TIP760：美元主导地位的衰落与林恩·奥尔登

您正在收听TIP节目。

You're listening to TIP.

随着美元对全球经济影响深远，探讨这一世界储备货币的未来走向显得尤为及时。在本期节目中，与见解独到的林恩·奥尔登对话时，需谨记美元的主导地位可能正让位于更加多元化的货币体系。与此同时，美国面临持续的财政赤字和美联储独立性的质疑。在这次谈话中，林恩与我探讨了美元前景、制裁与资本管制的影响，以及投资者如何在财政主导时代调整策略。若您是关注全球宏观形势的股票投资者，这期节目不容错过。

Stig With the US dollar shaping so much of the global economy, it seems timely to explore where the world's reserve currency might be heading. As you'll learn this episode with always thoughtful Lyn Alden, one thing to keep in mind is that the dollar's dominance may be giving way to a more multipolar currency system. At the same time, The US is facing persistent fiscal deficits and questions about the Fed's independence. In this conversation, Lynne and I discuss the dollar's outlook, the impact of sanctions and capital control, and how investors can position themselves in an era of fiscal dominance. If you're a stock investor concerned about the global macro backdrop, this is an episode you don't want to miss.

自2014年以来，通过超过1.8亿次下载量的积累，我们深入研究金融市场，解读白手起家亿万富翁们最推崇的著作。我们助您保持信息灵通，为意外做好准备。现在有请主持人布罗德森。

Since 2014 and through more than 180,000,000 downloads, we've studied the financial markets and read the books that influence self made billionaires the most. We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected. Now for your host, Brodersen.

欢迎收听《投资者播客》，我是主持人迪克·布罗德森。今天再次与林恩·奥尔登连线。林恩，最近好吗？

Welcome to The Investors Podcast. I'm your host, Dick Brodersen. Today, I'm back here with Lin Alden. Lin, how are you today?

我很好，你呢？

Lin I'm good. How are you?

我也很好，感谢你抽空参加。距离我们上次交谈实在太久了，我该为此道歉。

I'm good and thank you for making time. It's been way too long since we last chatted and my apologies, I should say.

斯提格 我很乐意。每次重返节目都让我倍感欣喜。

Stig Well, I'm happy to. Always happy to come back on.

斯蒂格，莱恩，我打算用第一个问题让你们稍微为难一下。鲁登最近出版了《去美元化，你的难题》一书，他认为美元已经过了其主导地位的巅峰。他首先会承认美元依然非常重要，但30:50的格局可能会形成。他预测欧元和人民币将在全球储备、贸易结算、财政交易等方面逐渐占据更大份额，与美元共同分担。你可以把这看作是在向30:50的格局迈进

Stig So, Len, I'm going to put you a bit on the spot here with the very first question. So Roeden came out with this book, Out Dollar, Your Problem, and he argues that the US dollar has passed its peak dollar dominance. So he would be the first to say that it's clear that the US dollar will still be very important, but the footprint thirty:fifty is likely to So he predicts that the Euro and the renminbi will increasingly have a share of your global reserve, trade invoicing, fiscal transactions and so on, share that more with the US dollar. So you can think about this as moving toward thirty:fifty a

一个三极货币体系，如果你愿意这么称呼的话。

three pole currency system, if you like.

就像我刚才说的，每次我问'你同意吗？'都会让你们为难。但我想更生动地描述这个场景。我知道当我问'十年后的法币体系会是什么样子？'是个相当不谦虚的问题。但我想借此来设定场景，引出后续大纲，并概述我们可能面对的局面。

So like I said here, I'm going to put you a bit on the spot here whenever I say, Do you agree? But I wanted to paint a bit more color around it. I know it's a not so modest question whenever I ask you, How would the fiat system look like in ten years? But I wanted to use that also to set the scene and tee off the rest of the outline and give a broad overview of what we may be looking at.

是的，听起来不错。根据描述，我大体同意。虽然没读过他的书，但我早已知晓他的观点。过去五六年我也一直在观察我们似乎正逐渐转向的这个更加三极化或多极化的世界。我同意美元在数量上确实已经达到了主导地位的顶峰。

Yeah, sounds good. Based on the description, I largely agree with it. I haven't read his book, but I've been aware of his arguments before. And I've been making similar observations for the past five or six years about this more tripolar or multipolar world that we seem to gradually be shifting toward. So the parts I agree with, I do think that the dollar quantitatively has reached its peak level of dominance.

这个顶峰大致出现在2000年代初。从很多指标看，美国当时达到了统治力的巅峰——那是劳动力参与率的峰值，也是人口结构的顶峰，当然还有互联网繁荣。可以说科技与人口因素都达到了完美协同。

That was basically somewhere in the in the early two thousands or so. By many metrics, The US kinda reached peak dominance at that point. So those are peak labor participation rate, basically our peak demographics. There was, of course, also the .com boom. So kind of tech and demographics all kind of aligned.

那是苏联解体后的第十年，可以说是单极霸权的巅峰时刻，也就是所谓'历史终结论'者喜欢称道的时期。当时看起来很多问题都已解决，那确实是个顶峰时刻。但现在基于多方面因素，其中一些优势正在消退。

That was a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union. So it's kind of the peak hyperpower moment, could say, kind of the quote unquote end of history people like to call it. It's like basically, it seemed like a lot of issues were fixed. That was kind of the peak moment. Based on a number of things, some of these things are rolling over.

展望未来（其实已经开始），我们看到储备货币持有正逐渐多元化。人们常问：如果不是美元，还有什么能取代它？第一个答案是没有任何单一货币能取代。甚至美元自身也无法完全延续现有地位——因为美元当前的霸权地位真正形成于二战后的满目疮痍时期。

And when we look out forward, basically, and it's already been the case, we see gradual broadening of reserve currency holdings. And so people often ask if it's not the dollar, what could possibly replace it? And the first answer is that nothing individually can replace it. Even the dollar itself can no longer really replace itself. And that's because it the current status of the dollar really came into being after World War two when, you know, the world was devastated.

美国可以说是最后一个在战争中基本未受损伤的大国。我们拥有黄金储备、制造业基础、军事霸权，GDP曾占全球40%以上。

The United States was kind of the last, you know, big thing standing, mostly untouched by the war. We had the gold. We had the manufacturing base. We had the military dominance. We had over 40 of global GDP.

因此我们本质上成为了世界的账本。随着时间的推移，虽然布雷顿森林体系结束后情况有所变化，但它以新形式延续了下来。美国为维持储备货币地位付出了代价，比如贸易逆差等问题。经过几十年后，我们已被掏空。按购买力平价计算，美国GDP仅占全球15%到25%——考虑到我们只占世界人口的4%，这仍然很多。

And so we basically could become the world's ledger. And over time, obviously, it's it shifted after Bretton Woods ended, but it's it took a new form, and it and it's kinda remained in effect. And so that's the world we've been in, but the but the issue is that The United States has paid a cost, which you've talked about before, kind of these these trade deficits and other things to maintain that reserve currency status. And so after decades of this, we have been kind of hollowed out. The US is only, depending on how you measure purchasing power parity or not, somewhere in the ballpark of 15 to 25% of global GDP, which is still a lot considering we're 4% of the population.

但相比曾经40%以上的占比，我们现在小得多。世界其他地区已经复苏并增长。纵观历史，印度和中国因其人口规模和创新历史，GDP占比一直很高。我们正从那个异常时期回归到更常态的阶段。

But we're much smaller than that kind of 40 plus percent, which is a normal state of affairs. The rest of the world has recovered and grown. If you look long back history, I mean, India and China were always very big percentages of GDP, especially given their population size and and just a long history of innovation there. And so we're kind of in that was kind of an anomalous period in many ways. We're kind of returning to a more normal period.

目前确实没有足够体量的货币能接棒。中国是唯一规模相近的经济体，但出于各种原因仍无法像二战后美国那样承担主导角色。我认为世界正变得更加多极化，这可能意味着两种情况：

And so there's really no currency big enough. I mean, China is the only other currency of similar scale really. But for a variety of reasons, they're not really big enough to take on the mantle that The US had after World War two or after the Bretton Woods system ended. And so I think we're entering a more multipolar world. And that can mean one of two things.

要么更多法定货币用于贸易（我们已看到这种趋势），要么黄金等中性储备资产重新进入体系——就像过去黄金的角色。数据显示，21世纪头二十年黄金在全球储备中的占比触底后持续上升，各国央行增持加上金价上涨使其在资产组合中占比扩大。

Either more fiat currencies become used for trading, which we're seeing, and or neutral reserve assets like gold, for example, or in some smaller countries, Bitcoin, but currently mostly gold, they can kind of reenter the system in a way that gold used to be. And we've seen this quantitatively. Gold kind of bottomed, you could say, depending on if you look at price or tonnage in kind of the 2 thousands and the 20 tens in terms of its share of global reserves. And it's been increasing ever since then, both in terms of central banks buying more tonnage of it, as well as, of course, the outperformance, the price appreciation, kind of by extension, making it a bigger share of their portfolio. If you don't rebalance, one thing outperforms, that becomes a bigger share.

我认为世界正走向多极化。唯一看法不同的是：在这个三极格局中，欧洲似乎处于弱势。这是我过去五六年修正的观点——若在五六年前，我会认为欧元占比将提升。

So I think we are entering a more multipolar world. Perhaps the one area where I would somewhat see things differently is I think that of that kind of tripolar setup, Europe seems to be the on the the weaker side of that. So that's that's one area where I've kind of revised my outlook over the past five or six years. So if you asked me five or six years ago, would have said, I do think the euro is gonna increase in share. That somewhat changed and that was happening.

举例来说，俄乌战争前俄罗斯输欧天然气以欧元结算的比例逐年上升，这种联系本在加强。但战后该链条断裂，欧洲能源安全恶化。相比中美，欧洲在AI等科技创新领域也表现平平。

So for example, if you look at, say, Russian gas back when that was flowing to Europe readily, the percentage of that that was denominated in euros was increasing over time. That connection was kind of strengthening. Of course, after the war, that whole component was, of course, disrupted. Europe became more energy insecure. It's also not been a very big tech innovation area compared to United States and China, whether it's AI or a bunch of other things.

出于多种原因，我认为这是三大货币集团中最弱的一个。所以我认为另外两个可能是更重要、更相关的。尽管目前欧洲显然在外汇储备中的份额远大于中国。但从发展趋势来看，我认为后者最具增长潜力。不过确实，我们正在进入一个多极化的世界，这意味着我们将使用多种账本体系。

And so for variety of reasons, I think that's kind of the the weakest of those three big currency blocks. So I think that the other two are probably the, you know, the bigger, more relevant ones. Even though currently, obviously, Europe has a much bigger share of reserves than China. But in terms of kind of this, you know, where the puck is headed, I think that's got the most growth in it. But I do think, yeah, we're entering a multi polar world, which basically means we use multiple ledgers.

大国能够以本国货币结算贸易。全球资金配置更加多元化，中性储备资产重新回归历史常态。

The big powers are able to kinda settle trades in their own currencies. Global funding gets more diversified, and neutral reserve assets reenter in a way that historically they always have been.

斯蒂格 是的。琳恩，我非常感谢你的回答。可能还存在一种自然的——我不认为通胀是正确的用词，既然我们在讨论金融体系，必须注意准确定义。当你观察欧元的作用时，仅凭成员国数量就会存在差异。

Stig Yeah. You, Lynne. I really appreciate that response. And there's probably also a natural I don't think inflation is the right word because now that we are talking about the financial system, have to be aware of the exact definition. Whenever you look at some of euro's role just by having a number of countries and would be different countries.

跨境交易量也会被夸大，这是由定义决定的。但不管怎样，我觉得这是个有趣的视角。我应该是第一个提到的人。今年我们开始录音前简单讨论过罗夫的书，我当时也提到我并不完全认同那本书，但我确实尽量不去读太多完全认同的书。内容不能太过离经叛道，虽然我认为他有很多精彩观点，但只读完全认同的书通常不会让我们变得更聪明。

Will also see inflated numbers in how much of that is cross border because by definition it would be. But anyways, I kind of felt it was an interesting way of going about it. I'll also be the first one. We just briefly touched on this year before we hit record about Rov's book where I also mentioned that I don't really agree too much with the book, but I really try not to read too many books I agree too much with. It can't be something that's completely outrageous, and I think he has a lot of great points, but we also generally don't get smarter if we only read books that we completely agree with.

斯蒂格 我同意。

Stig I agree.

斯蒂格 是的。说到这里，不知是否合适，但我想说——没人付钱让我说这话——琳，在我看来你和雷达利奥的宏观经济学著作文笔最为优美。

Stig Yeah. So with that said, I don't know if that's a good jump here, but I wanted to You didn't pay me to say this, but I want to say, Lyn, that together with Redaglio, at least in my book, have the most eloquent writing on macro.

斯蒂格 谢谢，非常感谢。

Stig Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate that.

是的。我是说，这是最佳方式。它非常容易理解。而我认为确实存在大量学术写作，我有点觉得自己可以把它们推下公交车，因为我曾经也是其中一员。很多这类写作更像是炫耀。

Yeah. I mean, this is the best possible way. It's very easy to understand. Whereas I do think that there is a lot of academic writing and I kind of feel like I can throw them under the bus because I used to be a part of it myself. A lot of that is just more like showing off.

我能不能用更复杂的词汇来表达非常简单的事情？不过，那是另一个话题了，三十比五十

Can I use more difficult words for something that's very simple? Anyways, that's a different discussion, thirty:fifty

但我觉得你在宏观经济学方面写得非常雄辩。

but I think you write very eloquently when it comes to macro.

几个月前你写过这段话，我来读一下：'随着时间的推移，外国对美元的需求可能会减弱。持续的预算赤字和被美联储吸纳的货币增加可能导致货币供应量逐渐加速增长和金融抑制。我们的结构性赤字使我们面临货币脆弱性，这是拥有结构性贸易顺差的国家所不具备的。那么Len，你能为我们解读一下吗？这对美元意味着什么？'

A few months ago you wrote this, I'm just going to read this up here. So foreign demand for the dollar may weaken over time. Ongoing budget deficits and increase in the captured Fed may result in gradual accelerating money supply growth and financial repression. Our structural deficit provides us with a currency vulnerability that countries with structural trade surpluses don't have. So, Len, could you please unpack this for us and what is the implication for the US dollar?

本，当然。我想总结起来就是：美国在这方面有一个非常非常大的优势和一个非常非常大的弱点，两者相互制衡，就像互相依靠的两样东西。换个说法，如果一个人站得笔直，他就很稳定。但如果你靠着一堵墙或用力推墙，而墙突然倒塌或消失，你就会踉跄甚至跌倒。美国现在就是这种情况——我们拥有全球货币话语权，这主要体现在四个方面。

Ben Sure. So I guess the way to summarize it is The US has one really big big strength and one really big weakness in this regard that are kind of balanced against each other, like two things leaning on each other. Another way to put it is if someone's kind of standing straight, they're pretty stable. If you're leaning against a wall or pushing against a wall really hard and that wall breaks or vanishes, you're gonna stumble and potentially fall. So The US is kind of in that situation where we have the global words of currency, which basically means four major things.

