提示733：沃伦·巴菲特是如何成为沃伦·巴菲特的

沃伦认为股价低到足以取得控股权。

Warren thought the shares were cheap enough to take a controlling interest.

但当他去工厂了解为什么业绩如此糟糕时，他意识到自己没有能力扭转局面。

But when he went to the mill to see why it just wasn't performing very well, he knew he didn't have the skill set to right that shit.

于是沃伦向查理请教了关于邓斯特的问题。

So Warren went to Charlie about the problem with Dempster.

查理对邓斯特这类企业的看法与格雷厄姆提出的观点不同。

Charlie had a different thought process on businesses like Dempster than Graham would have offered.

查理认为，像邓斯特这样陷入困境的公司之所以折价交易，是因为其基本面实在不佳。

Charlie felt that troubled companies like Dempster traded at discounts because the underlying business just wasn't good.

而且这类企业也很难被修复。

And it was also hard to fix these types of businesses.

幸运的是，查理向沃伦介绍了他的朋友哈里·博特尔。

Now luckily for Warren, Charlie introduced him to his friend, Harry Bottle.

哈里进入公司后大刀阔斧地整顿了局面。

Harry went into the business and just cleaned house.

他减少了库存和员工人数。

He decreased inventory and staff count.

从财务角度来看，效果非常好。

And it worked wonders from a financial standpoint.

这个‘垃圾堆’故事中一个有趣的地方是，哈里是如何降低库存水平的。

One interesting aspect of the dumpster story was how Harry went about decreasing inventory levels.

哈里将这一成功很大程度上归功于沃伦和查理。

Harry attributes a significant portion of the success of this specifically to Warren and Charlie.

有趣的是，他们通过将库存的重置成本与竞争对手的进行对比，提升了库存的价值。

And interestingly, they were able to increase the value of inventory by assessing its replacement cost against those of competitors.

以下是哈里所说的话。

Here's what Harry said.

一个想法来自沃伦和查理。

One idea came from Warren and Charlie.

在调查我们的销售定价结构时，我们将备件和维修零件的价值等同于成品的总和。

Upon investigating our sales pricing structure, we were evaluating replacement and repair parts equal to the total of the sum of the completed item.

由于缺乏成本数据来确定正确定价，他们建议我们将所有零件分为三类。

So lacking of any cost data to determine the correct pricing, they suggested that we simply categorize all parts into three categories.

第一类是100%专有的零件，只有我们能提供，价格上调了高达500%。

The first one, an item 100% proprietary, not available except from us, increased up to 500%.

半专有零件的价格上调了200%至300%。

An item semi proprietary increased 200 to 300%.

非专有零件的价格上调了0%至100%。

Non proprietary increased zero to 100%.

我们把这批估计价值为30万美元的库存，转化为了超过200万美元的转售价值。顺便提一下，我们几乎没有任何人对我们的定价策略提出异议，并且继续以更高的价格销售这些零件，几乎没有遇到销售阻力。

We turned this inventory with an estimated inventory value of 300,000 into a resale value exceeding $2,000,000 Incidentally, we had a few, if any objections to our pricing strategy and continued to sell these parts at higher sales prices with little, if any, sales resistance.

这清楚地向沃伦展示了一个能够提高产品价格的企业，是一种非常强大的商业模式。

Now this clearly showed Warren that a business that could increase the price of its products was a very, very powerful business model.

尽管邓普斯特并不是一家出色的企业，但这一课对沃伦未来的投资决策至关重要。

And even though Dempster wasn't a great business, it was a crucial lesson that Warren would utilize for future investments.

但正如我之前提到的，博特不得不裁员，而裁员这件事让沃伦非常不适，他再也不想经历这样的事情了。

But as I mentioned there previously, Bottle had to lay people off and laying people off did not sit well with Warren, and he never wanted to go through that type of experience again.

所以，你知道，沃伦并不完美。

So, you know, Warren wasn't perfect.

尽管他在邓普斯特学到了这一重要教训，但他即将做出职业生涯中 arguably 最糟糕的投资决策。

Despite this crucial lesson that he learned at Dempster, he was about to make arguably the worst investment decision of his career.

而这，当然就是他对伯克希尔·哈撒韦的投资。

And this, of course, was his investment into Berkshire Hathaway.

有趣的是，在对这个行业进行一些侧面打听时，他本该了解到纺织业其实是个非常糟糕的行业。

Funny enough, when doing some of the scuttlebutt on this industry, he would have learned that textiles was a really lousy business.

索尔·帕索是基威特广场一家男装店的老板，巴菲特最近把办公室搬到了那里，至今仍在那儿。有一天，沃伦去拜访了他。

Sol Parso, who owned a men's shop in Keywit Plaza, where Buffett had recently moved his office to where his office was till today, got a visit from Warren one day.

所以，当沃伦询问服装行业的情况时，对方告诉他：沃伦，这行太烂了。

So while inquiring about the suit industry, told him, Warren, it stinks.

没人买西装了。

Men aren't buying suits.

但沃伦根本无法自拔。

But Warren couldn't help himself.

此时，他与格雷厄姆的联系依然非常紧密。

His roots with Graham were still strong at this point.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦的股价约为7.60美元，而其营运资本高达16.50美元。

Berkshire Hathaway's shares were trading at about $7.60, and they had $16.50 of working capital.

我推测巴菲特认为，这在清算时就是它的价值。

I assume Buffett figured this was what it was worth in a liquidation event.

由于公司从未清算，也许他相信自己能很快以同等或更高的价格卖掉所有纺织品。

And since they never liquidated, perhaps he believed they could still sell all their linens at or above that price in short order.

这是一个他未来二十年都会后悔的错误。

This was a mistake that he would regret over the next two decades.

这家企业根本缺乏资本效率，因此巴菲特不愿再往一家无法提供超越其最低回报率的公司投入更多资金。

The business simply was not capital efficient, and therefore Buffett was not interested in plowing more money into a company that just didn't offer returns that exceeded his hurdle rates.

纺织行业，你知道的，根本不是个适合投入资本的好地方。

The textile industry, you know, just wasn't a good place to have capital.

简单来说，一旦竞争对手升级了设备，整个行业都得跟进，否则就会落后。

Basically, way it worked was that once a competitor upgraded their machinery, everyone in the industry had to follow suit and that was just to keep even.

当时其实没什么方法能获得竞争优势。

There weren't really a lot of ways to get a competitive advantage.

这意味着，仅仅维持业务就需要不断投入更多资金购买那些无法带来更高回报的机器。

And this meant that just having to maintain your business meant you had to spend more and more money on machinery that didn't offer a higher return.

沃伦知道，凭借伯克希尔产生的现金流，他可以用这些钱去收购其他私营企业或股票。

Now Warren knew that with the cash flows he was getting from Berkshire, he could use that to purchase other private businesses and stocks.

除非伯克希尔能提供比他 elsewhere 更高的回报，否则他不愿意再往这家企业投入哪怕一美元。

And unless Berkshire Hathaway could offer a return above what he was getting elsewhere, he was unwilling to put even a dollar back into the business.

如果我不谈一谈沃伦最具反主流、最成功的投资之一——美国运通，那我就对不起我们的听众了。

I feel I'd be doing our listeners a disservice if I didn't speak about one of Warren's most contrarian and successful investments, which is American Express.

许多伯克希尔股东都知道，通过伯克希尔，他们长期持有美国运通的股票，自1991年以来一直持续增值。

So many Berkshire Hathaway shareholders know that through Berkshire, they've held American Express, which has compounded since 1991.

但这其实并不是沃伦第一次投资这家公司。

But this wasn't actually Warren's first rodeo with the business.

他第一次投资美国运通可以追溯到1963年。

His first investment into American Express was all the way back in 1963.

再次说明，品牌的力量至关重要。

And it once again, top of it, the strength of a brand.

我不会详细展开关于美国运通的太多细节。

Now I'm not gonna go into too much detail on American Express.

请注意，股价在短短几个月内下跌了近50%。

Just realize that the share price had dropped nearly 50% over just a few months.

当时市场认为，美国运通因一名客户可能涉及的欺诈行为，账面上面临约1.5亿美元的潜在损失。

Now the market believed that American Express was on the book for about $150,000,000 of potential fraud from one of its customers.

运用格雷厄姆的‘市场先生’概念，

Using Graham's Mr.

市场因担心美国运通若需偿还这笔账单可能带来的后果，而对持有该股票感到极度恐惧。

Market analogy, the market was petrified of holding the stock because of what could have happened if Amex had to pay back that bill.

但美国运通实际上并不需要承担全部赔偿金额。

But Amex was not required to foot that entire bill.

最终，双方达成和解，美国运通支付约5800万美元了结此案。

They settled on about $58,000,000 payout to settle the case and move on.

但在这段时间里，沃伦通过更多地收集旁证，更好地了解了美国运通品牌的实力。

But during this time, Warren had used more of the scuttlebutt to better understand the strength of American Express's brand.

他坐在奥马哈市罗斯牛排馆的收银员旁边。

He positioned himself next to the cashier at Ross's Steakhouse in Omaha.

他与店主聊天。

He chatted with the owner.

