RWH054：亿万富翁英国人 与特里·史密斯

因此我学到了非常多东西。

And so I learned an awful lot.

通过这份工作，我很早就承担了大量责任。

I got an awful lot of early responsibility doing that.

所以我基本上就是直接向首席财务官汇报的经理，负责管理银行的财务，可以这么说。

So I was basically the manager straight underneath the CFO, managing the bank's finances, if you like.

通过深入了解内部运作，你认为自己学到了什么？

What do you think you learned by looking under the hood?

因为显然，我的意思是，这已成为你作为选股高手成功的关键之一，就是你通过实际深入内部、揭开表象，真正理解了——你究竟看到了什么？

Because obviously, I mean, this has been part of the key to your success as a stock picker, is that you understand What the did you see by actually being on the inside and looking under the hood?

看到了很多方面。

Loads of things.

我是说，你会看到很多很多的事情。

I mean, lots and lots of things that you see.

比如其中之一就是现金流和利润完全是两回事。

I mean, one of them is cash flows and profits are completely different things.

我是说，它们显然是相关的。

I mean, they are clearly related.

应计利润或权责发生制会计是一种将现金流分摊到不同报告期的方法。

Accrual profits or accrual accounting is a way of spreading cash flows across reporting periods.

但你可能有大量利润却依然破产。

But you can have plenty of profits and go bust.

对于需要杠杆或借款才能运营的企业——银行业就是如此——你必须格外注意两件事，对吧？

The two things that you've got to be very careful with businesses that require leverage or borrowing in order to function, which banking does, right?

因为在那个阶段，成败之间的容错空间非常小。

Because the margins for error, in terms of success or failure are very slim at that point.

当你使用20:1的杠杆率之类的时候，破产可能转瞬即至，明白吗？

When you're on 20 to one leverage or something like that, it doesn't take long to go bust, you know?

真的，在这方面冒险的话，破产可能来得相当快。

Really, you can do it quite quickly by taking risk, you know, in that regard.

所以我了解很多这类情况。

So there are lots of things I know.

但在当时做那份工作时，我们现在所熟知的投资者关系行业——即公司设有投资者关系办公室的情况——根本不存在。

But in the course of doing that job, in those days, the investor relations industry, which we've now got where companies have IR offices, didn't exist.

当时根本没有这种东西。

There was no such thing.

没有任何公司设有这样的部门，一个都没有。

Nobody had one, not even one.

实际情况是，这些经纪人、分析师会打电话来，他们会要求与财务总监通话，而财务总监并不喜欢接听他们的电话。

So what would happen is these people, brokers, analysts, would ring up, and they would, ask for the finance director who didn't like taking their calls.

财务总监会把电话转接给我的上司，但他总是不在办公室。

He put them through to, to, well, my boss, but he wasn't there.

于是电话就转给了我。

Me.

所以电话铃声响起时，通常是伦敦或纽约等地的股票经纪公司的银行分析师打来的，他们会开始质询我关于业绩、来年计划、我们在房地产贷款或欠发达国家贷款等方面的定位情况。

So the phone would ring, and it would be a bank analyst working at a stockbroking firm in London or New York, whatever, who would start questioning me about the results or the forthcoming year and what was going on and where we were positioned in relation to property lending or less developed country lending or whatever.

我与所有这些人都打过交道，这对我来说完全没问题。

And I dealt with all these people, and that was fine.

并且从他们那里逐渐了解到市场是如何看待我们的。

And learned quite a lot from them about how the market viewed us over time.

还有来自资本集团等机构的投资者会来拜访，我会向他们介绍这些情况。

And investors who would come in as well, from Capital Group, people like that, and they come in to interview and I would tell them about that.

后来其中一个人对我说，你是在浪费时间。

And then eventually, one of them said to me, you're wasting your time.

你明白这一点，对吧？

You know that, don't you?

我回答，你说我浪费时间是什么意思？

And I said, what do you mean I'm wasting my time?

他说，你将来会大有作为。

He said, you're going to do very well.

我说，是的，他们告诉我我正快速晋升，可能有一天会进入董事会之类的。

I said, yeah, they've told me I'm on the fast track up towards the board possibly or something like that one day.

他说，我对此深信不疑。

And he said, I'm absolutely certain.

他说，但你只会拥有一份职业，成为银行里相当重要的人物，然后就这样了。

He said, but you're just gonna have a career, and you're gonna be quite an important guy in a bank, and then that's gonna be that.

他说，我认为你应该来我们行业工作，这里的回报要大得多。

He said, I think you should come and work in our industry where the rewards are much greater.

显然，如果你失败了，就不会像你现在这份工作那样有同样的保障。

Obviously, if you fail, then there's not the same sort of parachute that you might get in your job here.

他说，但我不认为你会失败。

He said, but I don't think you will.

他还说，你更像你自己，这是一种合伙关系，最终你会成为自己的老板。

And he said, you've been far more like you, this is a partnership, you'll end up being your own boss.

他说，而且我认为你明白这一点。

He said, and I think you get it.

我说，哦，好吧。

And I said, oh, okay.

于是我辞去了银行的工作，转行成为一名银行分析师，这让所有相关人士都大为震惊，管理层的离职率因此直接上升了100%。

So I quit the bank and went off and became a bank analyst, much to the shock of everybody involved, who, like, increased the managerial turnover by literally a 100%.

比如，人们不会辞职离开。

Like, people don't quit and go off.

我说，嗯，不会的。

I said, well, no.

我要成为一名银行分析师。

I'm going to be a I'm going to be a bank analyst.

于是我去了一家股票经纪公司，成为了一名银行分析师。

And I went and I joined a stockbroking firm and I became a bank analyst.

于是你离开并成为了一名分析师，我记得先是去了W Greenwell and Company公司，后来到了Barclays De Zuitt Wed，在那里一直工作到80年代末。

So you went off and you became an analyst, I think, first to a company called W Greenwell and Company, and then you ended up at Barclays De Zuitt Wed, which was where you were until the late '80s.

关于你在那里的经历，有一个广为人知的故事。

And there's a famous story told about your time there.

我记得你刚成为银行分析师大约一周后，就确立了你直言不讳的名声，即便这会惹恼那些掌权者。

I think about a week after you joined as a banking analyst that sort of cemented your reputation as someone who would speak your mind, even when it annoyed the hell out of people in positions of power.

给我们讲讲发生了什么。

Tell us what happened.

杰里米，其实不是我加入后一周的事。

Jeremy It wasn't actually a week after I joined.

我是1986年左右加入的，就在伦敦金融大改革前夕。

I mean, I joined sometime in the 1986, just before Big Bang in London.

然后我在圣诞节前写了一篇关于银行业的分析报告，留待发表。

And then I wrote a piece on the bank sector, a piece of research, in the run up to Christmas and left it for publication.

那时候的做法是把报告留给出版部门，他们会印刷并邮寄给客户。

These were the days when you left it, the publication department ran it out and mailed it to people.

