RWH053：前方有麻烦，与比尔·普里斯特

所以杰克、我和另一位同事帕特·里格尔合著了一本书，名为《财务现实：IRSA的养老金筹资》。

So Jack and I and another fellow, Pat Riggle, he wrote a book called The Financial Reality Pension Funding at IRSA.

我曾在国会作证，我们推动了法律的修改。

And I testified before Congress, we changed the law.

那条第四零二三款是错误的，后来要么被撤销，要么得到了修正。

That section four zero two three was erroneous and it was either withdrawn or corrected.

但这件事在很多方面成就了BEA。

But that made BEA in a lot of ways.

当时我们成立BEA，正如你所说，世界突然蓬勃发展起来。

Here we were, BEA was set up for just as you say, the world just took off.

突然间，这些养老金基金出现了高达数亿甚至数千亿美元的资金缺口。

All of a sudden, these pension funds, they were underfunded by hundreds of millions, billions of dollars.

因此每年都需要注入大量资金，专业资产管理人也正是从那时起迅速崛起。

So every year there had to be a large sum, and the professional money manager just took off at that point.

但正是由于那本书，我们在与养老基金受托人沟通时获得了真正的公信力。

But because of that book, that book gave us real credibility when we were talking to trustees of pension funds.

我们最终建立了业务，我想在BA的巅峰时期，我们的资产达到了100亿美元。实际上，我们最初只有1.5亿美元，而且那时我们根本没给任何人发钱。

And we wound up building, I think at one point, I think at the height of BA, we were $10,000,000,000 Well, we really started with like 150,000,000, which which we didn't pay anybody anything.

所以这里有很多内容需要梳理。

So so there's a there's a lot to unpack here.

我的意思是，其中一部分是好运——你恰好赶上了这个千载难逢的时机。

I mean, part part of it is the good fortune of of, this kind of lightning strike that you just happened to be in the right place at the right time.

你从一家资产负债表薄弱、资产不足3亿美元、勉强维持生计的公司，突然间乘上了这股浪潮。

You went from this this company with a relatively weak balance sheet and less than 300,000,000 in assets living more or less hand to mouth to suddenly you being kind of riding this wave.

所以，运气在这件事中占据了相当重要的部分。

So so luck is a is a pretty good part of this.

确实如此。

Absolutely.

我坚信时机和地点的重要性。

I'm a big believer at right time, right place.

事实上，我曾经开始为《巴伦周刊》写一篇文章。

In fact, I wrote a started to write a piece for Barron's.

我给你举两个例子，这发生在招聘一个人的时候。

I'll give you two examples, and it came up in hiring somebody.

这是几年前的事了。

This was a few a few years ago.

有个人来面试，我是最后一个见他的人，他本打算成为我们的医药分析师之类的。

There was a guy that came in, was the last person to interview him, he was going be a pharma analyst or something for us.

所有人都进来后，比尔，他说这是我们见过的最优秀的人。

And everybody came in, Bill, he's the best we've ever seen.

你必须雇用这个人。

You got to hire this guy.

我说，是的，但有两个候选人。

And I said, Yeah, but there's two candidates.

别担心，这个人不如那个人优秀。

Don't worry, this guy You're not as good as this guy.

你必须雇用这个人。

You got to hire this guy.

于是我坐下来和他交谈，他开始让我感到不适。

So I sat down with him and I started talking to him and he started to bother me.

我觉得他身上有那么一点傲慢。

I felt that there was a bit of an arrogance in him.

他本科读的是哈佛，商学院在哥伦比亚，之前还在高盛工作过。

He had gone to Harvard undergraduate, Columbia Business School, and Goldman Sachs.

他来到我办公室时，一副‘我什么都有了’的样子。

So he arrives in my office like, I got all the the tickets.

我想在这里工作。

I'd like to work here.

我喜欢我见过的那些人。

I like the people I've met.

那你想聊点什么？

So what do you want to talk about?

说实话，那种语气真的让我非常恼火。

That tone just irritated the hell out of me, to be honest with you.

我说：好吧，我们来谈谈时间和地点。

And I said, Well, let's talk a little bit about time and place.

他说：你什么意思？

He said, What do you mean?

我说：那你认为长期来看股市表现如何？

I said, Well, what do you think the stock market's done over a long period of time?

他说：你知道的，大概9%左右。

He said, You know, 9% or so.

我说：嗯，实际上更接近10%，但长期平均来看，是9.5%到10%。

Said, Well, yeah, actually it's closer to 10, but 9.5%, 10% over a long period of time on average.

但让我们看看其中一段特定的年份。

But let's take a subset of those years.

我们来看1980年到2000年。

Let's take 1980 to 2000.

你觉得那段时间市场表现如何？

What do you think the market did in that period?

他说：嗯，可能稍微好一点。

He said, Well, probably a little better.

我说：我知道答案。

I said, Well, I know the answer.

拿这个问题来考你，确实不公平。

It wasn't fair to challenge you with that.

二十年来，每年的回报率是17.6%。

It's 17.6% a year for twenty years.

1980年的一笔十万美元，在2000年变成了二百五十万美元。

A $100,000 in 1980 became 2 and a half million in 2000.

他说：你的意思是？

And he said, what's your point?

我说：你觉得你得有多大年纪，才能享受到这么好的市场行情？

I said, well, how old do you think you had to be to benefit from that wonderful market?

如果你二十岁，那你只是个打杂的。

If you were 20, you were the office boy.

如果你当时60岁，你就要准备退休了。

If you were 60, you're getting ready to retire.

但如果你40岁左右，像我这样，那就是天时地利人和。

But if you were 40, approximately my age, right place, right time.

当然，我工作很努力，但我一直受益于运气和好运。

Sure, I worked hard, but I always had the benefit of luck, good fortune.

永远不要低估时间和地点的价值。

Never underestimate the value of time and place.

然后我们错过了他。

And then we passed on him.

我错过了他，而我有能力这么做。

I passed on him and I had the capability of doing that.

于是我雇了另一个人，他至今仍在我们这里工作。

And I hired another guy, and he's actually still with us today.

他叫史蒂夫·萨尔宗。

His name is Steve Salzon.

所以史蒂夫来了，他正准备离开联博公司。

And so Steve comes in and he is leaving AllianceBernstein.

他是一名分析师，管理着一只五星评级的小盘基金，但该基金已经关闭了。

He is an analyst with a five star small cap fund that's closed.

我不明白他为什么想离开这样一家优质公司，在那里他根本不必担心资产增长的问题。

And I can't understand why he wants to leave a quality firm like that, where he doesn't have to worry about asset growth.

你为什么想来这儿？

Why do you want to come here?

这是一家初创公司，可能成功，也可能失败，我们正在尝试建立一只小盘基金。

This is a startup that may or may not work, the small cap fund we're trying to build.

他说，我只是想参与建设一些东西，这对我来说完全说不通。

He said, Well, I to just be part of building something, And it just didn't make any sense to me.

于是我问他：那你当初是怎么走到那一步的？

So I said, Well, tell me how you got there.

我喜欢聊关于家庭背景的话题。

I like talking about families of origins.

他说：‘告诉我你是怎么去的，劳伦斯·伯恩斯坦。’

Said, Tell me how you got there, Lawrence Bernstein.

我向你保证，比尔，如果你听说过这所大学，我就请你去世界上任何地方吃晚餐。

And I promise you, Bill, I'll buy you dinner anywhere in the world if you've heard of this college.

他上了一所叫弥赛亚学院的大学。

He went to a college called Messiah College.

我从来没听说过弥赛亚学院。

I've never heard of Messiah College.

