提示799：戴维斯王朝 与 凯尔·格里夫

现在，他愿意听这位绅士介绍那些甚至不在美国的再保险公司。

And now he was willing to listen to this gentleman about reinsurers that weren't even in The US.

我认为这充分表明，戴维斯愿意持续学习，并在其他地方寻找新的机会。

I think this really shows that Davis was willing to continue to learn and seek new opportunities elsewhere.

再保险业务显然是在他擅长的领域内的机会。

Now the reinsurance business was an opportunity that clearly was in his wheelhouse.

这是一个相邻的行业，戴维斯可以轻松地深入了解哪些保险公司可能从再保险中受益，或者哪些再保险公司会成为美国保险行业的首选供应商。

It was an adjacent industry where Davis could easily have learned more and gain insights into which insurance companies would probably benefit from reinsurance or which reinsurers would be the preferred suppliers for The US insurance industry.

这一演变非常关键，因为几乎所有拥有数十年业绩记录的投资者都必须不断进化，才能持续成功。

Now, this evolution is very key because nearly every investor with a multi decade track record must evolve to continue to succeed.

巴菲特在从‘雪茄烟蒂’转向更高品质企业时做到了这一点。

Buffett did it when he moved away from cigar butts and towards higher quality businesses.

在戴维斯的案例中，情况有些类似。

In Davis' case, it was somewhat similar.

他逐渐不再寻找那些股价远低于账面价值的超低价保险公司，而是用他相信可以长期持有的高品质企业取而代之。

He moved away from finding these super cheap insurance companies trading far below book value to replacing them with high quality businesses that he felt he could hold for extended periods of time.

不过，这本书并没有明确说明是什么促使了这一转变，只是指出这一转变确实发生了。

Now, the book doesn't exactly outline what precipitated that shift, but only that it happened.

我只能在这里推测，但也许即使在这32家公司中，也存在少数几个大赢家，谢尔比觉得如果他寻找类似特征，还能发现更多这样的公司。

Now I can only speculate here, but perhaps even in those 32 companies, there were maybe a few large winners where Shelby felt he could find more of them if he looked for similar attributes.

而其中一种特征可能是寻找那些拥有长期优势、能够抵御保险行业周期性波动的企业。

And perhaps one of those attributes was to find businesses that had these long term advantages that protected them from the cyclicality of the insurance industry.

现在，我想转而谈谈戴维斯和他的儿子谢尔比·戴维斯在1950年至1970年间学到的几个关键教训，那正是市场波动剧烈的时期。

Now I'd like to transition here to talk about a couple of key lessons that both Davis and his son Shelby Davis learned between 1950 and 1970, which was a great time of volatility in the markets.

他们两人有许多非常宝贵的教训，我认为所有投资者都应当加以重视。

There are a ton of great lessons from both of them that I think all investors should take into account.

因此，谢尔比·戴维斯——戴维斯的儿子——在投资方式上与他的父亲略有不同。

So Shelby Davis, Davis' son approached investing a little differently from his father.

他未曾经历过大萧条的痛苦与煎熬，因此起初并没有像他父亲那样高度关注下行风险的保护。

He had been spared the pain and heartache of living through the great depression, so he wasn't nearly as focused on the downside protection that his father was at first.

那么，让我们回到20世纪60年代。

So let's go back here to the nineteen sixties.

谢尔比和两位合伙人共同创立了纽约风险投资基金，初始资本为200万美元。

Shelby and two partners set up the New York venture fund with just $2,000,000 of initial capital.

请记住，当时正值‘狂热年代’，许多投资者开始获得媒体关注，比如蔡杰德。

Now keep in mind this was during the go go years where many investors were starting to get media attention such as Jared Tsai.

基金经理之所以受到关注，是因为他们投资了一些具有惊人回报的高增长公司。

Now the reason fund managers were getting attention was due to their investing in some of these kind of high flying names that had incredibly impressive returns.

因此，在‘漂亮五十’股票时代，这些企业被赋予了极高的预期。

As a result of these times, these businesses in the nifty 50 had some incredibly high expectations.

于是，谢尔比投资了Memorex、数字设备公司、美国微系统公司和莫霍克数据公司等企业。

So Shelby was investing in businesses like Memorex, Digital Equipment, American Microsystems, and Mohawk Data.

谢尔比认为，这些新时代公司的盈利前景在未来非常清晰可见。

Shelby thought that the earnings of these new era companies were very, very visible into the future.

书中暗示，谢尔比或许只是因为刚踏入投资生涯，想通过这种方式证明自己。

Now the book suggests that perhaps Shelby adopted this strategy simply to prove himself as he was at the beginning of his investing career.

起初，这种策略是有效的。

Now at first, this strategy worked.

这家风险投资基金在第一年实现了25%的回报。

The venture fund was up 25% in its first year.

谢尔比回顾那段时期时说：‘我们都觉得自己是天才。’

Shelby reflecting on that time said, we all thought we were geniuses.

问题是，当整个市场都对你所投资的公司抱有极高预期时，背后其实正在发生一些事情，那就是风险在增加。

The problem here is that when the entire market also shares in your high expectations of a business, there's something behind the scenes that's happening, which is increasing your risk.

这种风险就是公司的实际业绩无法达到华尔街的预期。

And that's the risk that expectations will not meet Wall Street's estimates.

因此，对于那些高预期已经反映在股价中的公司来说，问题就在于想象一下：如果市场不再对这些公司抱有好感，会怎样？

So the problem for businesses with high expectations that are already priced in is simply imagining scenarios in which the market is no longer in a loving mood towards these businesses.

我们以美乐士公司为例，这是一家专注于计算机硬件和内存存储的公司。

So let's look at Memorex, for example, which specialize in computer hardware and memory storage.

这家公司的业绩出现了一个糟糕的季度，股价一天之内下跌了20%。

So this business had a bad quarter, and the stock dropped 20% in one day.

但不幸的是，这仅仅是个开始，美乐士的股价曾高达168美元，随后迅速跌至仅3美元。

But that unfortunately was just the beginning as Memorex was once a $168 and promptly fell just to $3.

这是高估值企业的根本问题。

This is the fundamental problem with high priced businesses.

它们根本没有安全边际。

They simply do not have that margin of safety.

如果它们遇到困难时期，那些期待高增长的投资者就会抛售股票，转而寻找其他他们能建立信心的增长型标的。

If they go through rough patches, then investors who expected high growth will sell and look for other growth names that they can build conviction in.

当他们离开时，往往不加区分地抛售，导致市盈率大幅下跌。

And when they leave, they often do so indiscriminately causing massive drops in multiples.

这教会了我们两件事。

So this teaches us two things.

第一，短期内，价格比质量更能决定回报。

One, price drives return more than quality in the short term.

第二，避免投资那些定价完美的股票。

And two, avoid stocks that are priced to perfection.

虽然有许多优秀的企业会经历价格波动，但我认为你必须对不同的公司区别对待。

While there are all sorts of great businesses that go through price fluctuations, I think you have to treat different companies differently.

如果一家企业的利润起初上升，随后却像过山车一样从顶峰急剧下滑，那么你很可能损失惨重。

If a business sees its profits rise initially, then drop like a roller coaster coming from its apex, then chances are you're going to lose a lot of money.

但优质企业可能会经历利润的大幅增长，而等待这种增长反映在股价上的回报，实际上只属于那些能够忍受短期痛苦的耐心投资者。

But quality businesses might see a massive rise in their profits, and the rewards of waiting for that to be reflected in the stock price are actually only available to the patient people who can endure some short term pain.

避免股价被完美定价的股票，这是第二个非常重要的教训。

The second lesson on avoiding stocks priced to perfection is a great one.

但我认为投资者需要思考，究竟有多少‘完美’已经被定价进去了。

But I think it requires investors to consider just how much perfection is already priced in.

是一年的完美吗？

Is it one year of perfection?

五年？

Five years?

十年？

Ten years?

如果我持有的一家企业已经涨到那个价位，而我认为它在未来五到十年仍能持续表现良好，那么我个人可以接受其中已包含了一年的完美定价。

I personally can live with a year of perfection priced in if it's a business that I already own that's gone up to that price point and I think can continue to do well for another five to ten years.

但你知道，如果是一家我认为只有一两年增长空间的企业，那我绝不会为完美定价买单，因为一旦这家企业的基本面开始恶化，我就没有任何安全边际了。

But, you know, if it's a business where I think it only has maybe one or two years of growth in it, then there's zero chance that I'm gonna pay for perfection because then I get no margin of safety once the fundamentals of that business begin deteriorating.

所以我之前提到，纽约风投基金在第一年表现极佳，以至于谢尔比和他的合伙人变得极度自信。

So I mentioned earlier that the New York Venture Fund had done so well in its first year that Shelby and his partners were just swelled with overconfidence.

谢尔比那段时间每天工作多达十六小时，认为自己如此努力正是基金表现优异的直接原因。

Shelby had been working a ton of that time, up to sixteen hours per day, and believed that all that hard work was directly tied to the reason that the fund had been performing so well.

但第二年就没那么顺利了。

But the second year just wasn't so good.

纽约风投基金从一年前美国表现最好的基金之一，变成了下一年最差的十分之一。

The New York Venture Fund went from being one of the top performing funds in America one year to being in the lowest decile the next.

投资很难。

Investing is tough.

从1969年到1971年，该基金的份额价格从10.22美元仅上涨到10.88美元。

Now from 1969 to 1971, the fund shares went from $10.22 to just $10.88.