许多国际合约都以美元计价，作为中性的全球账本选择。此外，约90%的货币交易都涉及美元，因为全球100多种货币中，很多货币之间缺乏直接流动性市场。比如埃及和韩元之间就不太可能...如果你随便选两个非前五名的国家，它们的货币市场通常流动性不足。但所有这些货币与美元交易时流动性都很好。所以你可以先兑换成美元，再用美元兑换目标货币。第三，各国都将美元作为主要外汇储备之一。

A lot of international contracts are priced in dollars as kind of the the neutral global ledger of choice. Also, it's it's at like, 90% of currency trades, the dollar's on one side of it because out of the over a 100 currencies in the world, many of them don't have a liquid market with other currencies directly, say Egypt and Korea, unlikely to have a you know, if you pick two countries that are that are not, you know, the top five or so, they're unlikely to have particularly liquid currency markets. But all of them are pretty liquid with dollar. So you can always go from one to the dollar and then dollar to the one you're you're going after. Three, countries hold it as their one of, you know, one of their biggest reserve holdings.

第四，美元是跨境债务的主要计价货币，用于各种融资活动。因此它是使用最广泛的账本货币，自然拥有最大的全球需求。对大多数货币来说，主要是本国人民需求，与该国贸易的实体可能暂时需要，某些交易者会进行买卖操作。

And then four, it's the principal currency used for cross border debt, so funding in various capacities. And so it's the most used ledger, and therefore, it has by far the most global demand for it. So for most currencies, obviously, country people in the country demand it. Entities trading with that country might temporarily demand it. Certain traders might trade in and out of it.

但美元和其他几种货币具有结构性持续需求，即使相关实体无意与美国进行贸易。它们将美元用于其他目的，这有利有弊。好处在于人为强化了美元地位——许多货币交易基于利差和贸易平衡等因素。

But the dollar and a couple other currencies have structural persistent demand for that currency, even if the entity in question has no intention to trade with The US. They're using it for other purposes. And that has pros and cons. So the pro is it I mean, it artificially strengthens the dollar. So many currencies trade on interest rate differentials, trade balances, things like that.

美元确实如此，但它还具备额外的结构性优势——默认情况下就是最佳结算货币。这人为抬高了美元价值，赋予我们强大的进口能力和军事主导权，让我们能轻松维持约七八百个海外军事基地，但代价是掏空了我们的工业基础。

The dollar does, but it also has this extra just structural component to it, By default, the best ledger to use. And so that artificially boosts our dollar. That makes us it gives us lots of importing power. It gives us lots of military dominance. It makes it easy to maintain our, like, seven or 800 foreign military bases, but it hollows out our industrial base.

这导致我们低利润率的实体产业竞争力下降。换个说法：如果全球都需要美元并持有美元，他们如何获得并持续获取更多美元？答案就是结构性贸易逆差——美国通过强化美元、增强进口能力、削弱出口竞争力，年复一年向世界输出美元，这种模式已持续数十年。

It makes some of our lower margin physical stuff less competitive. Another way of putting it is if the whole world needs dollars and has dollars, how did how do they get all those dollars, and how do they get more of those dollars to keep using them? And the answer is structural trade deficits. The US by, you know, strengthening the dollar, boosting our import power, hurting our export competitiveness, we spew dollars into the world every year basis. We've been doing this for decades.

这就是美元遍布全球的途径。我们因此处于强弱并存的矛盾地位，只要全球对美元存在超额需求，这种状态就会持续。但若因突发或渐变因素导致世界不再需要这么多美元...

That's how all the dollars get out there. Most of them get out there. And so we we've got this kind of position of both strength and weakness. And that persists as long as that extra demand for dollars exists globally. If something changes, either suddenly or gradually, and the world shifts toward not needing as many dollars as anymore.

可能各国会增持黄金储备，或转向多极化世界的贸易结算体系——正如我们讨论过的。无论何种原因，一旦美元需求下降，我们基于超额需求构建的体系就可能面临痛苦转型。

Maybe they shift toward gold for a bigger share of their reserves. Maybe they shift toward that multipolar world for for contracts and trade settlement, as we talked about. Just for a variety of reasons. Maybe there's less demand for dollars. We're set up with that kind of excess demand in mind, which means we could go through a kind of a painful transition should that structurally change.

这并非全是坏事，正如所言当前体系本就有受损者。但这类转型往往伴随剧痛——这正是美国面临的风险，尤其在数十年政治极化加剧的背景下。当高通胀或转型期遇上社会紧绷状态，防御机制就会失效，即便本质只是回归结构常态。这就是我所说的根本性弱点。

And it's not all bad because like I said, there's there's some that are disadvantaged by the current situation. But transitions like that do tend to be particularly painful. And so that's kind of the risk that The US has, especially as over decades, we've become increasingly more politically polarized. So when you have periods of high inflation or transitions while you're already on edge, that's kind of where the shields are down, things are vulnerable, even though it's kind of in some ways just going back to the structural norm. But that's basically what I mean when I say that it's that's our weakness, basically.

我们的体系本就是基于这种预期构建的。1:30

We're kind of built with that in mind. One:thirty

所以如果情况发生变化，事情就会变得有趣起来。

So things get kind of interesting if that situation changes.

琳，我要告诉你一些我确信你已经知道的事。每当我提到我们都被利益驱动时——虽然我总爱在没有更好替代方案的情况下抨击民主制度，这很糟糕，因为民主最美好之处就在于政客必须通过选举连任，他们需要赢得你的选票才能保住职位，这正是其美妙所在。

Lyn, I'm gonna tell you something that I'm sure you already know. Whenever I say that we're all driven by incentives. One of the things I love doing without coming up with any good alternative, I like to knock democracy once in a while. It's terrible because one of the wonderful things about democracy is that politicians have to be elected and reelected, and they have to earn your vote to stay in office. That's why it's so wonderful.

当然，这也正是问题所在。我敢肯定在私下场合，你会发现有些政客会说：'好吧，如果我们实施XYZ方案就能平衡预算'，但马上会有其他人跳出来说：'嘿，让我们花的比赚的还多吧'然后照样当选。这不是个完美的制度，而我确实也想不出更好的方案。回到美元这个话题及其在民主制度中的运作——我们很容易说'我看空美元'，但紧接着就必须定义：什么是看空？时间跨度是多久？

Of course, that's also the problem. I'm sure behind closed doors, would find some politicians who would say, Okay, if we did XYZ and then we would balance the budget, then someone else would just come in and be like, Hey, let's spend more money than we actually bring in and then be voted in. It's not a perfect system and I for sure can't come up with anything better. Going back to this idea here of the US dollar and how that works in a democracy, It's easy to say, for example, Hey, I'm bearish on the US dollar, but then of course you also have to say, How do you define being bearish? What's the time horizon?

三比五十的概率下我可以断言（可能前面已经提过），强国终将衰落，特别是以几十年甚至世纪为尺度观察时。我特意在海明威的《太阳照常升起》中引用了关于破产的描述：'逐渐地，然后突然地'——说实话，这个引用纯粹是因为我一开始就在想'怎么才能塞段海明威语录进来'。

Thirty:fifty I can come out, which I've probably already done here so far, and say that the mighty always fall, and especially if you look decades or certainly centuries. I took the opportunity to include a quote by Hemingway in our outline just because I don't know. I probably started with saying, How can I include a Hemingway quote? To be honest, that was how it started. In his book, The Sun Also Rises, he says about bankruptcy, Gradually and then suddenly.

就是...不知该怎么形容，这段话太精妙了。当然，美元在下次选举周期内失去世界储备货币地位、变得像阿根廷比索那样的概率极低，但看空美元仍可能有充分理由。所以我很好奇，琳，像你这样的身份是否会与政客们讨论美元问题？如果会，他们对你的观点感兴趣吗？

It's just, I don't know, it's just so eloquent. Stig So of course, the US dollar is highly unlikely to lose its status as the world's reserve currency and look like, say, the Argentine peso within the next election cycle, but there might still be good reason to be bearish. Stig So I'm curious to hear, someone in your position, Lynne, do you discuss the US dollar one:thirty with politicians? And if yes, interested are in your perspective? And are

他们是否有兴趣了解如何维持美元的主导地位？

they interested in learning how to sustain US dollar dominance?

我确实与部分政客讨论过这个问题。更广泛地说，我知道很多政界人士读过《破碎的货币》这本书，有些知名人士还把它推荐给国会议员，其他议员则是自己发现的。此外还包括加拿大和欧洲的政界人士。

So I have discussed it with some politicians. More broadly, I know that there are a lot of politicians that have read Broken Money. There are some kind of prominent people that have given it to members of Congress. Other other members of Congress find it themselves. In addition, Canadian politicians, European politicians.

有张挺有意思的照片——埃塞俄比亚央行行长办公室里挂着自己的肖像，旁边还摆着破损的钞票，至少非常显眼。那算是...那算是段值得骄傲的时刻。很多政客都熟悉这个典故。我本可以多结交些政界人士，但并没有刻意为之。华盛顿有很多活动邀请我，我大多婉拒了。

There's kind of a funny picture where the central bank governor of Ethiopia had a picture of him in his office and broken money was kind of there, pretty prominent at least. That was kind of that was kind of a proud moment. So politicians, many of them are familiar with it. I have not kinda courted politicians in a way that I could have. There are lot of events in DC that I've been invited to that I've kinda declined.

部分原因是精力有限，部分纯粹是个人选择——这不是我想投入时间的领域。或许我影响他人的某些方式间接促成了这些。与我交好的同事确实有人从事这类工作。说到美元看跌趋势，我们可以从三个层面来分析。让我们先退一步看——

Just partially bandwidth and partially it's just not what I've kinda chosen to put my time into. You know, maybe some of the ways that I've influenced of others have gone there. Certainly colleagues that I I'm close with have gone to do things like that. When we think of kind of dollar bearishness, I mean, there's there's kind of three levels we could consider. So we back up.

自从布雷顿森林体系结束，进入浮动汇率制以来，美元其实只经历过三个周期。熟悉五十年美元走势图的人都知道：八十年代冲高后因广场协议回落，九十年代再度攀升，次年二月见顶后又下跌。2014年至今算是第三个强美元周期。这就是整体脉络。

I mean, ever since we ended the Bretton Woods era and we went to we entered this more floating currency regime, there's really only been three dollar cycles. So if anyone's kind of familiar with the fifty plus year dollar chart, it spiked in the eighties and then fell after the plaza cord. Then it it started rising again in the nineties, you know, peaked around February, rolled over again. And then ever since 2014, it's kind of been in in the third strong dollar period. So that's kind of the the the big picture.

这张走势图可以从三个层面解读：第一是周期性波动。即使在强美元周期内，美元指数相对其他主要货币出现5%、10%甚至15%的波动都属正常。这种12-18个月级别的交易机会，比如2017年弱美元年对新兴市场有利，

And there's kind of three levels we can think of on that chart. So one is cyclically. So even within a week or a strong dollar environment, a five, ten, 15% fluctuation in the dollar index relative to other major currencies, that's kind of that first level. That's like one of those, like, twelve month trading calls, eighteen month trading calls that people might have. So for example, 2017 was a weaker dollar year, good for emerging markets.

2022年强美元年则让很多资产类别承压。而今年迄今为止是弱美元年。但这些都只是图表上的短期波动——拉长时间轴看，这些并非结构性变化，只是交易性机会。

2022 was a very strong dollar year, you know, to the, you know, painful a lot for a lot of asset classes. This calendar year so far has been a weak dollar a year. But that's all in the context of those wiggles on that chart. They kinda when you zoom out, they're not structural. They're more trading calls.

第二层面是对主要美元周期的判断。如果你在美元弱势时预判将进入强势周期，这种预测跨度可能长达十年——毕竟五十多年里只出现过三个周期。同理，若在强美元周期预判将转入结构性弱势阶段，这也是重大判断，但仍属于美元周期范畴。

The second level would basically be a call on one of those major dollar cycles. So if if the dollar's weak and you're thinking it's gonna have one of those big strong periods, that's a that's a more decade long call. Because we're only talking three cycles in a fifty plus year history. Again, and also if it's a strong dollar period and you're talking about a breakdown, a fall to another kind of structurally weak dollar period, that's yeah. I mean, that's a pretty big call, but that's still in the context of just another dollar cycle.

即便美元指数跌到70，也谈不上'美元终结'——这只是现行体系下的第三次下跌，并非全新局面。虽然很多交易员有生之年未经历过（年长的可能职业生涯遇见过一次），会把它当成世界末日，但从宏观角度看这仍属正常范畴。

So you can certainly I mean, the dollar index could go down to 70, and it wouldn't be the the, quote, end of the dollar. It it would it'd be kind of the third down leg in this system. It wouldn't be something entirely new. Even though people might treat it as though it's the end of the world or something because it hasn't really happened in a lot of traders' lifetimes or maybe if for the older ones happened once in their trading careers. But it's still in the grand scheme of things normal.

第三层级本质上将是结构性的不同，它将打破这一趋势，进入某种危机状态，或者我们确实进入一个更加结构性多极化的世界，而美国在其政策中并未真正考虑到这一点。其中某些方面会让我们痛苦地感受到。因此在近期时间线上，我认为我们确实可能面临更多疲软，也就是说，我认为有相当可能性我们已经见顶当前美元强势周期。我不认为我们很快会回升至2022年的高点。而且我认为我们可能突破当前区间，在未来几年里测试进入第三个主要美元周期的下行阶段。

The third level would basically be something structurally different, that it breaks out of that trend, enters some sort of crisis, and or we do enter a more structurally multipolar world, and The US doesn't really account for that in its policies. And some of those kinda hit us painfully. So on the near term timeline, I do think we could potentially, you know, have more weakness ahead, which is to say, I I do think there's a reasonable chance that we've we've we've seen the peak of this current dollar strength cycle. I don't think we're getting up to $20.22 highs anytime soon. And that I do think we could break out of this current range and test falling out into the basically, the third major dollar cycle in the years ahead.

我们还需观察。这可能是我的基本假设。虽然不是高度确信，但这是个基础判断。我认为除非政治危机提前引发，否则我们需要看得更远才能看到真正的危机。因为政治与货币会相互影响。

We'll have to see. That's probably my base case. It's not it's it's not a super high conviction one, but it's a base case. I think we'd have to look farther out to see something more of a true crisis unless we bring it forward with a political crisis. Because politics and currency can kind of feed on each other.