当他看着收银员工作时，注意到顾客们仍在使用美国运通卡支付晚餐费用。

And as he watched the cashier sing, he noticed that customers were still using their American Express cards to pay for their dinners.

由此，他推断顾客们很可能继续在美国各地使用美国运通卡结账。

And from this, he deduced that customers would probably continue to use their American Express card to pay for their bills all across America.

沃伦最终在短短三年内使这笔投资获得了三倍回报，这对他而言是一次重大成功。

Warren would eventually get about a triple on this investment in only about three years, making it a significant success for him.

另一个沃伦·巴菲特的标志性特点是，他偏好集中投资。

Now, another Warren Buffett hallmark was his preference for concentrated bets.

在20世纪60年代初，沃伦将基金资产的绝大部分集中在五只股票上。

During the early 1960s, Warren had the lion's share of the fund's assets in only five names.

对沃伦来说，他的合伙人付钱给他，就是希望他能超越市场表现。

To Warren, his partners were paying him to outperform.

如果他不能对某个投资进行大幅集中押注，那就只是像市场一样投资，最终也只能获得市场平均水平的回报。

And if he couldn't put a hefty concentration on a bet, then you were just investing like the market, and you would get market like returns.

因此，沃伦认为过度分散投资等于承认管理者根本无法挑选出赢家。

So Warren felt that excessive diversification was an admission that managers just couldn't pick winners.

现在，这一直是我想了很久的一个话题。

Now this has been a subject that I've spent a lot of time thinking about.

虽然我始终会做一个集中型投资者，但我已经比过去更愿意接受一定程度的分散化。

And while I'll always be a concentrated investor, I've allowed for a little bit more diversification than I would have previously been comfortable with.

我的理由非常简单。

My rationale is pretty simple.

由于我现在将一部分资金投入微型股，这些投资有时在我看来更像风险投资，而非优质复合型企业的投资，因此我让部分仓位保持稍小一些，以提供下行保护。

Since I now invest a part of my capital into microcaps, which I sometimes consider more venture style bets compared to investing in quality compounders, I allow some of my positions to remain just a little bit smaller to account for downside protection.

沃伦可能会觉得这简直是大逆不道，但你知道，考虑到我持有的仓位数量，我仍然认为自己很好地遵循了巴菲特的准则。

Warren might find this to be a complete abomination, but, you know, given how many positions I own, I still think I'm fitting well into Buffett's rules.

有时，我只有大约八个仓位。

At times, I've only had about eight positions.

而今天，在我分散程度最高的时候，我持有大约十三个仓位。

And today, near my highest amount of diversification, I own around 13 positions.

所以我会说，我仍然非常集中。

So I would say I'm still quite concentrated.

我不介意让我的复合型公司——其中一些最终会变成我的微型股投资——在投资组合中的集中度更高。

I have no problem allowing my compounders, some of which my micro cap bets eventually become, to run up higher in concentration levels within my portfolio.

但如果一个想法没有带来回报，我会很明显地意识到，因为我在该投资上的集中度并不会显著增加。

But, you know, if an idea doesn't deliver returns, then it becomes obvious to me because my concentration levels in that bet just won't increase that much.

这向我发出信号，表明我的投资逻辑可能有误，或者市场误解了这个机会，从而帮助我进一步做出决策。

Now this signals to me that either my thesis was wrong or the market is misunderstanding the opportunity, which then helps to further guide my decision making.

一旦巴菲特尝到了美国运通的成功，并意识到这是一项不低于清算价值但仍取得成功的投资后，他便开始在其他企业中寻找类似的机会。

Now once Buffett tasted the success of American Express and realized that it was an investment that did not trade below liquidation value but still proved to be a success, he began looking for similar opportunities in other businesses.

迪士尼就是这样一个企业。

Disney was one such business.

所以洛温斯坦写道，他对价值的定义正在变化，或者说正在扩大。

So Lowenstein writes, his definition of value was changing, or rather, broadening.

对巴菲特而言，迪士尼电影库的价值，尽管难以精确衡量且大多未体现在账面上，但其真实程度丝毫不亚于工厂等有形资产。

To Buffett, the value of Disney's film library, even though imprecise and mostly off the books, was no less real than a tangible asset, such as a factory.

在巴菲特合伙企业的头十年里，巴菲特持续大幅跑赢道琼斯指数。

In the first ten years of the Buffett partnership, Buffett continued to just crush the Dow.

该合伙企业的回报高达1156%，而道琼斯指数仅为123%。

The partnership's returns were a whopping 1156% versus 123% for the Dow.

扣除费用后，合伙人的回报为704%。

After fees, his partner's returns were 704%.

然而，到了1967年，市场环境开始发生变化。

However, in 1967, market conditions began to shift.

那是所谓的‘狂热年代’，‘漂亮五十’股票概念首次形成。

These were the go go years where the Nifty 50 was first formulated.

这是一个快速增长、投机泛滥，随后迎来痛苦现实回调的时期。

It was a time of rapid growth, speculative excess, and then followed by a painful dose of reality.

然而，这段上涨行情并不是沃伦所喜欢的环境。

However, the ride up was just not an environment that Warren was pleased with.

找到符合他基准的投资标的变得越来越困难。

It was becoming increasingly difficult to find positions that would meet his benchmarks.

他持有的一家公司是Associated Cotton，一家女装连锁店。

One that he did own was Associated Cotton, a dress shop chain.

这家公司的创始人名叫本杰明·罗斯纳，他正计划退休。

The founder of this business was named Benjamin Rosner, who was planning to retire.

但巴菲特知道，这位先生对公司的顺畅运营至关重要。

But Buffett knew that this gentleman was integral to making the business run smoothly.

于是，巴菲特请罗斯纳再留任六个月。

So Buffett asked Rosner to stay on for six more months.

你知道，既然这家公司是罗斯纳的心血，巴菲特就告诉芒格，我们不用担心这个问题。

And, you know, since this business was Rosner's baby, Buffett told Munger, that's one problem we don't have.

这家伙根本不可能退出。

This guy won't be able to quit.

他确实没有走。

And he didn't.

罗斯纳最终多留了二十年。

Rosner ended up staying for twenty additional years.

我认为，这体现了巴菲特在理解人及其与企业关系方面的深刻洞察力。

And this, I think, shows how introspective Buffett was at just understanding people and their relationships to their businesses.

但随着市场越来越热，巴菲特发现可投资的机会和地点越来越少。

But as the market began getting hotter and hotter, Buffett was finding fewer and fewer opportunities and places to deploy capital.

他意识到，或许现在是趁势头尚好时退出的时机了。

He realized that perhaps it was time to get out while the going was still good.

他决定关闭基金以及如何操作，实际上非常独特。

His decision to close down and how he did it were actually very, very unique.

在华尔街，关闭一个像他这样成功的基金是完全闻所未闻的。

On Wall Street, shutting down a fund that had the success that he had was just absolutely unheard of.

没人这么做过。

No one did it.

因此，出售业务或改变策略可能是最有可能的情况。

So selling the business or changing the strategy would have been the most likely scenarios.

但你知道，巴菲特一直遵循内心的评分标准，他知道这两种选择对他的合伙人来说都不是最优的。

But, you know, Buffett lived by this inner scorecard, and he knew that both of those options were just suboptimal for his partners.

我认为，如果情况反过来，巴菲特是合伙人，他也不希望别人替他管理资金或采取截然不同的策略。

I think if he knew that the positions had been reversed and Buffett was a partner, that he wouldn't want someone else managing his money or taking a radically different strategy.

因此，在合伙关系关闭后，他为合伙人提出了投资建议。

So once the partnerships were closed, he had suggestions for where his partner should invest.

他说，他们可以投资于他的朋友比尔·鲁安，鲁安正在设立塞奎亚基金，显然取得了巨大成功；或者他们可以直接与沃伦·巴菲特一起投资伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司——据称，沃伦非常欣赏这家公司的首席执行官。

He said that they could either invest with his friend, Bill Ruane, who was setting up the Sequoia Fund and obviously had a massive amount of success, or they could invest right alongside Warren Buffett in Berkshire Hathaway, a business where Warren reportedly was a major fan of the CEO.

现在让我们稍微岔开话题，谈谈巴菲特即使对亲近之人也保持的秘密。

Now let's take a short tangent here to discuss more about Buffett's secrecy, even with those he loved.

他不仅对新想法保密，还向孩子们隐瞒了自己净资产正在增长的事实。

Not only was he keeping new ideas close to the chest, but he was also keeping the secret that his net worth was growing from his children.

沃伦每年仅靠从伯克希尔·哈撒韦领取的约5万美元薪水生活。

Warren lived off of just about $50,000 per year, a salary that he received from Berkshire Hathaway.

他不开豪华汽车，孩子们上公立学校，他们的生活与朋友们的生活非常相似。

He didn't drive fancy cars, his children went to public schools, and his kids lived, you know, a very similar life to that of all their friends.

他的女儿苏茜是通过读报纸才知道父亲的财富的，而不是从她父亲本人那里得知的。

His daughter Susie learned of her father's fortune from actually reading a newspaper, not even from her dad himself.

为了负担一些娱乐开销，她在年仅16岁时就不得不去做销售工作。

To afford fun things, she had to get a job as a salesperson at the young age of 16 years old.

