TIP770：与Andrew Brenton一起掌握市场

您正在收听的是TIP节目。

You're listening to TIP.

在本期节目中，我们邀请到了安德鲁·布里顿，一起探讨他对当前市场低效之处的见解。

On today's episode, I'm joined by Andrew Britton to discuss the inefficiencies he's seeing in today's market.

安德鲁是Turtle Creek资产管理公司的首席执行官兼联合创始人。

Andrew's the CEO and co founder of Turtle Creek Asset Management.

自1998年成立以来，Turtle Creek的年均回报率达到18.8%，而标普500指数仅为8.7%。

Since its inception in 1998, Turtle Creek has achieved an average annual return of 18.8% versus just 8.7% for the S and P five hundred.

若在基金成立时投入1万美元，如今价值已超过100万美元。

Dollars 10,000 invested in their fund at inception would have grown to over $1,000,000 today.

若将这笔资金投入大盘市场，现值约为9.5万美元。本次对话我们将讨论克里夫·阿斯内斯近期关于市场有效性的论文，分析当前市场是否类似1999年科技泡沫，安德鲁还将分享他对Floor and Decor及Kinsale Capital的投资逻辑。

And had that money been invested in the market, it would have been worth around $95,000 During this conversation, we'll cover Cliff Asness's recent paper on the efficiency of markets, whether today's market resembles the 1999 tech bubble, and Andrew also gives an overview of his investment thesis on Floor and Decor and Kinsale Capital.

希望您能享受今天与安德鲁·布里顿的这场对话。

So with that, I hope you enjoy today's discussion with Andrew Britton.

自2014年以来，通过超过1.8亿次下载量的研究，我们深入分析了金融市场，并研读了对白手起家亿万富豪影响最深的著作。

Since 2014 and through more than 180,000,000 downloads, we've studied the financial markets and read the books that influence self made billionaires the most.

我们确保您随时掌握信息，为意外情况做好准备。

We keep you informed and prepared for the unexpected.

现在有请主持人克莱。

Now for your host, Clay

一）：大家好。

one): Hey, everybody.

欢迎回到《投资者播客》。

Welcome back to The Investor's Podcast.

我是你们的主持人克莱·芬克。

I'm your host, Clay Finck.

今天很高兴再次邀请到龟溪资产管理公司的安德鲁·布伦顿。

Today I'm pleased to be joined again by Andrew Brenton from Turtle Creek Asset Management.

安德鲁，欢迎回到节目。

Andrew, welcome back to the show.

很高兴回来，克莱。

Great to be back, Clay.

克莱，你已经多次作为嘉宾参加我们的节目了，很高兴再次邀请你回来。

Clay So you've been a guest a few times on the show now, and I'm thrilled to have you back.

我们今天要聊聊当前的市场情况，稍后也会讨论你持有的几支股票。

We're going to be chatting about today's market as well as a couple of your holdings a bit later.

让我们先谈谈市场的效率问题。

Let's talk by talking a bit about the efficiency of markets.

如你所知，价值投资者会避开有效市场假说，并以试图发现市场中最大的低效为傲。

So as you know, value investors will shun the efficient market hypothesis and pride themselves on trying to spot the market's biggest inefficiencies.

我们不妨从讨论为什么有效市场很重要、以及我们为何应该关注这个问题开始？

How about we start by discussing why having efficient markets are important and something that we should even care about?

杰里米：当然。

Jeremy Sure.

我的意思是，如果你相信资本市场的目的——我现在说的是私募市场、债务市场、公开股票市场——如果你相信其目的是以合理的价格或成本将资本分配给值得的群体，那么我认为这绝对至关重要。

I mean, if you believe the purpose of the capital markets, and I'm now talking private markets, the debt markets, the public stock market, if you believe the purpose is to allocate capital to the deserving groups at the right price or cost, then I think it's absolutely critical.

这是资本主义定义的基础，也是自中世纪甚至更早以来西方世界成功的基础。

It's a foundation of most the definition of capitalism, and it's the foundation of the success of the Western world since the Middle Ages or even predating that.

因此我认为这个核心理念——如何获取信息，这个混乱又复杂的评估公司价值的过程，从而决定在公司需要发行股票时你应该支付多少股价——绝对是现代世界至关重要的组成部分，我认为极其重要。

So I think that foundational idea of how do you get information, that messy, messy process of figuring out what a company is worth and therefore what you should pay for shares when that company needs to issue equity is absolutely a critical component of the modern world and I think very important.

克莱夫·阿斯尼斯写过一篇精彩的论文《低效市场假说》。

Clay So Cliff Asness wrote this great paper titled The Less Efficient Market Hypothesis.

他实际上认为市场正变得越来越低效。

And he actually believes that markets are becoming less efficient over time.

他指出了三个不同的因素。

And he points to three different factors here.

首先，他提到了大家都熟悉的驱动力，即指数基金和被动资金流。

So first, he mentioned the driver that everyone's familiar with, which is index funds and passive flows.

第二是我们长期以来的极低利率环境。

The second is very low interest rates that we've had for a very long period of time.

第三则是技术和社交媒体导致更多的从众效应，人们蜂拥买入相同的股票，形成趋同的市场预期。

And third is just technology and social media leading to more of this hurting effect where people are crowding into the same stocks and everyone has the same outlook.

群体思维现象非常普遍。

There's a lot of group think happening.

你同意阿斯汀关于市场实际上正变得越来越低效的思路吗？

Do you agree with Astin's train of thought that markets are in fact becoming less efficient over time?

杰里米，我认为他是对的。

Jeremy I think that's right.

有趣的是，我上学时——大概和克里夫·阿斯尼斯是同一时期——那正是有效市场假说的鼎盛阶段。

And it's funny when I was at school, which is probably around the time that Cliff Asness was at school, that was the height of the efficient market hypotheses.

我最初并不是以投资者身份入行，而是从投行和并购业务开始的。

And I didn't start as an investor, I started in investment banking and mergers and acquisitions.

我很快意识到，带着'市场是完美且高效的'这种校园观念出来，结果发现根本不是这么回事。

And I quickly realized that, you know, came out of school thinking markets are perfect, markets are efficient, and quickly realized that isn't true at all.

说真的，我们其实不会去读大量其他材料——如果你明白我的意思。

We don't really, if you will, read a bunch of other stuff, if that makes any sense.