正如你提到的非线性变化可能发生——逐渐累积，然后突然爆发。但从数据来看，我认为我们距离真正超出常规范围的情况还较远。量化来看，根据国际清算银行等机构估算，离岸美元计价债务约有18万亿美元，其中大部分甚至不是欠美国的，而是因为美元是全球融资货币。

So nonlinear things can happen, like you mentioned, gradually, then suddenly. But looking at the numbers, I I think we're still further away from something truly outside of the band. And part of that, to quantify it, I mean, there is 18,000,000,000,000 or so according to the BIS and similar estimates for offshore dollar denominated debt. And that's mostly not even owed to The US. That's mostly owed because it's the global funding currency.

这些债务可能是X国某实体欠中国的，或是另一国欠法国实体的。这种错综复杂的跨境融资环境，都代表着对美元的刚性需求——其规模超过美元货币基础，几乎与广义货币供应量相当。因此存在大量结构性美元需求，不会轻易改变。这不是选择问题，而是契约约束。

That's owed from an entity in country x to an entity in China or owed from another country to an entity in France. It's this kind of big intertwined cross border funding environment. All of that represents inflexible demand for dollars, which is larger than the dollar's monetary base and almost as large as the broad money supply. So there's a lot of structural demand for dollars, which is that doesn't just kind of change on a whim. That's not like a choice, that's a contract.

这正是美元比许多看空者想象中更具韧性的部分原因——那些总认为美元即将崩溃的观点往往忽略了这些细微差别。

And so that's part of what gives the dollar kind of a lot more strength than a lot of the bears that always seem to think it's going to blow up around the corner, they seem not to account for that, those nuances.

斯蒂格，确实。这个观点非常精辟。请允许我补充几点：正如你所说，这套体系已根深蒂固。如果说'最大经济体就是世界储备货币'未免过于简单化。

Stig Yeah. I think that's such a good point. If I can just add a few more pointers here. To your point actually, so much of this is entrenched into the system. It would be a bit of a felony to say biggest economy, that's the world reserve currency.

30:50的比例确实存在某种对应关系，但看看英镑——即使英国经济被美国超越后，它仍是储备货币。这是体系惯性使然，至少维持了一段时间。回到'渐进而后突变'的话题，随后爆发了第一次世界大战等事件。另一个认知误区是，斯蒂格，事情并非'强美元就好，弱美元就坏'这么简单。历史上不乏政治家为国家利益（取决于如何定义）主动寻求弱美元政策的案例，关键在于'弱到什么程度才算弱美元'。

Thirty:fifty Of course, it does rhyme to some extent, but if you look at the British pound, that was still the reserve currency even after the British economy got eclipsed by The US. It was just the system, at least for some time. And we're going back to this gradually and then suddenly, and then we have the First World War and a bunch of other things. The other fallacy I also want to say is that Stig it is not as simple as saying, if anyone was thinking strong dollar, good, weak dollar, bad. There have been many examples of why politicians would want a weak dollar for the good of the country, depending on how you define for the good of the country and how weak a dollar is a weak dollar.

每次讨论这个话题时都有很多变数。我只是想提一下1:50那个比例。

There's a lot of moving parts whenever we talk about that. I just wanted to mention one:fifty that.

是的，完全同意。我们看达里奥在这方面做过很棒的图表分析——当你观察一个大国的兴衰时，各种指标并非同步升降。像教育、科技这些先行指标会率先超越世界其他地区，很多因素都在共同作用。

Yeah, absolutely. And we look at And Dalio had really good charts on this, which is when you look at the rise and fall of a major power, it's not like all the metrics go up and down together. Some of them are more forward, things like education, technology. They start to get better than the rest of the world. A lot of things are coming together.

这些属于早期催化剂。而储备货币则是典型的滞后指标。基本上当其他实力要素（最大经济体、最强军队、最具创新活力、教育水平等）到位并持续一段时间后，这种账本优势才会滞后显现。同理，当这些要素已经衰退多年甚至数十年后，储备货币仍能依靠网络效应维持。

That's kind of early catalysts. And then one of the lagging things is the reserve currency. Basically, once the other powers get into place, so biggest economy, biggest military, biggest innovation, vibrancy, things like that, strongly educated, That's when and it's been in place for a while. That's when that kind of that ledger becomes more dominant with a lag. And then similarly, when those things have rolled over already for years, in many cases, decades, that reserve currency has a network effect.

就像社交网络停止增长后，仍能通过'大家都在用所以我也用'的网络效应维持。储备货币也是如此。尽管美国多项指标已经见顶回落，美元虽然也有小幅下滑，但相比其他领域（比如经济规模，特别是教育等方面已被某些国家明显超越），美元作为滞后的网络效应变量，其衰落过程更为缓慢。

Kind of like how if a social network is not really growing anymore, but it's still got the self reinforcing network effect that everyone's still there because everyone else is still there. That's how reserve currencies work as well. So even though many other metrics for The US have already rolled over, the dollar's kind of, I mean, it's rolled over a little bit, but it's still closer to the apex than a lot of its other things. So whether it's economic size, whether it's especially things like education, certain other places have kind of firmly eclipsed us. Whereas the dollar is that lagging network effect later variable that that rolls over more slowly.

我们先稍事休息，听听今日赞助商的消息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

有没有发现精明投资者总在防范尾部风险，却几乎从不讨论金融压制？这个令人不安的事实是：无论你如何谨慎构建投资组合，只要资金规则可能一夜突变，你就处于风险之中。问问银行账户被冻结的加拿大卡车司机、汇款被国有银行截流的古巴家庭，或是数十个威权国家中目睹毕生积蓄在恶性通胀中蒸发的人们就知道，这些都不是孤立事件。

Ever notice how smart investors hedge against tail risk, but almost never talk about financial repression? Here's the uncomfortable truth. It doesn't matter how careful you build your portfolio because if the rules around your money can change overnight, you're vulnerable. Just ask the Canadian truckers whose bank accounts were frozen or Cuban families whose remittances were hijacked by state banks or citizens in dozens of authoritarian countries watching their life savings evaporate under hyperinflation. These aren't isolated incidents.

这是全球性的趋势。因此人权基金会发布《金融自由报告》周刊，追踪政府如何将货币武器化来控制民众，以及比特币如何帮助个人抵抗金融压制。如果你关注健全货币、个人主权和金融自由，这份我个人订阅并从中获益良多的报告值得一读。免费订阅请访问financialfreedomreport.org。

They're part of a global pattern. That's why the Human Rights Foundation publishes the Financial Freedom Report, a weekly newsletter that tracks how governments weaponize money to control people and how Bitcoin is helping individuals resist financial repression. If you care about sound money, personal sovereignty, and financial freedom, HRF's financial freedom report is essential reading. This is a report that I'm personally subscribed to and learn a ton from. Sign up for free at financialfreedomreport.org.

这里是financialfreedomreport.org。聪明的投资者不只关注美联储，他们放眼全球。

That's financialfreedomreport.org. Smart investors don't just watch the Fed, they watch the world.

作为小企业主，你没有提前下班的奢侈。你的生意24小时占据着你的思绪。因此当你招聘时，你需要和你一样努力的伙伴。这个招聘伙伴就是领英职位。当你下班时，领英开始工作。

As a small business owner, you do not have the luxury of clocking out early. Your business is on your mind twenty four seven. So when you're hiring, you need a partner that works just as hard as you do. That hiring partner is LinkedIn jobs. When you clock out, LinkedIn clocks in.

领英让你轻松免费发布职位，分享到人脉网络，并在统一平台管理优质候选人。领英甚至能帮你撰写职位描述，通过深度候选人洞察快速触达目标人群。你可以免费发布职位，或付费推广获得三倍优质申请者。72%使用领英的中小企业表示它能帮助找到高质量候选人，让你对获得最佳申请者充满信心。了解为何我们和超过250万家中小企业选择领英招聘。

LinkedIn makes it easy to post your job for free, share it with your network and get qualified candidates that you can manage all in one place. LinkedIn can even help you write job descriptions and quickly get your job in front of the right people with deep candidate insights. You can post your job for free or promote it to get three times more qualified applicants. With LinkedIn, you can feel confident that you're getting the best applicants as 72% of small and medium sized businesses using LinkedIn say it helps them find high quality candidates. Find out why our business and more than 2,500,000 other small businesses use LinkedIn for hiring today.

免费发布职位请访问linkedin.com/studybill。在linkedin.com/studybill免费发布职位，条款适用。我经常做笔记：构思播客新点子、记录投资研究、甚至日常待办清单。过去整理这些笔记曾是项挑战。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill. That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free. Terms and conditions apply. I take a lot of notes, coming up with new ideas for the podcast, jotting down notes for investing research, even everyday to do lists. And keeping these notes all organized used to be a challenge.

因此我开始使用Remarkable Paper Pro Move。这款纸感平板融合纸张触感与平板数字功能。我可以手写笔记，立即转换为文字并通过邮件或Slack分享。我发现其他笔记方式有明显缺陷：纸质笔记难以整理易丢失，

That's why I started using the Remarkable Paper Pro Move. It's a paper tablet and it combines the familiar feel of paper with the digital powers of a tablet. I can jot down notes by hand, then instantly convert them to text and share them by email or Slack. I found that other note taking methods have clear drawbacks. Paper's hard to organize and easy to lose.

膝盖上平衡笔记本电脑既不适又烦人。手机注意力总被社交媒体和无穷通知劫持。Remarkable Paper Pro Move完全不同——它的屏幕看起来、摸起来甚至听起来都像纸，没有伤眼的蓝光。最重要的是，Remarkable的使命是帮助你更好地思考。

Balancing laptops on my knees can be uncomfortable and annoying. And on our phones, our attention gets hijacked by social media and endless notifications. Remarkable Paper Pro Move is nothing like your other devices. It has a display that looks, feels, and even sounds like paper, so there's no blue light that causes eye strain. And most importantly, Remarkable's mission is about helping you think better.

这意味着没有应用、社交媒体或其他干扰。你可以免费试用Remarkable Paper Pro Move一百天。如果它不符合你的期待...

That means no apps, social media, or any other distractions. You can try Remarkable Paper Pro Move for one hundred days for free. If it's not what you're looking one:thirty for,

您可获退款。立即访问remarkable.com购买您的纸质平板电脑。网址是remarkable.com。

you get your money back. Visit remarkable.com to pick up your paper tablet today. That's remarkable.com.

好的，回到节目。斯蒂格·林恩，感谢你引出我的下一个问题，因为我很好奇你认为美国是否应该使用美元制裁手段。这听起来可能有些争议——既然拥有美元霸权，为何不加以利用？

All right. Back to the show. Stig Lynn, thank you for teeing up my next question because I'm curious to hear how you think The US should use dollar sanctions, if at all. It might sound a bit controversial as saying, if at all. If you have the dollar, why wouldn't you use that?

这里存在一个有趣的动态：在某些情况下，武器使用得越多，其效力反而越低。众所周知，美国曾脱离全球美元体系（包括SWIFT系统），俄罗斯目睹了这一切。当2022年遭遇类似制裁时，他们已建立了黄金储备并扩展了SPFS系统。虽然俄罗斯可能仍对制裁规模感到意外，但显然他们预判到了部分制裁。那么快进到现在：中国的情况如何？

So there's this interesting dynamic where the more you use a weapon in some situations, the less useful it becomes. Famously, The US ran off from the global dollar system, also SWIFT, and Russia saw that. And whenever they hit by some of the same sanctions back in 2022, they already built up some reserves in gold and the one, they also expanded SPFS. I still think the Russians were probably surprised by how many sanctions they got hit by, but it looked like that they did anticipate at least some sanctions. So if we fast forward then and say, Okay, so what about China?

中国确实加速了人民币国际化进程。目前超过30%的商品服务以人民币计价，跨境收入中人民币占比超50%，这包括资金流动。考虑到中国当前局势，斯蒂格，或许这些发展本就会发生。我推测部分进程因俄罗斯前车之鉴而加速。能否请你分析美元武器化的利弊？

Well, they've certainly accelerated the internalization of their currency. Today, over 30% of goods and services are danny yuan and it sells more than 50% of cross border receipts, so that also includes financial flows in their own currency. Perhaps Stig with everything that's going on in China, perhaps a lot of that would have happened in any case. I mean, I can speculate that some of that has been speeded up because they've seen what happened to Russia. But perhaps you could outline the advantages and disadvantages of weaponizing the dollar

一点三十

one:thirty

以及哪些政策能在短期和长期内达成这些效果。

and what policies would achieve with outcomes, short and long term.

没错。我们开场很好——使用得越多，削弱得越厉害。而且针对的对手越强大，制裁效果就越有限。历史上相对有效的情况是制裁小型边缘国家，这相当于切断其与全球最大清算体系的联系，给国际贸易增设摩擦成本与风险等障碍。

Right. I think we opened it well, which is the more you use it, the more you weaken it. And then also the the bigger adversary you target with one, the less likely it is to be effective. So where it historically has worked somewhat well is when you pick a a smaller pariah state and you sanction them, you're basically cutting them off from the world's biggest ledger. You're adding all sorts of frictions for them to trade with other countries, extra costs, risks, things like that.

即便是这些制裁的效果也受到了某种程度的限制。我是说，看看朝鲜被制裁多久了，他们的政权依然在运作，还有伊朗、委内瑞拉这类国家。人们甚至可以争论这类制裁是否有效，但显然它们对美国造成的反弹影响，比起频繁使用制裁或针对俄罗斯这样的大国时要轻微得多。战争初期，我记得有人说俄罗斯在全球GDP中的占比也就和意大利差不多。

Even the effectiveness of those have been somewhat constrained. I mean, you know, how long has North Korea been under sanctions and their their regime still operating or similar like Iran, these kind of countries, Venezuela. So there's even I mean, people can debate around the effectiveness of even those types of sanctions, but but clearly, they they ricochet back into The US less severely than when they try to either use them more frequently or go after a bigger entity like Russia. During the opening phase of that war, I mean, I saw people say, you know, Russia's only this share of GDP, global GDP. It's kinda like Italy.

这不算什么大事。但并非所有GDP都具有同等价值。特别是在衡量经济规模时，购买力平价GDP往往更重要，因为这反映了实际可调动的商品和服务总量。另一个关键指标是能源产量或发电量——这些硬性经济指标更能体现国家体量，尤其在战争时期，也能全面反映经济实力。

That's not a giant deal. But not all GDP is created equal. And especially, I mean, when it comes to economic size, in many cases, purchasing power parity, GDP matters more because that's kind of the amount of actually goods and services they can they can bring to bear. Another thing to look at is just energy production or electricity generation. These kind of harder metrics of an economy, I think, are a better descriptor of their size, especially when it comes to war, but also just economic weight as a whole.

一个靠旅游业和服务业支撑的体面GDP国家，与依靠能源生产、军火、原材料和各种全球必需金属创造高GDP的国家截然不同。哪怕这些金属供应中断10%，对世界都像是场灾难。我认为我们在那方面的实际效果比许多人预期的要差。正如你所说，让俄罗斯意外的是欧洲的介入程度超出了他们的预料——他们完全预料到美国会制裁，但没想到欧洲会如此强硬。

A place that's got a decent GDP because of tourism and and services is different than a country that has a big GDP because of energy production, arms, raw commodities, all sorts of metals and stuff that the world needs. And if even 10% of those metals goes offline, it's like a kind of catastrophe for the world. And so I think we were less effective there than many people thought. And to your point, where I think it surprised Russia was I think that Europe got involved more than Russia would have guessed. So I think they fully expected The US to sanction them.

