#2 - 网络效应与 Anu Hariharan

嘿。

Hey.

我是克雷格·卡农，欢迎收听Y Combinator的播客。

This is Craig Cannon, and you're listening to Y Combinator's podcast.

今天我们邀请到的嘉宾是阿努·哈里哈兰。

Our guest today is Anu Hariharan.

阿努是YC Continuity的合伙人，这个基金专门帮助创始人把公司做大做强。

Anu's a partner at YC Continuity, which is an investment fund dedicated to supporting founders as they scale their companies.

在加入YC之前，阿努曾在安德森·霍洛维茨公司工作。

Prior to YC, Anu was at Andreessen Horowitz.

她当时主导了一项关于网络效应的深入研究，这正是我们本期要聊的主题。

And one thing she worked on there was a pretty extensive study on network effects, which is what we're gonna talk about in this episode.

好的。

Alright.

我们开始吧。

Here we go.

大家好。

Hey, everyone.

今天我们请到了安努·哈里哈兰，聊聊网络效应。

Today, we have Anu Hariharan, and we're gonna be talking about network effects.

安努，你是Y Combinator的合伙人，对吧？

So, Anu, you're a partner at YC.

能跟我们讲讲你的背景吗？

Would you mind giving us some background?

当然可以。

Sure.

很乐意分享。

Happy to.

我本科是电子工程专业，以前在圣地亚哥的高通工作。

I'm an electrical engineer by training and worked at Qualcomm in San Diego.

那是iPhone还没出现的时候，我们正在研究如何从底层到应用层全面实现移动视频流媒体。

This was the pre iPhone days when we were trying to design mobile video streaming all the way integrated to the stack.

在圣地亚哥的高通公司工作多年后，我去了商学院，后来在波士顿咨询公司待了一段时间。

After spending many years at Qualcomm in San Diego, I went to business school, worked at BCG for a bit.

在加入Y Combinator之前，我曾在安德森·霍洛维茨公司，专注于消费科技领域的投资。

And then prior to joining YC, I was at Andreessen Horowitz, focused on consumer tech investments.

因此，我有幸与许多优秀的Y Combinator公司合作，比如Instacart、Airbnb，还有几家其他公司。

So had the opportunity to work with a lot of great YC companies like Instacart, Airbnb, and a few others.

太棒了。

Awesome.

你还在安德森·霍洛维茨发布过一份关于网络效应的演示文稿，可以说你已经成了这方面的专家。

You also published this network effect deck at Andreessen Horowitz, so you've kind of become an expert in the field.

那我们先从 basics 开始吧，你能定义一下什么是网络效应吗？

So just to start out, can you define what a network effect is?

当然可以。

Sure.

简单来说，网络效应就是，使用产品或服务的人越多，对每个使用者来说价值就越大。

I think see, the the simple definition of network effect is basically as more users use the product or service, it's more valuable to the people using it.

举个简单的例子，比如 Facebook。

So simple example, Facebook.

朋友越多，Facebook 的网络就越强大，因为你作为用户更容易联系到更多人、互相发消息，对吧？

The more friends that join Facebook, the more powerful the network became because it was easier for you as a user to connect with more friends and exchange messages, You know?

现在你看新闻动态，会看到大量被分享的内容。

And now you see the news feed, and so you see a lot of content shared.

用户越多，Facebook 对现有用户来说也越有价值。

So the more users that join Facebook, the more powerful it is even for the existing user base.

不错。

Cool.

而且在这一领域，还有几个术语经常被提到。

And then there are there are a couple terms thrown around in that space as well.

比如病毒式传播和增长，你能分别解释一下吗？

So that virality and growth, could you define each of those as well?

可以。

Yes.

我觉得，如果你退一步看，人们常常把增长和网络效应搞混了。

I think see, I mean, I would if you take a step back, growth is what is confused with network network effect.

这确实很容易混淆，因为初创公司本来就是在快速增长。

I think and and it's very easy to confuse the two because when you are a start up, you're growing.

如果你的产品本身很有价值，用户增长就会特别快。

And if you're, if you have a really valuable product that provides inherent value, you're growing really fast.

于是大家就误以为，增长就等于网络效应。

And so what happens is that the common misconception is you think growth is equal to network.

但增长其实有多种形式，这时候病毒式传播就派上用场了。

And there are different forms of growth, and that's where virality comes into the picture.

我觉得病毒式传播讲的其实是增长的速度。

I think virality is actually about the speed of growth.

它跟产品本身的价值没关系。

It's not about the value.

那这两者到底有什么区别呢？

So what's the difference?

所以，可能是口碑传播。

So, you know, it could be, word-of-mouth.

比如Uber早期，人们从A点到B点，或者参加活动后，都会向其他人夸赞这项服务，因为比打车好上十倍，而且时间久了还更便宜。

So in the early days of Uber, for example, you know, when people took the right point to point or arrived at an event, they would rave about the service to other users because it was 10x better than using a taxi and, you know, over time became cheaper.

这就推动了口碑式的增长。

So that helped drive word-of-mouth growth.

所以病毒式增长往往指的是免费的增长，也就是不需要营销投入，因为你的产品比其他替代选项好太多了。

And so virality is often about free growth, meaning unpaid growth, which you can drive without marketing because your product is just much superior to the alternate option available.

