TIP783：市场遗漏了什么：普雷姆·沃特萨与商业史上最伟大的记录之一，与凯尔·格里夫斯对话

因此，在2009年，他们从纽约证券交易所退市了。

And so in 2009, they delisted from the New York Stock Exchange.

就像对冲基金做空富通一样，富通本身也不害怕在自己的投资组合中使用做空策略。

Now, just like the hedge funds shorted Fairfax, Fairfax itself wasn't actually afraid to use shorts in their own investing portfolio.

每位听众可能都听说过迈克尔·伯里，他在次贷危机期间著名的做空操作被写入了《大空头》一书。

Everyone listening has probably heard of Michael Burry for his famous short during the great financial crisis, which was outlined in the big short.

但他的收益实际上只有富通的四分之一。

But his outcome was actually only a quarter as profitable as Fairfax's.

为了理解这一点，我们需要一些背景信息。

Now to make sense of this, we need some context.

首先，富通并没有将自己对抵押债务证券（以下简称CDS）的投资视为宏观交易。

So first of all, Fairfax didn't actually view its investment into collateralized debt swaps, which I'll just refer to here as CDS as a macro trade.

这仅仅是针对金融体系的一种灾难性保险。

It was simply a catastrophe insurance on the financial system.

富通显然是一家保险公司，必须为自己防范罕见的灾难。

Fairfax was obviously an insurance company and it had to protect itself against rare disasters.

通过CDS持有保险是一种应对灾难的方式，他们认为这种灾难发生的可能性正在不断增加。

Now owning insurance via the CDS was a way to survive a disaster that they thought was becoming increasingly more likely.

由于法尔克斯的许多再保险公司都投资了这些抵押贷款支持证券，因此如果这些抵押贷款支持证券出现崩盘——而法尔克斯认为它们确实会崩盘——法尔克斯必须得到保护。

Now, since many of Fairfax's reinsurers had invested in these mortgage backed securities, it was vital that if these mortgage backed securities went south, which Fairfax thought they would, Fairfax could be protected.

因为如果他们自己的再保险公司持有大量这些衍生品，而这些衍生品最终会大幅亏损，法尔克斯就需要一种自我保护的手段。

Because if their own reinsurers owned a lot of these derivatives that would eventually, you know, lose a lot of money, Fairfax needed a way to protect itself.

于是，他们开始购买AIG、瑞士再保险和慕尼黑再保险的CDS。

So they began buying CDSs on AIG, Swiss Re, and Munich Re.

问题是，他们从2003年开始回购这些CDS，而全球金融危机还要再过几年才真正爆发。

The problem was that they started to repurchase them in 2003, and the GFC still had a few more years until things really started to break down.

在继续讲述之前，让我们简要了解一下CDS是什么。

Now, before we continue the story, let's briefly cover what a CDS is.

CDS本质上是对一家公司破产的廉价保险。

A CDS is basically cheap insurance on a company's failure.

如果什么都没发生，你只是损失一点点，就像支付保险费一样。

If nothing happens, you just lose a little bit, just like paying an insurance premium.

但如果情况恶化，你将获得巨额收益。

But if things go badly, you stand to gain a ton.

因此，自2003年以来持有这些CDS，投资者们某种程度上认为这些是不必要的成本。

So since they had these CDSs since 2003, investors were kind of viewing them as, costs that was unnecessary.

在某些方面，这确实没错。

And in some ways it's true, you know.

这是对信贷市场的一种保险，而信贷市场本可能彻底摧毁富兰克林的资产负债表。

It was insurance against the credit markets that really could just destroy Fairfax's balance sheet.

在没有发生严重问题的时期，富兰克林仍需持续为这些CDS支付资金。

Fairfax would have to continually dish out money for these CDSs when nothing really bad was happening for a time.

这一举动引发了股东和分析师的批评，他们不理解为何富兰克林要随着时间推移不断增加这些CDS。

This action generated criticism from shareholders and analysts who didn't understand why they were increasing these CDSs over time.

在2003年至2006年间，富兰克林在这些投资上亏损了5亿美元。

Now between 2003 and 2006, Fairfax lost $500,000,000 on these investments.

但在那时，他们发现其再保险公司所持有的资产根本不够稳固。

But during the sign, they were seeing that the asset that their reinsurers had just weren't durable.

因此，尽管瓦塔萨不得不忍受这些年的亏损，但他知道只要再保险商面临风险，就必须继续持有这些合约。

So while Watsa had to endure these years of losses, he knew he had to keep them on as long as his reinsurers were at risk.

而这一决定是正确的，因为他们在2008年2月因这些投资获得了46亿美元的收益。

And it was the right call as they made $4,600,000,000 in 02/2008 as a result of these investments.

因此，普雷姆·瓦塔萨和枫叶公司从这一时期学到了许多宝贵的教训。

So Prem Watson and Fairfax learned many valuable lessons from this period.

首先，他们所购买的保护不仅带来了纯粹的经济收益。

First, the protection that they'd purchased generated more than purely economic profits.

它还为他们赢得了时间、信誉和选择权，而这些是其他绝大多数公司都无法享有的奢侈。

It also bought them time, credibility, and optionality that very few other firms had the luxury of.

当金融危机爆发时，枫叶公司并非一个被迫抛售的机构。

When the great financial crisis hit, Fairfax was not a foreseller.

当所有人都没有资本时，他们却拥有数十亿美元的资本，能够冷静地将资金投入最佳机会，而不必担心自身是否能维持偿付能力。

They had billions in capital when nobody had any, and they could calmly deploy capital into the best possible opportunities, rather than worrying about staying solvent.

其次，他们认识到系统性风险高度相关，而这种相关性往往在大多数人最意想不到的时候发生。

Second, they learned that systemic risk is highly correlated, and this correlation can happen when the majority least expect it.

根据富通的模型，他们理解到资产价格很可能会一同下跌。

Under Fairfax's modelling, they understood that the asset prices were likely to fall together.

因此，交易对手也往往会同时失败。

As a result, counterparties would also unfortunately fail together.

随着这些事件的发生，保险索赔会激增。

And as these events happened, insurance claims would spike.

因此，信用违约互换是对这种相关性失败的保护，而不仅仅针对单一资产类别。

So the CDSs were protection against this correlated failure, and not just from a single asset class.

第三，在全球金融危机期间，尽管富通的表现远优于几乎所有人，但这表明风险必须时刻监控。

Third, during the great financial crisis, even though Fairfax came out looking much better than nearly everybody else, it showed that risk must be monitored at all times.

全球金融危机之后，富通实际上变得更加保守。

Fairfax actually became even more conservative after the great financial crisis.

他们利用这段时间保持流动性并保护自身下行风险。

They used this time to maintain liquidity and protect their downside.

我认为，这对投资者和企业主的重要启示并不在于我们一定要专注于从崩盘中获利。

I think the big lesson here for investors and business owners isn't that we should focus necessarily on making money from a crash.

我们应该专注于投资或建立那些在危机不可避免来临时也不会倒闭的企业。

It's that we should focus on investing in businesses or building businesses that can't die when one inevitably comes.

因为投资者如果幸运的话，只会从中吸取一次教训。

Cause that's a lesson investors will only learn once if they're lucky.

现在我刚刚谈到了普雷姆和法尔克斯在金融危机后学到的关键教训。

Now I just spoke here about the key lessons that Prem and Fairfax learned after the great financial crisis.

正如你将在金融危机后立即看到的那样，他们确实将这些教训铭记于心，甚至可能因此付出了代价。

And as you'll see in the period immediately following the GFC, they really took these lessons to heart, perhaps even to their own detriment.

因此，金融危机后，法尔克斯继续将股票对冲作为另一种保险形式。

So Fairfax continued to hedge equities as another form of insurance after the great financial crisis.

问题是，这一次并没有像金融危机那样的破坏性事件在前方等待。

The problem with this was that this time there was just no destabilizing event like the great financial crisis on the horizon.

因此，在2010年至2016年期间，这些保险对冲完全抵消了所有经营收入。

And as a result, between 2010 and 2016, the insurance hedges wiped out 100% of operating income.

在此期间，公司的投资组合回报率为负7%，而标普500指数则实现了近15%的回报。

During this period, the company's investment portfolio returned negative 7%, while the S and P returned nearly 15%.

瓦塔萨承认，这一策略是为了保护，但这种保护的成本已经变得太高。

Wasa admitted that this strategy was done for protection, but that the protection was just getting too costly.

其中主要的拖累来自做空标普500指数和罗素2000指数。

One of the main drags on this was from shorting the S and P five hundred and Russell 2,000 indexes.

在该策略上亏损了20亿美元后，普雷姆得出结论，他们将不再做空，我认为这是一个很好的策略。

After losing $2,000,000,000 on the strategy, Prem concluded that they would no longer short, which I think is a great strategy.

普雷姆认为，做空偏离了富兰克林价值投资的核心，也就是找到价格优异的好企业。

Prem felt that shorting got away from Fairfax's wheelhouse of value investing, which is just, you know, finding good businesses at great prices.

因此，他遵循这一原则后的首个投资是家名为Zenith National Insurance的私人保险公司，主要承保工伤赔偿。

So his first investment following this maxim was a private insurance business called Zenith National Insurance, which insured workers' compensation.

但由于瓦塔萨是价值投资者，这家公司并没有被包装得完美无缺。

But since Watsa is a value investor, the company did not come wrapped up very perfectly.

它显然存在一些问题。

It obviously had some hair on it.

