and these this West Coast business model has worked really well for the obvious winners.

但我想指出几点。

But, I mean, there's a couple things I'd point out.

首先，它对另一类公司来说却糟糕透顶。

First of all, it's worked really badly for a kind of.

你知道吗？

You know?

我们往往只记得赢家，赢家吸引了我们所有的注意力，却完全忽略了失败者。

We tend to forget that the winners and the winners capture all our attention, and we forget entirely about the losers.

而科技行业中的大多数失败者，其商业模式与赢家非常相似。

And most of the losers in the technology industry had very similar business models to the winners.

而决定赢家与输家之间差异的，很大程度上可能是金融学教授口中的运气，或者我所说的，一个公正客观的观察者会称之为某种不可观测的因素。

And a lot of what separates the winners from the losers is what a finance professor would probably call luck and what the founders or, I would say maybe a fair objective observer would call something unobservable.

这些公司身上有种神秘的东西，是他们的竞争对手所不具备的。

There's some magic, some to these companies that their competitors don't have.

这就像瓶中的闪电。

It's lightning in a bottle.

也许你能识别出这种特质。

And maybe you can recognize that.

也许你看到某种看似如此的东西，但结果却发现并非如此。

Maybe you see something that looks like it but turns out not to be.

但我认为，问题在于这些公司成长到多大、多快时，就再也无法维持詹姆斯·安德森所谈论的那种超高速增长。

But I think the question becomes at what point do these companies grow so big, so fast that they no longer can sustain that hyper growth that James Anderson is talking about.

我的意思是，我觉得这就像金融物理学中的一条定律：如果你有一条这样的曲线，最终它必然趋于平缓。

I mean, I would think it's sort of a law of financial physics that if you have a curve that looks like this, eventually, it has to plateau.

我的意思是，如果这只是一条抛物线

I mean, if it's just a parabola

对于所有音频听众来说，杰森，你得用比手势更好的术语来表达。

For all audio listeners, you're gonna have to use better terminology than hand movements, Jason.

是的。

Yeah.

抱歉，刚才那样了。

Sorry about that.

我的意思是，如果一家公司的增长只是以这种极其迅速的速度扩张的话。

I mean, if the company's growth just, you know, is scaling at this incredibly rapid rate.

而且事实上，如果它越大增长越快，这在许多最大的科技公司中几乎就是现实情况，我很难想象这种增长能无限持续下去。

And in fact, if it grows faster as it gets bigger, which is close to the case for a lot of the biggest technology companies, it's hard for me to imagine that that's indefinitely sustainable.

你可能记得，威廉，上世纪九十年代沃尔玛曾经历过一段飞速增长的时期。

You may remember, William, there was a point in the nineteen nineties where Walmart was growing so fast.

我想那大概是它刚开始进入墨西哥市场的时候，当时增长如此迅猛，以至于华尔街的一些分析师预测它将在几年内成为一家万亿美元的公司。

I think it might have been when it was just beginning its expansion into Mexico, but it was growing so fast that some analysts on Wall Street were projecting that it would, you know it would become a trillion dollar company in a few years.

当然，沃尔玛确实增长得非常快，但随着规模扩大，它的增长率已经大幅放缓。

And, of course, Walmart has grown really fast, but its growth rate has slowed down a lot as it's gotten bigger.

现在它并不是像阿尔法贝特或Meta那样的科技公司，但历史上，增长在某种程度上往往埋下了自我毁灭的种子。

Now it's not a technology company in the same sense that say Alphabet is or or Meta, but, you know, growth to some extent historically has sowed the seeds of its own destruction.

牛肉公司似乎是这一规律的例外，这正是詹姆斯·安德森所强调的。

Beef companies seem to be the exception to that pattern, and that's what James Anderson is emphasizing.

他认为这是一种全新的商业模式，也许确实如此。

He thinks it is an entirely new model of doing business, and it may be.

我觉得有趣的是，詹姆斯、比尔·米勒和尼克·斯利普都深受圣塔菲研究所关于网络效应等研究的影响。

I think it's interesting that James and Bill Miller and Nick Sleep were all steeped in Santa Fe Institute kinda studies of network effects and the like.

我想他们确实看到了我们其他人没有看到的东西。

Like, I think they did see something that the rest of us hadn't seen.