考虑到之前讨论过的能源相互依存关系，他们应该没料到欧洲会如此强硬。带来的连锁反应之一就是：欧洲原本越来越多地用欧元结算俄气贸易，当这条渠道中断后，中俄转而更多使用人民币结算。欧洲的损失就此成了中国的收获，这在很大程度上是形势所迫。

I didn't think they expected Europe to go as hard, given that intertwined energy situation we talked about before. And one of the ramifications was, like I mentioned, that Europe used to price a lot of its Russian gas trades increasingly in euro. Of course, when that went away, one thing that China and Russia did was they increasingly priced them in China's currency. So what was kind of a loss for Europe was a gain for China in that regard. And it's in many ways out of necessity.

既然无法使用制裁清单上的结算系统，他们索性启用了其他早就想用的大额清算渠道。与其分三年逐步推进，不如现在就全面转换。这就是我们面临的局面——当你不再是最大贸易伙伴时，这个巨变就产生了根本性影响。要知道二十年前，美国还是世界上绝大多数国家的头号贸易伙伴。

If they can't use the sanction ledger, well, have these other big ledgers they always kind of wanted to use anyway. And now it's like, instead of just doing over the next three years, let's just do it now. And so that's kind of the situation we found ourselves in. Basically, as you're no longer the biggest trading partner, that's another giant factor. So it used to be a couple decades ago, US was the biggest trading partner with the vast majority of countries in the world.

过去二十五年间，中国已大幅超越我们。如今对绝大多数国家而言，中国已是比美国更重要的贸易伙伴。虽然仍有少数国家与我们的贸易额更大，但整体格局已定。因此当制裁等状况发生时，美国在这方面的筹码已大不如前。我认为我们的制裁能力确实过了巅峰期。

Over the past twenty, twenty five years, China has greatly eclipsed us. The vast majority of countries, China is a bigger trading partner with them than The US. And there's still a handful of countries we have bigger deals with, but it's China. And so when sanctions fly, things like that, The US's ledger is just weaker than it used to be in this regard. And so I I think we are kind of past our prime in terms of sanctioning ability.

但重申一次，我并不认为维持美元霸权是最需要优化的首要变量。正如之前所述，人为创造对本币结算需求有利有弊——这会让某些群体受益而另一些受损。过去四十多年里，一方持续获利而另一方（制造业等产业）则在这种工业基础空心化过程中不断受损。因此某种程度上，失去美元主导地位未必是坏事。真正的危机可能发生在竭力维持霸权却仍失去它的过程中。

But again, it's I don't view maintaining dollar dominance as the number one variable to optimize. Because as I talked about before, there are pros and cons to having an artificial demand for your domestic ledger. There are certain winners and certain losers, and we've had forty plus years of one side winning and the other side kind of manufacturing and and the other things on the wrong side of this kind of hollowing out of our industrial base losing. So in some ways, losing dollar dominance is not a bad thing. I think the the bad thing would be losing it while trying to gain it.

就像，如果你竭尽全力去维持某件事，但它却被夺走，那感觉就像你正推着一堵墙，墙却突然消失了。更好的做法是逐渐远离那堵墙，这样当墙消失时，你已能独立站稳。所以我担心的不是美元主导地位的丧失，而是它以不体面的方式丧失。另一个类比是，通常当一个帝国变得过于庞大时，与其优雅地收缩，领导者往往会谦卑地说‘我们扩张得太大了’。

Like, if you do everything in your power to maintain it and it gets taken away from you, that's kinda like you're pushing into the wall and the wall vanishes. It's better to start easing away from the wall so that by the time the wall's not there, you're standing on your own two feet. So what I worried about is not losing dollar dominance. It's it's losing it inelegantly. Another way another analogy I've used is typically when an empire gets too big, instead of drawing back gracefully, some sort of the leader saying humbly, we we have gotten too big.

‘让我们退回更可持续的状态’。但他们常常耗尽鲜血与财富来维持每一条边境线，而蛮族同时从四面八方叩关。于是他们节节败退，而非以强势姿态有序收缩。所以，如果我要给政策制定者建议，那就是：很多趋势是结构性的、不可避免的。其中未必是坏事，关键在于处理方式——是否在下午1:30妥善应对，是否准备得当。

Let's let's pull back something more sustainable. They often try to spend all their blood and treasure maintaining every border they have as the barbarians are knocking on too many gates at the same time. And they they kinda fall back weekly instead of falling back from a position of strength. So that's you know, if I if I give advice to to, you know, policymakers, it'd be something like that, which is a lot of this is structural, it's inevitable. A lot of it's not even a bad thing, and it's mostly about how it's handled one:thirty and whether it's prepared for correctly or not.

琳恩，我特别欣赏你这个观点。但这极具挑战性，因为当你身处其中另一面时，必须真正理解它。当今世界大多数事情都要压缩成30秒的片段。表面看当然要维持美元主导地位，但你的观点是‘既要也要’。如果终将失去主导权，该如何优雅退场？

I absolutely love that you say that, Lynne. It's also incredibly challenging because you really need to understand it so well whenever you are on the other side of it. In today's world, most things just have to fit into a thirty second clip. So it seems like, of course, you want US dollar dominance, but then you're saying, Well, yes, but also no. If you are going to lose the dominance, how are you going to do it?

我本来要长篇大论英国和埃及的历史教训。就像每次权力更迭的转折时刻——‘噢，新警长是美国人了’。优雅过渡极其困难，因为需要适应过程。二战后那段历史就毫不优雅，这么说应该没有争议。

I was about to go on a long rant about The UK and Egypt and everything that was going on. Sort of like whenever you have that pivotal moment where you're like, Oh, we got a new sheriff in town and it's The US. It's incredibly difficult to do it gracefully because you're getting used to it. You saw what happened after the Second World War and it was not graceful. I don't think it's controversial to say that at all.

一切发生得太快，可能远超英国预期，这也解释了为何结局如此。斯蒂格·琳，我想多聊聊中国和货币互换协议。我对互换协议有种执着的兴趣，虽然不一定总能切中要害。中国已用本币签署超6000亿美元的互换协议——注意这不是美元计价，但规模确实超过6000亿。

It happened very fast and probably a lot faster than what The UK thought, which is also why it happened the way it did happen. Stig Lyn, I wanted to talk a bit more about China and I wanted to talk about swap lines. I have this fascination with swap lines and I don't necessarily know if it always hits home, but it's interesting. So China has extended more than $600,000,000,000 worth in its domestic currency. So by definition, this is not in dollars, people are familiar with what that is, but it's more than 600,000,000,000.

准确说是超4万亿人民币！他们与32家央行签署协议，虽然实际使用不多（毕竟互换协议通常只在危机时启用）。但这信号表明：中国正沿着美国主导的旧体系，搭建自己的金融管道。欧央行也在扩大互换协议地理范围和工具类型。我想请教：未来几十年非危机时期，你认为互换协议在三大货币体系中会扮演什么角色？

It's more than 4,000,000,000,000, Juan. They've extended that to 32 central banks, And they're not used significantly because by definition, you generally don't use a swap line unless you really need to, typically in a state of crisis. But it is a signal that they're building up their own fiscal plumbing around the legacy US led system. The ECB has increased their swap lines geographically and the type of facility that they're now offering. I'm curious to hear from where you're sitting, which role do you expect swap lines to have in the three major currencies over the next decades less crisis?

好问题。我之前讲过贸易逆差是储备货币流向世界的主要渠道。危机期间（比如2020年经济骤停时），由于全球以该货币计价的债务总量远超流通中的货币量，会导致储备货币（比如美元）突然短缺。

Yeah. Good question. I talked before about how trade deficits are mostly how the reserve currency gets out into the world for the world to use. During crises, because at any given time, there's more debts denominated in that currency than there are units to that currency floating around. If cash flows dry up for any reason, like let's say 2020 or any sort of other major economic contraction, there suddenly becomes a shortage of the reserve currency, let's say dollars in this case.

另一种暂时释放美元流动性的方式是货币互换协议。这与贸易逆差导致的美元外流不同，它是危机期间的临时借贷，就像音乐不停游戏就能继续的抢椅子游戏——只要音乐持续，椅子数量少于孩子也没关系。

And so another way of getting dollars out there temporarily is swap lines. And that's not giving them out in a similar way that trade deficits are. It's loading them out until the crisis is over and the music keeps playing. Any sort of debt based system is kind of like musical chairs where it works. There can be more kids than chairs as long as the music's playing.

当音乐停止或放缓时，问题就会突然显现。货币互换协议的作用就是在音乐间歇期搭建桥梁，避免危机爆发，直到音乐自然重启。中国由于长期贸易顺差，人民币自然外流有限，这也是人民币在全球储备中占比不高的原因——他们不像美国那样向世界倾泻货币。

And when the music stops or slows, that's when suddenly it's a problem. And swap lines are meant to, when the music gets off, to bridge the gap so it doesn't become a crisis until the music starts playing again on its own. So that's kind of the main purpose. For China, because they run structural trade surpluses, they don't really get a lot of their currency out there. So, I mean, that's part of why, you know, we don't see a much larger share of of Chinese currency in reserves is because they're not spewing it into the world.

中国并不想完全复制美国体系，他们只希望用本币结算更多贸易（实际上正在这么做）。货币互换协议主要针对那些美元债务高企、本币在危机中剧烈波动的国家。

They don't really wanna replicate the the exact US system. They just wanna denomine a lot of their own trade in in their currency, which they're effectively doing. So I think, you know, swap lines are for that purpose. It's mainly for those countries that have a lot of dollar debt. I mean, a lot of currency debt relative to their units floating around in crises.

鉴于中国不存在大量这类问题，互换协议使用率低就不足为奇。但值得注意的是，全球现存18万亿美元主导的债务就像戈尔迪之结——美元多头视其为不可战胜的体系。然而破解方法之一就是债务货币转换。

Because China doesn't have a ton of that, it's not surprising to see that swap lines are not greatly used. One thing I think we could see over time is that we have this Gordian knot I mentioned before of 18,000,000,000,000 in dollar dominant debt outstanding in the world. And that for some of the dollar bulls, that's kind of viewed as like this invincible thing. You just have to there's nothing that can get around that. Well, one of the things they can get around it is that countries can kind of refinance their debt in another currency.

比如中国通过对美顺差积累的美元储备，可以帮助受美元债务困扰的小国进行债务置换：用人民币计价替代美元计价。这不是债务减免，而是改变债务计价货币。虽然操作空间有限，但通过互换协议或其他合约，这种边缘性的多极化策略正在显现。

So say China has some dollars, is their reserves and elsewhere because they've run such surpluses with The US and others, they've gotten a lot of dollars. And if there's smaller entities, smaller countries that are struggling with their dollar denominated debt, especially if the dollar gets too strong or otherwise they they wanna change their orbit, China can offer to pay off their dollar debt in exchange for having it now in in their currency. So it's not that they pay off their debt, but they basically swap the debt domination of their debt. And, you know, there's a certain capacity to do this, but that that could be something we see along the margins, whether it's swap lines helping with that or other types of contracts. I think that's that's kinda more the multipolar playbook.

欧元区也可能出现类似操作，但欧元在三大货币中最弱势。中国显然更积极推动这类货币外交，因此边际上会看到人民币使用比例提升。不过中国并不希望人民币像美元那样被过度用于非中国相关交易——他们既要获取国际化的好处，又试图规避美国体系的弊端。但这确实是维系势力范围、拯救受美元体系困扰国家的有力工具。

Now it could happen in euro too, but again, I think that's kind of the weakest of the three major currencies. China's certainly more kind of outwardly engaged in all this type of stuff. So I do think that you could see around the margins that kind of shift toward the Chinese currency. Now again, they don't necessarily want a lot of, you know, their currency being used for things not related to China per se, because they're not trying to replicate the advantages and disadvantages of The US system. But it is a really powerful tool they have to keep countries in their orbit or bail countries out of struggling in The US orbit.

比如这些国家可以放弃IMF援助，转而选择中国提供的方案：'如果想换个游戏伙伴，我们随时欢迎'——这正成为一种新选项。

That instead of getting IMF support, for example, they can say, well, if you wanna you wanna play with a different set of players, we're here. That's kind of an option.

斯蒂格·林恩，我要说一些可能让美国听众不太爱听的话。我只能希望他们一听到我谈论互换额度就已经失去兴趣了。但我会先多谈谈中国，然后转向美国，让自己不受欢迎。作为一个投资者，每当一个国家实施资本管制时，我总是感到担忧。其中最著名的例子之一就是中国。

Stig Lyn, I'm going to say something that's probably very unpopular with our US listeners. The only thing I can hope for is that once they heard me talk about swap lines, they're already turned off. But I'm going to first talk a bit more about China and then transition into The US and make myself unpopular. One of the things that always concerns me as an investor is whenever a country imposes capital controls. So one of the most famous examples of that would be China.

他们有5万美元限额的规定，允许用于旅游、学习、医疗等特定用途，但对货币流动实行严格管控。当然，当地政府宣称这是为了维护稳定，但对我这个偏爱自由开放市场的资本家来说，这就是资本管制。斯蒂格，因为当你阅读《破碎的货币》这类精彩书籍时，你会了解到政府有强烈的动机控制货币。所以我看到这个3.5%的汇款税——它是五月那个'美丽大法案'的一部分——后来遭到反对降到1%，如此反复。很多听众可能会说：哇等等，你把两件完全不同的事混为一谈了。

They have this $50,000 rule or equivalent of $50,000 that there are some approved purposes such as travel study, medical expenses, but there was this tight control of the currency. Of course, the style of the local government, they were talking about securing stability, but at least for me as a capitalist who have this bias for free and open markets, to me that's just capital controls. Stig Also because whenever you read wonderful books such as Broken Money, you also learn how governments have an incentive very much to control currencies. So I saw this 3.5% remittance tax here that was a part of the one big beautiful bill back in May, and then there was some pushback, and then it was a 1%, and so on and so forth. So many listening to this would be like, Woah, woah, woah, woah, you're mixing up two completely different things.

我从不进行任何汇款，为什么要关心这个？这与中国现状毫无关系。这话可能没错，但作为投资者，我总是在寻找未来趋势的信号。我想获得最佳回报，所以每当看到资本管制的迹象就会警惕。当然，作为投资者你仍可以投资那个国家——只要获得足够的风险溢价。

I don't do any remittances, so why would I even care? It has nothing to do with what's going on in China. That's probably true, but as an investor, I'm always looking for signals for what's going to happen in the future. I want to capture the best returns and I'm always concerned whenever I see signs of capital control. So of course, as an investor, you can still invest in that country, especially if you get an adequate risk premium.