正如我之前提到的，沃伦非常希望孩子们过上没有金汤匙的生活。

Now, Warren was very interested in making sure that his children lived a life without a silver spoon as I previously mentioned.

尽管由于他不善于敞开心扉，他与孩子们的关系有时会紧张，但随着年龄增长，他还是稍微放宽了对金钱的控制。

And while his relationship with his children could be rocky due to his inability to open up, he managed to loosen the purse strings a little bit as he aged.

洛温斯坦还提到了沃伦对慈善事业的看法，我觉得这些观点非常有趣。

Lowenstein also points out Warren's thoughts on charities, which I thought were very interesting.

虽然沃伦希望回馈慈善事业，让世界比他来到时更好，但他很难理性地思考慈善机构的运作方式。

While Warren wanted to give back to charity to leave the world a better place than when he entered it, he really struggled to think rationally about how charities were run.

正如我提到的，巴菲特不会在无法获得高回报的情况下往一个企业里投一美元。

As I mentioned, Buffett wouldn't put a dollar into a business if he wasn't going to get a high return on it.

这种思维模式在社会项目中也完全相同。

And this mental model was the exact same in social projects.

因此，如果一个慈善项目需要试错或依赖信仰才能成功，沃伦根本不愿意捐款。

So if a charitable initiative was a testing ground or required faith to succeed, Warren was just not interested in donating.

这被视为投机。

Was seen as speculation.

洛温斯坦写道，正是这种使他成为优秀投资者的自律，抑制了他推动社会变革的强烈倾向。

Lowenstein writes, the very discipline that made him a good investor crippled what could have been a very powerful inclination to work for societal changes.

他需要一个衡量标准。

He needed a yardstick.

巴菲特曾对记者说，在投资中，你可以衡量结果。

Buffett once told a reporter, in investment you can measure results.

对于其他一些事情，你最终并不知道是赢了还是输了。

With some of this other stuff, you don't know in the end whether you've won or lost.

现在回到投资，沃伦在1973年非常忙碌。

Now getting back to investing, Warren stayed very busy in 1973.

这是一个纳指50指数开始崩盘的时期，基金经理们因恐惧蔓延而纷纷撤出市场资金。

This was a period when the Nifty 50 was beginning to crack, and fund managers were pulling money out of the market as fear crept up.

在此期间，巴菲特对伯克希尔·哈撒韦进行了多项投资。

During this time, Buffett made several investments in Berkshire Hathaway.

这些投资包括底特律国际大桥、国家普雷斯特工业公司、迪安威特、福特汽车、选买超市、大联盟等，许多其他公司也被加入伯克希尔的公开股票投资组合。

They were names such as Detroit International Bridge, National Presto Industries, Dean Witter, Ford Motor, Pick n Save, Grand Union, and many other names were being added to Berkshire's public stock portfolio.

当时的市场环境对巴菲特极为有利，他拥有的投资机会多于可用现金。

Conditions were so good for Buffett that he had more ideas than cash at this time.

为了解决这个问题，他希望发行约2000万美元的高级票据。

Now to solve this, he wanted to raise about $20,000,000 in senior notes.

问题是，筹集这笔资金实际上非常困难，因为贷款方知道伯克希尔的纺织厂并非一项好业务，不愿将资金投入该业务。

The problem was that raising this money was actually pretty tough because lenders knew that Berkshire, the textile mill was not a good business and wouldn't want to put money into that business.

因此，负责协助筹资所罗门兄弟公司，必须说服贷款方，这笔资金是专门用于巴菲特本人，而非重新投资到伯克希尔·哈撒韦。

So Solomon Brothers, who was in charge of helping to raise the money, had to actually persuade the lenders that the money was specifically for Buffett and not to reinvest into Berkshire Hathaway.

贷款方还在条款中要求，如果沃伦·巴菲特出售股票，他们有权要求立即偿还贷款。

Lenders also demanded in the terms that they'd be able to demand repayment if Warren Buffett sold stock.

沃伦最终以约8%的利率成功筹集了2000万美元。

Warren eventually secured the $20,000,000 at about an 8% interest rate.

沃伦提出了一个很好的观点：当资金成本低廉时，借款是最明智的选择。

Warren made a good point that borrowing money makes the most sense when the money is cheap.

这让我想起了霍华德·马克斯在《最重要的事》中详细讨论过的债务周期。

This reminds me of debt cycles that Howard Marks has discussed in details in The Most Important Thing.

当贷款方愿意放贷时，债务成本最低。

Debt is cheapest when lenders are willing to lend.

如果你等到急需贷款时才去借款，很可能面临更差的条款。

If you wait to borrow when you need a loan, you're likely going to get worse terms on that debt.

这关于筹集资本是一个很好的教训。

This is a good lesson regarding raising capital.

到了1974年，沃伦发现了其他他开始觉得有吸引力的商业模式。

Now in 1974, Warren discovered other business models that he was starting to find attractive.

媒体业务就是其中之一。

Media businesses was one of them.

他认为媒体企业是一种现金生成机器，因为它们能够通过广告产生收入。

He saw media businesses as a cash generating machine due to their ability to generate revenue through advertising.

你知道，与邓普斯特磨坊或伯克希尔这样的企业不同，它们需要投入大量现金才能盈利，而广告业务只需要几个人、几张桌子和一支铅笔就能产生广告利润。

And, you know, unlike say a Dempster mill or Berkshire, which just sucked up cash to make profits, An advertising business required a couple of people, some desks, and a pencil to generate advertising profits.

这种业务正是沃伦非常喜欢的类型。

This was the kind of business that Warren really, really liked.

鉴于他在其他媒体企业上的成功，显然他完全掌握了这种商业模式。

Given his success with other media businesses, it's clear that he nailed this business model.

我个人也喜欢这种商业模式，不一定非得是广告行业，而是广义上的这类模式。

I also personally like this business model, not necessarily in advertising, but just broadly.

所以请容我解释一下。

So bear with me here.

我曾经拥有一家煤炭特许权业务，在我看来，这是一种类似的商业模式。

So I owned a coal royalty business, and this was a similar business model in my opinion.

这听起来有点奇怪，但让我来解释一下。

Now it seemed a little bit weird, but let me explain.

如果我们看看巴菲特，他知道广告商需要一个投放广告的地方。

So if we look at Buffett, he knew that advertisers needed a place to advertise.

当巴菲特进行这些投资时，主要的广告方式是通过电视、报纸、广播等渠道。

When Buffett made these investments, the primary means of advertising was through things like TV, newspapers, radio.

所以，如果你拥有这个行业中的企业，那就是你成功的钥匙。

So if you owned a business in that industry, that was your key to success.

至于我所拥有的煤炭特许权业务，世界仍然需要煤炭，尤其是用于炼钢的那种。

Now, as for the coal royalty business that I owned, the world still needs coal, especially the kind that's used for making steel.

只有少数几个地方蕴藏着冶金用煤。

There are only certain places where metallurgical coal is located.

因此，如果你拥有这些煤炭所在地的土地，你就能在几乎不花什么钱的情况下产生大量现金流，因为矿主在此情况下负责资本支出。

So if you own the land where that coal sits, you could generate loads of cash without spending very much money as the miner actually takes care of the CapEx in this case.

而这正是这项业务的运作方式。

And that's what this business does.

它有50名员工，每年产生数亿美元的收入。

It's got 50 employees and generates a few 100,000,000 in annual revenue.

很不错。

Pretty good.

到了1974年，市场彻底崩盘了。

Now during 1974, the market completely collapsed.

市场已经经历了大约六年的熊市，是大萧条引发的熊市时长的两倍。

The market had been in a bear market for about six years, twice as long as the bear market that was caused by the great depression.

在那时，沃伦高兴到了极点。

And at this time, Warren was as happy as he could be.

在《福布斯》的一次罕见公开采访中，巴菲特被引用说：现在是投资并致富的时机。

In a rare public interview on Forbes, Buffett was quoted as saying, now is the time to invest and get rich.

由于他真心相信这一点，与许多其他基金经理不同，他赚得盆满钵满。

And since he truly believed this, unlike many other fund managers, he made just an absolute killing.

沃伦非常知名的另一项业务是蓝筹邮票公司。

Another business that Warren is very well known for is Blue Chip Stamps.

这项业务的现金流模式与保险公司相似。

This business had a flow similar to an insurance company.

正如我们所知，巴菲特喜欢那些能产生现金、让他可以投资于更高回报机会的企业。

And as we already know, Buffett loved businesses that generated cash that he could invest in opportunities with superior returns.

洛温斯坦写道，对巴菲特而言，蓝筹邮票不过是一家不受监管的保险公司。

Lowenstein writes, to Buffett, blue chip was simply an insurance company that wasn't regulated.

现在我们来看看它是如何运作的。

Now here's how it works.

蓝筹邮票从销售其交易邮票的超市收取费用，并允许顾客用这些邮票兑换免费商品，比如烤面包机或草坪椅。

So Blue Chip collected a fee from supermarkets that distributed its trading stamps and redeemed these stamps for free items such as toasters or lawn chairs.

它每年向零售商销售约1.2亿美元的邮票。

It was selling about $120,000,000 of stamps to retailers each year.

