RWH057：与乔尔·格林布拉特、尼克·斯利普、汤姆·鲁索、克里斯托弗·布卢姆斯特兰和克里斯·戴维斯共同庆祝沃伦·巴菲特

别再等了。

Don't wait.

未来由你掌控。

The future is yours to hold.

如果你经营企业，最近可能也产生过同样的想法。

If you run a business, you've probably had the same thought lately.

我们如何让人工智能在现实世界中发挥作用？

How do we make AI useful in the real world?

因为潜在收益巨大，但盲目尝试却风险很高。

Because the upside is huge, but guessing your way into it is a risky move.

借助甲骨文的NetSuite，你今天就能让人工智能发挥作用。

With Netsuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite是全球排名第一的AI云ERP系统，已被超过43,000家企业信赖。

Netsuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它将你的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合到一个统一的系统中。

It pulls your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into one unified system.

而这种互联的数据正是让您的AI变得更智能的关键。

And that connected data is what makes your AI smarter.

它能够自动化日常任务，提供可操作的洞察，帮助您在自信地做出快速AI驱动决策的同时降低成本。

It can automate routine work, surface actionable insights, and help you cut costs while making fast AI powered decisions with confidence.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，您可以使用您选择的AI工具直接连接到您的真实业务数据。

And now with the Netsuite AI connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect directly to your real business data.

这并非某种附加功能，而是内置于支撑您业务的系统中的AI。

This isn't some add on, it's AI built into the system that runs your business.

无论您的公司年营收达到数百万甚至数亿，NetSuite都能帮助您保持领先。

And whether your company does millions or even hundreds of millions, Netsuite helps you stay ahead.

如果您年收入至少达到七位数，请免费获取他们的商业指南《揭开AI的神秘面纱》，访问 netsuite.com/study。

If your revenues are at least in the seven figures, get their free business guide, Demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南可在 netsuite.com/study 免费获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

netsuite.com/study。

Netsuite.com/study.

好的。

All right.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

这段我与乔尔·格林布拉特的访谈摘录，我认为揭示了沃伦·巴菲特的核心所在——他的教导不仅关乎如何聪明地投资，还关乎如何友善地对待他人。

This excerpt from my interview with Joel Greenblatt, I think gets at the essence of Warren Buffett in that his teachings are not just about how to invest intelligently, but also about how to treat people decently.

让我感到有趣的是，乔尔本人也是一个极其善良、正直且慷慨的人。

It's interesting to me that Joel himself is an extremely good natured, decent, and generous person.

因此，他被巴菲特的仁慈、优雅以及谦逊和乐于分享的特质所打动，这或许并不令人意外。

So it's not surprising maybe that he was struck by Buffett's kindness and graciousness and by how humble and sharing he was.

我也对乔尔所说的‘原创思维被高估了’这一观点非常感兴趣。

I was also really interested by Joel's comment that original thinking is overrated.

正如一些观众可能还记得的那样，《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书的第一章正是关于模仿或复制像巴菲特这样的伟大投资者已经发现的策略的力量。

As some of you may recall, the very first chapter of Richer, Wiser, Happier is all about the power of cloning or basically replicating what a great investor like Buffett has already figured out.

在那一章中，我详细论述了莫尼什·帕布里致力于逆向工程沃伦·巴菲特所称的投资法则，他认为这些法则如同物理学定律一样基础。

In that chapter, I write at some length about Monish Pabrai's efforts to reverse engineer what he describes as Warren Buffett's laws of investing, which he regarded as really about as foundational as the laws of physics.

令莫尼什感到震惊的是，这些规律其实就明明白白地摆在那儿，却几乎没有投资者去理解或践行它们。

And it was astounding to Monish that these laws were really sitting there in plain sight, and yet so few investors bothered to understand them or to live by them.

我认为，乔尔·格林布拉特的天才之处在于，他能够逆向分析像巴菲特这样的人，并将他们的教诲提炼到最核心的本质。

I think part of Joel Greenblatt's genius is that he had this ability to reverse engineer people like Buffett and distill their teachings to their very essence.

在我与乔尔的一次对话中，他基本上告诉我，巴菲特将本·格雷厄姆关于购买低估股票的见解进一步发展了。

In one of my conversations with Joel, he basically said to me that Buffett had taken what Ben Graham had figured out about buying undervalued stocks.

然后他说，巴菲特添加了一个简单却关键的调整，这让他成为了世界上最富有的人之一。

And then he said that Buffett added one little simple twist, which made him one of the richest people in the world.

那就是，买便宜的东西很棒。

And that is buying cheap is great.

如果我能以低价买入优质企业，那就更好了。

And if I can buy good businesses cheap, that's even better.

于是，乔尔将这一切浓缩为我所描述的格雷厄姆与巴菲特思想的纯粹精华：以低价买入优质企业。

So Joel then basically boiled it all down to what I would describe as the purified essence of Graham and Buffett, which is to buy good businesses at bargain prices.

后来，在他的职业生涯中，乔尔提出了一种系统性方法，称之为‘神奇公式’，他根据两个非常简单粗略的指标来购买这些便宜且优质的公司。

And later in his career, Joel came up with a systematic approach that he called the magic formula in which he bought these cheap and good businesses based really on two very simple crude metrics.

其中之一是高收益收益率。

One of which is high earnings yield.

换句话说，相对于股价而言，盈利很高。

So in other words, lots of earnings relative to the price of the stock.

其次，是高有形资本回报率，他认为这是质量的良好指标。

And secondly, a high return on tangible capital, which he regarded as a good indication of quality.

无论如何，令人印象深刻的是，巴菲特作为投资者对这么多杰出投资者产生了非凡的影响。

In any case, I think what's striking is that Buffett has had this extraordinary influence as an investor on so many of these great investors.

在我的多次访谈中，我一再看到这一点。

And I've seen this again and again in my interviews with them.

我记得，比如当我采访查克·阿克尔时，他给我读了他2005年写给巴菲特的信。

I remember, for example, when I interviewed Chuck Akre, how he read me this letter that he had written to Buffett back in 2005.

前几天我把那封信翻出来了。

And I dug it out the other day.

我翻阅了以前的访谈笔记，看到了查克写给沃伦的这封信，信中回忆了他1977年作为一名年轻股票经纪人时首次买入伯克希尔股票的经历，此后他参加了无数次年度股东大会，并于1986年开始 professionally 为他人管理资金。

I went through my old interview notes and saw this letter that Chuck had written to Warren, basically recalling how he bought his first Berkshire shares back in 1977 when he was a young stockbroker, and that he'd been to enormous number of annual meetings, then starts investing money professionally for other people in 1986.

他在信中说，对我本人、我的家人以及我的合伙人和客户而言，我们多年来作为投资者的成功，直接归功于您愿意谈论和撰写有关投资过程的内容。

And he says in the letter, It is a fact of my life and my family and the lives of my partners, my clients as well, that our success as investors over many years is directly attributable to your willingness to talk and write about the investment process.

我深表感激。

I'm profoundly grateful.

我们今天的投资组合由那些企业构成——这完美地总结了他从巴菲特那里学到的东西。

Our portfolios today are characterized by businesses which and this is a beautiful summary of what he learned from Buffett.

我们今天的投资组合由那些企业构成：第一，它们能为股东资本带来显著高于平均水平的回报。

Our portfolios today are characterized by businesses which, one, earn significantly above average returns on the owner's capital.

第二，由聪明、诚实且在经营业务方面堪称世界级的管理者运营，并且有长期将公众股东视为合伙人的历史，尽管他们很少认识这些股东。

Two, run by managers who are smart, honest, and world class at operating their businesses and who have a history of treating public shareholders as partners, though they rarely know them.

第三，由于业务本身的特性以及管理者 reinvest 超额利润的能力，存在机会，从而也能实现远高于平均水平的资本回报率。

And three, where opportunity exists because of the nature of the business and the skill of the manager to reinvest the excess profits to also achieve well above average rates of return on capital.

他还补充说，所有这些股票都是以合理或廉价的价格买入的。

And he adds that all of these stocks have been bought at either reasonable or bargain prices.

因此，查克在信中补充道：您愿意谈论投资过程、分享您对人类行为的观察与经验，对我一生都极为宝贵，我至今仍对您心怀感激。

So then Chuck adds in the letter, your willingness to talk about the investment process, your observations and experiences about human behavior have been invaluable in my life, and I remain indebted to you.

我认为，这很好地总结了查克·阿克尔——这位杰出的投资大师——如何以类似乔尔·格林布拉特的方式，从巴菲特及其前辈格雷厄姆的教诲中构建了自己伟大的职业生涯。

So it's a lovely summary, I think, of how this great career of Chuck Akre's, one of the great investment careers, was really built in a similar way to Joel Greenblatt's on lessons from Buffett and before him Graham.

然后我特别喜欢的一点是，查克后来给我读了巴菲特的回信，他重读这封信时如此开心，即使多年后仍感到无比振奋。

And then one of the things I really like is that Chuck then read me the reply from Buffett, and he was so joyful rereading this letter that still sort of chuffed him many years later.

信中写道：亲爱的阿克尔先生，收到您这封信真是太棒了。

And he's and so the letter said, dear mister Akre, what a terrific letter to receive.

这让我一整天都心情愉悦。

It made my day.

我希望你在会议上买了一本《穷查理宝典》。

I hope you picked up a copy of poor Charlie's almanac at the meeting.

很高兴你从我这里学到了一些东西，但你还能从查理那里学到更多。

I'm glad you have learned something from me, but there is a lot more to learn from Charlie.

请继续参加年会。

Keep coming to the annual meetings.

下一次年会将会是迄今为止最棒的一次。

The next one should be the best ever.