而网络效应，讲的是价值。

Network effect, on the other hand, is about value.

这个网络能带来什么样的价值？

What does the network offer in terms of its value?

比如Facebook。

So, for example, Facebook.

在早期，你怎么判断它有没有网络效应呢？

The how would you know whether it had a network effect in the early days?

这其实讲的是使用频率，换句话说就是用户留存。

It really is about usage, which in other words translates to retention.

所以这跟增长是两回事。

So it's different from growth.

早期的Facebook，虽然增长速度很快，但跟现在的App比起来还算合理，毕竟那时候还是网页服务。他们的留存率在提升，也就是说，早期的日活跃用户占月活跃用户的比例，随着用户增多，这个比率一直在上升。

So in the early days of Facebook, even though they were growing quite fast, I would say reasonably fast when compared to apps today because it was first a web service, The retention improved, meaning if you looked at their daily actives to monthly actives in the early days, as they added more users, that percentage kept improving.

这种留存就是网络效应的标志，因为老用户更愿意频繁登录、更活跃，是因为服务变得更有价值了。

And so that retention is the sign of network effect because existing users were willing to log in more frequently and be more active because the service was more valuable.

对。

Mhmm.

明白了。

Okay.

懂了。

Gotcha.

那病毒式传播有什么好例子呢？比如一个人人都知道的、靠自发传播火起来的应用？

And so what's a good example of virality, like an app that everyone knows about that was viral?

我觉得现在很多应用都是靠病毒式传播的。

I think a lot of apps out there are viral.

你要问我，Facebook 早期的增长就是典型的病毒式传播。

You know, if you ask me, Facebook's early days were viral growth.

Airbnb 其实没那么强的病毒效应。

Air I mean, Airbnb didn't have as much virality.

不过他们确实有口碑传播，用户之间互相推荐。

I think they did have virality in the sense they had word-of-mouth growth.

但他们的产品本身并没有因为使用而自然扩散开来。

But the product itself didn't spread as an organic consequence of of its use.

让我来解释一下什么叫这个。

So let me define what that is.

你看 Facebook，为什么它能这么快增长？因为如果你是唯一一个用 Facebook 的人，那根本没什么用。

So, you know, if you look at Facebook, the I mean, the reason why it grew quite fast was because if you were one user on Facebook, it was not that useful.

对吧？

Right?

其实最早的时候，这个应用是为了查看在线学生名录推出的。

I mean, the early days, the app was launched to see the online student directory.

他们利用了哈佛的学生名录来推出Facebook，你知道的。

That's you know, they brought you know, they leveraged the Harvard directory to launch Facebook.

但除此之外，除非你那门课的所有同学都用了Facebook，否则它也没多大用处。

But beyond that, it wasn't as useful unless the entire class or the group of students taking that class was on Facebook.

所以你就开始邀请同班的其他朋友加入。

So therefore, you started inviting other friends who were in the same class.

因此，这个产品本身的设计就是为了让其他用户也能用得上。

And so the product itself was designed such that it was useful for other users.

Skype也是同样的道理。

Same with Skype.

对吧？

Right?

如果你要打Skype电话，另一边总得有个人才行。

If you wanted to place a Skype call, you needed someone on the other end.

所以这个产品是因为用户自然使用而慢慢扩散开的。

So the product spread as a result of organic consequence of its use.

至于Airbnb，我觉得它确实有病毒式增长，但那是靠口碑传播的。

And versus Airbnb, I think, did have viral growth, but it's word-of-mouth growth.

因为早期的Airbnb，其实就是把自家空房间租给陌生人住。

Because if you look at Airbnb in the early days, it was about renting a room in your house to other guests.

大家会主动聊这个，因为比起酒店，它更有温度，尤其是酒店全满的活动期间。

So you talked about it because it was less sterile than hotels, especially during events when the hotels were sold out.

价格比酒店便宜三成到八成。

It was 30% to 80% cheaper than hotels.

所以你会跟朋友提起，他们也就因此发现了这个平台。

So you talked about it to your friends, and therefore, they discovered it.

但用Airbnb的时候，你并不需要朋友也注册了才能用。

But to actually use Airbnb, you didn't need your other friends on the other end to actually use the app.

所以我觉得这两者是有区别的。

So I think there's a difference.

你知道，增长的方式其实有很多种。

And, you know, there are different forms of growth.

所以你得弄清楚，你的产品是不是因为使用本身就会自然带来增长，还是靠口碑、推荐这些免费的方式实现病毒式传播。

And so you need to understand whether your product has an organic consequence of its use because of which it tends to grow really fast versus word-of-mouth, referrals, anything unpaid attributes to viral growth.

对。

Mhmm.

那现在，你对创业者有什么建议？

And so at at this point, what do you recommend to founders?

人们是不是经常来找你，说我想在我的产品里打造网络效应？

I mean, are people approaching you, asking you, like, I wanna build a network effect into my product.

你一般会怎么建议他们？

What should I Like, what do you tell them?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得，如果你去问大多数创业者——哪怕那些做出了很棒产品的 founders——他们根本不会跟你谈网络效应或者病毒式增长这回事。

I think, you know, if you talk to most founders, even, founders that have built really amazing products, I don't think anyone would talk to you in the context of a network effect or viral growth.