由于邮票持有者不会立即兑换，这意味着企业手中积累了大量现金，可以重新投入到其他地方。

And since the owners of the stamps wouldn't redeem them immediately, it meant that there was ample amounts of cash in the business that could be redeployed elsewhere.

尽管蓝筹邮票是一家不错的企业，但它最终成了巴菲特和芒格的一大麻烦。

Now even though blue chip stamps was a good business, it ended up being a pretty big headache for both Buffett and Munger.

因为其复杂的股权结构，最终给他们带来了麻烦。

So there is some complicated ownership structure that would end up biting them both in the butt.

所以巴菲特通过三个不同的实体持有蓝筹邮票公司。

So Buffett owned blue chip stamps through three separate vehicles.

他和妻子个人持有这部分股份。

He and his wife owned it personally.

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司持有它，而查理·芒格与他合伙的多元化零售公司也持有一部分。

Berkshire Hathaway owned it, and Diversified Retailing, a partnership with Charlie Munger, owned a slice as well.

由于蓝筹邮票公司还投资于公开上市公司，监管机构认为这构成了严重的利益冲突。

Then with blue chip stamps also investing into public businesses, regulators just saw this as a massive conflict of interest.

所以问题真正源于一家名为Wesco的公司。

So the problem really arose due to a business called Wesco.

Wesco是一家储蓄与贷款公司，其股价被低估，交易价格约为账面价值的一半。

So Wesco was a savings and loan business that was undervalued trading at around half its book value.

因此，蓝筹公司迅速购入了该公司约8%的股份。

So blue chip quickly bought up about 8% of the company.

最终，Wesco宣布计划与另一家储蓄与贷款公司圣巴巴拉合并。

Eventually, Wesco announced a plan to merge with another savings and loan business called Santa Barbara.

但这笔合并交易让巴菲特和芒格都感到不安，因为他们认为威斯科的股东用被低估的股份换取了圣塔芭芭拉公司高价的股份。

But this merger just didn't sit well with either Buffett or Munger because they saw it as Wesco shareholders exchanging their undervalued shares for expensive shares of Santa Barbara.

顺便说一句，如果你持有的是价格更高的公司，我不介意这类交易。

As a side note, I don't mind these types of transactions if you own the more expensive business.

原因很简单。

And the reason is simple.

当一家高价公司收购一家低价公司时，就存在套利机会。

So there's an arbitrage opportunity when an expensive company acquires a cheap one.

例如，如果你的公司市盈率为30倍，而你以5倍市盈率收购一家公司，一旦它成为母公司的一部分，其估值就会被重估为30倍。

For instance, if your company trades at 30 times earnings and you buy a company at five times earnings, it rerates once it becomes part of that parent company to 30 times.

所以，如果你以500万美元买入，而这家公司年利润为100万美元，一旦你拥有它，根据市盈率倍数，它的价值就变成了3000万美元。

So if you buy it for 5,000,000, meaning it has 1,000,000 in earnings, once you own it, it's now worth one:thirty thirty million dollars based on the multiple.

让我们稍作休息，听听今天赞助商的发言。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

不，这不是你的错觉。

No, it's not your imagination.

风险和监管正在加剧，客户现在要求提供安全证明才能开展业务。

Risk and regulation are ramping up and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是Vanta之所以成为变革者的原因。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta自动化了您的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合到一个基于AI的平台上。

Vanta automates your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust together on one AI powered platform.

无论您是在为SOC 2做准备，还是在运行企业GRC项目，Vanta都能确保您的安全并推动交易顺利进行。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

像Ramp和Ryder这样的公司使用Vanta后，审计时间减少了82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长腾出了更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

我喜欢Vanta如何让合规管理变得轻松，而不会完全打乱您的工作流程。

I love how Vanta makes it easy to stay on top of your compliance without it taking over your entire workflow.

它只是简化了通常比实际需要更繁琐的事情。

It just simplifies something that's usually way more painful than it needs to be.

立即前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

那就是 vanta.com/billionaires。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

开始一件事不仅困难，而且确实有点吓人。

Starting something new isn't just hard, it's honestly kind of terrifying.

我仍然记得在我真正决定开始做播客之前的那些时刻。

I still remember those moments right before I really committed to podcasting.

夜里辗转反侧，想着如果没人听怎么办？

Lying awake at night thinking, what if no one listens?

如果这件事彻底失败了怎么办？

What if this completely flops?

或者如果我只是在白白浪费时间呢？

Or what if I'm just straight up wasting my time?

尽管克服这种怀疑并不容易，但迈出这一步最终成了我做过的最好的决定之一。

And even though pushing past that doubt was not easy, making the leap ended up being one of the best decisions I've ever made.

我要说，当你拥有合适的工具时，这会带来很大的帮助。

And I'll say this, it helps a lot when you have the right tools on your side.

这就是Shopify发挥作用的地方。

And that's where Shopify comes in.

Shopify是数百万企业的电商平台，占美国电子商务总量的约10%，从家喻户晓的大品牌到刚刚起步的新锐品牌都在使用。

Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses and about 10% of all e commerce in The US, from massive household names to brands just getting started.

如果你曾经想过，如果我不知道怎么建店怎么办？

If you've ever thought, What if I don't know how to build a store?

Shopify提供了数百个精美且即用的模板，完美契合你的品牌风格，让建店变得轻而易举。

Shopify makes it easy with hundreds of beautiful, ready to use templates that actually match your brand.

或者，如果我没时间做所有事情怎么办？

Or what if I don't have time to do everything?

Shopify内置的AI工具能帮你撰写产品描述、标题，甚至优化产品图片。

Shopify's built in AI tools help write product descriptions, headlines, and even enhance your product photos.

是时候用Shopify将那些‘如果’变为现实了。

It's time to turn those what ifs into with Shopify today.

立即在 shopify.com/wsb 注册您的每月1美元试用。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往 shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是 shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

亿万富翁投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Bill Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于拥有超过6亿美元投资规模且派息率达7.97%的Fundrise收益基金，这一被动收入策略已向所有规模的投资者开放。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97 percent distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄利率下滑，私人信贷在近几年成长为万亿美元级资产类别也就不足为奇了。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

立即访问 fundrise.com/wsb，只需几分钟即可投资Fundrise收益基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金2025年的总回报率为8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往表现不预示未来结果。

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

截至2025年1月20日12:30的当前分配率。

Current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多信息可在fundrise.com/income的收益基金招募说明书中找到。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundrise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

好了，回到节目。

All right, back to the show.

关键在于理解母公司的价值。

The key is understanding the value of the parent co.

我认为在Wesco这个例子中，巴菲特认为母公司被高估的估值是不可持续的，因此他对这一点感到不安。

And I think in this Wesco example, Buffett believed the premium evaluation of the parent company was just unsustainable and that's why he wasn't comfortable with it.

但我跑题了。

But I digress.

所以沃伦希望买入更多Wesco股票，以对抗他认为对Wesco股东不公平的合并交易。

So Warren wanted to buy more Wesco stock to counter the merger that he believed was unfair to Wesco shareholders.

最终，他积累了大约20%的持股。

Eventually, he accumulated about 20% position.

与Wesco总裁们的讨论不幸毫无进展，于是他们转向了最大股东伊丽莎白·彼得斯。

Discussions with Wesco's presidents unfortunately went nowhere, so they turned to Elizabeth Peters, who largest shareholder.

她很难被说服，因为她知道Wesco需要一些推动力来为公司注入新的活力。

She was tough to convince as she knew Wesco needed a push to bring in some new energy into the company.

但巴菲特和芒格说服了她，让他们自己成为那个推动者。

But Buffett and Munger convinced her that they could be that catalyst.

一旦确认彼得斯已经支持，他们就买入了股票。

Once they knew that Peters was on board, they bought the stock.

问题是，一旦合并告吹，任何投资者都知道，许多投资者会退出，导致股价下跌。

The problem was that once the merger was blown up, as any investor knows, lots of investors just drop out creating a drop in the share price.

巴菲特和芒格以高于他们原本能买到的价格购入股票，因为他们觉得自己是导致合并失败的原因。

Buffett and Munger bought shares that they intentionally purchased at higher prices than they could have as they felt like they were the reasons for the merger's failure.

这一举动特别引起了证券交易委员会的注意。

This action specifically caught the SEC's attention.

这个案件最终以非常低的罚款金额解决，仅为11.5万美元。

The case was eventually settled for a very modest view, dollars 115,000.

但在审理过程中，律师们明显看出，巴菲特和芒格并没有故意以损害他人利益为代价来破坏这笔交易。

But during the case, it was made pretty obvious to lawyers that Buffett and Munger had not tried to kill the deal at the expense of others intentionally.

他们希望威斯科的股东获得应有的价值。

They wanted Wesco's shareholders to receive value.

由于调查的结果，巴菲特不得不简化事务。

As a result of the investigation, Buffett just had to simplify things.

他将多元公司与伯克希尔合并，这使芒格获得了伯克希尔哈撒韦2%的股份。

He merged Diversify with Berkshire, which netted Munger a 2% position in Berkshire Hathaway.