我觉得这真是太美好了，查克真正意识到他的整个职业生涯都是建立在巴菲特的教诲之上，而巴菲特回给他一封如此友善、体贴却又自谦的信，说其实从查理身上还能学到更多。

And I think that's just lovely, the fact that Chuck really saw that his whole career was built on teachings of Buffett, and Buffett sends him back this kind, thoughtful, but also self deprecating letter saying, you know, there's more to learn from Charlie.

这真的非常美好。

It's really lovely.

我认为，一件让我特别印象深刻的事情，是我回顾与查克的访谈笔记后想到的：如果你真想复制巴菲特的策略，他的那些教训其实就明明白白地摆在那儿。

And I think one of the things that's so striking to me that occurred to me after looking through my notes from my interview with Chuck is that the lessons from Buffett are just sitting there in plain sight if you do wanna clone them.

但要复制这些并不一定容易。

And it's not necessarily easy to clone them.

对吧？

Right?

我的意思是，你需要具备正确的天赋、技能、性格和自律，以及更多其他素质。

I mean, you need the right talents and skills and temperament and and discipline and all of those things and more.

但那些基本原则却被如此慷慨、清晰地阐述出来了。

But the actual principles are laid out so generously and so clearly.

你可以在巴菲特的信件中看到这些，这些信件都可以在伯克希尔·哈撒韦的网站上免费获取。

You can see it in Buffett's letters, which are available for free on Berkshire Hathaway's website.

你可以在罗伯特·哈格斯特朗的《巴菲特之道》等书中看到这些内容。

You can see it in books like The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom.

我在《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》一书的资料来源与延伸阅读部分写下过一条评论，至今我仍认为它基本正确。

And I wrote in the notes on sources and additional resources section of Richer, Wiser, Happier, this comment that I still believe is basically true.

我写道：如果你真正深入研读巴菲特关于商业与投资的著作，我不确定你此生还需要再读其他关于这些主题的书。

I wrote, if you truly immerse yourself in Buffett's writings on business and investing, I'm not sure you'd need to read anything else on these subjects for the rest of your life.

所有内容都在那里。

It's all there.

你需要知道的一切都清晰地摆在眼前，而且比MBA学位便宜得多。

Everything you need to know, sitting in plain view and a whole lot cheaper than an MBA.

当我翻阅查克·阿克的笔记时，发现他基本建议你应回去重读巴菲特的全部书信。

And then as I was looking through my notes from Chuck Akre, I saw that he basically recommended you should just go back and read the collected letters of Warren Buffett.

他说：如果你想上一门投资的研究生课程，就去读他三十年的年度报告吧，看在上帝的份上。

And he said, if you want a graduate course in investing, just take thirty years of his annual reports for Christ's sake.

你不需要别的任何东西。

You don't need anything else.

所以我认为这是一个非常重要的教训。

So I think that's a really important lesson.

这些内容并不晦涩。

It's not this stuff isn't obscure.

它们就摆在那里。

It's it's there.

它们就在明处，关键在于我们要像查克·阿克和乔尔·格林布拉特那样，真正去利用它们。

It's sitting in plain view, and it's up to us to do what people like Chuck Akre and Joel Greenblatt have done, which is actually to take advantage of it.

下一个片段是我在这档播客中对托马斯·鲁索的采访，他是全球股票领域最杰出的长期投资者之一。

Our next clip is from an interview that I did on this podcast with Thomas Russo, who's one of the great long term investors in global stocks.

早在1982年，汤姆在斯坦福大学攻读法学和工商管理双学位时，巴菲特曾去他的课堂演讲。

Back in 1982, when Tom was doing a joint law degree and MBA degree at Stanford, Buffett came to speak to his class.

这次相遇彻底改变了汤姆的人生，过去四十多年里，他的投资理念一直建立在从巴菲特那里学到的原则之上。

That encounter totally changed Tom's life, and his investment approach over the last four decades or so has been built on the principles that he learned from Buffett.

多年来，汤姆的投資公司通过伯克希尔赚取了巨额收益，其持股一度增长到超过10亿美元。

Over the years, Tom's investment firm has made so much money in Berkshire that its stake grew to more than $1,000,000,000.

这是来自我们对话的一段摘录。

Here's an excerpt from our conversation.

我想起在大约四十年前那次与他初次会面时浮现的几个非常基础的原则。

A couple of really foundational principles that I think came up in that first meeting with him back around forty years ago.

我记得你曾经向我描述过，几年前我们讨论这个问题时——我想我第一次采访你大概是七、八年前——其中一个原则与你刚才说的有关，就是他像对待股东一样，把你当作合伙人来考虑。

I remember you describing to me, and when we talked about this a few years ago, I think when I first interviewed you probably about seven, eight years ago, one of them is related to what you just said, that he's kind of looking out for your best interests as a shareholder, treating you as a partner.

你曾引用他当时的话对我说：‘你不可能和一个糟糕的人做成一笔好交易。’

You quoted to me him saying at the time, You can't make a good deal with a bad person.

我想知道你能否谈谈这一点，因为我最近读了你的一封股东信，你提到：‘我相信，伯克希尔是我所关注的公司中代理成本最低的。’

And I wondered if you could talk about that because you said that I was reading one of your recent shareholder letters and you said, it's my belief that Berkshire has the least amount of agency cost of any company I follow.

这是一个非常重要的理念，但也是一个容易被我们忽视的术语。

And this is such an important idea and it's a piece of jargon that it's easy for us not to understand.

你能谈谈这种以正直待人、不利用合作伙伴、降低代理成本的做法吗？因为代理成本实际上是所有投资者面临的最大风险之一。

Can you talk about that sense of treating people decently, not taking advantage of your partners and reducing agency cost, which turns out to be one of the greatest risks facing all investors?

是的。

Yes.

是的。

Yes.

我完全同意你最后提到的这一点。

I I completely agree on the final point there.

事实上，人们往往倾向于把本应由他们负责监督、维护、发展和增值的他人资产，当作自己的资源来利用。

And it really is the tendency of someone to try to make another person's, assets to which they're hired to supervise and to maintain and to develop and grow.

但本应将这些原则视为不言自明的正确目标，他们却在过程中逐渐忽略了。

But rather than hold those truths to be fully self evident as the proper objective, they let slip in along the way.

对我而言，有几点特别重要。

A few here for me.

对我而言，有几点特别重要。

A few here for me.

不久前的一天，我一直在思考这个问题。

And and, I was thinking about it one day not that long ago.

我望着邻居家的院子，篱笆边种满了树莓。

I was looking out to the neighbor's house, the lot line was planted with raspberries.

这位女士已经八十多岁了，行动不太方便了。

And this lady who was in her late eighties, didn't get around very much anymore.

我去看望她，见到了她。

I stopped by and I see her.

她说，你知道吗，我错过很多东西，她说道。

She she said, you know, I miss a lot, she said.

但我最怀念的是那些新鲜的树莓。

But what I really miss are those fresh raspberries.

我们以前经常见到很多树莓。

We used to see a lot of them.

有一天下午，我正看着她家的草坪维护团队，他们负责打理出一片整洁的草坪。

And I was looking out one afternoon with her lawn crew who were charged with the task of, you know, maintaining a decent looking lawn.

他们转过拐角时，

You know, they came around the corner.

在没人看见的地方，他们直接放下工具，冲向那丛树莓，把果实吃得一干二净。

Was out of the out of anyone's view, and they just dropped everything and ran to that raspberry bush and and just, you know, ate it clean.

你知道吗，她的难题就在于，这些树还在结果，但她的代理们却决定把果实据为己有，而不是让她像过去那样享受它们。

And, you know, therein lied her lay her problem, which was they were still producing, but agents her agents decided to take them for themselves rather than to allow her to enjoy them as she once did.

这并不是一个企业故事，但我认为它传达了一个原则：在商业中，你有各种结构，有基于特定标准制定的选项和计划。

And it's not a corporate story, but it, I think, conveys the principle, which is that in business, you have you have structures where you have options, plans that are based on certain criteria.

巴菲特先生会说，他们在伯克希尔最核心的工作之一，就是设计合理的薪酬体系。

And and mister Buffett will say this, is that one of the most critical jobs that they have at Berkshire is calculating appropriate, compensation systems.

我记得他多年前说过，他和最核心的团队成员签订了超过140份不同的高管薪酬方案，每一份都是单独协商的，每份大约三页纸。

And I recall him saying years back that he had something north of a 140 different executive comp packages with his senior most teams, each one separately struck and each one commanding about three pages.

如果你看过公开市场公司中与沃伦所起草的三页纸薪酬方案相对应的薪酬手册，你会意识到那些手册长达几百页，而且未必能真正激励你真正想激励的行为。

Now if you ever looked at a comp book for the public market counterpart of the book that Warren drafted in three pages, you realize it's several 100 pages long, and it doesn't necessarily incent what you really want to incent.

但它们更偏向于保护性，而不是协作性。

But it's more protective than it is collaborative.

我们正视这种现实。

And we deal with that reality.

而如今，薪酬体系中大多包含相当大比例的股权激励部分。

And mostly, the compensation that's used today has a substantial component that's equity linked.

因此，这种与股权的关联将华尔街的参与带入了公司的运营、期望和决策过程中。

And so that equity link invites into the operations and the expectations and the deliberations of a company.

它把华尔街的存在带了进来。

It invites in the presence of Wall Street.

因为如果薪酬与股权挂钩，他们就会有各种理由向你解释：只要你做以下七件事，就能达成目标。

Because if it's going to be equity linked, they will have all sorts of reasons to explain to you why if you do the following seven things, you'll hit the target.

他们会达成自己的业绩数字。

They'll make their numbers.

只要他们达成数字，股价就会上涨，你就会对该事项持有超配仓位。

If they make their numbers, the shares will trade up, and you'll have an overweight for that particular thing.

你会从低配转变为超配。

And you go from being underweight to overweight.

我想我刚读完上周发布的季度财报，内容涉及一家啤酒公司。

I think I just read quarterly results that came in last week, and it had to do with a brewer.