但他们当初做产品决策时，决定让产品做什么，其实决定了他们如何聚焦于网络效应。

But the key decisions they took as to what their product should do will help inform how they focused on the network.

所以这个问题，创业者们一再问到。

So this keeps coming up repeatedly as a question from founders.

我总是会回过头去讲Facebook的例子，顺便也提一下WhatsApp。

And I always go back to the example of, you know, Facebook, Even I'll also touch upon WhatsApp as an example.

Facebook刚上线的时候，只在哈佛大学推出。

So when Facebook first launched, they launched in Howard.

结果特别受欢迎。

And it was quite a popular service.

他们完全可以在短时间内把服务扩展到其他很多大学。

They could have easily rolled it out to multiple universities pretty quickly.

但他们没有这么做。

But they didn't.

相反，他们采取了集中推进的策略。

They actually took a clustered approach.

他们这么做的原因是，早期他们希望确保至少有80%的哈佛学生在使用Facebook，大概60%到70%的人每天都会用。

And the reason for that was they wanted to make sure that, you know, if you ask the early days, they would say they wanted to make sure that 80, at least 80% of Howard students were using Facebook and, you know, maybe 60 or 70% were using it daily.

你可能会问，为什么这很重要？

You know, why is that important?

因为我觉得，如果早期不重视用户活跃度，就容易增长过快，反而把老用户丢掉了。

Because I think if you didn't focus on engagement in the early days, you could end up growing too quickly and lose your older user base.

这样一来，你就没法真正聚焦在能提升整个网络价值的产品和改进上。

And therefore, you're not really focusing on products or improvements that help the overall network.

反而可能只关注那些能短期拉新但没实质帮助的功能。

And you may end up focusing on features that help you grow in the interim.

我觉得Facebook做得特别好的一点，就是始终关注网络的生长，而不仅仅是用户数量的增长。

So I think one of the things Facebook did really well was always pay attention to how the network grew and not just the user grew.

事实上，根据他们在S1文件里公布的数字，早期的月环比增长和用户基数只有16%。

In fact, in the early days, based on the numbers they've quoted on the S1, if you look at their month on month growth and user base was 16%.

放在今天移动互联网的时代，你可能会觉得16%的月增长算不错，但谈不上惊艳，对吧？

In today's world in mobile, you might say 16% month on month growth is solid, not great, right?

但我觉得关键在于，随着用户增长，你是否真正为现有核心用户创造了内在价值？

But I think it's important to real, I mean, it's important to focus on, are you driving inherent value to your existing core users as you grow?

这其实就是衡量用户活跃度的标准。

And that's a measure of engagement.

以Airbnb为例，它的使用频率很低，对吧？

In the case of Airbnb, which is a low velocity use case, right?

人们一年可能就旅行一两次。

People don't travel as often, maybe once or twice a year.

那该怎么衡量这种使用情况呢？

How do you sort of measure that?

方法就是看每一批用户的预订量和复订率。

And the way to measure that is bookings and rebookings cohort after cohort.

Airbnb正是这么做的。

And Airbnb did that.

这才是真正检验用户是否真心喜欢你的标准。

That was a measure of, your customers really love you?

因为如果他们喜欢，就会回来更频繁地使用，还会尝试更多场景。

Because if they do, they will come back and use it more often and for more use cases.

所以我觉得，在早期阶段，尤其是产品开发初期，特别重要的是关注用户增长时的参与度有多强，现有用户愿意多大程度上更深入地使用你的服务。

And so I think focusing in the early days, especially as you build a product, it's very important to focus on as you grow, how strong your engagement is and how much are your existing users willing to use your service more and more.

现在你看到人们在做哪些有效的事情？

What are you seeing now that people are doing that's been effective?

我觉得这几年，尤其是在消费类应用领域，获客越来越难了。

I think these days, especially in recent years, would say, in consumer apps, it's become harder to find the distribution.

我觉得消费类应用需要考虑两个关键问题。

I think there are two challenges a consumer app should think of.

第一个是，我的入口在哪里？

One is, what is my entry point?

我该怎么把产品推出来？

How am I going to launch this thing?

第二个是，我该怎么把产品扩散出去？

And then two, how am I going to distribute this?

所以当你面对像 Facebook、Twitter 这样强大的社交网络时，如果你只是把产品作为一个功能推出，就会越来越难，因为这些平台本身已经拥有庞大的用户网络。

And so when you have powerful networks like Facebook, Twitter, it becomes harder and harder if you launch something as just a feature because these other platforms have the network.

因此你得想清楚自己的传播策略。

So you have to figure out what your distribution strategy is.

最近有一款应用特别火，叫 Musically，它其实最初是个教育类应用。

You know, one app that recently has gained a lot of traction is Musically, you know, and Musically actually pivoted from being an education app.

他们一开始是面向青少年推出的工具。

And they, you know, first launched as a tool among teens.

这个工具的核心功能是制作短视频，配合口型同步。

And the tool was creating short form lip sync videos.

他们提供的工具让青少年能轻松制作视频。

And the tools they provided made it really easy for teens to create videos.

做这个事儿特别有意思。

And it was a fun thing to do.

挺酷的。

It was cool.