例如，在金融危机后，该公司因洪水遭受了严重打击，尽管拥有长达三十年平均综合比率仅为95%的出色业绩记录，仍正努力扭转局面。

For instance, it had been hit very, very hard by the floods after the great financial crisis and was working on turning its business around from that despite having this incredible thirty year track record of an average combined ratio of just 95%.

在拥有Zenith的第一年，其综合赔付率达到了异常高的137%，亏损了2400万美元。但Fairfax对这家企业的质量判断实际上是正确的。

During the first year of ownership, Zenith's combined ratio was an uncharacteristic 137% and it lost $24,000,000 But Fairfax was actually correct about the quality of the business.

尽管综合赔付率花了大约三年时间才降至100%以下，此后一直保持在这一水平。

Although it took about three years for the combined ratio to drop below 100%, which should have stayed ever since.

后金融危机时期，他们也开始将运营业务从保险领域扩展至其他行业。

The post GFC period was also when they began diversifying their operating businesses beyond just insurance.

例如，他们收购了殡仪馆、零售商、高尔夫及运动用品零售商，并组建了一组成功的餐饮连锁品牌。

For instance, they bought businesses such as funeral homes, retailers, golf and sporting goods retailers, and assembled a portfolio of successful food chains.

这些餐饮连锁品牌最终通过首次公开募股（IPO）拆分为Recipe Unlimited，随后又被Fairfax再次私有化。

The food chains were eventually spun out into an IPO as Recipe Unlimited, which was ultimately taken private once again by Fairfax.

我在这里提到，Fairfax在2010至2016年期间主要采取的是防御性策略。

Now I mentioned here that Fairfax had mainly been playing defense during that twenty ten, twenty sixteen period.

但自2017年以来，Fairfax已真正重新转为进攻性策略。

But since 2017, Fairfax has really gone back on the offensive.

首先在2017年，Fairfax整体开始显现出转机的迹象。

First in 2017, the entirety of Fairfax showed that it was starting to kind of turn a corner.

尽管发生了造成约13亿美元损失的灾难性事件，富通仍实现了创纪录的最高利润。

Even though there was a catastrophic event, ate about 1,300,000,000.0, Fairfax still achieved a new all time high in profits.

即使我们快进到新冠疫情时期——理论上这对保险公司来说应该是非常糟糕的一年，富通依然表现良好。

And even if we fast forward to COVID, which theoretically should have been a very bad year for insurers, Fairfax still did well.

2020年新冠疫情给富通造成了约6.7亿美元的损失，但它们仍实现了创纪录的利润。

In 2020 COVID hit Fairfax for about $670,000,000 yet again, they had record profits.

因此，这家公司的业务显然已经转型，即便面对这些超级巨灾，仍能实现盈利。

So the business had clearly evolved and was still able to return a profit despite the presence of these super cats.

但我们现在先回到2017年，因为那是富通迄今为止最大一笔收购的年份。

But let's stick with 2017 for now because that was the year that Fairfax made its largest acquisition to date.

这是一笔名为Allied World的保险业务收购，价格为50亿美元，富通显然仍在持续提升其收购业务的质量层级。

This was an insurance business called Allied World and its price was $5,000,000,000 Fairfax was clearly continuing to run up the ladder of quality businesses.

Allied World成立于2001年，其平均综合比仅为91%。

Allied World was founded in 2001 and had an average combined ratio of just 91%.

如今，鉴于其保险业务显然运营得非常出色。

Now, given the businesses insurance operations were clearly very well run.

法尔科斯公司究竟看中了这家公司的哪些方面？

What exactly did Fairfax see in the company?

浮存金。

The float.

艾利德世界的投资记录仅带来了约4%的回报。

Allied World's investment track record yielded only about 4% returns.

如果这些回报能通过法尔科斯明显更优的投资能力得到提升，其平均表现本应远为优越——达到7%，而艾利德的实际回报本应是20%而非12%。

And if those returns were then transformed through better investing that Fairfax could clearly offer, their average performance would have been far superior 7% and Allied's actual returns would have been 20% rather than 12%.

因此，借鉴亨利·西蒙森的做法，这笔交易通过股权发行融资。

So taking a page from Henry Singleton, this deal was financed by equity issuance.

问题是，法尔科斯的股价并没有达到瓦塔斯所期望的那么高。

The problem was Fairfax's shares weren't trading nearly as expensive as Watsa would have liked.

因此，法尔科斯的股价仅以账面价值约6%的溢价交易，而他们在收购艾利德世界时却以高达32%的账面价值溢价进行购买。

So Fairfax shares were only trading at about a 6% premium to book value, and they used them while purchasing Allied World at an actually 32% premium to book value.

由于这笔交易规模庞大，使法尔科斯的流通股数量增加了近25%，但依然物有所值，因为它推动了已签保费、投资组合和账面价值的增长速度，远超稀释效应所暗示的水平。

Since the deal was large, it increased Fairfax's, shares outstanding by nearly 25%, but it was still worth it as it boosted premiums written, the investment portfolio, and the book value at a much higher rate than the dilution would suggest.

对于这笔交易来说，更重要的是普雷姆的谈判。

So what was even more important to this deal was Prem's negotiations.

我在这档节目中多次提到，最好的并购应该是买卖双方双赢的结果。

I've mentioned many times on this show that the best M and A should be a win win for the buyer and the seller.

普雷姆正是这样设计这笔交易的。

And Prem designed the deal that way.

利用富兰克林的分散化结构，他告诉艾利德的管理层，他希望他们留下来并保留员工，因为他们表现得实在太出色了。

Using Fairfax's decentralized structure, he told Allied's management that he wanted them to stay and keep their employees because they were just doing such a good job.

因此，艾利德的股东们并不用担心合并完成后必须大规模裁员，这对真正关心员工的卖家来说是一个巨大的优势。

So there wasn't really this kind of fear among Allied's owners that they'd have to fire a large percentage of their workforce after the merger was completed, which is a huge bonus for sellers who really care about their workforce.

艾利德世界公司的另一大亮点是其有机增长。

And another beautiful part of Allied World was its organic growth.

从2017年被收购到2024年，其毛保费收入翻了一倍多，展现了非常强劲的有机增长。

Between 2017 when it was purchased and 2024, its gross premiums written more than doubled, demonstrating very, very strong organic growth.

现在我们来谈谈新冠疫情。

Now let's get to COVID here.

因此，许多企业在疫情期间为削减开支而被迫采取的不幸策略，就是不得不大规模裁员。

So the unfortunate strategy that many businesses were forced to adopt during COVID to reduce expenses was just to unfortunately fire large parts of their workforce.

但正如你可能猜到的，富凯并没有采纳这种做法。

But as you can probably guess, Fairfax did not subscribe to that.

瓦尔萨表示，我们有责任照顾好员工。

Watsa said, we have a responsibility for looking after employees.

我必须怀着极大的感激之情感谢我们的总裁们，我们做到了。

And I must say with much gratitude to our presidents, we met it.

疫情期间的另一个问题是，当世界停摆时，许多公司都经受了压力测试。

The other problem during COVID was that many companies were stress tested as the world shut down.

但富凯加强资产负债表的战略在此时确实取得了巨大成效。

But the strategy that Fairfax took of bolstering its balance sheet really, really paid off here.

它的大部分应急资金甚至根本不需要动用。

Most of its emergency funds didn't even need to be touched.

他们拥有约20亿美元的现金和可变现证券，直到2022年才面临债务到期，同时还有一条20亿美元的未使用信贷额度。因此，尽管这对富凯来说也是一段艰难时期，但他们表现得非常强劲，充分证明了其在资产负债表战略转型上的关键作用。

They had cash and marketable securities worth about $2,000,000,000 no debt maturities until 2022, and an unused credit line of $2,000,000,000 So while of course this was a tough time for Fairfax, they came out very, very strong showing how crucial its strategic shift on the balance sheet front was.

法尔克斯做的另一项成功投资是戴维·托马斯所说的‘大额长期投资’。

Another winning investment Fairfax made was what David Thomas called the big long.

但这并非单一投资，而是一系列增值投资，使法尔克斯能够真正实现自我蚕食。

Now this wasn't one investment, but a series of value adding investments that allowed Fairfax to really just cannibalize itself.

基础投资很简单：回购股票。

The base investment was simple, buy back shares.

但法尔克斯想出了许多非常有趣的方法，以筹集更多资金进行大规模股票回购。

But Fairfax came up with some very interesting ways to help raise funds to do buybacks on steroids.

为了表达对公司业务及其低价的信心，瓦尔萨在2020年亲自买入了1.5亿美元的股票。

To show confidence in the business and its low price, Watsa backed up the truck in 2020, personally purchasing $150,000,000 worth of shares.

但瓦尔萨的这项投资在短期内并未达到他预期的效果，因为市场情绪并未发生明显变化。

But this investment by Watsa didn't actually have the effect he was hoping for in the short term, as sentiment just didn't really change that much.

但我想我已经充分说明了，瓦尔萨是一个极具长期眼光的人。

But as I think I've made abundantly clear, Watts is a very long term thinker.

因此，在2024年，他最终将所回购股票的一半出售给法尔克斯，用于注销。

So in 2024, he ended up selling about half of the shares that he bought back to Fairfax for cancellation purposes.

所以他最初以每股约400美元的价格购入这些股票，最终以1500美元的价格卖出。这一操作对各方都有利，因为即使在更高的价格下，富达也只是在股票交易价格低于内在价值时才进行回购。

So he originally purchased the shares at about $400 per share and ended up selling them at $1,500 Now this worked for all parties because even at that higher price, Fairfax only buys back shares when they're trading at a discount.

因此，普雷姆和股东们都从这笔交易中获益良多。

So both Prem and the shareholders made out well from this deal.