这家啤酒公司承诺要进行一些重大投资。

And the brewer was committing to making some substantial investments.

在这个过程中，它打乱了他们报告的利润时间表。

In the process of doing it, it disrupted their reported profit schedule.

华尔街的声音一致认为。

The Wall Street voice was unanimous.

他们没有达到预期数字。

They missed their numbers.

由于他们未能达到预期数字，你可能想把资金投到别处。

You probably want to look somewhere else to deploy those cash because they missed their numbers.

当然，我们为此欢呼，因为如果他们之所以没达到预期数字，是因为他们原本就在有条不紊地扩张和发展，我们反而希望他们偏离目标的幅度更大。

And of course, we celebrate that because if they missed their numbers, because they're expanding and developing in a thoughtful way in the first place, we'd like to have them miss their numbers by a even broader margin.

如果这意味着他们以更大的决心进行前期投资的话。

If it meant that they're if they're investing upfront with more vigor.

而这正是真正的权衡。

And that's really the trade off.

我想说，我们站在另一方。

I'd say we're on the other side.

在华尔街，有一种非常标准的术语叫现金流量转化率，这是一种普遍的语言和期望，通常被强制要求。

On Wall Street, there's a very standard parlance called cash flow conversion ratio, which is a common language and a common expectation that is often commanded.

基本上，它要求你把几乎所有的收益现金都返还给投资者。

And and basically, it wants you to give back almost all the cash that you earn, give it back to the investors.

100%的现金流量转化率意味着你把所有现金都返还了。

And, a 100% cash flow conversion ratio is you giving it all back.

而我们的目标是让这些现金留在公司内部。

And our goal is to have it stay put in the company.

我们选择投资这家公司，是因为它具备再投资的潜力，而并非所有公司都具备这种能力。

We chose the company to invest in because they had the prospects with the capacity to reinvest, and not all companies do it.

因此，对于我们最看重的这些企业，我们最不想做的就是把它们从再投资模式中拉出来。

So the last thing we wanna do with the businesses that we most esteem would be to take them out of that reinvestment model.

而这里正是代理成本产生问题的地方：你的薪酬很大程度上取决于股票市场对华尔街所认可的公司责任优化水平的评价。

And that's where the kind of the mischief takes place as it relates to agency cost is that your compensation will be set largely by the stock market recognition of what Wall Street allows them to think is the level which they're optimizing their responsibilities of the company.

我们的观点是，他们采取了长远的视角，正投入大量资金建设基础设施，这些投入将在十年后带来回报，而这一切都源于资本在扩张中的成功配置。

And our view of that is that they're taking a very long view, and they're pouring substantial money in to building out the infrastructures that will reward people ten years from now, but they'll do so as a result of the successful deployment of the capital into expansion.

不幸的是，当你实施这样的计划时，它会对短期业绩产生不利影响，因为你正在将投资支出集中投入。

And unfortunately, when you embark upon a plan like that, it's going to weigh adversely on near term results because you will be funneling your investment spending.

这意味着你的运营将低于满负荷状态，并且在维持工作场所秩序等方面普遍会带来干扰。

And it will mean that you're operating at less less than full capacity, and and there's disruption in general of trying to keep workplaces in order and all the rest.

因此，当你为未来投资时，你是在给当下增添负担。

So when you're when you're investing for the future, you're burdening the present.

我们完全接受这种权衡，因为我们追求的是今天的痛苦换来明天更大的回报。

And we're perfectly comfortable with that, with that trade off because we're interested in more gain, pain today for more gain tomorrow.

威廉，这与沃伦和查理的思维方式完全不同。

William So it's a totally different mindset with Warren and Charlie.

对吧？

Right?

他们每人每年的薪酬我认为是10万美元。

They're they're paying themselves, I think, a $100,000 a year each.

因此，在这些薪酬文件中，他们可能是拿得最少的。

And so probably in those in that stack of compensation documents, they're the ones who get paid the least.

所以他们是在和你一起赚钱，而不是从你身上榨取利益。

And so they're making money with you, not off you.

然后同时，而且

And then at the same And

我们有权参与。

we have the right to participate.

汤姆·鲁索在这里强调了一个极其重要的观点，即巴菲特拒绝采取华尔街通常施压企业采用的那种自我挫败的方式。

Tom Russo highlights something hugely important here, which is Buffett's refusal to operate in the standard self defeating kind of way that Wall Street typically pressures businesses to adopt.

例如，他对像通用电气那样臭名昭著地操纵收益、制造虚假增长幻觉的行为毫无兴趣。

For example, he's not interested in the sort of games that a company like GE notoriously played, where it would manipulate its earnings to give a false impression that it was on some kind of glorious, perfectly consistent upward trajectory of growth.

他也从不希望激励伯克希尔的员工做任何短期内看起来光鲜、却会损害公司长远健康的事。

He was never interested either in incentivizing Berkshire's employees to do anything that would look good in the near term but would damage the company's health in the distant future.

相反，他始终一心一意地通过扩大伯克希尔所拥有的各家企业竞争优势——即护城河——来构建长期价值。

Instead, he's been single mindedly focused on building long term value by expanding the competitive advantage, the the moat of the various businesses that Berkshire owns.

在奥马哈的问答环节中，巴菲特明确表达了他对这类做法的鄙视，比如为了取悦华尔街而操纵收益，让数据在下一季度或下一年看起来更好。

During the q and a session in Omaha, Buffett was very explicit about his disdain for those sort of practices, like manipulating earnings so they'll look better in the next quarter or the next year just to satisfy Wall Street.

正如他在股东大会上所说，我们不会根据季度或年度收益来做任何决定。

As he put it at the AGM, We don't do anything based on quarterly or annual earnings.

数字会是什么就是什么。

The number will be what it is.

他说，重要的是五年、十年或二十年后的情况。

What counts, he said, is five or ten or twenty years from now.

这种坚持理性长期运营、真正为股东服务的做法出奇地罕见，而这显然是伯克希尔的巨大竞争优势。

This kind of insistence on operating in a rational long term manner that actually serves shareholders well is surprisingly rare, and it's clearly been an enormous competitive advantage for Berkshire.

有一位对伯克希尔多年来采取的这种反主流文化方式思考得非常深入的人，他是一位杰出的投资者，名叫尼克·斯利普。

One person who's thought very deeply about this countercultural approach that Berkshire's taken over all these years is a fantastic investor named Nick Sleep.

正如你们中的一些人可能记得的，我在我的书《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》中曾详细写过尼克和他的合伙人扎克（Zakaria）的故事，描述了他们如何创建了名为Nomad的、极为成功且非常非传统的投资合伙企业，该企业深受巴菲特的影响。

As some of you will recall, I wrote at some length in my book, Richer, Wiser, Happier, about Nick and his partner, Zach, case Zach Zakaria, describing how they created this stunningly successful and very unconventional investment partnership called Nomad, which was profoundly influenced by Buffett.

我过去与尼克和扎克的访谈中有很多材料，实际上我从未公开分享过。

And there's a lot of material from my old interviews with Nick and Zach that I've actually never shared before.

我没有在书中使用这些材料，只是因为我手头的素材太多了。

I didn't use it in the book because I just had so much material.

因此，我想在这场纪念沃伦的活动中，朗读一段我与尼克对话中未发表的简短内容，其中我们谈到了他对伯克希尔、对巴菲特以及这种极其反主流的长期价值创造理念的钦佩。

So I thought that what I'd do now as part of this celebration of Warren is actually read you a short unpublished section from one of my conversations with Nick in which we talked about his admiration for Berkshire and for Buffett and for this very countercultural focus on building enduring value.

基本上，尼克和扎克最终关闭了他们的基金，并向股东返还了35亿美元。

Basically, Nick and Zach ended up closing their fund and returning 3 and a half billion dollars to their shareholders.

随后，他们几乎将自己全部的个人财富（数额相当可观）都投入了三只股票：伯克希尔、好市多和亚马逊，并且一直持有至今。

And they then had virtually all of their own personal fortune, which was considerable in three stocks, which were Berkshire, Costco, and Amazon, which they've held ever since.

这三家公司有一个非常独特的地方，那就是它们都以一种极其非传统的长期方式运营，完全不是为了取悦华尔街。

And there's something very distinctive about those three companies because they all operate in this extremely unconventional long term way that's not designed to please Wall Street.

因此，当我问尼克为什么仍然持有伯克希尔的巨额股份时，他这样告诉我。

So when I asked Nick why he still had a huge stake in Berkshire, this is what he told me.

他说，他的口音和我的很相似。

And he said and his accent's pretty similar to mine.

他说，我喜欢伯克希尔的一点是，我认为它代表了一种不同的资本主义形态。

He said, the thing that I love about Berkshire is that I think it's a different form of capitalism.

当巴菲特收购一家公司时，他会保留原有的管理团队，并要求他们像要经营一百年那样去运作。

When Buffett acquires companies, he keeps the existing management, and he asks the guys to run it as if they were running it for a hundred years.

如果你被要求以百年为期限来经营公司，你的行为方式会与仅以三年为期限、之后便转投其他职业截然不同。

So you behave completely differently if you're being charged with running the company for a hundred years than running it for the next three years before you move on to another career choice.

当你采取这种长期视角时，一切都会改变，我们注意到，那些主动选择加入这一生态系统的公司，实际上是在远离华尔街和凯利资本主义。

Everything changes when you take that orientation, and it strikes us that companies that are self electing to be part of that ecosystem are the ones that are opting out from Wall Street and Citi Capitalism.

因此我认为，像伯克希尔这样的公司，在长期表现上会远优于普通的指数型企业。

So it strikes me that those companies, the Berkshire companies, will do much better over the long run compared to the average index type business.

所以我非常喜爱这种生态系统立场。

And so I love that ecosystem stance.

这完全契合我的理念。

That's right up my street.

这就是我们持有伯克希尔的原因。

So that's why we own Berkshire.