于是大家就开始谈论它。

And so people talked about it.

突然间，学校里很多学生都开始用了。

And so suddenly, a lot of students in school started using it.

但在上线后的前十四个月左右，增长一直很缓慢。

But for the first fourteen months or so, even after they launched Musically, it was sort of a slow growth.

我觉得创始人亚历克斯也提到过这件事。

And I think the founder, Alex, has talked about this.

他们差点就没钱撑下去了。

They were almost about to run out of cash.

后来他们发现，很多Musically的视频被分享到了Instagram和Twitter上。

And then what they did is they realized that a lot of the Musically videos were being shared on Instagram and Twitter.

所以它实际上被当成了一个传播工具。

So it was being used as a tool.

为了更好地贴合用户群体，他们试了一招：把Logo做得更显眼，这样当视频在Instagram和Twitter上被转发时，大家就能认出是Musically，进而下载应用。

So to sort of shape it towards the community, one, they made one of the things they tried was to make their logo more prominent so that when it was shared on Instagram and Twitter, people knew about Musically and downloaded it.

当时有很多人制作对口型视频，但明显那些顶尖用户更突出，他们粉丝多、人气高，而且特别擅长拍这类对口型视频。

There were a lot of people created lip sync videos, but they were clearly top musers, the people who had a lot of fan base and following and were really good at creating these lip sync videos.

他们在应用里搞了个问答功能，让粉丝能跟他们互动。

They created a Q and A platform on the app for the followers to interact with them.

这样一来，就有一部分观众又被吸引回应用里了。

And so that helped shift some of their audience back into the app.

他们开始专注开发一些能促进应用内社区和社交网络的功能。

And they started focusing on features that helped create the community and network on the app itself.

现在说它会不会真变成一个社交网络还为时过早。

It's still early to say, you know, if it will become a network.

但我认为，至少他们已经尝试了这些方法来建立一个社区。

But I think these are some of the things they've tried to at least, know, form a community.

现在有更多用户会直接打开Musically了。

And now you have more users going directly to Musically.

那如果我刚起步，该怎么判断什么时候该开始把其他平台的人吸引过来呢？

And so how like, if I'm just getting started, how do I know that like, when is the time that I can start, you know, trying to pull people over from other platforms?

因为感觉在一定程度上，你确实可以借这些平台的流量起步。

Because it seems like you can, you know, piggyback onto these platforms to a certain extent.

但到了某个阶段，如果你想为自己的公司打造长期价值，就必须把用户沉淀到自己的社区里。

But at some point, to create lasting value for your company, you need to have people that, like, you have in your community.

完全没错。

Absolutely.

所以我觉得，这时候理解网络效应的定义就很关键了。

So I think so this is where the network effect definition is important.

我发现很多人都会在这个问题上搞不清楚。

I think, you know, people often say, oh, you know, this is where people get confused about.

也就是这个产品到底有没有形成网络效应？

Like, does this company or does the product have really a network effect or not?

要验证这点其实有两个很简单的判断方法，首先看入行门槛。

I think the two quick ways, to really test for that is barriers to entry.

这就是你的产品的核心竞争壁垒。

This is your competitive mode as a product.

还有用户退出的门槛。

And barriers to exit for the user.

我觉得第二个往往是大家忽略的。

I think the second one is the one people usually miss out on.

进入壁垒意味着你增长得特别快。

So barriers to entry means you are growing really fast.

你的产品本身就有价值。

Your product provides inherent value.

由于存在需求端的规模效应，别人很难一夜之间就破坏你的网络。

There are some, you know, demand side economies of scale because of which it's not easy for someone to come and disrupt your network overnight.

用户退出的门槛在于，你已经在这个网络里建立了牢固的联系，获得了大量价值，所以很难轻易换平台。

The barriers to exit for the user is, you know, you've you've built such strong connections, and you have a lot of value from this network that it's not easy for you to switch as a user.

举个简单的例子，Facebook 和 Google+。Google+ 其实做得挺方便，用圈子功能就能轻松导入所有联系人，复刻同样的社交图谱，甚至帮你整理好友关系。

So simple example, Facebook and Google plus You know, Google plus actually made it really easy with the Circles to, you know, import all your contacts, have the same graph, even so, you know, help break down your friends.

对吧？

Right?

有些人在Facebook上加了成千上万的好友。

Like, some people have thousands of friends on Facebook.

那你怎么把这些人分成紧密的小圈子，和那些偶尔联系一下的松散圈子呢？

And so how do you break it down into closed circles versus these circles you probably touch base every now and then and so on.

用户想换平台太难了，更别说公司自己想推动了。

But it was so hard users to switch, let alone what the companies tried.

作为Facebook用户，你根本舍不得换，因为你和这么多人都有联系，有这么多沟通记录。

As a Facebook user, you found it so hard to switch because you have all these connections, these communication, the communication that you've had with these users.

你的信息流也早就设置好了。

You have the newsfeed set up.

平台上你已经积累了很多东西、很多价值，换平台真的太难了。

There's a lot of things and a lot of value you're already deriving for the platform that it was absolutely hard for a user to switch.

所以，这些平台最后都会变成赢家通吃吗？

So, yeah, do these platforms end up being winner take all?