我们的策略是像企业所有者那样深度参与，只不过这些企业恰好是上市公司——这就是我们的思考方式。

Our approach is to be intensely owners of companies that happen to be public is how we think about it.

不过，有人给我发了克里夫的论文。

But, you know, someone sent me a Cliffs paper.

实际上，我想我看到了那篇论文并读了摘要，觉得确实有道理。

Actually, I think I saw it and read just the abstract and thought, yeah, that that makes sense.

但我没有通读全文。

But I didn't read the paper.

大约半年前，我真正坐下来研读了那篇论文。

And about six months ago, I actually sat down and read the paper.

它实际上成为了我们今年某期季度评论的立论基础。

And it was actually a foundation for our one of our quarterly commentaries this year.

而且我确实认同市场效率正在降低的观点。

And, you know, I do agree that markets have become less efficient.

我们在Turtle Creek二十七年的历史中已经见证了这一点。

We've seen it over our twenty seven year now history at Turtle Creek.

市场并没有变得不那么狂热，流动性也没有减少。

They're not less frenetic, they're not less liquid.

所以如果你将效率定义为对最新推文或季度财报的快速反应，那确实没有改变。

So if you define efficiency as lots of reaction to the latest tweet, the latest quarterly results, that hasn't changed.

实际上这种情况变得更加极端了，但如果你认为效率意味着让股价合理接近公司的公允价值，那么这并不等同于效率。

That's actually become more extreme, but that doesn't necessarily equate to efficiency if you think efficiency means getting reasonably close to fair value for the shares of a company.

我认为这才是大多数人定义效率的方式，而不是对每一条新消息都做出大量反应。

And that's, I think, what most people would define as efficiency as opposed to volumetric reaction to every new piece of news.

我很喜欢经济学家罗伯特·席勒的那句话，大意是说因为市场对每一条新信息都做出反应，所以它们就是正确的。

I love the quote from Robert Schiller, the economist, and it goes along the lines of the thought that because the markets are reacting to every new piece of information that they are then getting it right.

这种关联毫无逻辑，是二十世纪经济学思想中最大的谬误。

There's no logic in that connection, and it's the greatest economic error in thought in the twentieth century.

我是在转述，但这就是核心观点。

I mean, that's I'm paraphrasing, but that's the essential thought.

如果你认为市场在某种程度上一直低效，我确实同意克里夫的观察：在他的职业生涯中，市场效率变得更低了，我们也看到了同样的情况。

And if you think markets were inefficient always to some degree, I do agree with Cliff's observation that in his career, markets have become less efficient, and we've seen the same thing.

崔，这个思想实验真有意思。

Trey It's such an interesting thought experiment.

关于市场低效性及其如何随时间自我修正的问题，我有几点想法。

A couple thoughts come to my mind when it comes to the market's inefficiencies and how those end up resolving themselves over time.

我认为部分低效现象纯粹源于人性。

I think part of the inefficiencies is just simply due to human nature.

人类才是进行大部分买卖操作的主体，或是编写所有这些执行买卖算法的程序员。

Humans are the ones doing most of the buying and selling or programming all these algorithms that do the buying and selling.

比如我就常思考人们为何普遍存在损失厌恶心理。

I think about how people just tend to be loss averse, for example.

当股票下跌时，我们的本能反应通常是避开那只股票以避免亏损。

When a stock is dropping, our gut instinct usually tells us to avoid that stock, to avoid losing money.

许多股票下跌仅仅是因为不确定性这类因素。

Many stocks drop simply due to things like uncertainty.

人类往往厌恶不确定性。

Humans tend to hate uncertainty.

另一个我认为经常影响市场的人性偏见是这种天然的外推倾向。

And another human bias that I think plays into markets quite often is just this natural tendency extrapolate.

因此市场往往会假定增长中的公司将持续增长，而增长放缓的公司将持续放缓。

So the market tends to assume that a company is growing as going to keep growing or a company that's experiencing decelerating growth is going to keep experiencing decelerating growth.

而当形势逆转时，你会看到一只股票相当快速地翻倍。

And then once the tide sort of turns, you can see a stock double fairly quickly.

我认为我们可以举出很多例子来说明市场有多么情绪化。

I think there are plenty of examples that we could point to that sort of illustrate just how moody the market can be.

比尔，这很有趣，对吧？

Bill It's interesting, right?

最近这十年，随着行为金融学的兴起和那些伟大的著作，比如《思考，快与慢》。

Recently, meaning the last ten years with the whole rise of behavioral finance and all of that great work, like thinking fast, thinking slow.

当我读到所有这些认知偏差时，我看着它们说，那不是我们。

When I read about all of the biases, I look at them and say, that's not us.

然后我读到下一个偏差又说，那不是我们。

And I read the next one and say, that's not us.

举个例子，损失厌恶，我的观点是如果你提前做了功课，对公司未来十到二十年的基本面有很好的判断，并且你也相信股价本身不包含信息量。

So for example, loss aversion, my view is if you have done the work ahead of time and you have a good fundamental view on what you think a company is going to do for the next ten and twenty years, and if you also believe that there is no informational content in the share price.

我认为这是个重要的观点。

I think that's an important point.

我能理解外部人士观察一家公司时，市场通过股价下跌告诉他们情况不妙。

I can understand people on the outside looking in on a company that the market's telling them things aren't going well because the share price is down.

但如果你明白，真正在做基本面分析的人非常非常少，而且越来越少，那么股价下跌并不会让你或我们感到不安。

But if you understand that very, very few people, an increasing number of fewer people are actually doing that fundamental work, a declining share price doesn't fuss you or fuss us.

同样地，股价上涨也不会让我们兴奋。

But equally, a rising share price doesn't get us excited.

所以，你知道，那句经典的话其实不太公平——为什么人们在超市看到金枪鱼打折会兴奋，但股票打折时却不会？

And so, you know, it's not really a fair description when the classic line of, you know, why do people get excited at supermarket when tuna goes on sale, but not when stocks go on sale?

简单的答案是人们了解金枪鱼的价格应该是多少。

The simple answer is people have an understanding of what the price of tuna is.

你得去捕捞它。

You have to go fish it.

你得加工它。

You have to process it.

你得把它装进罐头。

You have to get it into cans.

你得把它运到商店里。

You have to get it into the stores.

所以如果食品店像那样打折促销，你知道自己捡到便宜了。

And so if a food store puts something on sale like that, you know you're getting a deal.

