RWH063：与霍华德·马克斯共避灾难

你想这么做是因为你认为自己洞察到为什么他们都错了，而且他们的行为在市场上造成了错误的局面。

And you wanna do it because you think you have some insight about why they're all wrong and their actions have made it wrong in the market.

你能想象说服一个10人委员会让其中多数人支持你的观点吗？

Can you imagine trying to convince a committee of 10 people to get the majority of them to support it?

见鬼，这怎么可能做到？

Well, how the hell can you do that?

因为市场上大多数人都不采取这种策略是有原因的——它确实难以看清。

Because there's a reason why most people in the market aren't taking that approach because it's hard to see.

如果大多数人都在做A，你怎么可能说服委员会多数人去执行B呢？

So if most people are do are buying are doing a, how can you convince the majority of a committee to do b?

如果你拥有独到见解，比如手下有个年轻的沃伦·巴菲特，你最好让他放手去做，而不是规定必须说服委员会多数人才能交易。

If you have idiosyncratic insight, if you have a a young Warren Buffett working for you, you better just let him do his thing rather than say, well, you are, and you can't make any trades until you commit convince the majority of the committee.

所以这是投资中最重要的事情之一。

And so this is one of the most important things in investing.

官僚主义与卓越投资就像医生说的那样，是相互排斥的。

And bureaucracy and great investing are counter indicated as the doctors would say.

你知道，当雷曼兄弟在08年破产时，我们刚募集了史上最大规模的困境债务基金，规模大约是之前纪录的三倍。

You know, when when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in '8, we had raised the biggest distressed debt fund in history by a factor of about three.

我们有100亿美元资金随时待命。

We had $10,000,000,000 sitting on the shelf.

雷曼倒闭了。

Lehman goes under.

大多数人都认为金融世界即将崩溃。

Most people think the the financial world is gonna melt down.

问题在于你是否愿意花这笔钱。

Question is whether you spend the money.

而且，你知道，人们会说，为什么不直接分析未来呢？

And, you know, people say, well, why don't you just analyze the future?

根本不存在分析未来这种事，尤其是当前所未有的事件发生时。

There is no such thing as analyzing the future, especially when when you have unprecedented events taking place.

所以布鲁斯和我决定我们应该花这笔钱。

And so Bruce and I figured out that we should spend the money.

他负责处理融资问题，并勇敢地在接下来的十五周里平均每周投资4.5亿美元。

And he he ran the funding question, and he bravely invested an average of $450,000,000 a week for the next fifteen weeks.

这是一个季度内投入70亿美元。

That's $7,000,000,000 in one quarter.

但我不认为我们能说服委员会。

But I don't think we could have convinced the committee.

好消息是我们已经预先筹集了资金，所以不需要说服客户。

The good news is we had pre raised the money, so we didn't have to convince the clients.

要知道，最佳投资时机是在危机期间，但你无法在那时筹集资金。

You know, you can't you can't raise the best time to invest is during a crisis.

危机期间你根本筹不到钱，因为人们都吓得不敢行动。

You can't raise any money during the crisis because people are frozen into inaction.

所以这确实是个特例。

So, you know, it was certainly idiosyncratic.

我和一位在报社工作的朋友聊过这件事。

I I talked to a friend of mine who wrote for one of the newspapers.

他问，你们在做什么？

He said, what are you doing?

我说，哦，我们在买入。

I said, oh, we're buying.

他说，你们在买入？

He says, you are?

就像我们疯了一样。

Like, we were insane.

这确实很特立独行，也确实让人很不自在。

It was certainly idiosyncratic, and it was certainly uncomfortable.

我们当然不确定自己是对的，但这似乎是正确的做法。

We certainly weren't sure we were right, but it seemed like the right thing to do.

所以你就去做，必须克服内心的不安。

So you do it, and you you have to overcome your discomfort.

我不会试图说服20个人相信我是对的。。

What is it that try to I wouldn't try to convince 20 people that I was right.

霍华德，布鲁斯作为投资者，是什么让他如此非凡？

And what is it, Howard, that makes Bruce so extraordinary as an investor?

因为说实话，我确实很少听他谈论这些。

Because clearly, I I've never really heard him talk much.

前几天我听你们在橡树资本播客上的对话，你、他和谢尔顿聊到了公司早期的事情。

And then I was listening a couple of days ago to a conversation that you'd had on on your podcast, the Oaktree podcast, where you and he and Sheldon talked about the early days of the firm.

让我惊讶的是，他给人的印象是个非常和蔼、正直、聪明的人，极度重视家庭、正直品德和建立持久机构。

And I was surprised that sort of he just came across this really affable, decent, smart guy with a tremendous focus on on family and decency and building an enduring institution.

跟我们说说他是怎样的人，因为他显然是橡树资本成功的关键人物。

Tell tell us what he's like because he's so clearly been a a key figure in in Oaktree's success.

是的。

Yeah.

嗯，你知道，是他主动找上我的。

Well, I mean, you know, he approached me.

当时我还在TCW工作。

I was at TCW.

他在87年找到了我。

He approached me in '87.

他当时是名律师。

He was a lawyer.

他曾为伊莱·布罗德做过一些投资，后者是洛杉矶的商界领袖。

He had done some investing for Eli Broad, who was the biggest leader in LA.

他有个成立不良债务基金的想法，我们在88年实现了。

And he had this idea of forming a distressed debt fund, which we did in '88.

我认为这是主流金融机构中最早的一批。

And I think it was the one of the very first from a mainstream financial institution.

首轮募资我们筹集了6500万美元，第二轮将总额提升到了9600万。

We raised on the first closing, we raised $65,000,000, and and then the second close brought it up to a grand sum of 96.

我们当时觉得拥有了全世界的钱。

We thought we had all the money in the world.

但关键是布鲁斯极具分析能力。

But the point is that Bruce is extremely analytical.

他就像个棋手。

He's like a chess player.

他确实是个棋手，总是高瞻远瞩，在你描述的那种低调作风下保持着高度竞争力，但非常聪明且专注，是个卓越的执行者。

He and he is a chess player, and he looks, moves ahead, highly competitive in a as what you described, a low key manner, but, you know, really smart and and really focused, you know, great executor.

我们的合伙关系至今已持续三十七八年了。

And we have enjoyed a partnership for now thirty seven years, thirty eight.

这是我生命中除了家庭关系外最闪耀的事物之一，这份友谊。

And it's it's it's one of the one of the shining things in my life, you know, after my family relationships, the friendships.

就像沃伦·巴菲特几周前在卸任信中提到的他与查理·芒格的关系那样。

I mean, we've had you know, Warren Buffett wrote a letter a couple weeks ago about stepping down, and he talked about his relationship with Charlie Maher.

他说查理就像个保护他的大哥。

And he he said that in Charlie, he had a big brother who was protective.

在我看来，查理是那位给予建议的睿智哲人，而沃伦则是比他小六岁的执行者，负责分析研究和投资实操。

And the way I see it, Charlie was the wise philosopher who gave Warren advice, and Warren was the six years younger implementer who performed the analytical legwork and did the investing.

那段简短描述中最打动我的是他说：'我早告诉过你'这类话从未出现过。

What I really loved in in that brief mention, he said, and the words I told you so were never mentioned.

要知道，我和布鲁斯之间的关系也与之非常相似。

And, you know, so what Bruce and I have done with each other is we our relationship is very similar to that.

他比我年轻九岁，对此我们都心知肚明。

He's nine years younger than And we both acknowledge so healthily.

我们都承认对方能做自己做不到的事——这正是健康伙伴关系的唯一基础。

We both acknowledge that that the other can do things we can't do, which is such a great thing because that's the only basis for a healthy partnership.

一旦你开始认为自己无所不能，甚至能替代搭档的职责，这段伙伴关系就变质了。

Once you start thinking that you can do everything you can do and everything the other person can do, you're not your partner's do ship is doing.