因此，这段时间并没有创造多少价值。

So it just wasn't much value being created at this time.

而这很大程度上归因于谢尔比·戴维斯对自己第一年决策的过度自信。

And much of that was due to the overconfidence that Shelby Davis had in his decisions from the first year.

过度自信是非常昂贵的，我认为这是一个非常有趣的观点。

Now overconfidence is very expensive, and I think this is a fascinating notion.

伊恩·卡斯尔曾多次作为嘉宾做客TIP，他认为早期的成功对他的投资生涯起到了至关重要的作用。

So Ian Castle, who has been a guest of TIP multiple times believes that early success was very instrumental to his own investing career.

但说到谢尔比·戴维斯，我不确定早期的成功是否真的是一件好事。

But when it came to Shelby Davis, I'm not sure that early success was such a good thing.

早期成功的弊端在于，它通常是市场一时兴起的结果。

The problem with early success is that it's usually a product of the market's whim.

如果你在早期取得成功，通常意味着在你建立业绩记录的初期，市场也正处于大幅上涨阶段。

If you have early success, it usually coincides with the market also going up significantly during your early years when you're establishing your track record.

但如果你在牛市中承担了过度风险，那么在熊市中你也将遭受严重惩罚，因为最昂贵的股票往往在市场下跌时跌幅最大。

But if you're taking excessive risk in a bull market, that also means that you're going be severely punished in bear markets where most expensive names are often the ones that could just get hammered down the most in price.

因此，至关重要的是要明白，短期结果更多取决于短期噪音，而非你的投资流程。

So it's vital to understand that the outcomes in the short term is less predicated on your process and more predicated on short term noise.

只有经过多年的周期后，你才能知道自己的策略是否有效。

It's only after a multi year period that you'll know whether your process is good.

巴菲特说，你需要至少三到五年的时间来判断你的策略是否有效。

Buffett said that you need at least three to five years to understand whether your strategy works.

我认为这是一个相当合理的时间跨度。

And I think that's a pretty good amount of time.

在五年内，你很可能已经经历了一次熊市。

In five years, you're probably going to have gone through a bear market.

如果你在经历市场起伏后依然能保持成功，那你就可以更有信心地认为你的策略确实有效。

And if you still have success going through an up and down cycle, you can have some confidence that your process is actually working.

当我最初买入加密货币时，我以为自己的策略很好，因为短短几个月内我的投资组合就翻了四倍。

Now, when I first bought crypto, I thought I had a good process because, you know, I quadrupled my portfolio in only a few months.

但后来我损失了97%的资金，这才极其明显地看出我的策略完全失效了。

But then I lost 97% of it and it became incredibly evident that my process was completely broken.

而这一切都发生在非常短的时间内，远不到三年。

And this was over a very short period of time, much less than three years.

但这段令人谦卑的经历极大地塑造了我今天的投资风格。

But that humbling process was very potent in shaping me into the investor that I am today.

上世纪73年到74年期间，投资环境非常艰难。

Now the nineteen seventy three, nineteen seventy four period was very difficult for investing.

巴菲特早在多年前就关闭了他的投资合伙企业，仅仅因为他再也找不到像样的投资机会。

Buffett had already closed his investment partnership many years prior, simply because he couldn't find any more decent ideas.

当时市场情绪的改善，是沃伦找不到投资机会的主要原因。

The improving market sentiment at that time was a major reason that Warren couldn't find any ideas.

市场上资金太多，而优质投资机会太少。

There was just too much money coming into the market and not enough ideas.

这其中一个重要原因，就是我刚才 briefly 提到的‘漂亮50’股票。

And a big reason for that was the nifty 50 stocks that I briefly mentioned here.

这些股票被分析师称为‘一次决策型’股票。

So these were stocks that analysts called one decision stocks.

你买进之后，就再也不去碰它。

You bought them, and then you didn't touch them.

这种观点认为，这些公司的业务实在太好了，根本不需要干预股票，股价会自行上涨。

The thesis was that the businesses were just so good that you just didn't need to meddle with the stock, and the share price would just take care of itself.

听起来像是胡说八道，但当时人们确实相信这一点。

Sounds like hogwash, but people believed this at the time.

1973到1974年的下跌是自大萧条以来市场最糟糕的时期。

Now the decline in nineteen seventy three, nineteen seventy four was the market's worst since the great depression.

这次崩盘有多个原因。

And there are several reasons for the crash.

越南战争不受欢迎，严重打击了市场情绪。

There was an unpopular war in Vietnam, which drained sentiment.

发生了尼克松的水门事件。

There was Nixon's Watergate scandal.

中东地区出现了地缘政治动荡。

There was geopolitical unrest in The Middle East.

石油禁运推高了油价。

There were oil embargoes that were pushing up oil prices.

此外，还有货币问题和通货膨胀问题。

Then there were also currency issues and inflation problems.

正如我之前提到的，当时股票价格被定价得完美无瑕，而市场并未为这种经济周期的变化做好准备。

And as I mentioned previously, stocks were priced to perfection and the market was not prepared for this change in the economic cycle.

谢尔比·戴维斯从他在纽约风险基金的最初几年中学到了一些教训。

Shelby Davis had learned a few lessons from his first few years with the New York venture fund.

他意识到，如果再次出现类似第二年那样的大幅下跌，该基金可能根本无法存活，因此基金最好保留一些现金。

And he figured that the fund should probably have some cash on hand because if there was another massive drawdown similar to the one that they experienced in their second year, the fund just simply might not survive.

于是，他们将约30%的资产转为现金，这最终使他们避开了随后到来的大部分灾难。

So they moved about 30% of their assets into cash, which ultimately saved them from much of the carnage to come.

在那场熊市中，漂亮五十股的平均市盈率从43倍降至17倍。

So during that bear market, the nifty fifty's average PE dropped from 43 times to 17 times.

标普400指数的市盈率从30倍降至7.5倍。

The S and P four hundred's PE dropped from 30 times to 7.5 times.

属于漂亮五十的蓝筹股无疑未能幸免。

Blue chips that were in the Nifty fifty were definitely not spared.

宝丽来下跌了85%，迪士尼下跌了81%，施乐下跌了65%，可口可乐下跌了64%，甚至连麦当劳也下跌了61%。

Polaroid dropped 85%, Disney 81%, Xerox 65%, Coca Cola 64%, and heck, even McDonald's dropped 61%.

我认为，尼ifty五十股的暴跌故事为我们留下了几个宝贵的教训。

Now the story of Nifty fifty's epic free fall, I think leaves several excellent lessons for us.

我认为最重要的一点是，这一事件表明，即使是非常优秀的企业，也可能成为糟糕的投资。

And I think the biggest one is simply that this event showed that even wonderful companies can actually make horrible investments.

尼ifty五十中的企业包含了许多我们今天仍在使用的知名品牌。

Nifty fifty businesses included so many names that we still use today.

但如果你在20世纪70年代初它们的巅峰时期买入，你将不得不长期持有，才能回本。

But if you'd invested in them at their peak times in the early nineteen seventies, you would have had to hold them for an very extended period just to recoup your losses.

这表明，如果买入价格处于泡沫水平，优质企业也无法提供安全边际。

And this shows that quality doesn't offer a margin of safety if you're paying bubble like prices.

像礼来、菲利普莫里斯、德州仪器、默克和强生这样的公司，如今依然存在。

Businesses like Eli Lilly, Philip Morris, Texas Instruments, Merck, and Johnson and Johnson are all businesses that still exist today.

但它们都是绝佳的例子，说明即使是一家卓越的公司，如果买入价格过高，也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资。

But they're great examples that even a fantastic company could be a bad investment when you pay too high of a multiple.

强生公司巅峰时期的市盈率达到60倍。

Johnson and Johnson at its peak traded for 60 times earnings.

我很好奇，想知道它最近的估值是多少，过去十年里，它的平均市盈率大约是18倍。

Now I was curious here to know at, you know, just what it's traded at recently and over the past ten years, it's averaged around 18 times.

我假设如果我们回到过去，它的增长可能稍快一些，因此或许值得获得略高的平均溢价，但绝对不可能达到60倍。

Now I assume if we went back in time, it might have been growing a little faster and therefore deserved maybe a little bit of a higher average premium, but nothing close to 60 times.

这也表明，优质企业也无法避免成为自身泡沫的一部分。

So it also shows that quality businesses aren't shielded from becoming part of their own bubbles.

今天，当我们想到泡沫时，可能会想到人工智能领域的公司。

Today, when we think of bubbles, we might think of companies in the world of AI.

但像好市多这样的公司呢？

But what about a business like Costco?

这是一家简单的蓝筹股公司，当前市盈率高达50倍。

You know, this is a simple blue chip company that trades for 50 times trailing earnings.

好市多会不会正处在自己的迷你泡沫中？

Could Costco be in its own mini bubble?

只有时间能证明。

Only time will tell.

根据我的经验，我对优质企业的估值略高其实并不在意。

Now based on my experience, I'm actually okay with quality businesses being a little expensive.

对我来说，关键是对自己所投资企业的增长前景充满信心。

The key for me is to have conviction in the business's growth.

一旦这种信心开始动摇，那么其基础估值倍数很可能被大幅下调，并且再难回到历史平均水平。

Now, if that conviction starts wavering, there's a very, very good chance that the base rate multiple could be cut and never rebound to historical averages.