说完这些，你预期美国会出现资本管制吗？展望未来五到十年，你是否担心美国市场吸引力下降？在收到太多恶意推文前我要补充：严格来说这不能称为资本管制。但按我主观标准就是——因为你限制了资本流动（可能我有资本家偏见）。林恩，我很好奇你的看法。

With all of that being said, do you expect capital control in The US to come? Are you concerned about The US being less investable when you look five and ten years out? And then the last thing I would say before I get too many nasty tweets is that technically you would not call this a capital control. In my very subjective book, it is because you constrain capital from flowing and I probably have this capitalist bias, but I'm curious to hear how you look at it, Lyn.

林恩：我同意关于资本管制或资本摩擦的大体观点。我认为这些限制可能会随时间增加，原因有几个。而且不仅美国，全球都可能加强管制——虽然中国可能放松（但从宏观层面仍会保持某些限制）。

Lyn I agree with the broad view of capital controls or capital frictions. I do think those will probably increase over time. Couple of reasons. And and it might not just be The US. I think that that could increase globally, whereas potentially China eases them because from a very high level, but still maintain them in place as well.

这有几个原因，主要是财政主导。我此前谈过美国等发达国家处于财政主导状态：积累了巨额公共债务，结构性财政赤字持续增加，债务累积限制了政策选择。历史上财政主导时期往往伴随资本管制。我也不喜欢管制，和你理由类似——我支持自由开放市场。

And that's for a handful of reasons, with the main one being fiscal dominance. So I've talked before about The US and many other developed countries are in fiscal dominance, which is to say we build up a very large stock of public debt, and we're also running structurally high fiscal deficits, and therefore adding to that debt, which limits some of our options. And historically, when you have fiscal dominance, capital controls more likely come into the mix. And I'm not a fan of them either for similar reasons as you are. I'm a fan of free and open markets.

所以全球投资者配置资本时，最关键变量之一是：能否在所需时间框架内撤出资金？他们投资中国时会说那里可能有机会——股票更便宜/其他方面表现良好。但当我想撤回资本时，会不会被拒绝？

One of the so when any especially global investors, they look where to put capital, one of the biggest variables is can they get it out in a time frame that that is relevant to them? So when they invest in China, they say there might be opportunities there. The equities might be cheaper. Other things might be going well. But when I wanna bring this capital back for one reason or another, am I gonna get told no?

那个地方甚至已不再是他们的首都。而如果一个司法管辖区有着长期尊重产权、法治健全的传统，没有任意妄为的情况。如果某个国家的领导人就是不喜欢你，直接说‘不行，那个实体不能撤资，但这个实体可以’，你可能会想，我是否还要和这个国家做生意？或者即使做生意，是否要尽量减少规模，因为我不想让投资组合或公司中无法预测的因素损害特定比例。因此这确实可能降低一个地区的投资吸引力。

That point isn't even their capital anymore. Whereas if there's a jurisdiction that has a very long history of just freely respecting property rights, rule of law, no kind of arbitrary If there's a country where the leader just doesn't like you and just says, Nope, that entity can't get their capital out, This other entity can. You're kind of like, well, do I wanna do business with that country? Or if I do business, do I wanna minimize it because I don't want a certain percentage of my portfolio or a certain percentage of my corporation impaired for things that I can't predict. So it does potentially make a region less investable.

由于美元的特殊地位，我们——我是说问题之一是我们过去太具投资吸引力了。就像加拿大和澳大利亚的房地产市场因为全球资本涌入而异常火爆，特别是作为价值储存手段的中国资本。这其中有赢家也有输家。那些在房价飙升前就已拥有房产的人乐见其成，他们当初以X价格买的房子现在值5X了。

Now because of the dollar status, we're I mean, one of the problems is we we've been too investable. It's kinda like how Canada and Australia, their property markets get really hot because global capital goes into it, especially Chinese capital, as like a store value. And that's there's winners and losers from that. So those who already own homes going into that kind of surge are loving it. Their home, you know, they bought it for x and it's now worth 5 x.

那些难以进入房产市场的人，他们还没有房子，就处于不利地位。我是说，在这些地区，获得合理住所的成本高得离谱，因为几乎没有空置房屋被用作价值储存手段。在美国，这种情况对房地产市场影响较小，但对我们的股票市场和整个资本市场影响较大。这种过度估值美元的现象损害了我们的出口竞争力。

People that have trouble entering the home market, you know, they don't have one yet. They're impaired. I mean, it's the cost of of having reasonable shelter is just through the roof in those jurisdictions because it's not a lot of empty houses used for store value purposes or apartments. In The US, that doesn't really happen to our real estate market as much, but it happens to our equity market and our capital markets as a whole. That kind of overvalues the dollar and therefore impairs our export competitiveness.

所以从某些方面来说，降低美国的投资吸引力并不全是坏事，但我不赞同通过随意实施资本管制来实现——比如不确定投资者能否撤资，法治和产权可能得不到保障。在我看来，这不是减少美国资本流入的好方法。

So in some ways, making The US less investable is not all bad, but I wouldn't like that path of saying, our capital controls are more whimsical. We don't know if you're gonna be able to get your capital out or not. Rule of law might or may not be respected. Property rights might or may not be respected. That's not, in my opinion, a great path toward making The US stuffing the kind of less capital in The US.

因此在财政主导可能持续数年甚至数十年的时期，出现这种情况并不令人意外。

So but it's it's not surprising in a period of fiscal dominance, which lasts years or decades.

斯蒂格，没错。很高兴你这么说。我也应该澄清一下，我并不是在将美国与任何第三世界经济体在资金撤出方面相提并论。但我认为投资规模确实值得探讨。例如，我在土耳其有些投资，那里本质上实行着现实中的资本管制，但我可以控制规模——这只占我投资组合中很小一部分。

Stig Yeah. I'm very happy that you say that. I should probably also clarify and say that I'm not comparing The US to any kind of third world economy in terms of getting money out, But I do think that there is something to be said about sizing. So for example, I have some of my investments in Turkey, which by definition is like real world capital controls, but I can size that. It's a very small part of my portfolio.

如果资金无法撤出，那对我的整体资产根本不会造成任何影响。

If I can't get my money out, it makes absolutely no difference.

所以每当我看到美国发生不同的事情时

So whenever I see different things happening in The States that

我考虑的是本土市场却生活在国外，斯蒂格，我也在想这意味着什么？不，我遇到任何问题的概率确实低得多，但我的风险敞口却大得多。这对一切都会是毁灭性的。我一直在思考长尾端发生的事。有时在非常时期，长尾的形状会与正常分布曲线稍有不同——一点半时的样子可能和

I consider my home market and I live abroad, Stig I'm also like, what does that mean? No, the probability of me running into any kind of issue is significantly lower, but my exposure is that much higher. It would be absolutely detrimental for everything. I am always thinking about what's happening on the long tail. Sometimes whenever you have extraordinary times, the shape of the long tail is a little bit different one:thirty than what

你在正态分布曲线上看到的不一样。这是用非常书呆子的方式说，我不知道。我想总是要考虑所有可能的情况。

you look at in a normal distribution curve. That was a very nerdy way of saying, I don't know. Always think of all scenarios, I guess.

我同意。我同意。

I agree. I agree.

斯蒂格，所以琳恩，我想讨论的是，如果我提出一个非常粗略的过度简化说法，然后事后说它完全错误。那么让我试着说发达经济体有独立的央行，而发展中国家没有。这当然绝对不正确。可能方向上是正确的，但并不真实。独立性从来都不是绝对的。

Stig So, Lyn, I wanted to talk about if I can come up with a very rough oversimplification and then say afterwards it's completely wrong. So let me try to say that developed economies have independent central banks and then developing countries do not. That is of course absolutely not true. It is probably directionally correct, but it's not really true. Independence is never absolute.

政治仍然会影响它们。看看1970年代的美联储，再看看主权债务危机期间的欧洲央行。或许更准确的说法是，美联储是在政府内部独立，而非独立于政府之外。当然我们现在讨论的是语义问题，但世界最大经济体似乎正在发生某种转变，有人呼吁政府直接或间接更多地干预货币政策。比如可能在2026年5月现任美联储主席四年任期届满时替换他。

Politics still lean on them. You look at the Fed in 1970s, you look at ECB during the sovereign debt crisis. Perhaps it's more accurate to say that the Fed is independent within government rather than independent from it. Now of course we are discussing semantics, but it does seem like a shift may be happening in the world's largest economy with some people calling for the government to lean more on monetary policy either directly or indirectly. It could, for example, be replacing the current Fed chair whenever his current four year term expires in May 2026.

我还应该说，利率是由委员会设定的，并非主席一人决定，尽管主席通常是其代表。斯蒂格，所以这里有很多变动的部分。回到这个讨论：这是政治性的吗？还是非政治性的？每次有理事因故辞职时，总是由现任总统提名，然后参议院以多数票确认。

I should also say it is a committee that's setting the rate and it's not exclusively by the chair, though that's typically the face of it. Stig So there's a lot of moving parts here. Going back to this discussion about, is it political? Is it not political? Every time you have a governor that's resigning for the board for whatever reason, it is always the sitting president who nominates and then there is the senate confirms by a majority vote.

所以从定义上讲，无论哪届政府执政，美联储都不是完全独立的。但林恩，我认为现在值得讨论的是，如果市场认为美联储的独立性比现在显著降低，你预计标普指数和十年期国债收益率会对此作何反应？

So it is by definition, regardless of the administration, not completely independent. But I think what interesting to discuss now, Lynne, is if the markets were to perceive the Fed as significantly less independent than it is today, how do you expect the S and P and the ten year treasury yield to react to that fact?

回顾历史，我要指出，在政府内部维持权力分立历来非常困难。这并非历史的常态。在现代社会，这种情况更为常见，是各国努力追求的目标，但实现起来很困难。尤其是在发展中国家，由于缺乏相关历史传统，实现权力分立尤为艰难。

Backing up, I'd point out that just historically maintaining separation of powers within a government is historically very hard. It's not really the historical state of affairs. In kind of modern times, it's more common. It's kind of what places strive toward, but it's hard to achieve. And kind of the difficulty of achieving it, especially in developing countries, they don't have a history of it in many cases.

凭空建立这种制度几乎不可能。很多时候，所谓的权力分立只是假象，很快就会消失，因为它从未真正存在过。因此，建立稳固、持久、真正的权力分立制度极其困难。在当前语境下，这意味着各权力部门虽然相互依存，但存在制衡机制。例如美国最高法院作为政府三大分支之一，其大法官由总统和参议院任命，一旦就职便很难被罢免。

It's hard to just forge that out of nothing. And a lot of times you have an illusion of separation that quickly goes away because it was never really there in the first place. So actually having robust, stained, long term separation of powers is really hard to do. And what it means in this context is, like, the powers still lean on each other, but they have checks and balances. So for example, the US Supreme Court, one of the three branches of the government, the justices are put in place by the president and the senate that once they're in, it's it's very difficult to remove them.

因此从任命那一刻起，他们就能独立运作。这种制度设计本质上是为了防止个人意志或政府更迭导致政策剧变。即使某年选举出现极端结果，众议员任期两年，总统任期四年，参议员任期六年，而最高法院大法官更是终身任职直至退休或去世。某种程度上，美联储可以被视为政府第四分支——其理事任命方式类似最高法院大法官，任期漫长，理论上不受政治风向影响（除非有正当理由）。

And so they they they operate independently from that initial selection point, which basically tries to make it so that the whims of people or the whims of government can't change everything at once. So even if we have a crazy election one year, congressional terms last two years, presidential terms last four years, senate terms last six years, and the supreme court is life until retirement or passing away. The Fed can kind of be thought of as a fourth branch of government in the sense that the governors are put in place similar to Supreme Court justices. And then from there, they run these pretty long terms that are then supposed to be pretty much protected by political whims other than with cause. And so we have this kind of fourth branch.

历史经验表明，无论是美国还是其他国家，在财政主导时期或战争期间，央行独立性往往迅速消失。因为当局绝不会允许某些情况发生，比如本币主权债务违约或重大金融体系故障。十之八九，他们会选择货币贬值来灭火。因此在财政主导时期，独立性荡然无存。如今我们自1940年代以来首次重回财政主导时代，央行独立性出现可论证的衰退并不令我惊讶。

Now historically, again, during fiscal dominance or war, whether it's The US or elsewhere, independent central banking goes away pretty quickly during crises. Because the the handful of things they won't let happen are, for example, a sovereign bond default in their own currency, just major unchecked financial plumbing issues. They will generally put out fires if it means debasement 99 times out of a 100. And so especially during fiscal dominance, independence goes away. And I'm not surprised that what now that we're back in fiscal dominance, you know, since the first time since, like, the, you know, the nineteen forties and the aftermath, that we see a arguable deterioration in central bank independence.

我认为这种状况将持续。摆脱财政主导的出路之一是收益率曲线控制，这本质上是一段时间内放弃央行独立性。问题在于：这种独立性还能否恢复？在债务消融后，能否平稳着陆并重建市场信心？1940年代后我们曾成功做到，但今非昔比。

And I think this is gonna be sustained. One of the ways out of fiscal dominance is yield curve control, which is basically a giving up of central bank independence for a period of time. The question is, can you ever get it back? After you burn away the debt, can you stick the landing and then go back, you know, to some state of of more confidence? We did it before after the forties, but that was a very different time.

我们能否再次做到？拭目以待。回答你的问题：如果一个国家失去投资者对其货币和央行的信心，收益率曲线更可能变陡峭，资本外逃风险加剧。这反而可能促使当局实施资本管制或设置资本流动障碍，而这些措施在可行情况下往往会加速资本外逃。具体表现可能是美联储突然降息。

Can we do it again? We'll see. To answer your question, if a country does lose confidence of investors in its current and central bank, you're more likely to get steeper yield curves. You're more likely to get capital flight, which then actually then increase the probability of getting capital controls or capital frictions to try to slow it, which can then actually accelerate the capital flight where possible. And the way they can manifest is like the the Fed could cut.

因此，如果市场认同美联储的降息决定——比如经济正在放缓、通胀成问题、劳动力市场问题日益凸显，然后美联储降息，市场会说：'好吧，这说得通。'他们可能还会买入债券，从而推低债券收益率。但如果市场认为'通胀有点过热'……

And so if the market agrees with the Fed's cut, like, let's say the economy is slowing and inflation is on a problem and labor markets are viewed as increasingly a problem and then the Fed cuts, the market will say, okay. That makes sense. And they might also be, you know, buying bonds and therefore driving bond yields down as well. If the market says, okay. Inflation's kinda hot.