接下来，他们投资了一种名为总收益互换（TRS）的金融衍生品。

Next, they invested in these things called total return swaps or TRSs, are this form of derivative.

TRS允许买方（在此为富达）获得其股票的上涨收益，但并不实际拥有这些股票。

The TRS allows a buyer, in this case Fairfax, to access the upside of its stock, but it doesn't actually own the shares.

它只是获得了选择是否延续交易的权利。

It just gets the right to extend the trade if it chooses to do so.

2020年7亿美元的投资在2024年带来了约20亿美元的回报。

The $700,000,000 investment in 2020 returned about $2,000,000,000 in 2024.

另一种增加股票回购规模的策略是出售公司部分业务。

Another strategy to buy back even more shares was to just sell parts of the business.

富达最终出售了其王牌业务——奥德赛集团约10%的股份，以筹集资金用于股票回购。

Fairfax ended up selling off about 10% of its crown jewel, Odyssey Group, to raise cash for buybacks.

现在事情变得有趣了。

Now here's where it gets interesting.

这10%的股权被卖给了两家加拿大养老基金，为富达国际提供了十亿美元用于回购自身股票。

So this 10% stake was sold to two Canadian pension funds, which provided Fairfax with a billion dollars to buy back its own shares.

但关键在于其中的细节。

But the important part is in the details here.

因此，他们以账面价值1.7倍的价格出售了奥德赛集团10%的股权，同时以仅0.9倍账面价值的价格回购了富达国际的股票。

So they sold that 10% in Odyssey at 1.7 times book value to buy shares at Fairfax at only 0.9 book value.

我想提到的最后一个增长领域是国际投资，这是我感到非常着迷并亲身参与的投资领域。

Now the final area of growth I'd like to mention here was simply on international investments, an area of investing that I find fascinating and take part in.

到2019年，富达国际已在世界各地拥有保险公司，业务遍及东欧、拉丁美洲、南非、亚洲、乌克兰、越南、希腊和印度。

By 2019, Fairfax had insurance companies all over the world with exposure in Eastern Europe, Latin America, South Africa, Asia, Ukraine, Vietnam, Greece, and India.

但它们也开始在国际上收购运营公司。

But they also started buying up operating companies internationally.

其中一些公司后来成长为规模庞大且非常成功的企业。

And some of them grew into these very huge and successful companies.

在印度，他们持有班加罗尔机场的股份，该机场由富达印度公司控制。

So in India, they own a stake in Bengaluru Airport, which is controlled by Fairfax India.

他们拥有在线保险公司Digit和人力资源服务公司Quest。

They own Digit, an online insurance company and Quest, a staffing and workforce solutions provider.

在印度以外，他们拥有总部位于英国的特种保险公司Key Financial。

Outside of India, they have Key Financial, a specialty insurance company based in The UK.

欧洲银行，希腊最大的银行之一。

Eurobank, one of Greece's largest banks.

肯尼迪·威尔逊合作伙伴关系，一个全球房地产平台。

Kennedy Wilson partnerships, a global real estate platform.

这个名单还在继续。

The list goes on.

他们还拥有钢铁、能源和航运等其他行业的企业。

They also own businesses in other industries such as steel production, energy, and shipping.

因此，沃茨非常清楚地将内在价值视为一种指导原则，而不仅仅是一种估值工具，它指导着并购、有机增长和股票回购中的资本配置决策。

So Watts is someone who very clearly thinks about intrinsic value, not just as a valuation tool, but as a guiding light for capital allocation decisions in mergers and acquisitions, organic growth, and share repurchases.

瓦茨对价值的理解，丝毫不亚于沃伦·巴菲特。

What Watts understands just as well as Warren Buffett is value.

正因如此，他在多次情况下努力维持投资者的乐观情绪，即使内在价值上升，但股价却下跌。

And because of that, he has on several occasions tried to keep investor sentiment positive when the intrinsic value was up, but the share price was down.

让我们来梳理一下瓦塔在运营枫叶公司时所依赖的一些思维理念。

So let's go over some of the thinking concepts that Watsa leans on while running Fairfax.

第一个是所有价值投资者都非常熟悉的概念，即安全边际。

The first is one that all value investors are going be very familiar with, which is the margin of safety.

在瓦茨职业生涯的早期，他以极高的精准度专注于这一点。

Now early in Watts's career, he focused on this with laser like precision.

但随着经验的积累，他意识到内在价值并不仅仅存在于公司的资产负债表上。

But as he gained more experience, he realized that intrinsic value wasn't exclusively found on a company's balance sheet.

位于企业经营者身上的无形资产，比许多企业拥有的有形资本更为关键。

Intangible assets located inside the people running the business were even more critical than the tangible capital that many businesses have.

因此，瓦塔更重视企业的管理质量，而非低价。

For this reason, Watson placed a greater importance on a company's management quality than on a low price.

即使其无形资产的价值可能非常低甚至为负。

Even when the value of its intangible assets could be very low even negative.

瓦塔萨对管理的影响之一是传奇投资者菲利普·卡雷。

One of Watsa's influences on management was legendary investor Philip Carrey.

瓦塔萨在几封信中引用了卡雷的一句话：优秀的管理在最好的情况下也极为罕见。

Watsa added a Carrey quote in a few of his letters: Good management is rare at best.

它难以评估，但无疑是证券分析中最重要的单一因素。

It is difficult to appraise, and is undoubtedly the single most important factor in security analysis.

找一家老板全心全意致力于盈利运营的公司，而且更关注五年后的利润而非今天的利润。

Find a company whose boss is heart and soul dedicated to profitable operations, and even more interested in the profits five years hence than those of today.

如果他具备良好的商业判断力、挑选团队其他成员的技能，以及激励他们取得卓越表现的罕见能力，那么这家公司的股票就值得研究。

If he has sound business judgement, skill in selecting the other members of the team, and the rare ability to inspire them to superior performances as well, the company's stock is worth investigating.

没有比购买优质资产并让其长期复利增长更好的替代方法了。

There is no substitute for buying quality assets and allowing them to compound over the long term.

耐心可以带来非凡的利润。

Patients can produce uncommon profits.

正如科雷所提到的，你希望找到那些随着时间推移越来越好的企业，而要实现这一点，你必须有耐心。

As Coray mentioned, you want businesses that get better over time, and to accomplish that, you must have patience.

如果你想更好地理解复利效应和时间的力量，请查看我在TIP七七二期关于《复利者》这本书的节目，我会在节目笔记中提供链接。

If you want to understand the power of compounders and time better, please check out my episode on the book The Compounders on TIP seven seventy two, which I'll link to in the show notes.

但总体而言，那些能够持续复利并再投资利润的优秀企业，其价值会随着时间推移大幅增长，常常比市场给予的估值要高得多。

But the general gist is that good businesses that compound and reinvest profits become just so much more valuable over time, often more valuable than the market gives them credit for.

为了着眼于长期，沃森深知自己必须与短期主义的内心倾向作斗争。

To focus on the long term, Watson knew that he had to fight the inner battle against short termism.

沃森定期关注富通保险的内在价值，尽管股价波动剧烈，其内在价值却一直稳步上升。

Watson regularly focuses on the intrinsic value of Fairfax, which has risen very, very steadily over time despite a volatile share price.

如果你查看富通保险每股账面价值与股价的走势图，会发现两者惊人地相似。

If you look at a chart of Fairfax's book value per share and its share price, it's eerily similar.

优秀企业的另一个特征是长期使用创造价值的关键绩效指标来评估管理层。

Another hallmark of great businesses is the long term use of value producing KPIs to evaluate management.

沃伦·巴菲特用每股账面价值来衡量伯克希尔哈撒韦。

Warren Buffett used book value per share for Berkshire.

Fairfax公司经历了两种主要的KPI，但都有充分的理由。

Fairfax has gone through two kind of primary KPIs, but with very good reason.

因此，在公司早期阶段，他们专注于净资产收益率，并将基准设定为20%。

So when the business was in its early days, they focused on return on equity and set the benchmark at 20%.

随着公司规模扩大，他们不得不将这一数字下调至15%。

As the company scaled, they were forced to reduce that number to 15%.

而最近，他们实际上追随了巴菲特的脚步，越来越关注每股账面价值。

And as of late, they've actually just ended up following Buffett's footsteps and focus more and more on book value per share.

由于优秀的管理团队希望承担责任，因此也需要设定目标和指标。

Since good management teams want to be held accountable, it also needs goals and targets.

Watts提出了四项他认为自己应被评估的指导原则。

Watts has four guiding principles in which he feels that he should be evaluated.

第一。

One.

以每年15%的速度复合增长每股账面价值，第二。

Compound book value per share at fifteen percent two.

专注于长期每股账面价值的增长，而非短期收益。

Focus on the long term increase in book value and not on short term earnings three.

保持财务稳健，以及。

Remain soundly financed and four.

每年向股东提供完整的披露信息。

Provide complete disclosures to shareholders on an annual basis.

他还相信，管理层绝不能通过超级投票权股份利用股东利益。

He also believes that management should never take advantage of shareholders via superior voting shares.

因此，富兰克林的计划是现有管理层应始终掌控公司。

So the plan in Fairfax was that existing management should always maintain control of the business.

为此，他们设置了多重投票权股份，其中一些股份的投票权高于其他股份。

For that reason, they had multiple voting shares, some of which carried more votes than others.

在某些企业中，管理者会以高于普通股的价格出售这些股份，而瓦尔萨认为这非常不公平。

In some businesses, managers would sell these shares at a premium to the price of the ordinary shares, which Watsa felt was very unfair.