但我们始终清楚：彼此都有对方无法替代的能力。

But we both acknowledge that that we can that each can do things the other can't.

这种互补关系极其美妙，而且从不会有人因失误说'我早告诉过你'这种话。

And it's been extremely complimentary, and nobody has ever said, you know, I told you so on any mistakes.

失误总是层出不穷的。

There are plenty of mistakes made all the time.

我认为我们始终在相互支持。

And I think that we have supported each other.

要知道，在2008年第四季度花费70亿美元，如果没有支持会非常困难。

And, you know, spending $7,000,000,000 in the in the fourth quarter of of o eight would would have been very difficult without support.

你必须支持某人，永远不要说'哦，我绝不会那样做'。

You gotta buck somebody up and never say, oh, I would I would never have done that.

你知道吗？

You know?

事实上，他最初来找你时说'让我们进入不良债务领域'，这提出了一个非常重要的观点——我认为这在你很多文章中都有体现，最早可追溯到2014年的《幸运备忘录》，你在其中说过'投资中最简单的获胜方法就是坚持非有效市场'。

This fact also that he came to you originally and said, let's get into distressed debt raises a really important point that I think comes up in a in a lot of your writing, going back, I think, as far as the getting lucky memo in 2014 where you said the easiest way to win at investing is by sticking to inefficient markets.

我认为实际上早在1995年的《游戏规则》中你就写过'疯狂研究微观细节'。

And I think actually way back in in 1995 in how the game should be played, you wrote, study the micro like mad.

为了比其他人更了解你的研究对象，只有当你拥有知识优势时，你才能期待成功。

In order to know your subject better than others, you can expect to succeed only if you have a knowledge advantage.

你能谈谈这个吗？

Can can you talk about that?

因为这让我想起那些伟大投资者身上反复出现的特质，比如你的朋友乔·格林布拉特最初通过特殊情境中的才华致富，或是比尔·鲁安曾告诉我'我只努力深入了解七八个好点子'。

Because it strikes me as something that I see again and again with the great investors, like with your friend Joe Greenblatt, where he initially got rich partly through his brilliance in special situations or Bill Ruane who told me I I just try to learn as much as I can about seven or eight good ideas.

这种专注于狭窄领域但同时又选择低效市场的策略，似乎是你成功的关键所在。

And it seems like this this focus on specializing narrowly but also in a in an inefficient market has been absolutely central to your success.

是的。

Yeah.

让我们做个反向思考。

Well, let's take the the counterfactual.

就像我之前说的，你必须深思熟虑。

So as remember I said, you gotta be thoughtful.

当你开始投资时，必须思考：流程是什么？

When you sit down to start investing, you have to think, what's the process?

哪些因素能让我成功？

What are the elements that are going to make me a success?

重申一次，成功意味着要比别人做得更好。

And again, success means doing better than others.

所以你不能单纯地说'我很聪明'。

So it's it's not to you can't say I'm smart.

你不是世界上最聪明的人，而且业内其他人也都相当聪明。

You're not the smartest person in the world, and and everybody else in in the business is pretty smart.

你不能说我就读于最好的学校。

You can't say I went to the best schools.

那并不能说明太多问题。

That doesn't count for that much.

你不能说，我有这种可普遍应用的智慧，可以运用到每个资产类别，并且比其他人更了解每个资产类别。

You can't say, you know, I have this generalizable intelligence that I can apply to every asset class and know more than others in every asset class.

你必须发展知识优势。

You have to develop a knowledge advantage.

通常这需要：第一，制定正确的方法并始终如一地执行；第二，比其他人知道得更多。

And you have to usually, that comes from, at number one, developing an an approach, which is the right approach and that you implement consistently, and from knowing more than the other people.

可能是拥有更多数据，尽管这很难，因为FCC的职责就是确保每个人都拥有相同的数据。

It may be having more data, although that's hard because the FCC's job is to make sure that everybody has the same data.

也可能是更善于处理数据，或拥有更深刻的见解和分析能力。

Or it may be doing a better job with the data or having more insight and looking at it.

或者如你所说，进入信息分布不均的低效市场。

Or it may be in what you said, going into inefficient markets where the information is not evenly distributed.

但你必须拥有某种优势来源。

But you gotta have some source of superiority.

否则，你怎能指望获胜呢？

Otherwise, how can you expect to win?

你明白吗？

You know?

这是一场竞争异常激烈的游戏，获胜意味着要击败一群同样聪明、精通数学、懂计算机、勤奋且高度积极的人。

It's is an incredibly competitive game, and and and winning consists of beating a bunch of other people who are similarly intelligent, numerate, computer literate, hardworking, and very highly motivated.

所以你必须拥有优势。

So you you have to have an edge.

我认为专业化是获取优势的一种方式。

And I think that I think that specialization is one way to try to get an edge.

不过另一个重要概念是低效市场。

The other thing, though, is is it's really important, the concept of the the less efficient market.

当我试图向人们解释市场效率时，我会说：想象一下，如果我在1969年从芝加哥大学毕业后，遇到一个赌注登记员对我说，听着，我是做足球博彩的。

When I try to illustrate market efficiency to people, what I say is, well, what if when I got out of University of Chicago in '69, I had been approached by a guy and he says, look, I'm a bookmaker, and I book bets on football.

我得出结论：如果能知道比赛开始时哪支球队会赢得抛硬币，我就能在足球博彩上赚大钱。

And I have concluded that I can make a lot of money on football if I know which team is gonna win the coin toss at the beginning of the game.

所以我准备给你15个博士和一台克雷超级计算机，你只需要预测每场比赛开始的抛硬币结果。

So I'm gonna give you 15 PhDs and a Cray supercomputer, and all you have to do is com is predict the coin toss at the beginning of every game.

如果硬币是公平的，这就无法实现。

Now if it's a fair coin, it can't be done.

这完全是浪费时间，因为不存在优势。

It's a waste of time because there's no edge.

这就是有效市场。

And that's an efficient market.

有效市场就是所有人都和你掌握相同信息，不存在任何优势的市场。

An efficient market is a market where everybody knows as much as you do, and there's no edge.

你只是在白费时间。

And you're wasting your time.

因此，我们对低效市场的定义是：勤奋与技能能带来回报的市场。

So our definition of a less efficient market is a market where hard work and skill can pay off.

正如我在1月14日发表的《Getting Lucky》中所写，我很幸运在职业生涯早期发现了一些低效市场。

And, you know, I was as you said, in I wrote in Getting Lucky in January 14 that I was lucky to find some inefficient markets early in my career.

1978年8月7日，我接到花旗银行债券部门负责人的电话，这个电话改变了我的人生。

Seven in August '78, I got the phone call that changed my life from the head of the bond department at Citibank.

他说：'加州有个叫米尔肯的家伙在交易一种叫高收益债券的东西'。

He says, there's some guy named Milken or something in California, and he deals in something called high yield bonds.

'你能搞清楚那是什么吗？'

Do you think you can figure out what that is?

就这么简单。

That was it.

但当时它们被称为垃圾债券。

But they were called junk bonds.

大多数人对其避之唯恐不及。

Most people wouldn't touch them with a 10 foot pole.

那是78年的事。

That was 78.

我当时还没接触到——你知道的，美国的大资金池主要是公共养老基金，各州的，多数是城市的。

I didn't get my first you know, the big pools of of money in America are the public pension funds, states, mostly cities.

我花了十八年才获得第一个公共养老基金账户。

I didn't get my first public pension fund account for eighteen years.

他们不愿意涉足这个领域，因为这在声誉上和政治上都不讨好。

They wouldn't go there because they were reputationally and politically unpalatable.

哦，太棒了。

Oh, great.

你是说这是一种资产类别，我可以买而别人无论出什么价都不愿意买？

You mean it's an asset class that I can buy that nobody else will buy at any price?