随后，尼克·斯利普补充说，如果你参加伯克希尔的股东大会，巴菲特会不断谈论文化、传承，以及伯克希尔如同一座博物馆。

Then Nick Sleep added, if you go to the Berkshire meetings, Buffett speaks endlessly about culture and the legacy and Berkshire being a museum.

所有这些都在强化一个观念：伯克希尔不属于其他人所理解的资本主义或华尔街资本主义。

And all these things are helping to reinforce this idea that Berkshire isn't part of everybody else's capitalism or Wall Street capitalism rather.

所以我喜欢它反传统的一面，也喜欢这种简单朴实的方式，你和我都能向我们的父母解释清楚，他们会理解，因为他们知道这是对的。

So I love the iconoclastic nature of it, and I love it being a simple down to earth approach that you and I could explain to our parents, and they'll get because they know it's true.

我的意思是，人人都知道。

And, I mean, everybody knows.

你随便跟街上的人聊聊，他们都知道华尔街和金融城很糟糕、有点愚蠢，但它们仍然主宰着资本主义。

You talk to anybody on the street, and they all know that Wall Street and the city are rubbish and a bit stupid, but they still dominate capitalism.

我和扎克所做的，只是把一些常识应用到华尔街的机会集上。

And all that Zach and I were doing was taking a bit of common wisdom and applying it to Wall Street's opportunity set.

巴菲特给了我们信心，让我们去做自己一直认为正确的事。

And Buffett gave us the confidence to do what we knew was right all along.

我认为这就是他所做的。

I think that's what he did.

这就是为什么他真的、真的很重要。

That's why he's really, really important.

他只是告诉你什么是正确的，你只需要坚持下去，但人们很难做到这一点。

It was just telling you what you knew was right, and you just had to follow it through, but it's very difficult for people to do that.

所以我当时对尼克说，从一开始，当他们在大约2001年创立诺马德时，我就觉得诺马德是一个古怪而反传统的实验，目的是验证巴菲特的做法是否真实有效，以及这种反华尔街的实验是否对扎克和他本人适用。

So I then said to Nick that it seemed to me from the start when they first founded Nomad back in, I think, about 2001, that Nomad was this sort of eccentric, iconoclastic experiment to see whether what Buffett was doing was true or real and whether it could work for him and Zach if they did this sort of anti Wall Street experiment.

尼克回答说，是的。

And Nick replied, yeah.

对。

Yeah.

你说到点子上了。

You've got it.

这正是它的本质。

That's exactly what it was.

我们一直努力尽可能贴近巴菲特的做法。

All the time, we were trying to get as close to Buffett as we could.

所以，如果你把自己放在这条连续体上，一边是基金行业最糟糕的代理人——庞大的销售团队，根本不在乎客户利益；另一边是巴菲特这样极致秉持原则的人，那么大多数人本质上都处于中间位置。

So if you see yourself on this continuum, and you've got the worst agents you can possibly think of in fund management in one corner with big sales teams, they couldn't give a toss to our clients, and you've got Buffett being as principled as you possibly can be in the far corner, most people are in the middle by definition.

对吧？

Right?

而Nomad所做的，就是给了我们一艘小船，让我们能够尽可能靠近巴菲特，而我们确实这么做了。

And what Nomad did was give us a little ship that we could sail as close to Buffett as we did, and that's what we did.

我们不断前进，不断前进，不断前进，努力消除所有能想到的委托代理冲突，让基金变得更小、更简单、更诚实、更透明。

We just kept going and kept going and kept going and tried to remove all those principal agent conflicts we could think of, getting it smaller and simpler and more and more honest and then more and more transparent.

只有回头望去，你才会想：是谁给了我们去做这件事的勇气？

And it's only looking back that you go, well, you know who gave us the confidence to do that?

巴菲特。

Buffett.

我们都认为，我们应该尽可能靠近巴菲特，进行长期投资，深入理解这些公司的核心，并以一种非华尔街的方式去做。

We both thought that we should be getting as close to Buffett as we possibly could, investing for the very long term and getting to the deep heart of these companies and doing it in a non Wall Street type way.

基本上，我们对这个行业所做的事情嗤之以鼻，把投资基金当作是史上第一个被设想出来的投资方式。

Basically, thumbing our nose at what we understood the industry was doing and running an investment fund as if it was the only investment fund that had ever been thought of.

你知道吗？

You know?

如果你根本不知道别人是怎么解决这个问题的，你会怎么做？

How would you do it if you didn't know how everybody else had tackled the same problem?

我们有一个目标，就是要尽可能接近巴菲特。

We were on a mission to get as close to Buffett as we possibly could.

所以我特别喜欢我笔记中关于尼克的这一大段长内容。

So I love this long extended section from my notes with Nick.

当你想象我写《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》这一章时，我遇到的一个问题是，我采访了太多人，做了大量访谈。

And you can imagine when I was writing the chapter, one of the problems I had with my book, Richer, Wise Happier, was that I'd done such extensive interviews with so many people.

实际上，要把这些内容整合、提炼并决定哪些该用，真的很难。

It's really hard actually to synthesize and distill and decide what to use.

所以前几天我回头翻看像尼克·斯利普和查克·阿克尔这样的受访者笔记时，发现有海量的精彩材料，我甚至还没开始在书里使用。

And so when I was going back the other day and looking at my notes from people like Nick Sleep and Chuck Akre, there's just amazing volumes of material that I haven't even begun to touch in book form.

所以我喜欢给你分享一点尼克关于沃伦和伯克希尔的见解。

So I like giving you this little this little taste of what Nick said about Warren and about Berkshire.

而且这种感觉就是，沃伦给了他们巨大的启发，尼克和扎克并不追求管理资产规模的最大化。

And just this sense that Warren was a huge inspiration, that Nick and Zach were not trying to optimize for assets under management.

他们只希望取得卓越的业绩，并且以一种体面的方式去做。

They just wanted to have great performance, and they wanted to do it in an honorable way.

当他们第一次参加伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股东大会时，他们突然顿悟了：这就是他们想做的事。

And when they went to Berkshire Hathaway meeting for the very first time, they had this kind of epiphany where they were like, Oh, this is what we want to do.

所以我认为，这一点深刻揭示了沃伦的一个重要特质：他如何激励了像乔尔·格林布拉特、托马斯·鲁索、尼克·斯利普这样的杰出投资典范。

So this, I think, gets at something really quite important about Warren, which is the degree to which he's inspired these extraordinary models like a Joel Greenblatt, a Thomas Russo, a Nick Sleep.

威廉，我们先短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的话。

William Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

不，这不是你的错觉。

No, it's not your imagination.

风险和监管正在加剧，客户现在要求提供安全证明才能开展业务。

Risk and regulation are ramping up and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是为什么Vanta是一个变革者。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta自动化你的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合在一个基于人工智能的平台上。

Vanta automates your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust together on one AI powered platform.

无论你是为SOC 2做准备，还是在运行企业GRC项目，Vanta都能确保你的安全并推动交易顺利进行。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

Vanta 不再让你追逐电子表格和截图，而是提供跨35多种合规与隐私框架的持续自动化。

Instead of chasing spreadsheets and screenshots, Vanta gives you continuous automation across more than 35 and privacy frameworks.

像 Ramp 和 Ryder 这样的公司使用 Vanta 后，审计时间减少了82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长腾出了更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

如果我现在正在运营一家初创公司或扩大团队，这正是我想要的平台类型：one:fifty): 我'd

If I were running a startup or scaling a team today, this is exactly the type of platform one:fifty): I'd

要配备的。

want in place.

请前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

网址是 vanta.com/billionaires。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

亿万富翁投资者通常不会把资金存入高收益储蓄账户。

Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们通常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略之一——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于Fundrise收入基金，这种被动收入策略已向所有规模的投资者开放，该基金已吸引超过6亿美元投资，分配收益率为7.97%。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄收益率下降，私人信贷在近几年成长为万亿美元级别的资产类别也就不足为奇了。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

立即访问 fundrise.com/wsb，只需几分钟即可投资Fundrise收入基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金在2025年的总回报率为8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往业绩并不预示未来表现。

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

截至2025年1月20日12:30的当前分配收益率。

Current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细审阅投资材料，包括投资目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多相关信息可在 fundraise.com/income 上的收益基金招股说明书中找到。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundraise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

当我开始自己的副业时，突然感觉一夜之间必须扮演十种不同的角色，戴上许多不同的帽子。

When I started my own side business, it suddenly felt like I had to become 10 different people overnight wearing many different hats.

从零开始做一件事可能令人兴奋，但也可能让人感到无比压力山大和孤独。

Starting something from scratch can feel exciting, but also incredibly overwhelming and lonely.

因此，拥有正确的工具至关重要。

That's why having the right tools matters.

对数百万企业来说，这个工具就是 Shopify。

For millions of businesses, that tool is Shopify.

Shopify 是全球数百万企业的电子商务平台，覆盖美国 10% 的电子商务交易，从刚起步的品牌到家喻户晓的名字都在使用。

Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses around the world and 10% of all e commerce in The US from brands just getting started to household names.

它为你提供了一站式解决方案，涵盖库存、支付和数据分析等所有需求。

It gives you everything you need in one place, from inventory to payments to analytics.

所以你不需要在多个不同的平台之间来回切换。

So you're not juggling a bunch of different platforms.

你可以使用数百个现成的模板构建一个精美的在线商店，Shopify 还内置了众多实用的 AI 工具，能帮你撰写产品描述，甚至优化产品摄影。

You can build a beautiful online store with hundreds of ready to use templates and Shopify is packed with helpful AI tools that write product descriptions and even enhance your product photography.

此外，如果你遇到任何问题，他们提供屡获殊荣的 24/7 客户支持。

Plus, if you ever get stuck, they've got award winning twenty four seven customer support.