结果发现它位于宾夕法尼亚州的荒郊野外，是一所宗教学校，我就问：‘那你是在哪儿长大的？’

It turns out it's in the middle of nowhere in Pennsylvania, religious school is that my And I said, Well, where did you grow up?

他说：‘长岛。’

He said, Long Island.

我说：‘一个长岛的孩子，怎么可能去到我心目中那种地方？’

Said, But how in the world does a kid from Long Island get to what I think of?

于是我开始故意刺激他，说那是一所右翼宗教狂热的学校。

And I started to provoke him by saying kind of a right wing religious nutcase kind of a school.

他说：‘嗯，我是自由的。’

And he said, Well, I was free.

我当时想：‘哦，这样啊。’

I was like, Oh, okay.

我越和他聊，就越问他：‘跟说说你的家人吧。’

And the more I talked to him, well, tell me about your family.

他说：‘我爸爸是来自西西里的移民。’

Well, my dad was an immigrant from Sicily.

我想他是个泥瓦匠之类的吧。

Think he was a bricklayer or something like that.

他妈妈是名护士。

His mother was a nurse.

他是家里的长子。

He's first born.

我特别喜欢第一代移民中的长子。

I love first born immigrants.

我可以围绕这样的人建立一家公司。

I can build a firm around those people.

他们身上背负着推动家庭前进的巨大压力。

The pressure on them carry the family forward is just enormous.

这压力太大了，于是我问他：你到底是怎么进入安联伯恩斯坦的？

It's an enormous And I said, Well, how in the world did you ever get to AllianceBernstein?

因为那里根本不会主动招聘。

Because they aren't recruiting there.

他说：我当时在交易台当文员，而且还算个不错的运动员。

And he said, Well, I was on the trading desk as a clerk, I was a decent athlete.

那年夏天，我参加了一个篮球队。

This summer, I played basketball on a basketball team.

结果发现小盘基金的负责人也在队里，他很喜欢他，说：你这孩子挺聪明的。

It turned out the head of the small cap Fund was also on the team, took a liking to him, said, Hey, you're a pretty smart kid.

你为什么不考个CFA呢？

Why don't you get a CFA?

帮助他前进。

Helped him along.

他成为了那个五星级团队的一员。

He became a member of that five star team.

我说，让我告诉你为什么我认为你想来这里。

And I said, so let me tell you why I think you wanna come here.

他问，你什么意思？

And he said, what do you mean?

我说，好吧，这就是我认为你想来的理由。

I said, well, here's why I think you wanna come.

在安联伯恩斯坦，你会永远被称为那个碰巧走运的孩子。

In Alliance Bernstein, you will be forever known as the kid who got lucky.

你认识那位首席投资经理，他收留了你。

You knew the head PM, and he took you in.

你来埃皮克。

You come to Epic.

你带着真正的街头信誉而来。

You come with real street cred.

你是一名分析师，拥有CFA资格，来自一家已关闭的五星级基金。

You're an analyst, a CFA with a five star fund that's closed.

你走进门时所具备的信誉水平，是你现在所在地方所没有的。

You walk in the door with a level of credibility that you don't have right now where you are.

说实话，我不认为比尔当时同意我的观点，但如今他却是我雇过的最出色的两三人之一。

I don't think he ever agreed with me, Bill, to be honest with you, but I but he today is one of the two or three best people I've ever hired.

他是个很棒的人，也是PO部门非常出色的分析师。

He's a terrific person, and he's a very good analyst in PO.

我们稍作休息，听听今天赞助商的发言。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

好的。

Alright.

我想让你们想象一下，在夏季高峰期的奥斯陆度过三天。

I want you guys to imagine spending three days in Oslo at the height of the summer.

你将拥有漫长的白昼、令人惊叹的美食、漂浮在奥斯陆峡湾上的桑拿房，而且你所有的对话对象都是真正塑造未来的人。

You got long days of daylight, incredible food, floating saunas on the Oslo Fjord, and every conversation you have is with people who are actually shaping the future.

这就是奥斯陆自由论坛。

That's what the Oslo Freedom Forum is.

从2026年6月1日到6月20日，奥斯陆自由论坛将迎来它的第十八个年头，汇聚来自世界各地的活动家、技术专家、记者、投资者和建设者。

From June 1 through the third twenty twenty six, the Oslo Freedom Forum is entering its eighteenth year bringing together activists, technologists, journalists, investors, and builders from all over the world.

其中许多人正活跃在历史的最前沿。

Many of them operating on the front lines of history.

这是

This is

在这里，你可以亲耳听到人们如何使用比特币应对货币崩溃，如何利用人工智能揭露人权侵犯，以及在审查和威权压力下构建技术的故事。

where you hear firsthand stories from people using Bitcoin to survive currency collapse, using AI to expose human rights abuses, and building technology under censorship and authoritarian pressures.

这些不是抽象的概念。

These aren't abstract ideas.

这些都是人们正在当下实际使用的工具。

These are tools real people are using right now.

你将与大约2000位非凡的人物同处一室——持不同政见者、创始人、慈善家、政策制定者，这些不仅仅是你听其演讲的人，最终还会与你共进晚餐。

You'll be in the room with about 2,000 extraordinary individuals, dissidents, founders, philanthropists, policymakers, the kind of people you don't just listen to but end up having dinner with.

在三天里，你将体验到震撼人心的主舞台演讲、关于自由科技与金融主权的动手工作坊、沉浸式艺术装置，以及在会议结束后仍持续很久的对话。

Over three days, you'll experience powerful main stage talks, hands on workshops on freedom tech and financial sovereignty, immersive art installations, and conversations that continue long after the sessions end.

这一切都将在六月的奥斯陆发生。

And it's all happening in Oslo in June.

如果这听起来像是你感兴趣的氛围，那你可真是幸运了，因为你可以亲自到场参加。

If this sounds like your kind of room, well, you're in luck because you can attend in person.

标准票和赞助者票已在oslofreedomforum.com开放购买，赞助者票提供深度参与、私人活动以及与演讲者的小团体交流时间。

Standard and patron passes are available at oslofreedomforum.com with patron passes offering deep access, private events, and small group time with the speakers.

奥斯陆自由论坛不仅仅是一场会议。

The Oslo Freedom Forum isn't just a conference.

它是一个理念与现实交汇的地方，是那些亲历未来的人正在构建未来的地方。

It's a place where ideas meet reality and where the future is being built by people living it.

我们很多人都在退休账户之外购买比特币，一点一点地积累比特币。

A lot of us have been buying Bitcoin outside of our retirement accounts, stacking some Bitcoin here and there.

但我们的大部分财富仍然躺在传统的401(k)或IRA账户里，投资于那些我们不再真正相信的股票、债券和基金。

But most of our wealth, it's still sitting in traditional $4.00 1 k's or IRA's locked in the stocks, bonds, and funds we don't really believe in anymore.

但大多数人并不知道的是。

But here's what most people don't know.

你可以把这笔钱投资到一个可以持有比特币的税收优惠退休账户中。

You can invest that money into a tax advantage retirement account that holds Bitcoin.

这被称为比特币IRA。

It's called a Bitcoin IRA.

如果你操作得当，你不仅仅是通过某个ETF用比特币替代股票，而是将真正的比特币存放在一个由你掌控的保险库中。

And if you do it right, you're not just swapping stocks for Bitcoin exposure through some ETF, you're holding real Bitcoin inside a vault where you hold the keys.

这就是Unchanged比特币IRA与众不同的地方。

That's where unchanged Bitcoin IRA is built different.

它采用真正的多重签名，真正的链上比特币，由你掌控。

It's real multisig, real Bitcoin on chain in your control.

这意味着什么。

Here's what that means.