因此，Topicas 就是一个很好的例子。

So a business like Topicas is a good example of that.

我认为它过去一直估值偏高，但如果你看几年后的估值倍数，即使它几乎始终保持着看似很高的市盈率，仍能提供非常吸引人的回报。

I think it's been pretty expensive in the past, but when you look at the valuation multiples a few years out, it offers very compelling returns despite the optically high multiples that it pretty much always trades at.

我从中学到的最后一个教训是，市场可以作为一个工具，帮助你决定现金持仓水平。

Now the final lesson I took from this is that the market can be used as a tool to help you determine cash positions.

如果整个市场正经历一轮非理性繁荣，比如科技泡沫，那时几乎可以明显看出整个市场都在泡沫中，那么这很可能是一个建立现金仓位的绝佳时机。

If the entire market is having one of its bouts of irrational exuberance such as, you know, the tech bubble, where I think it becomes really obvious that nearly the whole market is in a bubble, then it's probably a great time to establish some sort of cash position.

不过，这些情况非常罕见，除非市场明显整体被高估，否则我不建议去尝试这样做。

Now, these are pretty rare occurrences and I wouldn't bother trying to do this other than when it's incredibly, incredibly obvious that the entire market is overpriced.

但如果所有信号都已显现，也许你该效仿谢尔比·戴维斯的例子，准备好现金，以抓住市场不可避免的下跌机会。

But if all the signals are there, perhaps you should clone Shelby Davis example here and have some cash ready to take advantage of the inevitable fall in the market.

现在我们要来看看戴维斯投资生涯中最大的一个错误，那就是GEICO。

Now we're gonna look at one of Davis's biggest mistakes in his investing career here, and that was GEICO.

实际上，戴维斯在20世纪60年代初就发现了GEICO。

So Davis actually found GEICO quite early in the nineteen sixties.

他认为这是一家出色的保险公司，因为其商业模式允许用客户缴纳的保费来支付理赔，同时保持投资组合的完整。

He thought it was a great insurer simply because the business model allowed it to pay out its claims from its customers' premiums while leaving its investment portfolio intact.

20世纪60年代，GEICO在基本面和股东总回报方面表现都非常出色。

The 1960s were great for GEICO's performance both fundamentally and via total shareholder returns.

戴维斯的持股比例如此之大，以至于他甚至被邀请加入董事会，他欣然接受了。

Davis' position was so significant that he was actually offered a position on their board, which he happily accepted.

但到了20世纪70年代，GEICO的基本面出现了逆转。

But the 1970s saw a reversal in GEICO's fundamentals.

美国人口变得年轻得多，导致鲁莽司机的保险索赔增加。

The US population became much younger, leading to more insurance claims from reckless drivers.

GEICO的首席执行官拉尔夫·皮克也在推行一项战略转变，向非公务员出售保单。

GEICO's CEO, Ralph Peck, was also undertaking a strategic shift by selling policies to non bureaucrats.

因此，GEICO最初的策略是只向政府雇员出售保险，因为他们相比普通美国人发生的索赔更少。

So GEICO's original strategy was to only sell insurance to government workers as they inherently had fewer claims than the average American.

但不幸的是，这些新客户产生了大量索赔，削弱了公司的准备金。

And unfortunately, this new customer ran up claims and reduced its reserves.

皮克实际上向股东和董事会隐瞒了公司面临的困境。

And PEK actually lied to shareholders and the board about the problems that the business was having.

曾经备受市场青睐的GEICO，在宣布1975年高达1.26亿美元的亏损后，股价大幅下跌。

GEICO, which had been something of a market darling, plunged in value as it announced a massive $126,000,000 loss for 1975.

股价因此从42美元暴跌至5美元，跌幅达90%。

This took the stock all the way from $42 to $5 and 90% decline.

作为GEICO的最大股东之一，戴维斯协助任命杰克·伯恩为新任首席执行官。

As one of GEICO's largest shareholders, Davis helped appoint Jack Byrne as a new CEO.

伯恩通过关闭100家GEICO办事处来削减成本，但股价继续下跌至2美元。随后，伯恩结识了沃伦·巴菲特，巴菲特曾拥有GEICO，并被其当前极低的股价所吸引。

Byrne cut costs by closing 100 GEICO offices, but the stock continued to crater down at $2 Byrne was then introduced to Warren Buffett, who had formerly owned GEICO and was attracted by the rock bottom prices that the shares were now trading at.

巴菲特买入了大量股票，并建议伯恩发行股票以筹集资金。

Buffett bought a bunch of shares and he suggested that Byrne sell the stock to raise capital.

我觉得这个案例非常有趣。

Now I found this case study very interesting.

原因在于，如果巴菲特愿意购买你的股票，那很可能就是进行股票回购的最佳时机。

And the reason being that if Buffett was willing to buy your stock, that's probably the best possible time to be doing buybacks.

尽管GEICO显然没有财务能力进行回购，但为什么巴菲特会建议他们在股价严重低迷时发行股票呢？

And while GEICO was clearly not in a financial position to do buybacks, why would Buffett have suggested that they issue shares at very depressed prices?

这个问题的答案是，GEICO处于一种非常特殊的情况中。

And the answer to that question is that GEICO was in a very unique situation.

如果GEICO没有获得所需的资金注入，它就有可能陷入资不抵债的境地。

If GEICO didn't receive the cash infusion that it needed, there was a chance that it would become insolvent.

GEICO需要拥有足够充足的准备金来满足监管机构的要求。

GEICO needed to have the right amount of reserves to satisfy regulators.

如果他们没有这些充足的准备金，公司可能直接被勒令关闭。

And if they didn't have those healthy reserves, they could simply just be shut down.

考虑到GEICO刚刚经历了亏损严重的糟糕季度，当时银行不太愿意向其放贷。

Now banks would have been iffy at this time to lend money to GEICO, given the fact that it just had this incredibly bad quarter with negative profits.

这意味着，筹集资金的唯一方式就是发行GEICO的股票，找到愿意投入资金的人。

And that meant the only way to raise capital was to issue equity in GEICO and find some people willing to put up the capital.

戴维斯不喜欢股权稀释的想法，完全反对任何股票发行。

Davis did not like the idea of dilution and was completely opposed to any equity issuance.

但你知道，巴菲特认为，以每股2美元的价格稀释股权，总比持有价值为零的股票要好得多。

But, you know, Buffett, he figured that dilution at $2 a share was probably much better than owning shares that were worth $0.

最终，GEICO完成了股票发行。

GEICO ended up going through the share issuance.

结果，戴维斯在听到这个消息后，愤怒地离开了GEICO的会议，直接回到办公室卖掉了他所有的GEICO股票，这一决定让他余生都深感后悔。

And as a result, Davis stormed out of the GEICO meeting when he heard about it and went straight to his office and sold all of his GEICO shares, a decision that he regretted for the remainder of his life.

很快，股价就从2美元涨到了8美元。

Now the stock went from $2 to $8 in very short order.

在救助后的几个月，伯恩宣布GEICO将进行股票回购，向戴维斯传递了公司财务状况已大幅改善的信号。

And a few months after the bailout, Berne announced that GEICO would actually do a share buyback signaling to Davis that the company was in much better financial position.

现在，戴维斯在GEICO上又获得了一次优势，但与他出售GEICO所错失的机会成本相比，这仍然微不足道。

Now Davis would get one more upper hand on GEICO, which still paled into comparison to the opportunity cost of his decision to sell GEICO.

因此，他持有GEICO子公司——政府雇员人寿保险公司（Jellico）的大量股份。

So he owned a significant stake in a GEICO subsidiary called Government Employees Life Insurance Companies or Jellico.

伯顿试图收购Jellico的所有股份，但戴维斯要价21美元，而伯顿只愿出13美元。

Burton tried buying all the shares of Jellico, but Davis' asking price was $21, and Burton would only pay $13.

所以这笔交易最终没有达成。

So the deal never happened.

不久之后，一家英国保险公司以每股32美元的价格收购了Jellico。

And shortly after, a British insurance companies bought out Gelico for $32 a share.

这个故事表明，正确的首席执行官和正确的建议，确实能够挽救一家看似注定失败的公司。

Now this story shows that the right CEO and the right advice can truly save a company that looks destined for the dumps.

这对寻找此类投资机会的价值投资者来说，是一个有趣的教训。

It's an interesting lesson for devalue investors who look for opportunities like this.

我觉得我要是想在这种情况下投资，得再多很多智商才行，所以我不会去追求这种机会。

I think I would need many more IQ points to ever invest in a situation like this, so it's not something that I would pursue.

但我真的能理解巴菲特的观点，因为他早几年就拥有这家公司，对业务非常熟悉。

But I can really see Buffett's viewpoints on this since he was intimately familiar with the business by owning it several years earlier.

让我们短暂休息一下，听听今天赞助商的信息。

Let's take a quick break and hear from today's sponsors.

克莱，不是你的错觉。

Clay No, it's not your imagination.

风险和监管都在加剧，客户现在甚至只是为了开展业务，就要求提供安全证明。

Risk and regulation are ramping up and customers now expect proof of security just to do business.

这就是为什么Vanta是一个变革者。

That's why Vanta is a game changer.

Vanta自动化了你的合规流程，将合规、风险和客户信任整合在一个基于人工智能的平台上。

Vanta automates your compliance process and brings compliance, risk, and customer trust together on one AI powered platform.