瓦尔萨引用了一个案例，即一家名为奥沙瓦集团的公司被收购，结果多重投票权股东获得的出售价格比例远高于次级股东。

Watsa cited a case study in which a business called Oshawa Group was bought out, and that a disproportionate share of the sale price went to holders of the multiple voting stock than the subordinated shareholders.

每股价值为116美元，而仅有36美元。管理层可能做的另一种滥用行为是领取极高的薪水。

The value per share was $116 compared with only $36 Another abuse that management can do is take very large salaries.

瓦尔萨目前的固定工资为60万美元，没有任何奖金，这并不令人意外。

It shouldn't come as any surprise that Watsa currently has a fixed salary of $600,000 with zero bonuses.

他的大部分收入来自持有富兰克林股票，每年获得约1900万美元的股息。

Most of his income comes from his holdings in Fairfax stock, which pays him now about $19,000,000 in dividends per year.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的介绍。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

当你经营一家小企业时，聘用合适的人才至关重要。

When you're running a small business, hiring the right person can make all the difference.

合适的员工可以提升团队素质、提高生产力，并将你的业务推向新的高度。

The right hire can elevate your team, boost your productivity and take your business to the next level.

但找到这样的人本身可能就像一份全职工作。

But finding that person can feel like a full time job in itself.

这就是LinkedIn招聘的用武之地。

That's where LinkedIn jobs comes in.

他们的新AI助手通过为您匹配真正符合您需求的顶尖候选人，消除了招聘中的猜测成分。

Their new AI assistant takes the guesswork out of hiring by matching you with top candidates who actually fit what you're looking for.

它不再让您逐份筛选海量简历，而是根据您的标准筛选申请人，并突出显示最佳匹配人选，为您节省数小时时间，帮助您在合适人选出现时迅速行动。

Instead of sifting through piles of resumes, it filters applicants based on your criteria and highlights the best matches, saving you hours and helping you move fast when the right person comes along.

最棒的是，这些优秀候选人已经都在LinkedIn上。

The best part is that those great candidates are already on LinkedIn.

事实上，通过LinkedIn招聘的员工至少留任一年的可能性比通过主要竞争对手招聘的员工高出30%。

In fact, employees hired through LinkedIn are 30% more likely to stick around for at least a year compared to those hired through the leading competitor.

一次就招对人。

Hire right the first time.

免费在linkedin.com/studybill发布您的职位，然后推广职位以使用LinkedIn新AI助手，更轻松快捷地找到顶尖候选人。

Post your job for free at linkedin.com/studybill, then promote it to use LinkedIn jobs new AI assistant, making it easier and faster to find top candidates.

免费发布职位请访问：linkedin.com/studybill。

That's linkedin.com/studybill to post your job for free.

适用条款和条件。

Terms and conditions apply.

2026年是你终于付诸行动的一年。

2026 is the year you finally do it.

这一年，你不再只是空想，而是真正将它变为现实。

The year you stop sitting on that idea and actually turn it into something real.

我们每个人都有那些本可以更上一层楼的技能、想法和副业项目。

We all have skills, ideas, and side projects we know could be more.

但梦想与行动之间的区别，在于迈出第一步。

But the difference between dreaming and doing is taking that first step.

Shopify为你提供了在线和线下销售所需的一切工具。

Shopify gives you everything you need to sell online and in person.

数以百万计的创业者，包括我自己，都已经从大型知名品牌跃升为刚刚起步的初创创始人。

Millions of entrepreneurs, including myself, have already taken this leap from massive household brands to first time founders just getting started.

借助Shopify，打造你的梦想店铺轻而易举。

With Shopify, building your dream store is simple.

你可以从数百种精美的模板中选择，并自定义以契合你的品牌。

You can choose from hundreds of beautiful templates and customize them to match your brand.

设置也非常快速，内置的AI工具可以撰写产品描述，甚至帮助编辑产品图片。

Setup is fast too, with built in AI tools that write product descriptions and even help edit product photos.

随着你的业务增长，Shopify也会与你一同成长，帮助你从一个仪表板处理更多订单并拓展至新市场。

And as you grow, Shopify grows with you, helping you handle more orders and expand into new markets all from one dashboard.

在2026年，别再等待，立即用Shopify开始销售吧。

In 2026, stop waiting and start selling with Shopify.

注册每月1美元的试用版，今天就前往shopify.com/wsb开始销售。

Sign up for your $1 per month trial and start selling today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

今年新年，让Shopify陪伴你聆听你的第一个声音。

Hear your first this new year with Shopify by your side.

每一家企业都在问同一个问题。

Every business is asking the same question.

我们如何让AI为我们所用？

How do we make AI work for us?

可能性无穷无尽，而猜测风险太高。

The possibilities are endless and guessing is too risky.

但袖手旁观绝非选项，因为有一件事几乎可以肯定：你的竞争对手已经行动了。

But sitting on the sidelines is not an option because one thing is almost certain, your competitors are already making their move.

借助甲骨文的NetSuite，您今天就能让AI发挥作用。

With NetSuite by Oracle, you can put AI to work today.

NetSuite是全球超过43,000家企业信赖的头号AI云ERP系统。

NetSuite is the number one AI cloud ERP trusted by over 43,000 businesses.

它是一个统一的套件，将您的财务、库存、电商、人力资源和客户关系管理整合为单一数据源。

It's a unified suite that brings your financials, inventory, commerce, HR, and CRM into a single source of truth.

这种关联数据让您的AI更智能，不再只是猜测。

That connected data is what makes your AI smarter so it doesn't just guess.

现在，借助NetSuite AI连接器，您可以使用任何您选择的AI，连接到您的真实业务数据，并提出您曾想过的每一个问题，从关键客户到现金状况，再到库存趋势。

And now with NetSuite AI Connector, you can use the AI of your choice to connect to your actual business data and ask every question you ever had, from key customers to cash on hand to inventory trends.

无论您的公司年收入高达数百万甚至数亿，NetSuite 都能帮助您保持领先。

Whether your company earns millions or even hundreds of millions, NetSuite helps you stay ahead of the pack.

现在，NetSuite 免费提供商业指南，为您揭开人工智能的神秘面纱，访问 netsuite.com/study 获取。

Right now, NetSuite's free business guide, demystifying AI at netsuite.com/study.

这份指南免费提供，访问 netsuite.com/study 即可获取。

The guide is free to you at netsuite.com/study.

netsuite.com/study。

Netsuite.com/study.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

说到并购，Fairfax 有一套非常明确的准则。

Now when it comes to M and A, Fairfax has a very particular set of rules that it lives by.

收购信条遵循四项原则。

The acquisition credo follows four principles.

第一，收购那些已经拥有良好管理团队的公司。

Number one, buy companies with good management in place already.

第二，只收购那些能够达到绩效目标的公司。

Number two, only buy companies that can hit a target of performance.

第三，被收购公司将独立运营，绩效将根据同一目标进行衡量。

Number three, companies will be run independently, and performance will be measured against the same target.

第四，当发行股票时，富达的股票等同于现金。

And number four, Fairfax stock is as good as cash when the stock is issued.

富达一定会确保自己获得的价值不低于付出的价值。

Fairfax will be sure to get as much value as it gives.

现在，正如其名称所示，并购始终是公平且友好的。

Now, as their name implies, M and A will always be fair and friendly.

因此，他们从未参与过敌意收购。

So they have never had to take part in a hostile takeover.

由于他们具有价值投资背景，因此也拒绝参与任何竞标。

And since they have this value investing background, they also refuse to participate in any auctions.

所以一旦他们提出报价，就只有接受或拒绝两种选择。

So once they make an offer, it's simply take it or leave it.

这是一个绝妙的策略，因为一旦陷入竞标战，你所谓的胜利其实是输掉交易，只能接受最低的回报。

This is a brilliant strategy because once you get into bidding wars, you only really win the deal by losing out and accepting the lowest possible returns.

我真的很喜欢这本书中所描述的并购交易类型。

Now, really like the types of M and A deals that were outlined in this book.

所以他把它们分成了几种不同的类别。

So he had a few different kind of buckets that he put them in.

首先是初创企业。

So the first were startup place.

当然，枫叶集团并不以大量参与风险投资而闻名，但它实际上早已投资了几家公司，并孵化了一些子公司。

Fairfax, of course, isn't really known for engaging too much in venture capital, but it actually has been a relatively early investor in a few companies and created a few spin offs.

接下来是重组企业。

The next are turnarounds.

黑莓公司就是一个例子。

Blackberry is an example.

但公平地说，这方面结果参差不齐，有失败也有成功。

But to be fair, the results have been kind of mixed on this with a few failures and a few successes.

然后就是大宗商品投资。

Then you get into commodity plays.

枫叶公司与威尔伯·罗斯和国际煤炭公司合作，取得了巨大成功。

Fairfax partnered with Wilbur Ross and International Coal, which has been very successful.

斯泰科公司也是一个巨大的成功案例，最近以25亿美元出售，使枫叶公司的初始投资翻了一番。

Stelco was also a great success that recently sold for 2 and a half billion dollars and doubled Fairfax's initial investment.

另一个是资产管理与基础设施、房地产和私募股权，他们在这方面略有涉足，但占比并不大。

Another is asset management and infrastructure, real estate and private equity, where they've dabbled a little bit, but it doesn't make up a significant share.

最后一个我感到非常有趣的是‘蚕食式收购’。

And the final one that I find really interesting is the cannibal buy up.

这其实就是收购他们已经拥有但尚未100%控股的业务部分。

So this is simply buying pieces of businesses that they already own, but don't own 100% of.