接着我就去度假了，具体去哪儿记不清了。

And, I went off for a holiday, I can't remember where I went.

所以我当时说，我要在圣诞和新年期间外出。

And so I said, I'm going away over Christmas and New Year.

我把所有事务都交给二把手负责，研究报告也准备好了。

And I left my number two in charge of everything, I've got this researched.

他去吃午餐时——那时候人们确实会外出吃午餐——把报告副本给了《金融时报》的银行业务记者。

He went out for a lunch, in the days when people did go for a lunch, with the Feet banking correspondent and gave him a copy.

当然，在新年的第一个工作日，金融界完全没有其他任何新闻。

And, of course, on the first working day of New Year, there was absolutely no news anywhere in the financial world.

于是《金融时报》的头版文章写道：BZW银行建议抛售巴克莱银行股票。

So the front page article of the Financial Times says bark BZW says sell Barclays.

当然，我的意思是，所有人都为此彻底疯狂了。

And, of course, I mean, everybody went completely crazy about this.

是的，那是不被允许的。

Yeah, that wasn't allowed.

你们通常不会发布这类投资建议。

You people didn't put out some recommendations generally.

总之，你们针对的是那家公司。

Anyway, you're doing it on the company there.

而我说，是的。

And I said, yeah.

巴克莱管理层咬牙切齿地表示：是的，这简直太棒了。

And they got look, through gritted teeth, the management of Barclays said, yes, this is absolutely wonderful.

这证明了我们投资银行子公司的独立性。

It proves the independence of our investment banking subsidiary.

老板说，我想你得离开了，因为你在这里已经没有前途了。

And the boss said, I think you're gonna have to leave because you've got got no career here now.

于是我就离开了。

I said and so I left.

事情就是这样了。

And that was that was that.

你知道吗？

You know?

而且，我想，这也不是我第一次这样了。

And, I guess, you know, I've kind of not for the first time.

我再次占据了道德制高点，但这次可能高得让人不太舒服。

I've reclaimed the moral high ground a notch too high for people's comfort zone.

不得不说，看看后来巴克莱银行发生的事，我是对的，因为这是1986年的事。

I've got to say, looking at what happened subsequently with Barclays, I was right because this was '86.

而到了八十年代末九十年代初，他们最终因房地产损失规模过大而削减了股息。

And by the turn of the eighties into the nineties, they ended up cutting the dividend because of the size of their property losses.

我提出的核心论点就是他们无法在不产生高于平均水平坏账的情况下放贷。

Was talking about their inability to lend without incurring higher than average bad debts was basically the thesis I was putting forward.

有一个更加戏剧性的类似故事重演，最终你去了瑞银、菲利普和德鲁公司。

There was an even more dramatic reprise of a similar story where you end up at UBS, Phillips and Drew.

于是在1990年成为了那里的英国公司研究主管。

So in 1990 became head of UK company research there.

对于那些不记得这家公司的人，它曾是英国相当知名的投资银行、股票经纪商和资产管理公司。

And for people who don't remember this firm, it was a pretty prominent investment bank and stockbroker and asset manager in The UK.

我认为飞利浦与德鲁公司创立于1880年代，后来被瑞银集团收购。

And I think Phillips and Drew had been founded in the 1880s and then acquired by UBS.

所以你正好赶上一个有趣的时期，对吧？当时像Polypec和British and Commonwealth这样的公司看似运营良好，却纷纷破产。

And so you come in at an interesting time, right, where there are all these companies like Polypec and British and Commonwealth that were going bankrupt while seeming to be in good health.

而你以一贯的细腻、优雅和机智涉足其中。

And you wade into this with your usual delicacy and gracefulness and tack.

然后做什么？

And do what?

告诉我们发生了什么。

Tell us tell us what happened.

是的。

Yeah.

我可能表现得比你认为的更得体些。

I probably did show rather more tack than you've you've given me credit for.

于是，我和一位运输行业分析师同事合作，提议说：'我们何不写一份研究报告，分析为何会出现这种情况——为什么有些公司明明报告创纪录利润，却在六周后宣告破产？'

So, I, together with the guy who was a transport analyst, I worked with him on it, said why don't we write a piece of research about why this is happening, why we've got companies which are reporting record profits and going bust six weeks out of big companies, right?

因此我们撰写了一篇约30页的研究报告，详细剖析了企业做假账的12种手法，比如虚构利润、制造无现金流支撑的盈利、通过合伙关系转移负债等

And so we wrote a research paper, probably 30 pages long, which looked at 12 methods by which companies cook the books, right, that they managed to report profits that didn't exist or profits without cash flows or got liabilities out of partnership.

我们写了那份报告，而且值得一提的是，它被路透社评为当年伦敦发表的最佳研究报告。

And we wrote that, and it was, for what it's worth, voted the best piece of research published in London that year by the sort of Reuters.

你需要往回倒一点。

You need to back up a bit.

瑞银为什么要雇佣我？

Why was I hired by UBS?

他们在我入职前不久卷入了一起名为'蓝箭事件'的风波。

They'd been involved in a thing called the Blue Arrow affair, shortly before they hired me.

蓝箭是一家英国壳公司，由一位叫托尼·巴里的人经营——我记得他曾一度拥有热刺足球俱乐部。他利用这家壳公司竞购了一家规模大得多的企业——总部位于威斯康星州密尔沃基的临时劳务服务公司Manpower。

Blue Arrow was a UK shell company run by a man called Tony Barry, who owned Spurs, I think, for a while, the football club, and he used that to bid for a company, a much, much bigger company, because this was a shell company called Manpower, temporary employment service company based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

这是笔巨额收购，他们发行了7.5亿英镑的可转债。听起来金额很大，但想想1989年那个年代这笔交易的规模。

And, it was a huge acquisition, and they did £750,000,000 convertible, which sounds quite a lot of money, but try and think back to 1989 in terms of the size of that deal.

牵头银行是巴克莱和国民西敏寺银行，也就是瑞银和国民西敏寺。

It was done by the lead banks were Barclays and NatWest, so UBS and NatWest.

问题是这次发行彻底失败了，因为整个交易就是个烂摊子。

And the issue was a complete flop because the deal was a complete lemon.

他们非但不承认自己套牢了7.5亿英镑，反而把这些债券放进了做市账户——这个账户是免于披露的。

And instead of admitting that they were stuck with the £750,000,000, they put it on their market making book, which was exempt from disclosure.

后来东窗事发时，这个操作被两个人视为相当恶劣的犯规行为。

Now, this was regarded when it became apparent as a bit of a foul by two people.