嗯，也许全是便宜货呢。

Well, maybe it's whole bargains.

这些事情的运作方式就是这样的。

That's the way these things work.

但如果你看看那些大家都认为很棒且愿意高价购买的东西，你怎么可能在那里捡到便宜呢？

But if you look at the things that everybody thinks are great and will gladly buy at any price, why should you think you can get a bargain there?

1969年我刚入行时，我工作的花旗银行投资了所谓的'漂亮50'——美国最优秀的股票。

When I started in 1969, Citibank, where I worked, was an investor in what we call the Nifty 50, the greatest stocks in America.

如果你在我1969年9月入职那天买入这些股票，并固执地持有五年，你会损失约95%的本金。

And if you bought them the day I got to work in September '69 and you held them tenaciously and faithfully for five years, you lost about 95% of your money.

因为在你买入时，所有人都认为它们是前所未有的好东西。

Because at at the time you bought them, everybody thought they were the greatest thing since sliced bread.

所以这是你必须警惕的事情，你需要关注那些较少人走的路。

So it's something you have to watch out for, and you have to look at the things that are less the the road less taken.

你提到了漂亮50和那次崩盘，这显然对你的职业生涯和投资理念产生了深远影响。

You talk about the nifty 50 and and that blowup, which obviously had a profound effect on on your career and and your philosophy.

我一直在思考你在备忘录中提出的这个问题：既然我们无法预测这些极端外部事件——无论是市场崩盘、疫情、战争还是其他——我们该如何做好准备？

And I I've been thinking a lot about this question that you raise in some of your memos about how we can prepare for these extreme exogenous events, whether it's a market crash or a pandemic or a war or or whatever it might be, given that we can't predict them.

你在某份备忘录中写道。

And you wrote in one of your memos.

我想这应该是你2020年关于不确定性的第二份备忘录。

I think it was the second of your memos on uncertainty in 2020.

我们可以通过认识到这些事件必然会发生，并在经济发展和投资者行为使市场更容易受到意外事件冲击时，让我们的投资组合更加谨慎来实现这一点。

We can do so by recognizing that they will inevitably occur and by making our portfolios more cautious when economic developments and investor behavior render markets more vulnerable to damage from untoward events.

你能详细谈谈这一点吗？

Can you talk a little bit about that?

因为我认为如何处理不确定性这个问题，绝对是作为投资者最核心的要务。

Because I I I think this whole question of how to deal with uncertainty is at the absolute core of what what you do as an investor.

首先，有句名言说市场里亏钱的人分两种。

Well, first of all, one of the great sayings is that there are two kinds of people who lose money in the market.

一种是什么都不懂的人，另一种是什么都懂的人。

The people who know nothing and the people who know everything.

所以我希望自己永远不要一无所知，但也从不认为自己无所不知。

So I hope I never know nothing, but I never think I know everything.

具体来说，我认为宏观未来是不可预测的。

And specifically, I believe that the macro future is unpredictable.

但有些迹象能让我们对未来有所预见。

But there are things that can give us a hint at what lies ahead.

所以我写了第二本书《掌握市场周期》，2018年出版，书中探讨了市场倾向性。

So I wrote my second book, Mastering the Market Cycle, published in 2018, and it talked about tendencies.

我常说，我们永远无法预知市场走向，但能感知它何时倾向于向好或向坏。

And And I say, we never know what the market's gonna do, we can have a feeling for when its tendency will be to do well or its tendency will be to do poorly.

而这种倾向性很大程度上取决于我们处于周期的哪个阶段。

And its tendency will largely be determined by where we are in the cycle.

因此当市场持续繁荣十六年、股价上涨、市盈率高企、作为恐惧晴雨表的债券利差收窄时，我们可以判断市场可能倾向走弱，并相应调整策略。

So when things have been going great and prices have been rising, as you can say, for sixteen years, and we're and and PE ratios are high and bond yield spreads, which are a barometer of fear, are narrow, We we can we can assess that the tendency of the market may be to do less well and act accordingly.

你不需要做出任何预测。

You don't have to make any predictions.

我之前提到的五个判断都不是基于预测得出的。

None of those five calls I talked about a little while ago was based on a prediction.

它们都源于观察。

It was based on an observation.

威廉，我想说的是，我们永远不知道未来会怎样。

And what I say, William, is we never know where we're going.

但我们至少应该清楚当前的处境。

We sure as hell ought to know where we are.

价格和估值是否过高？

And are are prices and valuations high?

风险是否被忽视了？

Is risk being ignored?

人们是否表现得过于乐观和亢奋？

Are people acting in an exuberant, buoyant way?

这些问题能帮你评估概率，尽管你无法预知未来。

These are the questions that can tell you what the odds are even though you don't know what the future holds.

其实我一直不太喜欢那本书的标题。

And, you know, I I I never cared for the title of that book.

我原本想用一个更学术化的书名。

I had a I had a more erudite title in mind.

我觉得《掌握市场周期》这个书名有点俗气，但出版商坚持要用，因为他们觉得这样书会更好卖。

I thought mastering the market cycle was a little cheesy, but it's what the publisher wanted because they thought they'd sell more books.

不过我很喜欢这本书的副标题。

But I like the subtitle of the book.

当然，副标题通常不太引人注意。

And, of course, subtitles don't get much attention.

但那本书的副标题是《让概率站在你这边》。

But the subtitle of that book was getting the odds on your side.

你永远无法预知未来会发生什么。

You never know what's gonna happen.

但有时你能感知某些事件发生的概率。

You can have a sense sometimes for what the odds of a certain event are.

当市场处于周期高位时，胜算往往对你不利。

And when the market is high in its cycle, the the odds are against you.

而当市场处于周期低谷时，胜算就会偏向你这边。

And when it's low in the cycle, the odds are in your favor.

但你要知道，即使胜算在你这边，接下来一两年甚至三年你也可能亏钱，反之亦然。

But, you know, the odds can be in your favor, and you can lose money for the next year or two or three and vice versa.

我想起写《更富有、更睿智、更快乐》这本书时——你是书中的核心人物之一——那五年间我最大的领悟就是：我们面临一个根本性问题，未来是不可知的，但正如你常写的，我们又必须对未来做出决策。

I think when I wrote my book, richer, wiser, happier, where you you were one of the central characters, I think in a way that was my biggest revelation over the five years of working on the book and digesting that material was that we we have this fundamental problem that the future is unknowable, and yet as as you often write, we have to make decisions about the future.

这让我深受震撼（可能深受你的影响），就是尽管无法掌控，却仍能通过各种微妙方式让胜算向自己倾斜。

And it struck me, I I think probably deeply influenced by you, was that there are all of these ways in which you even though you have no control, you can very subtly stack the odds in your in your favor.

这种认知让我觉得——它就像大多数真理一样，既显得平庸又无比深刻。

And that that strikes me I mean, it it kinda is simultaneously like most truths sort of banal and incredibly profound.

你能详细谈谈这个观点吗？

Can can you talk a little bit about that idea?

因为这似乎是贯穿所有伟大投资者生活的指导原则——这种能力。

Because it seems like a sort of guiding principle that actually I think runs through all of the great investors' lives is this ability.

比如埃德·索普就是这样的人，他通过不参与自己难以取胜的游戏，或是确保以理性独立的方式分析证据（无论是关于新冠疫情、市场还是其他），极其微妙地改变了胜率。

You see it with someone like Ed Thorpe, right, who you know, like, just to very subtly stack the odds by, say, not playing games that you're ill equipped to win or by making sure you analyze the evidence in a very rational independent way, whether it's about COVID or or markets or anything like that.

你能再深入解释一下吗？

Can can you unpack that a little?

嗯，你知道，关于这个话题有太多想法了。

Well, you know, I mean, there are so many thoughts on that subject.