例如，如果他们无力承担保险公司的全部收购价格，可能会寻找合作伙伴共同分担剩余成本。

For instance, if they couldn't afford maybe the full purchase price of an insurance business, they might have searched for a partner to help cover the remaining costs.

一旦他们的财务状况好转，就会直接收购合作伙伴的股份。

And once they're in a better financial position, they just simply just buy out the partner.

这在Allied World、Eurolife和新加坡再保险公司都发生过。

This happened on Allied World, Eurolife, and Singapore Reinsurance.

现在，如果你听过我关于2025年所学经验的那期节目，我其中一个核心感悟就是文化的重要性。

Now, if you could listen to my episode on what I learned in 2025, one of the central learnings I had was with the importance of culture.

主要观点是：文化位于基本面之上。

The main point being that culture is upstream of fundamentals.

如果你能较早发现一种卓越的文化，那么你看到的是一家被市场低估的企业。

If you can find an incredible culture reasonably early, then you're looking at a business that is being underappreciated by the market.

这本书实际上是对Fairfax卓越文化的宣言，其中包含了企业长期成功所需的所有要素。

And this book is really a manifesto of Fairfax's incredible culture, which has all the ingredients for a business that will succeed for a long time to come.

Fairfax的有趣之处在于，作为一家公司，它并没有一个能单独支撑整个企业的核心资产。

The interesting thing about Fairfax is that as a business, it doesn't have one specific crown jewel that carries the entire company.

保险业本身并不是一种固有的高利润行业。

Insurance itself isn't an inherently moady business.

我做了一个快速搜索，虽然没有确切的数字，但全球保险公司的数量非常庞大。

I did a quick search and while no concrete numbers exist, the range of insurance businesses worldwide is massive.

所以我得到的全球数字在70亿到9000万之间。

So I'm getting numbers between 7,001,900,000 worldwide.

因此，如果你拥有一家保险公司，你很可能面临多个竞争对手。

So if you own an insurance business, you're likely to have multiple competitors.

那么，为什么富兰克林在没有明显竞争优势的情况下如此成功？

So why has Fairfax been so successful despite having no obvious competitive advantages?

瓦塔写道：保险业务本身并没有太大差异。

Watsa wrote, The actual business of insurance is not that differentiated.

让我们与众不同的，是文化。

What differentiates us is culture.

当你剖析文化时，他会引导你关注一些具体品质，比如信任、公平、谦逊和长期思维。

And when you break down culture, he would guide you to some specific qualities such as trust, fairness, humility, and long term thinking.

这些文化特质构成了它的护城河，而且非常难以复制。

These areas of its culture are its moat, and they are very, hard to replicate.

让我们更详细地谈谈文化。

So let's go over culture in some more detail.

信任对富达来说至关重要，原因有几点。

Trust is absolutely vital to Fairfax for a few reasons.

首先，富达以其与业务伙伴的牢固关系而闻名，这些关系是经过长期培养的。

First, Fairfax is well known for its strong relationships with business partners, which it has cultivated over time.

而这一切始于善待他人。

And it really just starts with treating people well.

即使商业是一个残酷的行业，也不意味着你必须成为一个糟糕的人才能成功。

Just because business is a cutthroat industry does not mean you have to be a horrible person to succeed.

瓦尔萨表示，他在整个CEO生涯中，对每一个接触的人保持友善，带来了两大好处。

Watsa says that being kind to everyone he interacts with has had two major bonuses over his entire career as a CEO.

第一个好处是，它在富达内部培养了优秀人才。

The first one is that it creates performers inside of Fairfax.

第二个好处是，公司外部的人对你的信任度高于对其他人的信任。

And second, people outside of your company have a higher degree of trust in you rather than in others.

现在戴上分析师的帽子。

Now putting the analyst cap on here.

如果你在考察一家企业，试图发现像富凯这样所描述的信任，其实很难直接看到。

If you're looking at a business and trying to find the trust that's outlined here by, Fairfax, it's pretty difficult to really see it.

你知道，外面并没有什么具体的东西可以让你观察，但你还是可以使用一些原始数据点。

You know, there's nothing tangible out there for you to look at, but there are some raw data points that you can use as well.

例如，良好的企业文化会留下一些线索，任何投资者都能发现。

For instance, a great culture leaves some clues that any investor can really find.

第一，良好的企业文化通常会有良好的经济表现。

The first is that a good culture will generally have good economic performance.

这一点非常明显，因为富凯每股账面价值多年来一直在增长。

That's very obvious given how Fairfax's book value per share has grown over the years.

第二是员工流失率。

Second comes employee turnover.

这个数字较低是一个强有力的信号，表明员工喜欢在那里工作，得到了良好回报，并且正在创造股东价值。

That number being low is a very powerful sign that people enjoy working there and are being well compensated and are generating shareholder value.

富达保险以十年为单位衡量员工留存率，而非以年为单位，这充分说明了你需要了解的许多信息。

Fairfax measures its retention in decades, not years, which tells you a lot of what you need to know.

文化的问题在于，随着公司规模扩大，它可能会发生变化。

The problem with culture is that it can change as a company scales.

当富达保险还年轻时，其强大的文化显而易见。

When Fairfax was young, their strong culture was evident.

他们工作极其努力，并且远离聚光灯。

They worked incredibly hard and they stayed out of the limelight.

但如今，富达保险已拥有五万七千名员工。

But today Fairfax employs 57,000 people.

要让如此多的人认同同一种文化，并不容易。

So getting that many people to buy into a single culture is just not that easy.

富达保险解决这一问题的方式是，收购那些已经拥有强大文化、并非常注重自身文化建设的公司。

The way Fairfax has gotten around that issue is by integrating companies that already have strong cultures and are very intentional about how they built their own cultures.

这其实又回到了信任的问题，对吧？

This just kind of goes back to trust, right?

书中引用了一项研究，展示了人们离开公司的最主要原因。

There was a study cited in the book that showed kind of the biggest reasons that people leave a company.

最主要的原因实际上是未被尊重或缺乏尊严。

And the top reason was actually not being treated with respect or dignity.

第二是被阻止对组织产生影响。

The second was being prevented from making an impact on the organization.

第三是不被倾听。

Third, not being listened to.

第四是未因更多责任而获得奖励。

And fourth, not being rewarded with more responsibility.

当你拥有值得信赖且文化上一致的管理团队时，你可以相信他们会做正确的事，这在富达的整个发展历程中常常如此。

When you have management teams that you can trust and that are aligned culturally, you can just trust them to do the right thing, which often has been the case during Fairfax's existence.

富达建立信任的另一种方式是吸引合适的人才。

Another way Fairfax builds trust is by attracting the right talent.

他们总是从内部招聘。

They always hire from within.

因此，员工们知道，如果他们表现优异，有很大机会会被快速提拔到更高的职位，而不是从外部引进他人。

So employees know that if they outperform, there's a very good chance that they're gonna be fast tracked to a higher position rather than having someone from the outside being brought in.

这也有助于保持极高的士气。

This also helps keep morale very, very high.

有一位有趣的人，他希望研究以更好地理解企业文化。

There was a fascinating person that wants to study to better understand culture.

这个人是迈克·阿布拉肖夫，一位前美国海军舰长。

And that person is Mike Abrashoff, a former US Navy captain.

因此，阿布拉肖夫研究了人们离开组织的原因，发现信任至关重要。

So Abrashoff studied why people left organizations and found that trust was paramount.

以下是阿布拉肖夫的说法。

So here's what Abrashoff said.

我原本以为低薪会是首要原因，但实际上它排在第五位。

I assumed that low pay would be the first reason, but in fact it was the fifth.

原因就是我刚才提到的那四个。

The reasons were the four that I just covered.

首要原因是员工没有得到尊重或尊严。

The top reason was not being treated with respect or dignity.

第二是被阻止对组织产生影响。

The second was being prevented from making an impact on the organization.

第三是没有被倾听。

Third, not being listened to.

第四是没有因更多责任而得到奖励。

And fourth, not being rewarded with more responsibility.

阿伯肖夫的关键观点是，那些让员工对自己的决策负责的企业，将会远远超越竞争对手。

Abershaw's big statement was that businesses with employees who take ownership of their own decisions will beat the socks off of their competitors.

很明显，富达公司已经将这一观点铭记于心，并努力打造一种能够长期生存和繁荣的文化。

And it's quite clear that Fairfax has taken the statement to heart and tried to engineer a culture that will survive and thrive for many years to come.

我想暂时离开文化话题，讨论一下富达公司成长过程中许多企业都会经历的一个阶段。

I want to divert away from culture here and discuss a part of Fairfax's growth that I think many businesses go through.

我拥有一家名为Technion的公司，这是我的联合主持人斯蒂格推荐的，我将在节目笔记中分享。

A company I own is called Technion, which my co host Stig pitched, which I'll share in the show notes.

这是一家业务，其首席执行官约翰·斯滕表示，他在企业早期犯下的许多错误都是因为购买了廉价的企业，而这些企业最终被证明质量低下。

So it's a business where its CEO, Johann Steen, has said that many of the early mistakes that he made in the business were from just buying cheap businesses, which turned out to be, you know, low quality.

沃森在他的职业生涯早期也得出了完全相同的结论。

And Watson came to the very same conclusion very early in his career.

购买廉价公司的问题是，它们之所以便宜，通常都有非常充分的理由。

The problem with buying cheap companies is that there's often a very, very good reason that they're cheap.

当然。

Sure.

市场当然可能会对某些事物定价错误，但并非总是如此。

The market can of course misprice things something, but not all the time.

当然。

Sure.