我很喜欢詹姆斯·安德森文章中的一句话：在一个技术与知识驱动、高度复杂且具有初始路径依赖性的世界里，你为什么不期待那些运气更好的少数商人能够打破增长型股票必然失败的观念呢？

And I I I I you know, I I love this line from James Anderson's piece where he said, if you live in a technology and knowledge driven universe of great complexity and initial path dependence, why wouldn't you expect the luckier merchant few to buck the notions of the fallibility of growth stocks?

所以，也许某些东西真的已经发生了变化。

And so it may just be that something has shifted.

我觉得这恰恰揭示了投资中永恒的难题。

I think this just gets us at the the perennial difficulty of investing.

你知道，这要回到芒格说的，任何认为这很容易的人都是傻瓜。

You know, it goes back to Munger saying, you know, anyone who thinks this is easy is stupid.

是的。

Yes.

没错。

Exactly.

而且，你看，芒格在好市多上是对的，至少在一段时间内，他在中国的比亚迪上也是对的。

And, you know, look, Munger got it right with Costco, and he got it right at least for a good while with BYD in China.

这极其困难。

It's extraordinarily difficult.

如果这很容易，那你就会看到这些公司的创始人。

And if it were easy, then you would see the founders of these companies.

你会看到他们以个人名义进行投资的家庭办公室。

You would see their family offices that invest on their own personal behalf.

你会看到他们获得世界上最高的回报，因为我的意思是，如果杰夫·贝佐斯，如果有人在管理他的资金，而杰夫·贝佐斯说，‘这是下一个亚马逊’，那你就会期待他懂行，然后他们就会买入。

You would see them earning the highest returns in the world because they I mean, if if it if Jeff Bezos, if somebody's running his money and and Jeff Bezos says, oh, that's the next Amazon, then you would expect he would know what he was talking about, and they would buy it.

我不认为这些公司创始人的家族办公室表现得比其他人更好，甚至可能还不如其他人。

And I don't believe the family offices of these company founders have done any better than anybody else, and they might not even have done it as well.

我只是觉得，我们再怎么强调这一点都不为过：要识别的不仅是一个优越的商业模式，而是一个可持续且坚不可摧的商业模式。

And it's I I just think we can't emphasize enough how difficult it is to not just to identify a superior business model, but a sustainably unbreakable business model.

在专业资产管理行业，每个人都在不停地谈论护城河。

You know, everyone in the professional money management business talks about moats all the time.

是的。

Yeah.

还有大量主动管理型基金和ETF，声称能够识别出拥有强大护城河的公司。

And there is a whole bunch of funds, actively managed funds, ETFs that purport to identify companies with great moats.

但就连沃伦·巴菲特也曾在护城河的问题上犯过错误。

But, you know, even Warren Buffett has made mistakes about moats.

他买入的并非每一家他认为拥有强大护城河的公司都真的具备护城河，这非常棘手。

Not every company he bought that he thought had a great moat had a moat at all, and, it's very tricky.

这非常棘手。

It's very tricky.

GEICO的整个案例其实非常有趣，对吧？芒格显然指出了其中的讽刺之处，而本·格雷厄姆在本书的附录中也承认了这一点：他一生都秉持价值投资的纪律，专注于购买廉价资产，但最终却主要靠一家高质量公司——GEICO——赚到了巨额财富，而这家公司并不便宜，他对此进行了大规模押注。

The the whole case of GEICO is really interesting, right, where Munger obviously has pointed out the irony, which Ben Graham admits to in the postscript of this book that after spending a lifetime being so disciplined as a value investor buying stuff cheap, that basically he ended up Graham ended up making much of his fortune off one high quality company, GEICO, that wasn't particularly cheap and that he made a very big bet.

我认为你提到，他把大约五分之一的投资组合都投入了这家公司，并且持有了大约二十五年。

I think he you point out that he put about a fifth of his portfolio in it and then wrote it for something like twenty five years.

因此，某种程度上，芒格指出这其中存在一种内在矛盾，支持了这样一个观点：你不能只买那些极度廉价、被低估的资产，因为GEICO实际上违背了格雷厄姆自己关于集中投资和估值的所有规则。那么，你对整个GEICO争议怎么看？

So in a way, Munger pointed out that there's this inherent contradiction that supports the idea that you don't just wanna buy really cheap stuff that's undervalued because GEICO kinda violated all of Graham's own rules about concentration and valuation, and they're like what do you think of of the like, what what's your view on the whole kinda GEICO controversy?