您能享受到传统罗斯IRA或SEP IRA的所有税务优惠，同时不会放弃对资产的控制权。

You get all the tax advantages of a traditional Roth or SEP IRA, but you're not giving up sovereignty.

您持有两个密钥，Unchained持有其中一个，没有任何单一故障点。

You hold two keys, Unchained holds one, there's no single point of failure.

您只需点击几下，就可以将旧的401(k)账户转入比特币IRA。

You can even roll over your old four zero one k into a Bitcoin IRA with just a few clicks.

当需要传承时，系统内置了继承协议。

And when it's time to pass it all on, there's a built in inheritance protocol.

您的家人将获得密钥。

Your family gets keys.

没有任何麻烦。

No headaches.

Unchained自2016年以来一直在做这件事。

Unchained been doing this since 2016.

他们已为超过12,000名客户保管了超过120亿美元的比特币。

They secured over 12,000,000,000 in Bitcoin for more than 12,000 clients.

这约占全球比特币总量的二百分之一。

It's about one out of every 200 Bitcoin in existence.

所以，如果你认真打算长期持有比特币，并希望以正确的方式——主权、安全、享有税收优惠——在退休账户中持有，前往 unchained.com/preston 并在结账时使用代码 Preston 10，即可享受首次购买10%的折扣。

So if you're serious about holding Bitcoin for the long run and you wanna do it inside a retirement account the right way, sovereign, secure, tax advantaged, Go to unchained.com/preston and use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first purchase.

别再拖延了。

Don't wait.

未来由你掌控。

The future is yours to hold.

如果你经营企业，最近很可能也产生过同样的想法。

If you run a business, you've probably had the same thought lately.

我们如何让人工智能在现实世界中真正发挥作用？

How do we make AI useful in the real world?

因为潜在收益巨大，但盲目尝试却风险极高。

Because the upside is huge, but guessing your way into it is a risky move.

通过甲骨文的 NetSuite，你今天就能让人工智能为你工作。

With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite是超过43,000家企业信赖的头号AI云ERP系统。

NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它将您的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合到一个统一的系统中。

It pulls your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into one unified system.

而这种互联互通的数据，正是让您的AI变得更智能的关键。

And that connected data is what makes your AI smarter.

它能自动化日常事务，提供可操作的洞察，帮助您降低成本，同时自信地做出快速的AI驱动决策。

It can automate routine work, surface actionable insights, and help you cut costs while making fast AI powered decisions with confidence.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，您可以使用自己选择的AI工具直接连接到真实的业务数据。

And now with the NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect directly to your real business data.

这并非某种附加功能，而是内置在支撑您企业运营的系统中的AI。

This isn't some add on, it's AI built into the system that runs your business.

无论您的公司年营收达到数百万甚至数亿美元，NetSuite都能助您保持领先。

And whether your company does millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead.

如果您年收入达到七位数以上，请前往netsuite.com/study获取他们的免费商业指南《揭开AI的神秘面纱》。

If your revenues are at least in the 7 figures, get their free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南免费获取，网址是 netsuite.com/study.netsuite.com/study。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.netsuite.com/study.

好的。

Alright.

我们继续回到节目。

Back to the show.

我想稍微回溯一下，比尔，想多了解一下你之前提到的杰克·特雷诺。

I wanna wind back a bit, Bill, and ask you more about Jack Trainor, who you mentioned before.

因为你的其中一本书，我想是在《主动管理制胜》的开篇，你就提到了他，几乎将整本书献给了他，你称他为金融界的爱因斯坦，一位极具原则的人、一位合著者，以及一位我从他身上学到的金融与经济学知识比任何人都多的朋友。

Because one of your books, I think it's at the very start of Winning at Active Management, you mentioned him at the very start, more or less dedicating the book to him, and you describe him as the Albert Einstein of finance, a man of great principle, a coauthor, and a friend from whom I learned more finance and economics than any other person.

在书中的其他地方，我认为是在一个脚注里，你称他为我漫长职业生涯中所认识的最杰出的金融头脑。

Elsewhere in the book, in a footnote, I think you you call him the single most brilliant financial mind I've known in my long career.

前几天我偶然间深入研究了他，对此印象深刻。

And then I was very struck that I I I sort of fell down this rabbit hole and started studying him a bit a couple of days ago.

我发现彼得·伯恩斯坦——我一向非常敬重的《与天为敌》的作者——曾写道：杰克·特雷诺能看到别人看不到的东西，思考别人想不到的见解，解释别人无法解释的原理。

And I saw that Peter Bernstein, I always kind of revered as the author of Against the Gods, which is an amazing book, wrote, Jack Trainor sees what no one else sees, thinks what no one else thinks, explains what no one else explains.

所以你和他相处得非常密切。

And so you got to know him really very well.

当然，他在早期关于风险等理论研究方面是个重要人物，同时也涉及价值衡量的问题，比如你是否应该关注增长或会计准则等。

And, obviously, he was an important figure in terms of early theoretical studies of, you know, risk and the like, but also of, you know, the the measures of value, whether you should be focusing on growth or an accounting standards and the like.

我不知道你能不能详细讲讲，让我们了解一下，是什么让他对你产生了如此深远的影响，以及他究竟是如何塑造你的思维方式的。

And I wondered if you could unpack this for a little and give us a sense of what made him such a powerful influence on you and how he actually shaped your thinking.

因为某种程度上，你在职业生涯早期，也就是七十年代初，就遇到了这样一位非同寻常的人，真是运气不错。

Because in some ways, you kind of lucked out that you landed very early in your career in the early seventies, really, with this guy who was kind of an unusual guy.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，他从未真正拥有过一份稳定的学术职位。

I mean, he didn't really have an academic a steady academic job ever.

他更像是一位实践者，但却受到后来获得诺贝尔经济学奖的那些人的高度推崇，显然非常了不起。

He was more of a practitioner, but he was admired by all of these guys who subsequently won Nobel Prizes for economics and was clearly kind of remarkable.

那么，他究竟教会了你什么？

So what what did he teach you?

对我来说，杰克很好奇。

Jack, to me, was curious.

他总是充满好奇。

He was always curious.

杰克有一篇未发表的论文，其内容相当于资本资产定价模型。

And Jack had an unpublished paper that was the equivalent of the capital asset pricing model.

有一些学者知道他的这篇论文。

There were academics who knew of his paper.

比尔·夏普的研究是独立于杰克的，我并不是说比尔·夏普剽窃了他的论文之类的。

Bill Sharp's work was done independently of Jack's I'm not saying Bill Sharp stole his paper or whatnot.

但这两篇论文当时是同时存在的。

But there were these two papers were around at the same time.

杰克从未发表过他的论文。

Jack never published his.

如果他发表了，他本可以和比尔共享那份诺贝尔奖。

Had he published it, he would have shared that Nobel Prize with Bill.

如果你问比尔，他一定会第一个告诉你杰克有多聪明，如果有机会的话，他一定会这么说。

And Bill would be the first one to tell you how brilliant Jack was if you ever Bill would have done it.

比尔从来不是，我也慢慢了解了比尔·夏普。

Bill was never I got to know Bill Sharp too.

实际上，那时候，我从他那里漏掉了一些东西。

Actually, back in those days, I left this out of him.

我花了很多时间在CRISP，也就是芝加哥大学的证券价格研究中心。

I spent a lot of time at CRISP, which was the Center for Research and Securities Prices at the University of Chicago.

对我来说，芝加哥当时是定量学术研究的领先中心。

Chicago to me was the leading center of quantitative academic research at the time.

我很喜欢参加那些活动，还发表了几篇论文。

I loved going to those things, and I gave a couple of papers.