我觉得，只要你的业务有网络效应，就注定是赢家通吃。

I think network if you have if you're a business with network effects, you are a winner take all.

这实际上会帮你更容易成为那种赢家通吃的公司。

And it actually helps you tip towards becoming a, you know, winner take all businesses.

所以这也是为什么投资者有时候会关注：你的应用是不是一个用户非来不可的目的地？

And this is why one of the focuses, you know, sometimes investors look at is, is your app a destination app?

这说明用户想离开的门槛越来越高。

And that's a sign for barriers to exit for the user.

如果越来越多的用户直接打开你的应用，而且人均使用时间还在持续上升，那就说明用户离开的难度也在加大。

If more and more users are coming to your app directly and spending a lot of time and time spent per user is going up, that's a sign that the barriers to accept for the user is going up as well.

那像优步和Lyft现在这种情况，如果真是赢家通吃，会怎么样？

And so then what ends up happening with Uber and Lyft at this point, if it's one or take all?

对。

Yeah.

不过，打车服务在网路效应这个问题上一直挺有争议的。

So ride sharing has always been a little bit of a controversial topic in terms of network effects.

我觉得硅谷那边，甚至更广泛的圈子里，有一派观点认为它们的网络效应非常强。

And I think you have, you know, one school of thought in Silicon Valley and even a, you know, broader ecosystem who think that they have, you know, very strong network effects.

而另一些人则认为，它们并没有很强的网络效应。

And on the other spectrum of people, you have you know, they think that they don't have a strong network effect.

明白了。

Okay.

我个人觉得，关键是要具体分析每个产品做什么、提供什么服务，以及每家公司到底有什么护城河。

My personal view is, you know, every, you have to break it down in terms of what the product does, what service they offer, and what sort of moat each company offers.

我觉得，那种单纯的点对点网约车服务，网络效应其实并不强。

I tend to think that, you know, the basic point to point ride sharing service does not have a very strong network effect.

原因很简单，它就是从A点到B点的接送服务。

And the simple reason is it's a point to point right.

作为用户，除了把我从A地送到B地，它并没有给我带来其他额外的价值。

So as a writer, you know, as beyond taking me from point A to point B, I don't have any other value trapped in it.

如果另一个服务同样好，提供的价值也一样，那我就会愿意换。

So if there is another service that is, you know, equally that provides, you know, that is equally good and provides the same, you know, same value, then you are willing to switch.

所以对乘客来说，换平台的门槛并没有那么高。

So the barrier to exit for the rider is not as high.

那是不是说他们完全没有网络效应？

So does that mean they don't have any network effect?

这不对。

That's not true.

我觉得如果按城市来看，他们确实有一点网络效应，但我觉得这种效应很弱。

I think that if you look in a city by city basis, they do have some form of network effect, but I think of it as a weak network effect.

那具体是指什么？

So what is that?

意思是，当平台上司机和乘客都很多的时候，对乘客来说，承诺就是叫车时间不超过五分钟。

Meaning, if you have many drivers and riders on the platform, for the rider, the promise is that the ETA is less than five minutes.

所以你很清楚，只要叫车，肯定能在五分钟内有司机来接你。

So you know for a fact that you are going to get a ride and that it's going to be a driver that's going to pick up in less than five minutes.

对司机来说，关键就是每小时能赚多少钱，对吧？

And for the driver, it's the dollar they make per hour, right?

但问题在于，除了这五分钟之外，就没有别的联系了。

But the problem is, beyond that five minutes, there's no other connection.

所以如果还有别的服务能在五分钟内把你送到，你就会愿意换。

So if there's another service that can provide you something in less than five minutes, you are willing to switch.

对吧？

Right?

而且你确实看到有人因为高峰期加价而换平台。

And you see people switching because of surge pricing every now and then.

不过话说回来，这种市场还能不能出现一家独大的情况？

However, having said that, can this still be a winner take all market?

我觉得那些具备规模经济、尤其是供给端规模经济的公司，依然能占据垄断地位。

I think that companies that have economies of scale, supply side economies of scale, can still have monopolistic share.

我觉得这就是目前网约车市场正在发生的事。

And that's what I think is playing out in the ride sharing market.

人们选择Uber或Lyft，主要是因为比出租车快十倍，而且更便宜。

So two reasons people use Uber or Lyft is 10 times better than taxi and cheaper than a taxi ride.

至于比出租车便宜这一点，我觉得正是规模经济起作用的地方。

Now, the cheaper than a taxi ride, I think this is where you see economies of scale.

平台上司机和乘客越多，Uber每单的成本就越低。

So the more drivers that are in the platform and the more riders that are in the platform, the cost of unit output that an Uber incurs is probably much lower.

很简单，因为平台需求大的时候，司机每小时跑的单子就更多。

Simply because, you know, if there is a lot of demand on the platform, then the drivers are doing more trips per hour.

所以司机每小时赚得更多，Uber也能给乘客提供更低的打车价格。

So, therefore, they make more dollars per hour, and therefore, Uber can, you know, charge less per ride for the rider.

所以现在看起来，大家好像都在拼命融资。

So right now, it's kind of like a race to, like, raise all the money, it seems like.

对。

Mhmm.