一方面是机构投资者，因为其中一些购买了这些债券（虽然数量不多），但他们以为整个发行已经售罄，因为银行在报纸上刊登了类似'发行大获成功'的广告宣传。结果他们感到被欺骗，于是停止了与瑞银等机构的业务往来。另一方面是监管机构和警方，他们直接逮捕了首席执行官、研究主管、交易主管和销售主管。

One was the institutions, because a few of them had bought these bonds, not very many, but they thought the whole issue was sold, because they published newspaper sort of adverts saying successful issue triumph, da da da, you know, and they felt a bit of grief, so they stopped dealing with people like UPS over it and the, the the regulators and, sort of police authorities who went and arrested the CEO, the head of research, the head of trading, and the head of sales.

于是那位对冲基金猎头突然联系我说——毕竟我已从事银行业分析师多年（成功干了七年，应该算资深了），

And so the hedgehunter rang me up and said, because I've been a bank analyst for a number of years, successfully seven years, I think I've been a bank analyst.

我想尝试些新领域。

I'd like to do something more.

我希望从事更宏观的市场研究，扩大视野范围，而不是永远只分析银行业。

I'd like to do something looking at the whole market, you know, wider scope of things rather than doing banks forever.

我觉得自己对银行业已经相当了解了。

I think I know quite a bit about banks.

我想开拓新方向。

And I'd to do something new.

所以他突然打电话跟我说：'瑞银因为这些逮捕事件出现了职位空缺，他们想聘用你'。

So he rang me out of the blue and said, look, UBS have got a vacancy because of these arrests, they'd like to hire you.

我当时回答：'好吧，没问题，我愿意接受这个职位'。

I sort of said, well, okay, fine, I'll go for that.

我大概说了句，好吧，你们想从我这儿得到什么？

I sort of said, well, what do you want out of me?

他们回答说，显然，我们想要盈利。

And they said, well, obviously, we want to be profitable.

我们希望你能在那些机构面前重新占据道德高地，你和他们之间还有这个...这又回到了比兹多尔的问题上。

We want you to reclaim the moral high ground with the institutions who you've got this It comes back to the Beezidore.

你以直言不讳著称，我们希望你利用这点在机构中重建我们的声誉。

You've got this reputation for telling things how they are, and we'd like you to use that to rebuild our reputation in institutions.

我说，没问题。

I said, Sure.

于是我发表了这篇研究报告，整个过程完成得很顺利。

So I published this piece of research, and that was all very well done.

后来我接到兰登书屋出版商的电话，他们说如果你能写本书，我们认为这书会有市场，佩斯，你能写本书吗？

So then I got a phone call from somebody at Random House, the publisher, and said, we think that we could sell a book if you could write a book, could you write a book, Pace?

我说，好啊。

And I said, yeah.

于是我去了瑞银管理层那里，说有人找我出书。

So I went to the UBS management and said, I've had this approach.

我觉得这可能是个好主意，因为你们正想提升品牌形象。

I think it might be a good idea because you're trying to do some more high grade stuff.

他们说：'嗯，不错'。

And they said, Yeah, good.

我说：'我觉得这会是锦上添花的事'。

I said, I think this will be another feather in our cap to doing that.

你们觉得呢？

What do think?

他们说：'可以啊，如果你愿意的话'。

They said, Yeah, if you want.

于是我问：'这本书要署瑞银的名字还是署特里·史密斯的名字？'

So I said, want the book to be UBS's book or Terry Smith's book?

我说：'署特里·史密斯的名字'

And I said, Terry Smith's book.

说，好吧。

Said, fine.

好的。

Okay.

于是我就写了这本书。

So I wrote the book.

当然，问题是之前也有人写过其他关于创造性会计的书，而且那本是首创。

And, of course, the thing is other people had written other books on creative accounting in the past, the first one, by any means.

但如果你回顾那些书，他们用的是A公司加B公司的例子，而我实际上用的是真实公司。

But if you look back to some of those, they use company A plus company B, and I actually use real companies.

对吧？

Right?

临近出版时，出版商说你在书里引用了报告。

And when we got towards publication, the publisher said, you've quoted any reports in there.

我说是的。

I said, yes.

他说，我认为你需要给所有公司写信，告知他们你正在使用这些资料，以防他们想主张版权。

He said, I think you need to write to all the companies and tell them that you're using that in case they wish to claim copyright.

我说，这是公开文件。

I said, it's a public document.

然后他说，给公司写信。

And he said, write to the company.

于是我说，好吧。

So I said, okay.

行。

Fine.

所以我给所有公司写了信，说：我是特里·史密斯。

So I wrote a letter to all the companies saying, I'm Terry Smith.

我正在出版一本关于会计的书。

I'm publishing a book on accounting.

我将引用你们1988年的年度报告。

I'm gonna quote from your 1988 annual report.

希望这样没问题。

I hope that's okay.

如果有问题请告诉我。

Let me know if it's not.

当然，有几家公司看到我的身份后，意识到即将发生什么。

Of course, having seen who I was and so a couple of the companies realized what was about to happen.

接下来我就被瑞银集团主席召见，他说：'我们要阻止这本书出版，对吧？'

And the next thing I know is I get called in by the chairman of UBS who says, we're gonna stop this book, aren't we?

我说：'我认为我们做不到。'

I said, I don't think we can do that.

然后他有点...像是说'我觉得你没明白我刚才的意思'。

And there was a sort of, I don't think you've understood what I just said.

我是在命令你停止出版这本书。

I'm telling you to stop the book.

明白吗？

Right?

我说，我想你会发现这本书是我的，不是你的。

I said, I think you find the book's mine, not yours.

因为这是我们约定好的。

Because that's what we agreed.

好吧，我现在给你指示，你去告诉他们。

Okay, I'm giving you the instruction to you go and tell them.

我说，我该给他们什么理由呢？

I said, what reason shall I give them?

这件事会引起轩然大波。

Well, there's gonna be a huge route over this.

你知道吗？

You know?

然后我说，所以我得告诉出版商，注意publicity（宣传）和publisher（出版商）这个词的联系，它们同源。

And I said, so I'm gonna tell a publisher, note the connection between the word publicity and publisher, the same verb.

对吧？

Right?

他手头有本会计学的书，他估计能卖出大约5000册左右。

That he's got a book on accounting, which he's he thinks he's gonna sell about 5,000 copies or something like that.

但现在事情要闹大了。

But now there's gonna be a huge part.

我说，你有没有听说过一本叫《抓间谍的人》的书？撒切尔夫人曾试图封禁它。

I said, do you have you come across a book called Spy Catcher that missus Thatcher tried to ban?

我说，那书主要讲的是个军情五处的人抱怨自己养老金的事。

I said, it's mainly about a guy who was in MI five complaining about his pension.

我说，但你们越禁止它反而卖得越火。

I said, but it sold out when you tried to stop them.

我说，我们现在正式通知你，我们要起诉并和你打官司。

I said, we're telling you we're gonna fight you and sue you.

我说，行吧。

I said, okay.

于是我就被解雇并被告上了法庭。

And so I got fired and sued.

书出版了。

The book got published.