嗯，要反驳查理·芒格的观点确实很难。

Well, so it's hard to it's hard to disagree, with the point Charlie Munger made.

我的意思是，格雷厄姆本人虽然对此有点含糊其辞，但他确实最终承认了。

I mean, Graham himself, although he's a little coy about it, he does, he does fess up.

当你了解细节后就会发现，格雷厄姆的合伙人、格雷厄姆-纽曼基金的联合创始人杰里·纽曼说服了他，说这是一笔好交易。

And, you know, when you learn the details, it turns out that Jerry Newman, who was Graham's partner and name partner in the Graham Newman fund, twisted his arm and said, you know, it's a good deal.

我们就做吧。

Let's let's do it.

但格雷厄姆并不想这么做。

And Graham didn't wanna do it.

我相信格雷厄姆当时想支付的价格，我记得没错的话，

And I believe that Graham wanted to pay I think I remember this correctly.

他想以低于五万美元的价格买入这批股票，

He wanted to pay $50,000 less for the block of stock.

但这家族内部人士对价格毫不让步，

And the it was the family, the insider family, wouldn't budge on the price.

纽曼说：‘来吧，本，

And Newman said, come on, Ben.

我们就这么干吧。',

Let's just do it.

于是他们就这么做了，

And they did.

你可以感受到格雷厄姆对此事心存遗憾，

And so Graham, you know, is you know, you can tell that he's wistful about this.

他意识到，自己一生中最重要的决定，竟然违背了自己的原则，如果没有合伙人劝说，他可能根本不会做出这个决定。

He realizes that, you know, the single most important decision he ever made wasn't in accord with his principles, and he probably wouldn't have made it at all if his partner hadn't talked him into it.

但这引出了另一个非常重要的因素，你无需超越沃伦·巴菲特或查理·芒格就能认识到它的意义，那就是这些理念中有一种松紧交织的特性。

But that points to another very important factor, and you don't need to look beyond Warren Buffett or Charlie Munger to recognize the importance of it, which is there's kind of a a loose tightness or a tight looseness to a bunch of these ideas.

你知道，巴菲特一次又一次地打破了他自己的规则。

You know, Buffett has broken his own rules over and over and over again.

他会在股市崩盘时买入公开市场的股票，而在私人市场公司价格低廉时收购这些公司。

And, you know, he buys stocks in the public market when the market crashes, and then he buys companies in the private market when they're cheap.

当公开市场的股票和私人公司的价格都不便宜时，他就什么都不做，只是让现金积累。

And when neither publicly traded stocks nor private companies are cheap, He does nothing, and he just lets cash build.

如果机会并不真正有吸引力，他并不觉得必须做些符合自己原则的事情。

He doesn't feel he has to do something that squares with his principles if the opportunities aren't really attractive.

而这里说的是格雷厄姆，他有一整套政策和程序，至少在理论上，他会通过各种筛选标准来判断估值是否具有吸引力。

And, you know, here was Graham who had all these policies and procedures and, you know, in theory, at least ran everything through filters to determine that the valuation was attractive.

而他本人就在这里。

And here he is.

他面对的是一家不符合他标准的公司。

He's presented with a company that doesn't meet his standards.

最后，他说，是的。

And in the end, he says, yeah.

好吧。

Alright.

我们干吧。

Let's do it.

结果非常好。

And it worked out great.

格雷厄姆本人在描述时说，你知道，有时候你分不清运气和技能。

And Graham himself says when he's describing it that, you know, sometimes you can't tell luck from skill.

实际上，这并不重要。

And in effect, it doesn't really matter.

如果结果很好，那再好不过了。

If it works out well, more power to you.

对吧？

Right?

这涉及到投资应当有趣且富有吸引力这一观点的一部分。

And this gets to part of the idea that investing should be fun, and it should be engaging.

如果你觉得不有趣，就不必参与这个游戏。

And if you don't find it fun, you don't have to play that game.

你可以选择做一个防御型投资者，不去选股，也不去挑选基金。

You can just be a defensive investor and not attempt to pick stocks, not attempt to pick funds.

只需买入整个市场，然后安心睡上三十年。

Just buy the whole market and, you know, go to sleep for thirty years.

我认为这也体现了格雷厄姆著作中的一个基本洞见，即世界充满了巨大的不确定性，一切都在不断变化。

I I think it also gets at one of the fundamental insights from Graham's writing, which is that the world is just a hugely uncertain place, and everything is changing all of the time.