无论你是为SOC 2做准备，还是在运行企业GRC项目，Vanta都能让你保持安全，并推动交易顺利进行。

So whether you're prepping for a SOC two or running an enterprise GRC program, Vanta keeps you secure and keeps your deals moving.

Vanta 不再让你追逐电子表格和截图，而是为你提供跨越三十五多个安全与隐私框架的持续自动化。

Instead of chasing spreadsheets and screenshots, Vanta gives you continuous automation across more than thirty five secondurity and privacy frameworks.

像 Ramp 和 Ryder 这样的公司使用 Vanta 后，审计时间减少了 82%。

Companies like Ramp and Ryder spend 82% less time on audits with Vanta.

这不仅仅是更快的合规，更是为增长争取了更多时间。

That's not just faster compliance, it's more time for growth.

如果我现在正在运营一家初创公司或扩大团队，这正是我想要部署的平台类型。

If I were running a startup or scaling a team today, this is exactly the type of platform I'd want in place.

立即前往 vanta.com/billionaires 开始使用。

Get started at vanta.com/billionaires.

访问 vanta.com/billionaires 即可开始。

That's vanta.com/billionaires.

亿万富翁投资者通常不会把资金存放在高收益储蓄账户中。

Bill Billion dollar investors don't typically park their cash in high yield savings accounts.

相反，他们常常采用机构投资者常用的被动收入策略之一——私人信贷。

Instead, they often use one of the premier passive income strategies for institutional investors, private credit.

如今，得益于Fundrise收入基金，这一相同的被动收入策略已向各类规模的投资者开放，该基金已募集资金超过6亿美元，分配率为7.97%。

Now the same passive income strategy is available to investors of all sizes, thanks to the Fundrise Income Fund, which has more than $600,000,000 invested and a 7.97% distribution rate.

随着传统储蓄收益率下降，私人信贷在近几年成长为万亿美元级别的资产类别也就不足为奇了。

With traditional savings yields falling, it's no wonder private credit has grown to be a trillion dollar asset class in the last few years.

立即访问 fundrise.com/wsb，只需几分钟即可投资Fundrise收入基金。

Visit fundrise.com/wsb to invest in the Fundrise Income Fund in just minutes.

该基金2025年的总回报率为8%，自成立以来的平均年总回报率为7.8%。

The fund's total return in 2025 was 8% and the average annual total return since inception is 7.8%.

过往业绩并不预示未来表现。

Past performance does not guarantee future results.

截至2025年1月23日的当前分配率。

Current distribution rate as of twelvethirty onetwenty twenty five.

投资前请仔细考虑投资材料，包括目标、风险、费用和开支。

Carefully consider the investment material before investing, including objectives, risks, charges, and expenses.

更多相关信息请参阅 fundraise.com/income 上的收入基金招募说明书。

This and other information can be found in the income funds prospectus at fundraise.com/income.

这是一则付费广告。

This is a paid advertisement.

克莱：当我开始自己的副业时，突然感觉一夜之间必须成为十种不同的人，扮演各种角色。

Clay When I started my own side business, it suddenly felt like I had to become 10 different people overnight wearing many different hats.

从零开始做一件事可能令人兴奋，但也让人感到无比压力山大和孤独。

Starting something from scratch can feel exciting, but also incredibly overwhelming and lonely.

因此，拥有正确的工具至关重要。

That's why having the right tools matters.

对数百万企业而言，这个工具就是Shopify。

For millions of businesses, that tool is Shopify.

Shopify是全球数百万企业的电商平台，支撑着美国10%的电子商务，涵盖从初创品牌到家喻户晓的企业。

Shopify is the commerce platform behind millions of businesses around the world and 10% of all e commerce in The US from brands just getting started to household names.

它为你提供了一站式解决方案，涵盖库存、支付和分析等功能。

It gives you everything you need in one place from inventory to payments to analytics.

因此你无需在多个不同平台之间来回切换。

So you're not juggling a bunch of different platforms.

你可以使用数百个现成的模板构建一个精美的在线商店，Shopify 还内置了众多实用的 AI 工具，能够撰写产品描述，甚至优化你的产品摄影。

You can build a beautiful online store with hundreds of ready to use templates and Shopify is packed with helpful AI tools that write product descriptions and even enhance your product photography.

此外，如果你遇到任何困难，他们提供屡获殊荣的 24/7 客户支持。

Plus, if you ever get stuck, they've got award winning twenty four seven customer support.

今天就与业内最佳的商业伙伴 Shopify 一起开启你的事业，立即注册每月仅需 1 美元的试用期，访问 shopify.com/wsb。

Start your business today with the industry's best business partner, Shopify, and start hearing Sign up for your $1 per month trial today at shopify.com/wsb.

前往 shopify.com/wsb。

Go to shopify.com/wsb.

就是 shopify.com/wsb。

That's shopify.com/wsb.

好的。

Alright.

回到节目。

Back to the show.

现在，谢尔比从他在基金行业的最初几年中学到，仅依赖追涨策略只在短期内有效，之后会让自己和投资者面临过高的财务风险。

Now Shelby had learned from his first years in the fund business that a strategy based on chasing momentum only worked for short periods of time before you put yourself and your investors at just too much financial risk.

因此，他将策略从寻找具有巨大上升潜力的企业，转向专注于高质量的蓝筹股，这些股票在各种市场环境下都能表现良好。

So he shifted his strategy from looking for businesses with massive upside potential to focusing more on high quality blue chips that could perform well in a variety of different market conditions.

于是，他购买了像菲利普莫里斯和首都城市这样的公司，仅仅因为他相信人们不会停止吸烟或看电视。

So he bought companies like Philip Morris and Cap City simply because he believed that people wouldn't stop smoking cigarettes or watching television.

他现在关注的是那些收益非常可预测的企业。

He was now looking at businesses that had very predictable earnings.

他采用的一种策略是寻找那些遭遇糟糕季度、股价被市场打压的蓝筹股。

And one strategy he did was to look for blue chips that had a bad quarter where the market was punishing its share price.

我认为这是一个非常好的策略。

I think this is a great strategy.

谢尔比谨慎地避开了那些让廉价公司持续廉价的价值陷阱。

Shelby was cautious to avoid the value traps that keep cheap companies cheap.

他越来越依赖管理团队的才能和公司的资产负债表，以在困难时期维持这些企业的良好运营。

He relied more and more on management talent and a company's balance sheet to keep these businesses running well during tough times.

他还减少了买卖的频率。

He also stopped buying and selling so much.

该基金的周转率仅为15%，他还降低了对收益预期的门槛，而这在他投资生涯早期曾是相当大的风险。

The funds turnover was only 15%, and he also decreased the hurdle rate on earnings expectations, had been a considerable risk for him early in his investing career.

他与彼得·林奇一起采取的另一项策略是更加关注小盘股。

Another strategy he took part in alongside of Peter Lynch was to place a larger focus on small caps.

当中盘和大盘股受到大量关注时，小盘股往往表现不佳。

When mid and large cap businesses are getting a lot of attention, small caps just tend to underperform.

直到今天，这种情况依然存在。

And this still happens to this day.

鉴于大盘股的优异表现，谢尔比在小盘股领域看到了大量绝佳机会，并在未来十年左右持续挖掘这些机会。

Given the outperformance that large caps had, Shelby was seeing a lot of great opportunities in the small cap arena, which he milled for the next decade or so.

这一战略转变对谢尔比·戴维斯非常有效，正如戴维斯的转变对他本人同样有效。

And this strategic shift worked well for Shelby Davis just as Davis' shift had worked well for him.

从1969年到1978年，近岸风险基金的回报率达到43%。

From 1969 to 1978, the Near Venture Fund returned 43%.

我知道你在想什么。

Now I know what you're thinking.

这些回报率看起来相当糟糕，但你必须记住，当时市场环境并不好。

Those are pretty pitiful returns, but you have to remember the market conditions during this time were not good.

在同一时期，标普500指数实际上下跌了1.7%，这使得他的成就更加令人印象深刻。

Over that same stretch of time, the S and P 500 was actually down 1.7%, which makes that achievement quite impressive.

但这表明，优秀的选股者即使在熊市中依然能够获胜。

But this shows that good stock pickers can still win in down markets.

戴维斯也在不断调整自己的投资策略。

Davis continued to evolve his own investing strategy as well.

但随着年龄增长，我认为他开始做一些事情，只是为了找点事做，而不是继续依赖他原本的成功策略——那策略本质上就是尽可能少做干预。

But as he aged, I think he started to do a few things that just gave him an activity to do rather than rely on his winning strategy, which had just been to do as little as humanly possible.

例如，戴维斯开始投资于他能力圈之外的领域，而他的能力圈原本是保险业。

For instance, Davis actually started investing outside of his circle of competence, which was insurance.

他开始买入各种他此前从未成功涉足的行业的企业。

He began buying businesses across all sorts of industries that he hadn't had any previous success in.

这与他被任命为价值线公司董事会成员的时间相吻合，他因此收到了大量他们的报告，并倾向于据此采取行动。

This coincided with him being named to the value line board where he received many of their reports and tended to act on them.

由于戴维斯的联系人和企业，如首席执行官们几乎都已退休，戴维斯开始感到与市场有些脱节。

Since Davis' contacts and businesses such as CEOs had nearly all retired, Davis started feeling a little out of touch with the market.

因此，他也开始涉足过度分散投资。

So he began dabbling into over diversification as well.