出版商认为这是他见过最有趣的事情，也是他很久以来见过最好的事。

The publisher regarded this as the funniest thing he'd seen the best thing he'd seen for a long time.

暂停印刷，腾出时间在角落宣传这本他们试图封禁的书。

Stop the press long enough to put across the corner the book they tried to ban.

这太神奇了。

It's amazing.

我是说，你最初是因所谓的'严重不当行为'被停职。

I mean, you got suspended initially for quote unquote gross misconduct.

然后你被解雇了。

Then you're fired.

他们还起诉了你。

They sued you.

所以据我所知，大约十八个月后你不得不庭外和解。

So as I understand it, you had to settle out of court after about eighteen months.

但这本书却登上了畅销书榜首。

But the book was number one in the bestsellers.

我是说，它把史蒂芬·霍金挤下了——你就是投资界的史蒂芬·霍金，不仅仅是史蒂夫——我不是想

I mean, it knocked Stephen Hawking off the you are the Stephen Hawking of the investing world, not just the Steve I'm not trying

把这当作赞美。

to take that as compliment.

不过确实。

But yeah.

好吧。

Okay.

但没错，确实意味着——显然它不会那样做，试图——我是说你知道，有些人可能读过并认为它相当——有趣的是，我认为它在多个方面经受住了时间考验，这是个更有趣的反思——四年多后，甚至三十五年后，书中的一些例子依然经得起时间检验。

But, yes, did, mean but clearly it wouldn't have done that, tried to I mean you know, some people might have read it and regard it as quite, and the interesting thing is I think it has stood the test of time in a number of regards, think that's a more interesting reflection, over four years later, they're over 30, thirty five years later, are examples in there which stand the test of time.

尤其是关于养老基金会计的那一章，我认为特别经受住了时间考验。

The one on pension fund accounting, I think in particular, stood the test of time in there.

我觉得这是本不错的书。

I think it was an okay book.

不过我觉得，如果没有他们试图阻止并起诉我这类事情，我们也不会卖出几十万本。

Don't think we'd have sold hundreds of thousands of copies without them trying to stop it and sue me and things like that, though.

是啊。

Yeah.

而且在很多方面，这确立了您作为坦率正直、有勇气直言不讳之人的声誉。

And in many ways, it made your reputation as somebody who was candid and had integrity and had the courage to tell it like it is.

但同样重要的是，您所做的一切都基于对账目和财务的真正理解，这似乎是——听起来很平淡，但这确实是您在行业中的竞争优势之一，而这个行业里大多数人似乎都不愿费心去做。

But also, it seems relevant that everything you did was based on a real understanding of the accounts, of the finances, which seems to have been I mean, it sounds so prosaic, but that's kind of been one of your competitive advantages in an industry where most people don't seem to bother.

嗯，他们确实不这么做。

Well, they don't.

没错。

No.

我可以举出无数例子，只要您愿意听并记录下来，我们都知道业内很多人根本不看账目。

I'm not I can give you as many examples as you'd you'd prepare to listen and record to of of where we know that people in the industry don't read the accounts.

我的意思是，账目存在是有原因的。

I mean, we have the accounts for a reason.

你知道吗？

You know?

而且公司里的人都只看管理层的幻灯片演示，各种不知所谓的东西。

And there there's all company look at management slideshows and all kinds of don't know.

我读的是实际的财务报表。

I'm reading the actual accounts.

这样的例子比比皆是。

I mean, there are lots of examples of this.

比如我们就有个关于IBM的案例。

I mean, we have one on IBM.

我们在2010年研究过IBM并否决了它。

We looked at IBM in 2010 and rejected it.

事实证明这个决定很明智，至少从股票表现来看是这样。

Well, wisely so, as it turns out, as a stock.

但在分析过程中，我们发现需要核对数据时，在去年的现金流量表里找到了20亿美元的差错。

But when we're doing it, we found that I need to go look at the number, we found a $2,000,000,000 error in the cash flow statement for the last year.

于是我们给投资者关系部门打了个电话，说：'听着，我们是这些人，我们在做这个研究，发现了这个问题，只是想向你们核实些关于客户数据的事情。'

And so we sort of rang up the IR department and said, look, we're these guys, we're doing this, we're looking at that, we just gotta ask you something about your customers.

报表里这个数字我们怎么都核对不上。

There's this number in here that we can't make this work.

他们照例回复说会给我们回电。

And they said, did the usual, we'll call you back.

后来他们联系我们说：'已经和财务部门确认过了，你们完全正确，现金流确实有20亿美元的误差。'

And they said, we've been in touch with the financial arm, you're absolutely right, the cash flow is out by $2,000,000,000.

我们问，还有其他人发现了吗？

We said, anybody else rang up?

我说，没有。

I said, no.

而且我认为不是因为别人发现了却懒得理会。

And I don't think it's because other people have discovered it but couldn't be bothered.

他们根本没看。

They haven't read it.

好吧，那就这样吧。

It's like, oh, okay then.

这非常有趣。

It's very interesting.

我是说，在我看来，就为我们的听众和观众计分并让他们理解其中的一些道德意义而言。

I mean, so it seems to me, I mean, just in terms of keeping score for our listeners giving them and viewers and giving them a sense of some of the morals here.

显然，正如你之前所说，部分原因在于对现金流和尽职调查的重视。

I mean, part of it, obviously, as you said before, is an emphasis on cash flow and due diligence.

在我看来，部分原因在于，你职业生涯的重要一课就是专注于

Part of it, it seems to me, one of the great lessons of your career is just focusing on

三十比五十

thirty:fifty

经济现实而非报告收益。

economic reality over reported earnings.

是的，道格。

Yes, Doug.

我认为经济现实就是如此。

I think economic reality is it.

如果你读过我们在Fundsmith的做法，就会确信你可能一直在为此做准备。我们谈论的是那些资本回报率高、毛利率高、现金流转化出色且持续增长的公司等等。

If you read what we do at Fundsmith, would be confident you probably have been preparing for this, you know, we talk about companies with high returns on capital and high gross margins and great cash conversion and growth and so on.

但当我们发现这些公司时——我是说，任何人都可以通过查阅彭博或其他数据源找到它们。

But when we found those and I mean, anyone can find those going through, looking on Bloomberg or another data source to find them.

这时你必须停下来问自己一个非常重要的问题：它们是如何做到的？

You then have to pause and ask yourself a very important question: how do they do that?

就像你说的，经济现实是什么？

What's the economic reality, as you say?

它们向人们销售什么产品或服务，使其能获得高利润率、实现良好的资本回报、将利润转化为现金流，并让竞争相对受限？

What product or service are they selling to people that enables them to generate good margins, that enables them to get good returns of capital, enables them to convert profits into cash, that keeps competition somewhat unbaked?

它们实际在做什么？

What do they actually do?

你明白吗？

You know?