但我一直在工作，也认识这些人。

But I worked, and I knew these people.

当我看到迈伦·斯科尔斯时，比如，我跟他相当熟了。

When I looked at Myron Scholes, for example, I got to know pretty well.

我参加了他的婚礼，他也参加了我的婚礼。

Was at my wedding and I was at his wedding.

这是第二次婚姻，我们本该有的，但不是第一次。

This is the second marriage, then we should have had, but not the first one.

但无论如何，我和他相当熟了。

But at any rate, I got to know him pretty well.

那些人，还有七八十年代，那是金融界令人惊叹的时期。

And those people out there, and that's the '70s and '80s, that was just an amazing, amazing period for finance.

芝加哥引领一切。

Chicago led everything.

芝加哥是这一切的中心。

Chicago was the center of all that.

我在那里发表了一篇关于交易成本的论文，如何衡量交易成本，因为大多数人只认为那是佣金。

And I gave a paper there on trading costs, how to measure trading costs, because most people just thought it was a commission.

但那其实并不是看待这个问题的最佳方式。

Well, that really wasn't the best way to look at it.

我经常用的一个比喻是浴缸。

And the analogy that I often used was a bathtub.

让我们把浴缸里的水看作市场的交易，当你带着十万股的水量踏入时。

Let's stick to the water in the bathtub as being the market's trading, and you step in with a big 100,000 share of water.

这就像是踏入浴缸一样。

It's like stepping into a bathtub.

水位会上升，而当你离开时，水位又会下降。

The water level goes up, and then when you leave, the water level goes down.

所以你想把水位上升的这部分连同佣金一起捕捉到。

So you want to capture that step up in the water level along with the commission.

我写了一篇关于这个的论文，还在那里得了一个小奖。

And I wrote I wrote a paper on that and I won a little prize out there.

在那些颁奖专家面前发表论文真让人害怕。

Delivering papers in front of those prize guys is scary.

我得说，他们真的非常聪明。

I got to tell you, they are so smart.

而Trainer以前也在那里，但他是个特立独行的人。

And Trainer used to be out there too, but he was a maverick.

杰克经常会做几件事，大家都知道杰克非常聪明。

A couple of things Jack would do, everybody knew Jack was brilliant.

那时候，你真的有黑板，还有粉笔之类的工具。

So back then you had real blackboards and you had blackboard and chalk and whatnot.

所以人们看到杰克在黑板前，想象一个方形，这边一堵墙，那边一堵墙，这边也有一堵墙，整个房间就这样被围起来。

So people, Jack was in the blackboards, let's imagine a square, and so there would be a wall here, a wall there, a wall over here, so it'd kind of go around the room.

于是杰克会先在一边写下他的公式，然后走到另一边，停下来，接着回到前面的黑板，擦掉某些内容并修改公式。

And so Jack would start writing his formulas on one side, then he'd go over here, and then he'd stop, and he'd say, Then he'd back and erase something on this board and change the term.

然后其他人就能看到他正在抄写下来。

And then everybody else, you could see him copy it down.

接着他会去下一个黑板。

And then he would go to the next board.

但很快，那张纸上就乱七八糟了，因为他擦掉了太多东西，来回修改，导致谁也看不懂了。

But pretty soon, the paper was just, he couldn't understand anything because he had erased so many things and gone back and fixed it.

然后我们会听到他的结论，人们虽然点头，但都觉得这根本不可能。

And then we'd have his conclusion, and people would kind of nod their heads, but they it was impossible.

杰克是故意这样做的。

And Jack did this on purpose.

所以他并不太尊重金融领域的传统做法。

So he didn't have a lot of respect for conventional ways of doing finance.

这一点必须指出。

It has to be said.

所以我认为，有一件事我想强调，也是我觉得很重要的：显然，他影响了你的观点，让你认为那些简单粗暴的估值方法——把未经调整的报告收益当作真理，比如市盈率或市净率——其实是相当不可靠的。

So I think one I mean, one of the things that I that I wanna get to that I think is important is he obviously seems to have influenced your view that simple measures of valuation that took reported earnings without adjustment as gospel, like price to earnings ratios or price to book ratios, were sort of really unreliable.

所以，我是不是可以理解为，这是你从与他的交往以及早期研究中得出的结论之一？

And so it seemed am I right in thinking that that was one of the things that you drew from your relationship with him and your early studies?

你有一种感觉，即如果你遵循传统观点，即使是来自格雷厄姆和多德《证券分析》的传统观点，你也会被误导，因为你过于关注会计数字。

This sense that if you followed the conventional view, even the conventional view that came out of reading security analysis by Graham and Dodd, that you were gonna be misled because you were gonna focus too much on the accounting.

是的。

Yes.

当然。

Absolutely.

杰克当时和我经常讨论，当我有足够的资历时，我曾试图聘请杰克担任BEA的研究总监。

And Jack had, and Jack and I, we talked a lot about I tried to hire Jack as as director of research at BEA when I got to be senior enough.

而且我负责招聘所有人。

And I and I hired everyone.

从1972年到2000年，我亲自招聘了BEA的每一个人。

From 1972 until 2000, I hired every single person that came to BEA.

阿尔·扎齐尔做得很好，他让我全权负责招聘。

And that was a good thing Al Zazier did, he let me hire everybody.

我们建立了债券业务能力，也建立了衍生品业务能力。

We built a bond capability, we built a droughts capability.

那是一段非凡的、非凡的时光。

It was an amazing, amazing period of time.

我曾努力想让杰克加入。

And I tried to get Jack to come in.

没人喜欢杰克，因为他太刻薄了，是个叛逆者。

No one liked Jack because he was so acerbic, his iconoclast.

很难相处。

Was difficult.

他在很多方面都是个难搞的人。

He was a difficult person in a lot of ways.

我对杰克说：‘你只要表现得友善一点，我就能让你担任研究主管。’

And I said, Jack, all you got to do is be nice and I can bring you in as head of research.

杰克有一种方式，一旦他决定不想待在那里，就会通过多种方式表达出来，让人觉得‘我没法和这人共事’。

And Jack just had a way of, once he decided he didn't wanna be there, he just communicated that in a number of ways that people said, I can't work with this guy.

杰克很难搞。

Jack was difficult.

所以我们想聊聊一些真正核心的投资原则，这些原则在这么长的时间里一直对你非常有帮助。

So we wanna get to some of the really core investing principles that have served you so well over such a long period.

你写过一本关于如何在主动管理中获胜的书，而你的职业生涯在某种程度上正是这一理念的绝佳例证，这就是为什么我想深入探讨一下。

You you wrote this book about how to win at Active Management, and your career in a way is a very good test case for this, which is why I wanna unpack this at some length.

因为你已经在BEA和瑞士信贷资产管理公司工作了超过半个世纪，之后短暂地在你共同创立的Steinberg, Priest and Sloan公司待了几年，然后加入了Epoch。

Because you you've spent more than half a century, I guess, at BEA and then Credit Suisse Asset Management, then briefly a few years at another firm you set up called Steinberg, Priest and Sloan, and then at Epoch.

所以某种程度上，这堪称一个长达五十年的绝佳案例，我想把这些核心原则清晰地呈现给我们的听众和观众，让他们在对话结束时能真正抓住一些具体的东西，心里想：好吧。

And so in some ways, this has been a really good it's been a sort of fifty year test case for these very core principles that I wanna kind of lay out for our listeners and viewers so they actually have something sort of tangible to hold onto at the end of this conversation where they they come out and they're like, okay.

如果我真的想参与主动投资游戏，而不是仅仅投资指数基金或ETF，这些就是一些关键原则。

If I wanna if I wanna actually play the active investment game and not just invest in index funds or ETFs, these are some of the principles.