据报道，在他职业生涯的早期，他通常只持有大约30到50只股票，但后来这个数字激增到数百只。

So he reportedly only had about 30 to 50 names for most of his early career, but later on that number ballooned into the hundreds.

为了给自己找更多事情做——顺便也为他的经纪公司带来更多业务——他开始进行日内交易。

To give himself even more to do, which coincidentally gave his brokerage house more business, he began day trading.

他从不将超过3%的资金投入这一策略，但这种典型的快进快出方式却让许多投资者损失惨重。

He never committed more than 3% of his capital to the strategy, but it was your typical, you know, kind of get in, out strategy that loses many investors a lot of money.

幸运的是，戴维斯对风险控制有着非常清晰的认识。

Luckily for Davis, he had a very firm understanding here of risk control.

但当你拥有一个真正有效的强大策略时，它甚至能抵消你所做的任何调整，即使这些调整并不理想。

But when you have a powerful strategy that just works, it can overcome any adjustments that you make, even if they are suboptimal.

因此，在20世纪80年代这段时期，戴维斯的保险投资组合为他的净资产增加了超过5亿美元。

So in this period, the 1980s, Davis' insurance portfolio add over $500,000,000 to his net worth.

所有这些增加的资本，都只是因为他袖手旁观、什么都没做。

And all this added capital was from just simply sitting on his hands and doing nothing.

要取得这些成果，根本不需要任何 tinkering、日内交易，或依赖价值线。

No tinkering, day trading, or leaning on value line was needed to get any of these results.

这个故事让人非常想起一位刚去世的印度籍投资者，名叫拉克什·朱努恩瓦拉。

This story is very reminiscent of an unknown Indian investor who recently passed away named Rakesh Junjunvala.

他年仅62岁便去世，净资产高达40亿美元。

He passed away at the young age of 62 and had a net worth of $4,000,000,000.

他从未管理过任何外部资金，这一点和戴维斯相似。

He never managed any outside money similar to Davis.

拉克什拥有多种投资策略，有点像戴维斯晚年时的做法。

Rakesh had multiple investing strategies, kinda like Davis in his twilight years.

他既进行长期投资，也会做日内交易。

He'd invest long term, and he would also day trade.

但拉克什在印度拥有一家名为Titan Industries的企业，这是一家主要生产珠宝、手表和眼镜的大型制造商。

But Rakesh owned a business in India called Titan Industries, which was a major manufacturer of jewelry, watches, and eyewear.

他是在二十到二十五年前买下这家公司的。

And he'd bought that twenty to twenty five years ago.

当他开始买入泰坦时，这只股票只占他总投资组合的约3%，而且他从未卖出过一股。

When he started buying Titan, it made up only about 3% of his overall portfolio, and he never sold a share of the business.

在他拥有的40亿美元中，有20亿美元来自泰坦公司。

Of the $4,000,000,000 that he had, 2,000,000,000 was generated from Titan.

在整段持有期内，这只股票的年复合增长率约为30%。

That one stock compounded about 30% per year for the entirety of his holding period.

他的策略，就像戴维斯早期的保险投资一样，就是买入、持有，绝不频繁操作。

His strategy, just like Davis' early insurance bets, was to just buy, hold, and not tinker.

但拉克什投资组合的另外50%呢？

What But about the other 50% of Rakesh's portfolio?

其中大部分也集中在一家名为卢平的制药公司上。

The majority of that was also in one named called Lupin, a pharmaceutical business.

因此，尽管拉克什积极进行交易，但他几乎没碰过的两只股票却占了他净资产的75%以上。

So while Rakesh was actively trading, two stocks that he barely touched made up over 75% of his net worth.

如果这还不算一个信号，提醒你采取类似的策略、避开噪音，那我真不知道什么才算。

And if that's not a signal to take a similar strategy and avoid the noise, I don't really know what else is.

戴维斯在这里给我们的教训是，偏离自己的优势领域在当时可能感觉很刺激，但通常只是你失去纪律的信号。

The lesson here from Davis is that drifting from your edge can feel exciting at the time, but it's usually just a signal that you're losing discipline.

如果你在投资生涯早期就这么做，很可能很难实现复利增长，因为你总是过度摆弄那些本可以在未来几十年带你飞升的赢家股。

If you do this early in investing career, chances are that you're going to have a very tough time compounding simply because you're going to fiddle too much with the winners that can really carry you over the next few decades.

但戴维斯早在几十年前就已经打下了坚实的基础，建立了一个卓越的企业投资组合。

But Davis had already done the work for decades prior to establish an incredible portfolio of great businesses.

因此，他后来所做的那些额外调整，对他的伤害远小于如果他在职业生涯早期就投入大量资本频繁操作的情况。

Therefore, the additional fiddling that he did really just didn't hurt him as much as it would have if he dedicated a lot of capital to fiddling much earlier in his career.

我们还讨论过谢尔比的一些转变，但他在二十世纪八十年代还经历了一个了不起的转变。

We've also discussed some of Shelby's transformations, but there's another great one that he learned in the nineteen eighties as well.

我之前提到，谢尔比在二十世纪七十年代熊市来临前，已经积累了一笔可观的现金。

So I mentioned that Shelby had a nice cash position that he built up before the nineteen seventies bear market.

当熊市真正来临时，谢尔比开始低价买入银行股票。

And once that bear market came, Shelby got to work buying bank shares on the cheap.

谢尔比知道利率已经触底，这将为银行带来巨大的利好。

Shelby knew interest rates had bottomed, which would be a big time tailwind for banks.

因此，他大举买入银行股，充分利用了戴维斯双击效应。

So he backed up the truck on banks taking advantage of the Davis Double Play.

谢尔比选择银行是顺理成章的，因为他曾在纽约银行工作过。

Banks were a logical step for Shelby as he'd had a stint working at the Bank of New York.

谢尔比喜欢银行，因为它们不生产任何产品，不需要昂贵的资本支出，也不需要机器、研发实验室或高技能劳动力。

Shelby liked banks because they didn't manufacture anything, require expensive CapEx, didn't require machinery, research labs, or highly skilled labor.

他还喜欢银行的简单性。

He also liked the simplicity of banks.

你只需从储户那里借款，再贷给借款人，从中赚取两者利率的差价利润。

You just borrow from depositors and loan to borrowers and pocket the profits from the different interest rates for both of those parties.

他还觉得银行不会消失。

He also figured banks weren't going anywhere.

人们永远都需要一个存放资金的地方。

People would always need somewhere to put their money.

这是一个由于缺乏技术依赖而极难被颠覆的行业。

It was a business that was very hard to disrupt due to its lack of technological dependence.

但他并没有只投资于银行。

But he didn't exclusively invest in banks.

他还增加了对保险公司如Chubb和Lincoln International的投资。

He added insurance companies like Chubb and Lincoln International.

包括IBM、摩托罗拉和英特尔等专注于硬件的科技公司，以及默克等制药公司。

Tech plays that focus on hardware such as IBM, Motorola, and Intel, and pharmaceuticals like Merck.

英特尔实际上是谢尔比在会见英特尔首席执行官安迪·格鲁夫后选中的标的，他被格鲁夫及其精彩的金句深深打动。

Intel was actually a pick that Shelby got behind after meeting Intel's CEO Andy Grove and being incredibly impressed with him and his great one liners.

公司只有两种，一种是迅速崛起的，另一种是消亡的。

There are two kinds of companies, the quick and the dead.

他以个位数的市盈率买入英特尔，并持有了十多年。

He bought Intel at single digit PE multiples and held it for well over a decade.

如今，1987年黑色星期一引发的熊市进一步考验了谢尔比。

Now the bear market caused by Black Monday in 1987 further tested Shelby.

但正如之前市场中基金的做法一样，该基金在下行风险方面得到了很好的保护。

But as a fund had done in previous markets, it was very well protected from the downside risk.

崩盘发生后的第二年，谢尔比的风险基金下跌了6%，而标普500指数则下跌了15%。

The year after the crash had happened, Shelby's venture fund was down 6% versus negative 15% for the S and P 500.

谢尔比在熊市期间最成功的投资之一是房利美。

One of the best picks that Shelby had made during the bear market was in Fannie Mae.

和所有投资者一样，我不得不承受熊市带来的巨大波动。

Like all investors, I've had to hold to a lot of volatility caused by bear markets.

在我作为股东期间，欧洲的VMS系列收购公司一直是一个波动剧烈的标的。

The European VMS serial acquirer has been a volatile name while I've been a shareholder.

我经历过高达55%至36%的回撤。

I've held through drawdowns of 5536%.

当我持有的企业依然持续达到我高标准的预期时，我实际上将大幅回撤视为加仓的机会，而不是因为股价稍有疲软就卖出的理由。

And when I have a business in my portfolio that continues to meet my lofty expectations, I actually view large drawdowns as opportunities to add to my position rather than as justification to sell something that is just showing a little bit of weakness in its share price.

我想简要地为可能对信托有所了解的听众讨论一下这件事。

I wanna briefly discuss something here for listeners who might have experience with the trusts.

所以我个人不这么做，但我知道很多听众会。

So I personally don't, but I know many listeners do.

这里有一些非常出色的教训，关于信托的优缺点，特别是它们可能带来的限制。

And there are some very outstanding lessons in here about the advantages and disadvantages of trusts, especially in regard to the constraints that they can put on things.