等自动驾驶汽车普及了，你觉得这会是一场争夺自动驾驶技术的竞赛吗？因为最终这能为这些公司带来网络效应。

When self driving cars happen, is it do you think it's a race to reach self driving cars because that unlocks the network effect ultimately for these companies?

然后他们就成为垄断者了？

And then they then they're the monopoly?

说实话，我觉得不一定要靠自动驾驶才能形成垄断。就目前的市场格局来看，谁先入局、谁执行得更好，谁就能凭借规模优势获得垄断地位。

I don't know if you need self driving to be a monopoly, to be honest, because I think that even in the current market dynamics, are seeing, you know, depending on the market who, you know, who was first to come or who has executed really well, has economies of scale because of which they'll have monopolistic share.

关键就在于司机的单均效率，这直接决定了成本，对吧？

Simply because I think driver the trip efficiency is a very key, metric to focus on because that drives cost, right?

你看现在冒出来这么多‘Uber式’的服务，但我认为Uber最有可能在这些领域胜出，因为他们在配送效率上没人比得上。

I mean, you've seen a lot of Uber for X services that have, sprung up, but I think that, you know, Uber might likely win most of the Uber for X services simply because, you know, they can drive delivery efficiency unlike no one.

如果司机每小时能跑两三单甚至四单，那每单的成本就会低到极致，根本没必要向乘客收那么高的费用。

And if they are able to do two or three trips or four trips an hour, then the cost per trip is so low that they don't have to charge the rider as much.

这样一来，他们就能把节省下来的成本让利给乘客。

And so they can pass on those savings to the rider.

这其实就是亚马逊自营模式的翻版。

So, I mean, this is exactly what Amazon first party was.

这根本不是什么新点子。

This is not new.

很多年前，亚马逊刚推出服务的时候，全是自营模式。

When Amazon launched their service many years ago, more than a decade ago, it was all first party.

自营的核心就是规模效应——共享仓库、共享物流。

And first party is all about economies of scale, shared warehouses, shared shipping.

他们把每件商品的配送成本大大降低了。

You know, they made the cost of delivery of each good a lot cheaper.

现在，他们有了一个庞大的交易平台。

Today, they have a, you know, a big marketplace.

所以他们同时具备了需求端和供给端的规模效应。

So they have both demand side and supply side economies of scale.

但亚马逊自营主要靠的是供给端的规模效应，却依然占据了垄断地位。

But Amazon first party is primarily supply side economies of scale, and yet they have monopolistic share.

我觉得人们有时候太过于关注网络效应，以为只有那一种才能赢者通吃。

So I think it's, you know, people tend to focus too much sometimes on network effects and think that's the only winner take all businesses.

我认为，那些供给端规模效应显著、运营难度大但执行得特别好的公司，也能获得很大的市场份额。

I think that, you know, companies with supply side economies of scale, especially which have huge operational challenges and who execute really well, can have an opportunistic share too.

那现在有没有哪些市场，很多人觉得是网络效应驱动的，但实际上网络效应并没有那么强？

And are there any other any other markets right now that you think many people consider it to be a network effect, but in reality, it's not that strong of a network effect?

我觉得按需服务是最有争议的，因为它的地域性太强了。

I think on demand has been the biggest debate, I think, because, you know, it's highly local.

即使在国家层面或全球范围内，也很难复制这种模式。

It's not easy to replicate it across even nationally or globally.

所以这些网络最终会怎么发展，还有待观察。

So it remains to be seen as to, you know, what you know, how these networks evolve.

它们确实都带来了一些价值，我并不是想低估它们的作用。

You know, each of them do provide some value, so I don't want to discount that they don't.

但它的影响力可能没像社交网络那么强。

But it may not be as strong as you saw in social networks.

那即时通讯市场呢？

So then what about messaging at the spot?

我知道你打算聊聊 WhatsApp。

Like, I know you you want to talk about WhatsApp a little bit.

对。

Uh-huh.

你觉得它们在美国还能继续增长吗？还是说那些大型国际玩家会进来，形成这里的网络效应？

Do you see them continuing to grow in The US, or do you see some of these, like, larger international players coming in and and having a network effect here?

我觉得即时通讯具有非常强的网络效应。

I think that messaging has a very strong network effect.

这其实归结于用户切换平台的门槛很低。

It goes back to the simple thing of barriers to exit for the user.

我用WhatsApp很久了，因为我家里很多人在印度。

I have been a WhatsApp user for very long because I have a lot of family in India.

这是最便宜的沟通方式，尤其当初它完美替代了短信。

So it is the cheapest form of communication, especially it was a great replacement for SMS.

他们最初在2009年推出时，其实是个状态更新功能。

They also had, I think in 2009, when they first launched, they launched it as a status feature.

不知道有多少人知道这一点，有多少读者了解这个背景。

I don't know how many of them know that, how many of the you know, readers know that.

它的初衷就是告诉别人：我在健身房，别打电话给我。

But it was literally a status feature to let others know that, hey, if I'm in the gym, don't call me.

或者我在开会，别来打扰。

Or I'm busy in a meeting, don't call me.

但那没火起来。

That didn't take off.

不过他们还是保留了状态功能。

But the things that I mean, they still have the status feature.