在你的一本书中，你写过这样一句话。

And so in one of your books, you you wrote this sentence.

你说：我们理念的基石是相信，长期股东回报的最佳预测指标是自由现金流的增长和管理层配置这些现金流的能力。

You said, the bedrock of our philosophy is the belief that the best predictors of long term shareholder return are growth in free cash flow and management skill in allocating that cash.

这在我看来，是你信条中一个非常核心的表述。

And this seems to me a very central kind of Yes.

你在这里提出的这一观点，堪称你信仰的宣言。

Statement statement of your credo here.

你能跟我们谈谈这个观点吗？即现金流是股票价值的源泉，而作为股票分析师，你真正想做的，是将现金流预测作为证券选择的基础？

Can you talk to us about this whole idea that cash flow is the origin of value in stocks and that really what you wanna be as a stock analyst is someone who forecasts cash flows as the basis for security selection?

鉴于我有会计、金融和经济学的背景。

So given all my background in accounting I have a background in accounting, finance, and economics.

会计就像占星术，而金融则是天文学。

Accounting is astrology, and finance is astronomy.

这是我所作的区分。

That's a distinction I would make.

我可以利用各种完全合规的会计准则，把收益变成任何你想要的样子。

So I can make earnings anything you want using a variety of fully acceptable accounting standards.

所以我常常觉得会计有点像神话，但你无法隐藏现金。

So I often think of accounting as just being a bit of a mythology, but you cannot hide cash.

让我们给现金流下一个定义。

Let's give a definition of cash flow.

相信我，我们曾经反复讨论过，现在偶尔还会再讨论，什么是现金流，什么是自由现金流，因为现金流常常有各种主张。

Believe me, we battered this around for We still battered around occasionally about what is cash flow and what is free cash flow, because cash flow often has claims on it.

自由现金流是指在支付了所有现金股息和所有现金税款后，可供股东分配的现金。

So free cash flow is the cash available for distribution to shareholders after all cash dividends and all cash taxes.

所以这些就是索取权。

So those are claims.

那么，企业经营性现金流的已知索取权有哪些呢？

So what are the known claims on the operating cash flow of the business?

剩下的就是自由现金流。

And that leaves you with free cash flow.

现在，一美元的自由现金流只有五种用途。

Now there's only five things you can do with a dollar free cash flow.

你可以支付股息、回购股票、偿还债务、进行收购，或再投资于你的业务。

You can pay a dividend, buy back stock, pay down debt, make an acquisition, or reinvest in your business.

如果是在零售场景下，我会用同样的论点来讲述我孙女的柠檬水摊，因为她在夏天结束时面临的抉择，和公司CFO的抉择是一样的。

If I have a retail setting, I will take that same argument and talk about my granddaughter's lemonade stand, because she has the same set of choices at the end of the summer as that CFO that a company has.

根据零售环境和听众的成熟度，他们往往能对这个故事产生共鸣。

And depending on the retail, depending on the sophistication of the audience, they kind of identify with that story.

我的意思是，在她支付了所有柠檬水原料等费用之后，她剩下一些钱，基本上可以把它作为股息发给自己。

I mean, after she's paid all, bought all the stuff for her lemonade or whatnot, she's got some money left over, She can basically dividend it to herself.

如果她有姐妹之类的，她可以和她们平分。

If she has her sister or whatnot, she can split that.

她可以买断她姐妹的份额。

She can buy out her sister.

这就像股票回购。

That's like a stock buyback.

她可以买断街对面那个女孩的生意，说：明年别来了，我付钱让你别回来。

She can buy out the neighbor's girl down the street and say, don't come back next year, and I'll pay you to stay away.

这就像资本支出。

That's That's like a CapEx thing.

但这些就是五种选择，所以你要从这里开始。

But those are the five choices, so you start with that.

这是所有事情的起点。

Is the beginning of everything.

然后问题是，人们在这方面做得好吗？

And then the question is, are people any good at it?

因为识别出优秀的资本配置者，既是科学也是艺术。

Because identifying managements that are good capital allocators is part science and part art.

并不是每个人都能一直做得很好。

Not everybody is good at it all the time.

但关键在于理解所谓的投资资本回报率（ROIC），以及另一个术语叫加权平均资本成本（WACC）。

But the key there then is to understand what's called return on invested capital, ROIC, And then there's a phrase called WACC, weighted average cost of capital, WACC.

所以你需要关注ROIC和WACC之间的差值。

So you want to look at the spread between the ROIC and the WACC.

很多时候，你只能依赖会计数据，而不是财务数据。

Now, a lot of times you're stuck with accounting data, not financial data.

在可能的情况下，越接近真实的财务数据越好。

To the extent you can get closer to financial data, that's what you want.

事实证明，这个差值真的非常重要。

And it turns out that that spread really matters.

如果这种差值能够持续存在，那么投资一家能够年复一年、持续以高于资本成本的水平进行再投资的公司，你就能获得非常好的回报。

If that spread persists, you can do very well owning a company that can continue year in and year out, reinvest over and above their cost of capital.

如果他们无法实现所追求的超额收益，就会以股息、股票回购或债务偿还的形式将剩余部分返还给你。

And if they can't earn whatever premium they're seeking, they give you the rest back in the form of dividends, share buybacks, or debt pay downs.

我认为，这就是投资的核心与灵魂。

That is the heart and soul, I think, of investing.

我们用这种方法在Epic公司开发了两款产品。

We were able to build two products at Epic with that.

我们开发的第一款产品被称为股东收益率，我们还写了一本书，名为《自由现金流与全球投资者的新优先事项》。

The first product we built was something we called shareholder yield, was we wrote a book called Free Cash Flow and New Priorities to Global Investors.

这一策略的核心是能够向他人说明：我们会为你提供市场回报，同时降低波动性。

What that strategy was about was being able to tell someone, We will give you a market return with less volatility.

然后，你可以把我们在波动性上为你节省的成本，用于投资增长、比特币或任何你想要做的事情。

Then you can take what we save you in terms of volatility, you can spend that money on growth or Bitcoin or whatever you want to do.

这款产品如今已有超过二十年的历史，我们确实做到了。

This product now has over twenty years of history, and we've delivered.

我们为投资者提供了市场回报，同时降低了波动性。

We have given the investor a market return with less volatility.

衡量这种方式的指标被称为夏普比率。

The way that's measured is what's called a Sharpe ratio.

这个策略具有非常出色的长期夏普比率。

That product has a terrific long term Sharpe ratio.

关于股东收益率，我的理解是，不好意思打断你一下，我只是想把这个概念拆解清楚。

As I understood it with the shareholder yield thing, sorry to interrupt you, just to sort of break this down for the sake of clarity.

因为我不太懂经济或金融，所以我不得不反复读你的书，大概读了七遍，才真正理解透彻。

Because I I you know, I'm not very economically or financially minded, so I had to read this, like, about seven times in your books to make sure I internalized it.

所以我的理解是，你说的是，好吧。

So my understanding was you were saying, okay.

所以一家公司有能力以各种方式向股东返还现金，对吧？

So so a company has this ability to return cash to shareholders in all these different ways.

对。

Right?

他们可以通过股息来实现。

They can do it through dividends.

他们可以通过股票回购来实现。

They can do it through share buybacks.

他们可以偿还债务。

They can pay down debt.

所以，据我理解，你的意思是，好吧。

And so as I understood it, what you were saying is, okay.

因此，这是一种由三部分组成的、以股息为导向的方法，用于描述公司如何实际配置其自由现金流。

So there's this three part dividend oriented approach to how a company is actually deploying its free cash flow.