所以我在本集中非常简要地讨论了一下，但戴维斯的妻子出身于一个非常富裕的家庭。

So I discussed very, very briefly in this episode, but Davis' wife came from a very wealthy family.

因此他们自己管理着信托。

And so they managed their own trust.

但到了戴维斯职业生涯末期，如果他妻子的信托完全由戴维斯来管理，情况会好得多。

But by the end of Davis' career, his wife's trust would have been in much better hands if it had just been fully managed by Davis.

尽管戴维斯和他儿子谢尔比都推荐了优质股票，戴维斯在业绩上还是远远领先。

Davis absolutely creamed it performance wise despite the suggestions of great stocks from both Davis and his son Shelby.

信托的问题在于，它们通常建立在对继承人滥用信托分配的不信任之上。

The problem with trusts is that they're often built on the distrust of heirs to abuse the distributions from the trust.

以下是书中对此的描述。

So here's what's written about that in the book.

委托人的律师会安排好，使继承人无法触及本金，但信托会提供充足的收入，以满足他们旺盛的消费欲望。

The benefactor's lawyer fix it so that the heirs can't get their hands on the principal, but the trust is set up to provide ample income to satisfy the healthy appetite for spending.

基于这一目标，信托通常会大量投资于债券和派息股票。

With that goal in mind, trusts tend to be heavily invested in bonds and dividend paying stocks.

瓦瑟曼一家在1950年放弃了全债券策略，但投资组合仍以收入为导向，而非增长为导向。

The Wassermanns abandoned their all bonds strategy in 1950, but the portfolio was still income oriented as opposed to growth oriented.

在大多数情况下，收入型投资组合无法像股票型投资组合那样回报其所有者，尤其是当收入被分流给受益人用于支付账单，而未再投资以实现复利增长时。

In most cases, an income portfolio can't reward its owners like a stock portfolio, especially when the income is siphoned off to beneficiaries who use it to pay bills and don't reinvest it for further compounding.

由于资金被分流以及对提款征收的税款，以收入为导向的信托注定会逐渐缩水。

Between the siphoning and the taxes levied on the withdrawals, an income oriented trust is destined to become a dwindling asset.

是什么样的勇气、运气、智慧、才能、进取心，甚至在某些情况下是欺诈手段，让一代人创造了财富？

What pluck, luck, genius, talent, enterprise, and in some cases, con artistry create in one generation?

依赖、资金外流和国税局却在接下来的两代人中将其摧毁。

Dependency, cash drain, and uncle Sam destroy in the next two.

所以这里的教训是，错误的结构会严重阻碍复利的增长。

So the lesson here is that the wrong structure simply handicaps compounding.

所以，如果你的目标是以大约10%的速率实现复利增长，那就问问自己：为什么你要持有政府债券或其他收益型资产，而这些资产不太可能达到你的收益门槛。

So if your goal is to compound at a rate of, let's say, 10%, then ask yourself why you own things such as government bonds or other income producing assets that are unlikely to meet your hurdle rate.

事实上，如果你想最大化回报，长期来看，股票是最优的工具，而且优势非常明显。

The fact is that if you wanna maximize returns, stocks over the long term are the best vehicle to do it, and it's not even close.

今天我们谈到了戴维斯和谢尔比·戴维斯，但这一集讲的是戴维斯王朝。

So we've spoken today about Davis and Shelby Davis, but this episode is about the Davis Dynasty.

这意味着还有一代人需要讨论。

And that means there's actually one more generation to discuss.

那就是戴维斯的外孙克里斯·戴维斯，他和祖父、父亲一样，是一位出色的投资者，至今仍是。

And that's Davis' grandson, Chris Davis, who just like his grandfather and father was an excellent investor and still is.

现在，克里斯的哥哥安德鲁也是一位投资者，但他通常避居幕后。

Now Chris's brother Andrew was also an investor, but he tended to stay out of the limelight.

所以，我主要聚焦在克里斯身上。

So I'm just gonna focus mostly on Chris here.

克里斯是戴维斯家族中与沃伦·巴菲特最相似的一位。

Now Chris was the Davis who most closely resembled Warren Buffett.

十岁时，比巴菲特首次投资还小一岁，克里斯买下了一家名为Associated Madison的保险公司，据称他从未卖出，但也弄丢了它的下落。

At age 10, a year younger than Buffett's first investment, Chris bought an insurer named Associated Madison, and he reportedly never sold it, but also lost track of where it went.

在思考谢尔比教孩子们投资时，他说：‘我教他们关于投资事业最重要的一件事，就是我多么热爱这份事业，即使在七十年代的艰难年份里也是如此。'

While contemplating what Shelby taught his kids regarding investing, he said, the most important thing that I taught them about the investment business is just how much I love being in it, even in the lean years of the nineteen seventies.

我坚信选股是任何孩子都能做到的事，所以我努力让这件事变得有趣且简单。

I was convinced picking stocks was something any kid could do, and I tried to make it fun and keep it simple.

数学部分，比如会计和电子表格，我觉得他们以后再学也来得及。

The math part, you know, accounting and spreadsheets, I figured they could learn later.

我让他们参与侦探般的工作，去挖掘一家公司前景的线索。

I got them involved in the detective work, sniffing out clues about a company's prospects.

有时我会带他们一起去公司拜访，就像我父亲带我去那样。

Sometimes I took them along on company visits just like my father had taken me.

谢尔比会用一百美元作为奖励，激励他们撰写公司分析报告。

Shelby would incentivize them to analyze companies by dangling a $100 in front of them for an analysis report.

有一天，他向祖父戴维斯要一美元买热狗，戴维斯却给他讲了一大段关于复利力量的故事。

Now one day, asked his grandfather Davis for a dollar to buy a hotdog, and Davis went into a lengthy story about the powers of compounding.

他告诉年幼的克里斯，如果这一美元被明智地投资，每五年就会翻一番。

He told young Chris that if the dollar were invested wisely, it would double every five years.

当克里斯五十岁、达到戴维斯现在的年龄时，那一美元将值10.24美元。听完这个故事后，克里斯觉得自己没那么饿了。

And when Chris was Davis' age in fifty years, that $1 would be worth $10.24 dollars After hearing that story, Chris decided that he wasn't that hungry.

现在，克里斯比他父亲更亲近戴维斯。

Now Chris was much closer to Davis than his father was.

作为青少年，他花了很多时间与祖父在一起，并在学开车时帮他开车接送。

As a teenager, he spent a lot of time with his grandfather, and helped chauffeur him around as he learned to drive.

上学期间，他在戴维斯的办公室做后台工作，比如装信封和通过电传系统发送信息。

During school, he worked at Davis' office doing back end things like stuff envelopes and sending message on the Telex system.

他们一起散步，讨论政治和华尔街之类的话题。

They took walks together and they discussed things like politics and Wall Street.

奇怪的是，克里斯曾经一度打算成为一名神父。

Oddly enough, Chris at one point was studying to become a priest.

而且他还是个共产主义者。

And he was a communist to boot.

尽管如此，他的祖父仍然在他身上看到了潜力，说哲学和神学能为你提供投资的完美背景。

Despite all this, his grandfather still saw something in him saying, philosophy and theology give you a perfect background for investing.

要在投资中成功，你需要一种哲学，然后就得拼命祈祷。

To succeed in investing, you need a philosophy, then you've gotta pray like hell.

所以当戴维斯去苏格兰——那时克里斯正在那里上学——他会带克里斯一起去参观保险公司。

So when Davis went to Scotland where Chris was in school, he would take Chris with him to see insurance companies.

这帮助克里斯更好地理解了保险业务，并在该行业达成了关键合同，为他的投资生涯提供了支持。

This helped Chris better understand the insurance business and make key contracts in that industry that would help support his investing career.

在华尔街短暂工作后，克里斯实际上得到了祖父提供的工作机会，他立刻抓住了这个机会。

After a short stint on Wall Street, Chris was actually offered a job with his grandfather and he jumped at that chance right away.

在我成长过程中，我从家人身上学到了许多至今仍铭记于心的教训。

There are many lessons that I've learned from my own family growing up that have stuck with me.

节俭就是其中之一。

Frugality is one of them.

虽然我可能没有我父母那么节俭，但我也知道，相比我观察到的身边许多人，我还是要节俭得多。

While I'm probably less frugal than both my mom and dad, I also know that I'm much more frugal than many of the other people close to me that I've observed.

我爸爸在缅甸长大，小时候家境相对贫困。

My dad, who grew up in Myanmar, was relatively poor growing up.

所以他非常擅长让每一分钱都发挥最大效用。

So he's a master at making his money go as far as possible.

他一直很擅长讨价还价，以低价买到物超所值的东西。

He's always been great at bargaining and finding excellent stuff at a bargain price.

据我所知，他从未陷入债务问题，因为他一直过着低于自己收入水平的生活。

He also, as far as I know, has never had a problem with debt because he's always lived below his means.

这是我从父亲身上学到的宝贵一课，在我成年后我对此尤为重视。

This is a great lesson that I've taken from my dad and placed a lot of emphasis on in my adult years.

另一方面，我妈妈虽然节俭，但也喜欢美好的东西。

My mom, on the other hand, is frugal, but she also likes nice things.

所以在我成长的过程中，我知道她曾有过负债的时候。

So while I was growing up, there were times when I know she was in debt.

她会主动跟我谈论这些事，这让我更深入地理解了债务是如何运作的，以及最好尽可能避免陷入债务。

And she would actively tell me about it, which really helped me understand a little more about how debt worked and how it's best to just stay out of it as much as possible.