但沃伦·巴菲特最直言不讳的观点之一就是，比如在棒球比赛中，你应该站上打击区等待好球。

But one of the things that Warren Buffett has been most outspoken about is that in baseball, for example, you should get up to the plate and you should wait for a good pitch.

首先，你必须能分辨什么是好球什么是坏球。

And you you you first of all, you have to have a sense for what's a good pitch and what's a bad one.

他讲过泰德·威廉姆斯的故事，泰德不仅会等待好球，还对自己的表现非常钻研，他记录了自己所有的击球数据。

And he tells the story that Ted Williams not only was Ted Williams waiting for good pitches, but he he was very studious about his accomplishments, and he and he charted all his batting.

他会分析球投在哪里以及击球结果如何。

And if he's and he figured out where was the pitch and what was the result.

他研究出了规律。

And he figured it out.

他把好球区划分成18个区域，并总结说如果球落在第1、2或4区，他通常能击出一垒安打。

He broke the the strike zone into 18 spots, and he said, well, if the ball is in spot number one, two, or four, I tend to get a single.

如果落在第5或6区，他通常能击出二垒安打。

If it's in five or six, I tend to get a double.

如果球落在七号或八号区域，我往往会三振出局。

And if it's if it's in seven or eight, I tend to strike out.

所以你必须判断什么是好球，然后耐心等待。

So you you gotta figure out what's a good pitch, and you gotta wait for it.

他说巴菲特一直倡导耐心而非过度活跃。

He says and and Buffett has always advocated patience and not hyperactivity.

但他指出投资与棒球不同——在棒球比赛中，如果你扛着球棒站着不动，让三个好球飞过，你就出局了。

But he points out that in investing, unlike baseball, in baseball, if you stand there with the bat on your shoulder and you'll let three pitches go by and the strikes on, you're out.

但在投资中，你可以等待更久。

But in investing, you can wait more.

你不会因为好球未击而被判出局。

You you don't get called out on strikes.

严格来说也不完全正确，因为如果你是职业投资者，替别人管理资金，若你扛着球棒十六年不动，而市场持续上涨，你可能会被淘汰出局。

Now it's not exactly true because if you're a professional investor, you're investing for others, and you you sit there with the bat on your shoulder and the market goes up for sixteen years, you might be called out.

但沃伦有个特殊优势，他从不担心会被解雇，而我们其他人可能会。

But Warren had the particular benefit that he was never thought never thought he might get fired, but the rest of us might.

但耐心仍然非常重要。

But still, patience is very important.

等待一个客观上的好球，也就是适合你的投资机会，这是你可以做到的。

And waiting for a good pitch objectively and your kind of pitch, your kind of investment, and you can do that.

我们之前讨论过要在自己的能力范围内行事。

And, you know, we talked before about playing within yourself.

明确你要寻找的投资标的类型。

Figure out the kinds of things you're looking for.

你不能因为别人觉得有吸引力就去购买某项资产。

You can't buy something because you think it's attractive to others.

它必须对你有吸引力，符合你的标准，而且你应该有一套明确的标准。

It has to be attractive to you and has to satisfy your criteria, and you should have a set of criteria.

这些都是能让你获得优势的方法。

So these are the things you can do to get the odds on your side.

我认为还有另一个至关重要的相关经验，这些年来我一直努力从你身上深刻领悟的，就是不要自欺欺人地看待我们所处的环境和条件。

I think there's another really critical related lesson that I've tried deeply internalize from you over the years, which is not to fool oneself about the conditions, the environment in which we find ourselves.

这周重读你的备忘录时我经常找不到，但你的精神导师彼得·伯恩斯坦有句我常引用的绝妙名言——我可能会记错——他说的大意是：市场不是一台很会迁就的机器。

And I often I I couldn't find it when I was rereading your memos this week, but there's a really beautiful quote from your intellectual hero, Peter Bernstein, that I often quote that I'll probably garble, where he said something like, the market is not a very accommodating machine.

它不会仅仅因为你需要或想要高回报就给你高回报。

It won't give you high returns just because you need them or want them.

对。

Right.

没错。

Right.

是的。

Right.

你能谈谈这个观点吗？

Can can you talk about that?

因为我认为这也是你投资方法如此与众不同的地方。

Because I I think that's also so distinctive to your approach.

而且这是个极其深刻的核心思想——让自己适应现实本身，而非你希望它成为的样子。

And and it's such a profound and central idea, this idea of of accommodating yourself to reality as it is, not as you wish it might be.

首先，好消息是在哺乳动物周年纪念之际，我们发布了一份在线数字汇编。

Well, first of all, the good news is that that on the occasion of the anniversary of the mammals, we published an online digital compilation.

顺便说一下，它是免费的，所以价格很合适。

And by the way, it's free, so the price is right.

但它是可搜索的。

But it's searchable.

所以如果你想找到那句引语，下次就能找到了。

So if you want to find that quote, you can find it next time.

而且，你知道，我的意思是，不要自欺欺人。

And, you know, I mean, the thing is, don't kid yourself.

查理·芒格总是喜欢引用哲学家德摩斯梯尼的话说：'人总会相信他所希望的'。

And Charlie Munger always used to say delightfully, he used to quote the philosopher Demosthenes who said, for that which a man wishes, that he will believe.

我们往往会这样做，而这是有害的。

And we tend to do that, and that's injurious.

因为假设你是个股票经纪人，靠佣金赚钱。

Because you let's say let's say you're a stockbroker and you get paid on commission.

你会说，嗯，总有些好东西值得买。

And you say, well, there's always something good to buy.

于是你每天为客户买入，赚取大量佣金。

And so you buy every day for your clients and you make a lot of commissions.

那么，猜猜怎么着？

Well, guess what?

有些日子根本没有值得买的东西。

Some days there's nothing good to buy.

你必须接受这个事实，成熟应对，保持耐心，克制冲动。

And you have to accept that and be mature about it and be patient and and and hold back.

所以，这一切都需要成熟、分析力、耐心、洞察力，了解自己和自身偏见，理解赚钱的过程，然后等待时机成熟再加大筹码。

And so, you know, it it all goes with being mature, analytical, patient, insightful, understanding yourself and your biases, understanding the process of how money is made, and then waiting until the odds are on your side to turn up the wick.

我认为你应该始终保持投资状态。

Now I believe you should have investments all the time.

但有时可以更激进些，有时则需要更保守些。

But sometimes you do it more aggressively, and sometimes you do it more defensively.

你要等待那些黄金时刻，才能真正加大力度，采取更积极的策略。

You wait for those golden moments to really turn up the wick and become more aggressive.

你提到查理一生中真正赚大钱的机会主要来自大约四次重大投资。

And you've made the point that Charlie really made most of his hay on about four four big bets in the course of his lifetime.

嗯，查理过去常说，四次重大投资。

Well, Charlie used to say that, four big bets.

我记得他或者沃伦说过沃伦有八次这样的机会。

And I think he either he or Warren said that Warren had eight.

不过，查理会说他的所有财富都来自四件事。

But, Charlie would say that that he made all those money in four things.

让我们稍事休息，听听今天赞助商的消息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

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Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.

这就是Alexa和AWS人工智能背后的故事。

That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.

Alexa每天处理超过10亿次交互，涵盖17种语言，同时将客户摩擦减少40%。

Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.

这不仅让生活更便捷，更在变革客户互动方式并创造新的收入来源。

It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.

幕后由AWS AI驱动的70多个专业模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业如何能规模化部署AI并确保安全可靠。

Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.

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Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

这些创新现为其他企业提供成熟框架，用以提升效率、开辟新收入来源并获得持久市场优势。

These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.

访问aws.comai/rstory了解Alexa的故事。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.comai/rstory.