问题在于股市里，很少有人做过功课去判断：哇，以那个低价位，这真是笔划算的交易。

The problem is in the stock market, very few people have done the work to say, wow, at that lower price, that's a really good deal.

正如我所说，这确实不是个公平的比较。

And so as I say, it's not really a fair comparison.

如果你认为市场上基本面投资者越来越少——事实确实如此。

And if you think there are fewer fundamental investors in the market, and for sure there are.

接着，如果你把这些基本面投资者或主动投资者归入隐性指数投资者或准隐性指数投资者的范畴。然后当你提到克里夫·阿斯尼斯认为市场效率降低的三个原因时，那个对我来说不太有共鸣的必然是低利率。

And then if you take the fundamental investors or the active investors and you put them into the bucket of closet indexers or quasi closet indexers, And then when you mentioned the three reasons that markets have become less efficient from Cliff Asness' standpoint, the one that doesn't really resonate with me is necessarily low interest rates.

它确实会引发狂热情绪和资金宽松，这点我明白。

It does create, you know, exuberance and easing money.

这个我理解。

I get that.

但我认为还有第四个原因，那就是主动管理从长期基本面投资者（如富达或普信集团）转向量化基金，这些基金被规定不能展望超过三个月的期限。

But I think there's a fourth, and that is the shift in active management from that longer term fundamental investor from groups like a Fidelity or a T Rowe price to the paw shops, to the quants that are given the mandate, you know, you can't look beyond three months.

我们希望你能预测出股价在极短期的走势。

We want you to figure out where their share price is gonna be in the very short term.

他们的时间处境迫使他们必须进行非常短期的思考。

That their temporal situation is they have to think very short term.

因此这不仅是指数基金的转向，我认为这是股市结构性的转变——越来越多自主决策的交易活动是基于预测极短期走势进行的。

And so it's not just a move toward index funds, it's this, I think, a structural shift in the stock market to more of the trading or more of the activity who are people who are making their own decisions are doing it based on trying to figure out what's going to happen in the very short term.

而在所有这些因素中，或许对当前市场影响最为深远的正是这一点。

And maybe of all of those, maybe the most profound in terms of the impact on the market where we're sitting today.

崔，我想讨论的另一个有趣观点是

Trey One of the other interesting points I'd like

关于价值投资者需要保持耐心并承受某些痛苦时期的理解，我们可以称之为必经阶段。

to touch on is just this understanding of value investors needing to be patient and sit through some periods of pain, let's call it.

价值投资的核心原则之一就是以低于实际价值的价格买入资产。

So one of the core principles of value investing is buying something for less than it's worth.

通过等待市场认识到其价值，可以赚取大量利润。

And a lot of money can be made by simply waiting for the market to recognize that value.

在某些情况下，一只股票可能在市场意识到最初判断错误后的六个月内上涨50%。

Some cases, a stock can go up 50 in six months after the market realizes it initially had it wrong.

而在其他情况下，一只股票可能两三年内表现平平，市场就是对其不感兴趣，无论出于何种原因。

And in other cases, a stock might trade relatively flat for two, three years and the market just simply doesn't care about it or for whatever reason.

可能是这个故事太复杂了。

Maybe the story's too complicated.

也许市场更关注人工智能或量子计算股票，或者只是当时市场不看好这个板块，而且它们的同行表现也不佳。

Maybe the market's more interested in AI or quantum computing stocks, or perhaps it's just in a sector that the market just doesn't like at that period of time and maybe their peers aren't doing as well.

但最终市场往往会认识到其价值。

But eventually the market does tend to recognize that value.

根据你的经验，你认为这些重大低效现象平均会持续多久？

Based on your experience, how long do you think these really big inefficiencies tend to last on average?

杰瑞米：嗯，我认为这个时间可能正在变长。

Jeremy Well, I think it's probably getting longer.

所以我只能从我们的经验来谈。

So I can only speak from our experience.

大约十五到二十五年前，我们主要投资的是加拿大股票。

So twenty five to fifteen years ago, we were overwhelmingly Canadian equities.

我只能谈谈当时加拿大30:50市场的情况，而现在我们大部分投资的是美国公司。

I can only speak to the Canadian thirty:fifty market at that time and now where the majority are US companies.

杰里米，一般来说，我们采用五年的时间框架。

Jeremy Generally, we use a five year timeframe.

我们在构建投资组合时，对于资产低估程度的判断，会给予市场五年以上的时间，让股价最终被拖拽着趋向于我们对内在价值的判断——前提是我们的观点是正确的。

Our approach in terms of portfolio construction, in terms of how cheap something is, we give the market credit that over the next five plus years, the share price will get dragged kicking and screaming toward our view of intrinsic value if we're right in our view.

这一点已经多次得到验证。

And we've seen that born out time and again.

正如你所说，有时这个过程只需一两年。

And to your point, sometimes it happens in a year or two.

有时则需要五年以上。

Sometimes it takes more than five years.

我很难做出这样的论断，因为我认为我们正处于一个独特的股市环境中。

It's really hard to make this statement because I think we're in a unique stock market environment right now.

但可以肯定的是，如今所需的时间比十年前更长。

But for sure, it takes longer today than a decade ago.

我认为这再次印证了克里夫·阿斯内斯的观点，即如果你能真正理解价值并持有价值，考虑到市场结构变化，机会集更大，但你必须愿意有时等待更长时间。

And I think that, again, was one of Cliff Asness' point that, you know, if you can take the approach of being truly understanding value and owning value, given the market structural changes, the opportunity set is greater, but you have to be willing to sometimes wait longer.

我认为这是他论文结尾处最重要的总结性结论。

And I think that was the most important summary in a way conclusion that he made at the end of of his paper.

我们绝对相信，如今看到的错误定价比过去更为显著。

And we absolutely believe that we see greater mispricing today than we've seen in the past.

我会把互联网泡沫时期排除在外，因为那时存在疯狂的定价错误，可以与今天类比。

And I'll set the .com bubble aside because that was a, you can analogize to today, there was crazy mispricing then.

但除此之外，如果考虑常规市场，平均而言如今的错误定价比十或二十年前更为严重。

But otherwise, if you think of regular markets, the mispricing on average is greater today than it was ten or twenty years ago.

克莱，我认为你之前提出了一个很好的观点，即不要陷入结果导向的陷阱。

Clay I think you hit on a really good point earlier of not falling prey to resulting.