经济并没有那么疲软，此时降息不合逻辑。然而，若一个政治化的美联储或央行执意降息，市场可能会说：'我不相信他们能将通胀维持在目标水平，也不相信他们会努力回归他们衡量的2%通胀目标。'

The economy's not that slow. It wouldn't make sense to cut here. But then a a politicized Fed or politicized central bank cuts. The market could say, I don't trust that they're gonna, you know, maintain inflation at their target level. I don't I don't trust they're gonna try to get back to the 2% target the way they measure it.

于是市场可能要求更高的债券收益率。这就可能出现美联储降息时，长期资产（如抵押贷款支持证券或国债）因遭抛售而收益率上升的情况。其剧烈程度取决于市场信心——若认为只是少数理事受政治影响是一回事，若整个机构都被操控则是另一回事。

So maybe I want higher bond yields. So you can have a situation where the fed cuts and longer duration assets, mortgage backed securities or treasury bonds, go up in yields as people sell them. And the magnitude of that could depend on just how much confidence. If they think, okay, so there's maybe a couple politicized governors, that's one thing. If the whole thing's kinda captured, it's another thing.

所以这里存在程度差异。但可悲的是，当进入财政主导状态并持续一段时间后，无论是资本管制、资本流动障碍还是央行独立性受损，这些都是财政主导的症状。随着账目结构失衡加剧，更多'脚手架'会搭起来试图维持运转——这些都是他们惯用的工具，未来很可能会反复使用。

So there's a matter of degrees here. But I think it's it's it's unfortunately normal that as you enter fiscal dominance, stay there for a while, whether it's capital controls, capital frictions, or a a deterioration of central bank independence, these are symptoms of fiscal dominance. As the ledger gets structurally imbalanced, more kind of scaffolding goes up, trying to keep the the wheels on the track. And those are those are well trodden tools that they have that they'll probably resort to over time.

克莱，我们稍事休息，听听今日赞助商的内容。

Clay Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

克莱，商业未来会怎样？问九个专家能得到十种答案。牛市熊市争论不休，真希望有人能发明水晶球。在那之前，超过42,000家企业已通过甲骨文的NetSuite实现未来保障——这款排名第一的AI云ERP将财务、库存、人力资源整合到统一平台。

Clay What does the future hold for business? Ask nine experts and you'll get 10 answers. Bull market, bear market, it goes on and on. Can someone invent a crystal ball? Until then, over 42,000 businesses have future proofed their business with NetSuite by Oracle, the number one AI cloud ERP bringing accounting, financial management, inventory, HR into one fluid platform.

这套统一管理系统提供唯一数据源，赋予您快速决策所需的可视性与控制力。实时分析与预测让您能依据可执行数据洞见未来。若我当年需要这类产品，这绝对是首选。无论企业营收百万还是上亿，NetSuite都能助您应对挑战并抓住重大机遇。说到机遇，即刻登录netsuite.com/study下载《CFO人工智能与机器学习指南》。

With one unified business management suite, there's one source of truth giving you the visibility and control you need to make quick decisions. With real time insights and forecasting, you're peering into the future with actionable data. And if I had needed this product, it is exactly what I would use. Whether your company is earning millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you respond to immediate challenges and seize your biggest opportunities. Speaking of opportunity, download the CFO's guide to AI and machine learning at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南在netsuite.com/study上免费提供。想象一下：午夜时分，你躺在床上浏览新发现的网站，正把心仪商品加入购物车。结账时突然想起钱包在客厅，却不愿离开温暖的被窝。就在即将放弃购物车之际，你看到了那个紫色购物按钮——它已保存你所有的支付和配送信息，让你足不出被窝就能快速完成交易。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study. Picture this, it's midnight, you're lying in bed scrolling through this new website you found and hitting the add to cart button on that item you've been looking for. Once you're ready to check out, you remember that your wallet is in your living room and you don't want to get out of bed to go get it. Just as you're getting ready to abandon your cart, that's when you see it, that purple shop button. That shop button has all of your payment and shipping info saved, saving you time while in the comfort of your own bed.

这就是Shopify，包括我在内的众多商家选择它自有道理。从结账到创建独立店铺，Shopify让一切变得更简单。作为全球数百万企业的商业平台，它支撑着美国10%的电商交易，既有美泰、Gymshark等知名品牌，也有像我这样刚起步的商家。Shopify为你提供全球转化率最高的结账系统。

That's Shopify, and there's a reason so many businesses, including mine, sell with it. Because Shopify makes everything easier, from checkout to creating your own storefront. Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses all around the world and 10% of all e commerce in The US. From household names like Mattel and Gymshark to brands like mine that are still getting started. And Shopify gives you access to the best converting checkout on the planet.

让Shopify助你将宏大商业构想变为现实，日后你定会感谢我。立即注册享受每月1美元试用，今天就开始销售：shopify.com/wsb。初创企业讲究快节奏，在AI加持下，它们发货更快，更早吸引企业级买家。

Turn your big business idea into reality with Shopify on your side and thank me later. Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb. That's shopify.com/wsb. Startups move fast. And with AI, they're shipping even faster and attracting enterprise buyers sooner.

但大订单往往伴随更严格的安全合规要求。SOC2认证有时仍不足够，合适的安全措施能决定交易成败。可哪位创始人或工程师能抽离创业重心来处理这些？Vanta的AI自动化技术让你几天内就能做好大单准备。

But big deals bring even bigger security and compliance requirements. A SOC two isn't always enough. The right kind of security can make a deal or break it. But what founder or engineer can afford to take time away from building their company? Vanta's AI and automation make it easy to get big deals ready in days.

Vanta持续监控合规状态，确保未来交易畅通无阻。其服务随业务扩展，全程提供支持保障。面对AI驱动的法规变化和买家预期，Vanta精准把握需求节点，打造了最快捷的达标路径。正因如此，严肃的初创企业都选择Vanta早期护航。听众专属优惠：vanta.com/billionaires立减1000美元。

And Vanta continuously monitors your compliance so future deals are never blocked. Plus Vanta scales with you, backed by support that's there when you need it every step of the way. With AI changing regulations and buyers' expectations, Vanta knows what's needed and when, and they've built the fastest, easiest path to help you get there. That's why serious startups get secure early with Vanta. Our listeners get $1,000 off at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问vanta.com/billionaires即可享受1000美元优惠。

That's vanta.com/billionaires for $1,000 off.

Stig：好了，回到节目。Stig：Len你提出了精彩观点。你观察到全球国债市场特别是长端曲线的异常波动。当我们讨论陡峭化曲线时，可以想象成：资金投放期限越长，投资者要求的利率或收益率就越高。

Stig All right, back to the show. Stig Yeah, you bring up such good points, Len. You've seen some weird stuff happening in the treasury markets globally, especially on the longer end of the curve. Whenever we say that, so we typically talk about the ten year or the thirty year. Whenever we talk about a steepening curve, you can picture it as how far do you go out in time and what kind of interest rate or yield would the investors want to have.

斯蒂格，看起来随着事态发展，是的，我们已经见证了一些疯狂的市场波动，但也许真正的风暴尚未到来。或许这些波动甚至不取决于美联储的独立性，你即将看到的一些变化。谁知道呢？

Stig It seems like with everything that's going on, yes, we've seen some crazy moves, but perhaps we've seen nothing yet. Perhaps it's not even dependent on the Fed independence, some of the moves that you're going to see. Who knows?

斯蒂格，是的。我认为问题在于，在财政主导时期，美联储实际上已没有好的应对策略。当他们试图控制通胀时，其主要手段是通过加息或降息来加速或减缓银行信贷。但当通胀源于货币化的财政赤字时，这种从内部产生的压力使得利率调整效果有限——因为加息反而会进一步扩大赤字。这就是症结所在：他们的工具本就不是为财政主导设计的。

Stig Yeah. I think the problem is that during fiscal dominance, the the Fed doesn't really have good moves anymore. When they try to contain inflation, their main what they're trying to do is accelerate or decelerate bank lending with their rate cuts or rate hikes. But when the when the the call is coming from the inside, when inflation's from monetized fiscal deficits, raising and lowering rates is not as effective because if they raise rates, it actually blows out the deficit even more. That's kind of the problem is that their tools are just they're not designed for fiscal dominance.

这也部分解释了为何他们那时会丧失独立性——因为他们根本缺乏应对这种情况的工具。于是人们很容易会说：既然他们都不起作用了，那干脆接管他们吧。《破碎货币》的核心观点之一就是：货币本质上是账本，而账本有不同的类型。比如黄金，你信任的是自然法则和开采提炼的难度来决定世界上的黄金总量。

And so that's part of why they lose independence at that point because they don't really even have the tools to deal with the situation anyway. So then it's easy to say, well, like, they're not even effective. Let's just let's just take them over, basically. And I you know, what kind of a key theme in broken money is that money is a ledger, and there's different types of ledgers. So gold, for example, you're trusting nature and the difficulty of mining and refining to determine how much gold is in the world.

关键限制在于它是缓慢的物理过程。而美元体系本质上是你信任政府、央行及更广泛银行系统能有效维护这个由人类运作的巨型账本。有些账本（比如典型发展中国家）我们不会特别信任，除非出于贸易需要。而那些巨型账本，我们某种程度上是出于必要性才与之绑定。

And the and a key limiter is that it's slow. It's physical. Whereas with with the dollar system, it's you're basically trusting the reliability of of the government and the central bank and the broader banking system to maintain this gigantic human run ledger effectively. And there are some ledgers, like a typical developing country, we don't particularly trust that ledger more than we have to or as a trade or something. Whereas these really big ledgers, you know, were kind of out of necessity, were were kind of tied to.

所以当这种体系开始出问题时——关键在于这些集中式账本是许可制的。它们可以冻结资产、实施资本管制。如果失去制衡，它们能快速制造通胀。第三种类型则是代码构建的账本。

And so when that starts to have problems I mean, the problem is those big centralized ledgers are permissioned. So they can seize assets. They can do capital controls. And, you know, if they lose certain checks and balances, they can inflate quite rapidly. And then the third type would be, you know, code.

比如比特币或其他时间链，由众多用户共同维护账本。这种情况下你信任的是代码的安全性，以及维持这个生态系统规则的各种制衡机制。它不是单一中心化实体，而是多个参与者相互制衡，必须通过激励机制来维持无需许可的特性，确保交易不受审查，货币不会被暗中增发或贬值。这就是三种主要账本类型。

So Bitcoin or or other other time chains in general, which is a bunch of users run a ledger. And in that sense, you're trusting the security of the code. You're trusting kind of the checks and balances that maintain the rule set of that ecosystem. So instead of being one centralized entity, there's a handful of kind of players that all, you know, lean on each other and that the incentives have to be in place to maintain either permissionlessness, the, you know, the ability to transact without getting censored, or that your currency is not gonna get bugged or debased in some way. So those are kind of the three main ledgers.

问题在于财政主导时期，中间那种集中式账本会开始劣化。于是人们要么逃向尚未严重劣化的体系（比如瑞士这样的避风港），要么涌向其他类型的中立30:50资产。

And the problem is during fiscal dominance, that middle type, that centralized one starts to degrade. So you you people either flee to ones that are not quite as degraded, you know, maybe the the Switzerland's of the world, or they flock into these other other types of neutral thirty:fifty assets,

这些以不同方式治理的事物，无论是自然法则、代码规则还是其他形式。

these ones that are just governed in different ways, either by nature or by code or whatever else.

是的。我...我觉得从法律上讲我不能在播客里提供建议，所以我只能说观察——当你看到局势即将崩溃时，最好站在债券交易的正确一方。但如果你问政客们——我还没吐槽够政客，准备再说一次——多数人可能会说想平衡预算。但政客终究是政客，他们还要谋求连任，这很艰难。

Yeah. I I I would give my well, I think legally I can't give any advice on the podcast, so I'd probably make the observation that you better be on the right side of the bond trade whenever you see what's going to unravel here. But I think if you ask politicians I haven't knocked politicians enough, I'm going to do it one more time. But I think if you ask them, probably most would say they want to balance the budget. But politicians, being both politicians, also seek election or reelection, and that is tough.

实际上他们只有四种工具：削减开支、增加税收、印钞以及债务重组。有些人特别是政客会说'我们可以靠经济增长摆脱3:5的困境'——这种戏码我看过太多次了，历史书也读得够多，通常根本不会如愿。你往往得动用其他手段，这世界就是这么残酷。Stig，我要给你出个超级难题，因为各国政府似乎都无解，但也许你能行，Len。

In practice, they have four tools at their disposal, lower spending, raising taxes, printing money, and then restructuring debt. Some, especially politicians, would also say, Well, we can just grow out of thirty:fifty this issue we have right I've just seen that movie play out too many times now and read too many history books that that's usually just not what's going to happen. You typically have to use other tools. The world just isn't that kind. Stig So I'm going to give you a very, very tough challenge here because it seems like the world's governments can't figure it out, but perhaps you can, Len.

抛开政治不谈，假设由你掌权，同时拥有财政和货币政策工具，你会如何平衡这些杠杆？可能产生什么影响？

So politics aside, if you were in charge, and let's just say you could use, in this case, both fiscal and monetary tools, how would you balance those levers and what would the implications be?

这组问题问得好。说实在的，这可是价值万亿美元的难题。我第一反应是辞职，因为老实说我觉得自己搞不定——所以我才不去政府部门工作，而是在私人市场尽力管好自己的事，而不是试图管理所有人的账本。如果非要我给建议或在理论推演状态下尝试，会采用我们讨论过的思路：承认美国正在衰落的事实。

Yeah, it's a good set of question. I mean, that's kind of the trillion dollar question. First thing I would do is resign because I don't think I would be able to fix it, be honest. That's why I don't work in public office, work in private markets, kind of handle my own situation as best I can rather than trying to to govern everyone's ledger. I think that, you know, if I were to give advice or try to do it myself, if I was in some some of the in sort of just like a theory crafting mindset, it would be some of the stuff we already talked about, which is to recognize in The US's case that we are a fading empire.

我的意思是，帝国总会让某些群体受益——军工复合体因帝国地位获利，而制造业基础反而受损，比起那些向帝国方向靠拢的国家处于劣势。所以我们得承认：我们正走在帝国衰落的道路上，该如何体面地完成这个转型？

And to say that is I mean, empires, again, those that are rewarded by it, so the military industrial complex is rewarded by being an empire versus the manufacturing base is not even helped by it. It's actually harmed by it compared to countries that are leaning into that empire direction. So I basically say, okay. We're we're we're you know, it's it's we're we're in this fading empire path. How can we most graciously, you know, most gracefully transition in that regard?

如何从强势地位优雅收缩？如何继续保持山巅之城的魅力——让人们向往移民、愿意经商合作、热衷创新，保持人均富裕度与幸福感？我的方案是：不再维持美元霸权，转而推动中性储备资产。这才是符合自然规律的状态。

How can we pull back from position of strength? How can we continue being this, you know, shining republic on a hill that people wanna immigrate to, that people wanna do business with, that people wanna innovate in, that people you know, that it's as kind of the the most free and and pretty wealthy on a per capita basis and happy. How can we optimize toward that? So I instead of trying to, you know, maintain dollar dominance, I would promote neutral reserve assets. So think it's that's that's the that's the natural state of affairs.