今天就与业界最佳的商业伙伴 Shopify 一起开启你的事业，开始听到成功的声音。

Start your business today with the industry's best business partner, Shopify, and start hearing.

立即登录 shopify.com/wsb，注册每月仅需 1 美元的试用。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往 shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是 shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

我们的下一个片段来自克里斯托弗·布卢姆斯特兰，他经营着一家名为塞莫·奥古斯图斯的投资公司。

Our next clip is from Christopher Bloomstran, who runs an investment firm called Semper Augustus.

克里斯之所以闻名，部分原因在于他撰写的非凡股东信，这些信件对伯克希尔进行了极其详尽的分析。

Chris is famous in part for his extraordinary shareholder letters, which analyze Berkshire in incredible detail.

他无疑是观察这家公司为何如此成功最富有洞察力和信息最灵通的人之一。

He's undoubtedly one of the most informed and perceptive observers of what makes the company so successful.

顺便说一句，克里斯在伯克希尔年度股东大会前一天的价值XBRK会议上发表了一次非常有趣的演讲，他将巴菲特描述为仁慈、可信赖和良好道德等美德的杰出体现。

Chris incidentally gave a really interesting speech at Value XBRK the day before Berkshire's annual meeting, And he described Buffett as a great embodiment of virtues like kindness and trustworthiness and good ethics.

克里斯指出，你在资本主义世界中并不常看到这样的品质。

And Chris pointed out that don't see these kinds of qualities that often in the world of capitalism.

正如他所说，这就是我们来到奥马哈参加股东会议的原因。

And as he put it, that's why we come to the shareholder meeting here at Omaha.

所以我完全同意。

So I couldn't agree more.

无论如何，我早在2023年就在播客上采访过克里斯托弗，我们深入探讨了伯克希尔作为投资典范的价值——对于任何希望更自律、更理性、更聪明地掌握资产配置这一关键艺术的投资者或企业高管而言，伯克希尔都值得深入研究。

In any case, I interviewed Christopher on the podcast back in 2023, and we talked in some depth about Berkshire as a model worthy of study for any investor or corporate executive for that matter, who really wants to understand how to be more disciplined and rational and intelligent about the all important art of intelligent asset allocation.

所以让我们来听听。

So let's listen.

伯克希尔显然长期以来一直是您投资组合的重要组成部分，早在2000年，正如您之前所说，它的股价已经腰斩，而我记得您是在2000年2月以大约43,700美元的价格买入的。

Berkshire obviously has been an enormous part of your portfolio going back to 2000 when, as you said before, it had halved, and I think you you bought it in February 2000 initially at about 43,700.

而如今，我们来看看。

And here here we are.

43.07美元，7美分。

$43.07 $0.07.

还有7美元的佣金。

There were $7 of commissions.

是43.07美元。

Was $43.07

7美分。

$0.07.

是的。

Yeah.

所以某种程度上，这一仓位曾一度占到你客户投资组合的20%到30%。

And so I mean, in a way and and this has grown at times to 20 or 30 of of your client's portfolio.

因此，这显然是一个非常重要的核心持仓，而你最广为人知的，正是每年在致股东信中对伯克希尔所做的极其详尽的分析。

So it's it's a it's clearly a very important anchor position, and you're best known really publicly for your enormously detailed analyses of Berkshire, which you do each year in in your shareholder letter.

所以我希望能聊聊伯克希尔，因为它与你如此紧密地联系在一起，而你在理解这家企业的细节方面几乎无人能及。

So I wanted to talk a little bit about Berkshire because it's such a so so associated with you, and you're pretty much unrivaled in your understanding of the minutiae of the business.

当你在一份年度报告中撰写关于伯克希尔的内容时，你说它由全球最出色、最以股东利益为导向的管理团队运营，并体现了资本应有的运作方式。

When you were writing about Berkshire in one of your annual reports, you said it's run by the world's most skilled and shareholder friendly management team and that it embodies how capital should work.

如果你希望学习如何投资，以及如何以道德和合乎伦理的方式经营企业，伯克希尔可能是最值得研究的案例。

And it is probably the best business to study if you want to learn how to invest and how to run a company morally and ethically.

我不知道你能否简单谈谈，伯克希尔作为一个典范，其他首席执行官和投资者能从中学到什么，比如理性配置资产、以道德方式经营企业、以及为股东着想。

And I wonder if you could just talk a little bit about Berkshire as a kind of model for others, what other CEOs and investors can learn from Berkshire about things like rational asset allocation and running a company in an ethical way and looking out for shareholders.

这些非常根本的东西，我认为投资世界中那些像赌场一样的部分早已遗忘了。

These very fundamental things that I think so much of the casino side of the investing world forgets about.

我认为伯克希尔应该被管理层研究。

Well, I think Berkshire should be studied by managements.

你知道，很少有公司是由杰出的资本配置者领导的。

You know, rarely rarely are are companies led by great capital allocators.

在很多情况下，首席执行官来自运营背景。

CEO comes out of operations in many cases.

在很多情况下，首席执行官来自财务背景。

CEO comes out of finance in many cases.

管理层的薪酬通常包括一个名义上的基本工资，然后在大多数情况下还有一些不同程度的奖金，但主要还是股票期权和限制性股票单位。

Managements are largely compensated with a nominal base salary, but then in most cases, some varying degree of bonus, but then largely stock options, restricted share units.

而获得期权奖励所设定的门槛，不仅仅是时间上的归属，还包括绩效指标。

And the hurdles that are put in place to be rewarded with your options, it's not just time vesting, but they're performance elements.

很多时候，这些指标是收入增长、EBITDA之类的，却与任何资产回报率、股本回报率或资本回报率毫无关系。

And a lot of times, they're things like revenue growth, and they're things like EBITDA, and they have nothing to do with any kind of return on asset, return on equity, return on capital.

从一开始，沃伦·巴菲特就致力于提升伯克希尔的每股账面价值，并避免让企业陷入危险。

Well, from day one, Warren Buffett ran Berkshire to grow its book value per share and to not put the business in harm's way.

当公司面临风险时，他们会及时调整，比如他们最初拥有的纺织业务，最终在1985年果断关闭了它。

When it was in harm's way, to pivot when the first business they owned, obviously, was the textile business and famously ran it off and eventually closed it in 1985.

他们早期收购的几家企业，如蓝筹印花和多元化零售，最终都归零了，于是他们及时转向了其他方向。

Several of the first businesses they bought, blue chip stamps, diversified retailing were wound up essentially being zeros, and they pivoted away from those.

正是伯克希尔这种资本配置能力，才使其取得了如此巨大的成功。

And it's been this capital allocation at Berkshire that's allowed it to be so successful.

但这还不仅如此。

But it it's beyond that.

更重要的是对股东的态度。

It's the treatment of the shareholder.

由于沃伦是最大的股东，他经营公司的方式——虽然我可能表达得不够准确——是为了所有股东的利益，而不是牺牲其他股东来充实自己的口袋。

And with Warren as the largest shareholder, he's run it for I'm going to say this wrongly, but he's run it for his benefit, not so much to line his pockets at the expense of the other shareholders, but at the benefit of all of the shareholders.

因此，这体现在会计上没有滥用行为。

And so it's the lack of abuse in accounting.

在投入资本时，能够做出理性的收购决策。

It's making rational acquisitions when you're laying out capital.

你不会有一长串的减值和资产减记记录。

You don't have a litany and a long history of write offs and write downs.

关于精密铸件那笔100亿美元的减记，他承认在价格上犯了错误。

The $10,000,000,000 write down of precision cast parts, you know, he's acknowledged a mistake on price in particular.

这个业务状况变差了。

Mean, the business got worse.

其中一部分本来就不景气。

Part of it was already in bad shape.

涡轮业务在收购时就已经

The turbine business was already

在他们收购时就已陷入困境。

in bad shape when they bought it.

谁又能料到，疫情会让航空制造业经历如此低迷呢？

Who would have known, with the pandemic that aircraft manufacturing would go through the lull that it did?

但他支付了价格，我以为威廉被困住了。

But he paid and I thought William was stuck.

我以为他买贵了。

I thought he overpaid for it.

我认为他很可能已经放弃了大规模收购的策略，因为他从高价收购那些后来受损的企业中吸取了教训。

I think he probably has backed away from the big elephant hunting with the lesson of having overpaid for business that that did get harmed, in in various ways.

但你们有如此多的一致性，只需回头阅读董事长的信件，就能轻松学到这些经验。

But you've got so much alignment, and it's so easy to learn the lessons by simply going back and reading the chairman's letters.

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得很引人注目的是，你在其中一封信中指出，例如，马克·扎克伯格在2021年以每股330美元的价格购入股票，而这些股票后来价值低于100美元。

Thought it was striking that you in one of the letters, you pointed out, for example, that Mark Zuckerberg, for example, had paid, I think, $330 in 2021 for shares that would later be worth less than 100.

你刚才提到，你知道，不是不是

And you were just talking about the fact that, you know, not not

又是3.31美元。

$3.31 again.

是的。

Yeah.

但不要群起而攻之马克·扎克伯格，他无疑在自己的领域非常出色，但许多公司在股票回购等事情上缺乏纪律——本应在股价低迷时回购股票，却不管何时都随意回购，这种短视行为令人担忧。

But not to gang up on on Mark Zuckerberg, who who's obviously brilliant in his way, but the lack of discipline in a lot of companies about things like share buybacks, where instead of buying their stock back when it's cheap, they'll buy back kind of any any time, the sort of short termism.

而且在我看来，您在许多关于资本回报率的论述中，这一点非常引人注目。

And it seems like I I mean, was something very very striking to me in a lot of your writing about return on capital.

或许伯克希尔正是观察这一点的最佳范例。

And and maybe maybe Berkshire is kind of the best way to look at this.

您曾在其中一封信中提到，我们认为至少90%的上市公司不值得投资，因为它们无法达到资本成本回报。

You you said in one of your letters, we think at least 90% of publicly traded companies aren't worthy of investment because they don't earn their cost of capital.