我认为股市是个能让人学会谦逊的绝佳场所，因为如果你把股价上涨归因于投资成功，把股价下跌归因于投资失败。

I think the stock market's just such a great place to gain humility because if you attribute success as an investor to a stock price going up and failure as an investor to a stock price is going down.

短期内你可能会做出些非常愚蠢的事情。

You can do some really silly things in the near term.

他在论文中提出了一个精彩观点：有效市场假说的敌人正是泡沫。

And he has this wonderful point in his paper that the enemy of the efficient market hypothesis is a bubble.

根据Asinus的观点，当大量股票的交易价格无法用任何合理模型解释时，我们就处于泡沫之中。

According to Asinus, we're in a bubble when we have a large number of stocks that are trading at prices that can't be justified under any reasonable model.

关于这句话我认为有几个重点：必须是大量股票。

I think a couple important points on that sentence is it needs to be a large number of stocks.

不仅仅是某个小板块，或者几只交易价格高企的小盘股。

It's not just maybe one little sector, maybe a few small caps that are trading at high prices.

而且它们的价格无法用任何合理模型来解释。

Then also their prices can't be justified under any reasonable model.

如果存在估值偏高的合理依据，那么就很难将其称为泡沫。

If there is a reasonable case for higher valuations, then it's more difficult to justify it calling it a bubble.

正如你提到的，今天的市场特别有趣，因为有几个行业确实举步维艰，或者如你所说，正处于真正的衰退中。

As you mentioned, today's market is particularly interesting as there are several industries that are really struggling or as you've stated are really in a recession.

而整体市场却持续攀升，主要受到科技和人工智能领域那些大赢家的推动。

While the broader market continues to march upward and is primarily being lifted by the market's big winners in tech and AI.

不如你来谈谈，今天的市场是否确实类似于'99年的科技泡沫，可能在哪些方面相似？

How about you talk a little bit about if today's market does resemble the 'ninety nine tech bubble and maybe in what ways?

那句老话怎么说来着？

What's the line?

历史不会重演，但总会惊人地相似。

A history doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes.

我再次想到克里夫·阿斯内斯的论文和其他资深评论家的观点，我认同这种说法：你一生中会预期遇到一次泡沫，因为一旦人们意识到这一点，下一代就会制造出新的泡沫。

And I think again in Cliff Asness' paper and in other commentators who've been around for a while, I agree with this comment that you expect a bubble once in your lifetime because once people realize it's the next generation that creates a bubble.

我想现在时间已经足够久远，确实轮到下一代了。

And I guess it's been long enough now that it is the next generation.

我们曾经历过互联网泡沫的时代。

We were around for the .com bubble.

我记得当时有人询问我对一家名为北方电信的加拿大公司、360网络、环球电讯以及思科和英特尔的看法。

And I remember at the time people asking my view on a Canadian company called Northern Telecom, three sixty networks, Global Crossing, and Cisco and Intel.

事实上，微软是唯一一家挺过那一切的公司，但市场花了很长时间才真正认识到它的价值。

In fact, Microsoft is the one that comes through all of that, but it took a long time for them to come through in terms of recognizing what they're worth.

而我们拒绝发表意见，因为我们没有对这些公司进行研究。

And we refused to give a view because we weren't doing work on those companies.

因此今天我们对待'七巨头'和AI的态度也类似——我们的策略是寻找行业中的特殊公司。今天我们要讨论的两家公司，我认为它们正在各自领域做着独特的事情，而不是追逐趋势投资或主题投资，比如盯着AI或合成生物学这类主题然后试图在该领域寻找公司。

And so it's similar for us today with the magnificent seven and AI in that, you know, our approach is to try to find the special company in an industry, and we're going to talk about two today, I think, that are really doing unique things in their industry as opposed to trend investing or thematic investing where we look at a theme like AI or synthetic biology and then try to find a company that is in that space.

但就市场整体氛围和估值倍数而言，确实与互联网泡沫时期非常相似。

But just in terms of the attitude of people and what it feels like, and frankly, the multiple of the broad market, it feels very similar to the .com bubble.

你总能找到理由说'这次不一样'，但这恰恰是投资中最危险的说辞。

Again, you can always find arguments to say this time is different, but those are the foremost dangerous words in investing.

我们先稍事休息，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

你的比特币持仓增长得越多，面临的挑战就越复杂。

The more your Bitcoin holdings grow, the more complex your challenges become.

最初简单的自我托管，如今已涉及家族遗产规划、复杂的安全决策，以及应对一个失误就可能损失几代人财富的严峻局面。

What started as a simple self custody now involves family legacy planning, sophisticated security decisions, and navigating situations where a single mistake could cost generations of wealth.

标准服务并非为这种高风险现实而设计。

Standard services weren't built for these high stakes realities.

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That's why long term investors choose Unchained Signature, a premium private client service for serious Bitcoin holders who want expert guidance, resilient custody, and an enduring partnership.

通过Signature服务，您将配备专属客户经理，他们了解您的目标并全程提供协助。

With Signature, you're paired with your own dedicated account manager, someone who understands your goals and helps you every step of the way.

您将享受白手套式入职服务、当日紧急支持、个性化教育、降低的交易费用，以及独家活动和功能的优先参与权。

You get white glove onboarding, same day emergency support, personalized education, reduced trading fees, and priority access to exclusive events and features.

Unchained的协作托管模式旨在提供与全球顶级比特币托管机构同等级别的安全防护，同时满足那些希望自主掌控密钥的用户需求。

Unchained's collaborative custody model is designed to provide the same security posture as the world's biggest Bitcoin custodians, but for those who prefer to hold their own keys.

了解更多Unchained Signature服务，请访问unchained.com/preston。

Learn more about Unchained signature at unchained.com/preston.

结账时使用优惠码Preston10可享首年费用九折优惠。

Use code Preston 10 at checkout to get 10% off your first year.

比特币不仅关乎当下生活，更关乎世代传承。

Bitcoin isn't just for life, it's for generations.

想象一下，用真正理解客户的技术来扩展您的业务。

Imagine scaling your business with technology that understands your customers, literally.

这就是Alexa和AWS人工智能背后的故事。

That's the story behind Alexa and AWS AI.

每天，Alexa以17种语言处理超过10亿次交互，同时将客户摩擦减少40%。

Every day, Alexa processes over 1,000,000,000 interactions across 17 languages, all while reducing customer friction by 40%.