我支持一个更多元货币的世界，并会努力让国内体系更适应这种趋势。简单来说，当公共账目上的债务达到这种程度时，违约就不可避免。问题在于违约方式及对象——你可以选择名义违约（当债务以本国货币计价时通常不会发生），或者通过购买力贬值实现实质违约。

I would support a more multicurrency world, and I would try to gear the domestic system more toward that. So one would be basically whenever you have this much debt on the public ledger, you're going to default. The question is, how are you gonna default and who are who are you going to default to? So you can default nominally, which which generally doesn't happen when the currency is in your in your own when the debt's in your own currency. Or you can default through purchasing power.

某种程度上我们已经违约了。过去五年的债券实际回报率，从购买力角度看简直是在焚烧投资者收益。相比其他几乎所有资产类别，这已经算是某种局部违约。但我认为危机尚未结束，因为公共债务和利息支出仍处高位，更何况那些完全失控的福利体系。

In some way, already have. In the past five years of bonds, I mean, it's it's been absolutely lighting investor returns on fire in terms of purchasing power. We've already kind of done this partial default compared to every other asset you could have owned pretty much. But I don't think we're done yet because we still have very high public debt and high interest expense. There's also just entitlement systems that are just completely just out of control.

这些制度设计基于每代人口都会增长的假设，从而维持较低的退休者与劳动者比例——但现实恰恰相反。美国拥有全球最高的人均医疗支出，尽管日本平均年龄比我们大十岁，他们的医疗花费却少得多，人均寿命反而更长。我会采取与DOGE完全相反的策略。

Just they they were designed with the idea that every generation is gonna be bigger than the next generation so that you're always gonna have a a low retiree to worker ratio, and that's just not the case. So they were it's just not geared correctly to this gigantic insurance state. We also The US has the highest per capita healthcare costs in the world. So even though Japan on average is like ten years older than us, they spend on average way less on healthcare than we do and longer life expectancies. So basically, and I would kind of do the opposite of what DOGE did.

DOGE的做法是：如果把政府支出比作饼图，国防、社保、医保占大头（退伍军人福利可并入国防），其余如联邦航空局、国家公园等机构只占很小部分。

So DOGE, they went after So if you look at the government spending pie chart, there's defense, there's social security, Medicare, you can put veterans benefits in defense. And then there's a smaller part of the pie chart. It's like everything else. It's like the FAA. It's like the parks, the rest of the pie chart.

这些小项目当然可以优化，但这是在回避主要矛盾。真正问题在于国防开支膨胀、医疗体系臃肿、社保失衡。我的策略是精简国防开支，裁撤全球数百个军事基地，真正做到『言语温和，手持大棒』。

That obviously could be optimized, but that's pretending that there's not a bigger problem. The bigger problem is the defense, the bloated health care system, imbalanced social security. So basically, that's what I would try to right size, to try to clear out pork from the defense spending. Actually focus more on defense, not on hundreds of military bases globally. So I'd say pull back, make sure we speak softly and carry a big stick.

保持军事力量但不盲目扩张，以本土防御为主，偶尔协防盟友。其次停止食品补贴——现行政策本是为防止饥荒，但数十年补贴不健康食品导致全民健康恶化，反而加重医疗负担。再加上公私混杂的畸形体系，完全破坏了价格发现机制。

So don't disarm ourselves, but have a military designed toward defense of ourselves, occasional defense of our allies, global alliances, not just being everywhere all the time and not optimizing toward congressional pork. Two, stop subsidizing foods. Our food policy was kind of geared toward making sure starvation doesn't happen. So subsidizing unhealthy food, which then after decades gave us tons of health problems that then bloats our healthcare system. And then in addition, our kind of hybrid public private mess, It makes it so price discovery doesn't happen.

患者接受治疗时甚至不知道价格，买卖双方议价机制在美国医疗体系中根本不存在（其他国家也有类似问题，但美国尤甚）。若不改革医疗体系，其他问题都无解。我不幻想自己能完成这个艰巨任务，但这个问题终须解决——要么趁早，要么等到危机爆发时。

If someone goes for a procedure, they don't even know what the price is. There's no the mechanism of kind of buyers and sellers setting prices just doesn't really happen in The US healthcare system. Many other places too, but especially The US. So So I don't think you can fix this without tackling the healthcare system, which is incredibly hard. I wouldn't have any illusions that I would accomplish it, but that has to be accomplished eventually, either through crisis or preferably before there's a crisis.

然后回归到政府职能更加有限的领域。同时伴随一次重大的货币违约，基本上是货币贬值。货币贬值失败的根本原因在于问题未能得到控制。以二战后美国为例，他们确实经历了重大货币贬值，但随后转向了紧缩政策，不再持续巨额赤字。

And and get back toward those areas of government being more limited. And then along with kind of a one time major currency default, basically a a currency devaluation. Now where currency deviations fail is basically when they don't get the problem under control. So after World War two, The US I mean, they had a major currency devaluation, but then they did shift toward austerity. They didn't keep running big deficits.

他们拥有良好的人口结构优势，经历了创新热潮等等。他们利用这些条件转向紧缩政策。虽然债券持有人遭受损失，但之后局势稳定下来，重建了信心，并在此基础上继续发展。

They had I mean, they had the benefit of really good demographics. They had an innovation boom, all of this. And they used that to shift toward austerity. So, okay, it's okay. Bondholders got killed, but then it stabilized, rebuild confidence, go from there.

这基本上就是必须采取的做法——承认债务已经过多，意识到前几代人许下了无法兑现的承诺。如何以尽可能公平的方式对部分债务违约？然后稳定局面，为后代维系整体框架。这些就是我试图推动的措施。

That's kind of what you have to do, is basically say, we already have too much debt. We already you know, generations have made promises we can't do. How can we default on some of this is is it in the fairest way possible? And then stabilize to try to keep it together for future generations. Those are the things I would I would be trying to do.

但重申一次，说来容易做来难。整顿自家财务远比修复三亿多美国人乃至全球都在使用的总账本要简单得多。

But again, it's much easier said than done. It's much easier to get your own house in order than to try to fix the ledger that 300 plus a million Americans use and the whole world's tied into as well.

确实如此。成为收缩帝国的君主很难存在选择偏差——能登上皇位的人最初往往就不具备这种思维模式。我不想过度偏离话题，虽然我确实对历史过于着迷。

Stig Yeah. It's hard to be the emperor who scales back the empire. Is a selection bias. If you are the emperor, you probably didn't become the emperor by having that mindset in the first place. I don't want it to derail the conversation too much, and I know I nerd out too much about history.

如果有人研究过1940年9月2日英美《驱逐舰换基地协议》，会发现这个案例对当前诸多局势及如何在变动的世界秩序中（恕我词穷）驾驭帝国极具参考价值。Lyn，我要问个合理问题——毕竟本期节目我一直这么做的——除了硬通货（我限制你回答这个，因为预感到你会提），如果听众想问未来五到十年该如何应对？我们知道很多听众主要关注股市。

But if anyone would study what happened 09/02/1940 with the Disorder for Basis deal between The UK and The US, I just think that it's a very interesting case study in a lot of things that's going on and how to navigate empires, for lack of better words, in a changing world order. Lyn, I am going to ask you a reasonable question, but I've done that so far throughout the episode, so I can't help myself. So aside from hard money, I'm going to constrain you and say, You can't say hard money because I kind of felt you would go that route. But if some of our listeners are tuning in here and they're like, What should we do here over the next, say, five to ten years? We know that we have a lot of listeners who are mainly thinking about equities.

在财政主导时代，你如何看待优质股票？

How do you think about high quality equities in the era of fiscal dominance?

詹姆斯表示我看好优质股票。我维持着三支柱投资组合：第一支柱是硬通货和大宗商品生产商等；第二支柱是盈利能力强的高质量股票；第三支柱规模较小，是用于流动性和再平衡的现金等价物。股票在我的组合中占比很大，同时我也尽量做到全球分散投资。

James So I'm bullish on high quality equities. I maintain a three pillar portfolio, which is one is hard monies and commodity producers, things like that. The other one is profitable, high quality equities. And then the third smaller pillar is cash equivalents for liquidity and rebalancing and things like that. So the equity component is very large for me, and I try to be somewhat globally diversified.

品质是相对于价格而言的。如果某资产质量极高，我愿意支付略高价格；若是中等品质，我期望能以折扣价购入。在财政主导环境下，股票表现能相对出色（尤其当我们没有溢价买入时）——除了听众们熟知的股票优势外，更重要的是你持有的是持续创造价值的盈利企业，而非静态资产。

And quality is relative to price. So if something's extremely high quality, I'm willing to pay up for it a little bit more. If something is medium quality, I expect to get it at a bargain. The reason that equities can do pretty well in a fiscally dominant environment, especially we don't overpay for them, is I mean, in addition to just for all the reasons that your listeners know equities are are good. I mean, you're owning a profitable business that is you know, it's it's it's doing more than a inert substance is doing.

这是由一群人日复一日为提升你的投资价值而工作。但正如我之前强调的，宝洁公司最成功的产品其实是其债券，可口可乐亦是如此。换个角度说，可口可乐近一个世纪几乎年年盈利，那为何还会背负四五百亿美元债务？

It's it's a bunch of people working every day to try to increase the value of your investment. But they're also one of the I I've made the point before that one of the best products that Procter and Gamer ever sold was their bonds. Same thing for Coca Cola. And another way another way of putting it is that Coca Cola has been profitable every year for a century, more or less. And so why do they have 40 or 50,000,000,000 in debt?

答案在于他们不得不这样做——特别是在当前高利率环境之前，他们能以2-3%的利率发行5年、10年甚至20年期的债券。这本质上是以个位数利率做空法币，而这些货币的年均广义供应量增速达7%。这种大规模法币空头头寸不同于对冲基金，不会被像保证金贷款那样随时追缴，而是形成了一种永久性空头仓位。

And the answer is because they can't. Because especially before the current high rate environment, they could issue bonds at two or 3% for five, ten, twenty plus years. And they're basically shorting fiat currency for low single digits, while that currency was growing in broad supply by an average of 7% per year. And so they had this big fiat currency short that unlike a hedge fund or something, can't just be called back on them like a margin loan. They've got this kind of permanent short out there.

他们用这些资金购买任何收益率超过2-4%的资产：回购自家股票、进行并购等各种操作。因此股票在货币贬值期间表现优异（或至少相对抗跌）的原因之一，就在于它们同时做空货币并持有优于货币的资产。

And then they use it to buy anything that will give them a better return than two, three, 4%. They will buy back their own stock. They will make acquisitions. They will do all sorts of other things. And so one of the reasons why equities do well during currency debasement or at least hold up pretty well is that they're shorting the currency and then they're long assets that are in general better than the currency.

若企业收入以外币计价（比如某发展中国家股票收入主要是美元，而支出是本币），当本币对美元贬值时对其极为有利。但问题在于货币贬值时其收入实际价值也在缩水，只能通过长期提价来弥补。所以这并非对抗财政主导、通胀、货币贬值和资本管制等问题的完美盾牌，但相比年收益率固定4%且无增长的债券，你能获得5%-12%且持续增长的盈利收益率——无论是通过股息再投资增持股份，还是企业回购使你股权比例提升。

Now, if their revenue streams are denominated in foreign, so if you have a developing country equity, and then let's say they get a lot of dollars in income and their expenses are in local currency and they're short in local currency while they're earning dollars, that's a really good place for them to be in if the dollar strengthens relative to their currency. Whereas, obviously, problem is if you have debasement, their own revenues are also being debased, which then they're trying to recoup with price increases over time. So it's not a perfect defense against, you know, fiscal dominance and inflation and debasement, capital controls, and all these sorts of things. But it's it's one of the better things you could be in because unlike a bond that might pay you 4% a year with no growth, in many cases, you I mean, you can get a, you know, an earnings yield of 5%, 7%, 10%, 12% that also grows over time. And you either you get dividends, can reinvest into owning more of the company or they do share buybacks and you own more of the company.

因此我认为优质股票在当前环境下很有价值，有时甚至包括银行股——尽管我们讨论的是货币问题，但如果银行做空货币的利率低于做多利率，且其估值相对于盈利或资产较为便宜，它们也能表现良好。即便预期会出现货币问题，我对某些国家的金融板块仍持乐观态度。在多数环境下，股票与硬通货及其他硬资产能形成绝佳平衡。

And so I I do find that high quality equities are useful in this environment. And sometimes even banks, for example. I mean, even though we're talking about currency problems, if if a bank is shorting the currency at a lower rate than than they're long the currency, and they're relatively cheap relative to their, you know, earnings or assets, they can work well also. I've been reasonably bullish on certain countries' financial sectors, even as I expect currency problems. I do find that equities are a great balance with hard monies and other hard assets in most environments.

Stig 谢谢。Lynne，在结束之前我还有个最后的问题。看着你，我发现你正处在令人羡慕的位置。你有太多可能的方向可以选择。可以做更多研究。

Stig Thank you. Lynne, I have a final question here for you before I let you go. I look at you and I see that you're in such an enviable position. There are so many directions you could go. Could do more research.

你可以再写一本精彩的书。你是Eagle Death Capital的普通合伙人。完全披露一下，我的联合创始人Preston也是那里的GP。可以在会议上投入更多时间。你有太多能做的事了。

You could write another fantastic book. You're a GP at Eagle Death Capital. Full disclaimer, my co founder Preston is also GP there. Could spend more time on the conference. There are so many things you can do.

当然，你也可以和丈夫在家喝茶、读本好书或看电视，随便做什么。面对所有这些机会，你发现自己现阶段在人生中最优先考虑的是什么？一点半的时候

Of course, you could sit home with your husband and have tea and read a good book or watch TV, whatever. Given all of these opportunities that you have, what do you find yourself optimizing for in life right now one:thirty and

我会说是写作与工作生活平衡。职业生涯有不同的阶段。曾几何时，我的研究业务突飞猛进。然后疫情又发生了。宏观经济一片混乱。

I would say writing and work life balance. There are different phases of a career. During So at one point, my research business took off tremendously. And then also, the pandemic happened. Macro was crazy.

一切都疯了。货币大放水。我不得不全力投入。真的别无选择。要跟上节奏实在太难了。

Everything was crazy. Money printing was happening. I had to kind of lean into that really hard. Didn't really have a choice. It was just really hard to keep up with.

但如果你长期全速奔跑，就会精疲力竭。或者成为那种人——四十年转瞬即逝，你却怀疑自己是否真正活过？这是人们常陷入的经典陷阱。特别是在2022和2023年后，我在经营研究业务等多项工作的同时写了《破碎货币》，那是个非常全力以赴的时期。所以我需要暂时休息一段时间。

But if you kind of run at full speed for a very long time, you burn out. Or you're one of those people, forty years went by and you wondered, did you ever live? It's kind of the classic trap that people could fall into. So especially after 2022 and 2023, I wrote Broken Money while doing many other things, like running my research business and other work, which was a very kind of all in period. So I kinda needed a break for a period of time.