但我觉得，他们在状态功能上积累的经验，真正帮助他们转型成了一个聊天应用——那是最早一批直接用手机号和通讯录、不用用户名的应用之一。

But I think that things they learned in the status feature really helped them evolve towards a messaging application, meaning it was one of the first apps at the time that used phone number and address book, did not use a username.

现在回头看，好像理所当然就该这么干，但那时候可不是这样。

And it was very con today, it seems like, well, that's that's, you know, that's the way to go.

但在2009年，大多数应用都在搞用户注册，WhatsApp的做法完全反其道而行之。

But, in 2009, when most of them were all about creating user accounts, it was very contrary to how they approached the sign in process.

很多用户都建议他们改成注册账号，但他们没改，觉得既然用的是通讯录，你就该知道对方是谁。

And WhatsApp did not you know, quite a lot of the users asked them to change it to a user sign up, but they decided not to because they felt if you're leveraging the address book, you would know who that person is.

这我一直挺好奇的。

So that's something I always wonder.

那些看起来像‘增长黑客’的做法，真的能带来多少实际优势呢？

Like, are are all those things that could be considered, like, growth hacky type things, do they amount to, like, marginal gains?

或者你真的能通过这种方式，把这种特性融入产品，打造出一个强大的网络吗？

Or can you in fact build, like, a really powerful network with that in terms of, like, adding it to your product?

因为我觉得很多人最后做的东西根本不会有网络效应，却还总在不停地加这些小功能。

Because I I, yeah, I think a lot of people end up, like, creating thing that will never have a network effect and consistently trying to add these little things.

对。

Yeah.

所以我觉得归根结底还是那一点：只要你关注用户的参与度和留存率，自然就能判断出有没有网络效应。

So I think the most it comes back to the same point, which is if you pay attention to engagement, retention of your users, you will automatically know whether it's a network or not.

这是网络效应最明显的标志。

It is the single strongest sign of a network effect.

我觉得WhatsApp确实很在意这一点。

And I think WhatsApp did pay attention to that.

他们非常重视，虽然我不清楚他们具体用什么指标来衡量，但他们一直强调，核心用户是否还在持续使用产品。

They paid a lot of attention, you know, even though they, you know, I don't know the exact metric they used to sort of measure it, but they've, they talk about the fact that they always focused on did their core users continue to use the product?

如果是，又是怎么使用的？

And if so, how?

他们该怎么为用户创造更多价值呢？

And how can they sort of drive more value to the users?

事实上，这正是他们从状态功能转向聊天功能的原因之一。

And in fact, that's one of the reasons they moved from status to messaging.

我觉得大概在2009年不到六个月的时间里，他们推出了聊天功能，用户增长立刻大幅上升，因为这本质上是一种替代短信的方案。

I think within six months almost, by the 2009, they launched messaging and they saw a huge spike in growth because, you know, it was an alternate version of SMS.

最初是圣何塞的俄罗斯社群用来和国内家人联系，之后迅速在其他国际市场流行起来。

It started off with the Russian community in San Jose communicating with their family in Russia, and then it took off in other international markets.

到了2009年，他们又推出了彩信，也就是分享照片和视频的功能。

By the 2009, they launched MMS, you know, basically a way to share photos and videos.

那时候发照片或视频的费用太高了。

It was too expensive to share a photo or video at the time.

这个功能成了分享照片和视频的绝佳平台。

And this became a great platform to share, you know, photos and videos.

于是，这个应用就这样开始迅速扩大用户规模。

So all of now you have this app that started growing their user base.

但现有的用户开始用它来做更多事情，不只是发短信。

But users, existing users, started using it for more things than just SMS.

他们的产品功能也跟着这个方向走，也就是在扩大用户群的同时，我有没有为用户创造更多价值？

And their product features sort of went along that, which is am I driving more value to my users as I'm growing my user base?

随着连接越来越多，人们能接触到的用户也更广了。

And with more connections, people were able to connect with more users.

他们的网络效应非常强，因为用户退出的门槛其实很高。

And they have a very strong network effect simply because the barrier to the for the to exit for the user is really high.

作为用户，我和家人所有的聊天记录、照片和视频都在这儿，换另一个App真的挺麻烦的。

I, as a user, have all my communication with my family photos exchanged and videos, it's not easy for me to jump to another messaging app.

那你怎么看这些国际短信应用的发展？它们现在规模都大得惊人。

So how do you see this playing out with, like, all of these international messaging apps becoming I mean, they're just massive.

是每个应用只在某一个国家占主导，最后就这样分地盘吗？

Do they dominate in one country and that's how it plays out ultimately?

还是说最终会有一个应用成为真正的全球通用平台？

Or will one eventually, like, be the one international?

是的

Yeah.

我觉得任何具有强大网络效应的应用，都不可能在一夜之间被颠覆。

I think that any app that has a very strong network effect, it's very difficult to disrupt them overnight.

这也是为什么公司都愿意花力气构建网络，因为这真的不容易。

This is another reason why companies tend to focus on building a network because it's not easy.

就算你没做什么特别的事，要一夜之间打破这样的网络也几乎不可能。

Even if you don't do much, it would be very hard to disrupt that network overnight.

WhatsApp 在印度已经有了非常稳固的市场地位。

And so, you know, WhatsApp has a very strong foothold in India.

微信在中国也占据了绝对主导的地位。

WeChat has a very strong foothold in China.