他建立了对蓝筹邮票公司和Wesco的多数股权。

And he built a majority stake in blue chip stamps and Wesco.

现在转向芒格，我认为芒格对巴菲特最大的价值在于他偏好优质企业。

Now turning here to Munger, I think Munger's biggest value to Buffett was in his preference for good businesses.

尽管巴菲特在管理合伙企业的多年里，通过低价收购低质量企业取得了巨大成功，但芒格让他明白，这种策略只能在有限时间内奏效。

Even though Buffett had been highly successful in his years managing the partnership by buying these low quality businesses at a low price, Munger taught him that this approach only works really for so long.

一旦巴菲特收购了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，并购入了喜诗糖果、美国运通和迪士尼等企业，他开始理解无形资产的力量。

Once Buffett acquired the Berkshire Hathaway vehicle and bought businesses like See's Candy, American Express, and Disney, he began to understand the power of intangible assets.

这正是巴菲特对特许经营企业产生偏好的来源。

This was where Buffett's affinity for franchise businesses came from.

对巴菲特而言，特许经营企业具有六个吸引人的特征。

To Buffett, a franchise business has six attractive characteristics.

第一。

One.

持久的竞争优势。

A durable competitive advantage.

他喜欢品牌和低成本提供商。

He liked brands and low cost providers.

二。

Two.

一种人们渴望或需要的产品。

A product that is desired or needed.

在品牌方面，顾客因为其建立的信任和声誉而偏好某一特定产品。

When it came to brands, customers wanted a specific product over others because of the trust and reputation it had built.

因此，一个完全符合这一特点的公司是See's糖果。

So a company here that fits this to a T is C's Candies.

我其实没怎么详细讲它，只是因为这一集要谈的内容太多了。

I didn't really get a chance to speak too much about it just because there's so many things to talk about in this episode.

但See's糖果只是一个巧克力品牌。

But C's Candies is just a chocolate brand.

如果你参加过伯克希尔哈撒韦的股东大会，你会看到很多人提着See's糖果的袋子。

If you've gone to the Berkshire Hathaway AGM, you're going to see a lot of people carrying, bags with See's candy.

这个生意如此吸引人的原因是，产品是人们所渴望的。

And the reason that this business was so attractive was that the product was desired.

人们非常喜欢它。

People loved it.

人们特别想要See's，而不是其他替代品，因为他们购买See's糖果或把See's糖果送给别人时，能感受到这种品牌力量。

And people wanted specifically See's over an alternate because they had this feeling, this brand strength that they got when they, you know, bought Seas candy or gave Seas candies to other people.

第三点是，没有相近的替代品。

So the third one is that there's no close substitutes.

不幸的是，任何一个市场中的供过于求都会削弱定价能力。

Excess supply in any single market, unfortunately, erodes pricing power.

如果替代品质量较差甚至不存在，品牌就可以提价。

A franchise can raise prices if the substitutes are inferior or even nonexistent.

第四点是，有能力在不流失客户的情况下提高价格。

Number four, a capacity to increase the prices without losing customers.

所以巴菲特在这里有一个非常简单的测试。

So Buffett had a very simple test here.

他只会问，如果你把价格提高10%，会失去客户吗？

He would just ask if you raise the prices by 10%, would you lose customers?

是或否。

Yes or no.

第五点是低再投资需求。

The fifth one is low reinvestment needs.

如果一个企业源源不断产生现金，却不需要再投入，巴菲特就会把这笔现金拿去别处投资——这基本上就是他将伯克希尔·哈撒韦打造成今天规模的方式。

If a business is just gushing cash and doesn't require to be reinvested, Buffett would get that cash to then reinvest elsewhere, which was basically how he built Berkshire Hathaway into what it is today.

第六点则是可预测性。

And the sixth one here is just predictability.

巴菲特寻找的是那些收益稳定、净资产回报率持久且高昂的企业。

You know, Buffett sought businesses with predictable earnings streams and durable high returns on equity.

这意味着企业能够多年持续产生越来越多的现金，为巴菲特提供流动性，以收购其他私营和上市公司。

This meant that the business could continue producing more and more cash over the years, providing Buffett with liquidity to buy other private and public businesses.

所以芒格曾表示，他认为巴菲特最终会独自领悟到优质企业的全部理念。

So Munger has said, you know, that he thinks that Buffett would have come around to this whole concept of quality on his own.

但我认为，考虑到他们几十年来就各种理念进行的大量对话，芒格帮助巴菲特走上了正确的方向。

But I think he helped nudge Buffett in the right direction, given all the conversations that two of them had about different ideas over many, many decades.

我们已经讨论过，巴菲特喜欢那些资本支出需求低、能通过广告产生收入的媒体企业。

So we've already discussed how Buffett likes media businesses with low CapEx needs that can generate revenue from advertising.

巴菲特拥有一些非常知名的媒体企业。

And Buffett had a few businesses in media that he's very well known for.

我想重点介绍其中两家。

I want to cover two here.

《华盛顿邮报》和《晚间新闻》，顺便提一下卡皮塔斯公司。

The Washington Post and the Evening News with an honorable mention for cap cities.

那我们先从《华盛顿邮报》开始。

So let's start here with the Washington Post.

《华盛顿邮报》以其至今持续的发行量和悠久的历史而闻名。

So the Washington Post is well known for its continued circulation today and its very rich history.

当她的丈夫——这家企业的领导者——自杀后，凯·格雷厄姆接过了企业的领导权。

Kay Graham took over as a leader of the business when her husband, was a leader, committed suicide.

当巴菲特开始买入股票时，这家公司的业务并不出色。

The business wasn't amazing when Buffett began buying shares.

你知道，当时的利润率大约在10%左右，但被一些电视台和其他业务板块拖累了。

You know, the profit margins were around 10%, but these were being dragged down by some of the television stations and other parts of the business.

沃伦真正喜欢的业务板块是这家主导了本地市场的报纸。

The area of the business that Warren really liked was a newspaper, which has dominated its market.

于是他开始买入相当大数量的股份，很快便达到了10%。

So he started buying a pretty hefty sum, and he quickly approached 10%.

现在，凯·格雷厄姆看到这种情况，有些担心巴菲特试图发起收购，尽管他持有的是B类股票，投票权不如格雷厄姆家族持有的A类股票。

Now, Kaye Graham seeing this was a little fearful that Buffett was attempting a take over bid even though he had the b shares, which didn't have the same voting rights as the a shares that were owned by the Graham family.

为了打消凯的顾虑，他甚至将投票代理权交给了唐·格雷厄姆，也就是凯的儿子。

To ease Kay's mind, he even signed his proxy over to Don Graham, which was Kay's son.

一旦沃伦向她保证自己无意收购公司，他就被邀请加入了董事会。

Once Warren assured her that he wasn't trying to take over the business, he was invited onto the board.

一旦沃伦进入董事会，他就开始与凯分享自己在商业领域的智慧。

And once Warren was on the board, he helped share his wisdom with Kay about the world of business.

他分享了对资本配置、支出以及应对工会等问题的看法。

He shared his thoughts on topics such as, you know, capital allocation, spending, and dealing with unions.

好的。

Okay.

这很大程度上取决于沃伦，但他最终足够信任她，让她能够独立做出出色的决策，而她也确实做到了。

Really depended on Warren, but he eventually trusted her enough to make great decisions on her own, which she did.

书中提到，凯在支出上非常节俭，这可能是她从沃伦那里学来的。

The book mentions that Kay was very frugal with her spending, which, you know, she probably learned from Warren.

作为一家媒体公司，在那个时代收购其他媒体公司很容易，因为当时行业内很多人都在这么做。

It was easy as a media business to acquire other media business as that's what a lot of people were doing in that industry during that time.

但同样重要的是，不要去效仿糟糕的商业行为，而这正是巴菲特一直所避免的。

But it's also important not to try and emulate poor business, which was exactly what Buffett had been known for.

所以，举个例子，这家报纸当时收到了许多关于移动通信和电视领域的收购要约。

So, you know, just to give an example, the post was receiving numerous deals in cellular and TV sectors.

但巴菲特并不喜欢这些交易，因为这些特定业务只会大量消耗现金。

But Buffett didn't really like those deals because those specific businesses just sucked up cash.

相反，巴菲特和凯·格雷厄姆专注于股东回报。

Instead, Buffett and Kay Graham focused on shareholder returns.

巴菲特帮助建立了股票回购计划，最终回购了40%的流通股份。

Buffett helped establish a buyback program that ultimately retired 40% of its shares outstanding.

巴菲特确实选对了企业。

And Buffett definitely chose the right business.

因此，在1974年至1985年的十一年间，《华盛顿邮报》的基本面实现了卓越增长。

So during the eleven years from 1974 to 1985, the Washington Post had exceptional growth in its fundamentals.

明白了吗？

So get that.

净利润增长了七倍。

So net profits grew seven times.

由于大规模的股票回购，每股收益实际上增长了十倍。

Now because of that massive buybacks, EPS actually grew 10 times.

它保持了约23%的平均净资产收益率。

It maintained a average ROE of about 23%.

由于这一切，那十一年期间，股东的年化回报率约为37%。

And because of all this, the shareholder return was about 37% compounded annual during that eleven year time period.