网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

新年伊始，正是开启你梦想事业的最佳时机。就在几年前，我推出了自己的电商业务，而Shopify正是我起步所需的工具。

It's the new year, which means that it's the best time to finally start the business you've been dreaming Just a couple years ago, I launched my own e commerce business and Shopify was exactly the tool I needed to get started.

尽管许多人不断将梦想推迟到下一年，但我要告诉你，现在正是把握眼前机遇的最佳时机。

While many people continually push off their dreams until the next year, I am here to tell you that now is the time to capitalize on the opportunities right in front of you.

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数百万企业家，包括我自己在内，已经完成了从家喻户晓的品牌到初次创业者的跨越。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already made this leap from household names to first time business owners just getting started.

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Choose from hundreds of beautiful templates that you can customize and use their built in AI tools to write product descriptions or edit product photos.

随着您的成长，Shopify将一路相伴，与您共同进步。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you every step of the way.

2026年，别再等待，立即通过Shopify开启销售之旅。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

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Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

请访问shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

那是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

在新的一年里，让Shopify伴你同行。

Hear your first This new year with Shopify by your side.

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Startups move fast.

借助AI技术，它们的产品交付更快，能更早吸引企业买家。

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但大额交易会带来更大的安全和合规要求。

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恰当的安全措施能促成交易，也能毁掉交易。

The right kind of security can make a deal or break it.

但哪位创始人或工程师能抽出时间，不专注于公司建设呢？

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访问vanta.com/billionaires立减1000美元。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

好的。

All right.

回到节目中来。

Back to the show.

这些年来你写了很多关于查理的文章，比如提到有一次你们共进午餐时他说的那句名言——我认为他说的是'事情本就不该容易'。

You've written a a lot about Charlie over the years mentioning, for example, his great line, I think, at a lunch that you had with him once where he said, it's not supposed to be easy.

任何觉得容易的人都是愚蠢的。

Anyone who finds it easy is stupid.

你能谈谈从查理身上学到了什么吗？

Can you talk a little bit about what you learned from Charlie?

不仅是关于投资，更是关于如何过好这一生。

Not just about investing, but really about a life well lived.

嗯，你看。

Well, look.

他是个天才。

He was brilliant.

他博览群书。

He was extremely well read.

他他他他热爱思考，总是沉浸在对事物的思索中。

He was he he he loved thinking, and he would just think about stuff.

他发展出这些他称之为思维模型的东西，构建了他所说的'心智模型网格'。

And he developed these things he called mental models for thought, and he had a lattice what what he called the latticework of mental models.

这就像一套工具包。

And, know, it's like a toolkit.

你知道，我们作为成年人和投资者所做的很多事情，可以称之为模式识别。

And, you know, a lot of what we do as adults and and and and as investors is what you would might call pattern recognition.

活得久了并用心观察周围事物、运用智慧的美妙之处在于，当x y z发生时...

And the great thing about having lived a while and paid attention to what's gone around you and applying some intelligence is that, you know, x y z happens.

你不必停留。

You don't have to stay.

那是什么？

Was that?

这是什么？

What is it?

为什么会发生这种情况？

Why did it happen?

这意味着什么？

What does it mean?

我该怎么做？

What should I do about it?

在某些时候，你可能会达到一个境界，会说：哦，这是其中一种情况。

You at some point, you might reach a point where you say, oh, that's one of those.

我知道该怎么处理。

I know what to do about that.

所以你需要一个工具箱，知道该用哪些工具。

So you you have to have a toolkit so you know which tools to apply.

这就是查理。

And and that was Charlie.

他非常聪明，内心世界极其丰富且深思熟虑，直言不讳，总是想到什么就说什么，不管对方是谁或场合如何。他是那种善良的人，但也是你见过最不讲究政治正确的人。

And so very smart, very incredibly thoughtful in interior life, very outspoken, you know, said exactly what he thought all the time, regardless of who he was saying to or what it was or whether it would be you know, he was one of the he was he was a good kind person, but he was the furthest thing from PC that you ever met.

他会直接说出他认为正确的事。

And he would just say what he thought was right.

事实上，我觉得他有一本传记。

And and in fact, I think he has a biography.

是的。

Yeah.

市面上有本关于他的传记。

There's a biography of him out.

大概二十年前出版的，书名就叫《没错》。

It came out maybe twenty years ago or something, and the title is damn right.

因为这就是他的口头禅。

Because that's what he would say.

他就是这样的查理，会直接说‘没错，我就是这样’。

He's, well, you're Charlie thinking, damn right, am.

你明白吗？

You know?

强调。

Emphatic.

所以，我的意思是，他显然才华横溢，但但有一套自己的方法。

And so, I mean, he just was obviously brilliant, but but had this process.

未经约束的才华只能带你走这么远。

And unharnessed brilliance will get you only so far.

但他将其约束成了一套方法。

But he harnessed it into a process.

而且，你知道，他提出了很多

And, you know, he came up with a lot

的

of

指导沃伦的哲学观点。

the philosophical points that guided Warren.

其中最著名的是他说服沃伦停止在阴沟里寻找别人丢弃的、只剩一口的雪茄烟蒂。

The big one he's credited with is they convinced Warren to stop looking in the gutter for cigar butts that others had thrown away that had one puff left.

相反，与其试图以极好的价格买入普通的公司，不如以合理的价格买入优秀的公司。

And instead instead of trying to buy okay companies at great prices, try to buy great companies at an okay prices.

这就是为什么巴菲特和伯克希尔能取得如今的成就。

And that's why Buffett and Berkshire became what they did.

你刚才稍微谈到了模式识别能力，能够判断出这是其中之一。

You talked there a little bit about, patent recognition and the ability to say this is one of those.

显然，大家目前对你的观点很感兴趣，特别是你对当前投资环境的看法。

And, obviously, there's a lot of interest at the moment in your view of the the current investment environment.

我知道你过去三周一直在亚洲等地进行大规模访问，会见了许多客户。

I know you've been on a big trip around Asia and the like over the last three weeks meeting with lots of clients.

我相信你听到了很多这类问题。

I'm sure you're hearing a lot of these these questions.

八月份你写了一篇名为《价值计算》的文章，提到市场已从高位转向令人担忧的状态。

In August, you wrote a piece called the calculus of value where you said the market has moved from elevated to worrisome.

我想知道，当你将当前时期与1973-74年、1999-2000年或2007-08年相比时，在贪婪与恐惧、乐观与悲观、风险偏好与风险厌恶的钟摆运动中，有哪些相似之处？

And I'm wondering when you look at this period compared, say, to 1973, '74, or '99, 2000, or 2007 to 2008, what is it that rhymes in terms of where we stand in the pendulum between greed and fear and optimism and pessimism and risk tolerance and risk aversion?

既然你认为我们尚未达到那种极端情况，那么是什么让你认为我们目前还未达到那种极端呢？

And what makes you not think that we're at that kind of extreme yet, if that's still the case that you don't yet think we're at that kind of extreme most likely?

嗯，我并没有实时掌握市场脉搏，所以不清楚当前或本周的具体情况。

Well, I don't have my finger on the pulse, so I don't know where we are today or this week.

不过我认为在寻找历史参照时，最强烈的对比（虽非完美对比）——我不是说程度上的相似，威廉，而是性质上的——最强烈的对比就是1998至2000年的互联网泡沫。

Or but I think that when you look for comparisons, the strongest comparison not a perfect comparison, and I'm not saying this is true in degree, William, but in kind, the strongest comparison is to the tmtinternet.com bubble of ninety eight, ninety nine, two thousand.

漂亮五十行情则不同，因为它并非围绕某项新兴技术，而主要是围绕成熟的优秀企业。

The nifty fifty was different because it was not around one novel technology, and it was around established great companies for the most part.

我的意思是，漂亮五十时期并没有出现什么技术奇迹。

I mean, there were no there were no technological marvels that that cracked out in the nifty fifty.