这不仅让生活更便捷，更能重塑客户互动模式并开辟新的收入来源。

It's not just about making life easier, it's also about transforming customer engagement and generating new revenue streams.

幕后由AWS人工智能驱动的70多个专业模型协同工作，打造自然对话，证明企业可以安全自信地大规模部署AI。

Behind the scenes, AWS AI powers more than 70 specialized models working together to create natural conversations, proving how enterprises can deploy AI at scale with confidence and security.

Alexa的AI能力在亚马逊庞大业务中经过实战检验，实现了可量化的大规模影响。

Alexa's AI capabilities were battle tested across Amazon's massive operations, delivering real measurable impact at scale.

这些创新技术如今为其他企业提供了成熟框架，用以提升效率、开辟新收入来源并获得持久市场优势。

These same innovations now give other businesses a proven framework to boost efficiency, unlock new revenue streams and gain a lasting market edge.

访问aws.com/ai/rstory了解Alexa的故事。

Discover the Alexa story at aws.com/ai/rstory.

网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

你知道顶尖企业的制胜法宝是什么吗？

You know what sets the best businesses apart?

就在于他们如何运用创新将复杂性转化为增长动力。

It's how they leverage innovation to turn complexity into growth.

这正是亚马逊广告在AWS AI赋能下所实现的。

That's exactly what Amazon Ads is doing, powered by AWS AI.

亚马逊广告每天处理数十亿次实时决策，在310亿美元的广告生态系统中优化广告效果。

Every day, Amazon Ads processes billions of real time decisions, optimizing ad performance across a $31,000,000,000 advertising ecosystem.

最终使广告活动运行速度提升30%，并实现规模化可衡量的商业影响。

The result is campaigns that run 30% faster and deliver measurable business impact at scale.

这就是亚马逊自身推动增长的方式。

And this is how Amazon itself drives growth.

他们的代理型AI将营销从资源密集型流程转变为智能自主系统，最大化投资回报率，并让营销人员能专注于创意与策略。

Their agentic AI transforms marketing from a resource heavy process into an intelligent autonomous system that maximizes ROI and empowers marketers to focus on creativity and strategy.

亚马逊广告正在证明，AI驱动的广告不仅是未来趋势，更是新的竞争优势。

Amazon Ads is proving that AI driven advertising isn't just the future, it's the new competitive advantage.

更棒的是，每家企业都可以运用亚马逊内部完善的这套创新方案。

And better yet, every enterprise can apply the same innovation playbook that Amazon perfected in house.

查看亚马逊广告故事请访问aws.comai/rstory。

See the Amazon Ads story at aws.comai/rstory.

网址是aws.com/ai/rstory。

That's aws.com/ai/rstory.

克莱：好的，回到节目中来。

Clay All right, back to the show.

克莱：有意思的是，前几天我和一位节目听众聊天，他儿子是大学生，持有Palantir股票获得了过去一年里我听过的最佳收益。

Clay It's funny, the other day I was chatting with a listener of the show and his son was a college student and he had the best returns of anyone I've heard of in the past year owning Palantir.

很多这类我没听说过的AI股票在过去一年里涨了三四倍。

Many of these AI stocks that I haven't heard of that are up three, 4X in the past year.

我认为这某种程度上是市场狂热时期某些现象的典型征兆。

And I think that's sort of some of the telltale signs of some of the things that happen during market euphoria.

那么让我们来聊聊你投资组合中的两支股票吧。

So let's get here to talk about two of your portfolio holdings.

Florin Decor和Kenzel Capital。

Have Florin Decor and Kenzel Capital.

你认为市场对这些股票的定价有误，我们稍后会探讨具体原因。

And you believe that the market is getting the pricing of these stocks wrong, and we'll get into why that is.

不如我们先从Floor and Decor开始？

How about we start with Floor and Decor?

聊聊你欣赏这家企业的哪些方面，特别是在两点半这个时段。

Talk about some of the things that you like about two:thirty this business.

它是

It's

有意思的是，Clay，你提到的这两家公司有相似之处。

interesting, the two you mentioned, Clay, are they have similarities.

我们多年前就接触过Floor and Decor这家公司。

We came across Floor and Decor a number of years ago.

有趣的是，我记得多年前有一天在办公室时，曾做过一个思维实验。

And it's interesting, I think, here in my office one day years ago, I was having a thought experiment.

这个思维实验是：如果我们在Costco早期就活跃于美国市场，我们是否能理解他们当时所拥有的机遇？

And the thought experiment was if we'd been active in The US when Costco was early days, would we have understood the opportunity set that they had?

因为我们的投资方法不只是着眼于未来十到二十年的长期发展，还要力求在预测中保持平衡。

Because our approach is not to just we're thinking out ten, twenty plus years and trying to be balanced in our forecasts.

我走到走廊上，向当时正在那里闲聊的投资团队成员提出了这个观点。

I walked down the hall and spoke to some of the people on the investment team who were hanging out in the hall and I posed that point.

我问：你们觉得我们当时能识别出这个机会吗？

Said, do you think we would have recognized it?

他们笑着看着我说：我们认为现在有个类似的机会要推荐给你。

And they smiled and looked at me and said, We think we have one for you.

那就是Florian Decor。

And it was Florian Decor.

所以如果你认为一个好的价值投资者，我认为不是那种寻找净净价的人，对吧？

And so if you think a good value investor, I think is not someone who's looking for a net net, right?

那是60.70美元很多年前的事了。

That was $60.70 years ago.

一个好的价值投资者正在试图找出所有未来现金流的现值。

And a good value investor is trying to find what's the present value of all future cash flows.

可能是高增长，也可能是低增长。

Be high growth, could be low growth.

这只是基于未来的价值。

It's just what's it worth based on the future.

对于Floor and Decor，如果你了解他们的商业模式，他们二十年前就着手重塑硬质地面材料市场。

And with Floor and Decor, if you understand their business model, they set out twenty years ago to essentially recast the hard surface flooring market.

正如他们所说，他们直接去源头采购。

As they describe it, they go direct to the mountain.

因此他们在全球25个国家拥有250家供应商。

So they have two fifty vendors in 25 different countries around the world.

而创始人虽不运营公司但仍担任董事，他的目标是实现硬质地面铺装材料的民主化。

And the founder who is not running the company but is on the board set out to democratize hard surface flooring.