这使得巴菲特获得了20倍的回报，简直是惊人的收益。

This resulted in Warren netting a 20 bagger, which was just incredible returns.

在加入《华盛顿邮报》董事会后不久，巴菲特对GEICO的兴趣又被重新点燃了。

Now shortly after joining the board of the post, Buffett's interest in GEICO was reignited.

股价从42美元跌到了2又八分之一美元。

The share price had gone from $42 to $2 and an eighth.

这家公司犯了一些错误。

The business had made a few mistakes.

GEICO基本上放宽了其核保标准，这确实带来了短期利润增长。

GEICO had basically loosened its underwriting standards, which did result in a short term increase in profits.

但不幸的是，他们没有为损失计提足够的准备金。

But unfortunately, they failed to reserve for losses.

随后，公司遭遇了显著的盈利下滑，这也是股价暴跌的原因。

And then they were hit with a pretty significant drop in earnings, which was the reason the share price cratered.

巴菲特是所罗门公司约翰·古德弗里德领导的一个投资者团体成员，该团体帮助拯救了GEICO。

Buffett was part of an investor group led by Solomon's John Goodfriend that helped save GEICO.

他们向该公司注入了约7600万美元的资金，其中2300万美元来自伯克希尔。

They injected about $76,000,000 of capital into the business and 23,000,000 of that was from Berkshire.

资本注入取得了成功，六个月内，股价从低点上涨了四倍。

The capital infusion was successful and within six months, the stock quadrupled from its lows.

《晚间新闻》这家报纸在沃伦收购时的情况很有趣，因为当时它实际上并不是垄断，而是一个双头垄断。

The evening news, which didn't have the when Warren bought it, was an interesting business because when Warren bought it, it actually wasn't a monopoly, but it was a duopoly.

这是一家报纸。

So this was a newspaper.

在它的发行地布法罗，它有一家竞争对手报纸，即《水牛城快报》。

And in its town of Buffalo, it had a competing newspaper, which was the Courier Express.

沃伦喜欢《晚间新闻》因为与《快报》及其前所有者之间的一项非正式协议，从不在周日出版。

Warren liked that the evening news didn't print on Sundays due to an unwritten rule between Courier and the evening news's previous owners.

但巴菲特知道，这实际上会成为《晚间新闻》的一大增长杠杆。

But Buffett knew that this would actually be a great growth lever for the evening news.

所以沃伦和查理以大约19倍的税前市盈率收购了这家企业，这看起来非常昂贵。

So Warren and Charlie purchased this business pretax multiple of about 19 times, which seems very expensive.

然而，我相信他们可能假设自己可以安排合适的人选来提升利润率。

However, I believe they probably assumed that they could put the right personnel in place to increase the margins.

于是他们聘请了一位名叫斯坦·利普西的绅士，但即使有他掌管，他们仍然难以实现盈利。

So they used a gentleman named Stan Lipsey, but they actually ended up struggling to turn a profit even with him in charge.

他们实际上一直在亏损。

They were actually turning a loss.

但幸运的是，竞争对手《水牛城快报》的亏损更加严重。

But luckily, the courier was turning in an even greater loss.

最终，这家竞争对手破产了，使《晚间新闻》成为布法罗市场中唯一的幸存者。

And eventually, they went bankrupt leaving the Evening News as a sole survivor in the Buffalo market.

在没有竞争的第一年，《晚间新闻》就实现了1900万美元的税前利润。

In its first year without competition, evening news earned $19,000,000 in pretax income.

书中提到了一个沃伦在年度信件中讨论过的有趣观点，我想稍微谈一谈：如今，《晚间新闻》成为垄断企业后，不再有经济动力去维持其高质量。

The book mentioned an interesting talking point that Warren discussed in his annual letters, which I want to discuss a little And this was how now that the evening news was a monopoly, it no longer had an economic incentive to maintain its high quality.

我在这本书的页边做了一个笔记，让我想起了TCI发生的事情。

I had a note in the margin of this book that reminded me a lot of what happened with TCI.

TCI是一家我在TIP六一九中详细分析过的公司，它在某些市场拥有有线电视的垄断地位。

So TCI, a business I covered in a lot of detail in TIP six nineteen, had monopolies in cable in certain markets.

然而，它们遇到了困难，因为它们任由产品和服务质量下滑，这给它们带来了诸多麻烦。

However, they encountered difficulties because they really allowed the quality of their product and service to deteriorate, which caused them numerous amounts of headaches.

巴菲特承诺，无论是否拥有垄断地位，都会让《晚间新闻》保持一份优秀的报纸。

Buffett pledged to keep the evening news a good newspaper regardless of its monopoly status.

现在，这种垄断企业的困境让我想起了我所在省份的一家公司，我的不列颠哥伦比亚省很多人非常不喜欢它。

Now this kind of problem of monopoly businesses reminds me a lot of a company that's actually in my province that many people in my province of British Columbia very, very much dislike.

那就是一家名为ICBC的汽车保险公司。

And that's an auto insurance company called ICBC.

ICBC是一家完全由政府拥有的公有企业，意味着不列颠哥伦比亚省政府拥有它。

So ICBC is a fully owned Crown Corporation, which means the government of BC owns it.

正如许多政府机构一样，它的运营效率并不高。

And, you know, as many government entities go, it's not very efficiently run.

因此，他们还对汽车保险拥有完全垄断，这意味着我必须支付他们提供的任何保费才能开车。

So they also maintain a complete monopoly on car insurance, meaning I have to pay whatever premium they offer just to drive my car.

由于他们可以随意定价，我们的汽车保险费率成为加拿大最高的之一。

And because they can charge whatever they want, we have among the highest auto insurance premiums in all of Canada.

我从未向他们提出过理赔，但我认识的一些人有过，他们的经历简直糟糕透顶。

Now I've never had to claim with them, but I know others who have, and they've had absolutely miserable experiences.

曾经，不列颠哥伦比亚省政府甚至把ICBC的资本储备当作自己的提款机，用于自身的财政目的，结果导致ICBC的用户保费大幅上涨。

And at one time, the government of BC actually used ICBC's capital reserves basically as an ATM for their own financial purposes, which ended up punishing ICBC's users by just increasing their premiums.

我妻子曾向他们提出过理赔，他们的处理速度慢得令人发指。

My wife has made a claim with them and they're excruciatingly slow.

此外，每年他们都会调整我的保费，简直就像在抽彩票一样随机决定我要付多少钱。

Additionally, each year they adjust my premium and it's almost as if they're just drawing a lottery ball to see what they're going to charge me.

有一年涨了20%，另一年又降了10%，而我从未提交过任何理赔。

One year it's up 20%, another it's down 10%, despite the fact I've never made an insurance claim.

所有这些都说明，我完全同意先生的观点。

All this to say, I totally agree with what Mr.

巴菲特在这里说的是。

Buffett is saying here.

垄断型企业必须为顾客的利益而受到更高的标准约束。

And monopolistic businesses need to be held to higher standards for the good of its customers.

现在回到巴菲特这里，沃伦的一个有趣悖论在于，他作为一个非常低调的人，却拥有公众形象。

Now getting back to Buffett here, one interesting paradox about Warren has been the interplay between being a very private person and also having, you know, his public persona.

查理·芒格曾说，沃伦经营一家上市公司纯属偶然。

Charlie Munger said that it was an accident that Warren was even running a public company.

他本可以轻松地从奥马哈的家中运营一家私人公司，而且很可能取得巨大成功，甚至可能与现在一样成功。

He could have easily just run a private company from his home base in Omaha and would have been probably wildly successful, even maybe just as successful as he is now doing so.

但正如洛温斯坦指出的，他在致股东的信中找到了自己的舞台。

But as Lowenstein points out, in his letters, he found his stage.

他会抓住伯克希尔的某个方面、会计中的一个小细节、保险中的一个问题，然后转向一篇切题的随笔。

He would seize an aspect of Berkshire, a wrinkle in his accounting, a problem in insurance, and veer off into a topical essay.

当你审视他的生活方式和家庭生活时，主流媒体上根本没有什么可报道的。

Now when you look at his lifestyle and family life, there wasn't anything to read about in the mainstream media.

巴菲特遵循内心的评分标准，因此他并不试图做任何值得登上新闻头版的事情。

Buffett lived by the inner scorecard, so he wasn't trying to do anything that would be worth putting on the front page of the news anyways.

但他仍然做了许多与其他高净值人士不同的事情。

But he still did a lot of things different than other high net worth individuals.

我这里列出了五点。

I got five here.

第一点是，他住在奥马哈，这是一个与金融中心相距最远的地方。

So the first one here is that he lived in Omaha, which was a place that is, you know, as far away as possible as being known as a financial hub.

第二点是，他接受的采访非常少。

The second one was that he gave very, very few interviews.

是的。

Sure.

他确实接受过采访，但非常罕见，而且每次都极具洞察力。

He gave them, but they were quite rare, and they were always very, very insightful.

他并没有把采访当作宣传自己、扩大知名度的平台。

He didn't use them as a platform to be overly promotional and spread his name.

第三，他撰写的股东信非常透明，并将其作为工具，帮助普通投资者准确理解沃伦在做什么。

And third, he had very transparent shareholder letters, and he used them as kind of this vehicle to help the average investor just understand exactly what Warren was doing.