我们完全无法预知未来会发生什么。

And we have no idea what's gonna happen.

在其中一章里，他提到一个很精彩的部分，专门分析了四家公司。

And I there's a there's a lovely bit in one of the chapters where he, he focuses on four companies.

对吧？

Right?

埃莫森电气、乌尔特拉、埃姆哈特和埃默里空运，你指出这四家公司中只有一家至今仍以原来的形式存在。

Emerson Electric and Ultra and Emhart and Emery Airfreight, and you point out that only one of them still exists in that form.

我想知道，研究这本旧书能让你对资本主义世界中的变化、无常和创造性破坏的本质有什么新的认识。

And I was wondering what working on this old book teaches you just about the nature of change and impermanence and creative destruction in the world of capitalism.

是的。

Yes.

这确实令人惊叹。

And it's kind of remarkable.

你知道吗？

You know?

格雷厄姆写这本书是在1972年，那时正好是宾夕法尼亚中央铁路公司灾难性破产之后，那家铁路公司当时是美国最大的铁路公司，也是截至当时美国历史上规模最大的破产案，也是七十年代初金融市场上最重大的新闻事件。

Graham was writing in 1972, which was right after the disastrous collapse of Penn Central, which the rail you know, the which then I believe was the largest railroad in in The US and was also the largest bankruptcy in American history up until that point and was the big by far and the biggest news event in, you know, in financial markets in the early seventies.

当然，到了2003年我编辑这本书最后一版的时候，铁路行业已经奄奄一息。

And, of course, in 2003, when I edited the last edition of the book, railroads were moribund.

你知道，根本没人关心铁路了。

You know, nobody cared about railroads.

它们看起来是一种正在衰落的技术。

They were they seemed to be a dying technology.

你知道吗？

You know?

当时大家都关注空运，还有卡车运输之类的。

It was all about it's all about air freight and, you know, maybe trucking.

而如今，铁路行业表现得异常出色。

And, of course, now railroads have done extraordinarily well.

巴菲特在伯灵顿北方铁路公司上赚了巨额财富。

And Buffett has made a fortune on Burlington Northern.

你一次又一次地看到这种情况。

And you see that over and over and over again.

我相信，格雷厄姆一次又一次地回到同一个基本理念。

And I believe that, you know, Graham kept coming back over and over again to the same basic idea.

你知道吗？

You know?

你之前提到过这一点，威廉，你知道，这一切都会过去，但他也谈到‘先来的将变成最后的，最后的将变成最先的’，这当然出自《圣经》。

You alluded to it earlier, William, you know, this too shall pass, but also he talks about how the the first shall be last and the last shall be first, which, of course, is from the bible.

然后他在书的题词中还引用了拉丁诗人贺拉斯的话，大意是：走中间道路才是最安全的。

And then he also quotes the Latin poet Horus in the epigraph of the book saying something like, you will be safest in the middle way.

在《证券分析》中，他也引用了贺拉斯的话。

Well, in security analysis, he quotes Horus as well.

对吧？

Right?

他说：许多如今跌倒的，将来会被复兴，

Where he says many shall be restored that are now fallen,

许多如今受尊崇的，将来会跌倒。

and many shall fall that are now in honor.

没错。

That's right.

因此，他始终意识到市场周期可能在极其漫长的时间尺度上发挥作用。

And so he's always conscious of the incredibly long time scale over which market cycles can play out.

当然，它们也可能非常迅速，就像我们在2020年看到的那样，以及此后所见的那样。

Of course, they can be very quick too as we saw in 2020 and and as we've seen since.

但通常，它们可能需要数十年才能显现并逆转。

But often, they can take decades to to manifest themselves and to reverse.

格雷厄姆在他生命的晚期发表了一次演讲。

And Graham gave a speech late very late in his life.

我想那是在他八十岁生日宴会上，他谈到自己更倾向于以某种方式看待事物，并说他最喜爱的哲学家是斯宾诺莎。

I think it was at his eightieth birthday party, and he talked about how he preferred to view things on and his favorite philosopher, he said, was Spinoza.

他说，他更愿意通过斯宾诺莎所提供的视角来看待事物，那就是

And he said, I prefer to view things through the lens that Spinoza provided, which is the

是的。

Yeah.

永恒。

Eternity.

对。

Right.