所以，如果你的网络足够强，用户在里面花的时间多、获得的价值大，那最终很可能出现几个主要玩家，而不是只有一个。

So, you know, if you have a strong network and people tend to spend more time and have more value from that network, I think you will end up seeing a few players rather than one.

所以

So

如果你是个创始人，正在打造一个网络，那你该问自己什么问题？

if I'm a founder and I I am building a network, what question should I be asking myself?

是的。

Yeah.

我觉得首先你应该退一步想想：你到底是在做网络、市场平台，还是平台型产品？

So I think that the first thing I would say is you should probably take a step back and see, are you a network or a marketplace or a platform?

弄清楚这三者的区别很重要，不用搞得特别学术。

And I think it's important to understand these three, not to be super academic about it.

但你必须搞清楚自己属于哪一种，因为不同类型的业务，你该问的问题完全不同。

But the reason why you have to understand whether you're one of those three is because the questions you ask are really different depending on who you are.

网络，比如说Facebook或者WhatsApp，我就把它们归为网络。

And a network is basically, I consider Facebook a network or WhatsApp a network.

它是一群相互连接的用户，大家在分享信息，而你的产品要不断增值，随着网络扩大，价值也跟着提升。

It's a group of connected users and you're sharing information and you're trying to your product adds value and is trying to increase the value as the network grows.

市场平台则是由两类不同的人群组成的。

A marketplace is two heterogeneous sites.

你有两个不同的群体，比如 eBay 就是个典型的交易平台。

So you have two sites, you know, think of eBay as a marketplace.

一边是卖家，一边是买家。

You have sellers and buyers.

再比如 Airbnb，有房主，也有住客。

Think of Airbnb, you have hosts and guests.

所以，如果你做的是平台，你该问的问题跟做网络完全不同。

And so the question you would ask if you're marketplace are different from what you would be a network.

而平台是第三种类型，用户和开发者共同构成平台。

And platform is the third component, which is you have users and developers and a platform.

你可以这么理解：用户和开发者这两方都在一起推动平台的成长。

And so think of it as, you know, where both groups, users and developers, help build the platform.

它能通过编程实现定制化功能。

It can be programmatic, customized.

而且，这两方彼此强化，互相提升价值。

But, you know, each group reinforces the value of each other.

那谁是个很好的例子呢？

And who's a good example of that?

微软的操作系统就是一个平台。

You know, Microsoft operating system is a platform.

我觉得微信正在慢慢变成一个平台。

I think WeChat is evolving into a platform.

Facebook 也是一个平台。

Facebook is a platform.

你知道的。

You know.

有趣的是，随着时间推移，你完全可以同时具备这三种身份，对吧？

And the interesting thing is you could be all three over time, right?

你会看到不同的公司走这条路。

And you will see different companies do that.

但你从哪里开始很重要，因为这决定了你接下来会提出哪些问题。

But where you start is important because then the questions you ask are depending on where you start.

所以如果你做的是网络型产品，我觉得你最该问自己的问题是：你的进入策略是什么？

So if you're a network, I think that, you know, the number one question you have to ask yourself is what is your entry strategy?

而且我觉得，进入策略本身也在不断变化。

And I think the entry strategy is changing over time.

以前，在Facebook或者WhatsApp还没兴起的时候，大家普遍采用的是集中突破的方式。

Before, you know, the Facebook or WhatsApp days, it was a very clustered approach.

我仍然觉得集中突破的方式是有效的。

I still think a clustered approach works.

但问题是，该从硅谷入手，还是从硅谷以外的地方开始，这还存在争议。

But is it Silicon Valley or outside of Silicon Valley is a question up for debate.

接下来，一旦你定了进入策略，就得考虑怎么从那里开始扩张，对吧？

And then this, you know, so once you have an entry strategy, you have to think about how do I grow from there, right?

因为在YC，或者整个创业生态里，大家总强调创始人要专注增长，是因为如果你的产品已经显现出网络效应的苗头，那唯一能筑起护城河的办法就是快速扩张——你必须达到那个临界规模。

Because, you know, the reason why both, you know, at YC or even outside in the ecosystem, people ask founders to really focus on growth is if you have if you are a product with early signs of network effect, the only way you build a moat is by growing because you have to get that critical mass.

对吧？

Right?

所以增长是第二重要的事。

So growth is the second most important thing.

第三点呢，就是那个促使用户参与的触发点是什么？

The third is, you know, what is that engagement trigger?

你知道，Facebook 早期就发现了这一点：如果新用户在十四天内能和十个朋友建立连接，他们的留存率会高很多。

You know, this is something that Facebook sort of established in the early days, which was, you know, if you are a new user to the platform, if I could connect you to 10 friends within fourteen days, the retention was much higher.

我觉得，任何做网络型产品的企业，都必须特别关注这个触发点是什么。

And I think it's more important for any company that's building a network to really focus on what that trigger might be.

你可能需要一些时间，加上大量数据，才能真正搞清楚它到底是什么。

You may need some time and a lot of data before you understand what it is.

但留意那个能制造关键时刻的触发点，非常重要。

But paying attention to what is the trigger that sort of creates that moment is important.

还有参与度。

And engagement.

归根结底，还是得回到参与度上来。

It always keeps coming back to engagement.