他还分享了他对美国企业应该如何运营的看法。

And he also shared how he thought corporations should be running in America.

第四，尽管他以隐士著称，但他仍拥有庞大的投资者网络和一众商业巨头名单，比如凯·格雷厄姆、比尔·鲁安和汤姆·墨菲。

The fourth one is that despite being known as someone of a recluse, he still had a massive investor network and list of business superstars, people like Kay Graham, Bill Ruane, and Tom Murphy.

最后，第五点，巴菲特根本不需要自我宣传。

And lastly, you know, the fifth one, Buffett just didn't need self promotion.

他只是让自己的业绩自己说话。

He just allowed his results to speak for themselves.

这一点至关重要。

This final point is just so important.

在社交媒体盛行的时代，到处都是人高声宣扬自己有多优秀。

With the popularity of social media, there's no shortage of people just yelling from the rooftops about how good they are.

但这类人，你最好还是屏蔽掉。

But those are the types of people you should probably mute.

因为如果一个人在投资方面如此出色，你最终会知道他是谁，仅仅因为他的业绩记录实在太非凡了。

Because if someone is so good at the investing game, you'll end up knowing who they are simply because their track record is just so exceptional.

我跳过了巴菲特生活中一些重要的部分，比如他收购内布拉斯加家具商场以及与Cap Cities和Scott Fetzer的交易。

I skipped over a few important parts of Buffett's life, such as his acquisition of Nebraska Furniture Mart and his deal with Cap Cities and Scott Fetzer.

但为了节省时间，让我们快进到1987年，具体是10月19日，那天道琼斯指数单日下跌了22.6%。

But it's in the interest of time, so let's fast forward here to 1987, specifically on October 19 when the Dow dropped 22.6% in one day.

在黑色星期一期间，伯克希尔的股价在一周内下跌了25%。

Berkshire stock had dropped 25% during the course of a week during Black Monday.

但巴菲特毫不动摇。

But Buffett was unfazed.

由于他对价值有着深刻的理解，他非常清楚自己所有企业的真正价值。

Given his deep understanding of value, he had a very good idea of what all of his businesses were worth.

为了帮助解释这场崩盘背后的一些原因，洛温斯坦探讨了有效市场假说，即EMH。

To help discuss some of the reasoning behind the crash, Lowenstein goes over the efficient market hypothesis, or EMH.

简单来说，EMH认为投资的风险来自于股价的波动性。

To put it simply, EMH believes that the risk in investment comes from the volatility of a stock's price.

如果一只股票与市场同步波动，它就被认为是风险较低的投资。

If a stock moves in lockstep with the market, it is said to be a less risky investment.

巴菲特强烈反对这种观点。

Buffett vehemently disagrees with this.

对巴菲特而言，风险是资本的永久性损失。

For Buffett, risk is a permanent loss of capital.

正如他所指出的，这种风险往往源于你根本不知道自己在做什么。

This risk, as he pointed out, often arises when you just don't know what you're doing.

这完美地解释了为什么能力圈如此重要。

This perfectly explains why a circle of competence is so important.

如果你不了解自己在做什么，就不太可能理解企业的信号，以及这些信号如何影响企业的基本面和股价。

If you don't know what you're doing, it's unlikely you'll understand the signals of a business and how they affect the fundamentals of a business and its stock price.

有效市场假说认为波动性就是风险，但沃伦非常简单地彻底推翻了这一理论。

EMH believes that volatility is risk, but Warren pretty much crushed that theory very simply.

在思考华盛顿邮报时，他指出市场对该企业的估值约为8000万美元，如果这个价格下跌一半，那么根据有效市场假说，该企业现在就被视为风险更高了。

When thinking about the Washington Post, he noted that the market was valuing the business at about $80,000,000 If that price dropped in half, then according to the efficient market hypothesis, that business was now considered riskier.

巴菲特说，我从来想不通，为什么以四千万美元买入比以八千万美元买入风险更大。

Buffett said, I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy something at 40,000,000 than 80,000,000.

有效市场假说本质上把价值概念从投资方程式中剔除了。

EMH essentially just eliminates the concept of value from the investing equation.

由于巴菲特的投资体系完全建立在价值之上，你可以理解为什么这个假说对他来说毫无意义。

And since Buffett's entire investing framework is based on value, you can see why the hypothesis doesn't make sense to him.

换句话说，想象一下有人在出售10美元钞票。

Put another way, imagine if someone were selling $10 bills.

假设这个人脑子有点不正常，愿意用五枚一美元硬币卖给你一张10美元钞票。

Let's say this person has just lost her marbles, and they're willing to sell it to you for 5 $1 coins.

现在假设他那天特别情绪化，只愿意用三十一枚一美元硬币卖给你同一张10美元钞票。

Now let's say he's having an especially erratic day, and he only wants to sell it to you for $31 coins for that same $10 bill.

说用三美元买比用五美元买风险更大。

States that buying it for $3 is riskier than buying it for $5.

这完全说不通。

It just doesn't make any sense.

因此，试图用有效市场假说的概念来解释黑色星期一发生的事情，也是一个相当薄弱的论点。

So attempting to use EMH's concepts to justify what happened during Black Monday is also a pretty weak argument.

你之前说，在黑色星期一之前、当天以及之后市场迅速反弹时，市场都是理性的。

You were saying that the market was rational before Black Monday, on Black Monday, then right after Black Monday when the market rebounded pretty quickly.

根据罗伯特·席勒对黑色星期一的一些研究，他指出投资者平均每天查看股票价格35次。

So according to some research by Robert Shiller regarding Black Monday, he noted that investors check stock prices on average 35 times.

这种抛售并非源于基本面变化。

This selling wasn't due to the fundamentals.

当时并没有出现对未来企业盈利的突然下调。

There was no sudden downgrade in future corporate profits.

如果投资者并不是基于有关股票的可靠、可获知的信息而抛售，那他们为什么这么做呢？

So if investors weren't selling based on relevant, knowable information about the stock, then why were they selling?

答案是，这纯粹是情绪驱动的。

And the answer was that it was purely emotional.

这进一步强化了本·格雷厄姆的‘市场先生’比喻，该比喻认为市场常常做出一些愚蠢的行为。

This adds strength to Ben Graham's mister market analogy, which states that the market often does just silly things.

无论是由于悲伤还是从众心理，市场都无法用可衡量的方式解释。

Whether that's due to sadness or relation, the market simply cannot be explained in a measurable way.

有效市场假说所依赖的衡量指标被称为贝塔值，它衡量的是股票的波动性。

The measurement that EMH depends on is something called beta, which measures the volatility of a stock.

如果一只股票的贝塔值为1.0，就意味着它的价格与市场同步波动。

So if the beta was one point zero on a stock, it meant that the stock price moved in step with the market.

如果贝塔值高于1，说明该股票比市场更波动。

If it was above one, it was more volatile than the market.

如果贝塔值低于1，则说明该股票比市场更稳定。

And if it was less than one, it was less volatile than the market.

这个数值的问题在于，它实际上没有任何实用价值。

The problem with this number is that it doesn't really have any actual use.

确实有一项研究明确表明，贝塔值与股票回报率没有任何关联。

There was literally a study that was out that showed that beta had no relation to a stock's return.

我一直觉得这很讽刺，因为如果你试图用一个数字来证明一项投资的风险程度，它难道不应当与回报率有一定关联吗？

So I've always found this funny because if you're trying to use a number to justify the riskiness of an investment, shouldn't it have some sort of bearing on returns?

在我看来，像贝塔这样的数字被投资界用来让投资经理或顾问显得比他们实际更聪明，从而为他们的高收费辩护。

To me, figures like beta are used in investing field to make an investment manager or consultants just seem smarter than they are to justify their high fees.

巴菲特和大多数其他价值投资者都不使用它，但他们照样做得非常好。

Buffett and the majority of other value investors don't use it, and they get along just completely fine.

我从巴菲特那里学到的应对市场回调的关键是关注价值。

The key to dealing with market corrections that I've learned from Buffett is to focus on value.

在市场回调期间，昂贵的股票往往很快就会变得便宜。

During a correction, expensive stocks often get cheaper and, you know, very, very quickly.

便宜的股票也可能变得更便宜，但论点是，它们不太可能像高价企业那样迅速下跌。

Cheaper stocks might also get cheaper, but the argument is that they're less likely to drop as fast as an expensive business.

无论你是购买便宜的雪茄烟蒂股，还是高市盈率的优质企业，只要你对价值有判断，你就应该清楚一家企业是低于、等于还是高于其内在价值。

No matter whether you buy cheap cigar butts or high quality, high price to earnings businesses, if you have a view on value, you should know that when a business is trading below, at, or above intrinsic value.

当市场出现回调时，你最好基于这一点做出决策，而不是被市场的情绪左右。

When a correction happens, you're best off basing your decision making off of that and not trying to succumb to the mood of the market.

当你因为市场抛售而卖出时，你最终也会卖掉潜在的赢家。

When you sell because the market is selling, you'll end up selling potential winners too.

这本书最后一个重要的主题是所罗门兄弟事件。

The final prominent theme of this book was the Solomon Brothers incident.