我的意思是，在现代社会，你确实会遇到这样的情况：人们仅仅因为公司提到人工智能，就盲目投资各种他们根本不了解的东西。

And, I mean, you do get investments in companies, particularly in the modern era, where people buy all kinds of stuff without understanding it just on the basis of them mentioning AI.

哦，没错。

Oh, right.

好的。

Okay.

他们实际是做什么的？

What do they actually do?

这已经足够令人惊叹了。

And it's amazing enough.

我是说，我们多年来一直保持着这一点。

I mean, we've for years have maintained this.

我认为人们已经开始有点相信这一点了。

People have, I think, come to believe it a bit.

但如果他们实际上说的是胡言乱语，那就不是个好兆头。

But if they actually speak in gobbledygook, it's not a good sign.

明白吗？

You know?

我们需要人们用直白的语言告诉我们，就像我们在投资领域努力做到的那样。

We need people to tell us, you know, in straightforward, which we try to do in what we do in investment.

我们努力用简单明了的语言告诉人们我们做什么和不做什么。

We try to tell people in straightforward terms what it is we do and what we don't do.

普雷斯顿 我们稍事休息，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Preston Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

有没有注意到，聪明的投资者总会对冲尾部风险，却几乎从不谈论金融压制？

Ever notice how smart investors hedge against tail risk, but almost never talk about financial repression?

这里有个令人不安的事实。

Here's the uncomfortable truth.

无论你如何谨慎地构建投资组合都无济于事，因为如果资金规则可能一夜改变，你就处于风险之中。

It doesn't matter how careful you build your portfolio because if the rules around your money can change overnight, you're vulnerable.

问问那些银行账户被冻结的加拿大卡车司机，或是汇款被国有银行截流的古巴家庭，还有数十个专制国家里目睹毕生积蓄在恶性通胀中蒸发的公民们就知道了。

Just ask the Canadian truckers whose bank accounts were frozen or Cuban families whose remittances were hijacked by state banks or citizens in dozens of authoritarian countries watching their life savings evaporate under hyperinflation.

这些并非孤立事件。

These aren't isolated incidents.

它们是一个全球性模式的一部分。

They're part of a global pattern.

这就是人权基金会发布《金融自由报告》的原因，这份每周通讯追踪政府如何将货币武器化来控制人民，以及比特币如何帮助个人抵抗金融压制。

That's why the Human Rights Foundation publishes the Financial Freedom Report, a weekly newsletter that tracks how governments weaponize money to control people and how Bitcoin is helping individuals resist financial repression.

如果你关心健全货币、个人主权和金融自由，人权基金会的金融自由报告是必读材料。

If you care about sound money, personal sovereignty, and financial freedom, HRF's financial freedom report is essential reading.

这份报告我个人订阅后受益匪浅。

This is a report that I'm personally subscribed to and learn a ton from.

免费注册请访问financialfreedomreport.org。

Sign up for free at financialfreedomreport.org.

这里是financialfreedomreport.org。

That's financialfreedomreport.org.

聪明的投资者不只关注美联储，他们还关注全球动向。

Smart investors don't just watch the Fed, they watch the world.

经营小企业时，招对人能带来天壤之别。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

合适的员工能提升团队、提高生产力，让业务更上一层楼。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人选本身就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这时LinkedIn招聘就能派上用场。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

其全新AI助手能消除招聘中的猜测，为你精准匹配符合要求的顶尖候选人。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

它无需你筛选成堆简历，而是根据标准过滤申请人并高亮最佳匹配，既节省时间又能在合适人选出现时快速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是这些优秀候选人本就活跃在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工留任至少一年的可能性高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

第一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费在linkedin.com/studybill发布职位，然后推广使用LinkedIn招聘的新AI助手，让寻找顶尖人才变得更简单快捷。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

条款与条件适用。

Terms and conditions apply.

知道什么让最优秀的企业脱颖而出吗？

You know what sets the best businesses apart?

就在于他们如何运用创新将复杂性转化为增长。

It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

这正是亚马逊广告正在做的事，由AWS人工智能驱动。

That's exactly what Amazon ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.

亚马逊广告每天处理数十亿次实时决策，在310亿美元的广告生态系统中优化广告表现。

Every day, Amazon ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

最终实现的广告活动运行速度提升30%，并在大规模范围内带来可衡量的商业影响。

The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

而这正是亚马逊自身实现增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

他们的智能AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并让营销人员能专注于创意与策略。

Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告证明，AI驱动的广告不仅是未来趋势，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每家企业都能运用亚马逊内部完善的这套创新方法论。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

了解亚马逊广告故事，请访问aws.comai/rstory。

See the Amazon ad story at aws.comai/rstory.

访问 aws.com/ai/rstory 了解更多。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

好的。

All right.

回到节目中来。

Back to the show.

你职业生涯中还有很大一部分我暂时略过了，或许我们稍后再谈，就是关于你运营上市公司的经历。

There's a big chunk of your career that I'm sort of leaving out here that maybe we'll come back to later where you were running public companies.

不过既然你提到Funds Myth且它与我们当前讨论高度相关，让我们更深入探讨你在2010年创立的这家公司的业务——它已成为我称之为'品质投资艺术'的绝佳典范，这个短语你在《成长型投资》一书引言中用过，你在那里将自己的方法描述为品质投资。

But since you bring up Funds Myth and it's so relevant to our discussion here, let's dig in more to what it is you do here at this firm that you founded back in 2010, and that's become a kind of a really great emblem for what I would call the art of quality investing, which is a phrase you use in the introduction to your book, Investing for Growth, where you describe your approach as quality investing.

引言中有句很妙的话，你提到看到一辆冰淇淋车侧面写着广告标语'品质才是关键'。

There's a lovely phrase in that introduction where you talk about seeing an ice cream van that has an advertising slogan on the side, which is it's quality that counts.

所以这本质上就是你投资理念的核心。

So this is sort of at the heart of what you do.

请告诉我们你在识别这些优质企业时关注哪些特质。

Tell us about the attributes you're looking for when you're trying to identify these high quality companies.

从财务角度说，我们首先关注的是更高的已动用资本回报率。

Well, looking I mean, financial terms, we're looking for a higher return on capital employed.

我们就从这个指标开始谈。

Let's start with that.

你知道，沃伦·巴菲特在他1979年的年报中说过，这是衡量业绩最重要的单一指标，仅供参考。

You know, Warren Buffett said it's the single most important measure of performance in his 1979 annual report for what it's worth.

而他自那以后似乎做得相当不错，所以我们或许应该稍加借鉴。

And he seems to have done quite well since then, so probably we should listen a bit.

你知道吗？

You know?

这是因为，如果你投资于我，你会想知道你能获得怎样的回报。

And, it is because if you invest with me, you wanna know what return you're gonna get.

你会把钱存入银行。

You're gonna put your money in the bank.

你想知道它能带来什么回报。

You wanna know what returning it.

买债券。

Buy a bond.

你想知道能获得多少利率收益。

You wanna know what, interest rate yield you're gonna get.