我不确定具体含义，但我想我理解这个理念。

And I don't know what that means, but I think I understand the, you know, the thought.

相比家得宝、劳氏和其他专业连锁店，他们的结构性成本优势令人震惊。

Their structural cost advantage against the Home Depots and the Lowe's and the other specialty chains is shocking.

他们尽可能削减中间环节。

They cut out the middlemen to the extent they can.

如你所知，他们拥有自己的大型仓储式门店，采用现购自运模式。

They have their own big box stores, as you know, it's cash and carry.

他们彻底颠覆了这个市场。

They've upended the market.

这是该行业真正的颠覆者。

It's a true disruptor in their industry.

因此当我们创立基金与管理层会面交谈并理解业务后，我向负责财务模型团队的强调：展望未来时，我会同样严苛。

And so when we founded and met with management and talked to them and understood it, one of the things I stress to the people working on that financial model is I will be as upset, right, looking into the future.

如果你的预测过于保守，我们最终会认为它不够便宜，无法进入我们的投资组合，因为我们非常注重估值。

If you are conservative in your forecast, we conclude, you know, it's not cheap enough to make it into our portfolio because we are very valuation focused.

然后五年、十年后，我回顾他们的成就和我们最初的预测，会发现我们当初严重低估了。

And then five, ten years later, I look at what they've done and look at our original forecast and we were woefully low.

所以这比五年或十年后发现自己当初高估了更让我懊恼——虽然这么说可能有些矛盾，但我们确实在努力逐个公司地准确评估。

So that will make me in a way more upset than if I look in five to ten years and realize we were too high, if that makes any sense, trying to get it right company by company.

因此让我有些意外的是，一家纯粹依靠有机增长、许多投资者都理解其商业模式的公司，三年前竟然便宜到能符合我们的估值标准进入投资组合。

And so it's a little surprising to me that a pure organic growth company that many investors understand that has that business model was cheap enough three years ago to make it into our portfolio, given our valuation criteria.

所以它必须是一家拥有优秀管理团队（通常是长期任职的管理层）的杰出公司——这家公司完全符合这些条件，业务质量很高。

So it needs to be a great company with great management, long tenured management typically, which this company meets all of that, high business quality.

但同时它的估值必须足够低，能取代我们投资组合中的其他标的。

But then it has to be cheap enough to kick something out of our portfolio.

我推测三年前由于市场短期关注‘美国是否会陷入衰退’的担忧，

Would speculate that three years ago with the short term focus on, is The US going into a recession?

它的估值跌到了足以进入我们投资组合的水平。

Got cheap enough to make it into our portfolio.

我也推测，未来某个时候情况会好转，因为目前状况并不乐观。

And I'd also speculate that there'll be a point when things are fine out there, because they're not fine right now.

但当北美市场恢复正常时，由于这家公司是极具吸引力的有机增长者，每年都在其行业中抢占份额，很可能会发展到股价水平不再符合我们投资组合标准的程度。

But when they are fine out there in North America, because this is such a attractive organic grower taking share every year in their industry that it may well get to the point where the share price is such that it doesn't stay in our portfolio.

克莱，在我们之前的访谈中，我们深入讨论过'买入并优化'而非'买入并持有'的理念。

Clay During our previous interviews, we discussed in-depth the idea of buy and optimize instead of buy and hold.

回顾Floor and Decor的股价走势图，过去五年左右采用买入并持有策略的投资者表现并不理想。

And looking back at Floor and Decor stock chart, buy and hold investors aren't faring too well over the past five years or so.

2020年时股价是60美元。

In 2020, the stock price was 60.

你看它先翻倍，再腰斩，又翻倍，又腰斩。

You see it double, get cut in half, double again, get cut in half again.

但看业务本身，营收几乎翻了一番。

And you look at the business and revenues have nearly doubled.

门店数量也翻倍了。

The number of stores have also doubled.

由于行业正处于周期性低迷，盈利方面表现不佳。

The earnings side of the equation is struggling in light of the industry being in a cyclical downturn.

那么你能简单谈谈我们过去多次提及的'买入并优化'策略吗？以及你如何将其应用于像Fuller and Decor这样的股票？

So how about you touch a little bit on this buy and optimize that we've touched on so many times in the past and how you manage that with a stock like Fuller and Decor?

詹姆斯，当然。

James Sure.

我想先说明一点，我担心我们可能过度强调这一策略，仅仅因为它与众不同。

I mean, I would start on this conversation to say, I worry that we over emphasize this as part of our process because it's different.

对吧？

Right?

史上最伟大的投资者沃伦·巴菲特倡导的是'买入并持有'。

The best investor of all time, Warren Buffett, preaches buy and hold.

顺便说一句，他本人并不践行'买入并持有'，但他确实这么宣扬。

He doesn't practice buy and hold, by the way, but he preaches it.

我理解他为什么这样做。

And I understand why he does that.

这很有趣，对吧？我和我的合伙人都是从私募股权行业出身的。

And it's funny, right, that my partners and I come out of private equity.

我们在九十年代曾为一家加拿大大型银行建立并运营其私募股权部门。

We set up and ran the private equity arm of one of the big Canadian banks back in the nineties.

当我观察公开市场时，发现这里多了一个杠杆。

And I looked at the public market and thought, there's this extra lever.

你找到好公司，然后像在私募股权中那样采取买入并持有的心态。

You find good companies and you take a buy and hold mentality the way you do in private equity.

但随后股价会波动。

But then the price moves around.

而这正是为你的回报增值的一个杠杆。

And it's just a lever to be additive to your returns.

以Floor and Decor为例，核心理念是：你已经做了功课，有了完整的长期预测。

The fundamental idea, take a floor and decor, is you've done the work, you have a full long term forecast.

当某个时间点股价足够便宜时，它就能进入我们的投资组合。

And at a point in time, the share price is cheap enough to make it into our portfolio.

这意味着由于我们持有固定数量的目标仓位，确实会淘汰某些标的。

Then which means since we have a target of a fixed number of holdings, it does push something out.

如果之后没有任何变化，我们也不会采取任何行动。

And if nothing then were to happen, we wouldn't do anything.

我们本质上秉持着买入并持有的理念，就像任何优秀的价值投资者一样。

We are at core a buy and hold mentality like any good value investor.