市场可能会完全错误定价某些事物，但很多时候，企业之所以廉价，是因为它们本就该如此。

The market can completely misprice something, but a lot of time, businesses are cheap because they deserve to be.

当富达开始整合保险公司时，他们取得了好坏参半的结果。

When Fairfax began consolidating insurance companies, they had a good mixture of wins and losses.

他们亏损的共同点是，往往以低价购入，但这种低价是因为资产通常已损坏，且由无能的管理者运营。

The commonality in their losses was that they would often buy them cheap, but that cheap price was because the assets tended to be broken and managed by broken managers.

瓦塔萨很幸运，找到了他的版本的‘G’。

Watsa was fortunate to find his version of a G.

贾恩是一位名叫安迪·巴纳德的绅士。

Jain in a gentleman named Andy Barnard.

因此，枫叶保险的部分竞争优势在于巴纳德及其弟子布莱恩·杨等优秀人才。

So part of Fairfax's competitive advantage was in talented individuals such as Barnard and his protege Brian Young.

巴纳德现在是枫叶保险集团的董事长，而杨是总裁。

Barnard is now the chairman of the Fairfax Insurance Group while Young is the president.

巴纳德在很大程度上帮助瓦塔萨学习如何驾驭枫叶保险的业务方向。

Barnard helped Watsa to a very high degree in learning which way to steer Fairfax's insurance engine.

正是巴纳德主张侧重再保险和商业险业务，如今这两项业务占其保险组合的90%以上。

It was Barnard who wanted to lean on reinsurance and commercial lines, which now make up over 90% of their insurance book.

但瓦塔萨需要像巴纳德这样的人才来领导这些部门，因为这些保险业务在管理得当时利润丰厚，但管理不当时也会带来显著的下行波动。

But Watson needed a talented person like Barnard to head these divisions as they are insurance lines that can be very lucrative when properly managed, but also have significant downside volatility when not managed properly.

因此，像房屋和汽车保险这样的个人保险，其结果主要基于概率，同时还拥有大量辅助数据的优势。

So personal insurance like home and auto insurance has outcomes that are based much more on probabilities, which also have the added benefit of extensive backup data.

这使得每年的结果更容易预测，但同时也带来了较低的回报。

This makes outcomes much more easier to predict on a yearly basis, but it also gives just kind of lower returns.

法尔克斯重点投入的商业保险业务保费更高，但交易次数却少得多。

Commercial lines where Fairfax focused have much larger premiums, but much fewer transactions.

因此，当需要赔付索赔时，保障范围非常广泛，这会使业务变得稍微更具风险。

So when claims have to be paid, the coverage is very extensive, which can make the business a little more dangerous.

在商业保险和再保险领域，你承保的可能是十年到十五年后才会发生的责任，这显然非常难以核保。

Now on commercial and reinsurance, you're covering a liability that could be, you know, ten to fifteen years into the future, which is obviously very, very difficult to underwrite for.

由于瓦塔帮助建立了法尔克斯管理中的长期视角，这也帮助其高管们从错误中最大化地汲取经验。

Since Watsa helped create this kind of long term focus in the management of Fairfax, it also helped its own executives maximize their own learnings from mistakes.

以下是布莱恩·杨对那些频繁跳槽或在并购宣布后离职的员工的看法。

Here's what Brian Young said about employees who bounce around too much or leave after a merger is announced.

他们在某地工作四到五年，却错过了索赔最终发生的关键时期。

They work somewhere for four to five years and miss the period where claims finally come in.

他们最终没能从自己的行为中吸取教训，以改进未来的工作方式。

And they end up not learning from what they did to see how to do it better in the future.

我在这里谈了很多关于文化的内容，但现在让我们转向成功长期企业的另一个关键要素——分权。

I've spoken a lot about culture here, but now let's shift to another key element of successful long term businesses, which are decentralization.

因此，在我关于《复合者》这本伟大著作的节目中，我提到分权在该书所涵盖的所有企业中都显而易见。

So in my episode on the great book, The Compounders, I mentioned that decentralization was evident in all businesses covered in that book.

因此，了解到 Fairfax 是一家建立在分权基础上的企业，也就不足为奇了。

So it shouldn't come as any surprise to learn that Fairfax is a business that is built upon decentralization.

随着 Fairfax 的发展，其计划是将超额资本投入到更多机会中。

The plan for Fairfax as it grew was to deploy excess capital into more opportunities.

但当他们在并购上放缓步伐后，他们希望赋予旗下保险公司的管理层自主增长的权力，而这归根结底仍是另一项资本配置决策。

But once they slowed down on M and A, they wanted to empower management of their insurance companies to grow organically, which when it really comes down to it is yet another capital allocation decision.

但要让这一战略奏效，你需要配备合适的人才，能够推动业务向前发展。

But to make that strategy work, you need the right people in place who can help carry a business forward.

Watsa 像他的偶像亨利·西蒙森一样，相信成功来自于将决策权下放给更接近客户的人。

Watsa, like one of his heroes Henry Singleton, believed that success comes from pushing decision making towards people closer to the customer.

当你这样做时，你将责任转移给了其他地方，减少了集中化企业常见的官僚臃肿。

When you did this, you shifted responsibility elsewhere and reduced centralization and bloat that centralized businesses experience.

去中心化的美妙之处在于，它让高层管理者能够专注于那些需要他们立即关注的业务领域。

The beauty of decentralization is it allows upper management to focus on areas of that business that require their immediate attention.

这可能包括需要关注的个别业务部门、如何优化新收购的公司、是否进行并购、股票价格是否低到足以使股票回购变得合理，或者是否应直接偿还更多债务。

That might include individual business segments that need some attention, how to optimize new acquisitions, whether to pursue M and A, whether shares are priced so that buybacks make sense, or whether more debt should just be retired.

简而言之，它让高层管理者能够专注于能为公司创造最大价值的事务，而将其他许多重要但更适合由他人独立决策的工作交给更擅长的人去做。

Basically, it allows upper management to focus on what can create the most value for the business and leave a lot of the other very important work, but to people who are just better equipped to make those decisions on their own.

我认为另一个去中心化的领域在协同效应方面存在广泛的效用争议。

Another area of decentralization I think has a wide range of effectiveness concerns synergies.

像伯克希尔或枫叶这样的公司一直专注于完全忽略协同效应，到目前为止，这对它们而言效果极佳。

Companies like Berkshire or Fairfax have operated with the focus on completely ignoring synergies, and so far, it's worked incredibly well for them.

瓦塔认为，追求协同效应会损害枫叶当前的商业模式。

Watsa believes that pursuing synergies would negatively affect the current business model that Fairfax operates.

瓦塔希望旗下子公司的管理者能感觉自己是在枫叶内部经营自己的业务单元，尽管他们确实有一个母公司。

Watsa wants managers of their subsidiaries to feel like they're running their own business unit inside Fairfax, even though, you know, they do have a parent company.

如果你试图实现协同效应，就会削弱管理者那种独立自主的感觉。

And if you try to achieve synergies, you kind of lose that feeling of, you know, individuality for managers.

所以我的看法是，这其实取决于具体情况。

So my thoughts on this is really that, you know, it kind of depends.

有些业务几乎无法产生协同效应，适合以这种方式运营。

Some businesses that have very little ability to see synergies make sense to run-in that fashion.

但有些业务的去中心化程度有限，协同效应仍能创造巨大的价值。

But some businesses are decentralized just to a certain degree where synergies can still create a very, very large amount of value.

比如，我拥有的一家名为Terravest Industries的公司就是这样一个例子。

So an example of that is a business that I own called Terravest Industries.

它采用去中心化结构，拥有多个业务部门及各自的总裁，但公司内部仍能产生大量协同效应，带来显著价值。

It's decentralized with several different segments and presidents of those segments inside of the business, but it still creates numerous synergies within the business which offer very, very big value.

由于Terravest可以直接从钢厂大批量采购钢材，而非通过经销商，因此在钢材成本上可节省高达30%。

So since Terivest can source steel directly from the mills in large quantities rather than through dealers, it can save up to 30% on steel costs.

他们还整合了制造设施，通过将两家业务合并到一个制造工厂中，大幅降低了成本。

They've also consolidated manufacturing facilities, which helped save significant costs by moving two businesses into a single manufacturing facility.

他们可以缩短交货周期并增加库存。

They can reduce lead times and carry more inventory.

他们可以内部生产产品的定制零件，从而缩短交货周期并提高利润率。

They can in source custom parts for their products, which leads to shorter lead times and higher margins.

所有这些措施都是为了提高其收购业务的EBITDA。

And all of these are really just designed to increase EBITDA for their acquisitions.

因此，即使他们以五倍EBITDA的价格收购一家公司，一旦介入并优化利润率，EBITDA倍数下降一半也并不罕见。

So even if they purchase an acquisition at say five times EBITDA, once they go in and optimize margins, it's not unusual for that EBITDA multiple to drop by half.

现在回到瓦塔。

Now back to Watsa.

由于瓦塔是以投资者身份加入富兰克林的，他看待投资的角度与众不同。

Since he came to Fairfax from an investor point of view, he looks at his investments in a different light.

许多管理者对所处行业非常熟悉，并专注于公司的运营。

Many managers are highly familiar with the industry they're in and laser focused on a company's operations.

这当然很好，但首席执行官的角色实际上是多方面的。

That's all well and great, but the role of the CEO really is multifaceted.

他们必须是经营者，但同时也负责公司内部的资本配置。

They must be an operator, but they're also in charge of allocating capital inside of the company.

而正是这一点，许多首席执行官未能表现出色。

And this is where many CEOs fail to impress.