我一生中曾有几次陷入债务，感觉非常可怕。

There have been a few times in my life when I was in debt and it felt pretty scary.

所以最后一次是在大约十年前。

So the last time was about ten years ago.

我当时报名参加了一个提升商业敏锐度的课程，那笔费用在我当时来说相当昂贵。

I signed up for a course to improve my business acumen, which was expensive for me at the time.

不幸的是，这门课程根本没能带来相应回报，但我还是背上了巨额账单，因为我是用信用卡支付的课程费用。

And unfortunately, it just didn't really come close to paying itself off, but I was left with obviously this huge bill because I had to pay for the course, which I'd paid for with my credit card.

不幸的是，那段时间我的收入虽然够用，但还清这笔债务所需的时间远比我预期的要长，这意味着我要支付大量利息。

Unfortunately, this was during a time where I was making enough money that paying that debt off would have taken a lot longer than I would have liked it to, and that meant paying a lot of interest.

但当我越来越深入地思考如何筹措更多资金时，我突然想起自己每个月都在为缴税存钱。

But as I began thinking more and more deeply about where I could come up with more money, I remember that I actually been saving money each month to pay my taxes.

于是我咨询了帮我管理这笔资金的财务顾问，看看是否能明智地动用一些额外的储蓄。

So I checked with my financial advisor who'd been managing that for me to see if I had any extra savings that I could dip into intelligently.

这完全救了我。

And that completely saved me.

我用多余的储蓄作为应急资金，这帮助我避免了为债务支付过多的利息，而我当然不希望支付这些利息。

I used my excess savings as kind of my safety fund, which really helped me avoid paying excessive interest on my debt, which I certainly did not want to pay.

所以我妈妈和我聊过我生命中的那段时期，那对我来说很痛苦。

So my mom and I had spoken about that period of my life, which was painful for me.

我能感觉到她理解我经历的痛苦，因为她自己也经历过类似的情况。

And I could tell that she could understand the pain that I'd gone through because she'd been through it as well.

这给我上了宝贵的一课：我虽然冒了一个没有回报的风险，但多年来积累的储蓄帮助我避免了陷入严重的财务困境。

And that was a really good lesson for me because I ended up taking a risk that didn't pay off, but the savings that I'd made over the years helped me avoid getting into too much financial trouble.

但从那以后，我就再也没有债务了，未来也不打算改变这一点。

But since then, I've been debt free and don't intend to change that in the future.

所以当戴维斯雇用克里斯时，他让克里斯逐步适应工作。

So when Davis hired Chris, he eased him into the job.

克里斯开始为他的祖父写一些关于保险的段落。

Chris began writing a few paragraphs on insurance for his grandfather.

他注意到自己的部分文字被刊登在戴维斯的保险简报上。

And he noticed that parts of his writing were being published in Davis' insurance bulletin.

克里斯还通过在空白处写下他发现的有趣公司，提升了自己在简报中的分析能力。

Chris also improved his analytical skills in the bulletin by using blank space to write up interesting companies that he was finding.

但克里斯注意到了一些有趣的事情。

But Chris noticed something interesting.

实际上根本没人阅读这份每周保险简报。

Nobody really was reading the weekly insurance bulletin.

出于好奇，他问祖父为什么在没人看的情况下还要继续写下去。

Curious, he asked his grandfather why he continued writing it when nobody was reading it.

这难道不是浪费时间和精力吗？

Wasn't that just a waste of time and energy?

戴维斯的回答非常好。

And Davis' reply was great.

这不是给读者看的。

It's not for the readers.

这是为我们自己写的。

It's for us.

我们写这份简报是为自己写的。

We write it for ourselves.

把想法写在纸上能迫使你深入思考。

Putting ideas on paper forces you to think things through.

很好的建议。

Great advice.

当时，戴维斯开始放慢节奏，将越来越多的责任交给了克里斯。

Now at this time, Davis was starting to slow down and passing more and more responsibility to Chris.

所以他开始把一些自己管理的个人账户交给克里斯处理。

So he was doing things like giving Chris some of the personal accounts that he was managing.

1992年的一天，戴维斯带来了一个装满电脑打印纸的文件夹，里面记录了他整个投资生涯的盈亏情况。

One day in 1992, Davis brought a binder full of computer printouts with Davis' investing gains and losses from his entire investing career.

戴维斯让克里斯仔细看看，并给出一些建议，告诉他该卖哪些、该保留哪些。

Davis asked Chris to look it over and make some recommendations about what to sell and what to keep.

克里斯随后把这些交易记录拿给父亲看，他们一起进行了研究。

Chris then bought these trades to his father, and they looked them over together.

谢尔比惊讶地发现，他许多最看好的股票实际上都是他父亲买入的。

Shelby was amazed to see that many of his top picks were actually purchased by his father.

这让他大为意外，因为谢尔比和戴维斯的关系一直很冷淡，谢尔比觉得戴维斯并不太重视他的投资意见。

And this came to him as a big surprise as Shelby and Davis had a pretty tepid relationship, and Shelby felt that Davis didn't really value his investing opinions that much.

但他发现自己的投资选择，比如英特尔、房利美，甚至纽约风险基金，都出现在父亲的投资组合中。

But he found picks like Intel, Fannie Mae, and even the New York venture fund in his portfolio.

克里斯说，看到这些名字出现在父亲的投资组合里，是他父亲一生中一直渴望却从未从祖父那里听到的赞许。

Chris said that seeing those names in his father's portfolio were the words of praise that my father had waited all his adult life to hear and my grandfather had never uttered.

但他们也对戴维斯的投资组合有了一些有趣的发现。

But they learned some fascinating things about Davis' portfolio.

戴维斯资产的四分之三都集中在大约一百家全球保险公司上。

Three quarters of Davis' assets were in about a 100 worldwide insurance companies.

其余的则分散在1500家公司中。

The rest were scattered among 1,500 companies.

他拥有如此多股票的部分原因是他会一次性买入1000股的整批股票，只是为了能先入场。

Part of the reason that he owned so much was that he would buy these 1,000 share lots just to get his foot in the door.

这些股票在他的投资组合中所占比例微不足道。

And these lots made up a negligible amount of his portfolio.

所以我推测，他可能只是想获取这些公司的财务信息，或者提醒自己未来进一步研究它们。

So I presume that he may have just maybe wanted to have access to their financials or as a reminder to do more research on them in the future.

真正有价值的信息在于戴维斯是如何登上《福布斯》美国最富有人士榜单的。

Now the really juicy information was in just how Davis had made it onto the Forbes list of wealthiest Americans.

这并不是因为他选中了第1500只股票。

It wasn't in the fifteen hundredth stock pick that Davis made.

而是因为他持有了几十年的几只股票。

It was from a few names that he'd held for over thirty years.

这本书巧妙地选择了怀斯、劳申伯格和沃霍尔，以此向著名的美国艺术家致敬。

The book intelligently picks the Wyeths, Rauschenbergs, and Warhols as an ode to famous American artists.

戴维斯将这些企业视为自己私人艺术博物馆的一部分，持有时间越长，它们的价值就越高。

Davis kept these businesses as part of his own art museum, and the longer he held them, the more valuable they got.

其中一些投资包括AIG，其价值达7200万美元；东京海上火灾保险公司，他以64.1万美元购入，如今价值3300万美元；还有另外三家日本保险公司——三井住友海上火灾保险和安田海上火灾保险，合计价值4200万美元。你可能知道，三井和住友正是沃伦·巴菲特曾对五家日本公司进行组合投资时所涵盖的两家。

Now a few of these picks included AIG, which was worth 72,000,000, Tokyo Marine and Fire, which he bought at 641,000 and was now worth 33,000,000, and three other Japanese insurance holdings, Mitsui Sumitomo Marine and Fire, and Yasuda Marine and Fire worth a combined $42,000,000 You may recognize Mitsui and Sumitomo as Warren Buffett made a basket bet on five Japanese companies that included both.

我之前提到过，戴维斯后悔卖掉了GEICO。

Now I mentioned earlier that Davis regretted selling GEICO.

但由于戴维斯一直密切关注GEICO，他最终持有了伯克希尔A类股票的可观股份。

But since Davis followed GEICO so closely, he ended up with a nice stake in Berkshire A shares.

他实际上持有3000股，当时价值增长到了2700万美元。

He actually owned 3,000 shares, which at the time grew to 27,000,000.

如今，3000股伯克希尔A类股票价值22亿美元。

Today, 3,000 Berkshire A shares are worth $2,200,000,000.

其他美国持仓包括Torchmark、Aon、Chubb、Capital Holdings和Progressive，合计价值7200万美元。

Other American holdings were Torchmark, Aon, Chubb, Capital Holdings, and Progressive, which were worth a combined 72,000,000.

这十几只股票的总价值为2亿6100万美元。

Now these dozen or so stocks were worth $261,000,000.

克里斯从戴维斯创造如此财富的方式中学到了很多。

And Chris learned a lot from just how Davis created all that wealth.

这并非来自他的日内交易和微小的价值线押注。

It wasn't from his day trading and tiny value line bets.

而是通过让时间发挥作用，让一家持续复利增长的企业创造价值。

It was from allowing time to work its wonders on a business that compounded.

罗斯柴尔德写道，戴维斯的这十二只股票自上世纪七十年代中期以来就一直持有在他的投资组合中。

Rothschild writes, all the Davis dozen had been parked in his portfolio since the mid nineteen seventies.