但公开市场的特点在于，正如你提到的，我们几年前曾多次以60美元左右的价格增持。

But here's the thing about the public market, as you mentioned, we added it at around 60 a few years ago more than once.

昨晚我为今天与你的对话做准备时查看了股票走势图。

And I looked at the stock chart last night in preparation for talking to you today.

这让我想起它曾经历过多少波动。

It just reminds me how much it's moved around.

与此同时，我们对公司价值的评估其实并没有太大变化。

And in the meantime, our view of what the company's worth hasn't really fluctuated that much.

随着时间推移估值会上升，因为你是在随时间前进。

It's gone up over time because you move forward in time.

因此，随着时间的推移，价值几乎必然增长——如果你是一名价值投资者，而公司正在盈利并按你的预期发展。

So value is increasing as you move forward in time, almost by definition if you're a value investor and they're making money and they're on plan with what you forecast.

如果我们当初以60美元建仓时已合理配置了头寸规模，当股价涨至120美元时，若只是沾沾自喜地说'看我们多聪明，股价翻倍了'。

If we feel like we sized the position when we first bought it at $60 and at a point the stock's a 120, to sit and say, oh, look how smart we are, the stock has doubled.

如果你没有意识到'我们不该持有这么多股份'。

If you don't say to yourself, we shouldn't own as many shares.

我们实际上应该确保在股价上涨后，该持仓在投资组合中的占比要降低。

We should actually make sure it's a smaller percentage waiting in the portfolio with that higher share price.

这就是我们创立Turtle Creek时的思想实验：如果你不愿在100美元卖出股票，那说明你在60美元时买得不够多。

Then and this is our thought experiment when we started Turtle Creek was, hey, then if you don't wanna sell stock at a $100, you didn't own enough at 60.

在我们试图传达的理念中，最难解释的是：我们本质上是买入并持有的投资者。

And of the things that we try to communicate, the most difficult thing to communicate with our philosophy is we are a buy and hold.

除非Floor and Decor的估值高得离谱，否则我们会长期持有这家公司。

Unless Floor and Decor's valuation goes through the roof, we're going to own this company for a long time.

但我们持有的数量将取决于我们对价值的判断——这个判断会随时间略有变化，对吧？

But the amount that we own is going to be a function of our view of value, which changes a little bit over time, right?

但最主要的考量因素还是安全边际。

But primarily, it will be the margin of safety.

对吧？

Right?

股价与我们认定的内在价值相比如何？

What's the share price versus our view of intrinsic value?

这是我们整个投资组合都会应用的原则。

And it's something that we apply across the portfolio.

但正如我所说，我想明确表示，这只是锦上添花。

But as I say, I wanna make it clear, it's icing on the cake.

我们的大部分回报来自于以良好切入点增持像Flora and Decor这样的公司，并尽我们所能将其调整至合适的权重比例，然后在价格较低时增持，在价格较高时减持。

It is the bulk of our returns come from adding a company like Flora and Decor at a good entry point and sizing it to the correct weighting to the best of our ability and then reacting to owning more at a lower price, but owning less at a higher price.

Trey，我忍不住还想说，Floor and Decor虽然是家优秀企业，但在2010年代它背后有着强劲的顺风。

Trey I also just can't help but think about Floor and Decor is a great business, but in the 2010s, it has had this massive tailwind at its back.

作为一家硬木地板公司，它们与房地产市场紧密相连。

Being a hardwood flooring company, they are very much tied to the housing market.

如果房地产价格上涨，如果利率下降，这对Floor and Decor来说是一股强劲的顺风，因为许多房主会去进行再融资，申请房屋净值贷款，获得资金来重新装修房屋的某些部分。

If real estate prices are going up, if interest rates are going down, this is a major tailwind for floor and decor as lot of homeowners go and refinance, do a home equity line, get some capital to go and redo parts of their home.

我认为当前投资案例的核心在于，房地产市场或硬木地板行业正处于周期性低谷附近，随着市场复苏，大量被压抑的需求最终将得到释放。

And I think a lot of the investment case today is that the housing market or the hardwood flooring industry is near a cyclical low and there's a lot of pent up demand that's going to eventually be unlocked as the market rebounds.

就在这次访谈前我查过，Floor and Decor的营业利润已从2022年略低于4亿美元降至2024年的2.56亿美元。

I just checked prior to this interview, the operating income for floor and decor has gone from just shy of 400,000,000 in 2022 to $256,000,000 in 2024.

我天生对周期性行业持谨慎态度，因为我永远无法准确判断我们处于周期的哪个阶段。

I have this natural bias against trying to avoid many cyclicals just because I just never know where we're at in the cycle.

所以请谈谈您如何看待Floor and Decor当前所处的周期阶段，以确保我们不会陷入价值陷阱。

So talk about how you think about where we are at in the cycle for Floor and Decor to ensure that we're not entering a value trap.

我认为价值陷阱本质上是我们对预测的误判。

I think of value trap as basically getting things wrong on our forecast.

Floor and Decor是一家永远不会发行股票的公司。

Floor and Decor is a company that's never going to issue equity.

他们目前还没有到向股东返还资本的阶段，因为他们拥有巨大的增长空间，即使以当前较低的盈利水平，也能将所有资本重新投入到地域扩张中。

They're not at the point of returning capital to their shareholders because they have such a runway for growth and can take all of their capital even at this lower rate of earnings and redeploy it into geographic growth.

上次我们与CEO交谈时，我确实问过他，你们什么时候来加拿大？

And the last time we spoke to the CEO, I did ask him, when are you coming to Canada?

因为我最近刚做了装修，深知石材、板岩和瓷砖有多昂贵，也理解他们提供的价值主张。

Because I recently did a renovation and I know how how expensive it is for stone and slate and tile and understand the value prop that they provide.

我不相信价值陷阱，只要你建立了完整模型、尽了最大努力，并且持有那些不需要高股价的公司。

I don't believe in value traps if you've done a full model and you've done your best and you own companies that don't need a high share price.

当它们有盈余资本时，就会返还给股东。

Then when they have surplus capital, they return it to their shareholders.

我认为原因在于，正如我们在Flora和Decoran的研究中所发现的，我们持有它的理由正是你刚才提到的所有因素。

I think the reason why, as we found Flora and Decoran did work on it, that the reason we own it is all of the things you just said.

如果你有能力从长远考虑，能够看透我们目前在北美所处的这种极其疲软的环境。

If you have the ability to think long term, to look past this frankly profoundly weak environment we're in in North America.