而次贷危机和抵押贷款支持证券时期也不具可比性，因为那并非技术创新。

And then the years May with the subprime and the mortgage backed securities subprime mortgage backed securities is not comparable because that was not a technological innovation.

那是一种金融创新。

That was a financial invention.

没人会认为次级抵押贷款将彻底改变住房行业。

Nobody thought that, oh, well, you know, subprime mortgages is gonna change the business of housing.

房屋本身并未受到影响。

The houses were unaffected.

只是他们说，我们可以通过为一类新买家提供融资来赚钱，结果证明这是个糟糕的主意。

It's just that they said, well, we can make money by giving financing to a new class of buyers, which turned out to be a bad idea.

那些人甚至不愿提供收入或资产证明。

People who wouldn't document their earnings or their assets.

所以这与互联网泡沫具有可比性。

So it's this is comparable to the Internet bubble.

要知道，人们当时都说互联网将改变世界。

You know, people said the Internet will change the world.

你猜怎么着？

And guess what?

它确实做到了。

It did.

你能想象没有互联网的当今世界吗？

Can you imagine today's world without the Internet?

它已经在无数方面彻底改变了世界。

It's completely changed in a million ways.

事实上，包括我们现在正通过它进行对话这一点。

In fact, including the fact that we're talking over it.

因此这是可以类比的。

And so this is comparable.

我认为这项科技创新将会改变世界。

It's a technological innovation that I think is gonna change the world.

但我的记忆是，我们对互联网将如何改变世界有更清晰的预见。

But my recollection is we had a clearer view of how the Internet would change the world.

而许多人在1999年、2000年的预见如今已成现实。

And the view of many in '99, 2000 became has become true.

我认为当时很多兴奋点集中在电子商务上，而电子商务确实已成为主要力量。

And I think a lot of the excitement surrounded ecommerce, and ecommerce has become a major force.

所以给我的感觉是，我们当时对互联网发展轨迹的预见，大部分都已实现。

So it it just feels to me like we we had a vision of how that was gonna work out, and it mostly came true.

如今，我觉得我们对此的认知更少了。

Today, I think we have less of that.

我个人并非专家。

I personally I'm not an expert.

我是世界上最不专业的人，但我从未听任何人告诉我AI将如何改变世界。

I'm the furthest thing from an expert in the world, but I've never heard anybody tell me how AI is gonna change the world.

我们知道它是强大的资源。

We know it's a powerful source.

它能思考。

It can think.

它能处理数据。

It can process data.

它能访问所有曾被汇编的数据。

It can it has access to all the data that's ever been compiled.

它具体会做什么、如何形成商业模式、人们如何从中获利、它将如何影响生活，我认为这些都还不够清晰。

Exactly what it's gonna do, how that's gonna be a business, how people are gonna make money at it, how it's gonna impact life, I think is less clear.

但我确实认为这两者具有可比性。

But I I do I do think that the two are compare comparable.

在这两种情况下，都有激发想象力的新事物出现，而大多数泡沫都围绕着新事物产生。

And in in both cases, there was a new new thing that fired the imagination, and most bubbles are around something new.

1969年，是成长股投资。

In '69, it was growth stock investing.

2006年，是次级抵押贷款。

In o six, it was subprime mortgages.

1999年，是互联网。

In '99, it was the Internet.

1720年，是南海公司。

In 1720, it was the South Sea Company.

1620年，是荷兰的郁金香球茎。

And in 1620, it was tulip bulbs in Holland.

所以我总强调，围绕新事物产生的泡沫非常真实，因为想象力不受约束，可以天马行空地发展。

So I always make this point that the bubbles are very real around something new because the imagination is untrammied, and it can take go off in a flight of fancy.

你可以想象树木长到天上。

And you can imagine trees growing to the sky.

你永远不会在造纸股或木材股中看到泡沫。

You're never gonna have a bubble in in paper stocks or timber stocks.

明白吗？

You know?

这太乏味了。

It's too prosaic.

人们可能会说，我们知道你们要建多少房子。

And people can say, well, you know, we can tell how many houses you're gonna build.

我们知道每栋房子需要多少木材。

We know how much wood is needed in each house.

我们能说出木材的来源。

We can tell where we're gonna get it from.

所以，在这些乏味的领域里，你不可能有这种树木参天的幻想时刻。

And so, you know, you can't have these tree grow to the sky moments in the prosaic areas.

总是新事物不断涌现。

It's always something new.

你最近有一次非常有趣的对话，霍华德，我昨天听了你和《魔鬼吞噬落后者》作者爱德华·钱塞勒的谈话，这本书在2000年泡沫时期对你产生了重要影响。

You you had a very interesting conversation recently, Howard, that I was listening to yesterday with Edward Chancellor, author of devil take the hindmost, which had had an important impact on you when you first saw the the two thousand bubble.

对。

Right.

在那次对话中你提到，你做出了两个大胆的论断。

And one of the things you said in that conversation, you you made two bold statements.

你说过，第一，人工智能将改变世界。

You said, number one, AI will change the world.

第二，如今人们投资的大多数公司——换句话说，那些试图从人工智能中获利的公司——最终将一文不值。

Number two, most of the companies people are investing in today, in other words, to profit from AI, will end up worthless.

然后你还说过，当天真或满怀希望的投资者盲目相信这股不可抗拒的趋势必定带来利润时，那就是他们陷入麻烦的时候。

And then you said, when the naive or hopeful investor takes the leap that the irresistible trend will produce sure profits, that's when you get into trouble.

嗯，雷莫，我想我应该回去重新读读那段话。

Well, I should go back and reread that, Remo, I think.

但我你知道，确实如此。

But I you know, that's right.

改变世界和投资者赚钱是两码事。

And and change the world and investors making money are are not the same thing.

事实上，沃伦·巴菲特曾指出——我记得他是在2000年的年度会议上说的——互联网会极大提升生产力。

And in fact, Warren Buffett pointed out, and I think he said this about the Internet, that I think it was his in his two thousand annual meeting, there's no doubt that the Internet will produce a great increase in productivity.

但不清楚这是否会对盈利能力产生积极影响。

It's not clear that it'll have a positive impact on profitability.

我认为AI的情况也是如此。

And I think the same is true with AI.

AI会...我的意思是，我看到CNN正在播放一则广告。

AI is gonna you know, I mean, my my concern is I I saw that CNN is running an ad.

在我旅行期间，我观看了CNN国际频道，他们在为一档节目造势，主持人问嘉宾：'AI有能力淘汰一半的初级岗位吗？'

I would on my travel, I watched CNN International, and they had a you know, they're drumming up interest in a show, and the anchor says to a guest, you say that AI has the ability to eliminate half of entry level jobs.

然后他们接着说：'这将是整个对话的内容，因为接下来他们要切入其他话题了。'

That that was the whole conversation because then they cut to something else.

但关键在于，这可能是真的。

But but the point is that may be true.

而且显然，如果你能在保持美国GDP的同时消除一半的初级岗位，可能会更有利可图，或者说至少能提高生产率。

And, obviously, if you can produce The US GDP and eliminate half the entry level jobs, it could be more profitable, but or certainly more productive.

但问题在于，这真的会带来更高利润吗？

But the question is, will it be more profitable?

节省下来的成本会流向谁？

To whom will the savings accrue?

如果不同公司竞相提供AI服务，他们可能会在价格上激烈竞争，直至无利可图。

If different companies are competing to provide the AI service, maybe they'll compete on price to the point where they're where where it's not profitable for them.

或者如果使用AI服务的企业争夺市场份额，可能所有节省的成本都会以降价形式让利给消费者。

Or if the people who employ AI service compete for market share, maybe all the savings will go to the consumer in the form of lower prices.

所以AI这种节省劳动力的工具究竟如何转化为利润，我认为没人能断言。

So exactly how the the labor saving tool of AI is gonna turn into profits, I don't think anybody can say.