换句话说，当人们投资公司时，忽略这一点。

In other words, when people invest in companies, ignore that.

不，你购买的是他们资本的一部分。

No, you're buying your portion of their capital.

他们能从这些资本中获得什么回报？

What return do they get on that capital?

这是第一个问题。

That's question number one.

因为查理·芒格有句名言：长期来看，如果你长期持有股票，其表现将逐渐趋近于公司产生的回报。

Because there's a great Charlie Munger quote, which is over the long term, the performance of your shares, if you hold them for the long term, will start to gravitate towards the return that the company generates.

他在这里并不是在提出一个理论。

And he's not putting forward a theory here.

这是一个事实。

It's a fact.

因此我们关注资本回报率，而人们会关注各种其他指标，比如盈利增长等等。

And so we look at return on capital employed, and and people look at all kinds of other things, earnings growth and so on.

继续。

On.

如果你愿意让我动用资金，无论是你追加投资还是我留存你的收益，而你又忽视资本回报率，我就能以越来越低的回报为你创造收益增长，很多公司长期以来都是这么做的。

If you're prepared to give me access to capital, either by you sending me more or me retaining your earnings and you ignore the return on capital employed, I'll generate earnings growth for you at lower and lower returns, which plenty of companies have done over time.

详情请见乐购案例。

See Tesco for details.

对吧？

Right?

这就像是，哦，简直是一场灾难。

It's like, oh, it's a disaster.

对不对？

Right?

所以我们要看资本回报率，看毛利率，看销售收入与销售成本之间的差额，看他们的加价幅度。

So look at return on capital employed, we look at gross margins, we look at the difference between sales revenues and cost of goods sold, what they mark things up by.

因为公司会采购原材料、零部件、服务、劳动力等，然后在此基础上加价销售。

Because companies take stuff in, they take in components, ingredients, services, labor, and they put a markup on it.

对吧？

Right?

而且，在日常生活中，你去商店时也能想象他们会有加价。

And, again, in normal life, you're going to a shop, you can imagine them having a markup.

所有公司都有这种加价。

Well, all companies have that markup.

加价幅度是多少？

What is it?

这个幅度的大小能说明很多问题。

And and the size of that tells you a lot of things.

它能告诉你公司的定价能力和品牌实力。

It tells you about their pricing power, their brand strength.

如果商品成本上涨，它还能反映出公司对抗通胀的防御能力。

It tells you about their defenses against inflation if if the cost of goods goes up.

当然我们也会看利润率，不过大多数人都会关注这点。

And we obviously look at profit margins, but most people do.

我们会关注现金转化率。

We look at cash conversion.

利润中有多少比例是以现金形式实现的？

And what percentage of the profits arrive in cash?

你知道吗？

You know?

是100%、80%还是120%？

Is it a 100%, 80%, a 120%?

有些公司的现金利润甚至超过100%，通常是通过延迟支付供应商款项来实现的。

There are companies that make more than 100% of profits in cash, usually by the method of paying people more slowly than they get paid.

这显然是有利的，因为归根结底现金才是王道。

And that's beneficial fairly obviously, because cash is the only thing in the end.

你可以用各种方式来支付股息。

You can pay the dividend with various things like that.

因此我们会综合考察这些公司的一系列财务指标。

So we look at a raft of financial metrics for these companies.

每年，我们都会向人们展示我们的投资组合情况，包括其自身表现以及与指数等的对比情况。

And every year, we give that to people in terms of our portfolio and how it looks and how it looks against the indices and so on and so forth.

然后，正如我所说，我们会开始考察诸如：他们具体是做什么的？

And then, as I say, we start looking at things like, well, what do they do?

所以整体看起来都不错。

So it all looks good.

他们拥有品牌吗？

Do they have brands?

他们能控制分销渠道吗？

Do they have control of distribution?

他们拥有知识产权吗？

Do they have intellectual property?

他们是否拥有已安装的软件或设备基础，可以提供服务并销售备件及升级产品？

Do have an installed base of software or equipment that they service and sell spares so on and upgrades to?

他们是如何做到这些的？

How do they do this?

我们必须了解，他们是如何达到那些数字的？

We've got to have an understanding, how do they get to those numbers?

是什么驱使他们实现这些目标？

What drives them to get to those?

然后我们会考察管理层方面，不是指判断他们是好经理还是坏经理，

And then we look at things like the management, not in the sense of, know, are they good managers or bad managers?

传统上，大多数人指的是通过会面来了解他们给人的印象如何

Traditionally, what most people mean by that is they have a meeting with them and how do they come across?

我见过演讲精彩但管理糟糕的人，也见过不善言辞却非常优秀的管理者。

I've met people who can present brilliantly but bad managers, and people who can't present to save their lives who are very good managers.

对吧？

Right?

所以，那个不。

So and and that no.

不。

No.

不。

No.

不。

No.

让我们深入实质，与这些人交谈，问他们所有常规问题。

Let's get to the nitty gritty of of of talking to these people and ask them all the usual questions.

这里发生了什么？

What's happening here?

发生了什么？

What's happening?

那是什么产品？

What's that product?

在这个地区，我们真正想知道的是，每年这家公司产生这样的回报，这些利润和现金流是如何实现的。

And in this region, What we really want to know is every year, you have this company that produces this return, these profits and cash flows arrive.

对吧？

Right?

你如何决定是以分红形式返还、回购股份、投资业务还是购置资产？

How do you decide whether to give it back in a dividend, buy back shares, invest in the business, or buy things.

对吧？

Right?

这是你的四个基本选择。

Those are your four basic choices.

其中两个显然是返还资金的子选项。

Two of them are obviously subsets of one, which is giving money back.

你如何在这些选项间做决定？

How do you decide between those?

我们寻找的是真正理解运作机制、行事诚实且思维方式与我们相近的人，对吧？

And we're looking for people who've got a grasp of how that works and what they do, which is honest, and that matches something like the way that we think, right?

比如我遇到过一些上市公司管理者，多年来为他们做项目时，他们总说'我的股票被低估了'。

So they go, well, actually, I mean, I've met managers, I've done projects for managers in public companies over years where they say, my stock's undervalued.

现在你忙着收购资产吗？

Now you're busy acquiring things?

是啊，是啊，买了很多东西。

Yes, yes, buying lots of things.

对吧？

Right?

你为什么不回购自己的股票呢？

Why don't you buy your own stock?

什么？

What?

我为什么要那么做？

Why would I do that?

那样公司规模会缩水。

I'd shrink.

但显然你最了解的公司不是你要收购的，而是你已经拥有的。

But surely the company you know best is not the company you're acquiring, it's the one you already got.

你一定经营得相当不错。

You must have had pretty well.

是吗？

Yeah?

你是说你觉得它被低估了。

And you're telling me you think it's undervalued.

顺便说一下，我查过了，我觉得你是对的。

By the way, I've checked, and I think you're right.