所以，你发现这是一种非常优雅、简单的策略——虽然执行起来很难，但思路很简单，你的意思是，好吧。

So you were kind of finding this very kind of elegant, simple I I mean, difficult to execute, but simple strategy where you're saying, okay.

我们实际上可以判断，这种管理层是否擅长以真正惠及股东的方式配置其自由现金流。

We can actually see whether this management is good at deploying its free cash flow in a way that actually benefits the shareholders.

我理解得对吗？

Have I got that sort of right?

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

你说对了。

You got it right.

我漏掉的是，资本成本至关重要。

And what I left out was the cost of capital is everything.

如果你无法获得高于资本成本的回报，却继续再投资或收购，你将摧毁价值。

If you cannot earn your cost of capital, but you continue to reinvest or acquire, you're gonna destroy value.

因此，那些将超额现金流再投资于低于资本成本项目的人，将会毁掉自己的企业。

So people that reinvest the excess cash flow below their cost of capital are gonna destroy their business.

所以，当你想让这一点对人们来说更具体、更清晰时，当你观察Epoch投资的一些公司时，比如我看了你们的一些基金，发现像Meta、伯克希尔、摩根大通或硕腾这样的公司。

So when you're looking just to make this kind of tangible and clear for people, when you're looking at some of the companies that illustrate this best that Epoch has invested in, like, I I was looking at some some of your funds, and I can see there are these companies like Meta or Berkshire or JPMorgan Chase or Zoetis.

这些公司是如何体现你所说的管理层在做出明智资本配置决策方面的能力的？即它们如何投资资本，使其回报超过边际资本成本并提升价值？

How how do these companies illustrate what you're talking about here in terms of management's ability to make smart capital allocation decisions, their ability to invest the capital in a way that exceeds the marginal cost of capital and increases value?

你能举一两个像Meta这样的企业为例，说说我们喜欢的企业大致是什么样子吗？

Like, can you take us through one or two businesses like a meta and say, okay, this is sort of what we look for in a business that we love.

这并不是一个股票选择的例子，而是为了说明一比五十的方法。

And this isn't as a stock pick, it's more as an illustration of one:fifty the method.

你需要做的基本上是理解他们的业务。

Well, what you would do is to basically try to understand the business that they have.

以制药行业为例，我当年的论文就是在这个领域做的。

Let's take the drug industry for example, but that's where I did my thesis in that area.

所以你要确保产品本身有需求，并且需要了解单位需求。

So you want to make sure there's demand for the product itself, and you need to understand the unit demand, if you will.

我们是在瞄准一个大市场，还是一个小市场？

Are we going after a big market or is it a small market?

我们就假设这是一个非常大的市场吧。

Well, let's just say it's a very large market.

这些GLP-1药物，比如Wegovy，还有其他这些产品。

These GLP-one, Wegovy and all these things.

这些市场体量巨大，真的非常大。

These are enormous markets, just enormous in size.

一旦开始运行，你就可以看看单位需求可能是多少，然后评估你能收取多少费用，同时意识到你必须渗透到社会的很大一部分群体。

And so once it gets going, then the issue is you can kind of look at what unit demand might be, and then you can take a look at what you might be able to charge, recognizing you have to penetrate a very large segment of society.

它必须是负担得起的。

It has to be affordable.

这些费用会由谁来支付吗？

Are there houses going to be paid for?

是政府机构吗？

Is it a government entity?

是个体实体吗？

Is it an individual entity?

然后你看看利润率，以及这一切之后剩余的现金流。

Then you look at margins, you look at cash flow that's left over from all of this.

接着你会想，他们打算怎么用这些钱？

And then you say, What are they going to do with it?

嗯，他们可能会。

Well, they may.

他们必须决定是否要再投资，而制药公司确实会将大量资金投入研发。

They have to decide if they want to reinvest, and drug companies do reinvest a lot in research.

你事先根本无法知道这一美元能带来什么回报。

You really don't know in advance what you're going get out of that dollar.

这方面的软件还不明确，但你会分配其中一定比例的资金。

It's software unclear, but you allocate a certain percent of it.

但本质上，你试图表达的是：如果我们无法通过内部投资或收购获得超过资本成本的回报，我们就把钱还给股东。

But essentially what you're trying to do is to say, Look, if we cannot earn our cost of capital by internal investments or acquisitions, we're giving it back to the shareholders or giving it back.

至于如何返还并不太重要，方式可以是降低债务、偿还债务、回购股票或发放现金股息。

And it almost doesn't matter how you give it back, but you give it back by taking down your debt, debt pay downs, buying back your stock, or paying a cash dividend.

从功能上看，它们本质上是一样的。

They're functionally the same thing.

出于税务原因，可能处理方式略有不同，但我们并不在此做区分。

For tax reasons, maybe it's treated a little differently, but we don't make a distinction there.

但当我想到我们可能持有的某些公司时，你首先需要了解的是总可服务市场（TAM）。

But when I think of some of the names that we would own, you really want to get an idea of first the TAM, the total addressable market.

我们想到一个名字，比如赌博。

We think of a name, let's say gambling, for example.

我们这里并没有持有任何赌博类股票，但我认为我们应该持有。

We don't own any gambling stocks here, but I think we should.

但无论如何，你可以看到电视上到处都是赌博和足球的广告。

But at any rate, you take something like, you see all these ads on TV with gambling football.

这让我感到不可思议。

It's incredible to me.

是什么让这些公司具有价值？

What makes these companies valuable?

在我看来，普通人有着强烈的赌博倾向。

Well, to me, there's just an enormous tendency for the average person to want to gamble.

你可以从彩票中看到这一点，比如有多少人购买彩票。

You can see it with the lottery, for example, the number of people who pay the lottery.

比如，如果你买一张彩票，预期回报最多只有50美分。

If you buy a lottery ticket, for example, the expected return at best is 50¢.

因为州政府保留了50%的资金，或者很大一部分，返还给玩家的非常少。

Because the state keeps 50% of the money or a big chunk of it, very little comes back.

这是一项糟糕的投资。

It's a bad investment.

我本人一生中从未买过彩票。

I personally have never bought a lottery ticket in my life.

我觉得这纯粹是笔糟糕的投资。

Just think it's a bad investment.

另一方面，你可以看看DraftKings，或者其他一些类似公司。

On the other hand, you can look at DraftKings, can look at some of these other ones.

这些企业真的非常出色。

Those are really remarkable businesses.

不知为何，如今在法律和社会层面，人们可以对任何事情下注。

For whatever reason, legally and society now, can gamble on anything.

最终的需求极其庞大。

And the final demand is just enormous.

所以当你审视这些公司时，关键在于谁掌握了数据。

So when you look at these companies, the key is who has the data.

你需要找到那个掌握交易和用户数据的公司。

And you want to find the company that has the data on the transactions, the individuals.

你无法与这些人竞争。

Can't compete with these people.

事实证明，一旦你掌握了数据，就可以创建他们所说的‘串关’结构，比如：我知道在第一季度，巨人队会以7分输给喷气机队。

And it turns out that once you've got the data, you can create, what they call parlay structures where you can say, well, you know, in the first quarter, I think, the Giants will lose to, the Jets by seven points.

你可以下这样的注，总会有人给你赔率。

And you can make that bet, and somebody will give you a odds.

问题是，你只是在猜测，而对方却掌握着数据。

The problem is you're making a guess, but the other side's got the data.

他们会告诉你这种情况曾经发生过多少次，或者类似的信息。

They will tell you how often that's happened or whatnot.

所以我认为你必须不断审视总体可服务市场，渗透率有多高？

So I think you're constantly looking at the total addressable market, how penetrated is it?