霍华德，你总爱问：这里面的错误是什么？

You often like to ask, Howard, what's the mistake here?

显然，我们完全不知道事情会如何发展。

And and so, obviously, we don't have any idea how this is gonna pan out.

但当你自问在这种时期，特别是对于天真轻信的投资者或是被狂热情绪冲昏头脑的聪明投资者来说，哪些错误最值得警惕？

But when you ask yourself what would be the likely mistakes worth avoiding at a time like this, particularly for either naive and credulous investors or just for smart investors who get sucked into euphoria?

我们当下应该努力避免哪些可能的错误？

What are the likely mistakes we ought to be trying to avoid here?

我在一次次市场狂热中观察到的是：第一，绝不能想当然认为今天的龙头企业明天必定还是龙头。

Well, the what I've seen in in in euphoria after euphoria is, number one, you shouldn't make the assumption that today's leaders are certain to be the leaders of tomorrow.

它们可能仍然是，但你不该押上全部身家。第二，不要因为龙头股价格高就认为投资滞涨股是明智选择——仅仅因为它们更便宜。

They may well be, but you shouldn't bet your life on Number two, you shouldn't assume that because the leaders are selling at high prices that it's a good idea to invest in the laggards because they're cheaper.

很多人会说：'这些股票成功概率虽低，但潜在回报巨大，所以我该买入'。

They much you people say, well, they have a low probability of success, but maybe a big payoff, so I should buy it.

这就是我所说的彩票心态。

And that's what I call lottery ticket mentality.

你要明白，如果成功概率很低，你就该接受这很可能意味着失败。

And, you know, if they have a low probability of success, you should accept that that means chances are good upon success.

关于AI领域，我认为你可以对毫无其他业务的公司进行二元押注，这将是孤注一掷的赌注；或者你可以投资那些已经成熟的优秀科技公司——即便AI未能带来巨大变革，它们仍能保持业务运营和盈利，只是从AI中获得适度收益。

And then on the AI, I'm led to believe I'm led to believe that you can make binary bets in companies that have nothing else going on, which will be sink or swim bets, or you can invest in through great tech tech you know, preexisting great tech companies, which will get moderate benefits from AI if they're successful, but still be in business and and profitable if it's not that big a deal.

现在我们又回到了对话的最初。

And now we're back to the very beginning of our conversation.

你是想要投资一家如今既无收入也无利润的初创企业，它可能成为改变游戏规则的黑马？

Do you wanna have a novel entrepreneurial startup pure play, which has no revenues and no profits today, but could be a moonshot if it works?

还是选择投资一家已经成熟且盈利丰厚的科技公司，AI对其只是锦上添花而非颠覆性变革？

Or do you want to invest in a great tech company, which is already existing and making a lot of money where AI could be incremental but not life changing.

这是个选择问题。

It's a choice.

你的风格是什么？

What's your style?

你的策略是什么？

What's your game plan?

但如果你要对新型公司进行二元押注，你必须清楚这有多高风险。

But, I mean, if you're gonna make binary bets on novel companies, you have to understand how risky that is.

显然，关于黄金（最近每盎司突破了4000美元）和比特币的猜测也很多。

There's also been a lot of speculation, obviously, both on gold, which recently hit more than $4,000 an ounce, and on Bitcoin.

我回顾了你之前的一份备忘录，你在里面提到要么相信黄金，要么不信，就像你信不信上帝一样。

And I I I was looking back at one of your old memos where you were saying either you believe in gold or you don't, and you you you compared it to whether you believe in God or not.

你写道，在你看来，对于不产生现金流的资产，没有分析性的估值方法。

That there's there's no analytical way, in my opinion, you wrote, to value an asset that doesn't produce cash flow.

我也一直无法说服自己购买比特币，现在它的价格从10月份以来下跌了约三分之一，每枚9万美元。

And I've never been able to bring myself to buy Bitcoin either, and it's now down about a third since October to $90,000 a coin.

显然你和儿子安德鲁就这个问题已经争论过很多次了。

And you you've debated this obviously a lot with your son, Andrew.

现在当你审视比特币和黄金，并思考它们是否应该出现在投资组合中时，你作何感想？

How do you feel now when you look at Bitcoin and gold and you kind of try to wrestle with whether they belong in someone's portfolio?

嗯，你知道的，听着。

Well, you know, look.

我和橡树资本都认为自己是价值投资者。

I and Oaktree consider ourselves value investors.

价值投资者所做的就是审视一种情况，无论是股票、公司、债券、房地产还是其他任何资产，并试图确定其内在价值。

And what the value investor does is you look at a situation, whether it's a stock, a company, a bond, a building, whatever it might be, and you try to figure out its intrinsic value.

然后你将看到当前价格与该内在价值的对比情况。

And then you see how the price today compares to that intrinsic value.

而内在价值总是来源于它能赚钱，能盈利并产生现金流这一事实。

And intrinsic value invariably comes from the fact that it can make money, that it can be profitable and produce cash flow.

所以，你看，假设我有一栋楼，它每年能带来一百万美元的利润，我想卖掉它，而你想买下它，我们可以进行讨论。

And so, you know, let's say I have a building and it produces a million dollars a year in profit, and you I'd like to sell it and you'd like to buy it, we can have a discussion.

我说，我想要1200万美元，在这种情况下，你将获得8%的回报率。

And I say, I'd like $12,000,000 for it, in which case you'll get an 8% rate of return.

你说，不行。

And you say, no.

我只愿意支付800万美元，因为我想要12%的回报率，因为这有风险。

I wanna pay $8,000,000 for it because I want a 12% return because it's risky.

我说，不行。

And I say, no.

你得支付1100万美元。

You have to pay $11,000,000.

我们得给你9%的回报率，但这个比例会随时间增长，同时风险也由你承担。

We gotta give you a 9% return, but that'll go up over time and it'll make you the risk.

然后你说，你看，我们可以商量，但我们的讨论始终围绕价值这个核心范围。

And you say, you know, so we can talk, but we're talking in a range centered around the value.

但如果你投资的是比特币、黄金、钻石或画作这类东西，它们根本没有内在价值。

But if you're doing Bitcoin or gold or diamonds or or paintings, there is no intrinsic value.

而且你知道，我经常以石油举例。

And, you know, I always talk about oil.

我记得石油，威廉，在6月还是7月时是每桶147美元，到了1月份就跌到35美元一桶了。

Oil as I recall, oil, William, was a $147 a barrel in June or July '7, and then $35 a barrel in January.

石油本身没有任何改变。

Nothing changed about oil.

它依然是黑色的。

It was still black.

它依然能让虱子消失，我们消耗它的速度依然快于发现新储量的速度。

It still made the lice go, and it still we were using it faster than we were finding it.

石油没有内在价值。

Oil doesn't have an intrinsic value.

所有这些资产，它们的价值只取决于市场愿意支付的价格。

And all these assets, all they're worth is their price is what the market will bear.

但这样你怎么进行理性投资呢？

But that's how can you invest analytically?

如果我对你说，或者对一个黄金爱好者或比特币爱好者说，你觉得一年后的价格会是多少？

If I say to you if I say to a gold fan or a Bitcoin fan, well, what do you think the price will be in a year?

他们是如何得出这个结论的？

How do they reach that conclusion?

他们的依据是什么？

What do they base it on?

如果他们缺乏现金流作为这个结论的基础。

And if if they don't have cash flow to base that conclusion on.

我记得我在备忘录里说过什么，你可能比我记得更清楚，毕竟那是十五年前的事了，说不定你昨天刚读过。

And what I think I said in the memo, you probably remembered better than I do since it's fifteen years ago, you probably read it yesterday.

但我想我说过，你可以出于迷信投资黄金。

But I think I said, you can invest in it out of superstition, gold.