你为什么不买那些呢？

Why don't you buy those?

不。

No.

这就像你也在寻找那些对此持有诚实且清晰可理解态度的人。

It's like you're looking for people who've got an honest and intelligible approach to that as well.

如此出色的财务状况，他们是怎么做到的？

So great financials, how do they do it?

人们在应用这一点时既诚实又直率，而且非常聪明。

People are honest and straightforward and intelligent in their application of this.

就在那时

That's When

当你与管理层面谈，试图判断他们在资本配置上是否理性时，你觉得哪种会议风格更有帮助？

you're interviewing management, and you're trying to figure out whether they're rational in the way that they allocate capital, What do you find helps in terms of your meeting style?

比如，表现得更有魅力是否更好？

Like, is it better to be charming?

表现得更具对抗性是否更好？

Is it better to be combative?

当你试图判断这些人对资本配置的思考是否理性时，实际上哪种方式对你有效？

What actually works for you when you're trying to figure out whether these guys are rational in the way they think about allocation of capital?

通常的做法是，先尝试引导他们谈论自己的看法，而不给出太多提示，可以这么说吧？

Usually, it's to try and start with going down the route, of trying to get them to talk about how they view it without giving them too many clues, as it were, right?

比如问些类似‘你们是如何决定优先事项的？’这样的问题

So, you know, something like, you know, well, how do you decide your priorities?

明白吗？

You know?

现在，什么都别说，不要说'你可以这样做，可以那样做，可以衡量这个'之类的话。

Now, don't say anything, don't say, oh, you could do this, you could do that, you could measure this.

不，不，不要给他们路线图。

No, no, don't give them a roadmap.

显然你希望引导他们谈论这个话题，但要尽可能少给提示，看看他们是否真的有自己的思考框架。

Just leave it as obviously, you want to point them down the route of talking about this, but you wanna point them down the route of talking about it with as few signposts as possible to see whether they've actually got a framework.

明白吗？

You know?

有时候他们根本没有一个框架体系。

And sometimes they haven't got a framework.

我是说，对抗性的态度确实会带来问题。

I mean, combative, yeah, it makes a problem.

我们通常不会那么针锋相对。

We're not usually all that combative.

我的意思是，我们面对的那些人，最终我们认为他们要么试图欺骗我们，要么根本不听我们想告诉他们的话，尤其是当我们持有他们大量股份时。

Mean, I we are with people who we think in the end are trying to dupe us or just not listening to what we're trying to tell them, particularly if we own quite a lot of their shares.

要知道，我们最终会像对待联合利华那样采取行动。

You know, we will become like we did with Unilever in the end.

这就像是说，伙计们，我们会变得强硬起来，因为我们持有这些股份已经很久了。

It's kinda like, guys, we will become combative because we've owned these shares for a long time.

你们完全无视了我们。

You've completely ignored us.

你们现在依然忽视我们，而我们认为你们不该这么做。

You're ignoring us now, and we don't think you should.

而且你们对待那些刚来五分钟的人比对待我们更好。

And you're treating other people who've arrived in the last five minutes better than us.

所以我们真心希望你们能重视起来，否则我们会变得极具竞争性。

So we'd really like you to focus, and we will become competitive.

就像他们说的，哦，我们有个活跃的投资者，我们希望他们加入董事会。

Like, you know, they they say, oh, we've got an active investor, and we would like them on the board.

然后就是，太好了，你懂吧？

And it's like, great, you know?

但我不想加入董事会。

But I don't want to go on the board.

如果他们邀请我，我会拒绝，虽然这种可能性微乎其微。

I will turn it down if they ask me, not that it's ever truly likely.

但你为什么要这么做？

But why are you doing that?

对吧？

Right?

为什么我要试图让他们明白这一点。

Why I'm I'm trying to get them to the point.

我们看看，我们可以为你找到管理层，他们会给你提供——虽然我觉得你可能不不。但我们可以找到愿意为我们提供推荐的管理层，他们会说‘基金已经到位了’。

And we look, we can get you managements, who will give you I don't think you want it probably, but we can get people managements who who will give us a reference and say, funds have turned up.

他们对我们的业务做了各种解读。

They did all this interpreting about our business.

他们收购了大量股份。

They bought a big stake.

Then we had an activist who said, we've got to cut costs, we've got to split the business.

Then we had an activist who said, we've got to cut costs, we've got to split the business.

We've to do this.

We've to do this.

And not only did they vote against that, but they talked to the proxy voting agency and said, I think these people are wrong.

And not only did they vote against that, but they talked to the proxy voting agency and said, I think these people are wrong.

What they're gonna do is injure this business.

What they're gonna do is injure this business.

Right?

Right?

I mean, we will actually stand alongside them and fight for the business if we think that someone's doing something wrong in that regard.

I mean, we will actually stand alongside them and fight for the business if we think that someone's doing something wrong in that regard.

So far from being coveted, sometimes we're their best friend.

So far from being coveted, sometimes we're their best friend.

You know?

You know?

你的投资组合中非常引人注目的一点是，显然你拥有许多这类根基稳固、自筹资金的企业，它们股本回报率高，具有持久的竞争优势，非常符合巴菲特风格的公司，但其中很多确实相当古老。

One of the things that's very striking about your portfolio is that obviously you have a lot of these very well established self financing businesses with these high returns on equity and durable competitive advantages, very much Buffett style companies, but a lot of them are really old.

我是说，我记得你曾说过你投资组合中的公司平均创立于1883年。

I mean, I remember you once saying that the average company in your portfolio was founded in 1883.

我不确定现在是否还是这样。

I don't know if that's still true.

你能谈谈吗？不，我想这大概有一百年了。

Can you talk No, think it's about a hundred years now.

我想那是在1920年代左右。

It's nineteen twenty something, I think.

这太不可思议了。

That's extraordinary.

你能解释一下吗？

Can you explain that?

因为我们处在一个许多人痴迷于新技术的时代，对吧？

Because we're in an era where so many people are just obsessed with the new technology, right?

还有人工智能、生物科技、无人机这些新兴技术。

And AI this and biotech and drones or whatever it is.

而你却专注于那些百年老牌企业。

And here are you focusing very heavily on 100 year old companies.

这是怎么回事？

What's going on here?

因为你并非对科技一无所知。

Because it's not that you're ignorant about technology.

不。

No.

不。

No.

但胜者往往能持续获胜。

But mostly winners keep on winning.

这某种程度上就是世界的运行方式。

It's kind of the way the world is.

纽约的斯特恩商学院制作了一份表格。

The the Stern Business School in New York produces a table.

我想他们是每年发布一次，上面列出了表现优异或欠佳的公司。

I think they produce it annually, and it's good or bad companies.

他们拥有按行业分类的公司数据，并用这套系统分析了成千上万家企业。

And what they have is companies by sector, and they analyze thousands of companies with it.