因此我一直在优先考虑健康，优先多出门活动，优先平衡各种兴趣。像《破碎货币》这样的事，我多年来犹豫要不要写书，因为在很多情况下——尤其从事金融行业——这是投资回报率较低的事。写过书的人都知道这超级乏味。所以我一直抗拒写书，直到脑海中形成清晰的框架后，不写反而更让人分心。我必须把它写出来。

And so I've been optimizing for health, optimizing for getting outside more, optimizing for just kind of having more balance of interest. Sometimes things like with broken money, for example, I for years, I was hesitant to write a book because it's one of the lower ROI things you can do in many cases, especially if you work in finance. It's super tedious, anyone who's written a book. And so I I resisted writing a book until a very clear picture of the book formed in my head, and then it was too distracting not to write it. I had to write it.

随着时间流逝，这确实是我做过最幸福的事情之一。可以说是我最引以为豪的成就。部分原因在于它是一件独立存在的'人工制品'，如今已拥有了自己的生命力——它超越了文章合集，超越了某些投资决策，成为持久存在的创作，我觉得这很有意思。关于如何消磨时间，最有趣的答案是我最近在写科幻小说，动机类似。我们讨论过身处动荡环境时——不仅是金融领域，还包括地缘政治剧变下的情境。

And with every year that goes by, I mean, that's one of the happiest things I've done. Like, that's one of the the things I'm most proud of. And it's partially because it is a it's a it's an artifact that is a self contained thing that has kind of a life of its own now. More than a collection of articles, more than certain investment decisions, this is like an artifact that persists, and I find that interesting. I guess the funniest answer of how I'm spending my time is I've actually been writing a sci fi book for similar reasons, which is I mean, we talked about when you're in kind of a crazy environment, like, you know, we we touched you know, not just finance here, but what happens geopolitically in these environments.

科技如何改变世界也是个问题。在这个AI能轻易制作深度伪造视频的时代，未来甚至更难辨别真伪。过去视频即真相，如今未必如此。当谎言传播比真相求证容易百倍时，我们该如何认知真实世界？

There's also the question of how does tech change things? And so in this world of you know, with with AI making it so you can, like, say, especially in the future, make a deep fake video that you have a lot of it's hard to even tell if it's true or not. It used be the videos where if if you saw a video of something, it was obviously that thing happened. Increasingly, that's not necessarily the case. And so how do you even know what's happening in the world if it takes far more work to untangle lies than to spread them?

此外，在资本管制或政府权力扩张的世界里，情况会怎样？我尝试通过小说探索这些命题。一方面希望作品有趣，同时也想推演当前趋势在未来数十年的发展。这迫使我——作为工程背景出身的人——重新审视技术演进，虽然我一直对科技很感兴趣。

In addition, in a world of capital controls or governments trying to seize power, what does that look like? And so I I've actually been exploring that to some extent in in fiction. So on one hand, it's hopefully entertaining, but then also touches on kind of extrapolates out current themes for many decades to kind of explore what things are like. And it kind of forces me to my background's engineering. I've always found technology interesting, obviously.

但当你过度专注宏观层面时，很容易错过技术领域的快速进步。就像达利欧这样的例外很少见——多数金融从业者会变成技术派，精通当前市场操作，却难以构想结构性变革。

But when you're so focused on macro, it's easy to miss a couple years worth of what tech's advancing pretty quick. You don't really have your finger on the pulse of it. So it's kinda like it forced me to do a check there on a bunch of technology related stuff. I also generally find and Dalio is kind of an exception in this. For a lot of people that work on finance, they become technicians, meaning they know how to trade the current market really well, but they can't really envision that structurally changing.

他们无法想象从未经历的环境。培养多元兴趣——无论是科幻创作、哲学思辨还是历史研究——能拓展认知维度。这让人从技术执行者蜕变为战略思考者，孕育突破性想法。所以我正在创作2026年出版的第二本书，既保持思维弹性，

They don't really picture an environment that they never knew. And one of the things is by having kind of diverse interests, whether it's exploring fiction, science fiction, whether it's exploring philosophy, whether it's exploring history, you either either broaden your scope forward or broaden your scope back or up or down, you have a bigger view. So instead of being a a technician, it helps you kind of be a strategist or or to have ideas in your head of how things could change that are maybe outside of the box. So I I've been leaning a little bit to fiction, working on my second book, which will come out in 2026, while maintaining these other things. And I think it's partially just because, you know, I wanna maintain flexibility and plasticity with my mind.

也旨在增强创造力——我认为这是动荡时代必备的核心能力。太平岁月重执行，乱世更需要跳脱框架的洞见，以及对历史与未来可能性的清醒认知。

I wanna enhance the creativity because I think creativity is one of the skill sets we need to cultivate in these kind of crazy times. When things are kind of more normal, it's more about operation execution. Whereas when things are more tumultuous, having ideas that are outside of the box and and being aware of history and aware of possibilities for the future is maybe how you navigate that better.

斯蒂格：琳恩，我想问个很自私的问题——虽然整场对话基本都如此。人生不同阶段会遇到不同困境，但至少对我来说，知道该做什么曾很简单：比如学生时代要争取好成绩，职场阶段要谋求晋升，这些目标都很明确。

Stig So, Lynna, I wanted to ask you a very self serving question, which I guess you can say I've done through most of the conversation anyway. I was curious, so I'm going to impose all my biases on you, which is not fair at all. There are different stages of your life where life might be difficult, but knowing what to do, at least in my case, was somewhat easy in the sense of there was a time where you needed good grades, so you had to optimize for getting good grades. Then you needed to find a job and perhaps you wanted to advance in that job. Were different things that was quite easy to identify.

尽管很棘手，你总能明白自己该做什么。至少就我而言，我不认为自己曾过多质疑过该做的事。即使可能被误导，但目标始终很明确。斯蒂格，当你处于人生可以随心所欲的阶段时——虽然我不认为你有分析瘫痪的问题——你用什么框架来决定下一步行动？

Tricky as it was, you could identify what you're supposed to do. Plus perhaps at least in my case, I don't think I asked too many questions of what I was supposed to do. Was just quite clear, even though I might be misguided, that that was what I was supposed to do. Stig So whenever you then read a state of your life where you can do anything you want to do, and I don't necessarily think you have this issue of analysis paralysis, but what kind of framework do you use to figure out what to do next?

这是个好问题。和你一样，我也曾有过目标明确的阶段。我用的一个框架是判断自己处于'肯定阶段'还是'否定阶段'。通常'肯定阶段'意味着你在尝试拓展边界。

Yeah. It's a good question. Like you, I mean, there's a there's a period of time where I was on a pretty clear path. One of the one of the frameworks I use is knowing whether you're in the yes phase or the no phase. So generally, when you're in the yes phase, it means you're trying to expand.

当你的时间和精力比其他资源更充裕时，机会来临时就要倾向于说'好'，或主动寻找机会。比如我做工程师时，除了攻读工程管理硕士，还会主动问上司：'有什么行政工作可以交给我学习处理？'就这样逐渐成为了管理者。

You've got more energy and time than you have other resources. And so when opportunities come your way, you generally have to lean into saying yes and or you have to pursue opportunities. And so for example, when I was an engineer, I would go to my boss and say, what tasks? I was working on my engineering management master's degree, but I was also going to my boss and saying, are there certain administrative tasks that you'd like off your hands that I could learn and help you with? And I would kinda I kinda slowly became the boss over time.

这就是主动说'好'的方式。无论是同事求助还是员工问题，你都会超额承担。

That's kinda how it is a proactive way to say yes. Or if you'd come to me and say, hey, could you handle this? Yes. Or if employees have issues, like, yes. You kinda lean into overdoing.

当然很多人没到这个阶段，他们渴望做更多却止步不前。这时就该多说'好'或主动争取。但经过一段时间后——可能因为年龄增长、生活复杂化，或多次成功接纳后——约束因素会变成时间和精力。

And so there are certain but, of course, a lot of people don't get to that phase. They wish they were doing more, but they're not. And so the answer is they probably should say yes more, or they should proactively reach out more. But then there's a phase sometimes after a period of time, whether it's because you, you know, you got older, your life became more complex, you were successful at saying yes so many times, you can do a thing where that's no longer your constraint anymore. Maybe you have other resources, but now time and energy are your constraints.

当被过多事务轰炸时，就难以聚焦真正重要的事。这时你必须意识到自己进入了'否定阶段'，要常说：'我欣赏你的提议，但目前没有足够精力妥善处理。'这是我保持专注的重要方法。

And if you're bombarded in too many directions, it's hard to focus and execute on the things that are actually really important for one reason or another. And so you actually then have to realize that you're in a more of a no phase. You're more of saying, I appreciate what you're doing, but I can't I don't have the bandwidth to do that properly right now. And you have to say that more and more. And that that has been one of the things I've had to navigate to stay reasonably focused.

正如你所说，我既要搞研究、写书，又要做风投，必须严格守护自己的时间、精力和注意力。因为贪多嚼不烂。

I mean, as you pointed out, I do research. I write books. I do venture capital. I have to then have a pretty big safeguard on my time and energy and attention. Because otherwise, if you do too many things, you don't do any of them well.

所以我认为最关键的是一个人需要明白：他们是倾向于积极把握机会说‘是’，还是更谨慎地选择自己能做的事？这还包括工作与生活的平衡，花更多时间陪伴家人，享受户外时光，关注健康——无论是身体还是心理健康，追求更全面平衡的生活。我认为这是每个人首先要回答的根本问题，因为其他都是战术层面的。然后才是具体问题：我该对什么说‘是’？

So I think that's the biggest thing is a person needs to know. Are they leaning in toward yeses and seeking opportunities, or are they leaning back toward picking more cautiously what they can do? And that can also include work life balance, spending more time with family, spending more time outside, focusing on your health, physical health, mental health, all these things like that, having a more holistic balanced life. I think that's the biggest starting point that someone has to answer because everything else is kind of tactical from there. Then it's like, okay, what should I say yes to?

我该如何主动争取？或者如何更频繁地说‘不’？如何更好地抽身？但如果你连方向都不明确，这才是最需要解答的核心问题——当事人是想要扩张发展，还是更想（我不想用‘收缩’这个词）精简优化。

How should I reach out? Or how do I say no more? How do I pull back more? But if you don't even know which direction you're going in, think that's the biggest question to answer. Does someone wanna expand or does someone wanna I don't wanna say contract, but more like streamline, optimize.

这才是首先要厘清的关键。然后要问：什么能让你快乐？什么既能经济可持续，又让你感到充实有意义，既能利己利人，又具备经济可行性？

And that's the biggest thing to get right first. And then it's what makes you happy? What has a blend of being economically sustainable but also rewarding and that you feel benefits yourself, benefits the world, and is economically viable to do?

斯蒂格：是啊。我很喜欢你写小说这件事。我也该尝试起来。这真是个有趣的领域对吧？就像你说的技术专家路径，你可以更专精、更出色，而变得更强本身也充满乐趣。

Stig Yeah. I love that you're writing fiction. I need to pick that up. It's such an interesting place, right? Because to your point about being a technician, you can specialize even more, you can be even better, and it's fun to be even better at something.

尝试新事物同样有趣，你会把自己置于一个可能不太擅长的全新位置（当然伦你肯定不存在这个问题）。总之感谢分享你的心路历程。

It's also fun to try something new and then you put yourself in a completely new position where you're perhaps not as good, which is not the case with you, I'm sure, Len. So it's just thank you for sharing your journey.

很乐意分享。有时你从某件事抽身，并非永久放弃。比如旅行过度——如果有人原本不常旅行，突然患上‘旅行瘾’疯狂出游，随后旅行疲惫感与兼顾家庭的压力会让人不堪重负。这时可能会进入一段暂时不想旅行的调整期。

Happy to. Sometimes when you pull away from something, you don't do it permanently. Travel too much If someone doesn't travel, they have a travel bug, they travel a ton. And then the exhaustion of traveling and the franticness of also trying to maintain your home situation can get very complex. So there could be a period of time where traveling is no longer fun, then you want to pull back.

等生活重新稳定后，那种‘旅行瘾’又会回来。这种模式适用于写书、金融市场操作、旅行等方方面面。就像要认识到...

Then after a while and you've got that stabilized, you get the travel bug again. And that can apply toward writing a book, that can apply toward operating in financial markets, that can apply toward travel. There's all sorts of things. So it's kind of like realizing one:fifty that as

你不断调整，这些决定未必总是永久性的。只是意识到人生就像四季更替一样，也有不同的阶段。

you shift around, it's not necessarily always permanent decisions. It's just kind of realizing that there's seasons to human life in a similar way that there's real seasons.

太棒了，太棒了，用这种方式结束本期节目真是完美。琳恩，我想给你机会向听众推荐任何你想推荐的内容。就我个人而言，我绝对热爱你的著作《破碎的金钱》。我也爱读你的通讯，但无论你想引导大家关注什么，请尽管推荐。

Wonderful, wonderful way to end the episode. Lynne, I wanted to give you the opportunity to give a hand off to whatever you want to give a hand off to. I can say for one, I absolutely love your book, Broken Money. I love your newsletter, but whatever you want to point people to, please do.

非常感谢。就是这些了。如果还没读过《破碎的金钱》，可以去看看，还有lynnaldon.com。我提供免费的通讯和文章供大家阅读。

I appreciate that. Those are it. Check out Broken Money if you haven't read it and lynnaldon.com. I have free newsletters and articles people can check out.

太精彩了。在我们这次节目结束前，琳，还有什么总结性发言吗？

Stig Fantastic. Any concluding remarks here before we let you go, Lyn, for this time?

我想没有了。保持开放心态吧。我认为在未来几年，创造力会变得很重要，因为我们生活在一个充满变革的时代。

I don't think so. I think stay open minded. Creativity is going to, I think, be important in the years ahead because we live in interesting times.

说得太妙了。我必须用这句话结束录音。好的，非常感谢你，莱恩。

Sinai Boom. I have to end the recording with those words. All right. Thank you so much, Len.

感谢收听TIP节目。请确保在您喜欢的播客应用中关注《我们研究亿万富翁》，不错过任何精彩内容。查看节目注释、文字记录或课程，请访问theinvestorspodcast.com。本节目仅供娱乐，在做出任何决定前，请咨询专业人士。

Thank you for listening to TIP. Make sure to follow We Study Billionaires on your favorite podcast app and never miss out on episodes. To access our show notes, transcripts, or courses, go to theinvestorspodcast.com. This show is for entertainment purposes only. Before making any decision, consult a professional.

本节目版权归投资者播客网络所有。未经书面许可，不得进行联合播出或转播。

This show is copyrighted by The Investor's Podcast Network. Written permission must be granted before syndication or rebroadcasting.