那些资本缓慢流失的公司，通常能够通过筹集新资金来掩盖真实状况。

Companies that slowly lose capital have generally been able to raise new capital and mask what is really going on.

从这个角度看，许多企业实际上运作得像一种合法的庞氏骗局。

In that way, many businesses operate on the order of a legitimate Ponzi scheme.

那么，您能否谈谈像伯克希尔这样对资本成本和资本回报率极为理性对待的公司，是如何体现这种更合乎逻辑、更明智的投资思维的？

So can you talk about how a a company like like Berkshire that's very rational about cost of capital, return on capital, how it embodies this kind of just much more logical and intelligent way of thinking about its its investments.

好吧，资本配置的手段在价值投资圈内是众所周知且被理解的。

Well, the levers of capital allocation are known and understood at least by the value investing world.

你能用钱做的事情只有这么多。

There are only so many things you can do with money.

从资本配置的角度来看，我在今年的信中放了一张图表，分析了伯克希尔过去五年的资本配置情况，图表从经营活动产生的现金流开始，减去折旧费用——在伯克希尔的情况下，折旧是一项真实的支出，而在许多公司中，折旧费用基本上相当于所谓的维护性资本支出，而非增长性资本支出。

And from a capital allocation standpoint, I had a chart in this year's letter, which looked at the last five years of capital allocation at Berkshire, and it started with cash flow from operations from the cash flow statement, netted out depreciation expense, which is a real charge in Berkshire's case, think, in a lot of companies' cases, depreciation expense essentially matches what you'd call maintenance CapEx as opposed to growth CapEx.

伯克希尔在能源领域投入了大量资金，用于扩大其能源资产的规模。

Berkshire has a lot of money being spent in the energy world where they're growing the footprint of their energy assets.

但在这种情况下，你可以通过股票来做一些事情。

But there you can do things with the share.

你可以在交易中发行股票。

You can issue shares in transactions.

你可以将股票作为薪酬发放给管理层。

You can issue shares to management as compensation.

你可以回购股票，而回购的价格至关重要，但大多数首席执行官对此却知之甚少。

You can buy back the stock, and the price at which you buy it back becomes critically important and so little understood by most CEOs.

你可以在资本结构中使用杠杆。

You can use leverage in the capital structure.

你可以发行债务。

You can issue debt.

你可以偿还债务。

You can retire debt.

你可以将资金用于资本支出，即增长型资本支出。

You can spend money on CapEx, on growth CapEx.

你可以将资金用于增长型研发。

You can spend money on growth r and d.

你可以利用任何可用的资本组合进行收购，包括内部产生的资本或通过股权市场或债务市场募集的新资本。

You can make acquisitions using any of the combinations of capital available to you, internally generated capital, net new capital, either through the equity markets or the debt markets.

今年我的表格中还提到了一种荒唐的做法：你可以购买飞机，一架或几架，也可以举办生日派对，甚至可以用蒸馏冰天使伏特加来举办生日派对。

And then I had a throw off one way line in in my table this year, or you can buy jets, a jet or jets, or you can have birthday parties and you can have a birthday party with matriculating ice cherubs of vodka.

这是对蒂科公司和丹尼斯·科兹洛夫斯基时代的致敬，给那些不记得蒂科事件的年轻人提个醒。

That's a nod back to the the Tycho, Dennis Kozlowski days for, you know, the young ones that don't remember the Taiko the Taiko saga.

这就是你能做的所有事情。

And that's all you can do.

我不认为这是CEO们整天思考的问题。

And I don't think that's what CEOs sit around thinking about.

我认为他们关注的是。

I think they look at look.

如果我的薪酬与EBITDA增长挂钩，那他们就会去推动EBITDA增长。

If I'm if I'm paid, if I'm incentivized to grow EBITDA, they're going to go grow EBITDA.

如果这是决定他们报酬的关键因素的话。

If that's what drives their comp package.

这属于线上的部分。

Well, that's above the line.

在EBITDA以下的项目中，利息是一项非常真实的支出，即利息费用。

The components below the EBITDA line, interest is a very real thing, interest expense.

但你会对企业的资本结构变得无动于衷。

But you become indifferent as to the capital structure of the business.

你的薪酬目标是增长营收和EBITDA，因此你会对资本结构中的杠杆更加宽容，因为你是在利息支出之前被评估的。

You're paid to grow the top line and you're paid to grow EBITDA, you become a lot more tolerant of leverage in the capital structure because you're measured before the interest expense.

在很多情况下，你会通过过度杠杆将企业置于危险之中，但你的薪酬并不在于保护企业免受伤害。

And in so many cases, you'll put the business in harm's way with excessive leverage, but you're not paid to keep the business out of harm's way.

你并不是像沃伦自1965年以来那样，坐在CEO的船长椅上。

You're not in the captain's chair as CEO as Warren has been since 1965.

你平均只坐在船长椅上四年半。

You're in the captain's chair for four and a half years on average.

当你获得大量的期权、限制性股票单位（RSU）和绩效限制性股票单位（PRSU）时，这就是你赚钱的机会。

And when you're given big option packages and big RSU packages and big PRSU packages, this is your chance to make money.

在很多情况下，你的动机变成了追求短期盈利、让华尔街满意、推高股价，而股票回购则成为重中之重，或许是你资本配置的最佳选择。

And your motivation becomes, in so many cases, short term earnings, making Wall Street happy, driving the stock price up, and the share repurchase becomes front and center, perhaps your best use of capital.

我还要指出，许多公司并没有明智地投资增长性资本支出的机会。

Now I'd also argue that so many companies don't have the opportunity set to go invest in growth CapEx intelligently.

他们也没有机会投资增长性的研发。

They don't have the opportunity to go invest in growth r and d.

那么，你拿这笔钱做什么呢？

So what do you do with the money?

嗯，我觉得这非常有趣。

Well, if you look at it's fascinating to me.

标普500的市值达到了38万亿美元。

You've got this $38,000,000,000,000 market cap for the S and P five hundred.

标普500的流通股数量，和23到24年前完全一样。

The share count for the S and P five hundred is exactly the same where it was twenty three, twenty four years ago.

如果你看一下用于回购股票、回购股份的净收入或经营活动现金流所占比例。

If you look at the percentage of net income or the percentage of cash flow from operations that have been spent retiring shares and buying stock up.

去年，标普500企业合计利润为16万亿美元，其中1万亿美元用于回购股票。

Last year, it was a trillion dollars out of the $1,600,000,000,000 in aggregate profits for the S and P five hundred.

你知道，过去二十年，标普500企业的利润在股息和股票回购之后，已经没有任何剩余了。

You know, between dividends and share repurchases, there's nothing left for the S and P five hundred for the last twenty years.

而你一直在20倍市盈率、5%的收益收益率下回购股票。

And you've been buying shares back at 20 times earnings at a 5% earnings yield.

如果你能投资一个项目，如果你的生意确实能实现15%的净资产收益率，但你无法以15%的ROE进行再投资，那你真的能实现15%的净资产收益率吗？

Well, if you can go invest in a project, if you really have a business that earns 15 on equity, do you really earn 15 on equity if you can't go reinvest at a 15 ROE?

但以5%的回报率回购股票，真的是你使用资本的最佳方式吗？

But your best use of capital is buying the stock back at a 5% return?

这种思维方式根本不是正常的董事会讨论策略，也不是CEO们晚上辗转反侧时会考虑的问题。

This is not normal boardroom conversational strategy thinking this is not what the CEO's laying away thinking about at night.

这是伟大的克里斯托弗·布卢姆斯特兰在谈论巴菲特过去六十年作为资本配置者的非凡纪录。

That was the great Christopher Bloomstran talking about Buffett's remarkable record as a capital allocator over the last sixty years.

我认为这引出了当前所有伯克希尔哈撒韦投资者心中最明显的一个问题：格雷格·阿贝尔该如何接替这如此难以复制的成就？

And I think this raises one of the most obvious questions that's on the minds of all Berkshire Hathaway investors at the moment, which is simply how will Greg Abel manage to follow this incredibly difficult act?

在年度股东大会的问答环节，有人问格雷格对资本配置的看法，特别是他将如何将资本配置到新业务上。

And during the q and a session at the annual meeting, someone asked Greg about his views on capital allocation and particularly about how he would allocate capital into new businesses.

我认为格雷格对此给出了一个出色、头脑清晰且条理分明的回答。

And I thought Greg gave an excellent, very clear headed, very lucid answer about this.

有趣的是，他使用的语言强调了维持伯克希尔哈撒韦声誉的关键重要性，管理风险的关键重要性，以及确保公司始终拥有坚如磐石的资产负债表，以应对困难时期且不依赖任何外部方的优先性。

And it was interesting that the kind of language he was using, where he talked about the critical importance of maintaining Berkshire Hathaway's reputation, the critical importance of managing risk, the priority of making sure that the company always has a fortress of a balance sheet that allows us to weather difficult times and not be dependent on anybody.

他说：我们绝不会依赖银行或其他任何外部方来实现伯克希尔的成功。

And he said, We'll never be dependent on a bank or some other party for Berkshire to be successful.

因此，他明确表示，按照他的话说，我们将继续秉持非常相似的哲学。

And so he really made it clear that in his words, we'll continue to move forward with a very similar philosophy.

这与我们目前以及过去六十年所坚持的哲学完全一致。

It's an identical philosophy to what we've had currently and for the past sixty years.

他说，他首先会专注于投资伯克希尔现有的业务，并让它们保持自主运营。

And he said that basically he'll focus first on investing in Berkshire's existing businesses and allowing them to operate in an autonomous way.

然后，他会考虑整体收购其他企业，并耐心等待这些资产以合理的价格出现。

And then he'll look at acquiring other businesses in their totality and will exercise patience in waiting for those assets to be available at a decent price.