我认为我们之前讨论过的AI浪潮、超大规模企业、大型项目和数据中心，显然掩盖了除此之外相当疲软的经济状况。

I think that what we talked about earlier, the AI wave and the hyperscalers and the mega projects and the data centers are clearly, I think, covering up quite a weak economy away from that.

有趣的是，当我们几个月前与管理层交谈时，大概是六个月前，他们已经两次下调了2025年的新店建设计划。

It was interesting when we spoke to management, I guess, a few months ago, maybe six months ago now, they've taken their new store build for 2025 down twice.

我们问他们，在什么情况下你们会后悔这个决定？

And we asked them, well, in what situation will you regret that decision?

我记得他们从30降到25，然后又从25降到20。

I think they went from 30 to 25 and then 25 to 20.

他们回答说，如果我们经历的是V型复苏而非U型复苏走出这场衰退的话。

And they said, well, if we come out of this recession with a V recovery rather than like a U recovery.

所以在他们的认知里，经济衰退已经持续好几年了。

And so in their world, they've been in a recession for a number of years.

正如你所说，克莱，自金融危机和房地产泡沫以来，被压抑的需求一直存在，家庭结构发生了深刻变化，而新房建设却未能跟上。

As you say, Clay, there is pent up demand since the great financial crisis and the housing bubble, then household formations have been profound, new home builds have not been.

因此确实存在被压抑的需求。

And so there is pent up demand.

这一点毋庸置疑。

There is no question about that.

但我们有时间优势，不必纠结于它是六个月、一年还是三年后发生。

But we've got the time frame to not really worry about is it gonna happen in six months or a year or in three years.

因为如果你拥有一家在结构上具有优势的公司，就像Floor and Decor那样，他们正在从竞争对手那里夺取市场份额，正如你所说，他们仍在增长。

Because if you own the company in an industry that's just structurally advantaged as Floor and Decor is, and they're taking share from their competitors, they're still growing, as you say.

他们在过去几年里将门店数量翻了一番。

They've doubled their store count over the last few years.

他们向我们强调的一点是，他们已经将新开门店数量从25家减少到20家。

And the point they made to us is, well, we've taken our store openings from 25 to 20.

但顺便说一句，我们已经收购了土地。

But by the way, we're still we've acquired the land.

我们正在建设这些门店。

We're building those stores.

我们只是暂时不配备人员和库存，等到明年再运营。

We're just not staffing them and putting inventory in them until next year.

所以这仍然是一家从竞争中夺取份额的高增长公司。

So it is still a high growth company that is taking share from competition.

我们不会花太多时间去思考，转折点何时会出现？

And we don't spend a lot of time thinking about, well, when when does the turn happen?

我们展望的是五年、十年甚至更长的时间。

We're looking out five years, ten years plus.

这就是我们的关注点。

That's our focus.

正因如此，过去三年里有许多公司进入了我们的投资组合，因为北美经济疲软，它们受此影响更大。

And I think because of that, there are a number of companies that have made it into our portfolio in the last three years because of the fact that the economy in North America is soft, and they're more impacted by that.

因此股价已跌至我们可以断言：只要持有长期视角，这些股票现在便宜到足以纳入我们的投资组合，取代其他标的。

And so the share prices have gotten to the point where we're able to say, if you have a long view, these are now cheap enough to make it into our portfolio to push other things out.

Floor and Decor就是三年前一个很好的例子。

And Floor and Decor is a good example of that three years ago.

克莱，是的。

Clay Yeah.

我提到过当时的低利率环境助推了房地产市场。

I mentioned interest rates there and the low interest rate environment that fueled the real estate market.

当然现在我们处于利率略高的时期。

And now, of course, we're in a slightly higher interest rate era.

近期利率下调以及您对美国住房市场的展望，如何影响对Floor and Decor的投资论点？

How does recent interest rate cuts and just your outlook on The US housing market, how does that play into the thesis on floor and decor?

哈里，从某种程度上说，这并不相关。

Harry In a way, it doesn't.

对吧？

Right?

因为这是一家净零负债的公司。

Because this is a company with net zero debt.

即便在当前疲软的环境下，他们仍在大量盈利。

And even in this soft environment, they're making lots of money.

所以这个论点可能影响股价一年后的走势，但不会改变我们对股票内在价值的判断。

So that thesis might play into where's the share price going to be a year from now, but it doesn't play into what's our view of the intrinsic value of the shares.

因此宏观环境并非我们考量的主要因素。

So the macro environment is not a big factor in how we think.

但我要明确说明，如果两家公司同样具有吸引力且运营良好，一家是Floor and Decor，另一家是非周期性业务，且估值同样低廉，我们会更倾向于选择非周期性业务。

But let me be clear, if you gave us two companies that are equally attractive, well run, one of them is floor and decor, one of them is a non cyclical business, with the same cheapness, we would have more of the non cyclical business.

所以我们并不惧怕像Floor and Decor这样的周期性企业，但相比非周期性企业，我们会相应调低持股比例。

So we're not afraid of cyclicals like Floor and Decor, but we do titrate down how much we would like to own versus something that is noncyclical.

比如我们持有一家名为SS and C的美国公司，他们的业务就非常抗周期。

Like we own a US company called SS and C, and they are very noncyclical.

因此在相同估值水平下，我们在SS and C的仓位会远高于Floor and Decor——不过目前它们的估值并不相同。

So at the same cheapness, we'd have a lot more in SS and C than we would in floor and decor, But they're not at the same cheapness today.

这确实在我们的考量范围内，但更多是思考行业影响及竞争对手动态。

So it's in our thinking, but it's more we think about, well, what's the impact on their industry and what's happening to their competitors?

要知道，他们的一家主要竞争对手去年已经申请破产了。

I mean, one of their large competitors has filed for bankruptcy or did last year.

从长期来看，疲软的经济对Florian de Corre这类公司反而可能是利好，因为这会淘汰那些不具备相同1:30商业模式竞争力的对手，

Sometimes the weak economy for a company like Florian de Corre can actually be a positive if you're thinking out long enough because it's taking their competitors who don't have the same business one:thirty model,

将它们逐出市场。

it's taking them out of the market.

当五年后经济强劲复苏时，这将使它们获得 获得更大的 更大的市场份额 市场份额。

It just gives them greater share in five plus years when the economy is much stronger.