美国的博彩市场仍然在旧金山。

And the gambling market in The United States is still on San Francisco.

所以我认为你可以看看一些博彩股，通过持有这些股票仍然能赚很多钱。

So I think you can look at some of these gambling stocks and you can still make an awful lot of money by owning the stocks.

不要去赌博，只投资那些最擅长运营的公司。

Don't gamble, just own the companies that are casting out their best.

他们拥有数据，而你没有。

They've got the data, you don't.

但我认为还有另一个例子，我正试着想一个，我们的团队关注销量，我们关注价格弹性。

But I think there's another I'm trying think of another example that might be, our guys look at units, we look at elasticity of price.

如果你持续提价，还能卖出同样的销量吗？

If you keep raising prices, can you still sell the same number of units?

大多数时候，答案是否定的。

Well, most of the time the answer is no.

到了某个时候，你就负担不起了。

At some point you just can't afford it.

我们关注利润率以及其可持续性。

We look at margins and the sustainability of this.

在今天开始之前，我们刚开完一个会，正在讨论特朗普政府。

We just had a meeting before we started today, and we're talking about the Trump administration.

特朗普政府上台了，带来了许多新人和新职位，这对某些行业意味着什么？

The Trump administration is coming in, they have all kinds of new people and new positions, and what does it mean for certain industries?

以RFK Jr为例，看看他的观点，真让我感到震惊。

You take RFK Jr, I mean, you take a look at his views and it has kind of shaked my head.

但就在一天之内，由于他对疫苗的看法，他让过去一两周内所有生产疫苗相关产品公司的市值大幅下跌。

But boy, in a single day, he took down the value of anybody that makes vaccine socks in the last week or two because of his views on vaccines.

我认为这只不过是噪音。

I think this is just noise.

希望科学能在该发挥作用的地方占上风，但除了理论上问：总可触达市场有多大？没有其他固定公式。

Hopefully science prevails where it should, but there's no one formula other than just theoretically, what's the total addressable market?

他们的市场渗透率是多少？

What penetration do they have?

你预期单位增长会是多少？

What kind of unit growth can you expect?

你能否预测价格的稳定性或增长？

Is there any way you can forecast price stability, price growth?

然后你分析销售成本，再查看销售和管理费用，从而建立一个模型。

And then you go through your cost of goods sold, then you take a look at your SG and A, and you come up with a model.

我们做的一件事是，这里有一个系统，叫做Epicor模型。

One of the things we've done, we have a system here, it's called the Epicor model.

我们刚刚更新了它。

We just updated it.

我们把所有关注的公司分为五等分，第一五分位、第二五分位、第三、第四和第五五分位，这种分组具有持续性。

We put all the companies we look at into quintiles, quintile one, quintile up two, three, four, and five, and there is a persistency.

令人惊讶的是，一旦一家公司今年得分在第一五分位，明年它仍处于第一五分位的概率相当高。

The amazing thing is that once you get a company that scores in the first quintile this year, it turns out the chances of them being in the first quintile next year is pretty high.

投资回报率与资本成本之间的差距具有持续性。

There's a persistency of the spread between ROIC and cost of capital.

随着时间推移，这种差异会消失。

Over time, it goes away.

随着时间推移，所有事情最终都会趋于均衡。

Over time, thing will all go to where they're just equal.

但你希望找到那些具有这种持续性差异的公司。

But you want to find those companies that have this spread because it's persistent.

因此，我们努力寻找那些有历史数据表明这种差异存在的公司。

So we really try and find those companies where you have historical data that suggests the spread exists.

然后你希望他们回答：明年有什么理由会导致这种差异不复存在吗？

And then you want them to say, is there any reason why that spread wouldn't exist next year?

只要你无法推翻这个论点，你就更倾向于进一步研究，想买入这些公司。

And to the extent you can't destroy that argument, you're inclined to do a little more work, you wanna buy those companies.

这种方法是有效的。

And it works.

你们对自由现金流的执着关注有没有什么弊端？

Is there a downside to your relentless focus on free cash flow?

我的意思是，这是否意味着你错失了一些像Netflix这样的企业，因为它们连续好几个季度都在亏钱？

I mean, has it has it meant that you missed out on certain types of business like a Netflix or something like that because they lost money every quarter for a long time?

这种对自由现金流的极度专注有什么局限性吗？

And what what's the limitation of this very relentless focus on free cash flow?

我认为企业在初创阶段，我们确实可能会错过这类机会。

I think businesses in their infancy, I think we can miss with that.

我是这么想的：我们确实错过了。

The, the way I would think about it is we did.

我们错过了Netflix。

We missed Netflix.

我们在Netflix上涨的过程中从未持有过它。

We we we never owned Netflix on our way up.

我们就是错过了。

We we just missed it.

我们只是看到它的估值不符合我们的标准。事实上，从长期来看，它是一只表现极佳的股票，但它就是没有产生那些现金流。

We just saw the valuation didn't didn't meet our the The reality is it was an incredible stock to own for a long period of time, but it just didn't have those cash flows.

另一点是，当利率下降时，长期资产表现良好，这在相当长一段时间内对成长型股票有利。

And the other thing you have is when interest rates are declining, longer duration assets do well, and that's been a benefit to growth stocks, if you will, for quite some time.

你仍然可以实现高于WACC的资本回报率，但这一差距的现值会随着利率变化而变化。

You can still be doing ROIC over WACC, but the present value of that gap changes with interest rates.

所以一旦你有了这个利差，事实上，我们不久前刚讨论过这个问题，我认为明年增长将面临一些困难。

So once you have that spread, in fact, was a discussion we were having a short time ago, my view is next year growth is going to struggle a little bit.

为什么？

Why?

并不是因为它们可能达不到现金流目标，而是如果利率曲线发生变化，短期利率可能保持不变或略微下降，但对我来说，长期利率别无选择，只能上升。

Not because they might not meet their cash flow numbers, but because if interest rates, if you were to look at the interest rate curve, maybe the short end stays the same or comes down a little bit, but the long end to me has no choice but to go up.

如果长期利率上升，且两年与十年期利率利差扩大，这将有效削弱任何投资的现值。

If the long end's going up and the spread between two and ten years steepens, that effectively hurts the present value of any investment.

但像成长型股票这样的长期投资将受到更大影响。

But a long duration investment like growth will be impacted more by that.

现在，我的一些同事对我的这一观点提出了质疑。

Now, some of my colleagues were pushing back on me with that view.

他们可能是对的。

They may be right.

也许收益会增长得足够快，足以抵消这一点。

It may be that the earnings are going to grow fast enough that it'll offset that.

但我可能会崩溃。

But I would die.

明年，我会担心可能陷入滞胀问题，我们这里已经很久没有出现过任何显著的滞胀了，但七十年代却到处都是。

Next year, would worry that might run into the stagflation problem that we haven't had in any we haven't had stagflation of any meaningful amount here for quite some time, but the seventies were full.

当你审视当前的投资环境并思考其中的各种风险时，我不禁想，我们能否详细梳理一下这些风险？因为我认为在2024年7月的《巴伦周刊》圆桌讨论中，你曾提到过。

When when you look at the current investment environment and you think about the various, the various risks there are, I I I wonder if we could if we could detail some of these because I I think it was in the in the July 2024, edition of the Barron's Roundtable.

你谈到了许多地缘政治风险。

You talked about a lot of the geopolitical risks.

你说中国存在严重的内部问题。

You said China has serious internal issues.

政府可能会加速对台湾采取行动，以此来转移民众的注意力。

The government might accelerate its interest in going after Taiwan as a way to distract the popular the population.

概率很低，但仍然是一个担忧。

It's a low probability, but still a concern.