对于经营者来说，当企业规模较小时，或当他们担任没有资本配置职责的职位时，这往往不是优先事项。

As it's not really a priority for operators when maybe the business is smaller, or when they're in a role with zero capital allocation responsibilities.

在布雷姆的情况下，情况恰恰相反。

In Brehm's case, was the opposite.

他首先是一位资本配置者。

He was a capital allocator above all.

他恰好是在保险行业进行资本配置，类似于巴菲特。

He just happened to be a capital allocator in insurance, similar to Buffett.

艾利德的总裁路·伊格莱西亚斯对去中心化和资本配置给予了高度评价。

Lou Iglesias, the president of Allied, one of Fairfax's insurance subsidiaries, had glowing words regarding decentralization and capital allocation.

资本配置正是法尔克斯团队最擅长的方面。

Allocation is what the Fairfax team is so great at.

他们负责确定股票回购的时机、增加持股比例的最佳方式、融资的最佳途径以及整个投资方面的工作。

They figure out buybacks and when to increase ownership stakes, the best ways to do financing, and the whole investment side.

他们不会花时间管理保险公司，基本上让我们自行运营这些资产。

They don't spend their time managing insurance companies and pretty much leave us to run those assets.

这些公司都有非常明确的目标。

And the companies have very clear objectives.

由于富通希望每年将账面价值提高15%，管理者们会非常清楚需要实现什么样的利润目标。

Since Fairfax wants to, you know, increase its book value by 15% annually, the managers will have a pretty clear idea of what kind of profit objectives need to be achieved.

由于不同的保险和非保险业务处于不同领域，它们可能拥有不同的关键绩效指标，以帮助提升股东价值。

And since different insurance and non insurance businesses operate in different fields, they're probably going to have different KPIs to help add to shareholder value.

这些指标可能包括承保利润、整体业务表现、对长期股东价值的贡献，甚至一些更主观的衡量标准，如领导力、判断力以及对富通文化的遵循。

These might be things like underwriting profits, overall business performance, contribution to long term shareholder value, and maybe even some more subjective measures such as leadership, judgment, and adherence to Fairfax's culture.

现在我想转到另一个话题，回顾富通历史上的几个案例研究。

Now I want to transition here and go over some case studies from Fairfax's history.

我们将探讨一些非常有趣的收购案例，并分析富通所犯错误中值得汲取的最佳经验，这些经验帮助他们不断改进。

We'll cover some very interesting acquisitions and examine the best lessons to be gleaned from Fairfax's mistake, which have helped them improve.

第一个是马克埃尔金融控股公司早期的一些经验教训。

The first one is some of the early lessons in Markel Financial Holdings.

富达在马克埃尔公司遇到的问题，我已经简要提及过。

The issue that Fairfax had with Markel was something that I already briefly touched on.

当时马克埃尔是一家规模较小的公司，比富达更加注重集中化管理。

Markel at that time was a smaller company and was much more focused on centralization compared to Fairfax.

但富达不得不通过犯错来艰难地吸取这一教训。

But Fairfax had to learn this the hard way by making mistakes.

马克埃尔金融控股公司的问题在于，当时的管理层误判了风险，在市场价格转向不利时未能及时撤退。

And the issue with Markel Financial Holdings was simply that the management in place misread the risks and failed to pull back when market pricing just kind of turned against them.

这本书总结了富达在保险领域学到的两个重要教训。

The book has two great lessons that Fairfax learned about insurance.

第一个是去中心化。

The first is to decentralize.

在早期，有太多经理向普雷姆·瓦茨汇报工作。

There were just too many managers that were reporting back to Prem Watts in their early days.

他没有逐一处理这些问题，而是将责任交给了里克·萨尔茨伯格，这帮助他们找到了一个折中的解决方案。

Instead of dealing with all them individually, he ended up handing off the responsibility to Rick Salzberg, which helped them kind of find this middle ground.

第二个教训是，有些公司不幸并不是快速就能解决的问题。

The second one was that some companies unfortunately just aren't quick fixes.

由于承保不当，马克尔花了近十年时间才得以修复。

Markel took nearly a decade to fix due to the poor underwriting.

要把它做好，需要投入大量的时间和精力。

It required time and energy just to get it right.

这些时间和精力本可以用于其他更有利可图的事务。

This was time and energy that could have been used for other more profitable things.

关键在于，即使你实现了去中心化，也必须有透明的报告机制。

The key point is that even if you are decentralized, there must be transparent reporting.

总部需要了解情况，判断是否需要在事情失控前按下紧急按钮。

The mothership needs to know what's going on and whether or not it needs to, you know, hit the panic button before things spin out of control.

另一个关于去中心化的教训发生在富达保险对其保险以外的投资进行测试时。

Another lesson in decentralization occurred when Fairfax tested in its investments outside of insurance.

他们曾是一个投资团体的成员，投资了一家名为Midland Walwin的公司，该公司从事投资银行业。

So they were part of an investment group that invested in a business called Midland Walwin, which was in the investment banking industry.

Fairfax认为Tony Arell是经营这家公司的合适人选，但与Markel类似，文化上并不契合。

Fairfax believed it had the right leader in Tony Arell to run the business, But similar to Markel, just didn't have the right cultural fit.

Midland的管理层与Fairfax格格不入，而Fairfax仅持有37%的股份，无法积极介入以推动Midland融入Fairfax的文化。

Management of Midland class with Fairfax and because Fairfax held only a 37% position, it was unable to take a more activist role in getting Midland on board with Fairfax's culture.

他们还发现，Bay Street的思维过于短期导向，这与Fairfax的商业模式完全背道而驰。

They also learned that Bay Street tends to be just too short term focused, which is completely antithetical to Fairfax's business model.

他们很快意识到投资银行业并不适合他们，最终不惜亏损退出了这项业务。

They learned pretty quickly that investment banking was not for them, and then ended up taking up a loss just to exit the business.

第三个关于分权的案例研究非常有趣。

The third case study on decentralization was fascinating.

事实上，Fairfax曾经一度尝试过集中化管理。

So there was actually a time that Fairfax had to tinker with centralization.

正是因为这种对集中化管理的短暂尝试。

And because of this kind of dalliance into trying centralization out.

这帮助他们更好地着眼于长期，因为他们理解了去中心化的强大力量。

It helped them become a lot better long term because they understood the power of being decentralized.

显然，这是一个非常冒险的实验，因为它可能导致严重偏离去中心化这一对企业至关重要的核心价值。

So obviously, this is a very risky experiment as it could clear a very, very significant move away from the core value of decentralization, which is highly valuable in a business.

所以，无论如何，我们来回顾一下发生了什么。

So anyways, let's just go over what happened.

2009年，北安大略保险公司被私有化，并由富达国际收购。

So in 2009, Northbridge was re privatized and owned by Fairfax.

在此期间，富达国际被划分为四个去中心化的部门。

During this time, Fairfax was separated into four decentralized segments.

你有马克尔金融控股公司、隆巴德保险公司、共同保险公司和加拿大联邦保险控股公司。

You had Markel Financial Holdings, Lombard Insurance, Commonwealth Insurance, and Federated Insurance Holdings of Canada.

问题是，这些部门各自面对不同的市场细分、经验和文化。

The issue was that each of these segments had different market segments, experiences, and cultures.

富达国际希望让子公司更加协同，但结果并不如预期般顺利。

Fairfax wanted to get the subsidiaries a little more aligned, but it just didn't go as well as expected.

安迪·巴纳德表示，这一变化使得各业务负责人更难领导和明确责任归属。

Andy Barnard said the change made it harder for individual business heads to lead and sort out accountabilities.

解决这一问题的任务交给了西尔维娅·赖特，她被提升为首席执行官。

The task of fixing this issue was handed to Sylvia Wright, who was promoted to CEO.

她决定将四个部门整合在一起，进行合并。

She decided to bring all four segments together and consolidate them.

这是一个集权化的举措，因此瓦尔萨很难接受，但事实证明，这是当时正确的策略。

This was a centralized move, so it was very hard for Watsa to accept, but it turned out to be the right strategy at that time.

这使瓦尔萨和枫叶公司认识到，集权化有时是提升运营去中心化组织能力所必需的。

This taught Watsa and Fairfax that centralization can be necessary to improve your ability to run a decentralized organization.

首先，它使枫叶公司的指导原则被所有子公司采纳。

First, it allowed Fairfax's guiding principles to be adopted by all subsidiaries.

这随后使子公司在遵守指导原则的前提下，获得了更大的自主执行空间。

This then allowed the subsidiaries to gain more freedom to execute in their own way while abiding by the guiding principles.

现在，我想转向三个案例研究，它们帮助瓦尔萨理解了优质企业所带来的强大影响。

Now I want to transition here to three case studies that helped Watsa understand the powerful effects of quality businesses.

这一教训是通过富达必须经历的巨大痛苦才学到的，这些痛苦迫使它提升了质量水平，最终成为今天这家持久的企业。

So this lesson was learned through large amounts of pain that Fairfax had to endure, which forced it up the quality curve to help make it into the enduring business that it is today.

第一个例子是奥德赛集团。

The first example was with Odyssey Group.

奥德赛集团最初是一堆破碎资产的大杂烩。

So Odyssey began as kind of this smorgasbord of broken assets.

这些资产大多是在富达股价高昂而资产价格低廉时购入的，普雷姆当时正进行一场并购热潮。

Many of these assets were purchased when Fairfax shares were expensive and the assets were cheap, Prem to go on an M and A buying spree.

奥德赛集团证明了耐心对富达的长期成功至关重要。

The Odyssey Group proved that Patience was vital to Fairfax's long term success.