价值与风险的比值必须合适，否则他会选择放弃。

The value relative to the risk has to be right, and otherwise he's gonna pass.

接着他说，我们也会投资上市公司，但不是把它们当作简单的纸面资产，而是真正作为长期持有的企业股权。

And then he said, we'll also buy stakes in public companies, but not as, you know, just just pieces of paper, but actually as stakes in these companies that he would have the intention of owning them for the long term.

所以我认为，他已经非常明确地表明，他在资本配置上的理念与沃伦一直秉持的相同。

So I think he's made very clear that he has the same philosophy to the allocation of capital that Warren has had.

谁知道他是否能实现沃伦所创造的这一难以置信的业绩纪录。

Who knows whether he can live up to this unbelievable record that Warren has established.

我认为很难期待他在选股方面有同样的天赋。

I think it's hard to expect him to be as gifted with stock picking.

很难期待他亲自做这些，你可能会认为他会把这部分交给泰德·韦施勒和托德·康布斯。

It's hard to expect him to be, You would assume that he's gonna leave some of that to Ted Weschler and Todd Combs.

但另一方面，他在公司任职期间确实有大量收购的记录。

But on the other hand, he does have a record of having made lots of acquisitions during his time within the company.

谁知道呢？

So who knows?

在伯克希尔哈撒韦年会期间，我与一位名叫鲍勃·拉博蒂的人聊过，他曾经做过播客嘉宾，是一位杰出的投资者，也是伯克希尔的长期观察者。

One person I spoke to during the Berkshire Hathaway weekend was Bob Rabotti, who's been a guest on the podcast, who's a remarkable investor and a long term observer of Berkshire.

我问鲍勃他对格雷格和公司未来有什么看法。

And I asked Bob what he thought about Greg and the future of the company.

他说，巴菲特非常专注于交易和并购，而不是运营。

And he said, Look, Buffett was very focused on deals, on deal making, and not on operations.

他还说，我们知道像GEICO和铁路等一些子公司确实遇到了问题。

And he said, We know there have been problems at some of the subsidiaries like GEICO and some at the railroad, for example.

所以他觉得，让像格雷格这样拥有工业经验的运营专家来接手是有道理的。

And so he said it makes sense to have someone like Greg who's really an operations guy who has industrial experience.

我多次听到过这种说法。

And I heard this a bunch of times.

我还和我的朋友贝克聊过，他提到GEICO有点失控了，塔德·康布斯能够将GEICO的员工人数从5万削减到2万，这表明伯克希尔的一些子公司之前并没有被严格管理。

I talked also to my friend, Beck, who mentioned the point that GEICO had kind of got out of control a little bit, that the fact that Todd Combs could come in and reduce the workforce at GEICO from 50,000 to 20,000 gives you a sense that some of the components of Berkshire were not run that rigorously.

我怀疑沃伦这种相对放手、极度信任各业务经理的做法也有其弊端，尽管这种信任方式带来了极大的忠诚度，也促使这些非凡的经理人表现出色。

And I suspect there's a downside here to Warren's somewhat hands off approach of really trusting the managers of the various businesses, that there's something incredible about that, that it engenders a great deal of loyalty, and you get these extraordinary managers doing an incredible job.

但另一方面，我怀疑这也让一些严重的低效问题得以滋生。

But on the other hand, I suspect it's allowed some serious inefficiencies to develop.

因此，人们普遍认为，格雷格·阿贝尔会更积极、更主动，因为他更年轻，也更亲力亲为。

And so there's a sense that Greg Abel's gonna be more dynamic, more active because he's younger and more hands on.

他的风格不同。

He has a different style.

在运营这些业务方面，他会更加亲力亲为。

So much more hands on in terms of operating those businesses.

但这件事最终会如何发展，我们真的不知道。

But how this will work out, we just don't know.

但我认为很明显，公司的方向已经发生了转变，我们稍后会听到更多关于这种强调运营和运营效率而非交易达成的信息。

But I think it's clear that there's been a shift in the direction of the company, and we'll hear more about this later, this emphasis on operations and operational efficiency rather than deal making.

最后，我要播放两段我2023年在这个播客中与克里斯·戴维斯的精彩访谈片段。

Finally, I'm gonna play you two wonderful excerpts from an interview that I did on this podcast with Chris Davis back in 2023.

克里斯本身是一位著名的投资者，非常幸运地得到了沃伦·巴菲特和查理·芒格的亲自指导。

Chris is a renowned investor in his own right who's had the great good fortune to be personally mentored by Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger.

他还担任伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的董事会成员，因此拥有极为罕见的内部视角——他亲身参与董事会会议，亲眼目睹沃伦在幕后如何运作。

He also serves on Berkshire Hathaway's board of directors, so he has a very rare insider's perspective that comes from actually being present in board meetings, watching Warren operate behind closed doors.

让我们来听一听。

Let's listen.

在很多方面，伯克希尔都像一个具有标志性的教学机构。

In many ways, Berkshire is is a kind of iconic emblematic teaching institution.

对吧？

Right?

在很多方面，它展示了资本主义的正确运作方式。

It's there to to show us capitalism done right in many ways.

我的意思是，它未必完美，有时也会有争议，但这是一种非凡的文化。

I mean, not that it's flawless necessarily, and, you know, sometimes there are controversies, but it's an extraordinary it's an extraordinary culture.

你被沃伦任命为伯克希尔的董事，我记得是在2021年左右。

And you're in this unique position of having been named by Warren as a director of Berkshire back in, I think, 2021.

为了给我们的听众一些背景，其他董事包括沃伦本人、查理、格雷格·阿贝尔——沃伦的潜在继任者、哈格斯特罗姆——负责保险业务、沃伦的儿子和女儿霍华德和苏珊、罗恩·奥尔森——我认为他是查理旧律所的联合创始人，以及肯·钱纳特——前美国运通首席执行官。

And just to give our listeners some context, the other directors are Warren himself and Charlie and Greg Abel, the the likely successor to Warren, Hagstrom, who runs the insurance operations, Buffett's son and daughter, Howard and Susan, Ron Olson, I think, who cofounded Charlie's old law firm, Ken Chenault, who was CEO of American Express.

因此，某种程度上，这就像一个终极俱乐部，让你得以近距离观察什么是良好的资本主义，以及是什么让沃伦和查理如此非凡，让这种文化如此独特。

So in some ways, it's kind of the ultimate club, it's given you this this insider's view of, capitalism done well and what makes Warren and Charlie extraordinary, what makes the culture extraordinary.

我想知道，你能否分享一下到目前为止的体验？你对这种文化有什么样的了解？

And I I wondered if we could get a sense from you of of what the experience has been like so far, what you've learned about the the culture.

我还想提一件事，我记得曾和我们的共同朋友布莱恩·劳伦斯聊过这个话题，他指出，有些非常出色的基金经理根本不会考虑加入伯克希尔董事会，因为要求实在太苛刻。

And one thing I would mention, I remember talking to our mutual friend, Brian Lawrence, about this, and he was pointing out that there are some really great money managers who would never dream of going on the board of Berkshire because the requirements are really difficult.

无论是正式还是非正式的，我认为其中一条要求是你必须持有相当数量的股票。

Like, whether formally or informally, I think one of them is that you you have to own a significant amount of the stock.

我看了下持股声明，我觉得你个人持有大约两千万元的股票，而且你没有任何股票期权。

And I I was looking at the ownership statements, and I I I think you own something like $20,000,000 worth of the stock personally that and you don't get any stock options.

我查看了薪酬结构，惊讶地发现你担任董事的年薪只有区区七千美元。

And I looked at the compensation structure and was stunned to see that you received the princely sum of $7,000 a year to serve on the board.

我想布莱恩告诉我，董事也没有任何保险保障。

And I think Brian told me that there's no insurance protection either for the director.

所以你实际上是个人承担风险，既没有从中获利，还得自己掏钱。

So so you're sort of personally exposed, not enriched, and you have to put up your own money.

你能谈谈这种独特的文化吗？你看到了什么？为什么你会愿意这么做？你从中获得了什么？

So can you can you talk about that unique culture and what you've seen about it and why why you would even, wanna do it, and what you've learned from it?

为我这个冗长的问题道歉。

An apologist for that long winded question.

哦，不用。

Oh, no.

这是个很好的问题。

It's a great question.

所以7000美元听起来才不算少。

That's the reason 7,000 sounds high.

我觉得每次会议是700美元，不过我可能记错了。

I think it's $700 a meeting, but I I I could be wrong on that.

你可能是报酬最高的。

You're the highest paid, I think.

我觉得大多数人拿3000美元，除非我看错了——这完全有可能——我觉得你每年拿7000美元。

I think there most people get 3,000, and unless I misread it, which is eminently possible, I think you get 7,000 a year.

必须得。

Have to

重新核对一下。

review that.

我得搞清楚，老兄。

I have to figure out, dude.

但没错，我相信伯克希尔不仅是一个典范，更是资本主义应该如何运作的象征。

But, yeah, I believe Berkshire is incredibly important as, well, as an exemplar, but as a icon of how capitalism should work.

对吧？

Right?

换句话说，你知道，一家没有走捷径的公司，在每一个维度上，在每一个行业和子公司中，都致力于实现查理所说的‘获得你应得的’，努力赢得成功。

In other words, you know, a company that hasn't taken shortcuts that in almost every dimension tries in every industry and every subsidiary has this goal of, you know, as Charlie would say, getting what you deserve, trying to earn success.

不走捷径。

No shortcuts.

他们希望在监管机构和客户心目中树立公平交易的声誉。

They wanna have the reputation with the regulators, with customers for fair dealing.

你提到了汤姆·盖纳。

And, you know, you you mentioned Tom Gaynor.

当然，马克尔也追求并实现了同样的目标。

Of course, Markel aspires and has delivered in the same way.