任何年轻、缺乏经验的投资者，都比成熟老练的投资者拥有一个与生俱来的优势。

Any young, inexperienced investor has a built in advantage over a mature, sophisticated investor.

时间。

Time.

他还会注意到，这十二只股票中有十一只都来自保险行业，房利美是唯一的例外。

He would have also observed that 11 of 12 of these picks were all from insurance, Fannie Mae being the outlier.

这会让25岁的克里斯明白，深入理解并重仓自己真正了解的行业有多么重要。

This would have taught the 25 year old Chris the importance of being heavily exposed to industries that you understand at a very profound level.

另一个观察是，复利型公司很容易弥补重大的亏损。

Another observation was that compounders can easily wipe out significant losses.

而戴维斯也经历过这样的亏损。

And Davis had those too.

他最昂贵的一次失败是名为First Executive的企业，其价值从250万美元一路跌至归零。

His most expensive flop was a business called First Executive, which went from $2,500,000 all the way down to zero.

但正如你从他的12个大赢家所见，这点小损失不过是微不足道的舍入误差。

But as you could see from his 12 big winners, that minor loss was just an insignificant rounding error.

在完成对戴维斯资产的分析后，他们必须决定如何处置这些资产。

Once they wrapped up their analysis of Davis' assets, they had to figure out what to do with all of it.

他们做了几件事。

There were a few things that they did.

首先，戴维斯资产的一部分将注入谢尔比的纽约风险投资基金，由谢尔比与其他他看好的企业一起管理。

First, part of Davis' assets would be funneled into Shelby's New York venture fund to be managed by Shelby along with some of the other businesses that Shelby liked.

其次，克里斯将管理一些新的投资组合，如果表现良好，就会扩大戴维斯业务的规模。

And second, Chris would manage some of the newer portfolios and if they perform well, they would expand the Davis operation.

从那里开始，剩下的就是历史了。

And from there really, the rest is history.

截至今天，克里斯管理着戴维斯基金，资产规模接近200亿美元，其中包括他父亲曾管理的纽约风险投资基金。

As of today, Chris runs the Davis funds managing nearly $20,000,000,000, which includes the New York venture fund that his father had managed.

戴维斯基金拥有多个不同的基金。

Davis Funds has many different funds.

但如果你查看其最古老的基金，那就是纽约风投基金A类，自1969年以来年化复合回报率达11.5%，在整个期间内跑赢标普500指数1个百分点。

But if you look at the oldest one on the book, it is the New York venture fund class a, which is compounded at 11.5% since 1969, outperforming outperforming the S and P 500 by 1% over that entire period.

这确实是一项了不起的成就。

Truly an incredible feat.

现在，我想通过讨论一个包含六项内容的清单来结束本集，这正是戴维斯家族三代人多年来用来实现财富复利增长的投资原则。

Now I'd like to finish off this episode by discussing a checklist of about six items that we can think about in our own investing that three generations of Davis' have used to compound money for many, many decades.

第一课是避免廉价的垃圾股。

The first lesson is to avoid cheap junk.

价值投资者喜欢物超所值的机会，但你必须能够区分优质低价股和劣质低价股。

Value investors love a good deal, but you must be able to differentiate between a good cheap deal and a bad cheap deal.

谢尔比在八十年代发现，许多企业之所以便宜，是因为它们很可能毫无发展前景。

Shelby learned in the eighties that many businesses deserved to be cheap because chances are they would just go nowhere.

谢尔比不看好困境反转股，因为它们的复苏往往比管理层声称的要漫长得多，而这些资本若投向别处，回报会好得多。

Shelby didn't like turnarounds because they often took much longer than management would claim, and the capital could be used much better elsewhere.

第二课是避免高价的卓越企业。

The second lesson is to avoid expensive greatness.

虽然谢尔比热爱优秀的企业，但他不愿为它们支付任何价格。

While Shelby loved great businesses, he wasn't willing to pay any price for them.

虽然一家高增长公司可能带来丰厚回报，但一旦增长放缓，投资者往往过度惩罚，因为他们最初假设的高增长期已经结束，便纷纷抛售。

While a great growth company can provide a great return, when growth falters, it's often punished excessively as investors who initially assumed a high growth rate sell out once they realize that the high growth rate period is now over.

第三是偏好定价适中、增长适度的公司。

Third is to prefer moderately priced, moderately growing companies.

这一点延续了上一课的逻辑。

Now the reason for this continues from that last lesson.

如果你投资的是增长适度的企业，其市盈率不太可能被过度推高或压低，而会与内在价值的增长保持同步。

If you have a business that's growing moderately, chances are the multiples won't be bid up or down too much or below the growth in intrinsic value.

因此，你的下行风险得到了良好保护。

So your downside is well protected.

如果企业业绩略超预期，你还能获得市盈率扩张的额外收益。

And if the business surprises slightly to the upside, you get the added benefit of multiple expansion.

第四课是等待合适的时机入场。

The fourth lesson is to wait for the right time to enter positions.

如果你分析大量公司，你会找到一些杰出的企业。

If you analyze a lot of companies, you're going to find some outstanding businesses.

但你也会发现一些定价已臻完美的企业。

But you're also going to find some businesses that are priced to perfection.

但市场是将财富从急躁者转移给耐心者的一个绝佳工具。

But the market is an excellent tool for transferring wealth from the inpatient to the patient.

让自己站在这一方的一种方法是，耐心等待绝佳的价格主动出现，而不是不顾股价高低就买入你喜欢的企业。

And one way to put yourself on the right side of that equation is to just wait for great prices to come to you rather than pulling the trigger on businesses that you like regardless of the share price.

第五课是押注卓越的管理层。

The fifth lesson is to bet on superior management.

戴维斯通过投资AIG的汉克·格林伯格获得了巨额回报。

Davis made a killing betting on Hank Greenberg at AIG.

谢尔比在英特尔的安迪·格鲁夫身上也做了同样的事。

Shelby did the same thing with Andy Grove at Intel.

所以，如果你发现了一些你觉得远超常人的高管，请密切关注他们的职业发展，因为他们一旦接管企业，可能会带来巨大的增长潜力。

So if you find some executives that you think are cut above the rest, follow their careers very closely because they may spark massive upside in a business once they take over.

第六个也是最后一个教训是：持有股票的时间越长，风险就越低。

And the sixth and final lesson here is that stocks are much less risky the longer you hold them.

许多节目的听众可能已经看过这张图表，展示了指数在一年、五年和二十年期间的波动情况。

Many listeners of the show have probably seen the chart showing the index's volatility over, you know, one year, five year, and twenty year periods.

你持有的时间越长，赚钱的可能性就越大。

The longer you hold the stocks, the more likely it is that you make money.

你持有的时间越短，亏钱的可能性就越高，因为短期内市场只是一个投票机。

The shorter you have them, the more likely you are to lose money simply because the market is a voting machine in the short term.

所以，无论你是投资股票还是ETF，最好的策略都是找到那些能够长期存在的企业，买入后静待其发展。

So whether you invest in stocks or ETFs, your best bet is to find businesses that will be around for a long time, buy them, and do nothing.

非常感谢你今天抽出时间与我交流。

Thank you so much for spending time with me today.

如果你想继续讨论，请在Twitter上关注我：irrational m r k t s，或在LinkedIn上与我联系。

If you'd like to continue the conversation, please follow me on Twitter at irrational m r k t s or connect with me on LinkedIn.

只需搜索凯尔·格里夫。

Just search for Kyle Grieve.

我始终欢迎反馈，请随时告诉我如何让这个播客更好地满足你的需求。

I'm always open to feedback, so please feel free to share how I can make this podcast even better for you.

感谢收听，下次再见。

Thanks for listening, and see you next time.

感谢收听《TIP》。

Thanks for listening to TIP.

请在您喜爱的播客应用中关注《我们研究亿万富翁》，并访问 investorspodcast.com 获取节目笔记和教育资源。

Follow We Study Billionaires on your favorite podcast app, and visit the investorspodcast.com for show notes and educational resources.

本播客仅用于信息和娱乐目的，不提供财务、投资、税务或法律建议。

This podcast is for informational and entertainment purposes only and does not provide financial, investment, tax, or legal advice.

内容为非个性化建议，未考虑您的目标、财务状况或需求。

The content is impersonal and does not consider your objectives, financial situation, or needs.

投资有风险，包括可能损失本金，过往表现不预示未来结果。

Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal, and past performance is not a guarantee of future results.

听众应在做出任何财务决策前自行进行研究并咨询合格的专业人士。

Listeners should do their own research and consult a qualified professional before making any financial decisions.

本节目中的任何内容均不构成购买或出售任何证券或其他金融产品的推荐或要约。

Nothing on this show is a recommendation or solicitation to buy or sell any security or other financial product.

主持人、嘉宾以及投资者播客网络可能持有节目中讨论的证券，并可能在任何时候未经通知而改变这些头寸。

Hosts, guests, and the Investors Podcast Network may hold positions in securities discussed and may change those positions at any time without notice.

提及任何第三方产品、服务或广告商均不构成背书，投资者播客网络不对它们所做的任何声明负责。

References to any third party products, services, or advertisers do not constitute endorsements, and The Investor's Podcast Network is not responsible for any claims made by them.

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Copyright by The Investor's Podcast Network.

保留所有权利。

All rights reserved.