你可以投资它，因为你认为它会升值。

You can invest in it because you think it'll go up.

你可以投资它，因为你认为它能保值，毕竟历来如此，但你无法基于所谓的'内在价值'进行理性分析投资。

You can invest in it because you think it'll be a store of value because it always has, but you can't invest it in it analytically on the basis of something called intrinsic value.

我依然认为这个观点成立。

I still think that's true.

所以一年前买入黄金的人已经赚得盆满钵满。

So the people who bought gold a year ago have made a ton of money.

那些在我来参加这次电话会议前，午餐时刚好查阅数据时买入黄金的人。

The people who bought gold at the time I just happened to look at the numbers at at my lunch before coming here to do this phone call with you.

如果你在2010年买入黄金，我想你至今的年化收益率是7.7%。

And if you bought gold at the 2010, I think you've had a 7.7% annual return since then.

如果你同期买入标普500指数，年化回报率可达12.7%。

And if you bought the S and P at the same time, you've had a 12.7% rate of return.

所以黄金投资并非灾难性的，但你不该被最近一个月的涨幅迷惑。

So it's not that gold was a disaster, but you you shouldn't be distracted by the gains of the last month.

这始终是个表现平平的投资品种。

It's it's been a lackluster investment.

你在2022年12月写过一份重要备忘录《SeaChange》，谈到自1980年以来依赖利率下降的时代彻底终结。

You wrote a really important memo called SeaChange in, I think, December 2022 where you talked about really the end of the end of an era where we could rely on declining interest rates that that had gone on since 1980.

你在备忘录中提到：投资者现在可以通过信贷工具获得稳健收益，这意味着他们不再需要过度依赖高风险投资来实现整体回报目标。

And one thing you wrote in that memo was investors can now potentially get solid returns from credit investments, sorry, from credit instruments, meaning they no longer have to rely as heavily on riskier investments to achieve their overall return targets.

能否谈谈普通投资者如何把握高收益债券等领域的投资机会？

Can you talk a little bit about the best way for regular investors to take advantage of opportunities in areas like high yield bonds and the like?

因为我对这个领域实在知之甚少，而你显然造诣颇深。

Because this is an area where my ignorance really runs deep, and obviously your knowledge runs very deep.

比如在当下令人担忧的环境里，若想获得类似股票的回报，具体该怎么做？

Like, if we actually want to get equity like returns in a fairly worrisome environment, What do you do?

对于一个普通投资者来说，有什么聪明实用的方法可以实现这一点？

What's a smart practical way for a regular investor to do that?

嗯，你知道，比如高收益债券就是一类资产中的一部分。

Well, you know, high yield bonds, for example, are part of a group of assets.

我称它们为借贷资产。

I call them lending assets.

业界通常称它们为债务工具，意思是投资者不再需要过度依赖高风险投资来实现整体回报目标。

The world calls them debt or fixed income or bonds or notes or loans, but they all fall under the same heading.

这些都是你把钱借给别人，他们向你租用资金，并承诺每六个月支付利息，最后再归还本金的金融工具。

And they're all instruments where you give somebody your money, they rent it from you, and they promise to pay you interest every six months and then give you your money back at the end.

你可以通过这些事实进行计算，算出如果你今天以这个利率借出资金，最后他们偿还时能获得多少回报率。

And you can take those facts and do a calculation and figure out what the rate of return will be if you lend the money at that rate of interest today, and then they pay you back at the end.

之所以称为固定收益，是因为结果已经确定。

And it's called fixed income because the outcome is fixed.

这是一种承诺固定回报的契约关系。

It's a contractual relationship that promises a fixed return.

因此整个方程中只有一个变量。

And so there's only one moving piece in the whole equation.

一旦你买入债券，利率和到期价格都已确定，你支付了固定价格后，唯一的变量就是对方履行利息和本金承诺的概率。

Once you've bought it and the interest rate is set and the price at maturity is set, you've paid a fixed price, there's only one moving piece, which is the probability that they'll keep the promise of of interest in principle.

而信用分析师的工作就是评估这一点，这是相当专业的事情。

And it's the job of the credit analyst to assess that, and it's it's a fairly arcane thing.

你不能像...你知道人们买股票是因为喜欢公司理念或产品之类的原因。

You can't you can't buy a a like, you know, people buy stocks because they like the idea of the company or they like the product something like that.

我不认为这是个好主意，但他们确实这么做。

I don't think it's a great idea, but they do.

信用分析则更为专业。

Credit analysis is more arcane.

你不能说'因为他们汉堡做得好，所以我要买他们的债券'。

You can't say, well, I like they make good hamburgers, so I'm gonna buy their bonds.

这完全是两码事。

It's a totally different story.

所以，对于大多数认真听讲的听众来说，让我这么说吧。

So, you know, for most people who are listening well, let me say this.

在大多数领域，业余投资者应该选择基金、ETF或其他托管产品。

In most areas, the amateur should go into funds or ETFs or some managed product.

记住查理·芒格说过的话。

Remember what Charlie Munger said.

这并不容易。

It's not easy.

嵌入式的东西简单又愚蠢。

Embedded things is easy and stupid.

这不仅适用于我所做的事情，在我看来对股票投资也同样适用。

And so that's true in the things I do, but it's also true in in my opinion for stocks.

共同基金、ETF、指数基金之类的产品。

Mutual funds, ETFs, index funds, something like that.

投资是个有趣的行业。

And investing is a funny business.

要获得平均回报非常容易。

It's very easy to get an average return.

要获得高于平均水平的回报则非常困难。

It's very hard to get an above average return.

但如果你满足于平均回报，你可以以相对较低的成本获得管理型产品，并有很大概率获得平均回报。

But if you're content with an an average return, you can get managed products at a relatively low cost and have a high probability of getting an average return.

关键在于，高收益债券的收益率大约在7%左右。

And the point is that, you know, high yield bonds yield around seven.

其他形式的信贷可能回报略高一些。

Other forms of credit may have a slightly higher return.

如果你对此满意，那么有很多管理型产品可以实现这个目标。

And if you're happy with that, then there are lots of managed products that'll deliver it.

回到我们一直在讨论的这个关于应对风险和不确定性的普遍问题，你经常引用你最喜欢的格言之一，来自埃尔罗伊·迪姆森，他说风险意味着可能发生的事情比实际发生的事情更多。

Going back to this general question that we've been discussing about dealing with risk and dealing with uncertainty, you you often quote one of your favorite adages, which is from Elroy Dimson, who who said risk means more things can happen than will happen.

而且感觉今天可能发生的事情范围比过去更广了。

And and it it feels like the range of possible things that can happen today is wider than it's been in in the past.

我在想你是如何应对的，不仅作为投资者，更是个人层面——当你与子女或孙辈交谈时，如何在这个你常引用彼得·伯恩斯坦名言'我们每天都步入巨大的未知'的时期保持镇定。

And I'm wondering how you deal with it, not only as an investor, but actually personally, this sense that you know, as you as you talk to your kids or as you talk to your grandkids, like, how one actually keeps an even keel in a period where you often quote a lovely line from Peter Bernstein who said, we walk every day into the great unknown.

我们该如何应对？

How do we deal with it?

首先威廉，最近几个月我得出的结论是：最难回答的问题总是以'如何'开头。

Well, first of all, I've concluded in the last few months, William, that that the toughest questions I get are the ones that start with how.

如何？

How?

因为我可以告诉你该做什么。

Because I I can tell you what you have to do.

你必须保持镇定。

You have to keep an even keel.

我可以说，如果你想'安全'，构建更具防御性的投资组合或许是可取的。

I can tell you that it may be desirable if you if you wanna be, quote, safe to have a more defensive portfolio.

但如何做出这个决定以及如何保持镇定，确实要困难些。

But how to make that decision and how to keep an even keel is is a little harder.