顺便说一句，还有其他公司也这么做，但伯克希尔在某种意义上无疑是这一领域的勒布朗·詹姆斯。

And and by the way, there are other companies that do, but Berkshire is absolutely in a sense the LeBron James of that.

对吧？

Right?

这种成功的规模，以及在各个方面持续如此之久的时间跨度。

There is the sheer scale of the success, the the time horizon over which it's been done in every manner.

因此，我认为伯克希尔对整个体系的福祉而言，是值得珍惜和保护的。

And so I think Berkshire, for the good of the entire system, Berkshire is worth cherishing and protecting.

这是一个几乎毫无瑕疵的典范。

It is this virtually sort of unsullied example.

当然，只要沃伦和查理还在，维持这种状态就非常容易。

And of course, the maintenance of that is something that is very easy so long as Warren and Charlie are there.

但商业中的惯性法则如此强大，很少有记录能长期保持下去。

But the laws of inertia in business and know, are such that the there are few records of that persisting.

沃伦和查理一个非凡的特点是，每年、每一个决策都以持久为目标，努力让继任者的工作更轻松，试图建立一套框架。

And one of the extraordinary characteristics of Warren and Charlie is how much every year, every decision they do with the goal of having it persist, of making their successor's jobs easier, trying to lay out a framework.

因此，我认为董事们的职责绝不能以任何方式介入业务运营。

So I think the responsibility of the directors will never be to be in any way involved in the business.

他们的职责在于保护这种文化——这种文化以其独立性而脱颖而出，拒绝所有常见的捷径，避免陷入各种可能损害其卓越美德的制度性偏见。

It will be in a sense protecting this this culture that really is a culture that is stands out for its independence, its rejection of all of the conventional ways that people begin to take shortcuts or begin to fall prey to all of the institutional biases that can cause something that's so excellent in its in its virtue in its virtue.

所以，像不支付董事报酬或只支付极少报酬这样的小事，都是在试图强化这种文化。

So little things like not paying the directors or paying them very little, that is a symbol that is trying to reinforce a culture.

因此，如果你设定的标准是董事必须个人持有大量股票，并且愿意无偿服务。

And so if you have a criteria that says directors have to own a lot of stock personally and they have to be willing to serve for no compensation.

那么，他们为什么要这么做呢？

Well, why are they doing it?

因为他们关心这个地方。

They're doing it because they care about the place.

这是一种难以置信的利害一致。

That's an incredible alignment.

我认为没有其他公司有这种标准。

I don't there is no other company that has that sort of criteria.

所以我认为伯克希尔的重要性在于，它提醒我们事物本应如此。

So I think Berkshire is important for the reminder that it is of how things ought to be.

它是一个绝佳的标杆，其他公司可以以此为参照。

And it's a great sort of benchmark against which other companies, you know, can something that they can look towards.

所以，无论如何，我认为这样做的原因是因为它作为一个典范极为珍贵，我认为它对整个体系而言是一个很好的提醒：当一种理念认为企业贪婪、CEO恶劣、资本主义有害，公司变富、股东获利是以牺牲其他利益相关者为代价时。

So, anyway, I I think the reason to do it is because it is so precious as an example, and I think it's good for the system as a reminder that when there's an ethos that says, you know, corporate greed, CEOs bad, capitalism bad, companies get rich, shareholders get rich at the expense of other constituencies.

这是一种零和游戏。

It's a zero sum game.

因此，如果股东获利了，那他们必定是以牺牲其他利益相关者为代价——员工、社区、环境或客户。

So if shareholders grow, they must have somehow profited at the expense of another constituency, employees, communities, the environment, customers.

而伯克希尔以及其他一些公司虽然并非唯一如此，但正如我所说，它们是最极端的例子，它们的成功并非以牺牲任何其他利益相关者为代价。

And Berkshire and and other companies that they aren't alone in this, but they as I say are the most extreme, you know, they they they achieved not at the expense of any other constituency.

它们通过在世界上创造价值，并以透明的方式实现这一点来发展壮大。

Built themselves by by creating value in the world and then doing so in a transparent way.

所以，这不仅仅是业务本身，还包括治理、沟通和教育。

So it wasn't just the business, it was also the governance, it was also the communication, the education.

因此，我认为这非常值得捍卫，而且当沃伦和查理不在了之后，这将会变得困难得多。

So I think it is really worth fighting for, and I think it'll be much, much, much harder when Warren and Charlie aren't here.

所以，这就是我对它唯一不满意的地方。

And so that's my one thing that I don't like about it.

我觉得你和我之前聊过这个，但你知道，我来自一个‘先工作后玩’的家庭。

I think you and I have talked about this, but, you know, I'm from a family of, you know, work before play.

这是我父亲的观念，也是我们家的传统。

That was my expression of my father's that it's in our family.

我们经常这么说。

It's just we say it all the time.

这就像奶奶的规矩：先吃西兰花，才能吃甜点。

And, you know, it's granny's rule, eat your broccoli, then you get dessert.

而伯克希尔现在的情况恰恰相反。

And Berkshire is serving Berkshire right now is the opposite.

你先吃甜点。

You get your dessert first.

你先玩。

You get to play first.

你可以先听沃伦和查理的讲话。

You get to listen to Warren and Charlie.

你可以毫无保留地参加每一次董事会会议，坚信他们所知晓的每一项决策都遵循着最高的道德标准，并且充分透明、全力维护股东利益。

You get to go to each board meeting absolutely secure in the conviction that anything that is being done that they know about is being done in absolutely the highest to the highest ethical standards and with deep transparency and advocacy for shareholders.

实际参加董事会会议是什么感觉？

What's it like actually being at a board meeting?

我的意思是，对于我们这些永远无法亲历这种内部体验的人来说，不谈机密，而是就会议的实际氛围和动态而言，那到底是一种怎样的体验？

I mean, for those of us who will never have this experience of being on the inside and actually watching up close, like, what's actually I mean, not in terms of state secrets, but in terms of actually the dynamic and the energy of it, what's actually what's that experience like?

如果你是一位长期股东，也像你一样参加过年度股东大会，从某种角度来说，感觉并没有太大不同，因为会议的基调完全坦诚直率。

It's it it is you know, if you were a longtime shareholder and you've attended annual meetings as you have, in one way, would say not that different because the tone is completely candid.

唯一的区别在于，在年度股东大会上，我认为我作为股东参加过三十多次会议时的感受是，沃伦会说：‘你有什么想法？’

The only difference is at the annual meeting, I think the mindset that I experienced as a shareholder going to thirty years worth of annual meetings was Warren saying, what's on your mind?

你们是股东，我会回答你们的问题。

You're the shareholders, I'll answer your questions.

而在董事会会议室里，他们的导向是：我想让你知道，如果我们的位置互换，我认为什么是重要的。

And I think in the boardroom, the orientation is I want you to know what I think is important if our seats were reversed.

我认为沃伦通过年报向股东传达这些观点，而董事会内部唯一的不同在于，他认为有必要确保，比如在某个子公司ABC存在什么问题时，他会主动提出来，并沟通他对于外界局势的看法。

Now I think Warren does that through the annual report for shareholders, and I think the only difference is within the boardroom, I think he has a view that he needs to make sure if there's, you know, an issue in, you know, subsidiary ABC that he is surfacing it and communicating what he's thinking is going on in the world.

你知道吗？

You know?

但方向完全是一样的。

So but the direction is exactly the same.

我会说，深度以及对我来说这份礼物的双重意义。

I would say the depth and the fact that to me the great gift is twofold.

第一，沃伦会告诉你他目前关注什么，他认为在本次会议上，哪些问题是对伯克希尔至关重要的。

One, Warren tells you what he is focused on, and he thinks in this moment at this meeting, are the issues that he thinks are very important for Berkshire.

他当然会回答任何人的提问，只要有人提问。

He obviously takes questions as long as anybody has them.

但我认为第二点，与其说是不同，不如说是一个令人惊讶的发现——从外部来看，你不会知道美国还有哪位CEO能像沃伦和查理那样如此深刻而广泛地思考风险。

But I think the second thing that I would say is different, not different, but is just was an incredible surprise is too strong a word, but you would know from the outside that there is no CEO in America that thinks about risk in a more profoundly broad way than Warren and Charlie.

我的意思是，沃伦会思考，比如资本市场关闭的可能性。

I mean, they Warren thinks about, you know, the capital market shutting down.

他会想到核武器和生物恐怖主义，而在年度会议上，你只能瞥见这些思考的冰山一角。

You know, he thinks about nuclear weapons and bioterrorism, and and in annual meetings, are glimpses of that.

我认为，坐在这里倾听时，我注意到的一点是，他如何深刻地构建并希望这个企业具备结构上的韧性，以应对那些普通首席执行官或普通投资者根本无法想象的情境。

I think the one thing I would say I've seen sitting there listening is how profoundly he structures and wants the enterprise structured to make sure it's resilient to to in scenarios that are so far outside of the thinking of a normal CEO or a normal investor.

他真正是在打造一种能够经受住几乎任何 conceivable 情境的事业，能够亲眼见证这种思维方式，是一种非凡的荣幸。

He is really building something that he wants to last through almost any conceivable scenario, and it is an incredible privilege to just see that mind at work in that way.

因此，所有内容在阅读年报和参加股东会议时，都已方向明确地呈现出来。

So everything is directionally laid out just sitting in a reading the annual report and sitting in a shareholders meeting.

一切都是一致的。

Everything is is the same.

只是更多而已。

It's just more of it.

正如我所说，尤其是风险这部分，让我感到极为震撼，那种对这家企业深切的 stewardship 感觉。

And and as I say, the risk part in particular is is something that I've been was just have been incredibly struck by, that sense of profound stewardship for this enterprise.

在年度股东大会上，这一点非常引人注目。

It was very striking in the annual meeting.

我总是会在手机上记很多笔记。

I I I always take a lot of notes in my phone.