所以它们有这些行业板块，包括必需消费品、非必需消费品、制药、医疗保健、矿业、银行等等，每个板块都有数百家公司，它们会做一个非常简单的计算，判断一家公司在所考察的年度里是创造还是毁灭了价值。

So they have the sectors, they so there's consumer stables, consumer discretionary, and pharmaceuticals, and health care, and mining and minerals and bank, all these sectors, hundreds and hundreds of companies in each one, and they do a very simple calculation of whether a company creates or destroys value for the year that they're looking at.

但他们拥有多年的数据积累。

But they've got the data over many years.

他们关注的是资本回报率，你知道的，就是巴菲特在79年强调的那个指标，也是我们重点关注的。

And what they look at is the return on capital employed, you know, the Buffett thing that he focused on in '79 that we focus on.

更像是加权平均资本成本的猜测。

Less a a guess at the weighted average cost of capital.

人们对于这是否只是猜测感到极度不安。

People get their knickers in a terrible twist about whether it's a guess.

对吧？

Right?

具体数字并不重要。

The exact number doesn't matter.

于是他们扣除加权平均资本成本后得出结果。

And so they take off a weighted average cost of capital and come.

它是通过高于平均资本成本的收益创造正利差（这时就是在创造价值），还是产生负利差（这时就变成了一台毁灭价值的机器）？

Is it taking in money at away the average cost capital making a positive spread, in which case it's creating value, or is it making a negative spread, in which case it's a machine for destroying value?

接着他们会向你展示各行业的情况。

And then they show you the sectors.

告诉你吧，几乎每年他们做这个分析时，你都会发现——

Let me tell you, almost every year they do it, you go, alright.

那些创造价值的好公司通常来自消费品必需品、非必需消费品、医疗保健和信息技术行业。

So the good companies, the ones creating value are oh, they're consumer staples, consumer discretionary, health care, information technology.

那么表现糟糕的都是哪些行业呢？

And then what's all the bad stuff?

哦，银行、房地产、保险、重型工程与制造业、采矿与矿产、石油、天然气以及运输业，尤其是航空公司，这些都是表现不佳的行业。

Oh, it's banks, real estate, insurance, heavy engineering and manufacturing, mining and minerals, oil, gas, and transport, in particular airlines, are all bad.

不过风水轮流转。

Now every dog has his day.

对吧？

Right?

在某个周期里总会有那么一年，矿业表现良好，或者航空公司还算可以。

There will be a year somewhere in the cycle where mining is good or, airlines are okay.

明白吗？

You know?

当然会有这种情况。

Of course, there is.

懂吧？

You know?

但好的不会变坏，坏的也不会变好。

But good things don't become bad, and bad things don't become good.

对吧？

Right?

所以第一点是，总的来说，我们不会突然发现所有好公司都变成坏公司，所有坏公司都...这种状态会持续下去。

So that's that's the first point is, you know, on the whole, we're not suddenly gonna fight all the good companies will become bad companies, all the bad companies will It persists.

而之所以能持续，是因为这些行业具有竞争优势。

And the reason it persists is because of competitive advantages in those sectors.

这些行业及其龙头企业享有特定的竞争优势。

There are certain competitive advantages that those sectors and the leading companies within it enjoy.

这就是巴菲特所说的护城河——防御机制。

It's what Buffett calls the moat, the defensive mechanism.

他们是如何保持这种强势地位的？

How do they keep those sharp elbows?

就是为了把你挡在外面。

It keep you out.

对吧？

Right?

因为我们都能看到可口可乐的回报不错，但我们要怎么进入这个市场呢？

Because we can all look at Coca Cola and see it's got good returns, but how are we gonna get in there?

我们得先越过百事可乐和胡椒博士的防线，才能有机会挑战他们。

And we've gotta get past PepsiCo and Doctor Pepper first before we even get a crack at them.

他们拥有这种自我防御的手段。

And they've got this means of defending themselves.

毫无疑问我们正处于变革的时代，环顾四周就会发现，在我从商的这些年里，我们见证了计算机、互联网、移动电话以及社交网络的变革。

And there's no doubt that we are in the era where there's been change, you know, and we can sort of look around us and go, well, in the time that, that I've been in business, we've seen change in terms of computing and the Internet and mobile telephony and, you know, and social networks.

或许我们现在正见证人工智能领域的变革，也许有，也许没有。

And maybe we're seeing something now in AI, maybe, maybe not.

我...我也不确定。

I I don't know.

这确实是一个变革的时期，毫无疑问你必须保持敏锐。

And it is a period of change, and there's no doubt that you've got to be alive to it.

我认为我们确实保持着这种敏锐。

And I think we are alive to it.

我们现有的并非所有事物都创立于1920年。

Not everything that we've got was founded in 1920.

如今，我们拥有Meta（原Facebook），拥有微软，还有一些更近期的产物。

Now, we've got Meta, and we've got Microsoft, and we've got some stuff that's more recent.

但在我们一致认同这是史上变化最多的时代之前，请记住——我可是历史系毕业的。

But before we align upon the idea that there's never been more change in this, bear in mind, I did a history degree.

而且，你需要回顾历史上更早的时期。

And, you need to think back to earlier periods in history.

你确信这是我们所经历的最大变革，但如果你在过去约两个世纪的通信行业工作，你会从电报业务起步——那时人们通常沿着铁路线架设电线，用摩尔斯电码发送信息。

You're sure that this is the most change we've ever seen because if you were involved in the communications business across the last sort of, two centuries, you would have started in the telegraph business where they put up wires typically alongside railway lines, and you sent Morse code.

那就是当时的通讯方式。

That's how you communicated.

对吧？

Right?

滴答滴答。

Dot dash dot dash.

然后有人发明了一种拥有麦克风的方法，这样就能传输声音。

And then somebody came up with a means of of having a microphone so you could have the voice.

于是我们把麦克风接到电线上。

So we attached a microphone to the wires.

现在我们能互相通话了。

Now we could talk to each other.

接着又有人发明了无线电。

And then somebody invented radio.

无线电技术普及后，从中发展出了两样东西。

And after we'd had radio in place for a while, two things evolved from that.

其一是我们无需电线连接就能彼此通话。

One was we could talk to each other without being connected by a wire.

啊，这确实不同了，对吧？

Ah, that's different, isn't it?

所以你看，海上的船只和旅行中的人们都能进行通讯了。

So, you know, ships at sea and people who are traveling, you know, could communicate.

意识到可以向大众传播信息，你就能进行广播。

And knowing that you could communicate to the many, you could broadcast.

这有点不同，对吧？

That's a bit different, isn't it?

然后有人过来说，别管那个了。

Then along came somebody who said, never mind that.

我有这个东西。

I've got this thing.

你们可以在交流时看到彼此。

You can look at each other while you're communicating.

你们有了电视。

You have television.

是啊。

Yeah.

你们可以选择视频通讯或广播电视。

You can have either video or you can have broadcast television.