巴菲特持有所罗门公司大量股份，因为他购买了约7亿美元的可转换优先股，以阻止敌意收购。

So Buffett owned a large stake in Solomon since he purchased about $700,000,000 of preferred convertible shares to keep Solomon out of the hands of an unfriendly takeover bid.

但在1990年，他对公司的薪酬方案感到不满。

But in 1990, he was kind of at odds with the business over their compensation package.

那一年公司亏损了约1.18亿美元，而首席执行官约翰·古德弗里德却要求董事会批准一项1.2亿美元的薪酬方案。

The business had lost about $118,000,000 that year, and CEO John Goodfriend was asking for board approval about $120,000,000 compensation package.

作为公司董事，巴菲特投了反对票。

Buffett, as director in the business, voted against the deal.

他认为，员工的报酬应当基于为股东创造价值，而那一年显然没有发生这种情况。

He believed that people should be compensated for creating shareholder value, which clearly had not happened that year.

巴菲特并不喜欢把公司当作提款机的企业。

Buffett doesn't really like businesses that treat the business as a piggy bank.

毫无疑问，所罗门的员工工作勤奋、时长惊人。

There is no doubt that Solomon employees worked hard and long hours.

但如果他们没有为股东创造价值，那他们凭什么获得额外的报酬？

But if they weren't producing value for shareholders, then why did they deserve additional compensation?

这确实导致了管理层与股东利益的严重错位，而这对巴菲特来说是绝对不能容忍的。

It really just misaligns management and shareholders, which is a major no no for Buffett.

在这段时间里，国债交易员保罗·莫瑟为了给所罗门和自己牟利，进行了一些不正当的交易。

So during this time, Paul Moser, a treasury bond trader, was engaging in some nefarious trading to make money for Solomon and himself.

所罗门公司一直是美国政府债券的主要买家。

Solomon was a mainstay in buying US government bonds.

但莫瑟购买的债券数量超过了允许的上限。

But Moser bid on more of these bonds than what was allowed.

他甚至在投资者不知情的情况下，以他们的名义购买了更多债券。

He even bought more on behalf of some of Solomon's investors without their knowledge.

由于他大量买入，成功推高了价格，实际上操纵了市场。

Because he was buying in such large quantities, he was able to drive up prices, essentially squeezing the market.

但市场上的老手们很快注意到了，并给了他充足的时间停止这些行为，而他却公然置之不理。

But regulars took quick note and gave him ample time to cease his actions, which he blatantly ignored.

约翰·古德弗里德知道这一情况，但不幸的是犯了一个重大错误。

John Goodfriend was aware of the situation, but unfortunately made a significant mistake.

他没有向律师、股东甚至董事会等人坦诚相告。

He just wasn't transparent with people like his lawyers, his shareholders, or even the board.

最终，所罗门被禁止参与国债拍卖，这对所罗门的业务造成了灾难性打击，因为这正是公司业务的核心部分。

And eventually, Solomon was banned from treasury auctions, which was catastrophic for Solomon's business as that was actually the core part of the business.

由于这种不透明行为，古德弗里德被迫辞职。

As a result of this opaqueness, Goodfriend was forced to step down.

巴菲特接替了他的位置，并向财政部长尼古拉斯·布雷迪承诺，他会进入所罗门公司彻底整顿。

Buffett took his place and promised the treasury secretary Nicholas Brady that he would go in and clean house inside of Solomon.

他确实彻底整顿了。

And clean house he did.

虽然巴菲特最初因领导公司渡过难关而受到正面评价，但随着他试图推行的一些变革，不满情绪开始滋生。

While Buffett was initially viewed positively for his leadership in keeping the company afloat, resentment began to build due to some of the changes that he sought to implement in the business.

首先，巴菲特不会花钱买忠诚。

For one thing, Buffett wouldn't partake in buying loyalty.

他不愿意给表现优异的员工加薪。

He was unwilling to give raises to top performers.

因此，许多人离开了公司，去寻找其他机会。

And as a result, many people left for other opportunities.

巴菲特与新任首席执行官德里克·莫汉一起推出了一项新的激励计划，将奖金与团队的资本回报率挂钩。

Buffett also went in with new CEO Derek Mohan on a new incentive program based on linking bonuses to the group's return on capital.

作为整顿措施的一部分，巴菲特亲自带头。

As part of the cleaning house initiative, Buffett was leading.

他说出了自己最著名的一句话。

He said one of his most famous quotes.

我希望员工们扪心自问：他们是否愿意让自己正在考虑的任何行为，第二天出现在当地报纸的头版，被他们的配偶、孩子和朋友读到？

I want employees to ask themselves whether they are willing to have any contemplated act appear on the front page of their local paper the next day to be read by their spouses, children, and friends.

如果他们遵循这一准则，就不必担心我给他们的其他指示。

If they follow this test, they need not fear my other messages to them.

如果为公司亏了钱，我会表示理解。

Lose money for the firm, and I will be understanding.

如果公司声誉受损，我会毫不留情。

Lose a shredded reputation for the firm, and I will be ruthless.

尽管所罗门的投资者有很多好点子，但他们还是会拿去给巴菲特过目，看他是否同意。

Now even though Solomon investors had plenty of good ideas, they'd take them to Buffett to see if Buffett approved.

巴菲特实际上不得不否决了许多投资，因为他觉得这些投资已经接近监管机构不愿看到的红线。

And Buffett actually had to deny many of the investments because he felt they were too close to the line that regulators might not want to see.

巴菲特还聘请了一位新律师，取代了以古德弗里德为首的旧团队。

Buffett also brought in a new lawyer and replaced the old team that was led by Goodfriend.

他最终将职责交给了鲍勃·登汉姆，并翻过了这一页，甚至增加了伯克希尔·哈撒韦的持股。

He eventually handed over his duties to Bob Denham and moved past the event, even adding shares to Berkshire Hathaway's holdings.

尽管巴菲特称所罗门事件既有趣又有价值，但他也补充说，这远谈不上愉快。

Although Buffett said the Solomon Escapade was interesting and worthwhile, he also added that it was very far from fun.

现在这本书大致结束于1995年，因此之后的三十年未被提及。

Now the book ends around 1995, so the last three decades aren't mentioned.

希望洛温斯坦或其他人将来能为那个时期写另一本传记。

Hopefully, you know, Lowenstein or someone else will write another biography about that period.

但在结束之前，我还想和大家分享书中一个额外的亮点，这出自书后的附录。

But there was one more nugget I wanted to share from the book before I let you go, and this was in the afterward.

因此，洛温斯坦写道，他经常被问到，是否会对书中对巴菲特的描绘做出任何修改。

So Lowenstein wrote that he was often asked if there was anything that he would change about the portrait of Buffett in his book.

他提到，比尔·鲁安告诉他，不确定自己是否充分展现了沃伦的坚韧。

And he mentions that Bill Ruane told him that he wasn't sure he captured just how tough Warren is.

这种‘坚韧’的概念很有趣，因为巴菲特的坚韧并不是那种典型的、充满男子气概的方式。

Now this concept of toughness is interesting because it's not like Buffett was tough in the typical, you know, macho way.

他是一个在商业上非常坚韧的人。

He was tough as a businessman.

他坚韧，是因为他能够避开那些很可能出问题的投资交易。

He was tough because he was able to dodge deals thrown his way that were likely to blow up.

他坚韧，是因为在一个热衷于聘请顾问等高薪职业的行业里，他经常说‘不’。

He was tough because he said no so often in an industry that loves to pay crupiers, such as consultants.

他坚韧，是因为在许多事情上，他都不盲从华尔街的主流教条，比如薪酬制度、有效市场假说、透明度、诚实与正直。

He was tough because he didn't follow common Wall Street dogma on many things, such as compensation, efficient market hypothesis, transparency, honesty, and integrity.

我认为这正是沃伦·巴菲特之所以成为沃伦·巴菲特的一部分原因。

And I think that's part of what makes Warren Buffett, Warren Buffett.

他能够按自己的方式做事，即使整个行业似乎与他的观点完全对立，他的做法依然极具道理。

His ability to do things his own way, which makes so much sense even when the industry seems to be diametrically opposed to his views.

他没有随大流，而是开辟了属于自己的道路，这条道路显然为他和伯克希尔的所有股东带来了成功。

And instead of following the herd, he created his own path that clearly worked for him and all of Berkshire's shareholders.

所以，如果今天这期节目只有一个最重要的启示，那就是：你完全可以在商业世界中取得成功，同时保持善良与正直。

So if there's one big takeaway from today's episode, it's to have an excellent understanding that you can succeed in the business world while being someone full of kindness and integrity.

今天我就分享这些了。

That's all I have for you today.

如果你想在推特上与我互动，请关注我：irrational m r k t s，或在领英上搜索Kyle Grieve。

If you'd like to interact with me on Twitter, please follow me at irrational m r k t s or on LinkedIn under Kyle Grieve.

如果你喜欢我的节目，请不吝告诉我，我该如何改善你的收听体验。

If you enjoy my episodes, please don't hesitate to let me know how I can improve your listening experience.

再次感谢你的收听。

Thanks again for tuning in.