你还谈到了全球范围内民族主义和非自由主义的兴起。

You also talked about the rise of nationalism and illiberalism around the world.

当然，还有一个巨大的话题需要讨论，那就是全球化的终结，这也是你一直谈论的内容。

And then obviously, there's an enormous topic to discuss, which is the end of globalization, which is something you've been talking about.

你能为我们梳理一下吗？作为一位在市场中打拼了六十年的人，当你观察当前的市场时，是什么让你感到担忧？

Can you take us through what it is that you, as somebody who's been in the market for sixty years, when you look at this market, what worries you?

不是预测市场会走向何方，而是为了提醒听众和观众，他们应该警惕什么，以及为什么此刻不应盲目承担风险。

Not as a prediction of where it's going, but just to sort of to to highlight for listeners and viewers what they should be wary of and why they should not take risk reckless risk at the moment forever, really.

那么，我该从哪里开始谈这个问题呢？

Well, actually, where do I start with this?

我目前正在写另一本书，我们稍后可以简单聊一聊。

I'm in the process of writing another book, which we can touch on a little later.

这本书还处于初期阶段。

It's in its infancy.

我确实欠别人一些时间，但具体会怎样还不知道。

I do owe people some time, but we'll see where that goes.

无论如何，假设我要写另一本书，它的核心理念会是什么？

At any rate, the idea behind a book, let's just put it that way, if I were to write another book, what would it be like?

首先，我会从这一点开始，然后回顾1989年发生的事。

Well, first of all, I would start with this and then a recognition of what happened in 1989.

1989年，柏林墙倒塌了。

In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell.

那是一个令人惊叹的时期。

It was an amazing period.

弗朗西斯·福山写了一本名为《历史的终结与最后的人》的精彩著作。

And Francis Fukuyama wrote a great book called The End of History of the Last Man.

我读了那本书，觉得它非常出色。

I read that book, I thought it was fantastic.

我跟你说过，快进到现在，事情并没有按那样发展。

I told you fast forward, it didn't work out that way.

但重点是，那本书背后的含义是，想想那些主义的终结。

But the point is, behind that book was, think of it the death of the isms.

那是资本主义加上一点社会主义，以及全球化。

It was capitalism plus a little socialism, and globalization.

还有一位名叫比较优势定律的人。

And there's somebody called the law of comparative advantage.

为了让你的听众更好地理解，假设你和我分别是两个国家。

And just to illustrate that for your listener would be, let's suppose you and I were two countries.

你是国家A，我是国家B。

You were country a and country b.

我们生产两样东西。

We bake we meant two things.

我们需要食物和衣物。

We want food and clothing.

唯一重要的因素就是劳动力。

And it and the only thing that matters is is labor.

你制作一单位食物需要一天，制作一单位衣物需要两天。

It takes you one day to make a unit of food and two days to make a unit of clothing.

我是国家B。

I'm country b.

我制作食物需要三天，制作衣物需要四天。

It takes me three days for food and four days for clothing.

那么表面上看，我们为什么还要贸易呢？

So on the surface, why would we ever trade?

因为你在两种产品上都绝对更高效。

Because you are absolutely more productive in both products.

但事实上，关键在于差异。

Well, it turns out it's the difference that matters.

你在食物生产上效率高两倍，但在衣物生产上只高50%。

You're twice as productive in food, but only 50% more productive in clothing.

但实际情况是，如果我们把一百天重新分配，让每个人专注自己更有优势的领域，我就完全退出食品生产。

But what happens, the way this would work out, is if we were to take a hundred days and reorient those hundred days as to who's doing what, I get out of the food business completely.

我这一百天的劳动全部用来生产服装。

All I do with my hundred days of labor is make clothing.

你生产更多的食物，同时也生产一些服装。

You make more food and you make some clothing.

看吧，如果你做了刚才那点代数运算，我们会发现产出的单位更多了。

And voila, if you went through that little algebra there, we have more units.

我们生产了更多的单位。

We have made more units.

除非我能得到一些回报，否则我不会跟你交易，但你会得到比我还多两倍的额外单位。

Now, I'm not going to trade with you unless I get something, but you will get twice as many additional units as I do.

因此，比较优势定律正是支撑了从1989年到最近我们所建立的惊人供应链的核心原理。

So the law of comparative advantage is what was behind this incredible supply chain that we built from 1989 till recently.

这简直不可思议。

It was incredible.

我们把一切都全球化了。

We globalized everything.

而比较优势法则在这整个过程中一直发挥作用。

Now, and the law of comparative advantage was at work this whole entire time.

问题是，在我刚才做的那个小类比中，我们假设劳动力是可互换的，可以随意把工人从服装业调到食品业。

The problem is in that little analogy that I just did, we assumed our labor's interchangeable, that the labor then clothing could be put into food, just move move people around.

但这并不符合现实。

That's not real world.

结果是，中西部的一个主要产业被掏空了，这些产业转移到了海外，去了中国，去了所有这些地方。

And what happened is there was a hollowing out, particularly in the Midwest, of a major industry that went that went abroad, that went to China, went to all these.

我们用这种方式摧毁了整个社区。

And we we we destroyed whole communities with this.

而这就是我们目前所看到的反弹。

And that's the backlash that we're seeing right now.

你在选举中就能看到这一点。

You see it in elections.

我在我的小家乡斯蒂蒙维尔也能看到。

You see it I see it in my little hometown of Stimmonville.

在斯蒂蒙维尔，我长大时，那里有三家钢铁厂。

And Stimmonville, I grew up, there were three steel mills there.

工资很不错。

There was good wages.

那是一个繁荣的景象。

That's a robust.

现在你再回去，钢铁厂只剩一半了。

Now you go back there, there's half of the steel mill there.

市中心已经被掏空了。

Downtown's been eviscerated.

非常空荡。

It's pretty empty.

斯通维尔的中产阶级，就是警察、消防员或教师的收入水平。

Middle class in Stoneville is what a cop makes or a fireman makes or a teacher.

仅此而已。

That's it.

这个社区已经崩溃了。

That community is devastated.

没错。

Correct.

所以当我们经历了这18年，发生的事情是，我们度过了全球化时期，建立了世界上迄今为止最高效的供应链。

And so when you so we had this 18 so what's happened is you went through this globalization period, and we created the most efficient supply chain the world has ever known.

但现在我们意识到，等等。

Well, now we're saying, wait a minute.

我们需要供应链的安全。

We want security of supply chain.

我们不再生活在一个由美国主导的单极世界中。

We no longer have a unipolar world led by The US.

我们现在生活在一个多极世界。

We have a multipolar world.

我们有中国、俄罗斯、伊朗和朝鲜。

We got China and Russia and Iran and North Korea.

我们周围有这么多角色在现实生活中活跃。

We got all these characters around real life.

所以我们现在要把生产回迁到本国。

So we're going to onshore now.

但你不可能用同样的成本结构来实现回迁。

Well, you cannot onshore with the same cost structure.

这是不可能的。

It's impossible.

就像在我们的小例子中，我们回到了两个独立国家分别生产食品和服装的状态。

Would be like in our little example, we went back to being two independent countries on making food and clothing as best I can.

生产食品和制作衣物，是的，我们可以做到，但我们的效率更低，生活更不富裕，财富更少。

Make food and clothe Yeah, we could do that, but we're less efficient, we're less well off, we're less wealthy.

所以目前正在进行的这种回迁，将会带来通货膨胀。

So this right now, this onshoring is going on, it's going to be inflationary.

我拒绝使用这个词，如果不引发通货膨胀，就不可能按我们希望的方式实现回迁。

I refuse the word, it's impossible to onshore the way we want to onshore without it being inflationary.