当时耐心至关重要，因为富达必须等待并观察保险资产作为奥德赛一部分的表现如何。

Patience was critical at this time because Fairfax had to wait and see how the insurance assets would perform as part of Odyssey.

结果非常理想。

And the outcome was very good.

首先，他们完成了两项大型收购：斯坎迪亚美洲公司和CTR。

First, they added two large acquisitions, Scandia America and CTR.

这使该部门的净保费增加到14亿美元。几年后，这一数字增长到了25亿美元。正如上述数字所示，这项业务起步缓慢，但随着其保险组合的改善，展现了强劲的增长。

This increased the segment's net premiums to $1,400,000,000 A few years later, that number increased to $2,500,000,000 As the numbers above show, the business started slowly but was able to show strong growth as it improved its insurance book.

尽管一些被并入奥德赛的资产几乎无法挽救，但保留下来的那部分在长期内被证明非常有效地创造了巨大价值。

And even though some of the assets that were rolled into Odyssey were kind of unsalvageable, the parts that were kept proved to be very, very good at creating a ton of value over the long term.

下一个案例研究是一种被称为Crum and Forrester的‘融化的冰块’状况。

The next case study was sort of this melting ice cube situation called Crum and Forrester.

这是一家耗时十余年、历经四位首席执行官才实现转型的业务。

So this was a business that took over a decade and four CEOs to turn around.

在1998年至2013年间，除了两年之外，其余年份都出现了承保亏损。

Between 1998 and 2013, it had an underwriting loss in all but two years.

所谓‘融化的冰块’是指他们在短短三年内，将签发的保单数量从约33,000份削减至6,000份。

The melting ice cube part was that they had to reduce the number of policies they wrote from about 33,000 to 6,000 over just a three year period.

幸运的是，这些战略调整帮助提升了其保费的价值。

Luckily, these strategic shifts helped it improve the value of their premiums.

直到他们聘请了一位名叫马克·阿迪的人，收益才真正开始显现。

It wasn't really until they hired this guy named Mark Addey that the benefits started to accrue.

他将Crum的保费从10亿美元提高到50亿美元。马克的一项重要举措是帮助Crum建立了一项宠物保险业务，该业务最终以14亿美元的价格出售。沃塔在这里学到的另一个重要教训是关于他坚持做正确事情的偏好。

He increased Crum's premiums from $1,000,000,000 to $5,000,000,000 One of Mark's biggest initiatives was to help build a pet insurance business within Crum that was eventually sold for $1,400,000,000 Another big lesson for Watsa here was regarding his preference for doing the right thing.

是的。

Yes.

他本可以关闭这些业务吗？

Could he have shuttered these businesses?

是的，他本可以关闭这些业务，但这意味着要解雇大量员工。

Yes, he could have shuttered these businesses, which would have meant firing a large number of employees.

但由于他希望做正确的事，他的重点是确保现有员工所管理的资产表现良好。

But since he wanted to do the right thing, his focus was on ensuring the assets were performing well with the people that he already had.

如果管理层能有这种长期眼光并坚持做正确的事，Crum根本不可能生存下来，或者如今的规模只会是现在的很小一部分。

If management had this long term outlook and focus on doing the right thing, Crum would never have survived or would be a fraction of the size that it is today.

回顾对Crum的收购，普雷姆承认，他绝不会再进行一次像收购Crum时那样充满问题的收购。

Reflecting on the acquisition of Crum, Prem admitted that he would never do another acquisition with the problems that Crum had when they purchased it.

从CEO的频繁更替可以看出，这段经历让普雷姆深刻认识到，在进行收购时，拥有正确的长期管理团队是多么重要。

Judging by the CEO carousel, you can see how much this experience taught Prem about having the right long term management in place when making an acquisition.

如果你被迫不断寻找新人来扭转一个糟糕的资产，那从一开始就不值得拥有它。

If you're forced to keep finding new people to turn around a bad asset, it's just not worth owning in the first place.

这是一堂关于质量的课，我认为普雷姆真正学到了。

This was a lesson on quality that I think Prem really learned.

说到质量，我们再来讨论一个名为Zenith National Insurance的案例。

Speaking of quality, let's discuss one more case study on a business called Zenith National Insurance.

因此，Zenith是Fairfax从少数股东逐步收购100%股权的一部分。

So Zenith was part of Fairfax's move to purchase 100% of a business, having started as a minority shareholder.

这次收购之所以有趣，是因为虽然它是一个高质量的资产，但其高质量并非隐藏属性。

This acquisition was interesting because while it was a high quality asset, the fact that it was high quality wasn't really a hidden attribute.

正因为如此，收购价格远高于账面价值，这对像普雷姆这样的价值投资者来说非常不寻常。

And because of that, the purchase price was at a pretty big premium to book value, which was very uncharacteristic for a value investor like Prem.

而且时机也不是最好的。

And the timing wasn't the best either.

因此，在2008年金融危机之后，Zenith不得不将保费业务缩减约50%。

So Zenith had to retrench about 50% of its premium writing following the two eight financial crisis.

因此，前三年的综合比率分别为136%、128%和116%。

As a result, the combined ratios for the first three years were a 136%, a 128%, and a 116%.

这导致富达在累计上损失了数亿美元。

And this resulted in a cumulative loss of hundreds of million dollars for Fairfax.

但正如你现在所理解的，普雷姆是一个非常长期的思考者。

But as I think you understand now, Prem is a very long term thinker.

他很可能早就预见到短期内情况可能会恶化，但未来会有更好的日子。

He would have had a very good idea that things were probably going to go south in the short term with brighter days ahead.

不久之后，综合比率下降到了90%。

And soon after, the combined ratios dropped to 90%.

普雷姆以高于内在价值的价格收购了这家企业，原因有几点。

Prem purchased this business above its intrinsic value for a few reasons.

首先，他认为Zenith的文化与富达非常契合。

First, he thought that Zenith's culture was a great fit with Fairfax.

双方都信奉善待员工、做正确的事，并拒绝那些自大狂妄的人。

They both believed in treating people well, doing the right thing, and rejecting people with large egos.

普雷姆还意识到，一旦短期的阵痛结束，Zenith将具备良好的内生增长基础，这是配置过剩资本的绝佳机会。

Prem also figured that once the short term pain was over, Zenith was well set up for organic growth, which was a great place to put excess capital to work.

这笔交易最棒的部分是什么？

And the best part of this deal?

一切都很顺利。

It all worked out.

Zenith如今已成为富达国际最盈利的公司之一。

Zenith is now one of Fairfax's most profitable companies.

本集的最后一部分将讨论继任问题，因为这是企业运营中不可或缺的一环。

The final section of this episode will discuss succession as it's an essential part of business.

普雷姆现在才七十多岁，没有任何放缓的迹象。

So Prem is only in his 70s and doesn't show any signs of slowing down.

但当你有一位即将达到常规退休年龄的首席执行官时，你必须确保企业在他们离开后仍能持续良好运作。

But when you have a CEO who's approaching, you know, typical retirement age, you must always make sure that the business is set up to continue to perform well once they leave.

由于富达国际是一家分散化经营的公司，理论上，在普雷姆离开后，可能会有企业评级机构试图对富达国际采取激进立场。

Now because Fairfax is a decentralized company, there could theoretically be corporate raters that are interested in taking an activist position at Fairfax once Prem is gone.

理论上，各业务之间的某些后台运营可以协同以降低成本，我认为这可能会让私募股权投资者垂涎三尺。

Certain back end operations between the businesses could theoretically be synergized to save costs, which I think probably would have PE lick in their lips.

但富凯历史上一直拒绝走这条路，因为他们认为这会损害其文化。

But Fairfax has refused to go that way in its history because they think it would damage their culture.

因此，瓦塔已立下遗嘱，确保他持有的富凯股份不会落入错误的人手中。

So Watsa has set up his will to ensure that his shares in Fairfax don't fall into the wrong hands.

他的持股将全部由其家族保管。

His holdings will all be maintained by his family.

如果需要出售股份，必须获得他其中一位高管的同意。

And in the event that shares need to be sold, they must be sold with one of his executives consent.

他的子女都不能担任公司高管职务，但他们拥有董事会席位，并清楚自己作为股东资本守护者的角色。

None of his children can take an executive role in the company, but they do have board seats and understand their roles as stewards of shareholder capital.

那么，谁会是富凯的下一任总裁呢？

So who might be the next president of Fairfax?

这本书的作者认为，彼得·克拉克兼具投资和保险领域的经验，将是富凯的理想领导者。

The book's author thinks Peter Clark, has experience in both investing and in the insurance sides, would make a great leader of Fairfax.

今天我就说到这里。

That's all I have for you today.

如果你想继续这个对话，请在Twitter上关注我 irrationalmrkts，或在LinkedIn上与我联系。

If you'd like to continue this conversation, please follow me on Twitter irrationalmrkts or connect with me on LinkedIn.

只需搜索Kyle Grieve即可。

Simply search for Kyle Grieve.

我始终欢迎反馈，欢迎随时告诉我如何让这个播客为你带来更好的体验。

I'm always open to feedback, so please feel free to share how I can make this podcast an even better experience for you.

感谢收听，下次再见。

Thanks for listening, and see you next time.

感谢收听《TIP》。

Thanks for listening to TIP.

请在您喜爱的播客应用上关注《We Study Billionaires》，并访问investorspodcast.com获取节目笔记和教育资源。

Follow We Study Billionaires on your favorite podcast app, and visit the investorspodcast.com for show notes and educational resources.

本播客仅用于信息和娱乐目的，不提供财务、投资、税务或法律建议。

This podcast is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not provide financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.